POL00098915 - Email from Martin Edwards to Paula Vennells, Alwen Lyons and others re: JA meeting brief

Evidence on official site

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Message

From: M

on behalf of .

Sent: 03/07/2013

To: Paula Vennelis!

cc: Al Susan Crichton
Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

I certainly don't think we can share the speaking note itself, but if you think he needs some of the messages
reiterated in writing immediately after the meeting we could turn into a follow-up letter.

Martin Edwards
Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive
Post Office

On 3 Jul 2013, at 07:40, "Paula Vennells" wrote:

Ignore the note below. just getting mixed up with mails : I'm sure there are plenty of good
reasons but let me ask anyway: could our two documents be shared with JA? They are so clear -
it might help his understanding . Paula

Sent from my iPad

On 3 Jul 2013, at 07:34, "Alwen Lyons)

I think her approach could work depends how open he will be. But the risk is he takes
control and we end up seeming defensive from the off

Thanks

Alwen

Sent from Blackberry

From: Paula Vennells

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 06:26 AM
To: Martin Edwards; Mark R Davies

Cc: Alwen Lyons

Subject: Fwd: JA meeting brief

Hi see note below from Alice. I am not sure that this is hard hitting enough for the
opener? Don't want to go overboard as she is right to get him to open up. But I do
think we should say that we are seriously concerned. "Position with SS not where
we would like it to be" could be too

Delphic? Or do you think JA will get it in one? P

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

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From: Alice Perkins GRO
Date: 3 July 2013 0
lwen.1

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

As we are unlikely to have time for a pre-chat, can I suggest I open
up by getting him to talk so we can see for ourselves what he is
thinking? eg

"Thanks for seeing us

Want to understand where you are coming from

Hope we can continue to work collaboratively as we have done to
date to get the right resolution for spms and PO

Position with SS not where we would like it to be - interim report
not complete and what there is will be delivered v late for a
meeting on Monday

Please share with us your thoughts about where we are and what
happens next."

Are you OK with this?

A

----- Original Message -----
From: Alice Perkins
Sent: We

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

I will be with you by 8 45 but not necessarily earlier.
A

----- Original Message
From: Alwen Lyons
Sent: Wednesday, Jul
To: Martin Edwards

; Susan Crichton

! Mark R Davies
‘Hugh Flemington
>: Rodric Williams
+; Simon Baker

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

Ihave copies for you both and will be at Portculis House at about
8.10 all being well with trains

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Thanks
Alwen

Alwen Lyons

On 3 Jul 2013, at 02:06, "Martin Edwards"
wrote:

Alice, Paula

With many thanks to Susan, Alwen, Mark and
everyone else involved, here's the briefing note for
the meeting with JA (attached as both a Word doc
and PDF, and also pasted in the email below in case
easier to read on blackberry. I think Alwen will try
to bring printed copies if she has time).

Also attaching a more detailed factual background
brief in case needed, which is what we're
developing as our main fact base for reference
throughout this process. It includes details of the 4
cases under review by SS in the interim report and
also a summary of the cases pertaining to JA and
OL's constituencies.

I mentioned a website earlier which provides
guidance on the proper process for independent
enquiries, including in relation to ‘Salmon letters' -
have referenced the key read-across in the brief, but
here's the link if anyone wants to read up on this in
more detail:

http://publicinquiries.org/holding a_hearing/fairnes
s_to_witnesses

Best wishes for the meeting,
Martin

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Briefing for meeting with James Arbuthnot, 3 July
2013

[KEY OBJECTIVES AND POINTS TO COVER
AT THE MEETING Headline messages of
reassurance: . We take sub-postmasters’ concerns
very seriously which is why we set up investigation
in the first place. . No evidence of systemic failures
in the system. But does highlight some important
lessons on wider support processes. Many of these
are historical issues which have already been
addressed, but we're determined to continue making
improvements (with input from a new user

forum). . Important this is seen in context - 6
million transactions per day across 11,800 branches.
More transactions per second (1,500) than this
entire review. Inevitable that some issues will arise
on a system of this scale, the important thing is that
they are handled properly. Process and handling
points: The Post Office is too important to too
many people for confidence to be undermined
unfairly. i. Gain an understanding of JA's intentions
for media and Parliamentary handling in relation to
the report - emphasising importance of an even-
handed and proportionate approach which doesn't
undermine public confidence in the Post Office. ii.
Emphasise importance of drawing clear distinction
between issues with computer system versus our
wider support systems. To date no systemic
problems found with computer - there can't be any
confusion about this as otherwise would undermine
customer and spmr confidence in Horizon. iii.
Reiterate the importance we attach to this being a
rigorous, credible and independent report, and
therefore we (and Fujitsu) will be checking
carefully for factual accuracy on Friday/over the
weekend. Our expectation is that this will enable the
report to be shared on Monday, but very tight
turnaround so we'll need to re-consider timing in
light of any fundamental differences of
understanding. iv. Explain we'd like option to
attend Monday's meeting as observers to ensure we
have accurate record (avoiding discrepancies which
emerged from last meeting). v. Propose that both
sides share draft media statements and agree factual
Q&A. vi. Explain that we would like to work with
JFSA to progress remaining spot reviews and MP
cases (where there is adequate evidence), with the
aim of taking on board lessons learned as quickly as
we can. We need to consider carefully what role SS
should play in that process. Reassurance on JA's

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two points of concern/annoyance: . On
prosecutions - since start of SS investigation we
have not pursued a criminal conviction which relies
solely on Horizon computer system evidence and
we have also put on hold civil recovery proceedings
in certain cases whilst we await final report. But we
do still have duty to protect public money in other
cases. . On the two 'exceptions' - we proactively
disclosed to SS two systems exceptions (or
‘anomalies') where spmrs' accounts have been
affected. Our internal and system processes
identified these cases, appropriate action has been
taken and they did not lead to any disciplinary
action against spmrs. No reason to believe this
means there are other undiscovered issues. (We are
sorry this information was not passed onto you at an
earlier stage - if we had considered to materially
change the investigation we would have flagged it
directly, but it doesn't).]

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SPEAKING NOTES

Introductory points:
Thank you for agreeing to meet us.

SS provided us with an update following your
call with them on Tuesday morning.

Following that, would like to discuss with
you:

a) Communications around the report and
media/parliamentary handling

b) The approach to the report itself and
Monday's meeting

c) The approach beyond next Monday to close
down other MPs' cases and learn lessons

But first point to reiterate is that we take this
whole process extremely seriously indeed. That is
why we set up the independent investigation in the
first place. It is important we get to the truth and
learn lessons where appropriate.

i) Communications around the report and
media/parliamentary handling

Would be useful to understand your plans for
communicating the report to the media and
Parliament. (Second Sight's read-out of your
conversation gave us some areas for concern.)

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The single most important principle from our
point of view is that the report and the associated
communications must be rigorous and completed
grounded in the facts. The Post Office is too
important a business to thousands of sub-
postmasters and millions of customers (and
taxpayers) across the country for confidence to be
undermined unfairly.

From the SS update we have been made
aware of the potential for different interpretations
on the definition of Horizon. Whilst we both agree
that the wider system is part of the review (as
defined in the ToR) we consider that the report and
communications should clearly distinguish between
the ‘computer system’ and the wider support
processes.

From what we have been told by SS so far,
there is no evidence in the interim report to support
any suggestion of systemic failures with the
Horizon system (and this is based on the four "best"
cases from all those under review).

If this is the case, important that point is
communicated clearly given some of the original
allegations against the system - otherwise customer
and agent confidence in the integrity of the system
could be fundamentally undermined.

This is not to belittle the importance of the
overall user experience for spmrs. It is essential that
we continue to improve our wider systems of
support and training for agents, and we are grateful
for some of the additional insights generated by this
investigation to date. Many of these process issues
are historical and have already been rectified
through improved guidance to staff and training for
spmrs - but where further changes need to be made
we will absolutely act on them. Will come back to
how we propose to engage JFSA and spmrs and
identifying further process improvements.

We're concerned to hear that you may have
lined up an interview with the BBC in advance of
the report being shared. Keen to understand your
thinking here.

We will let you know our handling plan in
relation to the media, and share statements. We
would be grateful if you were able to do the same.
You will appreciate the danger of the media
exaggerating the report and our need firmly to
defend our reputation.

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ii) The approach to the report itself and Monday's
meeting

SS propose to share with us the draft report
on Friday. We will work urgently over the weekend
to check for factual accuracy.

Clearly this issue has significant bearing on
our main supplier for Horizon, Fujitsu. They will
therefore also be asked for their views on the facts
contained in the report before publication.

Our hope and expectation is that this fact
checking and consultation can be completed in time
to allow the report to be shared with MPs on
Monday afternoon - but obviously an extremely
tight turnaround, so we will need to review the
situation on Monday. If there remain fundamental
concems around factual points, it would be better
for the report to be delayed rather than misleading
statements to be issued.

[If needed: none of this undermines the
independence of the SS investigation - on the
contrary, our aim is to protect its credibility and
rigour. Also has parallels with the statutory process
for public enquiries - Inquiries Act 2005 recognises
the need for 'Salmon letters' to give appropriate
warning to any person or organisation about whom
criticism could be inferred from an enquiry.]

In terms of the meeting itself, we understand
that the JFSA and their lawyers will be in
attendance alongside the invited MPs. As both the
commissioner and subject of the report, we would
appreciate it if you could also give us the option of
sending observer representatives. Most likely to
involve one employee and one external lawyer. Will
help us to ensure we have a clear and accurate read-
out of the meeting and that we can follow-up on any
queries or action points as appropriate.

iii) The approach beyond next Monday to close
down other MPs' cases and learn lessons

Clearly we recognise that the interim report
does not cover all the cases put to Second Sight. We
agreed on this approach and we also recognise the
need to complete the review of the other cases put
to Second Sight by the JFSA and MPs.

We'd like to work with JFSA to continue this
work but we do have concerns about the process. It
has taken too long, and we have to have regard for
the appropriate use of public money.

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Need to stress as well that, in Second Sight's
view, in around half of the cases from MPs there is
insufficient evidence on which to investigate,
despite requests for further information to be
submitted.

So we suggest a refined approach for the
remainder of the cases. We want to set up a user
group (chaired by CIO) which would meet regularly
to learn from experiences of spmrs and to provide a
forum for continual improvement.

We suggest that this would include JFSA and
for the immediate period the forum could
(potentially) also include Second Sight and have as
its priority the completion of the reviews of the
cases put to it. This approach might be more
effective than the process we have gone through,
which you will accept has not been perfect.

Once the cases put to us have been reviewed
by the group and a conclusion or conclusions
reached, the forum would continue as a structure
through which we can continue to refine and
improve our processes.

We would hope that the JFSA would
continue to be a part of this, along with other
interested parties such as the NFSP.

Additional point if needed

Depending on the tone of the meeting, it may be
appropriate to address head on JA's apparent
annoyance at the issues around prosecutions and the
systems ‘exceptions’.

Current prosecutions

Since the start of the SS investigation we
have not pursued a criminal conviction which relies
solely on Horizon computer system evidence. We
have also put on hold civil recovery proceedings in
certain cases whilst we await final report.

As you now, we also prepared an ‘immunity
agreement’ with the JFSA to provide reassurance to
spmrs thinking of submitting evidence to the
process.

But in cases where it is clear that Horizon
system isn't the issue, we have a duty to take
appropriate action to safeguard public money. For
criminal prosecutions we treat each matter on a case

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by case basis, with a detailed investigation and legal
review (generally involving external lawyers).

Historical convictions

Nothing has emerged from the interim
findings given to us by SS which would point to
specific convictions being unsafe. Cases have been
through the judicial process and the Court considers
all relevant evidence not just that relating to the
Horizon computer system.

In the event that any person considers that
there has been a miscarriage of justice they have the
right to apply to the Court of Appeal to have their
conviction reviewed.

System exceptions

We know of two systems exceptions
(anomalies) under the current Horizon system
where spmrs' accounts have been affected, and both
were voluntary communicated to SS (although not
directly related to the cases under review).

Key point to note is that in both cases our
processes picked up these issues, appropriate
remedial action has been taken and they did not lead
to any disciplinary action against the affected
spmrs.

Absolutely no reason to believe this means
there are other undiscovered issues.

We are sorry this information was not passed
onto you at an earlier stage - if we had considered
these cases to materially change the investigation
we would have flagged them directly to you, but in
our firm view they don't.

Further detail on the two cases if required:
The "62 branches exception" - 3 years old at

the time of migrating branches from old Horizon the
HNG:

o Affected 62 branches (13 Crowns; 12
Multiples; 37 Sub postmasters)

o Sub-postmaster branch losses ranged from
£115.60 down to 8p

0 Identified by Horizon's built-in checks and
balances which are designed to flag up these types
of discrepancies. Appropriate action taken to rectify
issue.

o 17 sub-postmasters were adversely affected, i.e.
had a loss attribute to their branch.

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o Sub-postmasters notified in March 2011 and
(where appropriate) reimbursed.

o Sub-postmasters who made a gain through the
anomaly were not asked to refund this.

The "14 branches exception"

o Financially impacted 14 branches (4 Crowns; 5
Multiples; 5 Sub-postmasters)

o Concerns an error where historic accounting
entries in the 2010/11 financial year were replicated
in accounts for 2011/12 and 2012/13, only showing
up a year later.

o Raised by 2 sub postmasters affected by the
exception.

o 1 sub postmasters and 4 multiple partners were
adversely affected, i.e. had a loss attribute to their
branch.

o We suspended attempts to recover known losses
from affected sub-postmasters

o Letters to notified sub-postmasters will be sent
out imminently

0 The worst loss to a branch would have been
£9,799.88. This was one of the first cases notified,
so no recovery action was progressed. Other losses
ranged from £113.14 down to a penny.

o Action underway to modify the system to
prevent any repeat of this exception

Martin Edwards I Chief of Staff to the Chief
Executive

postoffice.co.uk<http://www.postoffice.co.uk/>

@postofficenews<http://www.twitter.com/postoffic
enews>

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<20130702 JA meeting brief.doc>
<20130702 JA meeting brief.pdf>

<20130703 Briefing Note re Second Sight Interim
Report - 02 07 13 (2).pdf>

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