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Message
From: Lesley J Sewell (lesley.j.sewell
Sent: 25/06/2013 21:07:59
To: Simon Baker [simon.baker
cc: Alwen Lyons [alwen. lyons:
Subject: Re: Two System Defects
Simon
I don't know if it went higher than Mike, Andy Mc also managed the service at the time and if I remember correctly Mark
Burley was also involved.
I can't say whether we said anything to the press.
Other points - our Board at the time would have been Royal Mail as we didn't have an independent Board. Paula would
have been Network Director at the time with Dave Smith as MD.
Lesley J Sewell
Chief Information Officer, Post Office Ltd
EC1V 9HQ
Email: lesley.j.sewell¢
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b wrote:
Just got this from Ron.
I can get back to him on the most of the questions but need your help on who in Post Office knew about
it. I know from the email that Rod sent that Mike Young knew, but don’t know if it went any higher.
Also, I don’t think we went to press on this issue, but Ruth did mention that we may have said
something about the problems we were experiencing during the roll out of HNG, so maybe we can point
to that — lil ask Ruth.
Simon
From: Simon Baker
Sent: 25 June 2013 21:23
To: 'Ron Warmington’
Subject: RE: Two System Defects
Sensitivity: Confidential
Ron
{will get back to you tomorrow. I need to double check a few things first.
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In terms of numbers, the first incident is either 62 or 64 (the spreadsheet shows 64, the report says 62} I
will investigate why there is a difference between the two tomorrow, The second incident is 14.
I will get back to you on the other things tomorrow.
Simon
From: Ron Warmington
Sent: 25 June 2013 19:11
To: Simon Baker
Subject: Two System Defects
Sensitivity: Confidential
Simon:
This is the draft section of the report dealing with the two defects. Please let me
know if I've got anything wrong. I'm afraid that the POL/Fujitsu Reports on the
defects don't cover everything I need to know (including how the shortages and
surpluses impacted the SPMRs AT THE TIME... i.e. before the defects were
detected). I also need to know whether, after the defects were detected, the
SPMRs who had made good shortages that they should not have made good, were
reimbursed... and if so how many months later (than the end of the TP where they
made good the incorrect amounts). I think you said they were all reimbursed in
due course.
Also, the first report (on the Receipts and Payments Mismatch Problem) mentions,
on page 2 of 30, "this will assist in explaining the issue to senior management and,
if necessary, the Press". Can you please let me know whether, when and who (at
Board level) was informed about this defect (and also the later Local Suspense
Account defect) and whether any Press Release was issued in respect of either of
them? If so, may I please see a copy of that?
Also, you quoted the number of branches impacted by the two defects (Gareth
calls them "bugs" by the way) as 62. Looks like 77 to me (63 on the first and 14 on
the second).
EXTRACT FROM INTERIM REPORT (Draft):
POL has recently disclosed to Second Sight that, in 2011 and 2012, it
had discovered "defects" in Horizon online that had impacted 77 sub
post offices.
The first defect, referred to as the "Receipts and Payments Mismatch
Problem", impacted 63 branches. It was discovered in September 2010
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as a result of Fujitsu's monitoring of system events (although there
were subsequent calls from branches). The aggregate of the
discrepancies arising from this system defect was £9,029, the largest
shortfall being £777 and the largest surplus £7,044. It is not yet clear
whether the SPMRs with the surpluses profited from them or whether
those showing shortages had to make them good.
The second defect, referred to as the “Local Suspense Account
Problem", affected 14 branches, and generated discrepancies
aggregating to £4,486 including a shortfall of £9,800 at one branch and
a surplus of £3,200 at another (the remaining 12 branches were all
impacted by figures lower than £161). POL was unaware of this defect
until, a year after its first occurrence in 2011, it re-occurred and an
unexplained shortfall was reported by an SPMR. POL's initial
investigations failed to reveal the system defect and, because the cause
could not be identified, the amount was written off. Fujitsu eventually
looked into the matter early in 2013 and discovered, and then corrected,
the system defect. It seems, however, that the shortfalls (and
surpluses) that occurred at the first occurrence (in 2011) resulted in
the SPMRs being asked to make good incorrect amounts.
END OF REPORT EXTRACT
Best regards,
Ron Warmington, CFE, FCA
Director
2nd Sight Support Services Ltd
Tythe Farm
Maugersbury
Cheltenham
Gloucestershire
GL54 1HR
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