POL00046970
POL00046970
[Mos Pork
Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
Post Office Investigation Report
Branch Name: — I Astwood Branch Code: I 346246 Case M039
Bank Number:
Applicant Name: I Julian Wilson I Status of Mediation Date of 06/11/02
Case: Application Appointment: to
11/09/08
Executive summary
The Applicant, Mr Julian Wilson, was Subpostmaster of Astwood Bank branch from 06/11/02 to
11/09/08, when the Applicant resigned to avoid termination of his contract following an audit. The
audit had revealed a shortage of £27,811.98. The Applicant admitted to covering up losses over a five
year period.
The Applicant was initially prosecuted for theft and false accounting. However, the theft charge was
later dropped. The Applicant admitted to false accounting and received a 200 hour community
sentence. He also had to repay all losses and court costs. A plea of guilty to a charge entails a
complete admission of the offence to which the plea is entered, in this case an unqualified admission
to having dishonestly and with a view to gain for himself or with intent to cause loss to another,
falsified a document required for an accounting purpose.
Following the Applicant's resignation, two errors (detailed later in this report) totalling £740.00 were
reported and added to the audit shortage increasing the amount to be repaid to £28,551.98.
The Applicant repaid £28,434.95 to Post Office, with Post Office writing off the remaining sum of
£117.03.
Given the age of this case (2002-2008) and as a result of Post Office’s document retention practices at
the relevant time, there is limited information available to enable Post Office to investigate several
specific issues raised.
However, the Applicant has admitted to making false entries on Horizon over a long period of time.
Due to this false accounting, it was not possible at the time of these events, and it remains impossible
now, to precisely identify all the erroneous transactions which have caused the £28,551.98 shortfall;
any small operational losses would not have shown in the branch's accounts and would only have
revealed themselves to Post Office as a single large loss following the audit on 11/09/44.) >... 9
The Applicant has raised a number of issues in his Case Questionnaire Response (CQR). Detailed
findings in relation to each issue can be found later in this report.
Conclusion
Most of the issues raised by the Applicant refer to branch discrepancies, Horizon issues and a lack of
training and support. No systemic issues have been found with Horizon. Post Office’s view is that the
issues raised by the Applicant concerning branch discrepancies and Horizon are likely to have been
caused by human action (for example poor controls in branch and/or user errors). Post Office has
found no evidence to support the Applicant's claim that he did not receive sufficient training and
support.
The Applicant's complaint
In his CQR, the Applicant has raised the following issues:
* Inadequate training to operate a complex and evolving system;
© Training regarding new products;
© Unreliable Hardware led to losses in early 2008;
* Availability of and lack of support from Network Business Support Centre (NBSC);
© Complaints / Requests for help / Issues raised were ignored by Post Office;
‘* System discrepancies;
ae I 73 +e
{7 bo fe 76
Transaction issues (COOP Cheque Encashment, Lottery, Forged Green Giros, Traveller
Cheque issue); and
* Delayin resale of business. // (5
The Applicant is claiming compensation to the value of £460,749.54 as detailed in Schedules One and
Two of his CQR. In addition, the Applicant wishes to be compensated for the “hurt and suffering
caused by the inadequacies of the operation of the Horizon system” which has not been quantified.
POL00046970
POL00046970
Case Review Actions
Summary of the information collated by Post Office
Information available from Post Office records:
Information area
Information Information not Information not availabl
provided with available as beyond other reason
this response retention period
Training Records
NBSC call logs
Electronic Filing Cabinet
Horizon Service Desk
System Connectivity
Financial Service Centre
First Rate (currency
provider)
Branch Audit Records
Former Agent Debt
[oe] oe I x] a] >e] ><] 2] ><
Legal
ty AV bOUDe
wos
NB: Horizon Service Desk (HSD) and system €onnectivity information did not reveal any information
material to the Applicant’s claim as there were no issues contemporaneously reported by the
Applicant or branch staff.
Legal documentation has not been provided as it cannot be located.
Response to issues raised by Applicant
Issue raised
Investigation findings
4_ I Training
In his CQR, the Applicant states that the training he received was
minimal and not adequate to operate such a complex and evolving
system. He also states that he received no formal training for new
products and services and was often left “floundering” when changes
were implemented.
The training offered at this time was one of the options below:
Five or ten days’ classroom based training depending on the
services at the branch followed by six days' onsite training and
support at a follow up balance.
No classroom training, nine days onsite training (which would
include two Wednesdays to support the balance days).
A Subpostmaster would choose the option they preferred (which was
usually chosen based on the distance from the branch to the Counter
Training Office (CTO) or staff availability to attend the CTO). Ifa
POL00046970
POL00046970
Subpostmaster received additional onsite training days there would
have been a reason for such additional training ( e.g. numerous staff,
struggling in certain areas, or the Subpostmaster had requested extra
days) (Doc 001 refers).
Information held by Post Office shows that the Applicant received the
following training (Doc 001 refers):
® 04/11/02 & 05/11/02 at Lionel Street CTO, Birmingham with a
trainer called Mark Stone who has since left the business;
© 07/11/02 to 20/11/02 (12 days) onsite at Astwood Bank
branch with a trainer called Barry Hopkins ("Mr Hopkins");
and
© Asupport visit on 27/11/02 to help the Applicant with the
production of the branch accounts.
It is worthwhile noting that the Applicant states in his CQR that the
training took place at another venue. He also states that he only
received one week's onsite training followed by an odd day the
following week. Post Office records show that the Applicant received
12 days onsite training and a follow up session on branch balancing.
Analysis of NBSC call logs show no requests for additional training (Doc
002 refers) (NBSC is the first port of call for Post Office branches if they
have a query or need help). A call logged on 21/06/06 (Doc 002: Tab 1
refers) requests authority for four staff to attend a face to face sales
support event. Authority to attend was confirmed in a telephone call
from the Branch Intervention Team dated 23/06/2006 (Doc 003
refers).
Mr Hopkins (the trainer who provided the Applicant with twelve days
training in branch) has been contacted as part of this investigation. Mr
Hopkins has advised that he recalls training the Applicant. The branch
is located near to Mr Hopkins' home, Between 2002 and 2006, Mr
Hopkins regularly received phone calls from the Applicant if he was
stuck and Mr Hopkins consequently provided additional support to the
branch.
Mr Hopkins has advised that in 2006, the Applicant and his wife’s
attitude towards him appeared to change and he was made to feel
unwelcome at the branch. Asa result, Mr Hopkins decided to keep
away from the branch after this.
Mr Hopkins has confirmed that he did advise the Applicant that if he
had a gain in the branch accounts, he should put this in an envelope in
the safe to be used should the Applicant have a corresponding loss.
This is a sensible approach to dealing with small gains and losses. The
Post Office contract also states losses must be made good and gains
may be withdrawn (provided that any subsequent charge for that
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
‘amount is immediately made good) (Doc 004 refers).
Training on new products and services was sometimes delivered using
workbooks with support from NBSC. The workbooks would have been
sent to the branch prior to the transaction going live which would have
allowed sufficient time for training to be undertaken ahead of the
transactions going live. Articles would also have been printed in the
“Counter News” sent to the branch each week. Details of workbooks
sent to Astwood Bank from 2002 to 2008 are not available (Doc 001
refers). Horizon Online went live at the branch on 31/08/10 (i.e.
almost 2 years after the Applicant’s resignation) and is therefore
outside the scope of this investigation (Doc 005 refers).
In summary therefore, there is no evidence to support the claim that
the Applicant’s training was inadequate or that the branch
experienced issues when new products were launched. —
Replacement In his CQR, the Applicant states that he experienced an issue with his
Horizon System & I “hard drives" in early 2008 which resulted in replacement Horizon base
problems with units being installed. In addition, the Applicant states that he had a
Integrated Services I problem with the ISDN line connected to Horizon which meant that ~
Digital Network I Horizon had to transmit data using the mobile network. The Applicant
(ISDN) line states that this caused Horizon to freeze on many occasions preventing
the completion of relevant transactions.
In order for Horizon equipment to be replaced, a call should first be
made to the Horizon Service Desk (HSD). However, Post Office has 4 ¢
reviewed the call logs from January to March 2008 and there is no
evidence of any calls having been made to the HSD during this period,
whether in connection with equipment replacement or otherwise.
Further, it is acknowledged that communication failures (whether ISDN
line or mobile network) can and do occur during branch opening hours. -
However, Horizon is equipped with a recovery process for this -
eventuality and provided the correct procedure is adopted, no branch
discrepancy would have resulted.
There is therefore no evidence to support this claim from the Applicant
that replacement equipment or problems with the ISDN line caused "
losses in the Applicant’s branch (Doc 006 refers). -
Helpline Assistance I In his CQR, the Applicant states that when a new service for cashing
COOP Bank cheques was introduced, he contacted NBSC and followed
their instructions. The Applicant states that NBSC did not tell him the
correct envelope to despatch the cheques in which resulted in a loss
against the branch for £500.00.
Investigations have shown that Astwood Bank branch went live with fk
this service on 21/03/03 (Doc 007 refers). Analysis of NBSC call logs
show that a request for assistance with the counter procedures for this
service was logged on 09/05/2008, i.e. more than 5 years later (Doc
002: Tab 2 refers).
Counter Operations Manuals are also available and are held in branch
for staff to refer to when dealing with all operational, transactional
and despatch procedures. A weekly newsletter, the “Counter News”,
was also available at this time and sent to every branch in the network.
This detailed any operational updates and guidance.
No evidence is available regarding the content of the conversation
with NBSC to suggest that wrong information was given to the
questions asked by the Applicant. NBSC knowledge base was used for
the specific issue raised by the Applicant (NBSC knowledge base ("KB")
is the system used by NBSC advisors to offer appropriate advice and
resolution).
The correct procedure for cashing a COOP Bank cheque was for the
transaction to be recorded onto Horizon and to despatch it to
Santander in one of the pouches provided. Post Office investigations
have shown that the branch did correctly process a COOP Bank cheque
on Horizon for £500.00 on 09/05/08 (Doc 008 refers) but despatched it
to the Post Office Cheque Processing Centre instead of Santander
(where it ought to have been sent). Once dispatched, the cheque for
£500.00 was remitted out of Horizon (Doc 009 refers). The cheque
must then have been re-introduced manually by the Applicant onto
Horizon (i.e. for a second time), most likely through a cash/cheque
adjustment. The cheque was received at the Post Office Cheque
Processing Centre on 13/05/09 and processed (Doc 010 refers).
The result of claiming this on Horizon twice would have resulted in a
gain of £500.00 in the accounts for the branch.
As Santander did not receive the cheque, they raised an error against
the branch for £500.00, which was received after the Applicant's
resignation. Post Office is not liable for this amount (Doc 011 refers),
so it was added to the “late account” which is held for former
Subpostmasters for up to six years for any debit or credit amounts
applicable to the individual after they have left the business. Thus, this
£500 (along with the £240 referred to in Section 8 below) formed part
of the £740 which increased the audit shortage from £27,811.98 to
£28,551.98.
In his CQR, the Applicant states that he initially contacted NBSC on
many occasions but found them difficult to get hold of (particularly
around the time of balancing) and of little assistance when spoken to.
Balancing would have taken place each Wednesday at close of
business at 17:30.
No statistics are available to show the rate at which calls were
answered by NBSC or regarding specific training received by NBSC
advisors. All NBSC advisors would have received training from Post
POL00046970
POL00046970
Office to ensure that they could proficiently provide advice for any
new products or services (Doc 012 refers).
Analysis of call logs shown in the table below reveals that the Applicant
contacted NBSC 37 times regarding balancing or branch trading
procedures throughout the 6 year period 2002 to 2008. Sixteen took
place on balancing day, eight took place after close of business at
17:30 (Doc 002: Tab 3 refers).
an I Calls Reearelng I calls on Made
Year I npsc I _Balancing&® Ig atancing After
ails I Branch Trading Day 17.30
Procedure
2002 I 11 1 (9%) 0 0
2003 I 89 To (11%) 3 100%
2004 I 62 4:(6%) 3 100%
2005 I 33 8 (24%) 3 0%
2006 I 52 9 (17%) 5 20%
2007_I 29 5 (17%) 2 50%
2008 I 26 0 0 0
Totals I 302 37 (12%) 16 50%
Itis worthwhile noting that no calls were made from the branch
regarding balancing or branch trading during the period when the
Applicant claims his losses got worse.
NBSC opening hours during this period are detailed in the table below
with changes highlighted in yellow (Doc 012 refers).
NBSC
Opening 2002/2005 2005/2006 2007/2008
Hours
Monday (08:00- 18:00 I 08:00- 18:00 I 08:00 - 18:00
Tuesday 08:00 - 18:00, I 08:00- 18:00 I 08:00 - 18:00
Wednesday I 08:00€ 22:00) I 08:00 - 20:00 I 08:00 - 20:00
Thursday 08:00 - 18:00 I 08:00- 18:00 I 0 18:00
Friday 08:00 - 18:00 I 08:00- 18:00 I 8:00 - 18:00.
Saturday 08:00 - 17:30 I 08:00- 17:30 I (08:00-14:00 I >
Sunday Closed Closed Closed.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Applicant could not contact
NBSC or was unable to get assistance at the time of balancing.
Line Manager
Assistance
in his CQR, the Applicant states that he raised his concerns regarding
incurring losses with his line manager Paul Fantuzi. He also states that
Mr Fantuzi told him not to worry as Horizon would work itself out.
In conversations during this investigation with Keith Bridges (who was
the Business Development Manager (BDM) for Astwood Bank for 12
months in approximately 2006), he recalls that Paul Farftuzzd, worked
in the area intervention office and left the business around-2004/2005.
Analysis of NBSC calll logs do not show any calls from the branch
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
requesting contact from Mr Fahtuzzo or calls regarding losses (Doc 002
refers). There is no. other evidehce to Suggest that the matter was
raised with Mr Fantuzi of that he stated Horizon would work itself out.
Business In his CQR, the Applicant states that he asked his BDM, Keith Bridges,
Development about the losses which he was experiencing and Mr Bridges could not
Manager help him. The Applicant also states that Mr Bridges advised him that
Assistance no one other than the Applicant and Post Office had access to Horizon
at the branch.
During conversations held as part of this investigation, Keith Bridges
has advised that at that time his area of responsibility was sales. Keith
Bridges cannot recall anything regarding the Applicant mentioning
losses, issues with cash declarations or discussing access to Horizon. If
a Subpostmaster had experienced any issues not related to sales, Keith nt
Bridges has stated that he would have advised them to contact NBSC
direct.
Analysis of NBSC call logs do not show any calls regarding losses or
issues with cash declarations differing from close of business Saturday
to re-opening on Monday (Doc 002 refers). Further detail regarding
this is in Section Seven.
Assistance from __I In his CQR, the Applicant states that he rang and wrote several letters
the contract to the Contract Manager (CM) and The National Federation of Sub
manager andthe I Postmasters (NFSP) but none of his points were dealt with adequately.
Federation
The NFSP is not part of the Post Office and Post Office has no access to
their records. Post Office cannot therefore comment on any alleged
failure by the NFSP to assist the Applicant.
The only correspondence between the Applicant and his CM identified
in the course of this investigation was received after the Applicant's
resignation. This correspondence was originally sent to the NFSP and II o¢
then to the CM (Doc 013 refers). .
Discrepancies In his CQR, the Applicant claims that “on several occasions’ the cash
between cash position shown by the cash declaration at the close of business on
declaration at Saturday was different to that showing on a Monday, even though no
close of business transactions had taken place”.
on Saturday and
The Applicant has not stated when this occurred or the amounts in
question. Having reviewed NBSC call logs as part of this investigation,
there is no record of this issue being reported (Doc 002 refers).
opening balance
on Monday
The Applicant has not provided any detail of what report he has
compared the cash declarations to. Analysis of all transactions for
early 2008 (January to March) (i.e. when the Applicant states his
losses got worse) show that no report was obtained from Horizon
which would allow the Applicant to be able to check the cash position
on Horizon on a Monday prior to opening for business (Doc 014:Tab1
refers).
The Applicant had the opportunity to raise any alleged discrepancies
with Post Office at the time they occurred and could have contacted
NBSC to request further investigation. However, the Applicant appears
not to have done this, but instead chose to make false entries on
Horizon, preventing Post Office from carrying out such an
investigation.
There is therefore no evidence to support this claim from the
Applicant.
Out of Date
Scratchcards
In his CQR and through an additional request for further information,
the Applicant states that a Lottery (Camelot) rep removed one pack of
£1.00 scratch cards that were out of date in July/August 2008. The
Applicant states that the rep booked this pack out of the lottery
terminal and said that the Applicant would receive a TC to reduce the
stock. The TC never arrived and the Applicant was out of pocket by
£250.00.
The Applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to allow Camelot to
investigate this issue (Doc 015 refers).
It should be noted that a Pack of £1.00 scratch cards at that time was
valued at £120.00 and not £250.00.
Camelot has provided details of their process which allows Regional
Sales Executives (RSE) to remove non-activated packs (packs that have
not been put on sale or recorded on lottery terminal and Horizon).
The RSE would have completed this process on the lottery terminal
and left a receipt signed by the branch and the RSE (Doc 015 refers).
There would have been no need for a TC to be issued as a non-
activated pack would have no value on Horizon. It is unlikely that a
Camelot rep would have knowledge of Post Office terminology in
respect of Horizon.
Post Office investigations have revealed that the branch did create an
error on the 07/08/08. The branch activated three packs of scratch
cards on the lottery terminal but only activated one of these packs on
Horizon. This resulted in an error for £240.00 being issued to the
branch and was identified following the Applicant's resignation (Doc
016, 017, 011 refers).
There is no evidence to support this claim from the Applicant. Itis
likely that the Applicant has mistaken his issue with the error created
by the branch for £240.00.
Forged Green
Girocheques
In his CQR, the Applicant states that he experienced an issue with
forged “Green Giro” cheques (which are used to pay Government
benefits) amounting to over £10,000. The Applicant states that he was
required to make good one “Giro” cheque to the value of £350 but was
never given a satisfactory answer to what became of the remaining
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
POL00046970
uf
Giro cheques which totalled £9,650.
Analysis of NBSC call logs do not show any calls regarding Green Giro
cheques. There is however a call logged on 08/09/06 regarding an
issue with “Giro” cheques (Doc 002: Tab’S)refers), which was dealt A
with further in a branch intervention log. That log shows that this 4
issue concerned Inland Revenue Cashcheques rather than Green Giro /
benefit cheques (Doc 018 refers).
Further investigation has revealed that there was an issue with forged
Inland Revenue Cashcheques which affected multiple branches in early
September 2006. The Applicant’s branch processed six forged Inland
Revenue Cashcheques totalling £1,933.96. Post Office convened a
joint Post Office/NFSP panel to review the reasonableness of applying
liability to branches for the forged Inland Revenue Cashcheques. The
Applicant’s branch was held liable for one of these Cashcheques for a
£304.26 (Doc 019 refers), but not the remaining £1,629.70, which was
absorbed by Post Office.
There is therefore no evidence to support the claim from the Applicant
that his branch had an unresolved “Green Giro” issue amounting to 4
£10,000. It appears that the Applicant may have confused "Green
Giro” cheques with “Inland Revenue Cashcheques”.
£1,500 of US In his CQR and through a request for further information, the Applicant
Traveller Cheques _I states that he issued US Traveller Cheques to a customer on a
Wednesday (specific dates could not be provided). The following day,
his wife received a call from First Rate (Post Office's currency supplier)
in Twickenham to say that they could see that the transaction was not
processed correctly. The Applicant states that he contacted the
customer and asked her/him to return to the branch in order to rectify
the mistake which the customer did. On the Friday, the Applicant
states that he contacted First Rate to apologise and was instructed to
reverse the original transaction as the branch had balanced on the
Wednesday this could not be done. The Applicant claims that First
Rate advised that a TC would be issued but it never arrived. }
10
Through contact with the Post Office Product Manager for First Rate, I I‘)),$¢/
Cat he has confirmed that First Rate do not have an office in Twickenham. “
b (Doc 020 refers).
The branch at the time in question did not hold US Traveller Cheques
in branch (Doc 021 refers). Instead, US Traveller Cheques would have
to be ordered on behalf of specific customers. The transaction
required the branch to take payment for the order, phone in the order
and wait for it to arrive in the post and then check and hand it to the
customer.
First Rate only have a record of calls from late 2008 onwards which
include three calls made from the branch between October 2008 and
December 2008 (Doc 022 refers). These calls were made from the
branch following termination of the Applicant's contract.
First Rate have stated that they do not believe their staff would give
such advice (as the Applicant asserts in his CQR) as it is out with their
remit and their teams have no knowledge of Post Office's processes,
terms and language (Doc 022 refers).
First Rate does not have access to Post Office systems and would not
know if the transaction had been completed correctly on Horizon.
The Applicant could have contacted NBSC at any time following this to
enquire about the non-receipt of a TC. However, there is no record of
any call to NBSC (Doc 002 refers).
There is no evidence to support this claim from the Applicant.
Audit
In his CQR, the Applicant states that he informed the auditors upon
their arrival at Astwood Bank branch on 11/09/08 that he expected a
loss of around £27,000.00 to be identified.
The audit report states that the Applicant informed there would be a
shortfall in the cash of around £27,000.00 and said that this was
shortages accumulated at the branch over the last five years or so.
The Applicant also informed the auditors that he had been inflating the
cash figures each month in order to show a balance (Doc 023 refers).
12
Charges
In his CQR, the Applicant states that he was initially charged with theft
and numerous charges of false accounting. The theft charge was
dropped and the Applicant was charged with false accounting.
Post Office cannot confirm this information as it is no longer available.
The Applicant did however elect to plead guilty to charges of false
accounting. It is presumed that the Applicant would have been legally
represented and that he would have discussed the charges with his
legal representative before electing to plead guilty, but Post Office
cannot comment on this further.
13
Refusal of
Applicant for the
Astwood branch
In his CQR, the Applicant states that he found a potential buyer for the
Astwood branch who had worked as a relief Subpostmaster all over
the West Midlands region but the potential buyer's application was
rejected by Post Office. The Applicant states that he suffered a loss of
£29,500.00 as a result.
The Applicant was allowed to market his business on an “at” basis for
six months. This was to allow for a suitable applicant to be found who
could provide Post Office services from the existing branch premises
only. On 01/06/09 (i.e. after this six month period), this was changed
to also allow applications from anyone who would like to be appointed
to provide Post Office services from alternative premises (known as
marketing a vacancy “at or near”).
An application was received from Mr Mistry and he was interviewed
POL00046970
POL00046970
Cog
on 03/09/09. However, his application was not successful.
A further application was received from Mrs Mahli. She was
interviewed on 02/03/11 and her application was successful. Mrs
Mahli was appointed on 19/08/11.
The appointment of a new Subpostmaster is at the discretion of Post
Office and is based on the suitability of an applicant. The details of
applications and interviews are private and confidential.
Subpostmasters provide Post Office services under a personal contract
for services. Post Office does not therefore accept any responsibility
for the sale and marketing of a Subpostmasters independent
businesses or assets.
List documents (if any)
Reference Description
M039_POL_001_NSAT email_KS.pdf
E-mail response regarding training
offer
M039_POL_002_NBSC Call Logs 346246 Astwood Bank
06 November 2002 — 30 September 2008_KS.xls
All NBSC calls
™M039_PO1_003_Additonal Sales Training_KS.pdf
Phone log regarding attendance at a
training event
Contract_KS.pdf
M039_POL_004_Losses and Gains Extract from
Extract for SPMR contract regarding
losses and gains
‘M039_POL_005_HNG Data Extract_KS.pdf
Survey completed on day Horizon
online went live
™M039_POL_006_HSD email_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding calls to HSD
M039_POL_007_CO OP Live Date_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding date COOP went live
at branch
M039_POL_008_Cheque scan_KS.pdf
Copy of COOP cheque
™M039_POL_009_BCV scan_KS.pdf
Copy of Batch Control Voucher for
COOP cheque.
™M039_POL_010_SR013_KS.pdf
Spot Review SRO13
M039_POL_011_Agent Debt 346246_KS.pdf
Former Agent Debt
™M039_POL_012_NBSC email_KS.pdf
NBSC opening hours/availability/staff
training
™M039_POL_013_Letter to NFSP CM Astwood
Letter sent to NFSP and then to CM
POL00046970
POL00046970
Bank_KS.pdf
MO039_POL_014_HSD Events Jan to Mar 2008_KS.xis
Horizon events at branch
M039_POl_015_Lottery Process email_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding lottery
™M039_POL_016_FSC email camelot_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding scratch card error
M039_POL_017_SRO22_KS.paf
Spot Review SRO22
M039_POL_018_fone Log ASTWOOD BANK IR
cheques_KS.pdf
Intervention log regarding forged
Inland Revenue Cashcheques
M039_POL_019_FSC email IR_KS.pdf
Email regarding forged Inland Revenue
Cashcheques
M039_POL_020_First rate email1_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding First Rate
M039_POL_021_First rate email2_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding First Rate
MO039_POL_022_First rate email2_KS.pdf
E-mail regarding First Rate
M039_POL_023_Astwood Bank (346246) Audit
Report_KS.pdf
Audit Report
POL00046970
POL00046970