POL00027825 - Email from Alwen Lyons to Paula Vennells, Martin Edwards, Mark R Davies and others re JA meeting brief

Evidence on official site

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Paula Vennells{_
Martin Edwards

i Susan

Sent: Wed 03/07/2013 6:
Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

6 AM (UTC)

I think it's risky. It would depend on how open he is with us. if he listens and whether we believe we have convinced him to
amend his approach to media, MPs ete.

Thanks
Alwen

Alwen Lyons

On 3 Jul 2013, at 07:42, "Paula Vennells" ¢ wrote:

Ignore the note below. just getting mixed up with mails : I'm sure there are plenty of good reasons but let me
ask anyway: could our two documents be shared with JA? They are so clear - it might help his understanding
- Paula

Sent from my iPad

<> wrote:

On 3 Jul 2013, at 07:34, "Alwen Lyons"

I think her approach could work depends how open he will be. But the risk is he takes control and we
end up seeming defensive from the off

Thanks

Alwen

Alwen Lyons

Sent from Blackberry

From: Paula Vennells

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 06:26 AM
To: Martin Edwards; Mark R Davies

Cc: Alwen Lyons

Subject: Fwd: JA meeting brief

Hi see note below from Alice. I am not sure that this is hard hitting enough for the opener? Don't
want to go overboard as she is right to get him to open up. But I do think we should say that we
are seriously concerned. "Position with SS not where we would like it to be" could be too
Delphic? Or do you think JA will get it in one? P

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: Alice Perkins

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Date: 3 July 2013 07:15:10 BST

To: "Alwen.lyons
Ce: "paula.vennel: GRO

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

"gs

As we are unlikely to have time for a pre-chat, can I suggest I open up by getting
him to talk so we can see for ourselves what he is thinking? eg

"Thanks for seeing us

Want to understand where you are coming from

Hope we can continue to work collaboratively as we have done to date to get the
right resolution for spms and PO

Position with SS not where we would like it to be - interim report not complete and
what there is will be delivered v late for a meeting on Monday

Please share with us your thoughts about where we are and what happens next."
Are you OK with this?

oa Original Message -----

From: Alice Perkins

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 06:54 AM
To: 'Alwen.lyons!

Subject: Re: JA meeting brief

I will be with you by 8 45 but not necessarily earlier.
A

----- Original Message-.
From: Alwen Lyons {..
Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 0.
To: Martin Edwards <
Ce: Alice Perkins; Paula Vennells ¢
Crichton

___ } Susan

lugh Flemington
odric Williams
Simon Baker

Subject: Re:

IA meeting brief

Thave copies for you both and will be at Portculis House at about 8.10 all being well
with trains

Thanks
Alwen

Alwen Lyons
Company Secretary

On 3 Jul 2013, at 02:06, "Martin Edwards" 4
wrote:
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Alice, Paula

With many thanks to Susan, Alwen, Mark and everyone else involved,
here's the briefing note for the meeting with JA (attached as both a
Word doc and PDF, and also pasted in the email below in case easier to
read on blackberry. I think Alwen will try to bring printed copies if she
has time).

Also attaching a more detailed factual background brief in case needed,
which is what we're developing as our main fact base for reference
throughout this process. It includes details of the 4 cases under review
by SS in the interim report and also a summary of the cases pertaining
to JA and OL's constituencies.

I mentioned a website earlier which provides guidance on the proper
process for independent enquiries, including in relation to 'Salmon
letters’ - have referenced the key read-across in the brief, but here's the
link if anyone wants to read up on this in more detail:

http://publicinquiries.org/holding_a_hearing/faimess_to_witnesses

Best wishes for the meeting,

Martin

Briefing for meeting with James Arbuthnot, 3 July 2013

[KEY OBJECTIVES AND POINTS TO COVER AT THE MEETING
Headline messages of reassurance: . We take sub-postmasters'
concerns very seriously which is why we set up investigation in the first
place. . No evidence of systemic failures in the system. But does
highlight some important lessons on wider support processes. Many of
these are historical issues which have already been addressed, but we're
determined to continue making improvements (with input from a new
user forum). . Important this is seen in context - 6 million transactions
per day across 11,800 branches. More transactions per second (1,500)
than this entire review. Inevitable that some issues will arise on a
system of this scale, the important thing is that they are handled
properly. Process and handling points: The Post Office is too
important to too many people for confidence to be undermined unfairly.
i. Gain an understanding of JA's intentions for media and Parliamentary
handling in relation to the report - emphasising importance of an even-
handed and proportionate approach which doesn't undermine public
confidence in the Post Office. ii. Emphasise importance of drawing
clear distinction between issues with computer system versus our wider
support systems. To date no systemic problems found with computer -
there can't be any confusion about this as otherwise would undermine
customer and spmr confidence in Horizon. iii. Reiterate the importance
we attach to this being a rigorous, credible and independent report, and
therefore we (and Fujitsu) will be checking carefully for factual
accuracy on Friday/over the weekend. Our expectation is that this will
enable the report to be shared on Monday, but very tight turnaround so
we'll need to re-consider timing in light of any fundamental differences
of understanding. iv. Explain we'd like option to attend Monday's
meeting as observers to ensure we have accurate record (avoiding
discrepancies which emerged from last meeting). v. Propose that both
sides share draft media statements and agree factual Q&A. vi. Explain
that we would like to work with JFSA to progress remaining spot
reviews and MP cases (where there is adequate evidence), with the aim
of taking on board lessons learned as quickly as we can. We need to
consider carefully what role SS should play in that process.
Reassurance on JA's two points of concern/annoyance: . On
prosecutions - since start of SS investigation we have not pursued a
criminal conviction which relies solely on Horizon computer system
evidence and we have also put on hold civil recovery proceedings in
certain cases whilst we await final report. But we do still have duty to
protect public money in other cases. . On the two 'exceptions' - we
proactively disclosed to SS two systems exceptions (or 'anomalies’)
where spmrs’ accounts have been affected. Our internal and system
processes identified these cases, appropriate action has been taken and
they did not lead to any disciplinary action against spmrs. No reason to
believe this means there are other undiscovered issues. (We are sorry
this information was not passed onto you at an earlier stage - if we had
considered to materially change the investigation we would have
flagged it directly, but it doesn't).]

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SPEAKING NOTES

Introductory points:
Thank you for agreeing to meet us.

SS provided us with an update following your call with them on
Tuesday morning.

Following that, would like to discuss with you:

a) Communications around the report and media/parliamentary
handling

b) The approach to the report itself and Monday's meeting

c) The approach beyond next Monday to close down other MPs'
cases and learn lessons

But first point to reiterate is that we take this whole process
extremely seriously indeed. That is why we set up the independent
investigation in the first place. It is important we get to the truth and
learn lessons where appropriate.

i) Communications around the report and media/parliamentary handling

Would be useful to understand your plans for communicating the
report to the media and Parliament. (Second Sight's read-out of your
conversation gave us some areas for concern.)

The single most important principle from our point of view is that
the report and the associated communications must be rigorous and
completed grounded in the facts. The Post Office is too important a
business to thousands of sub-postmasters and millions of customers
(and taxpayers) across the country for confidence to be undermined
unfairly.

From the SS update we have been made aware of the potential for
different interpretations on the definition of Horizon. Whilst we both
agree that the wider system is part of the review (as defined in the ToR)

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we consider that the report and communications should clearly
distinguish between the 'computer system! and the wider support
processes.

From what we have been told by SS so far, there is no evidence
in the interim report to support any suggestion of systemic failures with
the Horizon system (and this is based on the four "best" cases from all
those under review).

If this is the case, important that point is communicated clearly
given some of the original allegations against the system - otherwise
customer and agent confidence in the integrity of the system could be
fundamentally undermined.

This is not to belittle the importance of the overall user
experience for spmrs. It is essential that we continue to improve our
wider systems of support and training for agents, and we are grateful for
some of the additional insights generated by this investigation to date.
Many of these process issues are historical and have already been.
rectified through improved guidance to staff and training for spmrs - but
where further changes need to be made we will absolutely act on them.
Will come back to how we propose to engage JFSA and spmrs and
identifying further process improvements.

We're concerned to hear that you may have lined up an interview
with the BBC in advance of the report being shared. Keen to understand
your thinking here.

We will let you know our handling plan in relation to the media,
and share statements. We would be grateful if you were able to do the
same. You will appreciate the danger of the media exaggerating the
report and our need firmly to defend our reputation.

ii) The approach to the report itself and Monday's meeting

SS propose to share with us the draft report on Friday. We will
work urgently over the weekend to check for factual accuracy.

Clearly this issue has significant bearing on our main supplier for
Horizon, Fujitsu. They will therefore also be asked for their views on
the facts contained in the report before publication.

Our hope and expectation is that this fact checking and
consultation can be completed in time to allow the report to be shared
with MPs on Monday afternoon - but obviously an extremely tight
turnaround, so we will need to review the situation on Monday. If there
remain fundamental concerns around factual points, it would be better
for the report to be delayed rather than misleading statements to be
issued.

[If needed: none of this undermines the independence of the SS
investigation - on the contrary, our aim is to protect its credibility and
rigour. Also has parallels with the statutory process for public enquiries -
Inquiries Act 2005 recognises the need for 'Salmon letters! to give
appropriate warning to any person or organisation about whom criticism
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could be inferred from an enquiry.]

In terms of the meeting itself, we understand that the JFSA and
their lawyers will be in attendance alongside the invited MPs. As both
the commissioner and subject of the report, we would appreciate it if
you could also give us the option of sending observer representatives.
Most likely to involve one employee and one external lawyer. Will help
us to ensure we have a clear and accurate read-out of the meeting and
that we can follow-up on any queries or action points as appropriate.

iii) The approach beyond next Monday to close down other MPs' cases
and learn lessons

Clearly we recognise that the interim report does not cover all the
cases put to Second Sight. We agreed on this approach and we also
recognise the need to complete the review of the other cases put to
Second Sight by the JFSA and MPs.

We'd like to work with JFSA to continue this work but we do
have concerns about the process. It has taken too long, and we have to
have regard for the appropriate use of public money.

Need to stress as well that, in Second Sight's view, in around half
of the cases from MPs there is insufficient evidence on which to
investigate, despite requests for further information to be submitted.

So we suggest a refined approach for the remainder of the cases.
We want to set up a user group (chaired by CIO) which would meet
regularly to learn from experiences of spmrs and to provide a forum for
continual improvement.

We suggest that this would include JFSA and for the immediate
period the forum could (potentially) also include Second Sight and have
as its priority the completion of the reviews of the cases put to it. This
approach might be more effective than the process we have gone
through, which you will accept has not been perfect.

Once the cases put to us have been reviewed by the group and a
conclusion or conclusions reached, the forum would continue as a
structure through which we can continue to refine and improve our
processes.

We would hope that the JFSA would continue to be a part of this,
along with other interested parties such as the NFSP.

Additional point if needed

Depending on the tone of the meeting, it may be appropriate to address
head on JA's apparent annoyance at the issues around prosecutions and
the systems ‘exceptions’.

Current prosecutions

Since the start of the SS investigation we have not pursued a
criminal conviction which relies solely on Horizon computer system
evidence. We have also put on hold civil recovery proceedings in
certain cases whilst we await final report.

As you now, we also prepared an ‘immunity agreement’ with the
JFSA to provide reassurance to spmrs thinking of submitting evidence
to the process.

But in cases where it is clear that Horizon system isn't the issue,
we have a duty to take appropriate action to safeguard public money.
For criminal prosecutions we treat each matter on a case by case basis,
with a detailed investigation and legal review (generally involving
external lawyers).

Historical convictions

Nothing has emerged from the interim findings given to us by SS
which would point to specific convictions being unsafe. Cases have
been through the judicial process and the Court considers all relevant
evidence not just that relating to the Horizon computer system.

In the event that any person considers that there has been a
miscarriage of justice they have the right to apply to the Court of
Appeal to have their conviction reviewed.

System exceptions

We know of two systems exceptions (anomalies) under the
current Horizon system where spmrs' accounts have been affected, and
both were voluntary communicated to SS (although not directly related
to the cases under review).

Key point to note is that in both cases our processes picked up
these issues, appropriate remedial action has been taken and they did
not lead to any disciplinary action against the affected spmrs.

Absolutely no reason to believe this means there are other
undiscovered issues.

We are sorry this information was not passed onto you at an
earlier stage - if we had considered these cases to materially change the
investigation we would have flagged them directly to you, but in our
firm view they don't.

Further detail on the two cases if required:

The "62 branches exception" - 3 years old at the time of
migrating branches from old Horizon the HNG:

o Affected 62 branches (13 Crowns; 12 Multiples; 37 Sub
postmasters)

o Sub-postmaster branch losses ranged from £115.60 down to 8p

o Identified by Horizon's built-in checks and balances which are
designed to flag up these types of discrepancies. Appropriate action

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taken to rectify issue.

o 17 sub-postmasters were adversely affected, i.e. had a loss attribute
to their branch.

o Sub-postmasters notified in March 2011 and (where appropriate)
reimbursed.

o Sub-postmasters who made a gain through the anomaly were not
asked to refund this.
The "14 branches exception"

o Financially impacted 14 branches (4 Crowns; 5 Multiples; 5 Sub-
postmasters)

o Concerns an error where historic accounting entries in the 2010/11
financial year were replicated in accounts for 2011/12 and 2012/13,
only showing up a year later.

o Raised by 2 sub postmasters affected by the exception.

o 1 sub postmasters and 4 multiple partners were adversely affected,
ic. had a loss attribute to their branch.

o We suspended attempts to recover known losses from affected sub-
postmasters

o Letters to notified sub-postmasters will be sent out imminently
0 The worst loss to a branch would have been £9,799.88. This was
one of the first cases notified, so no recovery action was progressed.

Other losses ranged from £113.14 down to a penny.

o Action underway to modify the system to prevent any repeat of this
exception

Martin Edwards I Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive

ttp://www.postoffice.co.uk/>

@postofficenews<http://www.twitter.com/postofficenews>

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<20130703 Briefing Note re Second Sight Interim Report - 02 07 13
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