FUJ00181504 - Comments on TOG’s Witness Statement 27.09.2018 by Gareth Jenkins
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Comments on TOG’s Witness Statement 27.09.18
Ref: — GIJ Comments on TOG's Witness Statement 27.09.18.docx
Author: Gareth I Jenkins
Date: 13/10/2018 10:19:00
1. Introduction
Unfortunately, the latest copy is a scanned document and so rather than converting it
to Word I have put my comments in this separate note.
2. Detailed Comments
They are:
1.
Para 12: My recollection is that the role out took 2 or 3 years and so was not
just 1999 to 2000. (The previous draft I saw said 1999 to 2002.) Probably not
important. Can we check this out?
Para 18: Probably worth mentioning the “Opening Figures” that are generated
by the Balancing process that are used in the calculation of the current cash
position.
Para 34: I actually worked for ICL from 1973. I’m not sure exactly when ICL
became Fujitsu, but I believe it was around 2002. I worked for the Post Office
account in ICL / Fujitsu from 1996 until I retired in 2015 and I have been
retained as a consultant since then.
Para 36: May be worth clarifying that such users would have been either in
SSC (3" line support) or possibly in the Ops team in Belfast (not sure about
their access rights). Also, following discussions with SSC wrt the Richard
Rolls WS, it appears that on occasions they would inject messages at the
counter. Such messages would be indistinguishable from those generated by
the SMPR other than any identifying info added by the SSC staff. Normally
such messages would relate to missing EOD markers or perhaps “orphaned”
transaction retrieved from a failed counter’s hard disk. However they had the
ability to inject any transaction, but should not have done so. As Torstein says
in Para 11, he is concentrating on what the system is designed to do and not
any malicious misuse of the system. Such malicious misuse makes most things
possible as with any other IT system.
Para 40: A corrupt CRC usually implied a Hardware issue such as a Disk
error, and when such errors were detected, then SSC would need to recreate
the message store on that counter as discussed wrt the Richard Rolls WS.
Para 46: NB Horizon Online still has the capability of retrieving audit data
from Legacy Horizon and carrying out these checks.
Para 48: At the time it was called OPTIP in then evolved into POL MI as part
of Impact around 2005. Not really important though. Also Horice doesn’t
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10.
1.
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access BRDB, but a read only copy known as BRSS. BRSS holds data for
longer than BRDB.
Para 57: I disagree with this. This only refers to Horizon Online. With
Legacy Horizon there was a capability to inject transactions which the SSC did
use on a number of occasions. Such injection should have been authorised and
logged by the OCP process (pre-cursor to MSCs). SSC can perhaps provide
more detail on this as it clearly relates to the Richard Rolls WS. There was no
capability to Edit or Delete (other than archiving after the message’s Expiry
date as described separately) transactions — just to insert new ones. (This was
a feature of Riposte.)
Para 58.10: It would appear that this is incorrect. I have come to understand
that in some circumstances the SSC needed to inject data at the counter. Iam
not clear as to exactly why this was necessary (other than for EOD Markers —
which are not transactional data), and it is likely that any transactions that were
injected would have been done at the CSs. Perhaps SSC can clarify this point
as it is important in relation to Richard Roll’s witness statement.
Para 59.1: Is it worth noting that should such changes be made, then this
would result in the Branch data differing from the Audit data and that this
could be detected if the calculations for the next balance were recalculated
based on the audit data? Sorry, I see that this is addressed in 59.3
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