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POST OFFICE LTD — CASE REVIEW
R. V. NICOLA GRECH
Shrewsbury Crown Court
Offence
1. Nicola GRECH faces two charges of theft, the first alleging that between the 10"
December 2011 and the 11" day of June 2012 she stole £625.40; the second alleging
that between 10" day of December 2011 and the 16" day of July 2012 she stole
£3000.00; both offences relating to the from the Brookside sub-Post Office in Telford.
Case history
2. The defendant appeared before the Telford Magistrates Court on 18" June 2013. She
indicated that she would contest the allegations and the Magistrates deemed the case
unsuitable for summary trial. The case was then sent to the Shrewsbury Crown Court
for a Preliminary Hearing, to take place on the 24" June 2013. Because the defendant
had then failed to secure any Legal Aid the matter was adjourned to enable her to do
so. The defendant did however indicate that she intended to contest the matters.
3. The matter is next listed to come before the court for a Pleas and Case Management
Hearing at Shrewsbury Crown Court on the 2" September 2013.
4. Consequently the case is next to return to court on the 2" September 2013.
Prosecution case
5. Nicola GRECH was the manager/clerk in charge at the Brookside sub-Post Office in
Telford.
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6. Routine systems analysis revealed that there was a high level of utility bill reversals
being conducted under Ms. Grech’s Horizon User ID. There had also been complaints
from customers that utility and other bills, paid through the Brookside Office, were
not being credited to the relevant accounts, even where those customers were able to
produce a Horizon receipt as proof of payment.
7. The initial investigation report indicated 21 such transactions for which complaints
had been received, which amounting to £610.40, 16 of which were supported by
Horizon receipts retained by customers.
8. Further complaints were then received, detailing some 13 A4 pages of similar
transactions, all reversed under Ms. Grech’s Horizon User ID, to an approximate
value of £3000.
9. Ms. Grech was interviewed about these matters, the interviews being conducted under
the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the relevant Codes
of Practice. In a series of very lengthy interviews the defendant said:
— Denied any wrong doing.
— She sought to cast suspicion on individual junior members of staff. These she
blamed for making repeated mistakes which she in turn had to sort out.
~ She said that her password was common knowledge: she leaves it under her
date stamp pad or keyboard “...for others to use...” Accordingly others were
able to carry out transactions, including these reversals, utilising her identity.
— Sometimes she would help out in the shop and forget to log-out of Horizon or
lock her till. Others could then conduct transactions with her Log-in.
— On occasions she would be off the premises for lengthy periods and forget to
log-out. When she returned she would see another member of staff using her
till and Log in.
— She claimed that customers were repeatedly paying their bills and then saying
they had made a mistake and requesting their money back. This could happen
sometimes up to twice daily. Once when this had occurred she had called the
Help Line and was told that it was up to the discretion of the office to reverse.
In these circumstances Customer mistakes had not occurred very often but
since a particular member of staff had joined they had occurred more
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frequently. She had told the sub-postmaster that if he did not get rid of the
staff-member she, NG would leave.
— A number of reversals had occurred when she was on holiday in Malta.
— Sometimes she had conducted reversals for customers but had neglected to
obtain the original Horizon transaction receipt.
— She stated that a number of reversed transactions related to British Gas regular
payment card holders and there was an issue with the account numbers being
changed.
— When challenged that this explanation did not make sense as the reversals
were all being carried out on the same day, often only minutes apart, she was
unable to offer any further explanation.
10. The defendant makes no reference at all to any Horizon problem, nor to any training
issues.
Defence case
11. At As set out in her interview: she had taken no money from POL. She could explain
the shortages by reference to a number of factors, including: other staff making
repeated mistakes which she had to correct; utility company’s own accounting
systems being at fault; and customers seeking to reverse their own transactions to
obtain refunds.
12. No Defence Statement has yet been served; the court has directed that one be served
by the 19" August 2013.
Prosecution response to defence
13. None as yet: awaiting service of a Defence Statement.
Discussion
14. Because this matter has not yet reached the trial stage, it is not, and cannot be, the
purpose of this review to determine the merits or otherwise of the defence case, not
least because we have yet to receive a Defence Statement. Our only task at this stage
is to determine whether or not we are required by our disclosure duty to serve the
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Second Sight Interim report and the Helen ROSE report. Here the defendant has
sought to offer numerous explanations for her conduct: importantly she accepts that
she conducted many reversals and seeks to blame others for similar conduct. In those
circumstances she is not seeking to criticise Horizon; rather she is seeking to justify
that which she admits to having done i.e. the conducting of numerous reversals.
Accordingly I advise that. At this stage of the case. These reports should NOT be
disclosed to the defence.
15. The only note of caution I would sound is in relation to the Helen Rose report. That
report deals specifically with Horizon reversal transactions and identifies NOT a
Horizon defect but a Horizon data presentation issue. The conclusion of the report
amounts to this: that Horizon ARQ spreadsheets are not specific enough in identifying
whether a reversal is system-generated (e.g. Recovery) or manual, although such
information may be easily obtained from the underlying logs. Helen Rose concludes
her report with a recommendation that the ARQ spreadsheets have inserted into them
a further column so as to permit this distinction to be made.
16.1 advise therefore that the underlying logs used to extract the standard ARQ
spreadsheet be examined to determine whether or not any of these reversals are
system-generated or manual. I suspect that almost all will be manual, given this
defendant’s comments in interview.
17. Once we have the information indicated in the preceding paragraph, and a Defence
Statement, we can then determine whether the Second Sight Interim report and the
Helen Rose report are to be disclosed — if there remains no credible attack on Horizon
and the vast majority of reversals are manual then there can be no disclosure. It serves
to recall the test for disclosure: we are required to disclose material to the defence
where that material “...might reasonably be considered capable of
undermining the case for the prosecution ...or of assisting the case for the
accused....” If matters remain as they are then that test is not met with either report.
Conclusion
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18. This case should be permitted to continue. There are no Horizon issues and the
defence has not attacked Horizon. Neither the Second Sight Interim report nor the
Helen Rose report is to be disclosed.
Simon Clarke 23 July 2013
Barrister
Cartwright King Solicitors