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R v Vreones, [1891] A Q.B. 360 (1891)
For educational use only
*360 The Queen v Vreones.
Ly] Positive/Neutral Judicial Consideration
Court
Crown Cases Reserved
Judgment Date
24 January 1891
Report Citation
[1891] I Q:B. 360
@BICLR
Crown Cases Reserved.
Lord Coleridge , C.J. , Pollock , B. , Stephen , Charles and Lawrance , JJ.
1891
Jan. 24.
Criminal Law—Indictable Misdemeanour—Attempt to pervert the Course of Justice—Preparing False Evidence to be used in
Arbitration.
The defendant was tried and convicted upon a count of an indictment alleging, in substance, that by the terms of a contract for
the purchase of a cargo of wheat, to be shipped by the sellers from a port in the Black Sea to the buyer at the port of Bristol,
it was provided that any dispute arising under the contract should be referred to two arbitrators, whose award should be final
and conclusive, and might, upon the application of either contracting party, be made a rule of Court in England; that the
defendant was appointed by the sellers to take samples of the cargo upon the arrival of the ship at Bristol; that such samples
were then taken, and placed in bags sealed with the seals of the buyer and seller of the cargo, in accordance with the custom
of merchants at the port, and for the purpose of being used as evidence before the arbitrators in case any arbitration was had
under the contract; that the defendant afterwards, intending to deceive the arbitrators to be appointed under the contract, and
wrongfully to make it appear to them that the bulk of the cargo was of better quality than it really was, so as to pervert the
due course of law and justice, unlawfully and designedly removed the contents of the sealed bags and altered their character,
and returned to the bags a quantity of wheat in a different condition, and altered in character and value, with intent thereby
to pass the same off as true and genuine samples of the bulk of the cargo, and that afterwards the defendant forwarded the
samples so altered to the London Com Trade Association, with intent that the same should be used as evidence before such
arbitrators, and thereby to injure and prejudice the buyer, and to pervert the due course of law and justice:-
Held, that the count stated an indictable misdemeanour at common law.
CASE stated by Denman, J., for the opinion of the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved.
At the Bristol Autumn Assizes, 1890, the defendant, Anastasios Wreonés, and his wife, Blanche Vreones, were tried before
Denman, J., upon an indictment containing four counts. The defendant was found guilty upon each count, and his wife was
acquitted.
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The first count of the indictment alleged that, before the commencement of the offence thereinafier mentioned, one Sidman
Thomas Stephens, on behalf of himself and others, trading under the name, style, and firm of Wait & James, at Bristol, had
entered into a contract with certain persons carrying on business under *36/ the name, style, and firm of D. S. Sevastopulo
& Co., for the purchase of a cargo of wheat then shipped, or about to be shipped, on board a vessel called the Whinfield , from
Novorrissisk in the Black Sea to the port of Bristol, which said contract then contained a provision that, in the event of a dispute
arising out of such contract, the same should be referred to two arbitrators, whose award should be conclusive and binding
upon all disputing parties, and might, upon application of either contracting party, be made a rule of any of the divisions of Her
Majesty's High Court of Justice in England; that the said ship Whinfield duly arrived at the said port of Bristol on March 15,
1890, with the said cargo of wheat, and it then became and was the custom of merchants using the said port to take from the
said cargo samples of the wheat as composing the bulk of the same cargo, and, for the purpose of using the said samples in the
event of a dispute between the buyer and the seller thereof as evidence as to the quality of the bulk of the said cargo in any
arbitration which might be taken under the terms of the said contract, to seal such samples with the seals of the buyer and seller
of such cargo, and forward the same so sealed and secured to the offices of the London Corn Trade Association, in 2, Lime Street
Square, in the city of London; and, upon any such arbitration as aforesaid, the said samples so sealed and secured as aforesaid
became and were evidence to be used before the arbitrators appointed to decide the question in dispute between the buyer and
seller of such cargo; that at the time of the commission of the offence thereinafter mentioned, one Anastasios Vreones was a
superintendent appointed by the said D, S. Sevastopulo & Co. to take samples of the said cargo, in accordance with the custom
in this count before mentioned, and on March 17, 1890, and on divers other days between that day and the day of the taking of
this inquisition, did so take such samples, to which samples the seals of the buyer and seller were duly affixed, in accordance
with the said custom, and the said sealed samples then became and were evidence to be used in accordance with the terms of
such contract upon any such arbitration as aforesaid; and that the said Anastasios Vreones and Blanche Vreones, having in their
possession divers, to wit, ninety bags, each containing *362 samples of the said cargo so taken from the said ship Whinfield
, as aforesaid, and duly sealed as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, on the said 17th day of March, in the year aforesaid, and on
divers other days and times between that day and the day of the taking of this inquisition, contriving and intending to deceive
the said arbitrators so to be appointed as aforesaid, and wrongfully to make it appear to the said arbitrators, and to cause and
induce such arbitrators to believe, that the bulk of the said cargo was of better quality than it in fact was, and by fraudulent and
deceitful means to cause and induce such arbitrators to give their award in favour of the said D. S. Sevastopulo & Co., so as
to pervert the due course of law and justice, unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly did take and remove from the said ninety
sealed sample bags the contents thereof, and unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly did alter the character of such contents, and
return to such sample bags a quantity of wheat in a different condition, and altered in character and value, with intent thereby
to pass the same off as true and genuine samples of the bulk of the said cargo; and, having so altered the character of such
samples, did forward the same to the said London Corn Trade Association in such altered condition, with the intent that the
same should be used before such arbitrators as aforesaid as such evidence as aforesaid, and thereby to injure and prejudice the
said Sidman Thomas Stephens and others, and by the means aforesaid to pervert the due course of law and justice, against the
peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.
The other three counts charged the defendants with unlawfully uttering the samples as false tokens, whereby Stephens and
others were defrauded and deprived of their just rights, and with unlawfully uttering them as false tokens, with intent to
defraud Stephens and others, and the arbitrators; but, as no judgment was given upon the second, third, and fourth counts, it
is unnecessary to set them out.
The following facts were proved at the trial, and stated in the case:—
On December 11, 1889, one Stephens, a corn merchant at Bristol, entered into a contract with one Sevastopulo for the purchase
of a cargo of wheat, to arrive by SS. Whinfield , consisting *363 in part of “Azina wheat about as per sample No. 10,” and in
part of “Azina wheat about as per sample ‘Rugby,’ both samples old crop sealed and in our possession.” About half the cargo
was to consist of each quality. The samples referred to in the contract were called the “standard” samples.
The contract contained the following clauses:—
“Difference in quality shall not entitle the buyer to reject except under the award of arbitrators, or the
committee of appeal, as the case may be. All disputes arising out of this contract, whether between
the parties hereto, or between one of them and the trustee in bankruptcy of the other, shall be referred
according to the rule endorsed. Power to either party to make this stipulation a rule of Court. Neither
party, nor any one claiming under them, to bring any action until dispute settled by arbitration, and
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it is expressly agreed that the obtaining an award from either tribunal, as the case may be, shall be
a condition precedent to the right of either contracting party to sue the other in respect of any claim
arising out of this contract.”
By rule 9, endorsed on the contract:
“When buyer requires arbitration on quality or/and condition upon samples previously drawn and
sealed, he shall make his claim and nominate his arbitrator within fourteen clear days of the final
discharge of the shipment.”
Rule 10 provided that “all disputes arising out of this contract shall be from time to time referred to two arbitrators, one to be
chosen by each party in difference, the two arbitrators having power to call in a third in case they shall deem it necessary.”
The rules further provided for the appointment of arbitrators in the cases of the neglect or refusal of one party to appoint an
arbitrator, or of the death, refusal to act, or incapacity of any one or more of the arbitrators, and in other contingencies. A right
of appeal was given to a committee of appeal appointed under the rules of the London Corn Trade Association, and various
conditions had to be performed by the parties to the contract in order to obtain an arbitration, or to appeal to the committee of
appeal from the decision of the arbitrators.
The standard samples were in this case as usual sealed by the sellers! broker in the presence of the buyer's broker, and kept by
*364 him; and on that being done, the money provided for by the contract was paid.
The Whinfield arrived on March 15, 1890, when, in accordance with the usual practice, a superintendent (in this case the
defendant, A. Vreones) was appointed by the seller, and one Brockman, the buyer's under-foreman, by the buyer, to take samples
of the wheat as it came up from the holds. It is unnecessary to describe the mode in which these samples are taken; but they
are taken for the purpose of being used as evidence in case any arbitration should take place as to the quality of the cargo, and
are called the “arbitration samples.”
In the present case ninety of these samples were taken - forty-five of each kind of wheat - and, in the ordinary course, sealed
by the defendant, as superintendent of the seller, and by the under-foreman of the buyer in the usual way, and at the same time
the buyer's under-foreman, Brockman, took samples for the buyer's use from the same bulk sample from which the samples
in these ninety bags were taken.
The fraud alleged in the indictment consisted in the fraudulent tampering with these arbitration samples after they were sealed
by both parties. It was proved at the trial that the whole of these ninety arbitration samples were taken to the house in which the
Vreones lodged before being sent to London to be kept by the London Corn Trade Association in order to be used in evidence
in case of a dispute arising which should be referred to arbitration.
It was proved that the prisoner Anastasios Vreones, sometimes when his wife was present, sometimes when alone, sometimes
through his wife, whom the jury acquitted as not being aware of any intention to defraud, tampered with these arbitration
samples by pulling down a portion of the tops of the bags through the string on the side opposite to the seal, then cleaning
the contents from cockles, rye, and small wheat by sifting, picking, and using flannel to which the cockles adhered, and in
replacing the wheat so cleaned in the bags without breaking the seals, so as to produce a very much better sample than the
standard samples, and than any of the other samples taken from the bulk. The motive suggested for this conduct was that in case
of any dispute arising *365 as to the quality of the cargo the purchaser might be defeated by the production of the samples
before any arbitrators who might be appointed.
No arbitrators were in fact appointed, nor did the purchaser take any steps in that direction, the reason assigned being that the
arbitration samples as altered having been found on comparison superior to the standard sample, and to all the samples fairly
taken by either or both parties, it would have been hopeless to proceed to arbitration.
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The evidence shewed that there was no substantial difference between the cargo and the standard sample so far as the wheat
No. 10 was concerned; but as regards the “Rugby” wheat it was proved that there was an inferiority which would amount to
112/. in value in that portion of the cargo as compared with the standard samples. The arbitration samples, as altered, shewed
wheat of a very superior quality to either the bulk or the standard samples of this portion of the cargo, and also, but not to the
same extent, as regards the wheat of quality No. 10.
At the end of the case for the prosecution it was urged by the counsel for Anastasios that the indictment ought to be quashed
upon the ground that it contained no charge for which an indictment for misdemeanour could be supported.
Denman, J., left the case to the jury, and, upon their finding a verdict of guilty against Anastasios Vreones, bound the defendant
over to come up for judgment when called upon.
The defendant's counsel moved in arrest of judgment in case that should be necessary.
The questions for the opinion of the Court were, with respect to the first count, whether it contained a statement of an indictable
misdemeanour, and whether there was evidence in support of it.
C. W. Mathews , for the defendant. The first count of the indictment states no criminal offence. There is no averment that the
evidence was ever tendered or used in any proceeding; nor that any legal proceeding was ever in existence in which it could be
used; nor that any Court or legal officer was in existence before whom it could be used. The averments shew *366 nothing
more than an intention by the defendant to deceive in future proceedings, if they should ever be had. There is no act stated
which is sufficiently proximate to the offence to make what the defendant did criminal. The defendant has done no more than
put himself in a position to commit a fraud upon the contingency occurring of a reference to arbitration as provided by the
contract. Under the rules endorsed upon the contract with respect to arbitration, various steps must be taken by the parties in
order that the right to refer may occur, and various things could be done by either party which would prevent the arbitration
being heard. In all the cases of indictments charging the manufacture or preferring of false evidence, the evidence has, in fact,
been used before a properly constituted Court. It is conceded that, if the tampering with the samples had been done by two or
more persons, an indictment against them for conspiracy would lie; but then the criminal offence is the agreement to bring about
an unlawful result by unlawful means. So in indictments for subornation of perjury, it is the act of suborning the other person
which is criminal. Rex v. Crossley is not against my contention, because a false oath was in fact taken, though the affidavit
was never used. The offence was in taking the false oath. Rex v. Heath? was decided on the same principle. The evidence given
at the trial was not sufficient to support the first count of the indictment.
Poole, O.C., (Bernard Coleridge , with him), for the Crown, was not heard.
LORD COLERIDGE, C.J.
The first count of the indictment in substance charges the defendant with the misdemeanour of attempting, by the manufacture
of false evidence, to mislead a judicial tribunal which might come into existence. If the act itself of the defendant was completed,
I cannot doubt that to manufacture false evidence for the purpose of misleading a judicial tribunal is a misdemeanour. Here,
in point of fact, no tribunal was misled, because the piece of evidence was not used; *367 but I am of opinion that that fact
makes no difference; it is none the less a misdemeanour although the evidence was not used. All that the defendant could do
to commit the offence he did. There was a contract for the sale of a cargo of wheat, and it provided a mode of settling by
arbitration possible disputes which might arise. The particular piece of evidence, namely, the samples of wheat placed in sealed
bags, would be, if not absolutely conclusive, of the greatest possible weight in determining any dispute as to the quality of the
wheat sold. The contract provided that difference in quality should not entitle the buyer to reject except under the award of.
arbitrators, or the committee of appeal, as the case might be; that all disputes arising out of the contract should be referred to
arbitration, and that where the buyer required arbitration on quality or condition upon samples previously drawn and sealed, he
should make his claim and nominate his arbitrator within fourteen days of the final discharge of the shipment. In accordance
with that stipulation samples were obtained, according to the usage, on behalf both of buyer and seller, and placed in sealed
bags, to be sent to London for the purpose of being used by the tribunal appointed, if the case went to arbitration, under the
contract. It was conceded by counsel for the defendant, and it is found in the case, that all that the defendant could do to tamper
with those samples and corrupt the evidence upon which the tribunal was to act he did. He interfered with the perfection of
the samples as samples, by making them shew a higher quality or condition of grain; and having done this in a most clever
and fraudulent manner, without breaking the seals of the bags, the samples were transmitted to the Corn Trade Association in
London, to be kept there, and used as evidence in the arbitration, in case an arbitration was held. They were not in fact so used;
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but I am of opinion that the defendant was none the less guilty of a punishable offence. I think that an attempt to pervert the
course of justice is in itself a punishable misdemeanour; and though I should myself have thought so on the grounds of sense
and reason, there is also plenty of authority to shew that it is a misdemeanour in point of law. There is, of course, no case in
which the facts are exactly like these; but in *368 Reg. v. Crossley? the principle which applies here was clearly laid down.
The defendant in that case was charged with making a false affidavit. Lawrence, J., pointed out that it would be absurd to make
the guilt of the defendant depend upon the subsequent use of the false affidavit, the defendant being equally guilty of perjury
though no use had been afterwards made of it. I agree that this case is not exactly the same. In Reg. v. Crossley , when the
false affidavit had been made, the defendant no doubt had completed the act which constituted the offence. Exactly the same
principle applies here, because the offence of the defendant was completed, so far as his act could complete it, when he sent to
London the samples which might or might not be used in the arbitration. I am, therefore, of opinion that the first count of the
indictment contains a perfectly good statement of an offence at law, and that there was ample evidence to support the charge.
It is not necessary to give any opinion upon the questions which are said to arise upon the other counts of the indictment. I am
of opinion, for the reasons which I have given, that the conviction should be affirmed.
POLLOCK, B.
[have come to the same conclusion. This is an indictment for a fraud or cheat at common law. If it had been charged as a cheat
against a private individual, I should have felt bound to give effect to the argument of the defendant's counsel. In cases where
a cheat or fraud against private individuals is charged, the two conditions - (1) that the act has been completed, and (2), that
there has been injury to the individual - are conditions precedent to the offence. But this is not the case of a private fraud. It is
an offence which comes within the description in East's Pleas of the Crown, c. 18, s. 4: “There is also another head of public
cheats indictable at common law, which are levelled against the public justice of the kingdom, such as the doing of judicial
acts without authority in the name of another”; and the author goes on to say: “There is a precedent of an indictment against
a married woman for pretending to be a widow, and as such executing a bail bond to the *369 sheriff for one arrested on
a bailable writ. This perhaps was considered as a fraud upon a public officer in the course of justice.” I am quite clear that
the condition precedent that there must be injury to the individual does not apply in the present case. It applies in cases of
cheating or defrauding private individuals, because otherwise a mere naked lie might constitute an offence. But very different
considerations apply to the class of cases in which the present is included. The real offence here is the doing of some act which
has a tendency and is intended to pervert the administration of public justice. The question is, whether the sending of these
adulterated samples, which by previous arrangement were to be sent to the association in London to be used by the arbitrators,
is such an act as I have described. I think that it was. I think that the arbitrators are to be considered as a tribunal administering
public justice. Such a tribunal is one specially sanctioned by Courts of law, and its decisions are enforced and carried out by
the Courts of law. I am of opinion that by tampering with the evidence which was to be laid before that tribunal the defendant
was interfering with the course of justice. I agree with my Lord that his act was completed.
STEPHEN, J.
1am of opinion that the conviction should be affirmed on the grounds stated by the Lord Chief Justice.
CHARLES, J. I am of the same opinion.
LAWRANCE, J. I entirely agree.
Representation
Solicitor for the Crown: The Solicitor to the Treasury . Solicitor for defendant: William Webb .
Conviction affirmed. (W. A. )
Footnotes
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R. v Vreones, [1891] 1 Q.B. 360 (1891)
7TR 31S.
Russ. & Ry. 184.
7T.R.315.
7TR 31S.
Rw
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