POL00042173 - Email chain from Mandy Robertston to Rodric Williams re: FW: Post Office Limited - CCRC. Email chain including correspondence with CCRC.

Evidence on official site

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POL00042173

Message

From: Mandy Robertson GRO i
Sent: 11/12/2018 10:

To: Rodric Williams

Subject: FW: Post Office Limited - CCRC [WBDUK-AC.FID26610170]

Attachments: _SPREADSHEET_150571755(1)_CCRC Tracker November 18.XLSX

Hi Rod
I hope ail is well. Are you back in the office following closings last week?

I was just wondering whether POL are happy for me to release Rasul's documents, subject to clarifying that Itazaz is the
same individual as Mohammed?

Many thanks

Mandy

Mandy Robertson
Associate
Wombie Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP

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From: Mandy Robertson

Sent: 09 November 2018 13:30

To: Rodric Williams; Jonny Clegg

Cc: Andrew Parsons; Jonathan Gribben
Subject: RE: Post Office Limited - CCRC [WBDUK-AC.FID26610170]

Hi Rod
I have reviewed Mohammed Rasul's documents. He was known by Itazaz (and there are various spelling variations in the
documents). I think it would be prudent to touch base again with my contacts to see whether anything further comes up on

this name search, rather than Mohammed. Are you happy with this approach?

With your approval, the documents located to date can be released to the CCRC's side of the data room, subject to Miles
confirming ftazaz Rasul is the same person as Mohammed Rasul

Please find below a draft email to send to Miles:
Dear Miles
We carried out searches in relation to the below individuais:
4, Ram Ranavaya ~ CCRC ref 01351/2017 ~ Our section 17 notice to yourselves dated 21/02/2018

2. Kamran Ashraf - CCRC ref 01105/2017 — Our section 17 notice dated 12/02/2018
3. Mohammed Rasui ~ CCRC ref 00164/2018 ~ Our section 17 notice dated 08/03/2018

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We have located electronic documents for an individual called Itazaz Rasui, whom Post Offices believes is one and the
same individual as Mohammed Rasul. Are you abie to clarify that this is the same person so that we can arrange for these
documents to be uploaded onto the data room for your review? Are you able to provide any documentation to evidence
that this is the name Mohammed is known by?

Ram Ranavaya and Kamran Ashraf are Claimant's in the Group Action. However, Post Office has been unable to locate
any documents for these individuais.

I attach an updated copy of the document tracker covering these new cases. We are just double checking whether there
are any electronic documents from Post Office's legal team. These items are marked in blue on the tracker,

Kind regards
Rodric

Many thanks

Mandy

Mandy Robertson
Associate
Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP

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From: Mandy Robertson

Sent: 07 November 2018 16:28

To: 'Rodric Williams’; Jonny Clegg

Cc: Andrew Parsons; Jonathan Gribben

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited - CCRC [WBDUK-AC.FID26610170]

Hi Rod
We are very light on documents for these 3 individuals. They were not part of the mediation scheme.

The 11 docurnents for Rasul were uploaded to Post Office's side of Relativity a couple of weeks ago. I plan to review them
this week before seeking your approval that these can be released to the other side. Mr Rasul is not a claimant in the
group action

I have exhausted my lines of enquiry on documents for Ram Ranavaya and Ashraf Kamran, who are claimants, save for
whether POL have an electronic legal file for these individuals ~ are you able to point me in the direction of someone who
can confirm there is no legal file for these individuals? Cartwright King's enquiries came back blank. I have not been
provided with any documents to date for either individual.

We only have two other instances where only one document type has been found per individual, and no previous
enquiries where no documents at all have been located.

I have good availability tomorrow if you would like to discuss where else I and Cartwright King can search for documents
for these individuals. I will confirm this week whether the documents on Rasul can be released, subject to your approval.

POL-0038655.
Kind regards

Mandy

From: Rodric Williams}.
Sent: 06 November 2018 15:05
To: Mandy Robertson; Jonny Clegg
Cc: Andrew Parsons

Subject: FW: Post Office Limited

Hi - can you please give me a response to the CCRC’s question below.
Thanks, Redric

From: TrentM [
Sent: 06 November
To: Rodric William:

Hi Rodric,

Thanks for the telephone call on Friday, I'll wait to hear from you further on those issues.

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I meant to mention another matter then, but didn’t get around to it, regarding case material. I am told by my colleague
Anona that there are three applications to us where there is not yet any case documentation in the data room. Can you

please arrange for a check of whether the material has been searched for in those three cases? They are:

Ram Ranavaya ~ CCRC ref 01351/2017 ~ Our section 17 notice to yourselves dated 21/02/2018
Kamran Ashraf — CCRC ref 01105/2017 ~ Our section 17 notice dated 12/02/2018
Mohammed Rasul ~ CCRC ref 00164/2018 ~ Our section 17 notice dated 08/03/2018

Let me know if you need any other details in order to check.
Thanks very much,

Miles

Miles Trent

Case Review Manager

Criminal Cases Review Commission
Tel: I

From: Rodric Williams }
Sent: 18 September 2018 19:20
To: TrentM

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Dear Trent,

My apologies again for the delay with this response.

How TCs are issued depends on the products themselves and how a specific transaction is conducted. TCs are therefore

bespoke.

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The basis for issuing a TC, and the supporting documentation which sits behind it, will be determined by the transaction
itself. The retention of this documentation is dependent on branch operational practice, the specific product, and the
transaction itself. I attach a brief, high level overview on how supporting documentation for certain transactions which
can give rise to a TC are currently retained. Please note this has been prepared for Post Office by its solicitors Womble
Bond Dickinson, and is privileged and confidential. I therefore make the standard request that it not be disclosed
without our prior consent (in line with s.25 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995).

Some documentation which underlies a TC may be retained in the Finance Service Centre, but not for every TC. The
Finance Service Centre also records TCs in its accounts as a simple line entry generally showing the acceptance of a TC
and whether it is a positive or negative TC.

TCs are ultimately recorded in a branch’s accounts, the line-by-line record of each transaction (e.g. sale of a stamp,
receipt of a banking deposit etc.) and event (e.g. logging on and off, printing certain reports, etc.) processed in the
branch. The branch account entry for some TCs may contain some explanatory text about the TC (e.g. for MoneyGram-
related TCs), but this is not a consistent practice for all TCs.

Branch account data is held in central data centres for a period of seven years, after which the data was typically deleted
at regular intervals. However, in October 2014 Fujitsu stopped deleting that data, such that it is our understanding that
Fujitsu holds transaction and event data for all branches dating back to October 2007. I assume this is the “suspension
on POL’s normal retention/destruction policy for branch data” to which you refer (1 should add that Post Office has also
taken steps to preserve various - and very substantial - documentation as part of the Post Office Group Litigation).

{hope this explanation is of assistance. Please let me know if you require anything further.

Kind regards, Rodric

From: TrentM {-
Sent: 13 September
To: Rodric Williams <3
Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Thanks Rodric, I look forward to hearing further.
Miles
Miles Trent

Case Review Manager
Criminal Cases Review Commission

From: Rodric Williams [__
Sent: 12 September 2018 11:55
To: TrentM

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Dear Miles,
My apologies. I have now picked this up and will revert as a priority.

Kind regards, Rodric

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From: TrentM GRO

To: Rodric Williams ¢ . GRO __. 4
Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Dear Rodric,

{hope you are well, and will forgive this quick nudge?

You will remember that we spoke on the phone on 8 August about TC supporting documentation. At the end of that
call you indicated that you could provide us with a brief written summary of the retention periods for TC supporting
documentation on the major products / transaction types, and that you thought you could get that to us by the end of
this month.

Is there any update you can give on that please?

Kind regards,

Miles

Miles Trent

Case Review Manager
Criminal Cases Review Commission

From: Rodric Williams
Sent: 31 July 2018 17:
To: TrentM

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Miles,

Thank you for your emails. I tried to calf earlier today to discuss your query, but understand you are out until Friday.

lam free on Friday afternoon from 13:30 if you would like to try to speak then? If that’s not convenient, I am in the
office all of the following week (commencing 6 August 2018) so shouid be able to speak at some point.

Kind regards, Rodric

From: Trent.
Sent: 26 July 2018 18:36.
To: Rodric Williams <___.
Subject: FW: Post Office Limited

Dear Rodric,

I hope you are well. Do you have any word on my below query please?
lam in the office tomorrow, perhaps we could discuss on the phone then?
Thanks,

Miles

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Miles Trent
Case Review Manager
Criminal Cases Review Commission

rentM

Sent: 09 July 2018 11:46

To: 'Rodric Williams’

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Morning Rodric,
Many thanks for your email and for the attached documents, which look very helpful. I confirm safe receipt.
While I remember, can I ask a quick question about retention periods? Towards the end of 2017 I asked you about how
long contemporaneous evidence for Transactions Corrections would be kept (my email of 05/12/2017) and you very
helpfully replied (07/02/2018) that:
“We would not expect the supporting evidence for a TC to be held for more than 6 years, so it is unlikely that the
contemporaneous evidence would still be available for TCs issued to Ms Misra, for example. However, if you
were to provide details of a specific TC, I would be happy to ask my colleagues in the Finance Service Centre to
check their records in case any such evidence is still held.”
A query has arisen at this end as to how this period for TC evidence coincides with the suspension on POL's normal
retention/destruction policy for branch data, which we understand was introduced some years ago. Is the answer that that
suspension was limited to branch transaction data? Or does it apply more widely?

Apologies if this seems a basic question, but we would be grateful for clarity on the point as we start to bring things
together.

Kind regards,

Miles

Miles Trent
Case Review Manager
Criminal.Cases.Review Commission

Sent: 06 July 2018 00:07
To: TrentM
Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Miles,

in terms of the ARQ data, the left hand column highlighted in blue is the row number. The subsequent column headers
are as follows:

1D for counter number

ID of logged on Horizon user

Stock Unit

Date

Time (NB Date and Time in UTC (i.e. GMT, so in summer it will be 1 hour slow})
Session ID for the customer session

Transaction ID

SOUR ONE

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8. Mode: Type of Transaction. For the extracted data:
a. Th Transfer In (from another Stock Unit)
b. ROSP: Rem out to a cash pouch (cash remains in suspense until it is despatched)
c. SC: Serve Customer (around 95% of transactions are this code)
9. Product No: POL’s ID for the product being transacted. 1D 1 means cash.
10, Quantity being transacted: In line 31610, 400 means 400 notes. These must have been 400 £20 notes to equate
to the sale value of £8,000.
11. Sale value: actual value of the transaction (as above)

The extract process from the audit trail initially produces raw data, which is then processed to generate the spreadsheet
we provided to you.

As for the Case Management directions made in the Post Office Group Litigation to address the Claimants’ challenges to
Horizon:
the Third Case Management Conference Order made on 1 March 2018 provided directions for a trial in March
2019 of “Horizon Issues” (copy attached).
- The “Horizon Issues” were then agreed between the parties as set out in Schedule 1 to the attached “Draft
Order ~ 22 March 18 (Final Version)”.
- That Order was subsequently approved by Mr Justice Fraser on 23 March 2018 (see attached “Consent Order
dated 23 March 2018 (Horizon Issues)”).
The Third Case Management Conference Order was varied and supplemented in a Fourth Case Management
Order made following a hearing on 5 June 2018. Although this Fourth CMC Order did not affect the Horizon
Issues themselves, I attach it for the sake of completeness.

{hope this addresses your enquiries, but please let me know if you need anything further.

Kind regards, Rodric

From: TrentM [;
Sent: 25 June 20:
To: Rodric Williams
Subject: FW: Post Office Limited

Dear Rodric,

I hope all is well. Can I ask a quick question about the ARQ extract which you sent to us recently please? Are we right in
thinking that the numbers in the left hand column (31609-31613) are the sequential numbering from the audit store?
Thanks.

I also look forward to receiving the other document mentioned below.

Kind regards,

Miles

Miles Trent
Case Review Manager
Criminal. Cases Review Commission

Sent: 12 June 2018 14:13

POL-0038655.
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To: 'Rodric Williams’
Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Dear Rodric,
Many thanks for this, I confirm safe receipt.

Thanks also for your call yesterday, it was very useful. I will look forward to receiving the other document which you
mentioned (arising from the Case Management Conference re the March 2019 trial).

Kind regards,
Miles

Miles Trent

Case Review Manager

Criminal Cases Review Commission
Tel:

From: Rodric Williams:
Sent: 11 June 2018 18:57

To: TrentM

Subject: RE: Post Office Limited

Dear Miles,

Please find attached the following data as requested:
ARQ, P445, specifically lines 31610 to 31612, together with lines 31609 and 31613 to illustrate that there is no
duplicate; and
The raw data showing the “remittance in slips" (relevant entries highlighted for ease of reference).

Thank you for confirming that the CCRC will treat the above material in accordance with Section 25 Criminal Appeal Act,
such that the Commission will not disclose any information contained within this email and attachments without our
prior consent.

I hope this satisfies your request for source data, but please let me know if you require anything further.

Kind regards, Rodric

From: TrentM itr

Sent: 24 May 2018 1
To: Rodric Williams ‘
Subject: RE: Post Offi

Morning Rodric,
We have now had a chance to go through POL's below reply, and to discuss. Thanks again for your help on that.

We don't have any follow-up queries regarding POL’s below reasoning, which seems clear to us. I do have a follow-up
request for source data though, please:

1. Can POL please provide the ARQ extract referred to below — ‘ARQ P445’, specifically lines 31610 to 31612 of
that file (but including the lines immediately before and after, to illustrate that there is no duplicate).

2. Please can we take you up on the offer to provide the source data referred to in your answer to Q3 b) below,
where POL stated: “Post Office reviewed the relevant session/event data, which showed 3 “remittance in” slips
printed at the branch in a short space of time. The first, at 10:01:21 is a £140 cash transaction. The second and
third slips (printed at 10:03:09 and 10:03:13 respectively) relate to the Euros received. Further, Fujitsu also

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looked at the raw logs for 12th June 2007 between 10:00 and 10:06, which showed that there were two separate
pouches with barcodes 326897905656 and 326897905298, each containing 11500 Euros and remitted in at the
same time (i.e. one after the other as the rem process allows). Please let us know if you require sight of this
data.”

Please let me know if you require specific Section 17 notices in relation to the above. For the avoidance of doubt, the
CCRC will treat the above material in accordance with Section 25 Criminal Appeal Act, and will revert to POL if any
onward disclosure is considered at any stage.

Let me know if you would like to discuss.

Kind regards,

Miles

Miles Trent

Case Review Manager

Crimi iew Commission

From: Rodric Williams:
Sent: 13 May 2018 22:59"
To: TrentM

Subject: Post Office Limited

Trent — please see below our responses (in red) to the matters raised in your email to me of 5 February 2018. Please
accept my apologies for the delay in providing these to you.

Please let us know if you require anything further.

Kind regards, Rodric

Questions & Responses

The Misra transaction logs contain a number of instances where there are two transactions for exactly the same amount
at the same time and date. The possibility has been discussed that one of the two entries might be a ‘duplicate’ which did
not in fact occur. However, the CCRC observes that almost all of the identified examples relate to transactions where
cash was being placed into pouches and then remitted back to POL.

it may first be helpful to expiain the “remittance out" process:

- First, the postmaster (“PMR”) prepares the remittance pouch containing, say, £10,000 to send to POL’s cash
centre.

- The PMR "rems out" the surn of £10,000 on Horizon, which has the effect of moving £10,000 from the branch
account to the branch suspense account {a holding account).

- Two print-outs are produced by the Horizon system detailing the pouch contents. One is placed in the pouch, the
other is retained in branch.

- The cash collection driver comes to the branch and takes the cash pouches. He provides a card to the PMR who
scans it, which has the effect of removing the £10,000 from the suspense account (this is often called “booking
out").

- The cash collection driver may not come for a day or two after the pouch is “remed out”, so using the suspense
account in this way means that when a branch declares its cash figure it is only declaring what it physically has in
the till.

- The “booking out process” will result in all pouches currently in the suspense account being processed, provided
they have not been in the suspense account “too long”. “Too long” originally meant at least 42 days, which was
subsequently increased to at least 84 days. Examination of the logs could identify any such issues if
required. Fujitsu’s does not consider that cash stranded in the suspense account for "too long" was an issue for
this branch.

- Where the booking out process is not followed correctly, but the cash is physically received by POL's cash centre,
the £10,000 will remain in the suspense account. The FSC wiil note this as part of their standard reconciliation

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processes and the branch will be issued with a TC to remove the sum from the suspense account (i.e. the TC will
do what the booking out process shouid have done).

- ff, before a TC corrects the problem, the branch transfers the £10,000 from the suspense account back into the
branch account, that would create a discrepancy as the physical cash is no longer in branch.

On the assumption that only 1 pouch was in fact remitted back to POL, the CCRC has considered whether this scenario
could cause a shortfall in the branch in question on an audit of the cash held. So, for example, if a duplicate remittance of
a cash pouch was recorded in Horizon as two £5,000 transactions (this would be recorded in the transaction log as two
negative entries of £5,000), POL would have expected to receive two pouches of £5,000. If POL in fact only received one
pouch, then the SPMR would be expected to have a pouch of £5,000 in branch.

First we need to define what is meant by “duplicate remittance" as this could cover two different types of apparent
duplication in the transaction logs:

- First Type: One type of “duplicate” is where ail the component parts (i.e. all columns of the spreadsheet) match,
including session IDs. An example of this is lines 50-55 of the sheet.

- This is very rare. Fujitsu believes this was caused by the harvesting/extraction of Horizon data, but not at the time
of the transaction itself (i.e. the duplication was created in the retrieval of the data), because:

o the spreadsheet is not as it would have been produced by Fujitsu, suggesting the duplication was
introduced by the spreadsheet processing:

© Fujitsu went back to the original ARQ extract (ARQ P445) which contains the transactions for West Byfleet
in September 2007. Lines 31610 to 31612 of this file match the transactions at line 50 ~ 52 of the
extract. However they are not duplicated, i.e. a second/duplicate transaction is not present in the original
ARQ data provided by Fujitsu.

© Fujitsu could also check the raw data logs which include the sequence IDs not extracted as part of the
standard extraction process. This however was not necessary as the ARQ data showed no duplication.

- Fujitsu advise that if the branch viewed or printed the transaction log report at the relevant time, it should not have
shown any duplication.

- Fujitsu also advise that “[u]nder old Horizon, Riposte Audit data was extracted from the correspondence servers
(central transaction data repositories) by an agent harvester process. These were then written as flat files which
were picked up and secured by the audit server. The design of this harvester was such that duplicate records
were allowed to be included in the files. This would only happen in exception conditions and basically operated
as a failsafe i.e. err on the side of including duplicates rather than potentially losing data.” Fujitsu’s view however
is that this is not relevant to the extracted data.

- inthe scenario described above therefore, Post Office wouid only have expected to receive one pouch as there
was only one transaction recorded on Horizon (the duplication arising on the later retrieval of Horizon data)

- Second Type: Ancther form of apparent duplication is where the transactions are for the same amount, most of
the details appear to be the same but the session IDs are different. In this situation, there is in fact no duplication
in the logs - there are two separate transactions.

- An example of this is contained in sheet 2 lines 6 to 11. In the scenario described in the question above, if the
second pouch was not physically sent to POL's cash centre, an amount of £5,000 would remain in the suspense
account and the PMR would be expected to still have a pouch of £5,000 in branch. This would not create a
shortfall in the branch.

The question arises as to whether this scenario produces a £5,000 shortfall in the branch. The CCRC's understanding is
that it does not.

That is also Post Office's understanding — as there was no duplication, there was no shortfall

If an audit of the branch took place at that time, the expectation would be that both sums of money have left the branch,
and so there would not be a shortfall of cash in branch.

That is correct, provided the cash had actually left the branch. If it hadn’t then the audit would find the value in the
suspense account.

In the event of a cash remittance failing to be dispatched and getting stuck in the suspense account, this would be picked
up at an audit as part of the audit procedure involves checking any sums in the suspense account. The vaiue would stay
in the suspense account indefinitely. However after a period of at least 42/84 days it would no longer be possible for the
“pooking out” process to include the value of the pouch, It can however be fixed by a Transaction Correction. Fujitsu is
not aware of this issue having occurred in this branch.

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The CCRC's understanding is that if POL were expecting two pouches in the above scenario and only received one, POL
would issue a Transaction Correction for £5,000. If the SPMR accepted such a Transaction Correction, there would then
be a shortfall in the branch accounts.

Yes, if POL was expecting two pouches and only received one, then enquiries would be made into the reason and a
Transaction Correction would be issued to the branch in the event of the branch failing to dispatch a pouch. Should the
dispatch procedure fail (for example, if the booking out process is not followed correctly) and a pouch is stuck in the
suspense account then a Transaction Correction would be issued to remove the sum from the suspense account. For the
avoidance of doubt, the suspense account is part of the branch accounts, but does not impact on balancing any Stock
Units.

Q1. Can you let us know whether or not you consider our above analysis to be correct? Please refer to our comments
above.

Q2. Sheet 1 of the attachment to this email (at lines 50-55) contains two identical entries for £10,000 cash remittances.
They are both made up of the same component parts (sums of £8000 and £2000), are both entered at exactly the same
time 12:26 and 17 seconds on 27/09/2007 [[Do you mean 29/09/20077]], and both have the same transaction ID number.
We have not been able to identify a Transaction Correction in the log which corresponds to these two entries. Please can
POL comment on:

a) Whether the component entries for £8000 and £2000 relate to denominations of banknote? Is the CCRC
correct in its understanding that there were 400 x £20 notes and 200 x £10 notes in each of these
entries? Yes.

b) How itis that both of the entries for £10,000 occur at the same time and have the same transaction ID? Is it
possible for separate transactions to have the same transaction ID? Piease refer to our comments above.

c) Does POL retain any records of either or both of these £10,000 cash pouches being scanned in as received
by POL? A print out from Horizon would be put in the pouch, and a second print out should be retained in
branch. Specifically in relation to the £10,000 cash pouch, this may no jonger be availabie now given the two
year retention period for such print-outs.

d) In all of the circumstances, might this be an example of a computer-generated ‘duplicate’? Or does POL
consider that these were indeed separate transactions and separate sums of money? Please refer to our
comments above - POL believes there was only one transaction recorded on Horizon (the duplication arising
on the later retrieval and manipulation of the ARQ data into the summary spreadsheet).

Q3. Sheet 2 of the attachment to this email (at lines 42-46) contains two identical entries for remittances into the branch of
foreign exchange, each valued at £7,806.15. Both entries are timed at 10:03 and 6 seconds on 12 June 2007. Please can
POL comment on:

a) The foreign exchange relates to a remittance of Euros. The CCRC understands that £7,806.15 would have
amounted to approximately 11,570 Euros in June 2007 (on an exchange rate of 0.67). Does POL consider
there is anything out of the ordinary about a Forex remittance in an uneven amount of this kind?

No. As West Byfleet was an “on-demand” office, stock holdings would have been managed by an automated
system, with forecasting based on the previous seven days’ sales, and a minimum level to ensure that a
branch does not run out of Euros. At different times of the year, replenishment levels will be amended to take
account of fluctuating customer demand, e.g. due to seasonai and travel trends.

b) Is there any way of POL being confident that there were in fact two deliveries of foreign exchange in this
amount at the same date and time or, in all of the circumstances, might this be an example of a computer-
generated ‘duplicate’?

Post Office is confident that there were two deliveries. Post Office reviewed the relevant session/event data,
which showed 3 "remittance in" slips printed at the branch in a short space of time. The first, at 10:01:21 is a
£140 cash transaction. The second and third slips (printed at 10:03:09 and 10:03:13 respectively) relate to the
Euros received. Further, Fujitsu also looked at the raw logs for 12th June 2007 between 10:00 and 10:06,
which showed that there were two separate pouches with barcodes 326897905656 and 326897905298, each
containing 11500 Euros and remitted in at the same time (i.e. one after the other as the rem process

allows). Please let us know if you require sight of this data.

Q4. Sheets 1 and 3 of the attachment to this email contain examples of transaction corrections for relatively large sums of
money.

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a) On sheet 1 (at line 60) there is a TC for £19,260, and on sheet 3 (at line 98) there is a TC for £27,000. For each
of these TC’s can POL please confirm whether the branch was being told, “the cash that you have sent to POL is
short by this amount”, or alternatively “the cash that you have sent to POL is x amount too much”?

The TC for £19,260

The branch was not being told that the cash it sent POL was too short or too much. Instead, this TC is an
example of the scenario expiained above where the cash is sent to and safely received by the cash centre but the
“booking out" process does not work and the amount remains in the suspense account.

POL's records show the details of the invoice TC of £19,260 issued on 31/08/2007 are as follows:

TRANSACTION CORRECTION ISSUED TO CORRECT THE AMOUNT OF 19260.00 POUNDS SHOWN IN
SUSPENSE ACCOUNT AS CASH IN POUCHES. THIS REMITTANCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THE CASH
CENTRE BUT DUE TO A PROBLEM BOOKING OUT HAS GONE INTO YOUR CASH IN POUCHES
SUSPENSE.CHECK THE HORIZON DATA BEFORE QUERYING THIS TRANSACTION CORRECTION.PRESS,
“ACCEPT” THEN “MAKE GOOD”, (YOU DO NOT HAVE TO PUT ANY MONEY IN), THIS WILL CORRECT THE
CASH IN POUCHES SUSPENSE ACCOUNT ONLY.DO NOT PRESS SETTLE CENTRALLY.ANN

BAILEY .01246 542001

The pouch was stuck in the suspense account rather than being removed as should happen in the booking out
process (possibly due to the Horizon despatch process not being completed on Horizon). Horizon would have
balanced, but the pouch was still showing in in the suspense account as "cash in pouches”. The TC was issued to
remove the pouch.

The TC for £27,000
TCs of £27,000 were issued on 15/01/2008 and 24/01/2008 in relation to cash in pouches.

The auditor requested the initial TC as the suspense account showed that £27,000 was held as "cash in pouches”
but in reality the branch was not physically holding £27,000 as cash in pouches, nor had a pouch been received
at the Cash Centre. This is the relevant entry from POL's records:

15/01/2008 TCINV: ISSUED AS REQUESTED BY AUDITOR KEITH NOVERRE. TRANSACTION
CORRECTION ISSUED TO CORRECT THE AMOUNT OF 27000.00 POUNDS SHOWN IN SUSPENSE
ACCOUNT AS CASH IN POUCHES DUE TO PREVIOUS PM'S FRAUDULENT CLAIM.PRESS “ACCEPT” THEN
“MAKE GOOD" IMMEDIATELY, (YOU DO NOT HAVE TO PUT ANY MONEY IN), THIS WILL CORRECT THE
CASH IN POUCHES SUSPENSEACCOUNT ONLY.DO NOT PRESS SETTLE CENTRALLY.ANN BAILEY.01246
542001

Despite POL's instructions not to settle centrally, the SPMR pressed "settle centrally”. See the message to the
branch below:

24/01/2008 TCCRM: THIS TRANSACTION CORRECTION MUST BE SETTLED CENTRALLY TO
COMPENSATE FOR TRANSACTION NUMBER 6000343723 WHICH YOU SETTLED CENTRALLY IN
ERROR.AS DISCUSSED 24/01/07ANN BAILEY01246 542001

24/01/2008 TCINV: **YOU MUST PRESS ACCEPT THEN MAKE GOOD CASH**THIS WILL TRANSFER
THE DEBT TO THE FORMER POSTMASTER.

This separate TC was issued to transfer the debt to the former SPMR who had entered £27,000 in the suspense
account to cover a cash shortage in the branch account.

b) On sheet 3 (at lines 88-91) there are also two TCs for £15,000 which appear to cancel each other out. Can POL
explain what was happening in those TCs?

The issue here was that the cash pouch was not despatched in a timely manner by the branch. It was remitted out
on Horizon on 12/12/2007. Whilst awaiting collection it sat in Cash in Pouches Suspense.

The pouch was not despatched until 08/01/2008. This delay resulted in an invoice TC being issued on
07/01/2008 with the following details:

POL-0038655
POL00042173
POL00042173

THIS TRANSACTION CORRECTION HAS BEEN ISSUED TO CORRECT THE AMOUNT OF 15000.00
POUNDS SHOWN IN YOUR SUSPENSE ACCOUNT AS CASH INPOUCHES, 12/12/07, POUCH
302124631192. THIS REMITTANCE HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT THE CASH CENTREPROOF OF
COLLECTION MUST BE PROVIDED IF THIS TRANSACTION CORRECTION IS TO BE DISPUTED.PLEASE
CHECK YOUR HORIZON DATA BEFORE QUERYING THIS TRANSACTION CORRECTION.PLEASE PRESS
“ACCEPT” THEN “MAKE GOOD’,DO NOT PRESS SETTLE CENTRALLY ANN BAILEY.01246 542001

As the branch despatched the pouch on 08/01/2008, a compensating credit TC was issued on 09/01/2008 to
cancel out the previous TC.

TC Details:

POUCH PREPARED 12/12/07 COLLECTED 08/01/08. COMPENSATING TRANSACTION CORRECTION FOR
THE ONE SENT TO YOU ON 07/01/08.PLEASE CHECK YOUR HORIZON DATA BEFORE QUERYING THIS
TRANSACTION CORRECTION.PLEASE PRESS “ACCEPT NOW” THEN “MAKE GOOD” IMMEDIATE.ANN
BAILEY.01246 542001

Both TCs were processed by the branch on 10/01/2008

RESPONSES END

Rodric Williams
Head of Legal - Dispute Resolution & Brand

P < T " 20 Finsbury Street
, London EC2Y 9AQ.

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may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please
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