POL00028554 - Email from Graeme Seedall, POCL, to David Smith, POCL, re Brief on Reference Data Issues relating to AI 376 (Lack of Data Integrity on the Data Stream Across the TIP Interface), 18 Nov 1999

Evidence on official site

18 NOV 1999
-2224.
Electronic memo
‘
To David X Smith/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE
cc John Meagher/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Keith K

Baines/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Min
Burdett/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Keith
Falconer/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE
Hard Copy To
Hard Copy cc

From Graeme Seedall/POCL/POSTOFFICE

Date 18/11/99 17:22

Subject Brief on Reference Data issues relating to Al 376
Dave,

I was asked to:

1, Describe the 3 root causes that Pathway concede will not be detected by the current design

for the EPOSS/TIP reconciliation feature.

Taking this into account, describe the predicted risk to POCL of going live with this feature.

Discuss this predicted state with Keith Falconer and gather his views on the acceptability of

this state. .

Describe the additional criteria that might be stipulated to allow Keith's ruling to be upheld

and yet support roll out .

5. Provide a brief to defend against Pathway's assertion that "Reference data issues are all
POCL's fault".

P 9p

Points 1 -3 were addressed in my previous e- mail to Keith (copied to you). Points 4 & 5 are
incorporated into the attached briefing paper which Keith has approved and which I hope will be
suitable for Dave Miller. However you may wish to compare it first to Keith's own words
contained in an e-mail which I have separately forwarded to you.

Regards, .

Graeme

Business Integrity Manager -
TMT

Post Office Network

Post Line:

Refdatabrief.

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Summary Brief on Reference Data Issues in relation to Acceptance Incident 376

Pathway assert that the end-to-end reference data process is broken and constitutes significant threat to
the roll out programme and to POCL and Pathway business aspirations .

The reference data issues that Pathway allude to fall into two broad families:

(i) Issues relating to

=> original data quality (such as incorrect outlet-product profiles, incorrect cash account types etc.)

=> transfer protocols (such as empty or incomplete files, invalid headers, ‘no change” changes etc.)

=> higher volumes than design assumptions which were based on POCL forecasts (such as correction
files, standard changes, bespoke outlet-product relationships etc.)

=> an operational need for tighter processing time scales than anticipated (for example as driven by the
roll out schedule, or aggressive future dating of changes)

(ii) Issues relating initial or changed data where the downstream impact of that data corrupts the

integrity of the core processes (such as accounting) supported by the application software..

The first family does not directly impact on downstream data integrity. The risks are mainly on
Pathway and generally relate to the sizing of their system infrastructure or data maintenance processes
and the cost of increase. These should be considered as outside of the scope of Acceptance Incident
376 or Contractual Acceptance as a whole.

The second family however places risk mainly on POCL core processes such as outlet accounting and
downstream central accounting and client reconciliation and settlement.

A case study is provided by PinICL 990930051 which relates to a change made to product 196/197
(Giro change giving) in September 1999

TIP personnel requested the Reference data team to make a change to the accounting sense of product
196 which was duly carried out.

The change is wholly allowable according to the rules expressed at the interface and the business
intention was to correct an erroncous accounting sense.

Pathway identified that the change would Iead to a clearly unintended effect of “netting out” two
products intended to aggregate on to a line on the outlet cash account. They suppressed the change and
raised a PinICL querying the POCL intention. (This is not a formal process).

Queries of this type do not currently pass through formal incident & problem management processes
and in the ensuing delay in resolving the issue, further sets of changes were issued which led to
Pathway accidentally lifting the suppression of the change to product 196.

The effect was as Pathway had predicted resulting in c. 1050 errors produced by the TIP Cash Account
compare process over a period of 3 weeks. Under the clauses of CCN 560 this equates to c. £245k
penalties against Pathway. .

Pathway’s analysis of this problem has led them to conclude that it and others like it would not be
detected by the proposed EPOSS/TIP reconciliation feature.

The position maintained by Keith Falconer is that all errors on the outlet account data or the daily
transactional data streams must be detected within the Pathway domain. (i.e. it is not acceptable to have
an ongoing safety net within our domain that detects errors undetected at the point of transmission
over the interface.) Thus to accept the Pathway provided EPOSS/TIP reconciliation feature it must be
proven that the feature is capable of tracking all known (or potential?) errors.

Refdatabrief.doc 1 18/11/9919:43

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However, it is true that the reconciliation feature provides POCL with a significant amount of
protection which it does not currently have. Additionally there already exists a criteria stipulating a
stability level of less than or equal to 0.6% of outlet accounts processed by TIP to contain errors as a
prerequisite to roll out. If it can be shown that the risk of “catastrophic exception” to the expected TIP
interface stability norm can be reduced, through a package of measures, to a level whereby local
corruption may be encountered at an acceptably Jow level and that global or near global corruption is
rendered virtually non-existent, then our accounting process would be deemed acceptable.

On this basis the following steps are proposed prior to re-commencement of roll out:

=> The Reference Data interface agreement must be re-introduced, agreed and brought under contract
control.

=> Pathway must analyse all possible reference data changes in relation their impact on the target
application(s) and derive a set of rules which protects the applications from all unintended effects.

=> A robust management process is defined, agreed and brought under contract control to enforce this
set of rules.

=> A “reference data proving” test environment is created and maintained within the Pathway domain,
on which all reference data releases are subject to formal (jointly agreed) test.

=> All recommendations emerging from the joint end-to-end reference data process review Tactical
stage which relate directly to accounting integrity are implemented.

=> In principle agreement is reached on the deliverables and costs for the joint end-to-end reference
data process review: Strategic stage. To include as a minimum that...

=> The Pathway owned target applications are reviewed such that they are more resilient to reference
data changes and less reliant on protection mechanisms expressed in the above rule set.

=> The different approaches taken by the two organisations to accounting principles is reviewed and
harmonised where deemed appropriate.

Proposed Criteria for continuing roll out which relate to reference data:

Refdatabrief.doc 2 18/11/9919:43

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Version 0.5

Roll-out 2000 Criteria - Monitoring Report

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Update for 17 Nov Checkpoint Meeting

ee

Week Commencing 2110 -[ 28/10 I 4/it I 11/1 I Total I Red/Amber/
Green
‘Al 298/1 I The number of system stability incidents for the four week period 119 201.5 I 1125 433 Amber @
21/10 to 17/11 shall be less than 547.
24/9- 2i/0- I 28/10- I 4/ii- I 11/11- I Total’ I Red/Amber/
210 2710 __I 3/1 1o/i1__I 14/11 _I Average I Green
‘AI376/1 I The percentage of cash accounts containing discrepancies shall not 2.24% I 0.90% I 0.40% 16.05% I Red @
exceed 0.6%
‘A1376/2_I No cash account discrepancy will be as a result of a cause 0 0 0 0 Green [ )
previously reported to POCL as having been remedied
‘AI376/3_ I All new causes of cash account will be analysed and have a 4 1 20 rl @
rectification plan, submitted to POCL, within 10 days (Number
without analysis/rectification plan)
‘A1376/4 I The Accounting Integrity Control Release would have identified all 3 rt @
new Cash Account Discrepancies reported prior to 24" November
(number not identified) _
‘AI376/5 I Those elements of the Rectification Plan for AT376 which are On Green @
scheduled to be complete by 24/11 shall be complete Track
Week Commencing Total) I Red/Amber/
Average I Green
‘AI408/1 _ I Service Levels for answering Level 1&2 calls to the Help Desk is
met in at least four of the six weeks as follows:
a) 95% of first level calls to be resolved in $ minutes 97% I 95% I 96% I 96% _I 96% Green
b) 100% of first level calls to be resolved in 10 minutes 100% I 100% I 100% I 100% I 100% Green
©) 95% of second level calls to be resolved in 30 minutes 96% I 100% [99% I 99% I 100% Green
d) 100% of second level calls to be resolved in 45 minutes 98% I 100% I 100% I 100% I 100% Green
‘AI 408/2_ I Service Levels for answering 80% of calls to the Help Desk within 69% I 82% [82% I 66% I 72% Red
20 seconds is met in at least four of the six weeks
‘A1408/3_I Service Levels for cash account calls (no ring backs required) is 3% 1% 0% 0% 0% Aube @
met in at least four of the six weeks
‘A1408/4 I Service Levels for Cash Account repeat calls is met in at least four 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Gren @
of the six weeks
‘1408/5 _I Service Levels for 95% compliance on Cash Account call scripts is NA I 36% ‘I 70% Amber
met in at least four of the six weeks 24% { J
‘A1408/6 I The Contractor’s Horizon System Helpdesk Service shall provide No Data

first, second and third level Services as described in Schedule GO1

Anbe@®

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Version 0.5 Roll-out 2000 Criteria - Monitoring Report Update for 17 Nov Checkpoint Meeting

Issues:

Criteria Tssuc Actions Responsibility

lL AIL 298/1 Pathway dispute whether the Blue Screens (possibly Energis Pathway to respond to POCL’s clarification of position Pathway (John
switch fail) should be included (78 failures counted: 65 in CAP Dicks)

32 and 13 in CAP 33)

2. A1L376/4 Three out of the cight new causes would not have been See issue below.
identified by the Integrity Control release. This is Pathway’s
analysis - POCL unable to corroborate.

3. A1376/4 POCL have not had access to Pathway’s design documentation, I Pathway to consider whether POCL can have access to the Pathway (John
and so POCL will not be in a position to concur with Pathway’s I documents Dicks)
analysis.

4 AI 408/3 The method of reporting is in dispute. POCL believe that these I Pathway have agreed that their next report will show numbers I Pathway (Paul
should be reported as integers not percentages, and that if there Westfield)
are any incidents in the week, this is a failed week.

5. Al 408/3 During the week of the 18" October, Pathway report'a ring back I ATMs have discussed reason and agreed that the ring back on I Pathway (Paul
in the text of the report, but not in the Service Level table, the 18" October should not be included. Westield an

POCL (Dave
McLaughlin)

6 AI 408/5 The agreed method of measurement has not been followed and. I POCL and Pathway have discussed an alternative means of (to be determined)
may not be workable. monitoring based on a newly introduced HSH report showing

the sequence scripts were used for each call. As only two
weeks is left of the original monitoring period POCL and
Pathway now need to agree the duration of the new monitoring
process, Pathway’s initial view is 2 weeks, POCL’s initial
view is 6 weeks.

7. AI 408/6 POCL and Pathway have not agreed how this should be Provide documentary evidence to support position Pathway (Paul
measured. Westfield)

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