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Initial Report Template in a Serious Fraud
Request to Sheriff and Jury Functional Lead for authority to place accused on
petition for Fraud case
Report case
Case Information
MURTAZA RASUL
Accused
Reference Number GE13008494
Office Glasgow
PF Depute A Lazzarin
Fraud
Nature of Offence
Date of Offence
(1) between 13 April 2010 and 27 May 2010 (2) between
7 May 2010 and 2 June 2010 (3) between 24 June 2011
and 6 March 2012
Date of Report to
Functional Lead
25 July 2014 updated 21/8/14
Brief Narrative and Recommendations
Brief summary of the
facts of the case
including any
additional facts or
issues which require
clarification.
Between 8 June 2010 and 2 April 2012, three reports of
Fraud were made to Police, all of which were alleged to
have occurred at Carmyle Post Office. The complainers in
these incidents were elderly females who held Post Office
Accounts and conducted their withdrawals/transactions
utilising a withdrawal card and Personal Identification
Number. Each complainer had an amount of money
withdrawn from their Post Office Accounts without their
consent or knowledge. All complainers conducted their
associated business at Carmyle Post Office.
Charge 1
The complainer, I GRO. _ (87), was the holder of
Post Office Account N Prior to 13 April 2010,
the account balance was £17,114.81. It was later
established through interrogation of Post Office
statements relating to this account that between 13 April
2010 and 27 May 2010, 30 withdrawals of £600 (the
maximum daily withdrawal limit) had been taken from
the account.
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Through enquiries made by family members it was
established that 4 withdrawals of £600 were genuine
withdrawals. However, 26 transactions of £600 were
conducted without consent or knowledge of {-
GRO .. All transactions were apparently carried out using
relating to same was carried out and sta
later noted from members of the witness!
family. A statement was also noted from the Sub-
Postmaster at Carmyle Post Office, the accused Murtaza
Rasul. During his state used Rasul stated
he recalled the witness having attended for
a period of a few weeks to withdraw money from her
account whilst accompanied by family members.
enquiries carried out with members of the witness
‘family confirmed the witness {
attended at the Post Office, however not for the
prolonged period described by the accused Rasul.
LABEL: 1 X PO ACCOUNT CARD SIGNED F
LABEL: 1 X PO ACCOUNT STATEMENT *
LABEL: 1 X POST OFFICE RECEIPT
were also seized. Statements were also noted from
relatives of the accused Rasul who had been covering
periods of annual leave taken by the accused.
Charge 2
The complainer, : I 86), was the holder of Post
Office Account No ROE
On 30 April 2010, the balance of this account was
£13,318.43. It was established through interrogation of
Post Office statements relating to this account that
between 7 May 2010 and 2 June 2010, 19 withdrawals
totalling £11,400 were carried out from the account
without the knowledge of consent of the account holder,
Z contacted the Post
Office to report the matter and the card which his
mother had in her possession was found to be in fact an
unregistered card and he was advised by staff (not
further described) to destroy the card, which he did. The
location of the true card has not been established. A new
card was issued on 21 June 2010 and it was noted no
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further fraudulent transactions occurred since that date.
On 6 August 2010,; _GRO
report the matter. A statement was noted from
[GRO I by the Police witnesses Morrison and Hope at
which time they seized
LABEL: POST OFFICE STATEMENT OF : 7
The Police witness Paterson conducted further enquiry
into the incident, which included close partnership
working with the witness Robert Daily, Security Manager
of Post Office Ltd.
Various enquiries were carried out and the Police witness
Paterson deponed for and obtained
LABEL: GLASGOW SHERIFF WARRANT
which granted Police the authority to interrogate
Clydesdale Bank Account Noi === GRO theld
jointly by the now accused Murtaza Rasul and his wife.
LABEL: COPIES ALE BANK STATEMENT,
ACCOUNT NO {- } - MURTAZA RASUL
were obtained as a result.
On inspection of the statement, it was observed that
between 13 April 2010 and 6th August 2010, a total of
GRO as, deposited into the account. It was noted
related to Tax Credits. Also between 6
and 31 December 2010 a further total of
was deposited into the account, with
relating to Tax Credits.
Further enquiry was carried out with the assistance of the
witness Daily of Post Office Ltd.
LABEL: COPIES OF MONTHLY POST OFFICE
REMUNERATION - MURTAZA RASUL
were generated. It was noted that between April 2010
and August..2010, the accused received a net salary
totalling I GRO I from Post Office Ltd. The bank
statement that has been recovered thus far does not
appear to have any entries that look like regular wage
payments.
On 12 October 2011, the accused Murtaza Rasul attended
at Shettleston Police Office in order to assist with
enquiries. The accused provided a statement which
detailed his personal finances. At the conclusion of the
statement the exact method by which the monies had
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the witnesses I
Charge 3
The complainer, (86), was the holder
of Post Office Account No Prior to 24 June
2011, the balance of this account was £4,544.38. It was
later established through interrogation of Post Office
statements relating to this account that between 24 June
2011 and 6 March 2012, 7 withdrawals of £600 (totalling
£4,200) had been taken from the account without the
knowledge or cons i
On 2 April 2012,
report the incident. The Police witness Alan Duff
subsequently attended at her home address and noted
details for a Crime Report, during which the Police
witness Duff seized eee
LABEL: 1 x POST OFFICE CARD NO! GRO
The Police witness Paterson conducted further enquiries
into the incident and further liaised with Robert Daily,
Security Manager of Post Office Ltd.
About 1100 hours on 27 April 2012, the Police witness
Paterson accompanied by Robert Daily attended at the
ome address. A statement was
noted from
who confirmed she had attended at Carmyle Post Office
and had been served on each occasion by a male staff
member she knows as "Danny" (confi as the
accused Murtaza Rasul). The wit
her Post Office Card, Account No
into the Horizon Automated System, when prompted she
entered her Personal Identification Number (PIN) and
verbally asked the staff member for the sum of £150. The
witness I } received the sum of £150 on each
occasion, however did not receive a receipt on the dates
where the sums of £600 had been recorded on the Post
Office Account. The problem only came to light when she
received a statement of her account covering a number of
months.
also described her pattern of taking
money out of her account and it did not match the
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pattern of withdrawals shown on her account statement.
She states that she withdraws £150 per fortnight and
£400-500 around Christmas time. As far as she was
aware, £500 was the daily maximum for withdrawals.
Accordingly she can rule out ever taking out £600
personally. She also states that she never wrote her PIN
down or told it to anyone and never sent anyone to the
Post Office for money on her behalf.
About 1445 hours on 13 August 2012, the witness Daly
attended at Shettleston Police Office where he provided a
self-written statement to the Police witness Paterson
which related to the operation of the Horizon Automated
System. From this statement it was established that the
Horizon Automated System could be manipulated in such
a way that would allow a customer to key in their
Personal Identification Number, request the sum of £150,
however at the vendor side the staff member would have
the option to press "Withdraw Limit" from the touch
screen panel. To confirm the transaction, the customer
would again be prompted to re-enter their Personal
Identification Number. The vendor would then hand over
the originally requested sum of £150, however by
selecting the "Withdraw Limit" option this would allow
withdrawal limit of £600 (providing there were sufficient
funds available), thereby the vendor would have the
opportunity to steal the amount of £450 without the
customer's knowledge. No receipt would be issued as this
would reflect the actual transaction of £600.
The accused was interviewed in relation to all three
charges on 20 February 2013. T
Horizon system usernames are i .
no one else knows his password and he does not know
anyone else’s password. He confirmed that it was possible
to swipe a chip and PIN card so that transactions could be
processed with out the PIN having been entered
successfully, and that it was possible for Post Office
employees to issue replacement cards.
CP Okay. When can you swipe a customer’s card on
Horizon?
MR You would swipe it basically if the customer’s entered
the card three times, it gives ...
cP Mmhmm
MR ... if the chips not working basically, yeah? If they’ve
got a damaged card or if the chip’s not working then we
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would swipe the card. So basically the customer gets the
option. We can’t joost, if you turn up to the Post Office
with your card and says I would like two hundred pound
out, I’m not gonna take your card off you and swipe it
‘cause it won't allow me, the system won't allow me. The
system, I'll ??? Chip & PIN, you would have to enter the
card three times ...
cP Mmhmm
MR ... before it allows me to manually do it. So, basically,
if you’ve got a damaged card and you come in, put the
card in, it’ll tell you please re-enter the card, so the
customer’ll take the card out, re-enter it, then it would
come up again please re-enter the card. So three times,
and after the third time, that’ when it kicks into my
system, asks hand the card over to the counter clerk and
they will swipe it. So the customer hands over, we would
swipe it, put the card back down again and then same
again; how much would you like, what would you like
etc?
CP Okay.
MR But now, recently, in the past, ??? six months, we
have a facility to issue like if the card’s damage or if it the
chip is down, basically we've got cards in the back that
we can joost re-issue them another card and swap it
round.
He accepted that he had given statements to the police
previously about suspected frauds at the post office and
that he remembered and she sometimes
forgot her PIN, but while he might invite other people to
help pensioners key in PIN numbers, he did not assist
personally.
CP ??? more than two occasions, but I’ve taken two
statements from you, is that
correct?
MR Uhuh, yes, I believe it is.
CP The first statement I took was 1249 hours, 26th of
June 2010. You mentioned you recalled a female, you
referred to her as
MR Yes, yeah, yeah I, yeah.
CP ... she had problems with the card and PIN, sometimes
she had forgotten her PIN and you’d also mentioned that
you noticed sometimes pensioners forget their PINs
MR Yes, yes, yeah, it’s joost, joost wi their age I guess,
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yeah.
CP Okay. You added that you don’t let pensioners key in
their PIN number in for a third time because it cancels the
card.
MR Mmhmm
CP Can you explain that?
MR Yeah, what it is basically so joost let’s say if your
colleague came up, ??? always be a pensioner, it could be
anyone comes up with a PIN and puts in the card, it
comes up incorrect PIN number, so I'll say can you please
enter your PIN number in again, they do it again,
incorrect PIN number, so then I'll say to them I'll say I
don’t advise you to put it in a third time because if you
put it in incorrectly again, three times, your card will get
cancelled, you’ll have to go away home, take your card,
phone that number on the back of the card and request a
new PIN number, which’ll take two to three days to come
back. So what I suggest you do is joost go away, have a
wee think about it and if you don’t know the PIN number
then by all means phone up the number on the back of
the card, or if you do remember you're more than
welcome back again and try it again. I’m joost trying to
save them the hassle of basically not being able to
withdraw money at that particular time.
CP Did you swap her card at any point, did you swap?
MR No, not at all.
CP Right, okay.
MR Like I say, I wouldn’t deal with the card, even if it’s
an incorrect PIN number, the customer's still putting it in
in their side. The only we would get the card passed
through to us is if it was a damaged card.
CP Have you ever put the PIN number in for ...?
MR No.
CP... for:
MR No, no.
CP You also mentioned that you ...
MR What I do, like joost to make that clear, if there is
another customer there and obviously they’re with
someone, I'll say to the customer if you would like they
could put the PIN number in for you if you're struggling
with the PIN number. And some of them say yes, some of
them say no.
CP Okay.
The accused was questioned about his spending and
accepted that he took a holiday in Las Vegas in 2010
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which cost him about £900 and a further £600-700
spending money. He was asked at length about his
income and outgoings which came to the totals below
CP Okay. So total income approximately, adding that up,
is roughly four thousand four hundred pounds.
MR Mmhmm
CP That be right at that time, yeah?
MR Yeah, yeah, joost at that time, joost off the top of my
head, yeah.
CP And outgoings would about thirteen hundred and sixty
pounds per month?
MR Mm yeah.
He was asked to explain April to June 2010
CP Okay. Okay referring back to your ??? account 13th
April 2010, 2nd June 2010, thirteen thousand nine
hundred and ten as I say was deposited in your account,
which was substantially more than yours.
MR Mmhmm
CP More than you have spare per month.
MR Mmhmm
CP What can you tell me about that?
MR Well like I say I will deposit money on behalf of my
father or my sis! i i i i
and it’s quite a!
G hat they put aside’
sometimes what T'll do is Tl put them in the safe in my
Post Office so joost to put aside for them for safekeeping
basically or sometimes if they need something or
whatever I'll put it into my account for them. I’ve nothing
to hide hence the reason it goes through my account.
‘Cause I’m fully aware like when I done my management
and accounts degree etc I do realise everything has a
Paper trail.
He was asked about charge 3
CP ... branch, Account number [ Okay? Do you
MR I think she’s one of my neighbours, isn’t she?
CP I believe she is.
MR Yeah, if she’s the same lady I’m thinking about, yeah.
CP Prior to 24th of June 2011, her account balance was
four thousand five hundred and forty-four pounds thirty-
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eight. And it was established between the 24th June 2011
and 6th March 2011, seven withdrawals of six hundred
pounds, that’s four thousand two hundred pounds, were
carried out from the account. And what can you tell me
about that?
MR As far as I’m aware the customer has withdrawn
these funds, but with all due respect Craig, I’ve got, I’m
dealing with customers on a regular basis who are like
you say they’re elderly, I don’t want to word this
incorrectly, but they’re very forgetful as well so I’ve got
customers who come in who forget their PIN numbers
etc, even forget what day their pensions are getting paid
in, so they might come in on a Monday to get their
pension and they might come back on a Thursday
thinking it’s a Monday, so you can understand it becomes
extremely frustrating for me as well dealing with certain
customers, but I’m not saying i: is such a case,
but I’m joost saying that certain customers do withdraw
money and then become forgetful if they have actually
withdrawn that money or whatever, but I can’t remember
the frequency of {GRO 5 visits to my Post Office, I
can’t tell you off the top of my head. Like I say like
customers are coming in all the time and stuff so I joost
forget if they’ve been in once a week or twice a week etc,
but I don’t know if you can shed some light on how often
like these transactions were carried out, if they
were on a weekly basis or a daily basis or to me it’s like if
it’s suspicious okay fair enough if it’s on a daily basis the
way the other two were I can understand where you’re
coming from, but.
CP Mmhmm. Obviously through enquiries she confirms
she’s attended at Carmyle Post Office and she’s
withdrawn a hundred and fifty pounds on each occasion.
So that totals one thousand fifty pounds. However, on
checking the Post Office account statement for it in March
2012, she’s realised that there’s withdrawals listed as six
hundred pounds on each occasion. What can you tell me
about that?
MR Thing is when a customer comes in, as I previously
spoke to you on the previous cassette, that the customer
would ask me how much they want, we’d give them a
receipt, we’d count the money out and as far as I’m
concerned that transaction is finished in relation to me
because they’ve asked for what they’ve asked for, I’ve
gave the receipt, gave the cash out and the receipt
clearly states how much that goes out and what their
balance is as well. So if customers ask for a certain
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amount, which could be a hundred and fifty pounds or six
hundred pounds, that’s what’s gonna get paid out and
their receipt will state that. There’s no way, even if you
speak to the Post Office Team, there’s no way that a
receipt will state something else to what actually’s coming
out the account. As far as I’m aware, that’s what we've
always been taught like always return a receipt to the
customer and the receipt will state what they've got in
their balance and what they have.
CP Mmhmm. Can you explain as to why it would be six
hundred pounds withdrawn, not the hundred and fifty
pounds?
MR As far as I believe if the customer’s asked for six
hundred pounds then that’s what they'll be getting paid
out six hundred pounds. There’s no way my system would
make a mistake if a customer’s asked for a hundred and
fifty pounds and put in six hundred pounds, I’m not
gonna make a mistake like that, and my system’s not, as
far as I’m aware like it’s not gonna make a mistake like
that.
I know there’s issues on the Horizon system about money
going missing, but that’s not from customers’ accounts,
that’s from actual Post Offices. Hence that they're
investigating that the Horizon system is not as stable as
they believe it is.
He was later asked about the suspected modus of the
theft and confirmed that it was possible.
CP Am I correct in saying the only explanation we can
give here, the fact there’s £600, is the fact that you can,
you can hit withdraw limit that would give you potential
to hand over £150 but keep £450 for each transaction?
MR That's not what I done.
CP Yeah, but am I correct in saying that is what can be
done?
MR That’s a list of possibilities that could be done yes.
Th 4 kad +, bout iscui £
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Robert Daily has since confirmed the process for
exchanging a card. The PIN is associated with the account
and not the card so is stored centrally. It always requires
to be entered correctly by someone before money can be
taken out of the account. Update 21/8/14
DW I think you might've covered this; you said something
about re-issuing cards if cards were damaged?
MR Uhuh
DW But how does that come about?
MR It comes about so if the customer comes in with a
broken card etc or if it’s been caught in the cash machine
and it’s been broken or the chip’s not working in it, if I’ve
got cards there we'll say right okay if they ask for another
card. So they'll phone up the Post Office and they'll say
joost go to your Post Office and they can re-issue
another card, so...
DW Sorry, see the Post Office card, I don’t have one, so
MR Okay, yeah.
DW Does it have the customer's name on the front of it?
MR No, no, they’re, I would've brought one if I’d had the
opportunity but it’s joost a small purple card that says
Post Office Card Account, it’s got a long number on it,
they way a debit card would have it and it’s got a chip on
it so you can assign that to a person.
So basically you've brought a card in to me myself and
said it’s not working, could you replace this card? If I’ve
got another card on site, what I'll do is right okay that’s
fine, so trying to think how this goes, yeah, you go into
your card management screen on the system and it say
issue/replace damaged card, so you’d hand your card
through to me, I would swipe your card, okay? You'd
have some identification on you, so I’d check your
identification and then I would bring the card I’ve got in
the back and I'd swipe that again.
DW How do you know the identification of the card ‘cause
you said earlier ...?
MR Sorry, pop, the name pops up, the name pops up. So
when I swipe up it says this card belongs to Mr Craig
Paterson.
DW And when they put the card in the chip and PIN
machine, does the name also pop up?
MR No, nothing comes up.
DW Nothing comes up so...
MR Nothing comes up at all.
DW... if you swipe ...
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MR Mmhmm
DW ... the name comes up?
MR Yeah.
DW Any other details come up?
MR Nothing at all.
DW So the only ID that you can check is that person’s
name, you don’t have a date of birth, you don’t have an
address?
MR Top of my head, yeah, I think that’s the way it is,
yeah.
DW So I could come in with a piece of paper with Joe
Bloggs on it and if Joe Bloggs’ name popped up on your
machine that would be fine, I would get a card?
MR But, yeah but, what you’re forgetting is, you don’t
have the PIN number.
DW Mmhmm
MR You still need the PIN number. So, but this is what I
was joost going to get to, sorry to stop you there.
DW Alright, no, no.
MR So basically hand me the card, I’d swipe it and it’d
say this card belongs to Craig Paterson so I’d say Mr
Paterson hand me some ID, I would check the ID, if
that’s no problem at all I would get a card out, I’d swipe
my card. So the old card I’ve swiped gets cancelled, it
gets automatically attaches itself to the new card, okay?
DW Mmhmm
MR So then what we’re supposed to do is get the
customer to put the card in the machine, put their PIN
number in, okay? And then if it passes it then we say
allocate card.
DW So they keep the same PIN number?
MR They keep the same PIN number, same account,
everything stays the same. It’ joost physically the card
gets changed and the old card, if it, obviously it’ll be
damaged so you won't be able to use it anyway, so they
would joost take that in and we'll pass them the new card
out.
DW What happens to the old card?
MR That gets destroyed on site.
DW You destroy it?
MR Yeah, we destroy it on site.
DW What do you do with it?
MR We joost cut it up, joost put it in the bin.
DW Cut it up and put it in the bin, okay.
MR As you would with any debit card a customer’s left
with. If you were using a debit machine to say pay for
cigarettes. If you left that I would wait, I always wait
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sixty minutes, if nobody comes back then I'll just cut it
up.
DW And you said earlier on you order sort of five of these
blank cards?
MR Yeah.
DW At a time?
MR Block of cards yeah.
DW But they’re just, they’re just blank they don’t have
any details on them, no information?
MR Nothing, nothing, absolutely blank, if you get in touch
with the Post Office they'll be able to tell you these are
just blank cards that have not been assigned to anyone
and they’ve just got the number on it but we have to rem
them in as a remittance into our system so the Post
Office at any particular point know that we've got say two
cards on site.
At the conclusion of the interview, the accused was
cautioned and charged with charge 3. His reply was "YEH,
IT WASN'T, I DIDN'T DO IT THE WAY YOU'RE SAYING
THATS WHAT HAPPENED. I BELIEVE THE CUSTOMER
WITHDREW THAT MONEY AND MISPLACED THE RECEIPT
SOMEWHERE BECAUSE RECEIPTS WERE ISSUED ON
EVERY SINGLE TIME AS THEY ARE WITH EVERY SINGLE
TRANSACTION."
Robert Daily, Post Office Security Officer gave a
statement which described a number of different frauds
that could be carried out by post office staff. Charge 3
was recent enough that he was able to interrogate the
system. He identified that th ect transactions were
carried out by username {_ ! which is one of the
usernames that the accused admitted belonged to him
and said no one else knew the password for.
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The PF Depute’s
Recommendations
as to why petition
proceedings are
appropriate and
Crown’s position on
bail.
Please ensure that the
charge is correctly
marked in FOS in
accordance with your
recommendation.
Petition proceedings are appropriate as the accused has
misused his position as sub-postmaster to steal from
vulnerable, elderly customers. The amounts taken just
about sufficient to merit petition proceedings in their own
right before aggravating factors are considered. The value
of charge 1 is £15,600, the value of charge 2 is £11,400
and the value of charge 3 is £3,150.
Given the time elapsed in the investigation of these
crimes, it is appropriate that the accused be granted bail.
The one suitable special condition that could be attached
is that he does not enter Carmyle Post Office, Gardenside
Avenue, Glasgow. It is also appropriate that the accused
be invited to answer any warrant.
Considerations on Sufficiency of Evidence
Evidence that false
pretence was made
and that it was false
Ol
Ch 3 is the easiest to follow. The complainer,
° “} (age 86) speaks to requesting £150 on each of 7
s and she accepts that she got £150. She says
she was given no receipt on any occasion. On checking her
statement, she noted that £600 had been removed from
her account each time. Robert Daily confirms that the Post
Office system gives the teller the ability to input the
withdrawal amount. Provided the customer gets what they
asked for, suspicions will probably not be aroused.
Charges 1 and 2 are more problematic. Due to the ages of
the incidents, Robert Daily was unable to interrogate the
system to see who processed the transactions. Only the
last 90 days are available in this level of detail. There are
a number of similarities between charges 1 and 2.
They were carried out at the same locus, have similar time
frames (charge (1) between 13 April 2010 and 27 May
2010 and charge (2) between 7 May 2010 and 2 June
have similarly aged__ victims (charge (1)
age 87, charge (2) :. +, age 86) and have
a similar modus in that the accounts were systematically
drained at the rate of £600 per day, but no further
suspicious transactions took place after the cards for the
accounts were changed. It is submitted that this is a case
where the principle in Howden v HMA could be applied and
the same person be said to be responsible for both
charges.
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For Charge 1, the complainer {-— says she did
not give details of her pin to ‘anyone, but recounts an
incident where she was trying to put her pin in at the Post
nd the “man who works in it all the time, he's a
quite tall, dark hair, clean shaven, over 40 yrs
of age,” shouted to her that she was putting her card in
the wrong way, came out from behind the counter, put her
card in for her and pressed some buttons and she got
straight into her account. She states she did not tell the
male, or anyone else, her PIN at any time. She confirms,
as do her family, that she did not attend the post office
anything like the number of times suggested by her
account statement and she only went to Carmyle Post
Office. Robert Daily confirms what the proper procedure as
regards Chip and PIN cards should be.
For charge 2, the complainer t > has I
i and was unable to give a statement. Her son
Ww her on an occasion where she attended Carmyle
Post office and was unable to withdraw money. He took
possession of her card to make enquiries and was told by
the helpline that the card was not registered with the Post
Office. He tried to get a replacement card from Carmyle
Post Office and was unable to get one from them, but
another nearby Post Office was able to help him. It seems
inconceivable that “} could have been
responsible for the practically emptying of her account
over 19 visits in the space of between 7 May 2010 and 2
June 2010 and yet she was unable to remember her pin
when at the Post Office with her son a few days later.
Even if this sudden forgetfulness were caused by her
condition, it does not explain the anomaly with her card
when it was checked with the helpline, nor why Carmyle
Post Office was unable to assist and issue her a new cards.
[ son confirms that his mother did not make
the transactions in relation to her charge. Carmyle Post
Office was local Post Office. Robert Daily
confirms wha e@ proper procedure as_ regards
replacement cards should be.
Evidence that false For charge 3 Robert Daily confirms the user identity who
pretence was made processed each transaction as belonging to the accused.
by the accused-ID I The accused confirmed his log in details (which matched
the log in used) and that no one else knows his password.
The complainer says she knows the accused and can
identify him.
For charge 1,; GRO describes a male who could
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be the accused- he has worked there for years, well before
these charges took place. The Police can identify the
accused as admitting to working there at the time of the
incident. His colleagues can identify him as working there
and also rule themselves out as having been involved. This
charge readily Moorovs with charge 3. There is significant
disparity in the accused’s income during the period and
the level of his salary. He also pays for an expensive
holiday to Las Vegas around this time. He is living well
beyond his means and gives an incredible explanation for
the excess income. See also further enquiries.
Charge 2 is the most difficult. There is no direct
identification of the accused. He admitted that he worked
there at the time of the incident, and his colleagues
confirm that. Thereafter, there is only his excessive
income (See also further enquiries) to tie him directly to
the charge. It is submitted that given the similarities with
charges 1 and to a lesser extent, charge 3, the Howden
principle (Howden v HMA 1994 SCCR 19) could apply here
and the same person be said to be responsible for all
charges. The differences in time frame and exact modus
(partially authorised transactions starting about a year
later and spread out rather than completely unauthorised
ones over a very short timeframe) could readily be
explained by the accused acting in a more circumspect
manner as he had been spoken to and a statement taken
from him after the first two charges (albeit no action was
taken at the time as the police concluded they did not
have sufficient evidence at the time).
Another adminicle of evidence that the accused was
responsible is that there have been no further reports of
similar offending at the Carmyle Post Office since the
accused was suspended.
Evidence that false In all three charges, money has been released when the
pretence induced complainer did not ask for it.
someone to do
something
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Practical Result
The complainer in charge 1 is £15,600 worse off than she
should be, The complainer in charge 2 is £11,400 worse
off than she should be and The complainer in charge 3 is
£3,150 worse off than she should be.
Observations and
recommendations in
respect of sufficiency.
Please refer to the
Fraud Toolkit for
guidance in assessing
the evidence.
Is there sufficient
evidence to prove the
charge(s)?
Charge 3 is the strongest charge by far. The complainer
speaks directly to the conduct and the offence was
fresh enough that the Post Office were able to link the
accused's user ID to the transactions and he confirms
no one else knows his password. The complainer
confirms that the accused served her on each occasion
and has been working there for years. She can identify
him.
As referred to above, charges 1 and 2 are not as
strong. They do have significant similarities both with
each other and with charge 3- all took place at Carmyle
Post Office, the ages of the complainers —all in their
eighties, all of the unauthorised transactions feature
use of the daily maximum withdrawal amount of £600
and from the start of charge 1 to the end of charge 3,
the time period is under two years. Charge 1 is
potentially capable of Moorov as although the
complainer is listed in the analysis of evidence as being
unable to identify the accused, she does give a detailed
description and says that the male who served her
works there all the time. This related to an occasion
where the accused, who should not know her PIN was
able to enter it for her. Other witnesses can place the
accused as a regular worker at the locus. The accused
also confirmed in interview that he had given a
statement to police when considered a witness where
he had accepted having dealt with jas a customer
r had had trouble with her PI
The offence appears to have been committed using a
cloned card as the complainer was not present on the
days when her account was systematically emptied.
This is a difference from charge 3, but probably
represents a refinement in technique after the accused
was spoken to in the aftermath of charges 1 and 2.
Charge 2 has no direct identification evidence and is
the weakest charge. It appears to have been a cloned
card type offence as well. The withdrawals again did
not fit the complainer’s known behaviour patterns. The
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complainer did not remember her PIN despite
apparently having attended on 19 occasions over a very
short time previously and successfully withdrawing
£600 each time. The complainer’s son was told that the
card in his mother’s possession was an unregistered
card and he should destroy it. It seems likely that the
complainer and card were not in fact involved in each
transaction. While charges 1 and 2 are not as strong as
charge 3 in terms of direct evidence, they do have
evidence of the accused spending in excess of his
apparent means at around the time of these offences.
It is hoped that this chapter will be bolstered further in
due course when we are in a position to evidence the
accused’s property purchases. Given the similarities
between the three charges, it is submitted that the
Howden principle can be relied upon to provide
identification for charge 2.
Non Fraud Cases :
Evidence of essential
elements of specific
offence
Considerations on Quality of Evidence
The investigation was paused for a number of months
Describe here the while the Post Office carried out a review of cases where
nature of any their Horizon computer system was involved. Paul Miele at
concerns. Policy was aware of the position. The Post Office have
reached the conclusion that the system is reliable in
relation to this case, but have yet to make a report
available confirming this is the case. The problems
concerning the system were widely reported at the time so
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will probably be something that the defence focus on for
the benefit of the jury.
Considerations of further inquiries to be carried out
The accused has been referred to the Police Financial
Investigation Unit. This has been done for the dual
purposes of firstly allowing the Reporting Officer to benefit
from their expertise in seeking bank warrants to try and
recover account details and statements to build a fuller
financial picture so we can evidence more excessive
income around the time of all 3 charges and secondly to
allow for action under the Proceeds of Crime Act against
the accused.
Early indications from the police are that they consider
that the accused should be a candidate to have his assets
restrained as, in addition to the bank statements already
recovered, they have foun ations that in 2007 the
! home taking only a
he Purchased another
!with no mortgage
_GRO_ mortgage and ‘in 2010,
property with his brother for L_.
taken over it.
L
Any further
enquiries to be
instructed after
accused placed on
petition
SOCD confirm that they have an interest in this case in
relation to POCA matters.
The reporting officer has been asked to provide full
transcripts of the statements that the accused gave before
he was a suspect and confirmation of the accused’s status
at the time. He has alse-been-askedte obtained a further
statement from Robert Daily about the proper working of
the replacement card process including what happens
when the chip is damaged and te-confirmwhether this
disables the PIN pretecti Ise-te covering the
swiping of cards and the processes concerning swiping
cards. PIN protection data is stored centrally and the PIN
always requires to be entered to obtain monies update
21/8/14
The Post Office have been asked to provide such
information as they can concerning work rotas to narrow
down who was working on the days where suspect
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transactions took place. It is understood that the accused
works at the locus alone most of the time. They have
provided work rotas for charge 3 (scanned into case
directory). They are still working on rota information for
charges 1 and 2. Update 21/8/14
The Post Office have commissioned an expert report to
cover the reliability of their Horizon computer system. It is
not yet complete. The Post Office indicate that they are
willing to support the accuracy of their system in relation
to this case. An interim report is available in the public
domain about issues with the Horizon system and a copy
is attached to this report. The specific case studies
detailed in that report are all of a significantly different
nature to the allegations here so the report is not of any
particular assistance or relevance in this case.
Functional Lead
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S&J Functional Lead’s Instructions
Date of Instruction
1.Instructions on
proceedings
2. Instructions on
bail, special
conditions of bail and
bail appeal.
3. Observations on
quality
4. Further Enquiries
Required before a
decision can be taken
on proceedings
The following further enquiries are to be carried out:
Please re-report to me by: