POL00098911 - Email from Mark Davies to Alwen Lyons, Paula Vennells and Martin Edwards re: JA meeting brief

Evidence on official site

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Message
From:

on behalf of
Sent:

To:

ce:

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

3 Martin Edwards!

I think it is too open and potentially defensive. I really feel we need to give him impression we are controlling
the process and I fear this looks a bit open ended and puts ball in his court.

M

Sent from my iPhone

On 3 Jul 2013, at 07:33, "Alwen Lyons"! “I wrote:

{ think her approach could work depends how open he will be. But the risk is he takes control and we
end up seeming defensive from the off

Thanks

Alwen

Alwen Lyons
fe :

Sent from Blackberry

From: Paula Vennells

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 06:26 AM
To: Martin Edwards; Mark R Davies

Cc: Alwen Lyons

Subject: Fwd: JA meeting brief

Hi see note below from Alice. I am not sure that this is hard hitting enough for the opener? Don't
want to go overboard as she is right to get him to open up. But I do think we should say that we
are seriously concerned. "Position with SS not where we would like it to be" could be too
Delphic? Or do you think JA will get it in one? P

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: Alice Perkins
Date: 3 July 2013 07.
To: "Alwen.lyong _

Ce: "paula.vennells¢ I
Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

As we are unlikely to have time for a pre-chat, can I suggest I open up by getting
him to talk so we can see for ourselves what he is thinking? eg

"Thanks for seeing us

Want to understand where you are coming from

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Hope we can continue to work collaboratively as we have done to date to get the
right resolution for spms and PO

Position with SS not where we would like it to be - interim report not complete
and what there is will be delivered v late for a meeting on Monday

Please share with us your thoughts about where we are and what happens next."
Are you OK with this?

oa Original Message -----

From: Alice Perkins

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 20130654 AM
To: 'Alwen.lyong GRO

Ce: 'paula.vennellst, GRO

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

I will be with you by 8 45 but not necessarily earlier.

Sent: Wednesday, Jul
To: Martin Edwards!
Ce: Alice P ; Paula Vennell

GRO

Susan

?; Mark R Davies

>; Rodric Williams
>; Simon Baker

Subject: ‘Re: JA meeting brief

I have copies for you both and will be at Portculis House at about 8.10 all being
well with trains

Thanks
Alwen

Alwen Lyons

On 3 Jul 2013, at 02:06, "Martin Edwards"
wrote:

Alice, Paula

With many thanks to Susan, Alwen, Mark and everyone else
involved, here's the briefing note for the meeting with JA (attached
as both a Word doc and PDF, and also pasted in the email below in

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case easier to read on blackberry. I think Alwen will try to bring
printed copies if she has time).

Also attaching a more detailed factual background brief in case
needed, which is what we're developing as our main fact base for
teference throughout this process. It includes details of the 4 cases
under review by SS in the interim report and also a summary of the
cases pertaining to JA and OL's constituencies.

I mentioned a website earlier which provides guidance on the
proper process for independent enquiries, including in relation to
‘Salmon letters' - have referenced the key read-across in the brief,
but here's the link if anyone wants to read up on this in more detail:

http://publicinquiries.org/holding a hearing/fairnmess to witnesses

Best wishes for the meeting,
Martin

Briefing for meeting with James Arbuthnot, 3 July 2013

[KEY OBJECTIVES AND POINTS TO COVER AT THE
MEETING Headline messages of reassurance: . We take sub-
postmasters' concerns very seriously which is why we set up
investigation in the first place. . No evidence of systemic failures
in the system. But does highlight some important lessons on wider
support processes. Many of these are historical issues which have
already been addressed, but we're determined to continue making
improvements (with input from a new user forum). . Important
this is seen in context - 6 million transactions per day across
11,800 branches. More transactions per second (1,500) than this
entire review. Inevitable that some issues will arise on a system of
this scale, the important thing is that they are handled

properly. Process and handling points: The Post Office is too
important to too many people for confidence to be undermined
unfairly. i. Gain an understanding of JA's intentions for media and
Parliamentary handling in relation to the report - emphasising
importance of an even-handed and proportionate approach which
doesn't undermine public confidence in the Post Office. ii.
Emphasise importance of drawing clear distinction between issues
with computer system versus our wider support systems. To date
no systemic problems found with computer - there can't be any

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confusion about this as otherwise would undermine customer and
spmr confidence in Horizon. iii. Reiterate the importance we
attach to this being a rigorous, credible and independent report, and
therefore we (and Fujitsu) will be checking carefully for factual
accuracy on Friday/over the weekend. Our expectation is that this
will enable the report to be shared on Monday, but very tight
turnaround so we'll need to re-consider timing in light of any
fundamental differences of understanding. iv. Explain we'd like
option to attend Monday's meeting as observers to ensure we have
accurate record (avoiding discrepancies which emerged from last
meeting). v. Propose that both sides share draft media statements
and agree factual Q&A. vi. Explain that we would like to work
with JFSA to progress remaining spot reviews and MP cases
(where there is adequate evidence), with the aim of taking on board
lessons learned as quickly as we can. We need to consider
carefully what role SS should play in that process. Reassurance on
JA's two points of concern/annoyance: . On prosecutions - since
start of SS investigation we have not pursued a criminal conviction
which relies solely on Horizon computer system evidence and we
have also put on hold civil recovery proceedings in certain cases
whilst we await final report. But we do still have duty to protect
public money in other cases. . On the two ‘exceptions’ - we
proactively disclosed to SS two systems exceptions (or ‘anomalies')
where spmrs’ accounts have been affected. Our internal and system
processes identified these cases, appropriate action has been taken
and they did not lead to any disciplinary action against spmrs. No
reason to believe this means there are other undiscovered issues.
(We are sorry this information was not passed onto you at an
earlier stage - if we had considered to materially change the
investigation we would have flagged it directly, but it doesn't).]

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SPEAKING NOTES

Introductory points:
Thank you for agreeing to meet us.

SS provided us with an update following your call with them
on Tuesday morning.

Following that, would like to discuss with you:

a) Communications around the report and media/parliamentary
handling

b) The approach to the report itself and Monday's meeting

c) The approach beyond next Monday to close down other
MPs' cases and learn lessons

But first point to reiterate is that we take this whole process
extremely seriously indeed. That is why we set up the independent
investigation in the first place. It is important we get to the truth
and learn lessons where appropriate.

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i) Communications around the report and media/parliamentary
handling

Would be useful to understand your plans for
communicating the report to the media and Parliament. (Second
Sight's read-out of your conversation gave us some areas for
concern.)

The single most important principle from our point of view
is that the report and the associated communications must be
rigorous and completed grounded in the facts. The Post Office is
too important a business to thousands of sub-postmasters and
millions of customers (and taxpayers) across the country for
confidence to be undermined unfairly.

From the SS update we have been made aware of the
potential for different interpretations on the definition of Horizon.
Whilst we both agree that the wider system is part of the review (as
defined in the ToR) we consider that the report and
communications should clearly distinguish between the 'computer
system' and the wider support processes.

From what we have been told by SS so far, there is no
evidence in the interim report to support any suggestion of
systemic failures with the Horizon system (and this is based on the
four "best" cases from all those under review).

If this is the case, important that point is communicated.
clearly given some of the original allegations against the system -
otherwise customer and agent confidence in the integrity of the
system could be fundamentally undermined.

This is not to belittle the importance of the overall user
experience for spmrs. It is essential that we continue to improve
our wider systems of support and training for agents, and we are
grateful for some of the additional insights generated by this
investigation to date. Many of these process issues are historical
and have already been rectified through improved guidance to staff
and training for spmrs - but where further changes need to be made
we will absolutely act on them. Will come back to how we propose
to engage JFSA and spmrs and identifying further process
improvements.

We're concerned to hear that you may have lined up an
interview with the BBC in advance of the report being shared.
Keen to understand your thinking here.

We will let you know our handling plan in relation to the
media, and share statements. We would be grateful if you were
able to do the same. You will appreciate the danger of the media
exaggerating the report and our need firmly to defend our
teputation.

ii) The approach to the report itself and Monday's meeting

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SS propose to share with us the draft report on Friday. We
will work urgently over the weekend to check for factual accuracy.

Clearly this issue has significant bearing on our main
supplier for Horizon, Fujitsu. They will therefore also be asked for
their views on the facts contained in the report before publication.

Our hope and expectation is that this fact checking and
consultation can be completed in time to allow the report to be
shared with MPs on Monday afternoon - but obviously an
extremely tight turnaround, so we will need to review the situation
on Monday. If there remain fundamental concerns around factual
points, it would be better for the report to be delayed rather than
misleading statements to be issued.

[If needed: none of this undermines the independence of the
SS investigation - on the contrary, our aim is to protect its
credibility and rigour. Also has parallels with the statutory process
for public enquiries - Inquiries Act 2005 recognises the need for
‘Salmon letters' to give appropriate warning to any person or
organisation about whom criticism could be inferred from an
enquiry.]

In terms of the meeting itself, we understand that the JFSA
and their lawyers will be in attendance alongside the invited MPs.
As both the commissioner and subject of the report, we would
appreciate it if you could also give us the option of sending
observer representatives. Most likely to involve one employee and
one external lawyer. Will help us to ensure we have a clear and
accurate read-out of the meeting and that we can follow-up on any
queries or action points as appropriate.

iii) The approach beyond next Monday to close down other MPs!
cases and learn lessons

Clearly we recognise that the interim report does not cover
all the cases put to Second Sight. We agreed on this approach and
we also recognise the need to complete the review of the other
cases put to Second Sight by the JFSA and MPs.

We'd like to work with JFSA to continue this work but we
do have concerns about the process. It has taken too long, and we
have to have regard for the appropriate use of public money.

Need to stress as well that, in Second Sight's view, in around
half of the cases from MPs there is insufficient evidence on which
to investigate, despite requests for further information to be
submitted.

So we suggest a refined approach for the remainder of the
cases. We want to set up a user group (chaired by CIO) which
would meet regularly to learn from experiences of spmrs and to
provide a forum for continual improvement.

We suggest that this would include JFSA and for the
immediate period the forum could (potentially) also include
Second Sight and have as its priority the completion of the reviews
of the cases put to it. This approach might be more effective than

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the process we have gone through, which you will accept has not
been perfect.

Once the cases put to us have been reviewed by the group
and a conclusion or conclusions reached, the forum would continue
as a structure through which we can continue to refine and improve
our processes.

We would hope that the JFSA would continue to be a part of
this, along with other interested parties such as the NFSP.

Additional point if needed

Depending on the tone of the meeting, it may be appropriate to
address head on JA's apparent annoyance at the issues around
prosecutions and the systems ‘exceptions’.

Current prosecutions

Since the start of the SS investigation we have not pursued a
criminal conviction which relies solely on Horizon computer
system evidence. We have also put on hold civil recovery
proceedings in certain cases whilst we await final report.

As you now, we also prepared an ‘immunity agreement’ with
the JFSA to provide reassurance to spmrs thinking of submitting
evidence to the process.

But in cases where it is clear that Horizon system isn't the
issue, we have a duty to take appropriate action to safeguard public
money. For criminal prosecutions we treat each matter on a case by
case basis, with a detailed investigation and legal review (generally
involving external lawyers).

Historical convictions

Nothing has emerged from the interim findings given to us
by SS which would point to specific convictions being unsafe.
Cases have been through the judicial process and the Court
considers all relevant evidence not just that relating to the Horizon
computer system.

In the event that any person considers that there has been a
miscarriage of justice they have the right to apply to the Court of
Appeal to have their conviction reviewed.

System exceptions

We know of two systems exceptions (anomalies) under the
current Horizon system where spmrs' accounts have been affected,
and both were voluntary communicated to SS (although not
directly related to the cases under review).

Key point to note is that in both cases our processes picked
up these issues, appropriate remedial action has been taken and
they did not lead to any disciplinary action against the affected
spmrs.

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Absolutely no reason to believe this means there are other
undiscovered issues.

We are sorry this information was not passed onto you at an
earlier stage - if we had considered these cases to materially
change the investigation we would have flagged them directly to
you, but in our firm view they don't.

Further detail on the two cases if required:

The "62 branches exception" - 3 years old at the time of
migrating branches from old Horizon the HNG:

o Affected 62 branches (13 Crowns; 12 Multiples; 37 Sub
postmasters)

o Sub-postmaster branch losses ranged from £115.60 down to 8p

0 Identified by Horizon's built-in checks and balances which are
designed to flag up these types of discrepancies. Appropriate
action taken to rectify issue.

o 17 sub-postmasters were adversely affected, i.e. had a loss
attribute to their branch.

o Sub-postmasters notified in March 2011 and (where
appropriate) reimbursed.

o Sub-postmasters who made a gain through the anomaly were
not asked to refund this.

The "14 branches exception"

o Financially impacted 14 branches (4 Crowns; 5 Multiples; 5
Sub-postmasters)

o Concerns an error where historic accounting entries in the
2010/11 financial year were replicated in accounts for 2011/12 and
2012/13, only showing up a year later.

o Raised by 2 sub postmasters affected by the exception.

o 1 sub postmasters and 4 multiple partners were adversely
affected, i.e. had a loss attribute to their branch.

o We suspended attempts to recover known losses from affected
sub-postmasters

o Letters to notified sub-postmasters will be sent out imminently

o The worst loss to a branch would have been £9,799.88. This
was one of the first cases notified, so no recovery action was
progressed. Other losses ranged from £113.14 down to a penny.

o Action underway to modify the system to prevent any repeat of
this exception

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Martin Edwards I Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive

Martin. Edwards
postoffice.co.uk<htt

/iwww.postoffice.co.uk/>

@postofficenews<http://www.twitter.com/postofficenews>

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<20130702 JA meeting brief.doc>
<20130702 JA meeting brief.pdf>

<20130703 Briefing Note re Second Sight Interim Report - 02 07
13 (2).pdf>

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