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DRAFT 05.04.01
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW
- HORIZON NATIONAL ROLL OUT
1. BACKGROUND
The project had its origins in the counter automation strategy as part of the business
mission and vision to create an automated retail network. Initially the intention was
to achieve this via a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) with the Benefits Agency and
ICL Pathway.
Implementation began with 10 initial go-live offices in August 1996. A further 314
outlets progressively entered live trial from April 1997 with a phased extension of
the software capability culminating in the Core Services Release with full
functionality in April 1999.
After a Government review the decision was made in July 1999 to proceed without
the Benefits Agency through a separate contract with ICL Pathway for the delivery
of implementation and training arrangements. The business case for automation
was subsequently approved by the Post Office Investment Board. The go-ahead was
given for a further 1532 to go-live from September 1999 and, subsequently, after
protracted release authorisation and acceptance deliberations involving a number of
rectification plans, the final phase of implementation, national roll out (NRO), to
commence from 24 January 2000.
The National Roll Out project emanated from a reorganisation of the Automation
Directorate in January 2000. The aim of the project was to manage, both through the
contractual relationship with ICL Pathway and internal resources, Horizon
implementation and training to all outlets to prescribed timescales, cost and quality
specifications. Essentially the project was about delivering a concentrated and
challenging installation programme by building on preparatory work done during
preceding years. The scope of the NRO project includes all preparation, training and
installation work but excludes direct responsibility for live environment
performance. The project does not cover the CSR+ software release strand which
was managed as a separate project.
2, PERFORMANCE AGAINST ORIGINAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The main objectives as defined in the Project Initiation Document (PID) and
performance against each are :-
2.1 Assure through effective planning and management of the components of the
plan with ICL Pathway that implementation and training delivered to outlets
meets contractual and business requirements on time, cost and quality
specifications.
* All milestones have been met, including the PID deliverables, and the project
came in under budget
The structure of the programme was systematic and enabled all key activities
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to be undertaken at the relevant time
© Roles were clear and interfaces with other functions, particularly territories,
generally good. Some confusion existed in the early days about the
decommissioning and recovery of legacy system equipment though this was
soon resolved
© PRINCE methodology was used throughout the project. The application of
proper project disciplines throughout the project has provided a benchmark for
others to follow.
¢ There has been an evident reluctance by ICL Pathway to treat Post Office
Network as a valued customer from the early days of the Horizon system. This
may, in part at least, have emanated from the commercial implications of the
switch from a PFI to direct contract. A major consequence of this switch was
that PON had to extend its implementation team from 10 people to 450 as it
inherited added responsibilities, for example, overseeing surveys, undertaking
data migration and supporting outlets post-migration
Whatever the cause, without active management by the project team, including
the provision of extra resource, ICL Pathway would not have performed as
well, and time, cost and quality specifications would have been in jeopardy.
ICL Pathway planning and supplier performance was variable and required
detailed control mechanisms, systems (eg. issues management, supporting
satellite and mobile solution surveys) and people (eg. Contract Compliance
Managers, Product Knowledge Managers) to be put in place by us to manage
progress and performance of activity at all outlets. Training, initially on course
scheduling then latterly on course occupancy levels, was an aspect that
required extra management attention throughout
* Training administration attracted criticism throughout around convenience of
course locations, inflexibility of dates and course occupancy. Subpostmasters
generally found the second day of the Counter Managers course was not
focused enough on balancing, suspense accounts, lottery and bureau de change
* Balancing training was perhaps the weakest link until outlets became familiar
with the system. Distribution of the Balancing With Horizon guide did much
to bolster knowledge and confidence levels and was well received
« The scheduling of activity was geared more towards supplier convenience
than the demands of customer service. Having said this the impacts were
generally well managed though some tensions were encountered during the
later stages of the project
« The management of suppliers and provision of contingency arrangements by
ICL Pathway was variable; third party and sub-contracted arrangements were
seemingly the weakest link. Greater visibility of performance management
information and contact with suppliers without transferring risks to ourselves
would have been helpful
¢ One of the strengths of the project was the comprehensive and structured
documentation of processes and change management.
2.2. Satisfactory roll out of Horizon to all outlets taking remedial action to secure
business performance by initiating or developing policies/frameworks as
appropriate.
» Activity in the outlets generally worked well though problems with ISDN
line provision and satellite permission delays eroded achievement of weekly
targets on a number of occasions. Some problems were encountered with
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appointments and the standard of some survey and modification work at
outlets left something to be desired
«The absence of a coherent and robust outlet and product reference data
system was evident at various times during the project
* Policies and approaches to support roll out were developed and deployed as
appropriate. Documentation, change control and issue management were
universally acknowledged as major strengths
«The management of problem outlets (eg. too expensive, no solution, refusals
etc) were all handled sensitively with the co-operation of the NFSP
¢ The Christmas 1999 installation break was a crucial factor in preparing for the
rigours of relentless implementation. The various preparation projects
undertaken before national roll out commenced were instrumental in
securing its success. In particular the Balancing Guide To Horizon filled a real
gap.
2.3 Plan and manage Post Office Network resource requirements according to the
needs of the project.
* Numbers on the project team were managed according to need via a project
manpower plan which was adjusted to reflect significant changes in the ICL
Pathway implementation plan. The nature of outlet migration activity
resulted in some anomalies in hours worked amongst field staff but these
were managed out
«The involvement of senior field management in the sponsorship and
development of implementation activity from an early date proved to be an
effective arrangement as too did the use of experienced outlet staff
* The organisational structure of the team was generally sound though the
revised gradings during SCS implementation, coming as they did just before
national roll out began in earnest, caused a degree of consternation and
unrest
* A notable success was the way field teams bonded and supported each other
* The training and provision of balance support to outlets during the early cash
accounts after migration was co-ordinated through a sub-project before it was
subsumed into the service management function
¢ Training and preparation arrangements for the CSR+ software upgrade,
which were handled by the project, generally worked well
* Equipment resources (eg. cars, mobile phones, laptops) and hotel bookings
were logistical challenges at times but were managed efficiently and
economically. Central London proved to be a particular problem from a
parking, transporting and security viewpoint and required special
arrangements to be made
« A comprehensive staff release plan and database were developed to manage
the release and redeployment of over 400 people from the project.
2.4 Confirm readiness of other business units to engage in Horizon
implementation through effective liaison and communication.
The involvement of PONEC members on the project board facilitated both
a high degree of ownership across the business and close and active co-
operation in the delivery of the project without becoming intrusive
* The creation of the Horizon Evaluation Review Forum brought together
key people from affected units across the business to co-ordinate activity
and provided an effective vehicle for brokering solutions to emerging
problems. Salient pieces of work included scenario planning, impact
analysis of service failures and driving down amounts in suspense accounts
* An influencing plan to secure the active participation of people across the
business was developed and deployed and used to inform the
communications plan
¢ Communications was actively driven by the project manager throughout
with regular briefings via all the main internal channels, reactive external
publicity and attendance at subpostmaster forums at national and local level
« A regular dialogue was maintained with key stakeholders, including NFSP
General Secretary, CWU and CMA, territorial staff and support functions to
secure their active co-operation.
. ACHIEVEMENT OF PLAN
All contractual and business milestones were met, In the early months of roll out
actual migrations regularly exceeded plan with a cumulative achievement by
mid-October of over 400 outlets ahead of plan. During the later stages of the
project some weekly targets were missed as activity moved to the more difficult
and thinly spread outlets
Daily, weekly and monthly reports collated the result of field activity for
circulation both within the project and elsewhere in the business. These reports
were used to inform and monitor progress against the plan. Deviations from
plan were the subject of regular dialogue with ICL Pathway by the NRO project
team. High level monitoring of progress against the plan was done by the NRO
Project Board and variations were only tolerated where these did not jeopardise
contractual or planned migration milestones
I, PERFORMANCE - FINANCIAL
The management of the complex and extensive contractual arrangement through
the specialist services of the Horizon Commercial team was extremely beneficial
and enabled the NRO team to focus on delivery
The project expenditure out-turned favourably against budgetary authority.
Even so expenditure control disciplines in the early days of the project were not as
rigorous or as widely embedded as they should have been; this was quickly
rectified and appropriate responsibilities established
Within the context of the overall business case and annual budgetary profiles
costs were controlled and reported under specific subheads by the NRO Project
Finance Manager in the Programme Office. Costs subheads were defined to the
lowest sensible accountable level with individuals responsible for activity having
accountability for associated costs. Costs were reviewed monthly by subhead
against budget by the head of Horizon Implementation and NRO Project
Manager. Explanations were sought for any variances, which were only tolerated
provided the overall budget and business case was not breached.
A tisk and issues log was maintained throughout the project and regularly
reviewed by the project manager and project board
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e A Post Project Review of the Horizon Programme will be undertaken by the
Horizon Commercial team which will address financial performance more fully
including achievement against the original business case and benefits realisation.
5. PERFORMANCE - OPERATIONAL
¢ The delivery of the project by a dedicated team sitting outside the retail line
provided a clear focus and was one of the main ingredients for success. A
structured hierarchy with pro-active leadership and good recognition of
achievements created a well motivated and performing field force
¢ The visibility of management information to monitor ICL Pathway performance
and initiate necessary remedial activity was generally poor
¢ The working relationship forged with the ICL Pathway Roll Out Services team
were positive and dynamic and a role model for others to follow
e Although all outlets were supported on their first balance by an HFSO sometimes
this was on Thursday morning rather than Wednesday afternoon/evening.
Where this happened subpostmasters generally felt more exposed and therefore
less satisfied
¢ Both HFSOs and Helpdesks had to go through a steep learning curve in the early
days
« Much was asked of RNMs during this project. Although extra resource was
provided to do everyday tasks for them they still incurred long hours supporting
balances.
6. PERFORMANCE - TECHNICAL :
Technical oversight and validation of ICL Pathway activities was almost non- :
existent compared with the preceding live trial and development phase. Although :
this was not really a problem it is an area that should not be overlooked either in the
Horizon maintenance phase or in future projects.
7. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES
The full lessons learned report are at Appendix A (NRO project team input) and
Appendix B (other business functions).
8. FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
* Satisfactory arrangements exist for the transfer of residual responsibilities to
other business units who have all signalled their willingness to accept them.
There are no remaining project resources and support services which are not
being transferred elsewhere
* All project issues are closed
* All relevant project information is secured and archived or handed on as
applicable to permit any future audit of the project's actions and performance
¢ All involved or interested parties are aware that the project is to be closed and
resources disbanded
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* The Influencing Plan has been reviewed and ongoing communications messages
have been handed on
¢ There are no contractual implications with decommissioning the project
¢ ICL Pathway currently have the intellectual property rights to outlet survey
plans; future access to these and PON data has been determined.
9. RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Supplier issues
© The project, understandably for its size and nature, had a heavy contractual
overlay. Despite best endeavours to establish open, constructive, customer
focused and forward looking relationships with ICL Pathway directors we did
not succeed in mirroring the relationships which existed at working level.
Consequently, consideration ought to be given in similar supplier dominated
projects in future as to how we can secure commercial benefit via a more
creative, constructive and less restraining jomt working or partnership
arrangement at all levels so that both parties secure a win-win position
« We should never again put ourselves in the position of dependence on either a
sole supplier (or, indeed, supplier dominated project progress information }
without first establishing a defined and adequate contingency. At the outset we
should assure customer pre-eminence with any future supplier who must
commit to identify, agree and deliver to our requirements including detailed
performance metrics and integrated reporting structures. Furthermore, any
future supplier must empower their local field teams to mirror the
responsibilities we invest in our people
* Improving the way we manage our chosen supplier; having more than one route
without proper technical back-up can make us look both unprofessional and
vulnerable :
* Supplier scheduling activity, including that of key sub-contractors, needs to be i
more visibly defined and delivered to an agreed level of quality and time with '
all activity in any PON location agreed in advance and no indirect contact made i
with outlets. This should include access to sub-contractor low level plans and '
guarantees on remedial activity (eg. infrastructure snagging). While it is
accepted that suppliers have the right to review the size and structure of their
supply teams this should be done in open communication with the customer
and any impacts fully understood.
9.2 Project management
¢ The importance of proper project management disciplines, including
documentation, change control, resource and financial management, and the
sustained interest, direction and support of the project board throughout cannot
be over-emphasised
¢ The importance of allowing sufficient time to plan and secure the concurrence
and readiness of key players pre-implementation should not be under-
estimated, Defining end user requirements (eg. training, account processing)
clearly and concisely at the outset and embodying these in the PID is a necessary
discipline. There is also a fundamental need to ensure that all project
dependencies are scoped, documented and agreed by all relevant parties and
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that compliance controls are in place during the project life cycle to assure
consistent delivery
Business standard planning techniques should be deployed and dedicated
planning resource provided from the outset. Any plan of outlet activity should
take due account of customer peaks, bank holidays etc and integrate with other
concurrent projects which impact on outlets
Defining end user requirements (eg. training, account processing) clearly and
concisely at the outset and embodying these in the PID is a necessary discipline.
There is also a fundamental need to ensure that all project dependencies in the
form of business interfaces and processes that underpin project deliverables are
scoped, documented and agreed by all relevant parties before implementation
begins and that compliance controls are in place during the project life cycle to
assure consistent delivery
On any project there needs to be a common, baselined set of data based on
robust internal reference data. As a business we are still weak on outlet data
management. A strong recommendation for any future project would be to
ensure that a universal database, especially for scheduling and performance
reporting, is adopted by both ourselves and our supplier with strict control
processes being implemented in respect of changes made to that data
The need for strong and consistent leadership behaviours with clear roles and
responsibilities and accountabilities is paramount. On projects of this nature
and size a single team concept should be adopted to ensure consistency and
avoid communication gaps
To avoid being numbers driven all projects should develop and deploy a
Quality Plan, which should embrace the effectiveness of activities of both
external and internal suppliers with appropriate check steps and remedial
requirements. Appropriate contingency arrangements need to be identified
The agreement of the NFSP to use their Discretionary Fund to finance the extra
cost of automating those outlets above business limits indicates both the
advantage of partnership and seeking inventive ways of meeting excessive costs
Organisational uncertainty threatened to get in the way of transferring residual
responsibilities and people as we planned close down. There is an evident need
to be crisper in the way we establish internal ownership and accountabilities.
9.3 Resources
Major projects of this nature should be run by a dedicated team including a field
force outside the retail line and be appropriately fire-walled from future
organisational change to avoid jeopardising their outcome. The use of
experienced business managers and not consultants to deliver implementation
activity, including the use of retail line and appropriate specialist support staff
in both the development and delivery stages of the project, is recommended.
Key project managers should either have a PRINCE qualification or be given the
opportunity to gain this as early as possible. Appropriate specialist staff should
be recruited or developed
There is a need to fundamentally review the way projects are resourced.
Employing managers on long term temporary promotion is not only
demotivational but creates ill-feeling when they subsequently leave the project
and return to original grades, There needs to be a defined process for resourcing
projects embracing both substantive appointments where the project is expected
to last longer than, say, 12 months, and a clear exit route for release from the
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project. All adverts and subsequent appointment letters should completely
clarify whether or not the individual has a right of return to their parent unit
and this should be agreed and documented with the old and new line managers.
All staff upon accepting a vacancy should be made aware that they will be
required to remain on the project until their role is no longer required. This
should be stipulated as a pre-requisite of accepting the post. A clear and
consistent business policy on temporary promotions would remove any doubt
and inequalities about the treatment of individuals, particularly those whose
temporary promotions have lasted longer than expected or have been extended
by the business. A dedicated Personnel contact at key stages is recommended
where numbers warrant
* The provision of a special bonus payment for delivering the project was well
received and incentive payments of this nature should be considered an
essential part of major projects in future
* The right tools in sufficient numbers need to be provided from the outset to
relevant staff to enable them to effectively discharge their responsibilities. The
physical resources (eg. cars, mobiles, credit cards) required by the project team
to allow them to effectively discharge their role needs to be scoped, risk and
impact assessed, and provided at an early stage. PON management teams need
to be provided also with clear levels of delegated authority at the outset to
maximise prompt decision making and issue resolution
9,4 Training
« All training courses and training content to undergo more in-depth
development and quality checks prior to delivery to ensure user comfort.
Training should be viewed as a process rather than an event and ensure it caters
for different learning pace, styles and requirements. A “one size” fits all
approach is not always appropriate, especially if an established learning
environment does not exist.
¢ Learning objectives should be clearly defined at the outset and strategic aims
built into the PID. The success of training needs to be quantified in terms of
contribution to the bottom line.
* Where business procedures are concerned this should be delivered by in-house
trainers
9.5 Communications
¢ Itis imperative that robust influencing and communication processes are
established from the outset to ensure that all people affected by the change
know what is expected of them and are kept abreast of developments and
opportunities to sustain morale.
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10. CONCLUSION
Although early stages of the Horizon project were plagued with problems
National Roll Out can be construed a success meeting all time, cost and quality
specifications. Delivering the project via a dedicated team outside the retail line
not only assured focus and delivery but enabled us to skill over 400 people in
outlet change management, most of whom will be available for future projects.
DON GREY
NRO Project Manager
May 2001
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Appendix A
POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW OF FIELD MANAGEMENT
Author: Martin O'Toole Version:1.0
Authority: Douglas Craik
I Reference: HOR/IMP/PRCO16
H Document Summary : This document addresses the management and logistical
learning points encountered identified via the deployment of a field resource
i nationally . It identifies improvement opportunities which could be used when
considering the processes to be adopted in future. The input for the document has
I been provided by representatives from field and administration teams working in i
Territorially based teams and the HO Implementation team
Distribution Don Grey
: Douglas Craik
Sue Lock
Dawn Green
Bill Kerr
Graham Katon
Andy Jones i
Ann Cocker
Martin O Toole
Barry Evans
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Contents Page
0.1. DOCUMENT HISTORY...
0.2 ABBREVIATIONG....
0.3 DOCUMENTS CROSS REFERENCED...
1. SCOPE AND FORMAT OF DOCUMENT...
2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSB........
3. MANAGEMENT LEARNING POINTS SUMMARY.....
3.1, Implementation Programme Management
3.2. Supplier / Business Interfaces...
3.3. Human Resource.
3.4. Support Systems and Resource:
3.5. Communications. Operational and Busine
3.6. Field Management......
4, BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS ......
4.1, Contractual
4.2. Business.
5. HUMAN RESOURCES.
4. PHYSICAL RESOURCEG.........
5. TERRITORIAL / BUSINESS INTERFACES...
6. SUPPLIER INTERFACES .
7, BUSINESS CHANGE IMPACTS...
8, HFSO FIELD ACTIVITY..
9, OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONSG.........
10. STRAND DOCUMENTATION .....
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0.1 DOCUMENT HISTORY
Version Reason for Change Date of
No, Change
10 Consolidated National Implementation PIR for Project Manager I N/A
0.2 ABBREVIATIONS
PON - POST OFFICE NETWORK
SSM - SURVEY SUPPORT MANAGER
CCM - CONTRACTS COMPLIANCE MANAGER
NRO - NATIONAL ROLL OUT
ISD - IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT DATA
SSTL - SURVEY SUPPORT TEAM LEADER
HIM - HORIZON IMPLEMENTATION MANAGER
IRM - ISSUE RESOLUTION MANAGER
NHIT - NATIONAL HORIZON IMPLEMENTATION TEAM
IP - IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME AREA
ROHD - ROLL OUT HELPDESK
RNM - RETAIL NETWORK MANAGER
0.3 DOCUMENTS CROSS REFERENCED
Reference Version Date Title Source
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1 SCOPE AND FORMAT OF DOCUMENT
This document has consolidated the main and understandably repeated
learning points from across the Implementation domain. Given the level of
overlap it has been decided that the training PIR should be the only separate
and referenced associated document. This is due to the specific issues and
impacts that were realised throughout the programme relating to Training
development and deployment.
The main body of the document will outline the general context of how
Horizon implementation has been delivered , the management summary of
learning underpins this general context of of although having worked well,
things can be improved for the future.
2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This document draws heavily on documents and inputs produced by past and
present HIMs Nationally , Bill Kerr , Beverley Evans, Liz Moran, Paul
Kirk Mike Cakebread, Dawn Green , Sue Lock and there teams of SSTLs ,
FSM, HFSOs, CCMs and IRMs.
Input from the HO Team , other HO and retail line areas is also
consolidated within this report to provide a holitic view of how key aspects
of the the Horizon Field Impleemntation activity was managed and more
importantly could have been improved . Main contributors include, Don
Grey, Douglas Craik , Steve Grayston, Graham Katon, Andy jones, Barry
Evans, Ann Cocker, Steve Gibbs, Frank Manning , Peter Pyecock and Martin
O'Toole
3, MANAGEMENT LEARNING POINTS SUMMARY
3.1. Implementation Programme Management
3.11. Future programmes should fit into a view of the transformational
outcome at a Group level. From this understanding of expected
contribution detail requirements should be drafted covering the full
list of programme deliverables, which must be formally defined with
business sponsors, and deployment owners.
3.1.2. All programmes must embed as much as possible a commercial ethos
at the earliest possible time to ensure that operational agreements
reflect the impacts on commercial outcomes.
ad
pe
Y
PON management teams to be provided with clear levels of delegated
authority at the outset of the programme to maximise rapid decision
making and issue resolution. Delegated authorities to included in the
project mandates, job descriptions inclusive of any budget limits for
role / grade.
3
3.1.6.
3.1.9.
3.1.10.
3.1.11.
3.1.12.
Programmes to have contingency plans / planning defined as core
deliverables for all significant interfaces affecting milestone delivery.
Programmes need to deploy an ethos of controlled empowerment
with defined areas of responsibility to allow field, central and
strategic teams to act concomitantly to deliver there input to the
programme.
Business standard programme management principles should have
been applied at the earliest opportunity , with trained and dedicated
resource to provide the following deliverables :
Production of PID
Project Organisation , with Role and Responsibilities
Project Interface management
Product descriptions
Product configuartaion architecture
Quality plan
Document Review and sign off process
Risk management process
Issue management process
Requirements definition catalogue
Ownership of programme requirements should be allocated at the
strategic and operational levels ensuring that requirements are baton
passed at points of organisation change, redefinition , removal or
delivery of requirements.
With a nationally dispersed team , video , telephone , Internet and off
site conferencing should all be considered to reduce cost and impacts
of travelling whilst maximising impact of information exchange ,
problem resolution.
Programme documentation for review should be provided in an
agreed standard or where suppliers veer from agreed packages they
must make viewing and printing access available.
Infrastructure programmes should plan impacts of bank holidays
including roll out rates, upgrade activity, staffing cover.
Future major programmes should have as a minimum people
experienced in financial and budget management included within the
project organisation both at the commercial contractual level and the
central deployment levels.
Project finance , budget managers should have access to SAP systems
to allow adhoc report generation to provide decision support
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3.1.13,
3.1.14.
3.1.15.
3.1.16.
3.1.17.
3.1.18.
3.1.19.
3.1.20.
3.1.21.
3.1.22.
3.1.23.
3.1.24,
Wherever possible future major programmes should be represented
at the initiation stage of any organisational change programmes
There should be clear line of sight between change reviewer and their
responsibility for agreeing or refusing change.
Budget for change to be incorporated into overall programme
business case.
A fully automated document management system should be
mandated and deployed to ensure that only the latest versions of
documents , draft or baselines are available for review or reference.
Programme information systems and reports to be defined wherever
possible in the project mandate i.e. issue management , risk
management, document library, change control, scheduling,
reporting.
Reports should be defined in terms of the on going metrics to be
measured or made visible to the business , each report should have an
authority to issue with a primary customer group who sign off the
need for the report.
Reports should be standardised to key information, support tools
should allow manipulation if required.
Reports should be automated as far as possible and targeted to an
identified audiences via an automated interface e.g. Lotus Notes
Databases , Business Objects.
Wherever possible the implementation plan should be fully
discussed and endorsed by all affected parts of the business including
other Group projects prior to its initial acceptance. Other projects
could then be driven by Horizon as it was the main business objective.
and vice versa
Have access toa specialist dedicated planning resource in place at the
outset.
Business standard planning techniques should be deployed.
A business planning and integration manager should have been
included in the implementation project organisation to avoid conflict
situations.
. For future programmes large scale programmes the planning review
process needs to be timely to avoid the continuation of roll out
activity against an undefined changed baseline.
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3.1.26.
3.1.29,
3.1.30.
3.1.32.
3.2.
Wherever possible sight of or access to lower level sub-contractor
plans should be agreed in order to place pressure on effective
planning and enable detailed review of issues around scheduling e.g
snagging programmes.
Planning style, format , scope, content, frequency , mediums should
be defined as project deliverables at the earliest opportunity.
. Business interfaces should be defined within the project organisation
and mandates with examples of the expected areas of responsibility
and scope decision responsibility e.g. operation to define impacts on
remuneration to SPMRs, to reach agreements with the NFSP.
Budget planning rounds should be formalised and include the
management team at the earliest possible opportunity subject to
commercial constraints.
Roll out planning should ; subject to commercial constraints ; be
embedded in contractual re-negotiations as an input as opposed to a
reviewer of proposals.
Business process changes to be identified as project deliverables as
early as possible e.g. NCA conversion requirements and deployment
models, management of business configurations.
Transformation programmes need to have in situ ( or define a
requirement ) a two tier project interface methodolgy , e.g at the
Strategic programme level to align release plans and at the delivery
level to balance product timescales, specification and quality criteria.
Supplier / Business Interfaces
Supplier
The terms of supply, whether from intra-business or external supplier
must be clearly defined in contractual terms and not “to be agreed”,
avoid qualitative requirements where possible, try to be quantitative-
deliverables must be measurable in volume and time.
It should always be assumed that only contracted services will be
provided, any non-contracted enhancements may be welcomed but
cannot be relied on until formalised as a contracted service.
Every effort should be made for supplier performance to be measured
in house rather than by the contractor unless their process/ data is
entirely transparent and immediately available on demand.
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3.2.4. Where possible joint working should be used rather than ping-
ponging papers, but meetings and agreed actions must be minuted in
a central file.
3.2.5. All decisions/agreed actions by PO personnel should be in the best
interest of the PO, not the supplier. It is reasonable to always assume
that vice-versa applies.
3.2.6. Wherever possible ensure that systems and software with supplier are
compatible with Group standards. Require suppliers to maintain
systems and software in line with Post Office Groups 1S/IT
change/ upgrade proposals e.g.. :
Issue management
Risk Management
Planning Tools
Word processing software
Presentational software
Spreadsheet software
Version of Windows
3.2.7. Ensure that where continued and reported breakdowns in working
relationships have been highlighted , issues are escalated , individuals
are dealt with fairly and obstacles are removed from the programme.
Business
3.2.8. Impact on all stakeholders must be taken into account, including the
“anions” -CMA/CWU/NFSP.
3.2.9. For business stakeholders the minimum number of points of contact
should be formally agreed with each cascading as appropriate.
Consideration may have to be given to interfacing with Postcomm via
the PON champion.
3.2.10. Identifying who are the real decision makers can sometimes be
difficult but must be pursued to successful conclusion to avoid later
internal disagreement.
3.2.11. The initial identification of needs and interfaces will have to be
regularly redressed to keep current.
3.2.12. It is important, sometimes vital, not to over-promise other areas
deliverables or indeed to make any significant commitment without
their agreement.
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3.3. Human Resource
3.3.1. Management responsibilities need to be clearly defined and roles
should be placed within the project organisation to best suit delivery
of the programme e.g the Issue Team may have best been part of the
Regional / Territorial Teams thereby ensuring ownership of the
resolution of all issues arising.
3.3.2. Key staff on the project should either have appropriate skills on
appointment or the appointment process should include a training 7
outcome map for developing the required skills e.g:
Prince 2 qualification
Budget Management, financial control experience
Training development skills
Database use and management
Operational experience
Technical / specialist skills (surveyor, H&S appreciation)
33.3. Clarity of roles, relationships and deliverables between HO and
Territorial staff needs to be included in the project mandate, to avoid
duplication or non-delivery.
3.3.4. The project mandate should fully scope the non HR resources
required to deliver the programme at the earliest point e.g Pool Cars,
mobile phones, corporate credit cards. I
3.3.5. In determining the resources required to support the programme
standard business recruitment and procurement processes must be
deployed.
3.3.6. Key roles supporting a programme should be defined as part of the
project organisation and made available to supplier and sub-
contractors , Where appropriate for smoothe working workshops on
expected roles and interfaces between the different organisations
resources should be held.
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HR involvement at key stages is an overriding requirement. Future
large scale projects must have a dedicated HR interface identified in
the project organisation and mandated to support the programme
from conception to closure including an exit policy. Areas of control
to include :
Scoping job role
Producing Job Descriptions
Managing Job Evaluation
Advertising (Re) roles in line with plans
Selection process
Monitoring of staff movements
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Management of reserve pools
Policy definition for term of appointments, temporary and permanent.
PDP policy
Exist policy developed in line with prevailing business policy
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Resource deployment to include demonstrating required skills, ability
to provide coaching and or shadowing , buddy system as role
requires,
3.4, Support Systems and Resources
3.4.1. PON needs to address the issue of robust data management . Future i
projects should adopt a universal database by both Customer and /
Supplier with strict control processes being implemented in respect
of changes made to that data.
3.4.2. Single database source should be used for scheduling and /
management reporting. The tool used should be generic i.e. not /
requiring specialist development or training by day to day users. i
3.4.3. Wherever possible business standard software products should be I
deployed
344. The issue management process and systems should be included in the
project mandate and ideally included in the project organisation from
the outset.
34.5. Helpdesk operation deployment should include sufficient time to
cater for operator learning curves.
3.5, Communications. Operational and Business Wide
3.5.1. Communications must be actively managed at both the operational
and wider organisational / PR levels.
3.5.2. A dedicated communications manager role should be included in the
project organisation and mandated to define, review and support all
aspects of communications supporting a key transformation.
programme.
3.5.3. Information exchange with the retail line needs to be timely. I
3.5.4. Retail Line should be provided with ability to view issue databases I
directly, with a timely means in place to raise visibility of defined :
issue types e.g. major costs, refusals to accept standard modification I
options , installation aborts , flag cases, failed training. i
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3.5.9,
3.5.10,
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3.5.12.
3.6,
3.6.1.
3.6.2.
3.6.3.
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General communications on programme benefits, impacts on end
users must be closely managed to avoid disillusionment e.g. “ No
more summaries” “ balance at the touch of a button”.
Exception management process to be defined within project
deliverables for , excess costs management options, Non co-operation
processes where inclusion to the programme is mandatory.
Span of control within field teams needs to be considered carefully,
more experienced managers could cope with a reporting line of 15-20
comfortably, where that level is breached balance between creating
smaller teams and the length of time larger teams will be running
needs to be understood.
Field based document standards should be defined as product
deliverables at the earliest point including , formats, access
requirements , retention and archiving instructions.
Any supplier roadshows facing the operational user community
should include appropriate business representatives.
Supplier communications with user community to be agreed via a
single co-ordination point i.e. communications manager.
. Supplier field based teams must be empowered to make decisions ,
the scope of their decision making authority needs to be known to
ensure issues are escalated quickly.
PON Roadshows were widely used and viewed as important to the
success of the programme. These should have been co-ordinated and
extended nationally providing consistency.
Field Management
Training of PON resource should be as close to utilisation as possible
to deployment. Future programmes should include an initial
training product for it’s staff, and a fallback training product for
refresh where programme slippage occurs.
Where any portion of a project team is field based, it’s supporting
management should have in built flexibility to attend sites, meet staff
and undertake office bound requirements.
Future programmes should seek visibility of supplier resourcing
profiles aligned to the programme plan. Horizon has experienced
sufficient drop out rates to indicate that plans had little flexibility or
contingency built into them,
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3.6.4. Supplier contingency plans for key programme activities should be
defined as product deliverables.
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or
The use of SSMs as a standard approach during combined
preparation and modifications activity by the supplier was not the
best use of resource. A risk approach should have been deployed,
ie. has there been a history of non-co-operation, has there been a
history of issues, or extended survey requirements. Rather than
blanket attendance.
3.6.6. For infrastructure programmes, a snagging process, should be
defined as a product deliverable at the earliest opportunity. To
include, format, timescales for resolution, exceptions from process i.e.
Security and H&S snags tio be resolved with investigation and
responsibility to be a retrospective investigation, agreement.
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For a major infrastructure programme, the coverage and application
of any warranty, guarantees , should be defined as product
deliverables at the earliest opportunity.
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3.6.8. Allowable exceptions to a standard solution should be identified as
product deliverables at the earliest opportunity e.g. Parcel shelving,
walk away solution, mobile options, trolley options.
3.6.9. The Supplier and there sub-contractors Quality assurance processes ,
where appropriate, should be reviewed and signed of in relation to
infrastructure type works.
3.6.10. Provisions of schedules as per a defined product should be included
within contractual agreements and include SLA measures.
3.6.11. To support a major programme at all levels , flexibility should be
embedded in processes, procedures and behaviours wherever
possible i.e. to avoid the refusal of entry to events due simply to a
change of name.
3.6.12. For all user events off site, clear attendance and contact details to be
supplied.
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411.
4.1.2.
4.13.
4.2,
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
4.2.3,
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BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS .
Contractual
The key area of the contract impacting upon Horizon Implementation
was schedule A12 of section GO6. In essence this captured the core
deliverables of the implementation programme in terms of process
development, planning,, reporting, training and installation.
The implementation area like other sections within Horizon suffered.
from a contractual position that was limited in terms of it’s definition
and level of detail. This was a hangover from the original PFI status
of the programme and the consequent decisions to maintain the
structures of the contractual agreements .
The main driver for any future programme must be to have clearly
defined baselined requirements that have a stated own at both the
strategic and operational levels. Requirements must have a tracking
mechanism to ensure that they retain visibility at times of
organisational changes. The decision making authority for
requirements needs to be clearly defined as too often Implementation
took the lead on requirements and process developments that should
ideally have resided within the business e.g. initial payments to sub
postmasters, conversion of NCA status, formal removal of temporary
closed and closed Fadcodes from the programme
Business
The programme experienced significant push pull factors with other
projects e.g. ISIS , Franchise where competing activities were not
initially always managed to the outcomes best suited to the
business. At the earliest opportunities links at the strategic and
operational levels should be identified as a formal product deliverable
to ensure that the spirit as well as the requirement to co-operate and
apply roll out criteria,
Resources were split between territorial reporting lines and
Programme delivery, roles and responsibilities need to be fully
articulated to ensure that individuals are always fully geared to
delivering the best business outcome.
Throughout the programme there was a drive to minimise impacts
upon the operational environment. For future large scale
infrastructure activities there needs to be an operational level
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agreement defined at the outset that accommodates the expected level
of disruption.
4.24. Horizon had to react to operational request that strained budgets and
the actual staff resources to deliver NRO. Specifically PON
determined at a late stage that the planned training and support
mechanisms including balance support needed to be enhanced, but
within the constrains of overall staff numbers. Whilst this proved
possible unrealistic expectations prevailed within the business with
regards 100% CA support on Wednesday with some RNMs reluctant
to provide cover where HFSOs could not be diverted from NRO
activity.
4.2.5. RNMs in the vast majority of cases and throughout installation cycle
were very supportive. In many respects those occasions where
support was less forthcoming related to either an initial lack of
information being provided to RNMs or a lack of Horizon experience
within the RNM Network to make their support worthwhile ( at the
time of asking).
5. HUMAN RESOURCES
5.1. The Horizon programme attracted a large number of skilled and
dedicated individuals at all levels.
5.2. Future programmes of this scale should have associated to them a
dedicated HR specialist to aid the drafting of the project organisation.
To prepare a job vacancy filling plan, training , induction and exit
planning.
5.3. It was considered a significant gap within NRO that HR issues could
not be tracked easily through the business standard approaches. A
HR specialist would have been able to draft Job description. Job
evaluation inputs with operational managers on the programme
freeing up a lot of time and mis-understanding on process,
application and the eventual outcomes.
54. To guard against vested interest such a HR representative would be
required to remain outside the formal evaluation.
4. PHYSICAL RESOURCES
a
in
The Horizon programme with circa 450 staff nationally had
significant physical resource requirements i.e. pool cars, laptops,
mobile phones, credit cards, fuel cards, taxi accounts, security passes,
HFSO and business operating guidelines. The need for these types of
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5.10.
5.11.
resources should have been scoped at the earliest opportunity with
the programme personnel using internal procurement specialist.
Main areas of issues raised providing the tools for the job were:
. The production of a robust business case for the provision of
pool cars, which should have been led by fleet specialists but
was left to the programme. This led to a potential £0.5 M early
termination lease risk that took an inappropriate level of
management cajoling to remove via reallocation of the fleet.
. Provision of laptops to support the migration of ECCO outlets.
The business was generally keeping a lid on distribution of
equipment the programme had difficulty identifying the need
and how that need was going to be supported.
+ Mobiles were identified as an operational necessity. Business
rules hindered the early provision , this was subsequently
overcome via MD intervention.
The Horizon Roll Out Database had a direct interface to ICL
Pathways. The initial aspects of the RoDB were driven by a
consultant developing a bespoke system within Access V2.0. This
created a level of tie in given the system protocols that were agreed
with ICL Pathway.
The Horizon programme was fortunate to have one Access expert
who could bridge the gap between a consultant driven system to the
operational systems that were eventual used to support NRO. With
limited expertise in access this created to high a reliance on a single (
later group) of individuals
Access version 2.0 provided an underpinning relational database that
supported, Horizon Roll Out database that provided subsequent
feeds to , Horizon Scheduling database, the Implementation Support
database.
The Horizon RoDB was not business supported , for future
programmes where a significant information tool of this scale is
required , it should be defined as a programme deliverable.
The National Network Database (NNDB) and Reference data
systems were core inputs to the Horizon RoDB fields that provided a
data exchange facility with ICL Pathway. This data was in many
areas widely inaccurate or out of synch with reality. The business
needs to address its information sources , there robustness , the
update facilities and speed of updating as a matter of urgency.
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5.8.
59.
5.10.
6.1,
6.2.
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Remedy was obtained as the programmes issue management system.
This was never satisfactory as it was a call management system
tweaked for purposes it was never intended to support. For other
major projects a standard issue management system should be
deployed that is fit for the purpose.
TERRITORIAL / BUSINESS INTERFACES
The roles and responsibilities of the HIM verses the HLM teams were
defined , however the split of the work and deliverables was toa
large extent artificial. For future programmes a matrix management
approach for resource should be considered to avoid any pull on
“loyalties” or reporting lines.
The Retail Line was very supportive of the Horizon Programme. For
future major programmes clear guidelines on policy issues must be
readily available to ensure consistency and conformity of deployment
e.g. the refusals policy was not deployed as issues raised which has
lead to a back loading of potential outlet closures ata politically
sensitive time.
SUPPLIER INTERFACES
At an operational level strong working relationships were built .
There was a mutual desire to deliver the programme to plan.
However it was evident that in the early stages ICL Pathway mangers
were stronger in terms of commercial awareness , and that some at
the junior management or new to senior salaried areas needed
coaching in these areas. Ultimately the team matched if not exceeded
it’s counterparts to the mid and later stages of the programme.
PON and ICL Pathway Implementation Teams structures sought to
mirror each other throughout the life of the programme in order to
provide direct operational links resolving issues at the lowest levels.
This approach seemed to work well at the NHIT to Kidsgrove central
team levels, but to a lesser extent within the field. The reason would
appear to have been that whilst PONs HIM and HLM teams had
significant levels of decision making , within the bounds of
commercial / contractual limits, the same could not be said of ICL
Pathways field teams. For future programmes the suppliers
representatives roles and authority levels need to be visible to all and
real.
64.
6.5.
6.6.
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PONSs interface with the ICL Planning function and outputs was
somewhat torturous. The planning process within ICL pathway seem
tpo be process and system driven with the high level roll out plans
rarely reflecting reality, where they eventually did reflect reality it
was an historic picture. For future programmes the planning
requirements must be defined as deliverables , and when captured
not contractually should encompass the need to be updated in line
with changing baseline, inputs, political drivers within a specified
period.
PON at a direct with ICL Pathway, but had to develop indirect
relationships with sub-contractors due to some weaknesses in
controls and performance. This primarily related to the Training area
where management of the training process was poor throughout the
programme by the supplier. It was only via persistent operational
pressure, senior management leverage and commercial positioning
that training eventually delivered to ( expected to) the contractual
levels of courses and persons trained within costs parameters.
For any future training programme within an infrastructure
environment the training element must not sit outside of the main
implementation activities as with Horizon . It is a strong belief that if
the training had been within the remit of the Kidsgrove
implementation team greater impetus to resolve issues would have
forthcoming and pragmatic.
At the outset of the programme there needs to be a clear
understanding (through a PID and subsidiary documents) of the
products which it is expected that the supplier will provide. This
needs to be translated into contractual requirements. If, as in this
programme, there is a perceived need to keep the requirements high
level (to promote free thinking from the supplier/s), than it is
essential that there is detail sitting beneath each requirement
providing a level of understanding of what must be delivered and the
constraints.
In terms of the requirements there must be, as a minimum, clear
ownership of each and version / change management control to allow
for business change. Where requirements cross functional or business
boundaries it is essential that the ‘owner’ has responsibility for
providing the cross functional view and, for matters of detail, can
identify who are the stakeholders who will feed into solution
agreement.
68.
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7.2.
73.
8.2.
8.3.
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In terms of detail encompassed within the requirements - the owner
will need to consider in some depth the potential impacts of the
solution and where possible pre-empt disagreements downstream
with the supplier by stating clearly responsibilities and ownership of
relevant elements of the solution. An example where greater ‘upfront’
thinking may have been beneficial is in the development of the data
migration solution where ownership and responsibility for
development of the reference data relationship, change management,
and data flows may have helped to smooth the way to an agreed
solution.
BUSINESS CHANGE IMPACTS
The implementation area was affected primarily in two ways, the
general business reorganisation SCS and the contractual changes that
affected the shape and rate of roll out.
Organisational changes cannot in itself be stopped , however for a
programme of Horizon scale it would in future be prudent to include
the project / programme manager in impact assessments at the
earliest opportunity.
The main areas of concern within the Implementation team with
regards contractual changes related to on occasions being an end
change impact assessor as opposed to being asked to provide change
design inputs. Wherever possible the for future large scale
implementation programmes must be involved in shaping the change
request rather than responding to it.
HFSO FIELD ACTIVITY
HR issues associated to the recruitment of a large field force and how
that resource can be managed have been identified earlier in this
paper.
HFSO field activity related to the transfer of the outlets operating
status from manual to Horizon. This was undertaken via a structured
data transfer process using the Horizon MiMan and MiECCO
systems.
Conceptually the activity was straightforward. It took some
considerable time however to gain the suppliers buy in to the process
requirements. The ideal migration working scenario would have
been negative stock working, whereby the installation and migration
activity could have effectively been separated as entities , and stock
declarations would have caught up with entries to the system. The
suppliers had a defined solution they were intent on delivering that
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8.6.
8.7.
8.8.
91.
9.2.
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had been designed into the overall system. This constrained the
migration solution and resulted in PON becoming a sub-contractor to
ICL pathway for Migration services.
For any future large scale programme the expected method of data
migration must be defined as a core deliverable, with explicit
requirements to minimise the impacts on the operational arena and
necessary resources to deliver such migration. In essence future
migration activity must be defined as via an electronic means ,
preferably with minor user interaction, i.e. to be done by central
systems.
HFSO selection was highly successful in obtaining the right skill set
individuals. HFSO Training was considered to be overly long witha
lack of emphasis on the more complex areas e.g. suspense accounts.
This is generally hindsight, and gaps were overcome within the field
by the use of team meetings and the deployment of best practice
sessions.
HFSOs built te first significant reservoir of Horizon Operational
knowledge and were keen to embed this within the business. They
played a significant role in the development of new aide memoirs for
using the system and the balancing guides, that have been well
received within the network.
The general management logistics of a field force of circa 350 people
has provided some of the major challenges to the field teams. Within
the overall learning points allocations of pool cars, mobiles, timely
schedules have all been identified as key areas of learning for future
programmes.
The communications process needs to be speedy and accurate for a
field forec of this size. One of the main roles of ant central team must
be to act as a champion for the field force ensuring that they are not
bombarded with unnecessary requests, that any request for additional
actions have been fully scoped, that any issues or perseptions raised
due to one or few minor errors are not mis-represented as general
failures.
OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
The field teams set up a very effective update process for teams which
included provision of the latest copies of operational procedures.
Field teams where proactive in ensuring that national processes
where developed to meet new or revised needs e.g. ALPs.
9.3.
10.
The Authorised Temporary Procedures and emergency cascades
process worked effectively., there were a number of occasions where
the needs of the HFSOs for migration activity where not fully scoped
and ATPs needed top be changed e.g. Quantum. To overcome this
field forces ohould ensure that they have appropriate links to the
areas that generate changes to operational procedures , as Horizon
put in place.
STRAND DOCUMENTATION
Horizon documentation fell into three broad areas
(a) Contractual documents with ICL Pathway, Roll out plans,
Migration specifications ;
These documents went through a formal document management
process ensuring business wide comments were incorporated. The
process with ICL pathway included a structured “Fagan” review
whereby documents were reviewed line by line with informed
representatives of each organisation and signed off on the basis of
open debate and closure of issues.
(a) Requirements / specification documentation
This area formed the largest set of documentation and included the
main infrastructure and installation supplier working criteria. Again
these were managed in a very structured manner which worked
exceptionally well. This area included the HFSO guide.
b) Field Procedures
These field based procedures were developed generally between the
Head office team and the Field teams e.g. the capping process, or in
isolation by the field NHIT. It must be noted that we were not as
effective in the overall review, visibility and control of these
documents as with ICL documentation.
For all types of documentation the field teams should have had
greater inclusion to the final review and sign off to maintain
consistent deployment and long term buy in to the processes.
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Appendix B
PIR HORIZON PROJECT REVIEW - INPUT FROM BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
1. Security
National security supplied details on screen specification, a number of
companies who could carry out the work, the standards employed within the
network and how screens could be modified. ICL Pathway compromised
certain elements of the screens to ensure the office was a ‘fit’. Parcel Hatches,
speech units and doors were fitted that were below the normal standard fit
SIZes.
Compromises in terms of screen specification have been sanctioned to
support the Horizon Project albeit against security requirements. In the long
term there will be a greater cost implication to the network as non standard
equipment will have to be made up specially when replacement is required.
2. Agency & Network Development
The agreement with the NFSP to use the discretionary fund to cover the
additional costs for post offices above the business limits worked extremely
well in releasing over 500 offices back into the programme.
The process for developing solutions for ‘No solution Offices’ worked well,
although funding was always a problem and an issue. Given the difficult
nature of some of these offices, different messages were sent around timings
and re-entry to the programme, this causes unnecessary stress and issues that
had to be resolved.
Inconsistent deployment of the Non Cash Account policy by the old regions
and Territories raised several issues, there was also a lack of support from
training. The effect of this is that some offices have been left as NCA which is
now causing problems over network closure.
The policy on office refusals worked well overall in what was a very sensitive
area, One area of concern was the lack of territorial support to the retail line
in deployment of the policy despite consultation and briefings undertaken.
Too many issues were referred to Head Office rather than being dealt with at
Territorial level.
Overall the policy on Network Transformation has been effectively deployed,
addressing the key issue of paying for OBC changes. There were incidents
where the view of the implementation teams was too rigid on issues and did
not take into account the operation of multiples and their funding policies.
The overall strategy towards training was not in tune with the contractual
relationship that exists between PON and subpostmasters. The requirement
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for subpostmasters and their assistants to pass a PSA (Personal Standard
Assessment) after training caused some inconsistent anomalies within the
network in terms of offices reaching the Minimum Training Compliance to
enable migration to be completed. The lack of a pro active approach by
Territories in this area, detailed information on PSA failures and provision of
training material from ICL Pathway have exacerbated the problem.
The policy for ‘out of hours’ transactions is at best a stop gap. There are key
client and account team issues that need to be addressed.
3. Territories
3.1 Territorial / Business Interfaces
There was a duplication in the Issue Management domain, Territorial Teams
duplicated work in recording and raising issues and then passing them to IP
teams. Feedback on issue progress was poor as was the length of time to
resolve issues.
At local level the integration with ISIS was good but at Head Office level
differing messages were coming out about priorities.
The role of Business Service Management was viewed as poor. The ability
and willingness to get involved in issue resolution was an area of concern.
3.2 Infrastructure Activity
The control mechanisms over ICL Pathway and their sub contractors were
poor, missed appointments, shoddy workmanship and reluctance to accept
responsibility for their shortcomings were commonplace.
The quality of some of the surveys, preparations and modifications were in
some cases a disgrace.
Problems were encountered with local planning permissions being gained to
meet the target infrastructure dates.
The role and expectation of subpostmasters in signing the survey forms was
not clear in the offices and led to a number of issues being raised when the
infrastructure work did not turn out as expected.
Retail Network Managers were not informed of modification work within ]
their offices and on occasions this led to them being contacted by '
subpostmasters and in some cases having very emotive conversations. :
The scheduling of the Management Information Briefings was not consistent '
with Territorial involvement required on several occasions to manage and
resolve conflicts between users and ICL Pathway (KnowledgePool).
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3.3 Installation
The process to determine the number of back office terminals within offices
was completed without consideration of the operational balancing aspects of
Horizon therefore a shortage of back office terminals resulted.
The process for office configuration caused problems with too many counter
discrepancies being encountered causing installation and migration
problems.
Retail Network Managers were not informed promptly enough when
installations were aborted, this caused issues with the individuals at the
office that were raised with the RNM.
It was disappointing that during phase II the same problems were being
encountered as in phase I i.e. ISDN line problems. Any lessons learnt in
Phase I were not incorporated into Phase IIL.
3.4 Training administration, scope and delivery
The process for Training scheduling was not consistent with the agreed
processes as documented and caused a raft of issues to be raised. (ie.
Training venues should have been checked on maps rather than relying
solely on postcode boundaries that caused users to travel excessive
distances). A ‘local’ input to the process would have mitigated a lot of the
issues raised.
The forward schedule should have been available to PON from the start of
the project, this would have enabled pro active management of the training
schedules rather that the constant ‘fire fighting’ that took place.
The Personal Standard Assessment process required a sub process that
detailed the re-training options available (to include informing the RNM of
subpostmasters who failed), these sub processes should have been deployed
in a consistent manner within territories.
Cash Account Training was not comprehensive enough within the training
delivered by ICL Pathway.
The training delivered by ICL Pathway was poor in terms of the instructors
had little or no knowledge of Post Office procedures,
3.5 Office Migration
General view received was that on the whole the migration activity went
well.
There was no agreed process for dealing with offices whose migrations were
deferred, these offices were dealt with in an ad hoc way once their deferral
was confirmed.
There were many instances were the HFSO transferred sums into the
Suspense Account without informing the office manager.
The standard of the HFSO was the greatest variable within the migration
process, there were differing levels of ability within the HFSO groups that
directly effected the migration activities.
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3.6 Pre / Post ‘Go Live’ Support
More in depth training for those people who supported 24, 3¢ and 4th
balance support especially around suspense account entries.
The scheduling of Retail Network Manager was not consistent with instances
of more than one arriving at an office to offer support,
The allocation of support for balances worked better when the scheduling
was undertaken by the cluster groups
Offices were given the impression that they would have a trained person
with them for the first balance, far too many did not have anyone leaving
them to ‘flounder’ with an inadequate balancing guide.
3.7 Resources
There would have been a reduction in the number of issues raised if more I
Survey Support Managers had been available to support surveys.
The IP training teams appeared under resourced to deal with the number of
training issues and therefore could not spend time on analysing venues,
occupancy and no shows.
The compensation was not sufficient to meet the travel costs of
subpostmasters
Retail Network Managers undertook a lot of the balance support activity, it
was thought that this activity would be undertaken by the HFSO's. This
resulted in RNM’s having little time left to deal with other operational issues
on Wednesdays.
3.8 Documentation.
In the latter stages of the project changes arising from revised documentation
have been deployed before the documentation had been signed off. :
Operational Instructions and Balancing Guides were excellent, the Quick i
Reference Cards poor as were the arrangements for CSR+. I
The distribution of documentation on the whole was poor with a number of i
offices receiving their Balancing Guides well after their go live. I
The diagrams within the Horizon System User Guide were not well accepted i
as it contained too many flow charts. /
The training joining instructions did not contain enough detail on venue /
location. I
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3.9 Communication
The processes supporting the despatch of RGM letters, closure notices and
preparation packs was not well developed in terms of responsibility in the
early stages of the project. The subsequent change in centralising the work in
Bristol was done without consultation with the regions.
The late receipt of survey, re-survey, modification and preparation schedules
cause operational problems in ensuring the retail line was informed.
During the infrastructure and installation phases too many people were
contacting the offices with differing and at time conflicting information.
Offices are still confuses at to the correct helpline to contact.
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A lack of an integrated approach to offices by Horizon, one office had at least
30 calls on the same subject.
Overall the communication was abysmal, Retail Network Managers were not
being kept informed of events.
The Horizon Cash Account feedback form is weighted against the outlet in
the assessment for balance support in respect of the scoring.
The process for HFSO’s to contact RNM’s when offices had problems was not
effectively used by HF5O’s in some cases.
The process to enable offices to request balance support through NBSC was
not totally effective as many requests did not reach the cluster offices.
Retail Network Managers were not informed in sufficient time to deal
effectively with issues arising from installation aborts and training.
The Management Information Briefing was too early in the process.
3.10 Other (
The helplines are not seen as an effective support to the network, there seems
a lack of knowledge and a reluctance to pass to a higher level for resolution.
Installing up to the 8& of December was a mistake.
The number of errors generated post go live is directly linked to poor Cash
Account Training, an extra half day should have been allowed.
The legacy left due to the migration use of the suspense accounts needs to be
resolved,
The roll out plan appeared to take no account of office size or pressure
periods, this operational information should be included within the
scheduling process
Overall the size of the project was immense and has been a success which is
mainly due to attention to detail, focus, meaningful reviews and a lot of hard
work by so many people.
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