POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
Post Office Investigation Report
Branch Name: Bowburn Branch Code: 233313 Case Number: M007
Applicant Name: I Mr Rajinder __I Status of Case: I Mediation Date of 31" Jan 2004
Singh Bilkhu Application Appointment:
Executive summary
The Applicant, Mr Rajinder Singh Bilkhu (RSB) claims that the shortfall of £25,174.08 (detailed in CQR Nov
2013) at Bowburn Post Office was as a result of issues with Training and Support (including the Helpline and
Audit), faults with Horizon and transaction corrections in relation to Lottery Scratch Cards.
The Applicant was appointed to Bowburn Post Office on 31" January 2004. Whilst the records of the actual
training delivered to the Applicant are no longer retained, due to the training having taken place 10 years ago,
the training he would have received at that time would have been between 5 and 10 days (depending on
products transacted in branch) classroom training followed by up to 10 days on site training support.
There was a support visit (2nd June 2004) from Post Office, four months after the Applicant took up
appointment as Subpostmaster, during which he was recorded as saying he had “got slicker” at balancing and
accounting.
A request for further training was made on 12™ June 2004: “New Spmr in post, at time of training branch was
extremely busy so Spmr is still unclear about daily & weekly dispatch and balancing procedures.
There are two further support visits (Performance Advisor Interventions): 12" Jan 2005 and 28" Jan 2005 that
refer to error notices (transaction corrections) and the Applicant's unhappiness with the amount of losses and
his reluctance to make good these discrepancies. Another request for further training on balancing and
branch trading was made 24" Nov 2005.
‘An audit of Bowburn Post Office on 10" June 2008 revealed a net shortage of £4025.51 and included a
shortage in the Lottery scratchcards of £4342.00. The Applicant raised a dispute with Post Office regarding
the scratchcard loss.
The Applicant was precautionary suspended in October 2009 after another audit in the branch revealed a
discrepancy of £4,562.13; this included £4317.00 loss that the Applicant referred to as a disputed scratchcard
loss. This was the scratchcard loss that had been carried from the previous audit in June 2008. The Applicant
was on holiday at the time of the audit and was therefore not present on the day. He was subsequently
reinstated in November 2009, after he was interviewed by the branch Contract Advisor, Andy Carpenter. The
Applicant made good the discrepancy on the day of the interview.
The Applicant previously instigated a legal case against Post Office, alleging faults with Horizon but
subsequently dropped the case.
The Applicant has kept detailed records of calls and letters regarding issues that have occurred in his branch.
The Applicant has explored different avenues within Post Office and the Legal System to find a resolution to
the issues he claims he has had in the branch.
Conclusion
Based on the evidence examined as part of the Mediation Scheme investigation, Post Office’s conclusion is
that the cause of shortfalls is highly likely to be operational errors in the branch by the Applicant or his staff
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
(such as mishandling cash, mis-keying transactions into Horizon, etc). In some instances and as detailed in
this report, Post Office has been able to identify an error due to it causing a reconciliation discrepancy against
some other accounting record. Where this has happened, Post Office has issued a transaction correction to
correct that error, However, Post Office is unable to determine the precise nature of some of the branch
errors as, by their very nature, these errors happened in branch and were therefore outside of Post Office's
knowledge or control, Nevertheless, the fact that the errors have arisen in branch mean that they, and any
consequential shortfalls, are the responsibility of the Applicant.
Post Office acknowledges that the Applicant did require/request further training four months after
appointment as Subpostmaster and further support was given through intervention visits in 2004 and 2005.
The Applicant has, during his tenure, disputed a number of transactions and/or transaction corrections with
Post Office and on investigation these have been found to be user error. The findings from these
investigations were communicated to the Applicant, although he was reluctant to accept Post Office’s
conclusion.
‘The other issues raised by the Applicant have been investigated and addressed in this report with the
conclusion being that Horizon did not cause any discrepancies.
The Applicant’s complaint
The Applicant’s Case Questionnaire Response (CQR) raises the following areas of complaint, which are
addressed in the “Response to issues raised by Applicant” section of this document:
* Training and Support including the Helpline and Audit
* Lack Of Support from Post Office Helpline
* Faults with Horizon
* Transaction Corrections -Lottery Scratch Cards
* Subsequent to the Applicant submitting his initial CQR, he has raised further issues of perceived
faults with Horizon and confusing and contradictory information supplied to him by Post Office
personnel.
The Applicant seeks the following:
* £635,756.99 for the financial impact which he claims to have suffered.
+ The Post Office to issue an apology to the Applicant and his family.
* Removal of the “final warning” status.
* Post Office to assist in the identification of any current or future differences and to establish why
such differences occur.
Case Review Actions
Summary of the information collated by Post Office
Information available from Post Office records:
Information area Information Information not Information not available for
provided with available as beyond other reason
this response retention period
Branch Audit and x
Training Records
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
NBSC Call Logs
Electronic Filing Cabinet
Horizon Service Desk
Transaction Corrections
><] ><I ><] ><] ><
Financial Dispute
Resolution
Sub Postmaster Contract I X
Response to issues raised by Applicant
Issue raised
Investigation findings
1 Training and Support
including the Helpline and
Audit
Training records for the time of the Applicant’s appointment are
outside of the Post Office retention period. However several
records are held on the Post Office Electronic Filing Cabinet (EFC),
documenting that several intervention visits took place at the
branch from June 2004 — May 2005 (Refer to Docs 001, 002, 003,
and 004},
The Applicant claims, at this time, there were problems with
banking transactions on Horizon. Although the Post Office records
are not detailed, the evidence suggests that ad-hoc training visits
were requested and delivered. Further training records (Refer to
Docs 009,010,011,012 and 013) support this.
Operations Manuals were available in branch and a weekly
“Counter News” was sent to every branch in the network. These
publications provided details on how to process alll transactions in
branch and included detailed balancing guide. The Network
Business Support Centre (NBSC) helpline was also available.
The branch contacted NBSC on 238 occasions in the 10 year period
from February 2004 to October 2013. The available evidence
suggests that calls were transferred correctly and proper advice
given. The log of all calls made are enclosed (Refer to Doc 022)
with specific calls as follows:
2006 ~ 1 call on the 8" September 2006 relating to a fault with the
online banking system (Refer to Doc 017}
2008 ~ 1 call on the 14” February 2008 relating to replaced
terminal being stored by Fujitsu (Refer to Doc 018)
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
2010 — 1 call on 14” July 2010 relating to a bill payment and 2 calls
on 4" August 2010 regarding National Lottery processes {Refer to
Doc 019).
2012 - 4 calls in August 2012 regarding system failure and Fujitsu
response to fault (Refer to Doc 020).
2013 ~ 1 call in January 2013 blaming Horizon for on-going
shortages in branch (Refer to Doc 021).
It would be expected that as a Subpostmaster became more
experienced in his role, the level of calls to the NBSC would
decrease; it appears the opposite in this case as the level has
increased.
After an audit in June 2008 (Refer to Doc 005}, the Applicant was
advised that the lottery scratch card figures should be adjusted to
state the true amounts held, and any resulting shortage dealt with
at the end of the trading period. At the following audit in October
2009 (Refer To Doc 006) the lottery scratch cards shortage was still
outstanding. The Applicant was suspended at this time; Section
12, Paragraph 4— ACCOUNTS of the Subpostmaster’s contract
(Refer to Doc 035) from the time of the Applicant’s appointment is
of particular importance to this case. The audit was conducted in
line with the audit process manual.
The Post Office audit records are available from 2008 (Refer to Doc
08). There is also evidence of a further risk audit being carried out
in July 2011 (Refer to Doc 007).
2 Faults with the Horizon
system, causing losses in the
branch Cash Account
The Applicant claims that issues arose after the Horizon terminal
upgrade in October 2004; this period is outside of Post Office’s
retention period so Post Office is unable to investigate further.
(Refer to Doc 016).
The Applicant has submitted call logs from the Horizon Service
Desk (HSD) from June 2005 —October 2006. In general, the calls
relate to issues with on line services and printer problems; all of
which have been resolved by Fujitsu.
In September 2006, the logs indicate a problem with the “On Line
Connection”; this call was open for 21 days and appears to have
been caused by a problem with the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber
Line (ADSL) that could only be resolved by BT. While both BT and
Fujitsu appear to have done everything they could to resolve the
issue as soon as possible, it appears to have left the Applicant
unable to process any online transactions during this time.
However there is no indication that this fault would have caused
any discrepancies at the branch.
On Thursday 23" August 2012 at 08:00, the Applicant reported to
HSD that Horizon was offline; HSD advised the Applicant to reboot
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
Horizon which resolved the issue and closed the call by 08:23
(Refer to Doc 039}.
On Friday 24" August 2012 15:15, the Applicant called HSD again
to report the same problem (Refer to Doc 040), namely the
terminal could not access “online services’. The fault could not be
resolved over the phone, so an engineer visit was requested. As
Monday was a bank holiday, the engineer did not arrive on- site
until Tuesday 28" August at 12:00.
Fujitsu engineers are trained to follow a set protocol for dealing
with faults; in this instance the fault appeared to be with the ADSL
connection that enables Horizon to communicate and send
information. The connections work by splitting the phone line into
two separate channels, one for data (Internet) and one for voice
(phone calls), which means you can talk on the phone and be
connected to the internet at the same time. The engineer carried
out the set protocol test and replaced the ADSL cables in branch.
This engineer closed down the call at 13:16. However, the
Applicant contacted the HSD again after the engineer had left as
he could not log on to the system.
The engineer returned to the site at 16:35 and performed a further
test on the phone line. When these tests had been carried out the
engineer could then determine that the fault was outside of the
branch at the BT exchange, the fault was then escalated to BT
It appears that the fault was again with the BT exchange. BT
resolved the fault by the 31 August 2012. This is a similar
problem to the one previously detailed within this report in 2006.
However, as before, there is no indication that this fault would
have caused any discrepancies in the branch's accounts.
Post Office records show that the Applicant lodged a complaint
with the NBSC (Refer to Doc 037), and requested a good will
payment as Horizon was not working in his branch for one
week. At the time, this was investigated by Laura Darby (Post
Office Service Support, IT and Change); the Applicant’s request for
a good will payment was refused (Refer to Doc 041). Although
there was a fault at the branch, this only affected one terminal,
and the branch was still able to operate with the other two
Horizon terminals.
Post Office response to Spot Review One explains the process for
recovering transactions on Horizon and Spot Review 10 explains
what happens after power or communication failures on Horizon.
{Refer to Doc 027).
On the 14" July 2010, the Applicant reported a fault to the NBSC
regarding an issue with a payment of a Post Office Credit Card; he
claims the transaction for £102.99 settled itself. On this occasion,
it appears the Applicant reversed the transaction at the time so
suffered no financial loss. However he states he keeps getting
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
issues like this (Refer to Doc 023).
At the time, the NBSC and HSD tried to resolve the issue. The
Applicant asserts that the HSD offered as an explanation that the
Horizon screen could be “settling itself”. This may not have been
the best terminology to use as it may have related to an old issue
around screen calibration.
On the 31* July, the Applicant contacted Andy Carpenter
(Contracts Advisor Post Office) regarding this issue, seemingly
convinced that transactions were settling themselves.
The transaction was investigated and it was concluded that user
error was the cause of the problem. (Refer to Doc 023)On the 31%
August 2010, Andy Winn (Branch Analyst Post Office) wrote to the
Applicant explaining that:
“The interrogation of the events logs by our IT supplier has
indicated that the transaction at 11.06 was settled by choosing the
“cash” button. This would explain why the transaction completed
before the customers debit card was even inserted. The required
debit card transaction was then completed at 11.07 and the “cash”
transaction correctly reversed at 11.33.”
The letter also recorded the investigation’s finding that the
transaction did not “settle itself” but had been “processed
correctly”. (Refer to Doc 024},
The Applicant makes further claims in his CQR regarding bank
giro/cheques/postage labels/stamps and phone cards. He also
claims to have settled £10,862.97 in cash shortages between
February 2004 and January 2006, and continues to have to settle
shortages.
The Applicant, however, has provided no explanation or reason
regarding why the losses suffered in the branch (which appear
from the CQR to be an aggregation of a number of irregular, lower
value losses rather than any single, large loss) were attributable to
problems with Horizon, and the transaction documents for any
shortages incurred between February 2004 and January 2006 are
no longer available as they are now outside normal document
retention periods.
There is a record of a complaint the Applicant made to the NBSC in
April 2007. The Applicant claimed a software problem with E-Top
transactions. However the explanation given and highlighted at
the time (Refer to Doc 038) is the most likely explanation. The
Applicant claimed that Horizon was producing E-Top vouchers
without having to swipe an E-Top card through the system and this
proved a fault with Horizon. This is incorrect as Icons are available
on Horizon that enables vouchers to be printed without the use of
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
a swipe card,
Again Post Office records are not detailed, but the issue was
passed on at the time to the Applicant’s Business Development
Manager (BDM) Rachael Oyston.
The Applicant claims that a base station was removed from his
branch in February 2009 and stored by Fujitsu; several documents
held on the Post Office Electronic Filing Cabinet (EFC) and
submitted by the Applicant support this claim.
Andy Dunks (Security Operations Post Office Account Fujitsu) has
confirmed that the base unit is being stored in their secure room
in Bracknell (Refer to Doc 025 A and 8). No investigation has
been carried out on the terminal but system wide tests on
Horizon found no systemic issues (Refer to Doc 026).
Also held on the EFC is correspondence between the Applicant and
Post Office Financial Dispute Resolution team in relation to
Transaction Corrections, which were issued to the branch and
concluded that losses at the branch were not caused by the
Horizon system.
The branch losses at Bowburn therefore appear to be the result of
human action.
3 Transaction Process —Namely
National Lottery Scratchcards
It appears that the Applicant has sent several letters of complaint
to Post Office regarding issues with Transaction Corrections issued
against his branch for incorrect accounting for National Lottery
transactions, The matter was investigated fully by Andy Winn
(Branch Analyst Post Office) at the time and his findings were
passed on to the Applicant
Andy confirms in his letter to the Applicant, dated October 2008
(Refer to Doc 015}, that the Post Office Lottery Team carried out a
full investigation and the transaction corrections issued proved
valid, Andy goes on to state that “as far as Post Office Ltd is
concerned this matter is at an end”. On balance, Andy’s letter to
the Applicant did highlight that there was a delay in Post Office
contacting the Applicant to inform him of the error. This was due
to achange in Post Office internal accounting systems.
Post Office’s response to Spot Review 22 explains the processes
for activating and REMMING in lottery scratch cards. (Refer to Doc
028)
4 The Post Office to issue an
Apology to the Applicant and
Remove the “final warning”
status.
In October 2009, the Applicant was precautionary suspended by
Andrew Carpenter (Contracts Advisor Post Office), and was
reinstated in November 2009 by Andrew, on a final opportunity to
improve his performance as Subpostmaster of Bowburn Post
Office (Refer to Doc 029). The Applicant accepted this warning at
the time and agreed to improve his performance ‘Refer to Doc
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
030).
Andrew Carpenter who issued the “final warning” to the Applicant
{Refer to Doc 034), believes the warning was a proportionate
response and properly given and sees no reason why this should
be removed,
Post Office has apologised to the Applicant on several occasions
regarding minor misunderstandings within his previous
correspondence.
5 Post Office to assist in the
identification of any current
or future differences and to
establish why such
differences occur
Investigations have highlighted that on each occasion when the
Applicant has asked for assistance regarding issues with National
Lottery and Bill Payments, a full investigation has been carried out
by the Branch Analyst Team and an explanation supplied to the
Applicant.
In 2005, Rachael Oyston was the Area Intervention Manager for
the Applicant’s branch. The role was reactive and involved visiting
branches, who had either raised issues themselves via the NBSC
which required a visit, or visiting on behalf of different teams
within Post Office who escalated issues such as rolling losses,
suspense account, audit follow up and post appointment visits.
Post Office records available on the EFC for this time are not
detailed; however Rachael has provided her recollection of events
(Refer to Doc 036).
In June 2008, the Applicant contacted the Chief Executive of the
Royal Mail Group, Adam Crozier; several of the letters from that
time are held on the Post Office EFC (the Applicant has also
submitted copies of the letters with his case questionnaire; refer
To Doc M007_CQR_Tab3).
In the Applicant's first letter to Mr Crozier (Refer To Doc 031) he
raises similar issues to the ones he has raised again in his Case
Questionnaire Response, namely;
* Unidentified Shortages In Branch Cash Account
* Horizon Equipment Issues
* Problems with Post Office Personal and Helpdesk
* Lottery Scratch cards
It should be noted, the Applicant claims in his June 2008 letter,
that since the Horizon Terminal was replaced in February 2008 he
has had no further issues or losses at the branch.
At the time these issues were investigated by Michele Graves, Flag
Case Manager for Post Office. Michele wrote to the Applicant
{Refer to Doc 032) and outlined Post Office’s response to the
Applicant's issues.
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
The Applicant, disappointed with Michele’s response, sent a reply
(Refer to Doc 033).
The case was then passed to Philippa Wright, National
Consultation Manager for Post Office, and Philippa investigated.
Her response is not held on Post Office EFC; however, the
Applicant has submitted a copy (Refer To Doc M007_CQR_Tab3).
Philippa again outlined the Post Office position to the issues raised
and corrected information, previously provided by Michele,
regarding National Lottery retention periods and the storage of
the Horizon system base unit by Fujitsu. Philippa apologised for
the misunderstanding and went on to add:
“Having looked again at all the information provided, I do feel that
we have explained our position on the matter and do not see any
benefit to covering old ground. We therefore consider this matter
dosed and all other issues related to it now closed and not subject
to further discussion”
The Applicant submitted a further letter to Philippa on the 27"
‘August 2008; he did not request any further investigation but
wished to have his comments held for future reference. Philippa
replied on the an September 2008 confirming that his comments
had been noted and confirmed these would be retained on file.
The Applicant has not put forward any evidence to suggest that
Horizon caused any discrepancy within his branch; the most likely
explanation is either human action. The Applicant was advised by
Post Office Flag Case team and by Rachael Oyston (Area
Intervention Manager) to move to single stocks (Refer to Docs 032
and 036); this would have made it easier to locate any future
discrepancy in the branch, but the Applicant failed to follow this
advice.
The Applicant could also produce transaction and event logs from
Horizon in branch that could have assisted him to locate errors.
Subsequent to the Applicant
submitting his initial Case
Questionnaire Response
(CQR), he has supplied the
Post Office with further
issues, regarding his
perceived faults with the
Horizon system, and
confusing and contradictory
information supplied to him
by Post Office Personal.
The Applicant contacted NBSC (Refer to Doc 043) on the 21"
November 2013; the Applicant reported losses of £600 and
£525.39 over the previous two weeks. The Applicant refused to
accept advice or help from the NBSC and asked for Andy Carpenter
to contact him. Post Office records (Refer to Doc 042) show that
Andy contacted the Applicant and arranged additional training for
the branch. The training was allocated to David Brown, Field
Support Advisor (FSA). David attended the branch on two
occasions; 29th November 2013 and 4th December 2013. David’s
full report is available (Refer to Doc 042). In summary, David’s
report advises the Applicant, once again, to change the branch to
single stock units. To do this, the Applicant would need to have
provided lockable drawers to secure each individual stock unit
during working hours; the Applicant did not wish to spend any
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
money on doing this. David’s second visit on the 4" December
2013 also highlights that when balancing, the Applicant was using
the Declare Stock function on Horizon; David states in his report
“that this is not normal practice and I have seen it cause problems
in the past”. David advised the Applicant of the correct way to
balance and sent him hand-outs to fully explain the correct
process. On balance, what the Applicant was doing was not
incorrect; it is just a more complicated process than what it
needed to be.
The Applicant contacted NBSC (Refer to Doc 043) on the 20"
December 2013 not the 9" January 2014 that he states in his CQR,
the two calls logged on the ” January 2014 relate to the issue
with the Co-Op cheque and his reporting of a loss of £86.05 for the
balance period. The Applicant logged a call on the 20th December
2013 claiming that Horizon is unable to assist in identifying error’s
at his branch, because when he tries to print a Transaction Log he
get the following error message (MSG70904- too much data to
process). Fujitsu have advised that the reason for this error
message is that there is a limit of 1000 lines of data returned by
transaction log searches. A search for all the transactions for a
single day, or several days, may hit this limit, especially at branches
with several counters. The Applicant needs to specify additional
Transaction Log criteria to reduce the amount of data
returned. Possibilities include:
* Date From / To
+ Time From /To
* Node Id (counter number)
* Stock Unit
* User
* Product (this displays a list of all products from which the
user can select the one they want by name)
NBSC advised the Applicant to follow this process, Neil Pape (NBSC
Operator) recalls advising the Applicant, “to search using criteria
such as stock user, user etc. that would break down the day’s
transactions and allow the report to be printed”.
Post Office Management Information Reporting System (Credence)
confirms {Refer to Doc 050) that the Applicant has recorded the
following losses since November 2013:
27" November 2013- £402.79
27" December 2013-£993.04
29" January 2014- £339.06
The Subpostmaster contract (Refer to Doc 035) Section 12;
paragraph 12- LOSSES, provides that the Applicant is responsible
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
for all losses within the branch. As previously mentioned within
this report, the Applicant was advised on several occasions to
convert to single stocks but he refused to follow this advice. Post
Office has not instigated an investigation into the losses at this
time — if the applicant converts to single stock this should help to
identify and resolve the user issues.
On the 27th January 2014, the Applicant contacted NBSC regarding
an issue with incorrect number of postage labels being printed in
the branch. Post Office Management Information Reporting
System (Credence){Refer to Doc 044) shows that at 12:49 on the
27" January 2014, the branch did indeed process seven postage
labels at £1.10 each by user IGA002; the Applicant’s user ID is
RBIOO2. No other transactions are made on the 27" January 2014
for this amount so it would be reasonable to assume that this is
the transaction the Applicant is alleging there was an issue with.
NBSC advised the Applicant that the user must have said yes to all
seven labels printing successfully. Postage Labels are of no
monetary value until they have been processed through Horizon;
once a label has been produced it then becomes of value and is
added to the customer basket for settlement. After every label is
printed, Horizon prompts the user to confirm the label has printed
successfully (Refer to Doc 049). If the user selects YES, then
Horizon will add the value of that label to the basket. If a postage
label does not print correctly or does not print at all, the user can
select NO. Horizon will automatically reject the postage label, and
generate a ‘Rejected’ postage label transaction. The user will then
be returned to the Post Mails screen where they can insert
another label and print the postage label again. Three
transactions will appear in the basket; two will have positive values
(one for the production of the correctly printed label, and one for
the incorrectly printed label), and the third will have a negative
value (for the rejected postage label). The positive value for the
incorrectly printed label and the negative value for the rejected
label will cancel each other out, and asa result only the amount of
the correctly printed label will be charged. It’s impossible to say
exactly what happened in the branch on the 27" January 2014;
however the most likely explanation is that one of the labels did
not print, but the Applicant has selected YES when prompted
Co-op Bank business cheques are issued by Co-op Bank business
customers for encashment in selected Post Office branches. A
Post Office branch can only be nominated as an office of
encashment for Co-op Bank business cheques by the Co-op Bank
Head Office. Co-op Bank customers are advised to contact their
Head Office to request that a Post Office branch of their choice be
added. All Co-op Bank business cheques presented must bear a
Post Office Branch Code (this may be printed on the cheque or
hand-written) and may only be cashed at the nominated Post
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
Office branch.
If a Co-op Bank business cheque presented does not bear a Post
Office Branch Code, branches are advised to:
+ Refuse payment and return the cheque to the customer
+ Advise the customer to contact the person/organisation
that issued the cheque.
The maximum value of an individual Co-op Bank cheque must not
exceed £500. A total of four cheques may be cashed in one day.
If a customer presents a Co-op Bank cheque in excess of £500,
branches are advised
* Not to cash the cheque
+ Retum the cheque to the customer
+ Advise them to contact the person or organisation that
issued the cheque.
The Applicant claims in his submission that the cheque presented
to him for £161.54 in October 2013 had no branch code printed on
the cheque, so he refused the transaction.
At some point, a complaint was raised by a Co-Op customer that
the branch was refusing the encashment facility and the branch
was contacted by Kevin Jarosz from the NBSC, on the 9" January
2014. NBSC call logs (Refer te Doc 045) suggest that the Applicant
was refusing to accept the cheques as the branch code was hand
written on the cheque rather than printed. Kevin correctly
explained that the cheque could be accepted if the branch code
was hand written. Kevin went on to navigate the Applicant to the
correct page on Horizon Help that explained how to complete the
transaction. Horizon Help is an integral facility within Horizon
which allows individuals to find and also print Post Office
instructions on products and services, which can be accessed
whilst serving a customer. The Applicant was still not happy on
how to process the transaction and advised he would contact
NBSC the next time for them to talk him through the transaction.
On the 13th January 2014, the Applicant contacted the NBSC and
claims he was advised not to cash the cheque unless the branch
code is printed on the cheque. NBSC call logs (Refer To Doc 045)
show that this call H18250380 is logged as “WANTING TO PAY A
CHEQUE INTO A CO OP ACCOUNT”. It appears in this instance the
Applicant and the NBSC Operator were at cross purposes; further
investigation has confirmed this (Refer to Doc 046). Michala
Millington (Post Office Client Advisor) contacted the branch on the
23” January 2014, after another complaint from a customer being
refused the service; during this call it came to light that there had
been some confusion between the NBSC and the Applicant as to
which process to follow. Michala instructed the NBSC to contact
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
the Applicant to explain the correct process (Refer to Doc 047).
Sharon Jamasb (NSBC operator) contacted the Applicant on the
23" January 2014 and made it clear to him that handwritten
cheques could be accepted (Refer to Doc 048). Sharon has
informed this investigation it was the Applicant that jumped onto
the subject about lack of training at the NBSC. Sharon did not get
drawn into any conversation with the Applicant and did not
comment herself on any issues regarding training at the NBSC.
Michala has also informed this investigation (Refer to 047}, that in
actual fact, it appears that it was the customer whois actually
mistaken in these instances as he is attending the branch with the
cheques to cash without a printed or handwritten branch code on.
It appears that there may have been some confusion has gone on
between the Applicant and the NBSC regarding this issue, with at
times both parties talking at cross purposes. In the Applicant’s
CQR, it could be easily miss- read when the Applicant states “The
cheque was crossed and did not have our branch code printed on
it”; this could mean one of either the cheques had no branch code
on it, or the cheque did have the branch code, but it was
handwritten rather than printed.
On balance, the Applicant did not suffer any financial loss as a
result of this misunderstanding and the correct information is
readily available on the Horizon Help facility.
Documents being provided to Second Sight
List documents (if any)
M007_POL_Intervention Visit June 2004_PT_OO1
M007_POL_Intervention Visit Jan 2005 _PT_002
M007_POL_2” intervention Visit Jan 2005_PT_003
M007_POL_Intervention Visit May 2005_PT_004
M007_POL_Audit Report June 08_PT_005
M007_POL_Audit Report Oct 09_PT_006
MO007_POL_Audit Report July 2011_PT_007
M007_POL_Scheduling Team email_PT_008
M007_POL_Ad-Hoc training record Feb 04_PT_009
M007_POL_Ad-Hoc Training Report_PT_010
M007_POL_Ad-Hoc Training Request Nov 05_PT_011
MO007_POL_Email Dave Ogleby_PT_012
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
POL00034875
POL00034875
™M007_POL_ Training Request and Report_PT_013
MO007_POL_Email From Camelot re training_PT_014
MO007_POL_Letter from A Winn re Lotto 08_PT_015
M007_POL_ARQs out with retention_PT_016
M007_POL_NBSC CALL LOGS 2006_PT_017
M007_POL_NBSC CALL LOGS 2008_PT_018
M007_POL_NBSC CALL LOGS 2010_PT_019
M007_POL_NBSC call Logs 2012_PT_020
M007_POL_NBSC CALL LOGS 2013_PT_021
MO007_POL_ALL NBSC CALL LOGS 04-13_PT_022
M007_POL_Emails Horizon 233313 Bowbum_PT_023
MO007_POL_Letter from A Winn AUG 2010_PT_024
M007_POL_Horizon Terminal PIC_PT_025 A
M007_POL_Horizon Terminal PIC_PT_025 B
MO007_POL_Post_Office_statement_on_findings_of_intrim_report_into_Horizon_computer_system_
PT_026
M007_POL_Spot Review 10_PT_027
M007_POL_Spot Review 22_PT_028
MO007_POL_Reinstatment Letter_PT_029
M007_POL_Reinstament Accept_PT_030
M007_POL_Letter to A Crozier June 08_PT_031
M007_POL_Respose to A Crozier Letter June 08_PT_032
M007_POL_Reply From Mr Bilkhu_PT_033
M007_POL_Offical Warning_PT_034
M007_POL_Sub Pm Contract_PT_035
M007_POL_Email Rachel Oston_PT_036
M007_POL_NBSC Call Logs Aug 12_PT_037
M007_POL_Email Re E-Top_PT_038
M007_POL_HSD Call Logs 23” Aug 12_PT_039
M007_POL_HSD Call Logs 24” Aug 12_PT_040
M007_POL_Email Re Aug 12 Goodwill Payment _PT_041
POL00034875
POL00034875
COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH MEDIATION
+ M007_POL_November 2013 Intervention_PT_042
* M007_POL_NBSC Call Logs Oct 13-Feb14_PT_043
* I MO007_POL_Credence Report 27.01.14_PT_044
+ M007_POL_NBSC Call Logs Re Co-Op_PT_045
+ M007_POL_Email Rob Carter_PT_046
+ M007_POL_Email Michala Millington_PT_047
* _M007_POL_Email Sharon Jamasb_PT_048
+ M007_POL_Reject Label Prompt_PT_049
* I MO007_POL_Seaurity_non_sales_events.xis Nov-Jan_PT_050