POL00030393 - Electronic memorandum by the Post Office on acceptance and business impact

Evidence on official site

POL00030393
POL00030393

10 AUG 1999 - S21

Electronic memo

To David W Miller/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Bruce
McNiven/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Keith K
Baines/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Keith
Falconer/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Andrew
Radka/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Christopher French@MAILHUB,
John Meagher/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Naresh Mohindra@MAILHUB, David X
Smith/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Gail Morley/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Don
Grey/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Ann Nevinson/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE

cc Min Burdett/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Graeme Seedall/POCL/POSTOFFICE, Mark
Burley/POCL/POSTOFFICE, David
McLaughlin/POCL/POSTOFFICE@POSTOFFICE, Peter G
Jones/POCL/POSTOFFICE

Hard Copy To

Hard Copy cc

From Ruth Holleran/POCL/POSTOFFICE

Date 09/08/99 19:15

Subject Fwd: POCL Acceptance and Business Impact Assessment
All

POCL Business impact assessment against proposed high severity Als positioned as work in
progress and to meet deadline of close of play today.

We need to refine and polish assessments further over the next 24 hours in the event some of
these may go forward into dispute. I will liaise direct with Keith Baines on this.

I would welcome any comments to strengthen our position.

Ruth

To
ce
Hard Copy To
Hard Copy cc

From Ruth Holleran/POCL/POSTOFFICE

Date 09/08/99 19:06

Subject POCL Acceptance and Business Impact Assessment
Mike

Please find attached details of POCL's draft business impact for the proposed High severity
rating incidents.

Ruth Holleran
POL00030393
POL00030393

Draft High Impact.do
POL00030393

POL00030393
POCL Business Impact Analysis of Proposed High Acceptance Incidents
Prepared on 9" August by Ruth Holleran - Draft - Work in Progress
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity
376 The business impact of these three The ICL Pathway service is an integral part of _I 376 376 376
410 requirements are the same, and so are POCL'’s client accounting system - indeed the High High
411 described together here. service is an accounting service. As such it The POCL position is that this incident is
accounts for turnover of £140 billion per annum I high severity and that the analysis 410 410
376. Data Integrity - TIP derived cash involving some 3 billion transactions. Given provided by Pathway is unacceptable for I None High
account not equal to electronic cash the scale of this system even the smallest of the following reasons:
account received by TIP. defects is capable of generating error within the 411 411
accounts of very significant amounts. i) There is no explanation as to how None High

In certain circumstances transactions are
recorded at the outlet with a missing
attribute, e.g. start time and mode. The

reason these attributes are omitted has not
yet been explained by Pathway. At the end
of the day, Pathway’s TPS harvester polls

the transactions from the outlets and
validates them before they are passed to

TIP. Any transactions with these attributes

omitted will fail the validation and not be
passed to TIP.

Pathway also poll the weekly cash account

from each outlet and passes this to TIP.
Transactions with missing attributes are

correctly recorded on the cash account and

are passed from the outlet, via the TPS
harvester into TIP. One of the processes
currently performed by TIP is to derive a
cash account from the daily transaction

A major component of the current system is the
matching of the underlying transaction stream
to summary totals on the cash account. There
are currently logged incidents where both the
underlying transaction stream is incomplete and
transactions are being “missed” when the
service accumulates the summary cash account
line. These faults were identified as a result of
special controls put in place by POCL to
monitor the live trial and not by any system
based control operated by ICL Pathway which
in turn are part of POCL’s requirements. It is
not known when if at all ICL Pathways controls
would have detected these fundamental and by
inference whether such controls are effective.

POCL has not seen a detailed description of the
faults creating the missing data neither has it
seen any description of how and when these

Pathway propose to meet R891/02 -
i.e. the need for them to reconcile the
two streams of data.

ii) There is no explanation on the real
cause of the problem, i.e. the reason
why the data attributes are omitted in
the first place?

iii) further detail is required on the fix,
e.g. if the date is omitted from the
first transaction of the day, first
transaction for a SU, etc. The
solution does not indicate what date
the TPS harvester applies in these
scenarios and why.

iv) The solution does not explain how it
will prevent transactions being
recorded against the incorrect mode,
e.g. a remittance as a serve customer
transaction. Invalid item transaction
modes could result.

POL00030393

POL00030393
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity

files and compare this with the cash
account received from Pathway. This
process - which is only being performed
on a temporary basis - has revealed
differences as a result of the above.

The cause of this incident is that, on
occasions, the counter system records a
transaction without all the data attributes
for the transaction which are required by
the TPS harvester to send it on to TIP.
However this does not impact the
transaction being recorded in the cash
account file sent to TIP.

Pathways proposed fix involves the TPS
harvester inserting the required data as
follows:

i) inserting the start time based on the
end time of the previous transaction;
ii)

in every occasion

The fix was applied on 3/8 and we need to

allow a full cash account period for

monitoring before this can be cleared due
to the multiplicity of data integrity issues.

This is the period over which the original

test was performed. (NB the cash account

for w/e 4" August; week 19 can only be
partially included as the fix was applied

inserting the mode as ‘Serve Customer’

faults will be fixed. ICL Pathway have
admitted that they do not yet understand the
root cause of the problem A workround has
been offered but by ICL Pathways own
admission this will not present a complete
solution to the faults in the service nor has
POCL had visibility of the testing plan to ensure
that the fix does not introduce further problems.

It is a fundamental of any accounting system
that it provides a complete and accurate record
of all transactions. The ICL Pathway system
does not support this fundamental. For example
in week 17 there were 89 differences in 20
outlets which extrapolates to 5500 differences
over the entire network. For week 18 there
were 2451 differences experienced in 67 outlets
which extrapolates to 150k differences over the
entire network.

These “gaps” in data will ultimately be reflected
in balance sheet accounts. The nature of these
gaps is such that POCL will not be able to
readily explain them. To this end our external
auditors operating within generally accepted
accounting practice will insist that any debit
balances are written to Profit and Loss account
whilst credit amounts are retained on the
balance sheet. Given the nature of the errors
concerned the potential is for these write offs to
be significant threatening the business
performance against shareholder targets and

v) The analysis does not explain
whether the fix is temporary or
permanent. If it is temporary, the
analysis needs to state why a
permanent fix is not being applied at
this stage, when the permanent fix
will be applied, what the permanent
fix will be and how we will know
whether the permanent fix works.

vi) Changing the transaction data in this
way impacts on the audit trail, i.e. the
transaction data received by TIP will
be different to that leaving the outlet
as the attributes are added.

vii) The proposal to reduce the severity
from high to medium if the frequency
falls is unacceptable because the
principle here is that if it happens
once, it means incidents can occur
and hence the fix is not working
correctly. Only a frequency rate of
zero - during an agreed period of
monitoring - should enable the
severity rating to be changed.

viii) If we accept the temporary fix, we
need to understand how we will
monitor any permanent fix as the TIP
processing in this area is only a
temporary measure. We will rely on
Pathway’s reconciliation of the two
data streams and we will therefore
need to assure ourselves that their

POL00030393

POL00030393
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity

during the week.) Any analysis provided
by Pathway should explain how they
propose to comply with R891/02 - which
effectively means they should be doing the
reconciliation currently being performed
by TIP.

410

This incident was previously recorded
under AI376. However as the effect is
different, this now stands alone. It refers to
a scenario resulting in the TIP derived cash
account, calculated from Pathways daily
transaction files, exceeding the transaction
totals in the Pathway cash account. (Refer
to description of AI376 for more detail on
this process). It is this latter cash account
stream that feeds the POCL accounting
processes via CBDB.

Pathway analysis - provided against AI376
- indicates the root cause as being a change
in the POCL data attributes relating to a
particular item (product). Some products
are available to all outlets, others to only a

potentially as a going concern.

These balances are also the basis of settlement
with clients. Failure to settle accurately with
clients could place POCL in breach of contract.
Many clients have a right of audit. For
government clients this is usually the National
Audit Office. The results of such audits can
feature in NAO opinions on the accounts of
Government Agencies. Such comments are a
matter of public record. Integrity failures
could thus become a matter of public record
damaging the reputation of POCL. Integrity
is one of the major attributes of the brand
such damage would, therefore, be
substantial.

Finally this level of difference is operationally
unsustainable. The level of resource necessary
to investigate and resolve these differences is
significant at the 5500 level and at the higher
level the resource requirements are impractical
i.e. there would be a complete breakdown of
POCL’s back end accounting as the effort
required would be unsustainable - error levels
are currently running at twice the normal pre-
horizon baseline. In addition, the absolute
increase at the 5500 level would increase error
processing costs by £8.3m per annum and
effectively double the size of the TP workload.

processes for doing this
reconciliation are acceptable.

ix) the frequency suggested by Pathway
does not match the result identified
by TIP.

As with AI 410, and AI 411, POCL
regard Pathway as non compliant on
R891/02 and require a proposal from
Pathway for reconciliation of the 2 data
streams within the Pathway domain
before closure of this incident which is
judged by POCL to be high.

410

Requirement 818/08 states ‘EPOSS shall
be a robust Service, including features
to:

a) check internal consistency, reporting
errors, warning of non critical errors
and preventing critical errors;

refuse deletions if there is a
dependent business data which would
lead to inconsistency of data within
the Service Infrastructure;

c) make Reference Data available at the
counter terminals;

check Reference Data consistency
and report exceptions.

b)

d)

The POCL view is that this criterion has

POL00030393

POL00030393
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity

portion of the network. This is expressed
through an attribute setting of ‘core’ or
‘non-core’.

4i1

This incident was previously recorded
under AI376 but has been separated as the
cause is now understood to be different.
Similarly to AI 376, the detailed
transaction stream was incorrect as
transactions were not passed from TPS to
TIP resulting in the cash account stream
being greater than the transaction stream.
(Refer to description of AI376 for more
detail on this process).

The problem was manifested through a
reconciliation failure on 2451 cash account
lines across 67 outlets during week 18. It is
not known how many transactions were
lost although this must be a minimum of

not been met, particularly in relation to
part ‘b’.

POCL also require evidence that
integrity checks in support of R818/08
are sufficient for all Business data. In the
absence of this evidence, the integrity of
the data that drives the central
accounting process is in question. This
incident is therefore adjudged high in
line with AI376 and AI411.

As with AI 376, and AI 411, POCL
regard Pathway as non compliant on
R891/02 and require a proposal from
Pathway for reconciliation of the 2 data
streams within the Pathway domain
before closure of this incident which is
judged by POCL to be high

411

‘The Pathway rectification proposed for
TIP incident 889 appears acceptable to
POCL at a high level. However a date
for the fix to the agents software is
required as is a detailed proposal of how
Pathways processes are intended to work
- this proposal needs to be agreed by
POCL and should explain how Pathway
will identify missing transactions, given
this was only identified by TIP.

POL00030393
POL00030393

Incident No

Business Description

Business Impact

Current Position including
rectification requirements.

Pathway
Severity

POCL
Severity

2451 which constitutes serious client
settlement and outlet reconciliation
failures. This applies regardless of the
value of these transactions - which may net
out to a negligible amount.

The analysis from Pathway indicates that
the root cause is a wholesale ‘data
replication’ failure due to conflicting
system processes following an unusual
failure condition

A date is also required for recovery of
the missing transactions and this needs to
be agreed with TIP.

As with AI 376, and AI 410, POCL
regard Pathway as non compliant on
R891/02 and require a proposal from
Pathway for reconciliation of the 2 data
streams within the Pathway domain
before closure of this incident which is
judged by POCL to be high.

298

Evidence from live trial shows that the
counter system is subject to ‘lockups’ and
‘system freezes’, where the system halts in
mid-processing giving the user no
opportunity to take any corrective action
other than re-booting the system. This is
either exhibited by the system hanging or
presenting a blank blue screen. The user is
forced to ring the HSH and is advised to
reboot the system.

This incident related to criterion 536-01.
“Peripheral and input devices supplied as
part of the elements of the Service

Infrastructure on which OPS is provided
shall be reliable, robust and easy to use”.

Estimate of outlet cost (this impact should be
updated when Pathway System management log
report is received):

1

POCL analysis based on telephone review
with outlets. This indicates that 56 outlets
affected in week 19 with system freeze.

. POCL estimated that on average 40 minutes

to: log call with help desk; re-boot system;
recover transactions (1 and 2 position
offices) undertaken in manual fall-back
mode.

. Indicate, conservatively, a cost of £2.6

million per annum.

Other impacts not quantified:

1.

2.

Extreme frustration and loss of confidence
by sub-postmasters in the system.

Adverse impact on customers perception of
the service

. Increase in HSH and NBSC Helpdesk calls

to authorise the need to re-boot

Pathway analysis received 9/8. This was
based on HSH log, and not an analysis of
re-boots from their System Management
Log as requested by POCL. Pathway
indicate that the HSH log reduces this
incident to acceptable numbers.
However, outlets are learning that the
recovery action is to re-boot, and are not
calling the Help Desk for many
incidents. Therefore POCL has
discounted the HSH log data in this
instance.

In addition, Pathway have not given

POCL confidence that they understand

the root cause of these system freezes

and lock-up. Reduction in severity will

require:

1. Root cause analysis discussed with
POCL

2. Rectification plan agreed

Low

High

POL00030393

POL00030393
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity
4. OBCS - unable to perform 100% checks on I 3. Pathway reporting accurate numbers
order books without recourse to HSH - of incidents from the outlets
therefore increase in transaction time - 4. To reduce to Medium - no more
assumed extra time 119 seconds per than 10 outlets per week (observed
transaction. over a period of 2 weeks for the 299
5. Client SLA/confidence LT outlets)
6. Risk of errors and impact on TP due to 5. To reduce Incident to low - no more
increased errors in fall-back than 2% per week of outlets with
7. Severe disruption to POCL's critical system freezes and lockups observed
operating process over a 5 week period
6. To clear incident - to be agreed.
300 Evidence from live trial indicates that The analysis of the business impact is similar to I No Pathway analysis seen. Low High

should the printer fail during operation, the
system may lock up rather than handling
the error normally. This has been
observed even when the printer has only
run out of paper. This has been observed
in the back office printer, and its main
impact has been on the time it takes to
produce the cash account.

This incident related to criterion 536-01.
“Peripheral and input devices supplied as
part of the elements of the Service
Infrastructure on which OPS is provided
shall be reliable, robust and easy to use”.

298.

Estimate of outlet cost (this impact should be
updated when Pathway System management log
report is received):

1. POCL analysis based on telephone review
with outlets. This indicates that 56 outlets
(NB this is a coincidence - this is not the
same 56 affected by other system freezes)
affected in week 19 with system freeze.

2. POCL estimated that on average 40 minutes
to: log call with help desk; re-boot system;
recover balance position.

3. Indicate, conservatively, a cost of £2.6
million per annum.

Other impacts not quantified:

1. Frustration and loss of confidence by sub-

Pathway have not given POCL
confidence that they understand the root
cause of these system freezes and lock-
ups due to printing problems. Reduction
in severity will require:

1. Root cause analysis discussed with

POCL

. Rectification plan agreed

3. Pathway reporting accurate numbers
of incidents from the outlets

4. To reduce to Medium - no more
than 10 outlets per week (observed
over a period of 2 weeks for the 299
LT outlets)

5. To reduce Incident to low - no more
than 4% per week of outlets with
system freezes and lockups observed
over a5 week period

N

POL00030393

POL00030393
Incident No Business Description Business Impact Current Position including Pathway I POCL
rectification requirements. Severity I Severity
postmasters in the system. 6. To clear incident - to be agreed.
2. Impact on customers’ perception of the
service
3. HSH and NBSC Helpdesk calls
4. Client SLA/confidence
5. Risk of errors and impact on TP
372 This incident addresses failures in In the LT2 implementation, 288 out of 299 Pathway have submitted, as part of their I Pending I High

Pathway’s system management function outlets were upgraded by 10:30 on Monday. 8 I analysis of the incident, a report which
following problems observed as part of the I of the offices were still outstanding at close of __I has been reviewed by POCL. However,
implementation of the LT2 maintenance business the following Wednesday representing I the report is insufficient to close the

release. 2.7% of the outlets. Extrapolating this to the —_I incident with many questions remaining
full network would mean that some 500 outlets I unanswered. These questions (39 in

The incident related to: would not be upgraded - this is unacceptable. number) have been put to Pathway on 8
Even though it appears that user intervention August and we await a reply.

537-01 may have been part of the problem, we have no

476-05 confidence that Pathway could manage even a Until our questions are satisfactorily

476-04 performance with the same results to the full answered and an appropriate rectification
network because the difference in scale will plan has been agreed this incident
compound any difficulties. remains of High severity.

This description represents a post hoc analysis
and at the time Pathway were not able to advise
which outlets had not been upgraded as
planned. In addition, a number of outlets were
left with a corruption to a .dll file which
subsequently resulted in corruption of business
data. The business impact has a dual
perspective: firstly, the failure to implement a
release successfully in all outlets and secondly,
the ineffective rectification of the problem.

POL00030393
POL00030393

Incident No

Business Description

Business Impact

Current Position including
rectification requirements.

Pathway
Severity

POCL
Severity

The business impact is:

1. outlets may not be able to sell products

2. outlets may sell products they are not
authorised to sell

3. outlets may sell products at the wrong price

4. outlets may wrongly account for items

5. outlets are likely to have an increased error
rate

6. circumstances are possible where the outlets
would be unable to use the horizon system

218

Training Course cash account module is
inadequate

POCL’s review of the training rectification
analysis will be issued on 10" August. Business
impact already explained.

384

Sequent failover time

Awaiting Pathway’s report of re-test results

Loss of accounting integrity due to
printing failures

To follow