JARBO000064
JARBO000064
Our preliminary conclusions are:
a) We have so far found no evidence of system wide (systemic)
problems with the Horizon software;
b) We are aware of 2 incidents where defects or ‘bugs’ in the Horizon
c) Occasionally an unusual combination of events, such as a power or
software gave rise to 76 branches being affected by incorrect
balances or transactions, which took some time to identify and
correct;
communications failure during the processing of a transaction, can
give rise a situation where timely, accurate and complete
information about the status of a transaction is not immediately
available to a SPMR;
d) When individual SPMRs experience or report problems, POL’s
response can appear to be unhelpful, unsympathetic or simply fail
to solve the underlying problem. The lack of a ‘user forum’ or
similar facility, means that SPMRs have little opportunity to raise
issues of concern at an appropriate level within POL;
e) The lack of an effective ‘outreach’ investigations function within
f)
POL, results in POL failing to identify the root cause of problems
and missing opportunities for process improvements;
The end of Trading Period processes can be problematic for
individual SPMRs, particularly if they are dealing with unresolved
Transaction Corrections (‘TCs’). The lack of a ‘suspense account’
option means that it is difficult for disputed TCs to be dealt with in a
neutral manner.