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Horizons Issues - Alan Bates & Others v
Post Office Limited [WBD]
Name Bundle Tab Page
KEL: GCSimpson1049L F 207 1
Memo: Horizon Briefing F 908 2
PEAK: PC0043811 F 24 38
PEAK: PC0089918 F 149 46
PEAK: PC0098230 F 184 51
PEAK: PC0141445 F 366 59
PEAK: PC0195561 F 590 62
PEAK: PC0196154 F 596 73
PEAK: PC0198077 F 630 76
Pack for meeting between POL and MPs on 17 May 2010 F 930 86
Report: Briefing Report - Part Two, Second Sight F 1333 110
Report: Post Office Operations Board - 23 May 2018
(redactions narrowed) F 1794.1 206
Report: Triplication of TAs incident F 1857 355
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HORIZON KEL GCSimpson1049L
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Symptoms
Information
Foreign currencies on hand doubled
Foreign currencies on hand doubled
by Garrett C Simpson on 29/04/2004
by Garrett C Simpson on 05/05/2004
S50
BureauDeChange
Authorised
Medium
PC102559
404260980
1
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Monday 19 Mar
The PM balanced on Weds 21st April 2004 and noticed that all currencies on hand had doubled up
Problem
Under investigation
Solution - ATOS
Under investigation
Evidence
Message store for the FAD<br>Message store for the subscription group<br>Event log<br>Audit
log<br>Tunable trace log
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Horizon Briefing — 22" March 2012
1. Computer Weekly Articles
Anumber of articles have been written by Computer Weekly relating to the Horizon System and
the issues postmasters have had with deficits. The main article was published in May 2009 and
can be found in Appendix 1.
In Summary this article highlights 7 case studies where the postmasters have claimed faults in the
Horizon system have generated unexplained losses. In all cases no evidence was provided to
substantiate errors in the Horizon System and where the case was taken to court the judge found
that the Horizon System was working properly.
Computer Weekly engaged with 3 experts, Leigh Ellis (See profile in Appendix 2), Tony Sykes (See
profile in Appendix 3) and Chris Wise. None of these IT industry experts could find any errors with
the system; although they made a general statement that IT Systems generally do have errors.
An article by a Forensic Accountant on the Fraud Resource Web Site ( See Appendix 11 ) also
commented about his involvernent in one of the cases where he states that “the Post Office
System was unlikely to be flawed otherwise you would see problems through many of the 14,000
or so branches’
There are further articles in Computer Weekly covering the more recent systems failures that have
been experienced — these can be found in Appendix 5, 7, 9, 10.
In 1999 Computer Weekly disputed the cause of the Chinook Helicopter crash which killed 29
people on board in 1994. The RAF inquiry ruled that the pilots were to blame — however Computer
Weekly reported that the control software may have been the cause of the crash (See Appendix 4).
This article has to some extent given added credibility to Computer Weekly's capability in this area.
2. IT Industry View of Computer Weekly
Mark Davison (Account Manager for Post Office Ltd at Gartner) has strong connections with Brian
Glick who is the Editor in Chief at Computer Weekly. His view is that Computer Weekly have a
strong influence across the IT Industry and Government. They seem to have major influence on
what is said and how it is presented.
Appendix 14 highlights the view from Gartner of what are the key influencers of UK Central
Government.
é
Brian Glick also has links with Charlotte Aldred who is an advisor to the Cabinet Office on Open
Data and Transparency.
Mark also confirms that Computer Weekly use “external experts” rather than using any internal
capability.
Should we wish to have contact with Computer Weekly, Gartner would be willing to facilitate the
contact with Brian Glick.
3. Audit Reports
The Ernst & Young management Letter for the year ending 27" March 2011 highlights a number
of security improvements that need to be made around the management of central support
accounts, there is nothing which would give concern regarding the integrity of the Horizon Online
system.
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The Gartner report in October 2008 was commissioned to provide assurance that the Horizon
Online design was in-line with Post Office Ltd emerging-strategies as well as providing a review of
the Horizon Online ( HNG-X ) architecture.. This can be found from page 28 onwards of report in
Appendix 12.
Gartner stated in their summary of the Architecture Suitability that :
“Overall, the HNG-X architecture is first rate. Gartner does not recommend changing it in any
substantial way. Placement of business logic on the Branch PCs and the use of a compact
interpreter maximize the use of modestly-configured PCs and minimize the load on the
network.
All solution architects have to deal with “trade-offs”; the HNG-X architects crafted a
strong solution that would be hard to improve upon.”
The Internal Audit Assurance Review, in conjunction with Deloittes, of Key System Controls in
Horizon which can be found in Appendix 13 was conducted in February 2012. Its conclusions were
as follows :
“IT disciplines around functional changes and capacity monitoring were found to be
appropriately designed and also operating effectively. However, access to the system in
branches, particularly sub-post offices, can be by means of shared accounts. In addition, fail-
over from the live data centre to the back-up centre has not been tested since June 2009. This
requirement is of particular importance, as highlighted by an outage in the system in
December 2011. Testing of the business continuity plan has been scheduled for March 2012.
Controls designed to maintain the completeness, accuracy and integrity of transactional data
flows within HNGX were effective, with minor weaknesses noted around manual processes for
the validation of master data and transaction data. No evidence was found of material
discrepancies arising from these issues.”
Peter V. Stanley
Chief Architect
22™ March 2012
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Appendix 1 ~ Computer Weekly Article — 1 1" May 2009
Bankruptcy, prosecution and disrupted
livelihoods - Postmasters tell their story
Monday 11 May 2009 01:01
Lee Castleton cannot get a mortgage or a bank account, and is unlikely to ever own his house.
He works over 100 hours a week as an electrician to make ends meet and support his wife Lisa
and two children, Millie, 13, and Cameron, 12.
In this article: Key points:
ee MO
o Case study 1 - Lee Castleton e 14,000 post office branches use the
nen a Post Office’s Horizon IT system for
o Case study 2 - Jo Hamilton their accounts.
0 Case study 3 - Noel Thomas
e—_ nee * — Postmasters claim faults with the
iO Case study 4 - Amar Bajaj technology are generating
ne en unexplained losses
0 Case study 5 - Alan Bates
fe ——— a
it] Case study 6 - Alan Brown * — Post Office denies IT fault could cause
fn ee ~~ I accounting system to show incorrect
0 Case study 7 ord balances
The 40-year-old former postmaster was declared bankrupt after he refused to pay the Post Office
£27,000 — money he owed because the accounts of his Post Office branch in Bridlington,
Yorkshire, showed deficits over a 12-week period in 2004.
Castleton insists he did not owe the money — although it showed as a loss on the Post Office's
Horizon system, which is used by postmasters to do their accounting. He is one of several
postmasters to come across losses they could not explain.
Castleton was so concerned about the debt that he refused to pay it back, and decided to go to
court to contest the Post Office's insistence that he should pay.
But the court ruled that the debt was real, not illusory as Castleton argued. “The losses must have
been caused by his own error or that of his assistants,” the judge said. “It is inescapable that the
Horizon system was working properly in all material respects.”
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POST OFFICE
Having lost the case, Castleton was left with costs of £321,000. In 2007, he filed for bankruptcy. “I
was in too deep —I see that now. The whole thing has been heartbreaking,” he says.
After an investigation of six months, Computer Weekly has discovered that at least seven
postmasters have come into conflict with the Post Office after the system showed losses which
took them by surprise.
Jo Hamilton started signing her accounts even when she knew they were wrong, because, she says,
calls to the Horizon helpline didn’t stop the deficits occurring and she felt backed into a corner. She
was convicted of false accounting, but was spared a prison sentence after local villagers organised
a collection to pay the debt.
Noel Thomas was convicted of the same charge, and spent his 60th birthday in jail.
A fourth postmaster, Amar Bajaj, ended up selling his Post Office. He resents making good the
shortage and claims that the Post Office has received £11,000 from him which he does not owe.
A fifth, Alan Brown, had a £6,500 deficit written off by the Post Office — only to find another
£13,000 loss that he could not explain:
In a sixth case, Judy Ford had her IT equipment replaced by the Post Office, but not before
£10,000 had gone missing. The company said it was probably down to her own errors, but she
insisted she had not got anything wrong. She couldn't afford the repayments. ‘I lost all confidence
in my job, and now I am going bankrupt. I have no trust in the Post Office at all,” she says.
Aseventh postmaster, Alan Bates, refused to sign his weekly accounts, saying it would have made
him liable for any losses. He has called for a public inquiry.
All of the postmasters we spoke to say that their union, the National Federation of Sub
Postmasters, has refused to help them investigate their concerns.
The Post Office denies it received any complaints from postmasters, and also denies that any IT-
related fault could have caused the systems to show incorrect sums of money owed by some
postmasters.
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Aspokesman said, “Horizon is an extremely robust system which operates over our entire Post
Office network and successfully records millions of transactions each day. There is no evidence
that points to any fault with the technology. We would always look into and investigate any issues
raised by sub-postmasters.”
The Federation declined to comment on the postmasters’ claims.
Lack of evidence
None of the postmasters have firm evidence that IT was to blame. Jo Hamilton did not even
realise it could have been the equipment causing problems until after her court case. She says, “I
didn't understand what was happening, and I'm so rubbish with IT that at the time I thought it was
somehow my fault. But other postmasters contacted me after my case, and I realised I wasn’t
alone”
One expert, Tony Sykes, a business systems specialist, says that further investigation is needed.
Sykes has studied the system print-outs which showed that Castleton’s Post Office had run up
large debts.
Asenior official at the Federation of Sub Postmasters, who asked not to be named, said, “The
Horizon system may have been hunky dory on day one, but how does the Post Office know the
system hasn't degraded over the years?
“The problem we have is the culture of the Post Office. It’s heresy to say something can go wrong.
No one can say computers cannot go wrong.”
Those affected say the Post Office did not fully investigate their claims. They also say that their
contract requires them to pay any loss at their branch, whatever the circumstances.
Litigation solicitor Leigh Ellis, an IT specialist, says the contract between postmasters and the Post.
Office is weighted in favour of the company. “Postmasters need to be very careful that they retain
evidence of differences between what the computer system reports and what they receive
through the till. They need to put their concerns in writing to the Post Office explaining what the
problems are.”
Chris Wise, a business systems consultant who acts as an expert witness in court cases involving IT
systems, says, ‘It’s difficult to know what has gone wrong from the evidence we have to date, but
almost all IT systems ever built have malfunctioned at some point. What matters is the way a
business deals with those errors and gets to the bottom of what has actually happened.”
He says it may not have been IT glitches that caused problems for postmasters but the way the
Post Office handled them.
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Back to top
Case study 1
e Lee Castleton, Bridlington, Yorkshire
Fillice Castleton, 40, was postmaster at the Bridlington post office
in neast Yorkshire. His problems started in January 2004, and he claimed he couldn't get help from
the Post Office.
“Misbalances continued for 12 weeks. I spent hours going through accounts, trying to find out
what had happened. It was baffling,” he says.
Castleton rang the Horizon helpdesk, which is run by the Post Office, and asked repeatedly for help
and a system check, but says they did very little.
“The Federation didn’t help me either. It said it didn’t want to get involved and refused to let me
join.”
After 12 weeks, Castleton was suspended and the Post Office told him he had to pay for the losses.
“I decided to contest my obligation to pay the money in the civil court, because I hadn't done
anything wrong,” he says.
Castleton could not afford lawyers in the High Court, or pay an IT expert witness to look at the
system logs for him. He argued that the discrepancy in his accounts had been created by the
computer. But the judge said that the deficiencies were real, not illusory, and, as such, were
evidence that the branch had not been managed properly. “The losses must have been caused by
his own error or that of his assistants,” the judgment said.
Under their contract with the Post Office, postmasters are liable for any losses that are due to
carelessness, negligence or error. Castleton was also liable for the company's legal costs.
“The Post Office really put me through the mangle,” he says. “l owed £27,000 for the deficits, and
£321,000 altogether. I was in too deep —I see that now. The whole thing has been heartbreaking.”
Back to top
Case study 2
© Jo Hamilton, South Warnborough, Hampshire
Jo Hamilton, 51, was postmistress in South Warnborough in Hampshire between 2003 and 2005.
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Hamilton started experiencing problems in October 2003. She entered every transaction into the
system via the touchscreen till, and at the end of the week the computer would tell her how much
money she should have.
“One time it said I was down £2,000, so I rang the Horizon helpdesk. The supervisor told me to do
various things, and three minutes later I was £4,000 down. Whatever I did after that, I couldn’t get
it to come up any different,” she says.
The Post Office told her she owed the money, and took repayments out of her monthly wages. “it
made me reluctant to phone them, because it was just crazy — when I asked for help, it just
doubled the amount and said I owed it money.”
Hamilton’s problems worsened. “Every week the system would come up telling me how much I
should have in there. I knew it wasn't the right amount, but I didn’t know what to do. I couldn't ring
them up, because I just didn’t have the money to pay it all back. So I signed the accounts each
week, saying there was a certain amount in there when I knew there wasn’t. I know it was
dishonest, but I didn’t steal any money. It got worse and worse.”
Post Office auditors visited the branch in March 2005 and told Hamilton she owed £36,000. They
prosecuted her for theft and 14 counts of false accounting, but later dropped the theft charge.
Hamilton says the case did not deal with the issue of IT. She pleaded guilty and was given a year’s
probation. Her house was remortgaged to pay the money, and the villagers in South
Warnborough collected £9,000 between them to help.
Hamilton says, “In 18 months, I will have finished paying back the villagers, but won't have paid off
our mortgage.”
Case study 3
e Noe! Thomas, Gaerwen, Anglesey
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Noel Thornas, 61, from Anglesey, worked for the Post Office for 42 years. His problems started in
2003, when he discovered a deficit of £6,000. He says he spent hours looking at it, trying to find
out what was wrong.
He says the Post Office paid half of the deficit for him, and he paid the other half. He didn’t have
any more problems until 2004.
“It started up again all of a sudden. The money was going at a rate of £2,000 a month, and it went
‘on until October 2005. The last figure they told me I owed was £50,000.
“The National Federation of Sub Postmasters didn’t want to know. It is frustrating —I would like to
know where that money went to. The whole thing is a real mess,” he says.
Faced with mounting deficits and nowhere to turn for help, Thomas signed the accounts to say
the money was there, when it wasn't. ‘I didn’t know what else to do. It was my biggest mistake —I
should have turned round and told them I was shutting up shop until they found out what was.
going on. But at the time I thought they would close the Post Office if I did that, and that would
cause a problem for the village.”
The Post Office prosecuted Thomas for false accounting. He pleaded guilty and says the IT system
didn’t come up during his hearing — his barrister told the judge about his good character.
Mark Jenner, who at the time was the director of fraud investigation at accountancy firm Baker
Tilly, said in a report prepared in advance of the case that he did not propose that the Horizon
system was flawed. “If the Horizon system was flawed, I would expect to see issues raised by all
14,000 branches in the UK and not only a handful,” he said
But Jenner had been unable to examine the computer terminal used in Thomas's branch. “To
completely discount the possibility that the Gaerwen branch terminal was not responsible for
creating systematic and cumulative errors, I would still wish to inspect the terminal,” he said.
Jenner's report was produced before the court hearing, when Thomas expected to face charges of
theft. It was not used in the hearing because the theft charges were dropped.
Thomas was sentenced to 12 weeks in prison. “I spent my 60th birthday in there,” he says. “It was
hell on earth and it took me a long time to get over it”
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Case study 4
Amar Bajaj, Chelmsford, Essex
Former barrister Amar Bajaj, from Chelmsford, sold his post office after losing £11,203.
His problems started in 2004, and he wrote to the Post Office every time there was a misbalance
in the accounts. In July 2005, he contacted a solicitor because he felt that “the Post Office would
look to prosecute us due to its own mistakes’.
Bajaj says of the problems, "Any shortage will remain on the system for many weeks until a
demand is made by the Post Office for the amount to be made good.
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“I personally made good any shortage. After we got it back down to zero, the system would show
a shortage of anywhere between £2,500 and £3,500 within a week.
“In spite of various letters and correspondence between myself and solicitors, no official has
visited to see or check or remedy the defects. I am of the opinion that the Post Office is in breach
of its contract to maintain the system, and therefore has wrongfully obtained our money and is
earning interest as a result.”
Bajaj contacted his MP, Simon Burns, who wrote to the Post Office on his constituent’s behalf. In
its reply, the company said, “We do accept that individual branches may experience very
occasional failures.”
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Case study 5
e Alan Bates, Llandudno, Wales
L lan Bates, 52, worked at the post office in Llandudno in north
Wales, from 1998 to 2003
In 2000, he discovered a shortfall of £1,041.86 which he couldn't account for, and wrote to the
Post Office. After two further letters, the company wrote back in 2002, saying they would write off
the amount but without giving any reason.
It said, “Post Office Ltd has decided to take no further action in respect of the loss at your post
office which will be written off.”
Despite the loss being written off, Bates continued to have problems with deficits. He refused to
sign his weekly accounts, saying it would have made him liable for any losses. When deficits
occurred, he refused to use his own money to pay them. He was a member of the union, but said
it was not supportive.
“Why didn’t the Post Office prosecute me? Because it knew there were faults with my system. It
did not want to take me to court. I never tried to take it to court as I had received quite a broad
range of legal advice about doing so. I was told that it could keep me in court and keep appealing
any findings until I ran out of money.
“There should be a public inquiry into this. I am in no doubt that many sub-postmasters have
finished up breaking the law because of the Post Office and the position it left them in,” he says.
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Case study 6
e Alan Brown, Callender Square, Falkirk
Alan Brown is a serving postmaster. He gave an e-mail dated January 2006 to Lee Castleton for
Castleton to use in his own court case. The e-mail says the Post Office had written off a £6,500 loss
‘on his account “some time” after he said it had appeared on the system.
But he says another shortage appeared that evening when he was balancing the accounts. ‘I have
one screen that says I have a £4 gain, and the screen next to it says I have a £13,000 loss on the
same stock unit,” he says in the e-mail.
“One node has stopped communicating with the rest. This could be costing sub-postmasters
throughout the country a fortune and all because the computer systems occasionally do not
work.”
Back to top
Case study 7
° Julie Ford, Yeovil, Somerset
Julie Ford is from Yeovil in Somerset. She became postmistress of Westfield Post Office in October
2007. Her problems with the company started at the beginning of November 2007, when her
branch started losing hundreds of pounds at a time. The problems continued until February 2009,
when she was forced to file for bankruptcy.
“At one stage I was £1,300 down. I rang up the Post Office and said I think there’s something
wrong. It said one of the staff, or myself, had sticky fingers,” she says.
By January, Ford had paid all her £2,500 savings to the Post Office, so rang up and asked for an
audit when £3,000 went missing overnight. The audit found she was nearly £10,000 short. The
Post Office took money out of her wages, and suspended her for 18 weeks while it carried out an
investigation.
Instead of prosecuting or terminating her contract over the deficits, the company reinstated Ford
in June 2008 without further action. The problems continued until several parts of her Horizon
system were replaced, then balancing returned to normal.
But Lynn Hobbs, general manager, network support at the Post Office, said in an e-mail at the
time, “lam sure you are aware that we have had previous challenges in relation to the integrity of
the system and I can confirm that the system has passed all tests and been exonerated in both
the civil and criminal courts. I therefore cannot accept that the losses were as a result of the
Horizon kit.”
Hobbs suggested, ‘I think we should also look at other factors which coincided with this change,
such as the additional training provided and the change of personnel at the branch.”
Ford says, “In the end I refused to work. I wasn’t taking the money and I wasn’t making stupid
mistakes. If they thought I was stealing money, why did they reinstate me? I lost all confidence in
my job, and now I am going bankrupt.”
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Other investigative articles by Computer Weekly:
Computer Weekly disputes cause of Chinook crash
MoD's £5bn Defence Information Infrastructure hits major problems
Hundreds of patients lost in NPFIT systems
Software scams grow
Co-op challenges court ruling
Housing Corp refuses to disclose report on £17m project
Government IT projects will cost taxpayers £18bn more than expected
Civil servants told to shred Gateway Review reports
The truth, a semblance of the truth and nothing like the truth
Computer Weekly wins Freedom of Information Award
HMRC's missing CDs — what went wrong and the lessons
No warning for hospital on patient system problems
ee ry
Teragram53 Collapse Expand
I am a sub-postmistress and have had problems with demands for money and deductions from
my salary twice and am sure of why it happened. I have a Hanco cash machine and the errors
occurred on the monthly rollover day both times. I tried to discuss it with the Post Office
department which covered the cash machine and was treated rudely and with little interest.
I discussed the matter with Hanco and our figures agreed. The problem was haphazard
accounting systems in the Post Office and the matter has never been resolved. I asked the
Federation for help because I was a member and was advised to photocopy reams of paper and
send them to Chesterfield and then they were all ignored and I was told that the sum would be
taken from my salary if I refused to pay. I spent time on this and the Federation kept coming
back and saying, that I wasn't presenting the case properly and they were no help at all. The
money was taken from my salary on both occasions regardless of the fact that my objections
were never answered.
I believe that there was a discrepancy because some of the money issued from the cash machine
was dispensed after cut off on the month end leaving a discrepancy for that month because of
the way the PO accounts for the cash machine money and that there should have been a
corresponding discrepancy at the end of the next month to compensate but although they were
willing to identify the discrepancy in their favour there was never a corresponding one. Therefore,
their argument was not valid and there was not even an attempt to communicate on the matter -
they just didn't understand how the office ran because they accounted one way and the Hanco
accounts were another way and my Horizon system was different from both - although, after
discussion, I was able to agree that there was no problem with Hanco because they understood
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how it worked. They also grouped several figures together which did not relate to each other and
refused to discuss the fact that this was not normal practice.
The sums of money were not big enough to justify legal action although I did think about going
through the small claims court. It is all extra work and everybody who works for the Post Office
works ridiculous hours for less than minimum wage (and without employee benefits because we
are “agents’). The result of these restraints is that I did not take further action but I was unaware
at the time of how often these discrepancies occurred and that so many large sums were involved.
Maggie
Lincolnshire
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Appendix 2 — Leigh Ellis - Profile
Leigh Ellis / Solicitor
Leigh Ellis is a solicitor, software engineer, intellectual property and information technology
specialist. He acquired significant experience in software development and the IT industry prior to
becoming a solicitor. Coupled with this, he is an accredited trade mark attorney and ideally suited
to address most issues confronting companies involved in information technology.
Legal Expertise
Leigh’s practice covers international information technology transactions and disputes, including
software and technology contracts, software and patent licenses, patent infringement, copyright
litigation and claims. He is a highly experienced intellectual property lawyer and advises on the full
suite of intellectual property rights. He regularly advises on protecting and enforcement of trade
reputation, infringement, structuring businesses to minimise risk and liability in commercial
transactions. He appears in court and conducts High Court commercial litigation for clients in a
range of industries.
With a keen eye for detail, technical expertise and genuine interest in the law, his skills facilitate
identification of sources of evidence easily overlooked and discounted, unravelling the complexity
in technology disputes and maximising the value and weight of evidence in court proceedings. He
has provided legal advice to clients located in the United Kingdom, the United States, France,
Switzerland, China, Gibraltar, Australia, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Russia and other countries on
intellectual property litigation & information technology contracts, and disputes.
Specialist Industry Sectors
* Information technology, software licensing
¢ Media and New Media
e Entertainment
* — Online Publishing
Memberships
© — British Computer Society
* Society of Computers and Law
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Admitted as a solicitor in England and Australia
Professional Experience
ee eee
advises regularly on software licensing issues and intellectual property rights
protection of trade reputation and goodwill
assists companies transform their marketing to internet based ventures
ISPs and commercial entities on internet based companies
Has appeared on Sky News, BBC News, Channel 5 commenting on international
developments in IT law and intellectual property affecting the technology industry and
interviewed for industry publications. Interviewed by The Times, Forbes, BBC Online,
Computing Magazine, New York Times, Guardian Online, TalkSport, amongst others.
Advised on examinations for a London University
Specialist Practice Areas
ee eee eee
Intellectual Property Litigation
Technology Law
Digital Rights Management (DRM)
Outsourcing and Procurement
Technology Licensing
Commercial Litigation
Protection of trade reputation and goodwill
Management of corporate risk
Academic Qualifications
Master of Laws: Intellectual Property
Bachelor of Computer Science
Registered Trade Mark Attorney, Australia
Clients include
«New Media Agencies
« Software Houses
¢ — National Distributors
e —{T Companies
« Importers and exporters
e Content Providers
¢ Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
¢ — Solicitors seeking intellectual property advice
Advised on
¢ — affiliate marketing disputes, involving high degree of technical knowledge relating to
database structures and programming languages
e ingestion of content, streaming of content, and maintenance of IP rights
° — software license audits
* — telecommunications contracts
¢ _ intellectual property rights in petroleum industry, mobile telephones, motorsport and
perfume
contractual disputes involving least cost routing algorithms, trading systems; online video
delivery systems
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Leigh is a non-member partner of Gillhams Solicitors LLP. For more information, see the Notices &
Disclaimer Section of our website by clicking below.
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Appendix 3 — Tony Sykes - Profile
GRO
David Anthony Sykes - IT Group Partner
BSc. CEng. CITP MIET FAE MEWI - Managing Director
Download David Sykes CV.
http://www. itgroup-
uk.com/files/Qualified_Electrical_Engineer_Expert_Witness.pdf Thank you for your
recent emails and for the further amended second report. I have reviewed the report in some
detail. fam extremely pleased with its content. You have done a first rate job of conveying in
simple terms what [our client's] problem is.”
Stephens Scown Solicitors - "Thank you for all of your help and assistance with this matter, and
your contribution was particularly significant, I believe, in achieving the end result.”
Read more testimonials from Solicitors & Barristers who have instructed David Sykes.
http://www.itgroup-uk.com/index.php?page=article&sec=140-
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Personal
Name. David Anthony Sykes BSc. CEng. CITP MIET FAE MEWI
Address.
IT Group UK Limited
Grosvenor House
Central Park
Telford
TF2 9TW.
Telephoi
Fax. #
Email!
Education
1967 - 1973.
King Edward Vil Grammar School Sheffield
9 GCE O Levels
3 GCE A Levels
1974 - 1978, BSc Honours Degree in Electrical Engineering with Electronics
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Professional
Chartered Engineer and Member of the Institution of Engineering and Technology. Member of
the Society of Expert Witnesses. Registered with the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers as an
expert witness, Practicing Fellow of the Academy of Experts. Member of the Society for
Computers and Law. Member of the committee of the SCL IT Disputes Group. Member of the
National Association of Subrogation Professionals. IEE Expert Witness, IET Expert Witness. Expert
in Sale of Goods act. Fully trained in Encase Mobile Phone Forensics.
Career History
1992 - Current. Chairman and Chief Executive, IT Group UK Limited
1989 - 1992 Managing Director, Microsys Consultants Limited
1988 - 1989 Group Manager, GEC-Plessey Telecommunications
1984 - 1988 Computer Applications Manager of FKI Babcock Group Company
1982 - 1984 Chief Engineer, Metal Closures Group Company
1979 - 1982 Systems Engineer for a German automotive test Company
1973 - 1978 Electronics Engineer, British Leyland
Profile
I have over 25 years experience in the application of electronics and software, chiefly as a designer
of IT and telecommunications products and systems. I have worked with organizations such as
GEC, Courtaulds and the MOD, on design contracts and for organizations such as OFCOM, BT and
British Gas in a Consultancy role. I have been instructed by FM Global, Crawfords, Cunningham
Lindsey and Zurich in connection with Insurance Claims and Loss adjustment. I have been
instructed by firms such as Slaughter & May, Herbert Smith, Baker McKenzie, Denton Wilde Sapte.
Pinsents, Eversheds, Taylor Wessing, Freshfields and PriceWaterhouse in connection with
company litigation, copyright and customs tribunals. I have undertaken many forensic
investigations and given evidence in the Crown Court in Criminal Proceedings presenting
computer and electronic forensic evidence.
Some reported High Court Trials in which I prepared reports and gave evidence include:
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Kingsway Hall Hotel Limited -v- Red Sky IT (Hounslow) Limited. High Court Queen's Bench
Division Technology and Construction Court
Horace Holman Group Limited v Sherwood International Group Limited (High Court TCC)
SAM Business Systems v Hedley & Co (High Court TCC)
Watford Electronics Limited v Sanderson CFL Limited (Court of Appeal)
R. Benfield v Life Racing (High Court TCG,
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Appendix 4 — BBC Article on Chinook Tragedy
Wednesday, May 26, 1999 Published at 12:10 GMT 13:10 UK
UK
Magazine disputes Chinook tragedy cause
The 29 people on board the Chinook died in the crash
A computer magazine is disputing the finding that two pilots whose Chinook helicopter crashed
on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994 were “grossly negligent’.
Pr All 29 people on board the helicopter died, including some of Northern Ireland's
most senior police and intelligence experts.
Tony Collins
fel eB BC The aircraft was flying to Inverness from Ulster when it crashed in thick mist.
An RAF board of inquiry ruled the pilots - Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper
= and Richard Cook - were to blame but the conclusion has been strongly
contested by their families and some politicians.
a Based on the limited evidence, the inquiry said the wrong rate of climb was the
most likely cause. It decided that although technical malfunction was unlikely,
The BBC's it could not be positively disproved.
Emma
Simpson: The
Now, Computer Weekly reports that the helicopter's engine control software
Magazine sus may have been the cause of the crash.
chnical
gation
was flawed
‘Car pedal’
The magazine's Executive Editor, Tony Collins, said with the benefit of hindsight new evidence had
come to light which was not available to crash investigators.
Fit Lt Tapper is said to have expressed concerns about the speed at which the Chinook's “full
authority digital engine contro!” was being put into service.
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Mr Collins likened the software to a car's accelerator pedal.
“If the engines receive a signal from the software telling them to
accelerate when the pilots don't want to, the only way they can bring
down the speed is to go into cloud in a way which they don't want to,"
he said.
“That has not been generally understood. It has been thought that if
the software fails, it would fail in a predictable manner.”
Mr Collins said he did not think the inquiry had been deliberately
misled but it was clear that crash investigators have difficulties when
examining computer software after an accident.
The pilots were said to
have chosen the wrong
climb rate
“Gross negligence can only be brought if there's no doubt whatsoever
as to the cause of the crash," he told the BBC.
Verdict ‘unsafe’
"In this case, there are too many uncertainties and the evidence that we have highlighted proves
‘that the evidence on which the verdict was based is inconclusive.
"We are saying that the verdict of gross negligence is manifestly and demonstrably unsafe.”
Computer Weekly also questions whether the aircraft should even have been allowed to fly as it
believes evidence from America should have alerted the army to the potential software problems.
Other theories which were rejected at the time of the inquiry included interference from laptop
computers, mobile phones, submarine communications and the possibility of a passenger
bursting into the cockpit.
Questions also arose about whether the crew members were running
out of flying time and were going flat out to stay within their
designated hours.
After a four-week fatal accident inquiry in 1996, a sheriff
recommended the immediate installation of cockpit voice and
accident data recorders.
He said he was not satisfied that the cause of the accident was the
pilots’ choice of an inappropriate rate of climb.
Liberal Democrat defence spokesman, Menzies Campbell said the
inquiry's findings should be reviewed.
Menzies Campbell: Call for
inquiry review
He said: “I have long been convinced that there is an injustice here.
"The RAF's own regulations at the time required that every other cause had to be eliminated
before deceased pilots could be found to be negligent.
"The additional evidence appears once again to confirm the view that there were other possible
causes for this tragic accident.”
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Appendix 5 — Computer Weekly Article 02 Mar 2012
News
Post Office turns to Twitter during
computer system crash
Cliff Saran { Friday 02 March 2012 12:02
The Post Office branch network is back up and running after it failed for several
hours on Thursday.
Users on Twitter were informed that the service had crashed. The Post Office team
tweeted and responded individually to over 100 customers who had queries on the
system failure: “Apologies, we are aware of a problem affecting our branches, which
is being looked at,” the Post Office posted in one tweet.
@ oe
oes
Home Insurance
We guarantee
to beat your 3
home insurance &
B renewal quote —
B by at least £50: [I
See haw much you
f e today!
A Post Office spokesman said of yesterday's system crash: "Post Offices across the
network are again working normally after a computer problem which had earlier
affected branches nationwide for several hours. We apologise to all our customers for
the service problems experienced in our branches and the inconvenience this may
have caused. Services have now fully been restored and customers are able to
complete all transactions across the Post Office network. We are continuing to
monitor the situation closely to make sure our services remain available as normal.”
The system failure appears more substantial than the previous outage in December
2011 when the Post Office suffered disruption after thousands of branches were hit by
a computer crash.
At the time the problems hit for two 30-minute periods, which left some branches
unable to handle the usual volume of mail.
Post Office owner Royal Mail is undergoing a major transformation in its business,
which is due to complete in 2016, to modernise the mailing service, with greater
levels of automation. As part of the project, according its December 2011 annual
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statement, Royal Mail reported it has started to implement the largest SAP human
resources and payroll system in Europe. The IT system, dubbed “People System
Programme”, aims to completely modernise all of the Royal Mail HR systems and
drive performance improvements.
As part of government plans to part-privatise Royal Mail, the Post Office is set to be
mutualised, a plan that is likely to lead to further major changes in the back-office IT
that supports both organisations.
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Appendix 6 — Computer Weekly Article 27 Feb 2012
Post Office reveals plans for identity
assurance services
The Post Office is tendering for hardware and software which will enable it to
become a provider of the government's proposed Identity Assurance (IDA) services.
IDA is a key part of the government’s move to "digital by default" public services,
and will require citizens to electronically verify who they are to access public services
online.
The government’s intention is to create a market of private sector identity assurance
services, with individuals given the option to choose a certified private sector
company to assure their identity. Banks, supermarkets and even social network sites
could set themselves up as identity assurance providers.
The Post Office's search for a technology partner reveals its intent to provide identity
assurance services across online, telephony and face-to-face channels, throughout its
branch network and brand, according to its tender notice.
The contract will be worth £9m over 12 months and has been split into two lots. The
first lot worth £2.5m includes consumer data services, which will process the
personal details of users, as a means of authentication.
The second lot worth £6.5m includes identity management services, for systems and
software for a single-sign-in system; near-field communication (NFC) tools, and
mobile telephony for authentication and transaction delivery, as well as customer
relationship management and support services.
Speaking at the official launch of the Government Digital Service in December 2011,
Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude said the government would seek an online-
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only model in digital services where possible to cut costs: “Where public services are
capable of being delivered digitally online they should be, and only online.”
Maude has earmarked £10m for implementation of IDA from the government’s
£650m cyber defence fund
Mike Bracken, director of digital and senior responsible owner for IDA, recently told
Computer Weekly that more widely used security protocols for IDA would be key to
identifying users. “Even some of our best services, like driving registration, require
users to put all their data in for parking permit even if they have already submitted it
for registration. There is no common ID framework recognised in two places,” he
said.
“What we are building is not an IT programme but standards the market can coalesce
around. So it’s more nuanced than classic IT programmes, where you throw ina
system integrator and wait for it to be delivered."
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Appendix 7 — Computer Weekly Article 14 Dec 2011
Post Office suffers disruption after IT
failure
Wednesday 14 December 2011 09:15
The Post Office suffered disruption this week after thousands of branches were
hit by a computer crash.
The problems hit for two 30-minute periods on Monday afternoon, which left some
branches unable to handle the usual volume of mail.
There was a problem with the Horizon system used by Post Offices around the
country. The service has now been restored.
“We are very sorry for the inconvenience this problem has caused customers. We
know how important the Post Office is to our customers at all times, but especially at
Christmas,” said Kevin Gilliland, network and sales director at the Post Office.
According to reports, staff had to manually calculate the cost of sending goods and
then stick on individual stamps on one of the busiest days of the year for the Post
Office with Christmas approaching.
About 4,000 branches were affected.
Previous Post Office system problems
The Post Office also suffered a glitch back in July, which meant customers were
unable to complete card transactions across all branches.
Debit and credit card transactions using Chip and PIN pads at branch counters and
Post Office Card Accounts were affected, with customers unable to complete
transactions or access their accounts.
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The Horizon system is currently at the centre of a potential legal action against the
Post Office. Over 80 sub-postmasters are interested in taking legal action against the
Post Office in relation to Horizon, which has allegedly has led to false accounting
accusations against them.
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Appendix 8 — Computer Weekly Article 15 Dec 2011
Post Office cas
services
Karl Flinders’ GRO
net for IT consultancy
Thursday 15 December 2011 11:44
The Post Office has put out a request for suppliers to bid for IT consulting
services worth up to £8m over two years.
The tender is looking for suppliers to provide consultancy services to the Post Office
IT department to support the transformation of its operating model.
According to the tender, the consulting will provide support and guidance to the IT
leadership team in the development and delivery of “organisational design and impact
assessment triggered by IT strategies and change programmes, the provision of
consultancy to support the development and delivery of enterprise architecture, the
provision of consultancy to support the development and delivery of the security
architecture”.
The Post Office expects four suppliers to be chosen.
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Appendix 9 — Computer Weekly Article 08 Feb 2011
Post Office faces legal action over
alleged accounting system failures
Tuesday 08 February 2011 14:33
More than 50 postmasters are planning legal action against the Post Office to reclaim
money they paid to the Post Office after being accused of theft and false accounting.
All the postmasters protested their innocence and it is alleged that the problems could
be down to the Post Office's Horizon accounting system, which they all use. The Post
Office has denied an IT fault could cause the system to show incorrect balances
Access Legal, the consumer arm of law firm Shoosmiths, will initially launch the
action for a group of six postmasters. It has a total of 55 already lined up to bring
action and expects many more once the cases are made public.
Some of the postmasters gave exclusive interviews to Computer Weekly almost two
years ago about the alleged Horizon problems.
Thousands of post offices use the Horizon IT system for their accounts and
postmasters claim faults with the technology could be generating unexplained losses.
The Post Office has denied this.
In recent years dozens of postmasters have been charged and even jailed with others
repaying money following prosecutions. More than 250 post offices have been forced
to close, according to Shoosmith's.
Amanda Glover, head of legal disputes at Shoosmiths, said, "Horizon was introduced
to sub-post offices to provide first weekly, then monthly accounting, but didn't do a
double entry, so it couldn't be checked regularly. Many users reported problems and
couldn't work out how losses were arising. When they called a helpline, many
claimed the problems got worse.
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"Customers would try to get money from the hole-in-the-wall, but although they
didn't receive it, it later showed as having been taken from their account.
"A key issue is the fact the system couldn't be accessed unless postmasters confirmed
they agreed with figures on a daily basis, which led to errors being accepted by
postmasters just so that they could log on to the system.
"They all say they have not taken any money, and while the Post Office says there is
nothing wrong with Horizon, it appears to record people using it when they are not
even logged on. One post office even recorded a loss when it was closed."
Glover said some postmasters are paying back "missing" amounts to avoid
prosecution. The most common amount is around £35,000.
The Post Office said in a statement that it is "fully confident that the Horizon
computer system in its branches, and all the accounting processes around it, are
absolutely accurate and reliable at all times."
It added, "The Horizon system has been subjected to full, independently assured,
robust testing procedures.
"The Horizon information security processes meet the relevant industry standards
which apply to such organisations as banks and building societies.
"Subpostmasters are given fully appropriate training, typically including classroom
training and a further time on site under close supervision and guidance from a Post
Office manager. Subpostmasters can also ring a dedicated helpline for advice.
"The Horizon system has operated successfully for more than 10 years across the Post
Office network, which currently stands at more than 11,500 branches.
"The National Federation of Subpostmasters, which represents the views and interests
of subpostmasters around the country, has gone on record on a number of occasions
to express its full confidence in the accuracy and robustness of the Horizon system.
"The Horizon system provides detailed records of every transaction, no matter how
small or large, in any individual post office branch. Separate records of all key
strokes in the system are stored in a tamper-proof way.
"The Post Office handles large sums of public money as well as the money entrusted
to it by the 20 million people who visit our branches each week. The Post Office
rightly makes every effort and takes all reasonable steps to protect the money in its
care."
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Appendix 10 — Computer Weekly Article 27 Jul 2011
Computer glitch halts Post Office card
transactions
Jenny Williams
2011 05:00
Customers have been unable to complete card transactions at the Post Office today
after a computer glitch across all branches.
Debit and credit card transactions using Chip-and-PIN pads at branch counters as
well as Post Office Card Accounts have been affected, with customers unable to
complete transactions or access accounts. The BBC predicts up to 3.3 million Card
Account customers could be affected.
In a statement, the Post Office apologised to customers for the computer problem and
confirmed its 11,820 branches remained open.
Martin Moran, Post Office commercial director said: "We apologise to customers for
any inconvenience. We are making every effort to restore these services as soon as
possible."
The Post Office is making "special arrangements" for emergency cash payments to
pensioners and benefits claimants that rely on Post Office Card Accounts.
The firm also advised customers could alternatively withdraw cash from any of the
Post Office's 2000 ATMs, which have been unaffected by the problem.
The Post Office said further details would be released shortly.
Royal Mail is set to get another CIO, its third in less than 18 months, when former
Network Rail corporate development director Catherine Doran takes over the role
from 1 September.
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UPDATE: A Post Office statement released at 4.30pm today says the technical
problems with PIN pads have been solved as of 3.30pm, having been down since
branches opened today. The firm says it made 1,000 emergency payments to Post
Office Card Account customers during that time.
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Appendix 11 — Fraud Advice Article 23 Oct 2009
Fraud and the Post Office Horizon
Computer
Friday, October 23rd, 2009 at 10:42 am
I was searching the Internet last night to see if my Fraud Resource web site
had moved up Google's ranking at all and came across a link to my name
concerning a job I did around 4 years ago. It is interesting to see the contents
of a forensic accounting report being quoted in the press as usually the
forensic accountant remains in the background in criminal prosecutions even
when his or her work is critical to the proper outcome of the matter.
The article was by ComputerWeekly.com and highlighted the plight of a
number of postmasters who ran 7 of the Post Office’s 14,000 or so branches
throughout the UK. All of them had been convicted or accused of stealing
typically £40,000 from their branch. One of the cases was mine. I am quoted
as saying that the Post Office system was unlikely to be flawed otherwise you
would see systematic problems through many of the 14,000 branches
[inferring not just those run by postmasters who just happened to also have
financial difficulties?]. 1 have to say that the contents of my report should not
have been disclosed but hopefully no harm has been done in this case.
What the article did not say was that I had a couple of similar cases a year or
two previously where I did examine the Post Office Horizon computer system
in more detail. I concluded then that the system was essentially straight
forward and could be considered to be an “Excel spreadsheet” with a fancy
front end. There were unlikely to be such substantial and regular errors on
the Post Offices part limited to only a few individual cases — however the
apparently disadvantaged postmasters failed to consider the most obvious
facts:
1. The deficit typically grew by a few £1000 per week over a few months.
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2. The deficit was discovered by a Post Office audit that would probably be
triggered by the increasing funds drawdown compared to usual.
3. The postmaster was responsible for reconciling his accounting system with
the Post Office daily and weekly. Any deficiencies should be reported
immediately so that they could be sorted (the Post Office would often bear a
loss in this way).
4. The postmasters knowingly carried forward an increasing error by falsifying
returns — failing to report the differences.
5. Whether or not the postmaster stole the money, a member of staff stole it
or it was negligently overpaid regularly to customers of the branch in error —
the fact remains that the postmasters were responsible for reporting problems
to the Post Office and because they allowed the error/loss to mount up — they
were responsible for it — either as criminals or incompetents.
In the most recent case that was being reported I had been asked by the
barrister to advise the defendant in conference of my findings and as a result
he pleaded guilty to false accounting — in return the prosecution dropped the
theft charges for which he would I am sure have been convicted. His
sentence was accordingly much lighter. 12 weeks in prison against probably
a couple of years at least.
Hopefully this was a just outcome. If he had been convicted of theft he would
have face confiscation proceedings for the £40,000 and given the nature of
the alleged offences may even have endured the lifestyle
assumptions. Clearly the postmaster had little in the way of assets and if he
had defaulted on the confiscation his whole term in prison could easily have
reached five or even more years!
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Appendix 12 — Gartner Report
C:\Documents and
Settings\peter.stanle
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Appendix 13 — Internal Audit Assurance Review of Key System Controls in Horizon
C:\Documents and
Settings\peter.stanle
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Peak Incident Management System
C0043811
Targeted At - CSR-CI3_2R_ _
Business restricted
Date:28-Apr-2000 15:02:00 User:_Customer Call_
ALL PCO043811:Priority B:CallType L - Target 04/05/00 16:0:
27/04/00 14:28 The pm is having problems rolling the office over. There are
figures missing from the cash account which is one person entire work.
7/04/00 14:30 uk079786
@vice: Got the pm to check all the stock unit and they are in
apos.
Got the pm to try and get a trial cash account.
< says balancing error reciepts and payments do not
match, investigate the error the error may be corrected using th
reversal function
27/04/00 14:50 uk079786
nformation: Discrepency on the cash account for redeemed stamp
nat saving deposits, out by £111
Nat savings withdrawels out by £450.95
VL stamps out by £75
av stamps out by £200
in each case the figures are the same as this stock unit
has taken.
iStock unit DD
User id CSTOOL :
7/04/00 14:53 uk079786
dvice: These figures are far too similar to the figures the women
has taken in this stock unit.
27/04/00 16:16 uk066871
Repeat Call: pm called chasing call ...voiced Sandra Clegg
27/04/00 16:35 uk059697
[Anformation: voiced SMC to this call
(28/04/00 10:28 uk061537
IRepeat Call: Caller has rung back again. At 18:21 on wednesday night
‘hey did a sales report and it included allt he transactions,
Thowever, they could not roll the clerk over. Yesterday
@norningn SU DD was rolled over and she is not in CAP 06. AL] her
work is missing from the CA> When she did a blaance snaj
Jehe was £9,000 over and all her stock is showing as minu
{Mt is all showing minus.
(28/04/00 10:36 uk061537
cence: I asked caller to do a reprint of the final balance for SU
:
f
3
:
:
:
;
D to see what the figures looked like. Everything is minus
f what she sold. I think that she rolled over with nothing
n her Stock, and everything went as an over. Advised caller
© roll over the SU into the next BP and declare stock
camps and cash
(8/04/00 10:44 uk061537
Jpavice: The manager will call in as they rolled the SU over and the
aller cannot carry out the tasks as she does not have
anagerial access
8/04/00 11:37 uk080106 ]
Repeat Call: asked pm to check figures on trial bal. pm says she cannot i
find this. asked to print a bal snapshot. it shows all minus
lagainst everything she has sold. the SU DD is individual
nd has been rolled over
advised to create correctional SU 222. already has 222, so
created XXX. individual. had pm attach to XXX. has pm
jeclare everything in XXX what should have been declared in DD on
bednesday using bal snpashot printed then.
8/04/00 11:45 vk080106
Advice: advised to go into stock bal and declare stock, then stamps
[nen cash. advised to then roll over XXX. then to transfer
[rhe stock from XxX to DD and then roll over office. pm ok to
jo this.
§28/04/00 11:53 uk080106
Advice: will leave call open for further contact from pm.
28/04/00 13:18 uk061537
[Repeat Call: Caller has rung back in again. She has rolled SU XXX over
[ith all the stock missing from the clerks SU. This is the ]
incorre: Caller should never have been advised to do this. i
If my update had been read from when she rang in before it
ould have been clear that the caller rolled over DD SU with
0 stook in it. Everything was zero and then she started /
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bor ng in CAPO6 with no stockm tus creating the minus figures.
y creating a correctional SU in CAP 05 and putting the
[figures in showing as a minus from CAPO6 it will now roll with
‘CAP 06 figures. If anything, they should never have added
istock from this cap, they should have added stock from last
cap. This faulty advise has caused even more trouble and the PM
has not rolled XXX over
(28/04/00 13:24 uk061537
‘Advice: Advised caller to go into Admin, SU, view Su as she states
he is unable to roll over the CA. I do not want her to roll
Hover her CA as becauase of XXX SU which has got CAPO6
igures in. All SU are in CAP 6. Asked caller to go to office
alancing, office CAP, the office is in CAP 05.
[28/04/00 13:32 uk061937
jAavice: Escalted to STSA Amanda, Sandra and Elizabeth. Spoke to
John Simpkins at BDSC for his advice. he advissed to create
[enother SU, and put in the difference between the correction SU
dand the actual Stock in DD (e.g. if DD had 100 first class
Estamps in CAPOS and sold 20, the balance snapshot would show
minus 20. The XXX SU would have shown 20 first class
amps, so the other correctional SU would have to show 80)
28/04/00 13:56 uk061537
[eontacted: Attempted to contact the PM but the line is currently
[engagea.
8/04/00 14:00 uk061537
Contacted: Attempted to contact the PM, the line is ringing off
28/04/00 14:06 uk061537
[kontacted: Phone line is still ringing off. I cannot get through
28/04/00 14:08 uk061537
[eontacted: I have tried three times in an attempt to contact the PO
ut the line just rings out.
28/04/00 14:10 uk061537
Information: Trieg_again,
Epumber and it is { 5RO”
{28/04/00 15:17 uk061537
[rontacted: Attempted to contact the PO but the line is engaged!
8/04/00 15:24 uk061537
Feontacted: Contacted PM (finally!) SPoke her through attaching herself
#to DD SU and doing a balance snapshot. Asked her to get the
[final balance from SU XXX. Compare the two and work out
Tyhat is left.
28/04/00 1
Advice: Caller advises she declared it already in SU XXX, so
Eaavised her to do a trial CA and see if the figures were correct.
aSpoke her through doing a trial CA.
28/04/00 15:44 uk061537
vice: The trial balance is not showing any of the receipts and
Ipayments. It is showing the stock but none of the receipts
nd payments.
and it times out. Checked with 192 of the PO
4 uk061537
;
:
;
4
:
4
‘
:
:
:
i
:
: 3 uk061537
: SU DD user name is CSTOO1 there is no set position. The
: report was carried out and was rolled over yesterday.
‘aller is trying to do the final CA from position 6.
[Please investigate why the SU DD receipts and payments are
qnot on the trial Ca.
;
i
:
;
:
:
4
:
:
3
4
;
:
4
3
3
[avised caller not to roll over CA ~ advise NBSC of this
8/04/00 15:57 wk059130
[Enformation: I have dowloaded the event logs for this counter which can
Ibe found in the web page.
(Passing call to SSC for further investigation.
I) call details
(Diagnostician nam
Ecustomer opened date 27/04/2000 14:26:01
FALL Pc0043811 opened
"Date:28-Apr-2000 15:12:00 User:_Customer Call_
(27/04/00 14:28 The pm is having problems rolling the office over. There are
[figures missing from the cash account which is one person entire work.
[27/04/00 14:30 uk079786
[Ravice: Got the pm to check all the stock unit and they are in
ape.
[Bot the pm to try and get a trial cash account.
ut says balancing error reciepts and payments do not
atch, investigate the error the error may be corrected using the
[reversal function.
(27/04/00 14:50 uk079786
[Enformation: Discrepency on the cash account for redeemed stamp
at saving deposits, out by £111
at savings withdrawels out by £450.95
VL stamps out by £75
av stamps out by £200
[in each case the figures are the same as this stock unit
Thas taken.
(Stock unit DD
ser id CSTOOL
27/04/00 14:53 uk079786
POL00112440
POL00112440
F/24/2
POL-0109936
JPovice: Those figures are far too similar to the figures the women
has taken in this stock unit.
(27/04/00 16:16 uk066871
Repeat Call: pm called chasing call ...voiced Sandra Clegg
21/04/00 16:35 uk059697
Unformat io:
(28/04/00 1
[Repeat Call: Caller has rung back again. At 18:21 on wednesday night
ithey did a sales report and it included allt he transactions,
owever, they could not roll the clerk over. Yesterday
boorningn SU DD was rolled over and she is not in CAP 06. ALL her
ork is missing from the CA> When she did a blaance snapshot
he was £9,000 over and all her stock is showing as minus.
[Mt is all showing minus.
48/04/00 10:36 uk061537
T asked caller to do a reprint of the final balance for SU
[bp to see what the figures looked like. Everything is minus
‘or wnat she sold. I think that she rolled over with nothing
[iin her Stock, and everything went as an over. Advised caller
ito roll over the SU into the next BP and declare stock
tamps and cash
28/04/00 10:44 vk061537
JAavice: The manager will call in as they rolled the SU over and the
caller cannot carry out the tasks as she does not have
managerial access
28/04/00 11:37 uk0B0106
epeat Call: asked pm to check figures on trial bal. pm says she cannot
[find this. asked to print a bal snapshot. it shows all minus
[egainst everything she has sold. the SU DD is individual
[ena has been rolled over.
advised to create correctional SU 222. already has 222, so
[ereated XXX. individual. had pm attach to XxX. has pm
[Beclare everything in XXX what should have been declared in DD on
jeednesday using bal snpashot printed then.
{28/04/00 11:45 uk080106
‘Pavice: advised to go into stock bal and declare stock, then stamps
yehen cash. advised to then roll over XXX. then to transfer
Tene stock from XXX to DD and then roll over office. pm ok to
[Bo this.
(28/04/00 11:53 ukoa0106
vice: will leave call open for further contact from pm.
[28/04/00 13:18 uk061537
Eeepeat Call: Caller has rung back in again. She has rolled SU XXX over
3
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3
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3
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to this call
Meith all the stock missing from the clerks SU. This is the
IAncorrect. Caller should never have been advised to do this.
[ar my update had been read from when she rang in before it
Jyould have been clear that the caller rolled over DD SU with
0 stock in it. Everything was zero and then she started
[serving in CAP06 with no stockm tus creating the minus figures.
[by creating a correctional SU in CAP 05 and putting the
afigures in showing as a minus from CAP06 it will now roll with
ECAP 06 figures. If anything, they should never have added
stock from this cap, they should have added stock from last
leap. This faulty advise has caused even more trouble and the PM
Fhas not rolled XxX over
(28/04/00 13:24 uk061537
[Ravice: Advised caller to go into Admin, SU, view Su as she states
Eshe is unable to roll over the CA. I do not want her to roll
ver her CA as becauase of XXX SU which has got CAPO6
figures in. All SU are in CAP 6. Asked caller to go to office
balancing, office CAP, the office is in CAP 05.
26/04/00 13:32 uk061537
Advice: Escalted to STSA Amanda, Sandra and Elizabeth. Spoke to
Wohn Simpkins at EDSC for his advice. he advissed to create
fnother SU, and put in the difference between the correction SU
fand the actual Stock in DD (e.g. if DD had 100 first class
istamps in CAPOS and sold 20, the balance snapshot would show
inus 20. The XXX SU would have shown 20 first class
so the other correctional SU would have to show 80)
6 uk061537
contacted: Attempted to contact the PM but the line is currently
‘engaged.
28/04/00 14:00 uk061537
ontacted: Attempted to contact the PM, the line is ringing off
8/04/00 14:06 uk061537
ontacted: Phone line is still ringing off. I cannot get through
[28/04/00 14:08 uk061537
ontacted: I have tried three times in an attempt to contact the PO
ut the line just rings out.
I
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3
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3
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it times out. Checked with 192 of the PO
contacted: Attempted to contact the PO but the line is engaged!
8/04/00 15:24 uk061537
ontacted: Contacted PM (finally!) SPoke her through attaching herself
‘9 DD SU and doing a balance snapshot. Asked her to get the
:
I
:
POL00112440
POL00112440
F/24/3
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
4 uk061537
ises she declared it already in SU XxX, so
advised her to do a trial CA and see if the figures were correct.
poke her through doing a trial CA.
8/04/00 15:44 uk061537
vice: The trial balance is not showing any of the receipts and
ayments. It is showing the stock but none of the receipts
nd payments.
3 uk061537
0 DD user name is CST001 there is no set position. The
alance report was carried out and was rolled over yesterday.
[caller is trying to do the final CA from position 6.
Please investigate why the SU DD receipts and payments are
fot on the trial CA.
JRavised caller not to roll over CA ~ advise NBSC
§28/04/00 15:57 uk059130
(information: I have dowloaded the event logs for this counter which can
Ibe found in the web page.
Passing call to SSC for further investigation.
F) Call details
Diagnostician name:
this
‘Date: 28-Apr-2000 15:51:00 User:Richard Coleman
_PRESCAN: It's so good they've told us 3 times by the looks of it.
Target Release updated to CSR-CT3R
Product EPOSS @ DeskTop Cash Account added
Ihe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: John Simpkins
efect cause updated to 40:General - User
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
B-Apr-2000 17:15:00 User:John Simpkins
ence added - Stock unit DD from 20-Apr-2000 to 28-Apr-2000 L
I) Response :
lmhe openingstock figures from the roll CAP4 BP2 to CAPS BP1 had a lot
[stock items. However T can not find a Stock Declaration DrawerIItemId:2 /
(stock) anywhere. I also cannot find a lot of DDNs that would match this. I
[cannot find a lot of SANs to remove the stock. I believe that the mapping
Trust s ting the CAPS openin
HI will attache the message store extract for SU DD. .
IH will route this back to the main stack to be re-assigned while I am on
Fholiday.
(UEND OF REFERENCE 17724827]
[Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
[he response was delivered to: Power#elp
[mhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
at
Dat
B-Apr-2000 17:26:00 User:John Simpkins
New evidence added - ObjectName:DD
#) Response :
I have followed the openingfigures markers from the StockUnits collection
(attached as evidence) and they seem to be correct.
{END OF REFERENCE 17724933]
Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
the response was delivered to: PowerHelp
Fpece:20-ape-2000 09:74:00 User:dahn Simptina
Ihe Call record has been transferred to the Team: QFP I
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
99-Apr-2000 10:12:00 User:_Customer Call_
29/04/00 10:21 uk079746 KSH1 Repeat Call: Pm rang in for update. i
to EDSC, they advised will need to go to development
02-May-2000 09:16:00 User:Lionel Higman
Whe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Steve Warwick
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
“Date:02-May-2000 12:05:00 User:Paul Steed
rently with fourth line.
(END OF REFERENCE. 17751933)
JRospondea to call type Las Category 40 -Ineident Under Investigation
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F/24/4
POL-0109936
fre response was delivered to: PowerHelp
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ate :02~May-2000 13:08:00 User: Customer Call_
SMPTY 02/05/00 12:43 uk080109 KSH1 Repeat Cal.
3rd line who said somebody
will callback asap.
pin rang back chasing, voi
Date:02-May-2000 16:35:00 User:Steve Warwick
iF) Response :
Having looked at the evidence supplied there does seem to be an issue with
Fche CAP 5 balance on Stock Unit DD. However to investigate fully we need to
isee a complete copy of the message store, not just the ‘Container:DD'
essages.
(BND OF REFER)
[Responded to
: 17762185)
all type L as Category 96 ~Insufficient evidence
[Hours spent since call received: 2 hours
Iqhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
Ime response has been routed to the gateway team for validation
“bate:03-May-2000 08:07:00 User:Barbara Longley
fhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: John Simpkins
Fours spent since call received: 0 hours
at
3-May-2000 12:47:00 User:John Simpkins
[New evidence added - Complete message store
(he Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS
‘Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
(pat
:
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:03-May-2000 14:07:00 User:Barbara Longley
Ir) Response :
New evidence added - Complete message store by John Simpkins in EDSC ~
Ime call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-Dev
TEND OF REFERENCE 17783656]
[Responded to call type L as Category 40 Incident Under Investigation
Fhe response was delivered to: PowerHelp
A
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“Date:03-May-2000 14:08:00 User:_Customer Call_
EMPTY 03/05/00 15:07 uk066702 KSH1 Advice: rnm - carl motion chasing this
fall for an update - tried
jpaul steed but unavailable - voiced barbara longley for
update on this call - if possible the pm needs a callback to
fexplain the situation so far...
[Date:08-May-2000 12:53:00 User:_Customer Call.
[EMPTY 08/05/00 13:20 uk080111 HSI Repeat Cal
‘ete as pm needs to know what is
voiced through Barbara
appening. A development team are investigating this. Pm
eports that this has happended again with this weeks CA on the
ame counter
ate:08-May-2000 13:50:00 User:Les Ong
he Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-FP
jours spent since call received: 0 hours
_Date:09-May-2000 16:23:00 User:Les Ong
arget Release updated to CSR-CI3_2R
#) Response :
otential target release updated to CI3_2R si
elease has passed.
[END OF REFERENCE 17936240]
"Responded to call type L as Category 68 -Administrative Response
Tours spent since call received: 0 hours
[Whe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
Whe response has been routed to the gateway team for validation
ce date for existing target
“Date:09-May-2000 16:31:00 User:Barbara Longley
[Me Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: John Simpkins
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
“pace :09-May-2000 16:34:00 User:Barbara Longley
[ane Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-FP
IHours spent since call received: 0 hours
POL00112440
POL00112440
'
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F/24/5
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
1-May-2000 10:41:00 1
Response :
HSH rang to say that NBSC are chasing for an update on this call. Have
informed them that call currently with the EPOSS development team.
{END OF REFERENCE 17989436]
Responded to call type L as Category 40 Incident Under Investigation
[fhe response was delivered to: PowerHelp
er:Barbara Longley
“Date:11-May-2000 13:22:00 User:Barbara Longley
ie) Response
HSH have chased call again. Call is still being progressed by EPOSS-FP. Have
prompted team
IIEND OF REFERENCE 17995831]
Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
‘The response was delivered to: PowerHelp
Banu
Date:11-May-2000 13:24:00 User:_Customer Call_
PTY 11/05/00 11:38 uk080007 KSH1 Repeat Call: repeat call from NBSC.
oiced through to EDSC, with eposs development team.
advised that she will put an update on the call.
1/05/00 14:12 uk066744 HSH1 Repeat Call: rnm Carl Motion called chasing -
is not happy at lack of
fapparent progression from support on this matter - office have
had no contact for 4-5 days and rnm wants to ensure the
urgency of this ised - rnm would like to s
fo call him on [ oiced ssc.
apport
jate:11-May-2000 14:18:00 User:Lionel Higman
‘The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Steve Warwick
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
Date:11-May-2000 14:21:00 User:Lionel Higman
failed to contact Steve personally, left a message on his answering service
fasking him to look at it.
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Date:16-May-2000 15:12:00 User: Customer Call_
EMPTY 16/05/00 16:16 uk079680 HSH1 Repeat Call: the rnm is chasing this call
he would like someone to call i
:
[phe office asap as the call has been going on for too long
ate 6-May-2000 16:11:00 User:_Customer Call
EMPTY 16/05/00 17:06 uk080147 KSH1 Repeat Call: RNM has called back for updt
n the situation. RNM has
reporting a problem whereby the transactions
arried out on the counter are being lost from SU TT.
iStock was
alanced on Tuesday and it was noticed that there was a
6343.07 surplus discrepancy. The counter daily and weekly
eports were showing zero. The RNM put £6343.07 into the
suspense account. The discrepancy has now doubled and is
showing
§ a £12686.14 surplus.
Date:17-May-2000 13:27:00 User:Steve Warwick
IB) Response :
[Looking at the message store it seems that Stock Unit DD has failed to
[balance properly. The rollover records for the stock unit on 27th April
include only records for Cash, Stamps (Product 21) and Discrepancies (Product
I145). These records are present only because they were the values of the
[Beclarations used prior to balancing, all other stock, receipts and payments
Fralues are missing from the rollover records. At the time of declaration,
[ene values declared for Cash and Stamps were converted to discrepanci
Hpresumably because the system had failed to accumalate any current stock
Jholding for either product.
[Mhe call needs to be looked at in detail by the BPOSS team in order to
festablish why the system appears to have failed to locate any transactions i
or this stock unit in CAP 5.
[BND OF REFERENCE 18177392] I
Responded to call type L as Category 38 ~Potential Problem Identified
The response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation ]
‘The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Walter Wright. 7
Hours spent since call received: 1 hours /
4
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jate:18-May-2000 15:32:00 User:Barbara Longley
iF) Response :
‘he Call record has been assigned to EPOSS-FP Team Member: Walter Wright
{END OF REFERENCE 18237650]
sponded to call type L as Category 38 -Potential Problem Identified
F/24/6
POL-0109936
lmre response was delivered to: PoxerHelp
“pate:23-May-2000 08:29:00 User:Walter Wright
the Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-FP
Hours spent since call received: .1 hours
(Date:26-dun-2000 07:39:00 User:_Customer Call_
[EMPTY 26/06/00 08:36 uk079674 KSH1 Follow Up: Shelley Lewis ~ Service
control Team ~ 7281-5432
Have mailed Walter Wright to request an update for this
all.
call has now received 11 Repeat calls from PM.
“Pate:26-Jun-2000 07:56:00 User:Walter Wright
[ae Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-Pre-Dev
[Hours spent since call received: .1 hours
“Date:26-Jun-2000 08:18:00 User:Walter Wright
[me Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Martin McConnell
[Hours spent since call received: .5 hours
Date:26-Jun-2000 09:32:00 User:Martin McConnell
This PINICL has just been assigned to me. I have a copy of the full
iessagestore which I've just started loading on my system. In meantime
(whilst I'm locking) , it would be useful for EDSC to supply event logs that
ight point to any further clues. Route back to BPOSS-Pre-Dev when finished
Iplease..
"fhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
efect cause updated to 99:General - Unknown
‘Hours spent since call received: 1 hours
6-Jun-2000 12:07:00 User:Barbara Longley
pat
dhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: John Simpkins
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
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“Date:26-Jun-2000 12:55:00 User:Martin McConnell
“After my first run through, the StockBalancing process has worked
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successfully as of 27-Apr-2000. BEFORE PASSING THIS BACK WITH THE EVENT LOG,
AY I REQUI THE MESSAGESTORE FOR NODE 1 IS RETRIEVED DIRECTLY FROM IT.
II suspect there is a serious problem (Ripostewise??) with this as opposed to
yehe correspondance view of it.
(I shall still continue looking at subsequent weeks to see why the situation
ever recovered itself.
Jate:26-Jun-2000 20:22:00 User:John Simpkins
ateway counter. Routing to EPOSS_PRE_DEV.
[me Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-Pre-Dev
‘Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
“Date :28-Jun-2000 13:08:00 User:Martin McConnell
[nis is another instance of PC0038631 where Dataserver trees have failed to
uild. This has now been fixed in CI4 and in conjuction with CP2587 (where
[he data tree rebuild is minimised to 2 attempts instead of 4) should return
fan abort right back up to the user to retry the balancing process. Instances
here this can potentially occur is for example if the Riposte service has
[stoped/failed/unable to complete an 10 request issed etc.
IWhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
cause updated to 14:Development - Code
11 received: 20 hours
B-Jun-2000 13:41:00 lser:Barbara Longley
the Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: John Simpkins
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
“pate:29-dun-2000 09:34:00 User: John Simpkins
New evidence added - event log - may only
ate :29-Jun-2000 11:22:00 User:John Simpkins
*} Response :
n early May (01-May-2000) the event log shows a corrupt storage
mit, and
iposte querys were destroyed as a result. This would have caused the
lescribed errors. Unfortunately the event logs do not go back to include
POL00112440
POL00112440
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F/24/7
POL-0109936
17-Apr-2000.
EUBND OF REFERENCE 19591884]
[Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
[The response was delivered to: PoerHelp
(Date:01-dul-2000 14:38:00 User:John Simpkins
EF) Response =
[his is another instance of PC0038631 where Dataserver trees have failed to
[build. This has now been fixed in CI4 and in conjuction with CP2587 (where
[the data tree rebuild is minimised to 2 attempts instead of 4) should return
fan abort right back up to the user to retry the balancing process. Instances
ishere this can potentially occur is for example if the Riposte service has
istoped/failed/unable to complete an IO request issed etc.
In early May (01-May-2000) the event log shows a corrupt storage unit, and
friposte querys were destroyed as a result. This would have caused the
IBescribed errors. Unfortunately the event logs do not go back to include
(27-Apr-2000.
his type of problem will be detected in Cr4 (Cc:
rompted to run the Cash Account again.
I have not contacted the PM due to the length of time the call has been under
investigation.
-EUEND OF REFERENCE 19669955]
[Responded to call type L as Category 74 -Fixed at Future release
IHours spent since call received: 0 hours
LL PCO043811 closed: Category 74, Type L
‘he response was delivered to: PowerHelp
Rt) and the user will be
_Customer Call_
Date and time complete: 01/07/2000 15:42:53
JService Complete (Confirmation) Received
POL00112440
POL00112440
Development - Code
Customer Call_ -- EDSC.
John Simpkins -- EDSC
01-Jul-2000 14:43 -- Customer Call
EPOSS & DeskTop -- Cash ‘Account (version unspecified
F/24/8
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Peak Incident Management System
PC0089918
argeted At ~ BI_3S30R-Authorised
A Business stopped
26/04/2003
)_ WP1 6353
‘E-0304240727
ate :25-Apr-2003 18:11:00 User: Customer Call_
‘ALL PCO089918:Priority B:CallType L - Target 30/04/03 19:11:32
4/04/03 15:44 Darren from NBSC states that the BM is trying to reverse a
rem, but when this has been reversed it is doubling up on a balance
napshot. PM has conducted and existing reversal on the rem in, which shows
yn the balance snapshot.
[24/04/03 16:00 uk951563
vice: adv the pm to print out the reversal summary for today.
(24/04/03 16:00 uk951563
[Mnformation: This shows that the reversals was performed at:
#25000 cash at 14.59
dvice: adv the BM to print off the rems in summary.
fe5000 cash was at 12.39
#28910 cash wasat 13.11
hen 2 more at
[e910 cash was at 1451
[e500 cash was at 1459
#24/04/03 16:28 uk951563
pavice: STSA Mary Rainbow
hat it says
pu reports that it shows the £5000 and £8910 rened in
Funber but ending it in -2 but pm was unable to complete these
Bayoayos 1
etween e stock units in the office to help correct this issue
4/04/03 16:31 uk951563
4/04/03 16:32 uk951563
0 uk951563
[from office weekly but this came up blank
(24/04/03 16:32 uk951563
Ipavice: advised the pm to print transfer in and transfer out
eports and try and see if they match with what the pm has
tually done,
24/04/03 16:38 uk951563
vice: pm reports that the figures showing on transfer are correct
nd on the ¥ stock unit it shows nothing for transfers in
Hor ont but it shows rems in to the value of £27820 which is
45000 x 2 and £8910 x 2
[24/04/03 16:52 uk951563
vice: advised the pm to go into session id in transaction log and
iery and input the -1 number from the rem in summary and
ontinue and print but this gave the same -2 number which pm
mas tried to reverse on previously and this again came up with
transaction has already been reversed
24/04/03 16:56 uk951563
Information: spoke to matt saunders on hit and asked for additional
ssistance, he advised to take down all relevant details and
to hit for further investigation
9 uk951563
Stock Unit: ¥
3 TASOOL
em in : £5000 + 8910
papa
i
]
]
F/149/4
POL-0109936
IREASSIGN: Call # E-0304240727 was Reassigned from Group FIL!
Date
8 uk951563
: Reversal
session ID: 1-966095-1
£5000
cash RIAD
Reversal
15:07
ession ID: 1-966113-1
“Rem In
9 uk951563
information: Reversal
fa:51
ession ID: 1-966076-1
1-966107-1
UREASSIGN: Call # £-0304240727 was Reassigned from Dane Meah, Group
UHSHL to Group HSHS
24/04/03 17
5 uk064675
(PRASSIGN: Call # £-0304240727 was Reassigned from Group HSHS to Tina
Wigens, Group HSHS
24/04/03 17:37 uk061610
[Information: Checking kels to see if any pertaining to reversal doubling
Jup figures.
24/04/03 17:44 uk081610
‘information: Cannot find any relevant kels.
24/04/03 17:47 uk081610
Information: PM advises that rem summery shows correct, both remms were
Ereversed and reversal is showing n the rems summery, error
[eppears to only be visbable on the bal snap.
(24/04/03 17:54 uk081610
[Informatio
[reversing the rem they might have tried remming the amount
back in and then reversed it also this would account for the
and then instead of
Possible that they remmed out amo:
joubling up on the bal snap.
§24/04/03 17:58 uk081610
[RBASSIGN: Call #
£-0304240727 was Reassigned from Tina Wigens, Group
HISHS to Group KSHS
[and of shirt.
24/04/03 18:20 uk064675
Anformation: still no answer.
24/04/03 18:24 uk064675
Unformation: no answer. Attempted 3 times will suspend call until the
Gnorning.
[25/04/03 08:57 uk080066
[BBASSIGN: Call # 5-0304240727 was Reassigned from Group KSKS to
artin Hammond, Group HSHS
25/04/03 09:15 uk085549
contacted: Pm confirmed all previous information. Summarise. PM was in
isu 'Y¥' he rewmed in £13910 and continued to trade in that
U in error, he should have been in 'I' SU, so he did
eversals of all transactions in 'Y' including the REM IN and
d to see a zero, but his REM IN had DOUBLED to £27,820.
expec
Je went through all CA checks with NBSC and Horizon and a
eversal was attempted but a message that a ‘reversal CANNOT
(be reversed' came up which indicated that a reversal WAS
ORRECTLY done.
4 uk085549
PM is seeing this on balance snapshot which indicates CASH
£27,820 and RIAD £27,820. ALL details of times, users and
famounts are in log for this call.
(25/04/03 09:30 uk085549
‘Information: assigning to Filter Hit for assessment
5/04/03 09:31 uk085549
[REASSIGN: Call # 5-0304240727 was Reassigned from Martin Hammond,
roup HSHS to Group FILTER KIT
5/04/03 09:33 uk0B0066
HIT to
roup EDSC1
IB) Call details
Diagnostician name:
‘ustomer opened date 24/04/2003 15:44:21
©ALL PCO089918 opened
8-Apr-2003 08:50:00 User:Catherine Obeng
Marget Release updated to BI_3S30R-Provisional
roduct EPOSS & Desk¥op EPOSS added
iF) Response :
IPRESCAN: Possible KELS DRowe5139K or DRoweS854M.
[len OF REFERENCE 34367444]
esponded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
POL00112440
POL00112440
F/149/2
POL-0109936
lmne response was delivered to: PowerHelp
he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: P
[Defect cause updated to 99:General - Unknown
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
ul Steed
“Date:28-Apr-2003 08:53:00 User:Paul Steed
‘Whe call summary has been changed from:-
[Darren from NBSC states that the BM is trying to r
‘ihe call summary is now:
IFa0003227 Reversed RAMs are doubling
‘pave:28-Ape-2003 10:07:00 User:Paul Steed
IF) Response :
HI have looked at the messagestore and can see that the SaleValue (and Qty)
Fhave been incorrectly calculated by the system.
[xnId Mode ProductNo SaleValue xRef
(44-3227-1-965837-2 RIAD 1 -5000
§44-3227-1-965837-3 RIAD 11215 5000
§44-3227-1-965912-2 RIAD 1 -8910
I44-3227-1-965912-3 RIAD 11215 8910
4-3227-1-966076-2 ER 1 -8910
I44-3227-1-966076-3 BR 11215 8910 44-3227-1-965912-2
[44-3227-1-966095-2 ER 1 -5000
I44-3227-1-966095-3 ER 11215 5000 44-3227-1-965837-2
G(END OF REFERENCE 34369828]
[Responded to call type L as Category 42 -Product Error Diagnosed
IThe response was delivered to: PowerHelp
"Date:28-Apr-2003 10:32:00 User:Paul Steed
New evidence added - Complete zipped messagestore
jew evidence added - Application Event Log
[Nex evidence added - System Event Log
[New evidence added - Audit Log
I) Response :
[Routing to MSU. Can MSU please liaise with NBSC over this software issue. The
[Post Office is going to have to balance with a large discrepancy 2 x (£5,000
Ey £8,910) = £27,820. I have spoken to the PM and said that I would arrange
[for someone from NBSC to talk to her ASAP. When the reconciliation issues
Jhave been put in train can you please route the call back to me so that I can
end it on to development for a code fix. (I am about to create a KEL the
Jreference of which I shall add to this call when available).
IEUEND OF REFERENCE 34370808]
[Responded to call type L as Category 42 -Product Error Diagnosed
[The response was delivered to: PowerHelp
"he Call record has been transferred to the Team: MSU-Indt Mgt
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
boco:28-npe-2008 10:46:00 Jcorsanga. shaw
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‘bate:2e-ape-2003 10:44:00 User:Paul steed
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[Fours spent since call received: 0 hours
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_Date:28-Apr-2003 12:30:00 User:Paul Steed
Whe call references have been updated. They are now:-
IDRIGINATOR : Phelp
I Powerkelp + 5-0304240727
USSCKEL : PSteed2847N. htm
:
“Date:29-Apr-2003 13:40:00 User:Michael King
Ie) Response :
FRouting back to SSC for further investigation.
IIEND OF REFERENCE 34388773]
gResponded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
"me response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
Ime Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
ate :29-Apr-2003 13:48:00 User:Barbara Longley
Whe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Paul Steed
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
'9-Apr-2003 13:51:00 User:Paul Steed
(END OF REFERENCE 34389172)
FRosponded to call type Las Category 42 -Product Error Diagnosed
;
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POL00112440
POL00112440
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F/149/3
POL-0109936
lmne response was delivered to: PowerHelp
he Call record has been transferred to the Team: QFP
‘Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
Date:29-Apr-2003 14:15:00 User:Lionel Higman
[ae Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Mark Scardifield
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
E
n transferred to the Team: EPOSS-Dev
Hours spent since call received: .2 hours
Whe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Martin McConnell
Hours spent since call received: .1 hours
[Date:30-Apr-2003 08:41:00 User:Martin McConnell
Found problem, to do with the fix introduced for PC0083594. Will have to get
Imy head around the original fix first before attempting to come up with a
[solution.
[Date:30-Apr-2003 14:38:00 User:Martin McConnell
[Whe fix for 83594 put an additional test to cater for adoptsettlement sense.
[Hn this case it was the reversal of a redeemed Postal order with partial
I(mon-fast cash). The fix quite rightly identifies that an adjustment to the
isense of the cash should be made in line with the sense that will best tilt
he balance towards zero. In the case of reversing a RIAD cash transaction,
ithe case of adopting a sense is a non-starter because all this requires is
[simply @ reversal of the sense (which has already been primed for
YopjTransaction.RealValue by the time it hits here!). Therefore RealValue will
[have to made aware of the original mode before deciding whether it wants to
[Buggle the sense or not. It's the best solution I can think of.
(Date:30-Apr-2003 14:56:00 User:Steve Parker
[Major problem with $30 Cash Account. POL will be aware because error notices
‘or CA will need to be generated. More sites with this problem are coming out
£ the woodwork as cash account day approaches.
[eALL Pc0089918:Priority ifype L - Target 28/04/03 19:11:32
“Date:30-Apr-2003 15:19:00 User:Walter Wright
jartin actually meant PCB3954 in his previous response.
"Date:01-May-2003 06:34:00 User:Walter Wright
Ie) Response :
Notes for testers:
[As well as testing that the fix addresses the problem described in this
iPinICL, it should be verified that the fix for the original bug (PC83954) has
es been undone. Other desktop modes should also be checked to ensure that no
:
:
Q :
egression has taken place:
(Discrepancies +/- (DDP/DDN)
[Housekeeping (HK)
INon-accounting Data (NAD)
[parcel Traffic (21)
[Revaluation Up/Down (RU/RD)
IRecovery or Bulk Input (REC)
[Remittance In/Out AD (RTAD/ROAD)
[Remittance In/Out Out Client (RICL/ROCL)
INew Reversal (RV)
tock Adjustment +/- (SAP/SAN)
qransfer In/Out (TI/TO)
[BND OF REFERENCE 34404934]
Responded to call type L as Category 42 Product Error Diagnosed
Whe response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
Date:01-May-2003 14:50:00 User:Lionel Higman
Marget. release updated following discussions with representatives from
evelopment, ITU @ Rl
“marget Release updated to BI_3S30R-Authorised
:
E
Date }1-May-2003 15:03:00 User:Walter Wright
[Product BPOSS & DeskTop EPOSS deleted
[Product BPOSS Deliverables Core.dl1 added
ithe call references have been updated. They are now:-
[pricINaron : Phelp
fPowerHelp : E-0304240727
[pScKEL : Psteed7847N.ntm
Work Package : PAY WP 16353 B3S30R
2) Response
POL00112440
POL00112440
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F/149/4
POL-0109936
link tested ok.
x released in WP16353 (B3S30R)
[END OF REFERENCE 34416355]
Responded to call type L as Category 46 -Product Error Fixed
the response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
the Call record has been transferred to the Team: Dev-Int-Rel
Defect cause updated to 14:Development - Code
IBours spent since call received: 4 hours
jate:01-May-2003 16:25:00 User:Miho Fuj
The call references have been updated. They are now:~
RIGINATOR : Phelp
[PowerHelp : -0304240727
;SSCKBL : PSteed2847N. htm
ork Package : PWY_WP_16353 B3S30R
I Fast track fix : FSTK_2_0_WP16353
Ie) Response :
[Fast tarck available, please test.
HUBND OF REFERENCE 34418031]
[Responded to call type L as Category 46 -Product Error Fixed
[mhe response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
[the Call record has been transferred to the Team: Live Supp.Test
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
_Date:01-May-2003 16:51:00 User:John Budworth
"he call references have been updated. They are now:
RIGINATOR : Phelp
owerHelp : B-0304240727
ISSCKEL : PSteed2847N.htm
jork Package : PWY_WP_16353 B3S30R
WT Fast track fix : FSTK_2_0_ WP16353
[Release PinICh
pco090109
_Date:07-May-2003 15:38:00 User:Graham Jennings
I) Response :
plied to Calthorpe on 06/05
{END OF REFERENCE 34457463]
[Responded to call type L as Category 60 -S/W Fix Released to Call Logger
Hours spent since call received: 12 hours
lmhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: EDSC
[he response has been routed to the gateway team for valida’
IDate:07-May-2003 15:51:00 ‘iscr:Barbara Longley
[he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Paul Steed
ed: 0 hours
IHours spent since call recei
Date:08-May-2003 12:30:00 User:Paul Steed
) Response
[vo or PinICL is PC0090109 and is currently udergoing testing at Calthorpe.
t
END OF REFERENCE 34469991]
Responded to call type L as Category 44 -Fix in Progress
the response was delivered to: PowerHelp
jate:09-May-2003 14:16:00 User:Paul Steed
i) Response :
a1 have spoken to the PM to say that the software fix was sent down and became
ctive on 07-May-2003 and so there should be no recurrences of the original
Iproblem. The suspense account issue being a procedural one; NBSC will tell
he PM when it can be redeewed. The PM was happy with the explanation.
4qEND OF REFERENCE 34490212]
‘esponded to call type L as Category 60 -S/W Fix Released to Call Logger
Gdours spent since call received: 0 hours
LL PC0089918 closed: Category 60, Type L
Ime response was delivered to: PowerHelp
‘Date:09-May-2003 14:30:00 User:_Customer Call_
Date and time complete: 09/05/2003 15:36:01
EService Complete (Confirmation) Received
POL00112440
POL00112440
Development - Code
Customer Call_ -- EDSC
_EPOSS Deliverables -- Core.dil (version unspecified)
0 - Customer Call
F/149/5
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Peak Incident Management System
_ COUNTER. $60. Voo1-Voo0
Business restricted
0401130647
OUNTER $60_Vo01 1-000 ; I
360 F )PiniCL Pack
3-Jan-2004 15:48:19 User:_Customer Call_
ps C0098230 opened
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E jate:13-Jan-2004 15:48:35 User:_Customer Call_
e
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‘ALL PCO098230:Priority B:CallType 1, - Target 16/01/2004 15:48:19
3/01/2004 15:23 Call details have been taken from Andrew Wise at NBSC on
icelephone number stated above. PM has a discrepancy with his cash account
[for the last few weeks.
13/01/2004 15:25 uk951450
[anformation: The NBSC have advised that the4 PM can only declare the
[holding amount or 0 not a negative figure.
jate:13-Jan-2004 15:48:36 User:_Customer Call_
§83/01/2004 15:26 uk951450
Hnformation: The NBSC have been through the checks with the PM and feel
[here is a software error as the PM has negative fig
which he would not have been able to enter
43/01/2004 15:30 uk951450
information: In week 37 the PM was showing a surplus of £19.66 on
[front page of the cash account
(93/01/2004 15:31 uk951450
Information: In table 5 cash and stock he is showing a surplus cash
[figure of £42860.61 and a surplus chq figure of £116248.50
3/01/2004 15:32 uk951450
[Anformation: The cash on hand declared was £159109.11
§13/01/2004 15:34 uk951450
nformation: In week 38 the Pm had a surplus of £49.22 on the front page
£ the cash account
(13/01/2004 15:34 uk951450
Information: In table 5 of the cash account it is showing a surplus of
[cash of £41723.47 and a surplus of chq £225291.93
jate:13-Jan-2004 15:48:37 User:_Customer Call_
(13/01/2004 15:35 uk951450
Hnformation: The actual cash on hand declared th:
413/01/2004 15:36 uk951450
Einformation: In week 39 the cash account front page was showing a
surplus of £110.35
13/01/2004 15:37 uk951450
Hnformation: Table 5 shows a negative cash figure of £264007.28 and the
hgs show a surplus of £450554.92
13/01/2004 15:38 uk951450
Information: The cash declared for this week was £186547.64
(93/01/2004 15:38 uk951450
[Mnformation: In week 40 the front page of the cash account is showing a
Ishortage of £5.29
13/01/2004 15:39 uk951450
Entomation: Table 5 is showing a negative cash figure of £732582.91 and
positive chq figure of £896298.45
13/01/2004 15:40 uk951450
Hnformation: The cash on hand declared was £163715.54
13/01/2004 15:41 uk951450
s week was £267015.40
FE :13-Jan-2004 15:48:38 User:_Customer Call_
nformation: Week 41 is showing a negative figure of £60.78 on the front
age of the cash account
13/01/2004 15:41 uk951450
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F/184/1
POL-0109936
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information: The RU
[Informatio
user name provided is "Sticky" NBSC unsure if this should have
at
[pate
lime response was delivered to: PowerHelp
‘In format iol
land a positive chq figure of £1786304.77
Table 5 is showing a negative cash figure of £1636386.90
i
413/01/2004 15:42 uk951450
[Informatio
The actual cash on hand was £147917.80 and no chgs were kept
43/01/2004 15:43 uk951450
has been through the cash account with the PM and
tried to adjust the figures but they keep doubling up.
43/01/2004 15:43 uk951450
The PM is balancing on the gateway in stock unit AA. the
01 at the end.
43/01/2004 15:44 uk951450
Information: Please can the cash account be investigated
43/01/2004 15:45 SYSADM
pen OTT: Automatic Open OTI
be*Updated by Jane Kastenhofer at 13/01/2004 15:45:28
Jate:13-Jan-2004 15:48:39 User: Customer Call_
13/01/2004 15:45 uk951450
BASSIGN: Call # E-0401130647 was Reassigned from Jane Kastenhofer;
roup HSH1 to Group EDSCL
I) Call details
(Piagnostician name:
jate:13-Jan-2004 15:48:40 User: Customer Call_
[Customer opened date 13/01/2004 15:23:52
3-dan-2004 16:01:17 User:Barbara Longley
fhe call summary has been changed from:
11 details have been taken from Andrew Wise at N
(me call summary is now:-
©AD416329 ~ discrepancy with CA for last few weeks
[marget Release updated to BI_3S50R-Provisional
oduct EPOSS & DeskTop added
jate:13-Jan-2004 16:01:18 User:Barbara Longley
IB) Response :
ate:13-Jan-2004 16:01:19 User:Barbara Longley
rescan: Assigning call to Anne Chambers in ESC.
ITEND OF REFERENCE 36970694]
[Responded to
all type L as Category 40 Incident Under Investigation
3-Jan-2004 16:01:22 User:Barbara Longley
ate:13-Jan-2004 16:01:23 User:Barbara Longley
he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: An:
efect cause updated to 99:General - Unknown
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
Chambers
yate:14-Jan-2004 17:55:56 User:Anne Chambe:
FF) Response : F
‘Spoke to PM to get some more info (his number is f GRO i
Before he balances; he rems out his cheques (although sometimes 1 or 2 more
cheques are taken before he balances the SU).
He Declares Cash then Declares Stamps; then finally Declares Stock. On the
irst Declare Stock line; he includes any ‘rest home' cheques which he is
molding.
[Mhis results in a discrepancy between the system cheque figure and the
eclared figure.
Something has changed in the counter code recently (I think at COUNTER_EPOSS
0_3; released end Nov) which causes the discrepancy to be recorded wrongly:
othe cheque discrepancy; instead of being cleared; is doubled; and the cash
Hs also wrongly adjusted.
However I think the PM should not be declaring his ‘rest home’ cheques in
ithis way; even if he has always done so - need to get advice on this or;
jpreferably; get NBSC to explain what the proper procedure is.
[END OF REFERENCE 36978269]
Date:14-Jan-2004 17:55:57 User:Anne Chambers
Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
ate:14-Jan-2004 17:56:00 Uscr:Anne Chambers
‘he response was delivered to: PowerHelp
POL00112440
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‘pate:18-Jan-2004 12:58:42 User:Anne Chanbers
iF) Response :
[When PM balanced yesterday: I advised him to leave the Cheque line in Declare
tock blank - i.e. not to put the ‘rest home' cheque in there.
He did as advised - and the problem has gone away - Cheque line 2051 is zero;
‘ash line 2050 is £132293.61; which is what he declared.
[Spoke to PM and explained that there is a new software problem; so that what
Ihe has been doing for 2 years no longer works. He's happy with this. Also
Ippoke to the auditor who was onsite; explained that I had advised him not to
I
E
jeclare these cheques in this way - she confirmed that they should be put in
he suspense account; and said she would talk him through the procedures. She
felso asked about another cheque which was not being handled correctly (not a
[cheque received in payment nor a rest home cheque); I knew nothing about this
Jas the PM hadn't mentioned it.
[END OF REFERENCE 36982109]
[Responded to call type L as Category 40 Incident Under Investigation
‘“Date:15-Jan-2004 12:58:44 User:Anne Chambers
[The response was delivered to: PowerHelp
“Date:15-Jan-2004 14:32:04 User:Anne Chambers
ew evidence added - Summary of cheque discrepancies
:
:
Tkow evidence added - Full messagestore
:
:
ate:15-Jan-2004 14:32:05 User:Anne Chambers
ponse =
Information above has been emailed to Julie Welsh; who will pass it on to POL.
lease can EPOSS development have a look at this
At this site; since 3rd Dec (almost certainly as a result of the fixes in
OUNTER_EPOSS 20_3); a discrepancy (gain) on cheques is written to the
essagestore with Mode DDN. In fact 3 lines are written: product 2; -ve
lsalevalue; product 222; -ve salevalue; product 1; tve salevalue (sum of the
ther 2). Summary file shows these messages; and also what happened before
rd Dec.
HWhis is a nasty problem as; if cheques continue to be declared each week on
ithe Declare Stock screen; the numbers keep doubling. However there is a
imple circumvention and; as they should not be declaring cheques in this
bay: it shouldn't have much impact. But I think it should be looked at and
esolved (any chance for $602?) - might be instances whre it really does
cause problems.
[Routing via OFP.
END OF REFERENCE 36982993]
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(Date:15-Jan-2004 14:32:06 User:Anne Chambers
[Responded to call type L as Category 40 -Incident Under Investigation
“Date:15-gan-2004 14:32:10 User:Anne Chambers
es response was delivered to: PowerHelp
‘Date:15-Jan-2004 14:32:11 User:Anne Chambers
[Mne Call record has been transferred to the Team: QFP
JHours spent since call received: 0 hours
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[Date:15-Jan-2004 14:49:06 User:Lionel Higman
IMhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Mark Scardifield
“Date:15-Jan-2004 15:42:53 User:Matt Arri
‘Mhe Call record has been transferred to the Team: BPOSS-Dev
Hours spent since call received: .3 hours
“Date:15-Jan-2004 15:43:12 User:Matt Arris
‘he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Martin McConnell
Hours spent since call received: .1 hours
Date:16-Jan-2004 15:27:42 User:Martin McConnell
i) Response :
jate:16-Jan-2004 15:28:19 User:Martin McConnell
with clsStockFigure was not initialised (was moved from clsOutlet). Alas this
brill affect products such as cheques with SE:Out when declared explicity.
code will take less than 1 day to code /unit test.
[END OF REFERENCE 37299768]
POL00112440
POL00112440
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POL00112440
POL00112440
(Date:16-Jan-2004 15:28:40 User:Martin McConnell
[Responded to call type L as Category 42 -Product Error Diagnosed
Date:16-Jan-2004 15:30:16 User:Martin McConnell
Whe response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
6-Jan-2004 15:31:12 User:Martin McConnell
Whe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Matt Arris
efect cause updated to 14:Development - Code
IHours spent since call received: 15 hours
Date:18-Jan-2004 16:33:04 User:Matt Arris
I can confirm Development can fix this bug at S60 provided we get the go
[ahead this week (W/B 19/1/04). Can RMF please decide which release it wants a
qtix in. SSC has asked for a fix at S60; so I guess it's up to ITU whether it
can fit in the testing for this fix at S60
ate: 18-Jan-2004 16:33:21 User:Matt Arris
The Call record has been transferred to the Team: RelMngmntForum
jate:18-Jan-2004 16:33:22 User:Matt Arris i
Hours spent since call received: 1 hours :
Date:19-Jan-2004 12:43:06 Use
Request For Service
hone: 01226 274513 Diagnostician Name
Product Type: Riposte Product Serial No: Product Site: 416329
Customer Call_
Date/Time Raised: 13/01/2004 15:2:
:52 Priority: B Contact Name: Andrew wise Contact
Request Identifiers Originator: Phelp
riginator's reference: B-0401130647 Consumer: 16953 AIGATE Consumer's reference: E-0401130647 Provider: PINICL Provider's
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eference:
Date:19-Jan-2004 12:43:07 User: Customer Call_
Prescan: Assigning call to Anne Chambers in BSC.
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[Spoke to PM to get some more info (his number is [””"~GRO.} Before he balances, he rems out his cheques (although
: 9-Jan-2004 12:43:45 User:_Customer Cal1_
:
[sometimes 1 or 2 more cheques are taken before he balances thé SU). He Declares Cash then Declares Stamps, then finally
:
;
[Declares Stock. On the first Declare Stock line, he includes any ‘rest home' cheques which he is holding. This results in a
iscrepancy between the system cheque figure and the declared figure. Something has changed in the counter code recently (I
hink at COUNTER _EPOSS 20 3, released end Nov) which causes the discrepancy to be recorded wrongly, so the cheque discrepancy,
Enstead of being cleared, is doubled, and the cash is also wrongly adjusted. However I think the 2M should not be declaring
[his ‘rest home’ cheques in this way, even if he has always done so - need to get advice on this or, preferably, get NBSC to
[explain what the proper procedure is.
hen PM balanced yesterday, I advised him to leave the Cheque line in Declare Stock blank - i.e. not to put the ‘rest home’
heque in there. He did as advised - and the problem has gone away - Cheque line 2051 is zero, Cash line 2050 is £132293.61,
nich is what he declared. Spoke to PM and explained that there is a new software problem, so that what he has been doing for
:
:
i wa oe wo
:
[Date:19-gan-2004 12:43:54 User: _Customer Call_
:
Q
[B years no longer works. Ke's happy with this. Also spoke to the auditor who was onsite, explained that T had advised him not
o declare these cheques in this way - she confirmed that they should be put in the suspense account, and said she would talk I
him through the procedures. She also asked about another cheque which was not being handled correctly (not a cheque received in}
Fbayment nor a rest home cheque); I knew nothing about this as the PM hadn't mentioned it. ]
(Date:19-Jan-2004 12:43:56 User:_Customer Call_
[information above has been emailed to Julie Welsh, who will pass it on to POL. Please can EPOSS development have a look at
[phis: at this site, since 3rd Dec (almost certainly as a result of the fixes in COUNTER EPOSS 20 3), a discrepancy (gain) on I
Jeheques is written to the messagestore with Mode DDN. In fact 3 lines are written: product 2, -ve salevalue product 222, -ve I
3
3
3
alevalue; product 1, #ve salevalue (sum of the other 2). Summary file shows these messages, and also what happened before 3rd I
(Dec. This is a nasty problem as, if cheques continue to be declared each week on the Declare Stock screen, the numbers keep I
[Boubling. However there is a simple circumvention and, as they should not be declaring cheques in this way, it shouldn't have
Gmuch impact. But I think it should be looked at and resolved (any
cause problems. Routing via QFP.
nce for $607?) ~ might be instances whre it really does I
9-Jan-2004 12:50:37 User:_Customer Call_
ix for 97081 was to blame. Initilialisation of session effect variable with clsStockFigure was not initialised (was moved
ifrom clsOutlet). Alas this will affect products such as cheques with SH:0ut when declared explicity. Code will take less than 1
lay to code /unit test.
Date:20-Jan-2004 14:31:00 lser:Martin McConnell
i'd like to add that this can occur when a clerk declares any cheque short of
bhat the system has calculated; the fact that the clerk/PM in this instance
as going against normal procedure is irrelevant. Multiply this potentially
[
I
I
:
i
'
I
I
i
F/184/4
POL-0109936
several thousands of times over there could be an awful lot of ‘repair’ work
do when S50R kicks in for real.
‘pao:27-Jan-2004 10:16:14 sor: Tyrone Cozens
with
Date:29-Jan-2004 11:19:52 Uscr:Lionel Higman
Whe call TargetRelease has been changed from:-
BI_3850R-Provisional
Whe call TargetRelease is now:~
i 99-Jan-2004 11:20:16 User:Lionel Higman
‘he Call References have been updated. They are now :~
HPowertielp : B-0401130647
er : S60 PinICL Pack
‘Pate:29-Jan-2004 11:21:25 User:Lionel Higman
[he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Mark Scardifield
= :29-Jan-2004 11:22:03 User:Lionel Higman
arget release agreed between development, test and live support.
(Date:29-Jan-2004 11:35:21 User:Matt Arris
[fre call record has been assigned to the Team Meuber: Martin MeConnell
Date:29-Jan-2004 14:06:55 User:Martin McConnell
iF) Response :
\ fix is available in S60 stream to build
[BND OF REFERENCE 37479926]
[Response code to call type L as Category 46
[Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
“Date:29-Jan-2004 14:07:13 User:Martin McConnell
he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Geoff Thomas
[Date:16-Feb-2004 16:36:46 User:Geoff Thomas
(Bix now on DeLY Rigs.
:16-Feb-2004 16:36:55 User:Geoff Thomas
¢ Call record has been transferred to the team: AP System Test
:20-Feb-2004 13:41:10 User:dulie Havard
20/02/2004 13:39:01 - By Julie Havard
Routed to me by Geoff, by mistake. Routing back to Geoff as per his request.
ate: 20-Feb-2004 13:41:12 User:Julie Havard
he Call record has been transferred to the Team: EPOSS-Rel
[Hours spent since call received: .1 hours
_Date:20-Feb-2004 13:53:10 Usor:Geoff Thomas
the Call References have been updated. They are now
[ORIGINATOR : Phelp
owerKelp : B-0401130647
Fother : 860 PinICL Pa
"Pix released in WP17829, BI3S60.
(pate er :Geoff Thomas
[me Call record has been transferred to the team: Dev-Int-Rel
0-Feb-2004 13:57:25 0
:
:
3
‘Date:05-Max-2004 09:31:16 User:Brian Bradley
Imhe call references have been updated. They are now:-
ORIGINATOR : Phelp
[eowerelp : B-0401130647
[Other : 860 PinICL Pack
[Mork Package : PHY_WP 17629
IT Other : COUNTER_S60_v001-V000
:
POL00112440
POL00112440
i
:
i
i
i
F/184/5
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
)S-Mar-2004 09:31:19 User:Brian Bradley I
Response : 7
‘te:05-Mar-2004 09:31:20 User:Brian Bradley
[Fast-track released, please re-test '
IUEND OF REFERENCE 37765312]
Date:05-Mar-2004 09:31:22 User:Brian Bradley
(Responded to call type L as Category 46 -Product Error Fixed
)S-Mar-2004 09:31:23 User:Brian Bradley
the response has been flagged to the gateway team for validation
Whe Call record has been transferred to the Team: ITU SV&I
Date:05-Mar-2004 09:31:24 User:Brian Bradley
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
:05-Mar-2004 10:07:29 User: _Customer Call_
ast-track released, please retest
P
IIEND OF REFERENCE 37883369]
"Responded to call type L as Category 68 Administrative Response
:
ministrative closure for OTT switch. :
i
Hours spent since call rec 7
ived: 0 hours
jate:20-Mar-2004 10:16:32 User:Chris Hawkes
‘ALL PCO098230 closed: Category 68, Type L
The response was delivered to: Powerelp
_Date:20-Mar-2004 11:57:54 User:_Customer Call_
[Date and time complete: 20/03/2004 10:48
[Service Complete (Confirmation) Received
"pate:22-Mar-2004 09:08:14 User: Customer Call_
Mery
20/03/04 10:48 PINICL
EREASSIGN: OTI monitor reassigned this call from PINICL to the Action Group
IJHSHI as directed by the OTIReturn activity
§22/03/04 08:46 uk081610
EREASSIGN: Call # B-0401130647 was Reassigned from Group HSH1 to Jane
(Kastenhofer, Group HSH1
2/03/04 09:05 SYSADM
[ReOpen OTT: Automatic Re-Open OTT
[Pvtupdated by Tina Wigens at 22/03/04 09:05:49
(22/03/04 09:05 uk081610
REASSIGN: Call # E-0401130647 was Reassigned from Jane Kastenhofer,
Group HSHL to Group EDSCI
[Date:22-Mar-2004 09:08:14 User: Customer Call_
[PALL PC0098230 reopened by Customer Call_
Date:22-Mar-2004 09:13:53 User:_Customer Call_
‘paministrative closure for OTI Swit
[Date:22-Mar-2004 09:27:08 User:Chris Hawkes
‘Whe Call record has been transferred to the team: ITU SvéI
[progress was delivered to Powerhelp
(Date:29-Mar-2004 12:27:58 User:_Customer Call_
[EMPTY 29/03/04 12:26 uk951566 HSH Repeat Cal
Ispeak to Jane as was dealing with
his call previously 29/03/04 12:27 uk951566 HSH8 Information: spoke to
‘Dane, transferred RLM
RLM phoning, requests to
(Date:29-Mar-2004 12:31:32 User:_Customer Call_
[EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY OTT Astea OTT Success: An add has been sent to PINICL
(9/03/04 12:29 uk951450 HSHL Information: Have spoken to Pail and
F/184/6
POL-0109936
wwised that I will
call him back
be
ate:29-Mar-2004 13:03:55 User:_Customer Call_
EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY OTI Astea OTT Succes
29/03/04 12:58 uk951450 HSHI Information
chrough the findings of ssc
[phil needed this information for a disciplinary with the PM
dromorrow. Advised Phil that this is basically user error
[and 3rd line had advised the PM of correct proce
Have contacted Phil and gone
at
:12-May-2004 11:07:07 User:Simon Vaughan
[Paph, can you retest this? Sp
[tests for this.
3
:
I
(Date:12-May-2004 11:07:12 User:Simon Vaughan
[me Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Raphael Howley
[progress was delivered to Powerhelp
:
:
:
:
:
:
f
“Date:27-May-2004 13:46:54 User:Raphael Howley
(Be-tested on BTC3 fad 183611 20 counter.
ccount balancing - cheque was declared in stock declaration, and was
progres on through balancing as there should be no cheques
aration.
77-May-2004 13:48:05 User:Raphael Howley
he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Simon Vaughan
rogress was delivered to Powerhelp
77-May-2004 15:11:42 User:Simon Vaughan
sionel, this can be closed (successfully re-tested)
ate: 27-May-2004 15:11:46 User:Simon Vaughan
The Call record has been transferred to the team: QFP
iProgress was delivered to Powerhelp
jate:27-May-2004 15:13:39 User:Lionel Higman
{Start of Response]
Wix tested as clearing reported roblem.
[END OF REFERENCE 38115255]
Response code to call type L as Category 46
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
Date:27-May-2004 15:14:17 User:Lionel Higman
[Start of Response]
z tested at S60 as clearing reported problem.
[END OF REFERENCE 38115262]
Response code to call type L as Category 74
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
ate :27-May-2004 15:18:25 User:Barbara Longley
"product EPOSS & DeskTop Balancing added.
jate:27-May-2004 15:18:27 User:Barbara Longley
roduct EPOSS & DeskTop Balancing updated to Subject.
bate:27-May-2004 15:18:48 User:Barbara Longley
[Start of Response]
[pate:2004-05-27 15:14:17,947
ser:Lionel Higman - QF?
Irix cestea at 860 as clearing reported problem.
closing as 74 - Fix at Future Release.
S{END OF REFERENCE 38115356]
[Response code to call type L as Category 74
Iervice Response was delivered to Powerhelp
I
i
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
‘pate:27-May-2004 15:18:48 User:Barbara Longley
ALL PCO098230 closed: Category 74 Type L
J-May-2004 15:20:15 User: Customer Call_
An add has been sent to PINICL
ak to Billie as she may have some scripted
not
POL00112440
POL00112440
F/184/7
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
F/184/8
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
_Peak Incident Management System
Hl Deleted User -- MSU-Indt Mgt
C0141477
-- Business restricted
losed -- Administrative Response
ive Incidents/Defects
PCO141386
PCO141477
y
Call Type:L
call Priorit:
ffarget Rele
puted tos
U-Indt Mgt - Pooja Sujith
fe:23-Nov-2006 11:35:14 User:Pooja Sujith
Iresc250. Produced on 22/11/2006
shows that the TPS Total and C
e in the Absolute Value.
Ibsolute Value for Counter Total is g
ues for the Number and Abs Quantity columns are the same, but there is a
unter total
than the corresponding TPS Total by £14.8
jot sure which KEL is relevant.
Relevant report attached. Sending to EDSC for investigation.
similar Peak, PCO141386 was raised on 21/11/06.
[Date:23-Nov-2006 11:35:24 Uscr:Pooja Sujith
Evidence Added - ZPSC25¢ — 22/11/2)
JDate:23-Nov-2006 11:36:19 User:Pooja Sujith
[fhe Call record has been transferred to the team: EDSC
[Date:23-Nov-2006 11:51:02 Use
[The Call record has been a
eryl Card
Date: 24-Nov-2006 1
Reference Added: PCO143477
[Date:24-Nov-2006 14:31:01 User:Cheryl card
PCO141386
pn Bulk/PrePaidBulk. Credit and Debit figures appear to have
480; message for product 8058, SaleValue is -7.40 but Debit isI
to smartpost products 7967/8058 - By
doubled - message for product 7967, SaleValue is 7.40 but Credit
again 1480.
problem has occ!
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under
Hours spent ce call received: 0 hours
141477 and PCO141386.
red 3 times - see also
[Date:24-Nov-2006 15:00:10 User:Cheryl card
of Response]
nsaction was carried out on counter 1 on 22/11/06 at 17:05.
[End of Response]
Response
flours spent
Category 40 =~ Pending == I
0 hours
cident Under Investigation
Date: 24-Nov-2006 15:33:13 Uscr:Cheryl Card
{start of Response) FI366/1
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Ster exceptions found for this
Incident Under
io har
(End of Response
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
ate:24-Nov-2006 15:41:19 User:Chezyl card
of Re
[TIP file Ww’ z shows values of 7.40 being harvested, not 14.80.
[End of Response
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
JDate:29-Nov-2006 09:15:51 User:John Ballantyne
eviden d= PCO141445.zip - File will be encrypted and made ava e to download soo:
Joate:29-Nov-2006 09:16:09 User:gohn Ballantyne
lrvidence Sel£-Decrypting Archive Added - Messaq PsStandard Download this executable file and use the pass phrase
lehv2Le4a*wz{\$-htu to decrypt it.
G:29-Nov-2006 10:22:16 User:John Ballantyne
lbvidence Added - Application events
S-Nov-2006 10:26:18 User:dohn Ballantyne
has had the <Credit:> attribute written immediately before after the <Mode:SC>>
ge. We have not as yet been able to
the end of the me:
ge
art of Response]
so far each riposte me
attribute is seen at
lin the 3 cases seen
th the value doubled. Normally the <Credit:
reproduced the fault, but continue to try and reproduce the fault.
(End of Response
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Hours spent since call received: 0 hours
Date:29-Nov-2006 10:30:29 User:gohn Ballantyne
[Start of Response]
EL created: ballantj2547«
Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Category 40 ~
0 hours
[End of Response
Response code to call type L ai
Hours spent since call received
[pate:29-Nov-2006 10:30:44 Uscr:John Ballantyne
Ihe Call record has been transferred to the teal
Scardifield
[Date:29-Nov-2006 10:43:14 User:Lionel Higman
record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
[The Call
K
ly a very similar P
number
[Date:29-Nov-2006 11:16:32 UscriMark Scardifield
eoks related to 141145 (coinciden
Rich cially this
super
[Date:29-Nov-2006 11:16:43 Uscr:Mark Scardifield
transferred to the team: APS-Ct
Ihe Call record has been
Mark Scardifield
ard O'Neill
Ricl
©129-Nov-2006 11:17:14 User
‘Team Member:
ed to the
ll record has
[The
stack and is cur:
his on ot
ently under investigation.
Suggest this PEAK]
tRichard O'Neill
ate of PEAK PCO141145 wh
Date: 08-Dec-2006 14:47:34 User
Hhis PEAK appears to be a dupl
losed to that effect.
lis
Date: 08-Dec-2006 14:47:55 Uscr:Richard O'Neill
E transferred to the teal
s been
[the Call recor
jDate:08-Dec-2006 15:18:14 Uscr:Lionel Higman
see response from Development .
@108-bec-2006 15:16:22 UseriLionel Higman
been transferred to the team: EDSC
[the Call record has
F/366/2
POL-0109936
6:08-Dec-2006 15:39:18 User:Steve Parker
POL00112440
POL00112440
fhe Call record has heen assigned to the Team Member? John Ballantyne
Té-Dee-2006 15:40:52 UscriJohn Ballantyne
t of Response)
lo further reported error - no action required. Call PC0141145 is being used to prog
[End of sponse
Response code to call type L as Category 40
jaterie-Dee-2006 15:41:18 User:John Ballantyne
:19-Dec-2006 10:43:14 User:Pooja Sujith
1 pco14ii4s.
er follo Progress upda'
11 received: 0 hours
TI9-Dee-2006 10:43:19 Usor:Pooja Sajith
cause updated to 14: Development ~ Code
[Date:19-Dec-2006 10:43:22 User:Pooja Sujith
CALL PCO141445 close: tegory 68 Type L
[jato:06-Dec-2010 06:36:58 Usor:dohn Ballantyne
KEL ballantj2547X rejected: Not a valid scenario in HNGX
evelopment - Code
eleted User -- MSU-Indt Mgt
POSS & DeskTop -- (version unspecified)
eleted User -- MSU-Indt Mgt
16-Dec-2010 08:36 -- John Ballantyne
F/366/3
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Peak Incident Management System
'C0195561
Targeted At -- HNG-X 01.22.01
ive Incidents/Defects
B -- Business restricted
Closed -- S/W Fix Available to Call Logger
ITU SV&I
OCP OCP 25882
TRIOLE for Service 2091569
KEL cardc262S
Lorraine Elliott
PrescanCounter
Customer Call_
) 1 opened
entered are:-
bumnary:see call 2083169. pm was trying to tansfer out 4000 pds. the...
call Type:L
1 Priority:A
rarget Release: T86
Routed to:EDSC - Unassigned_
[Date:04-Mar-2010 12
Customer Call
IDENT MANAGEMENT
Raised: Mar 4 2010 12:33PM
sce call 2083169. pm was trying to tansfer out 4000 pds. the system crashed. pm was issued with 2 x 4000pds receipts.
incident History:
2010-03-04 12:33:39 [ Vasse, Anthony]
INIT : create a new request/incident /problem/change/ issue
4 12:36:08 [ Vasse, Anthony]
: Open Notification
08 [ Vasse, Anthony]
ansfer Notification
36:20 [ Vasse, Anthony]
d that the error should have resolved itself overnight.
12:36:41 [ Vasse, Anthony]
TELD='zcbflag' OLD="NO' NEW='YES"
o10-03-04 12:36:50 [ Vasse, Anthony]
LOG : pm is horizon online.
bsername CDI001
tock Unit BB individual
[fransferring BB into MS shared main stock unit.
t receipt came up at 1506 on the 2/3
Jom got two receipts for 4000pds.
they have the same session number on them.
Jession 2-192266 F/590/4
POL-0109936
the transfer
POL00112440
POL00112440
jessage at bottom of receipt reads “this session may or may not have worked
Itt will not be recovered. You will need to check its effect when you next log in. "
lat 1615 pm logged into ms on the transfer screen.
m had two transfers at 4000pds each to complete.
oth had the same session id.
537246
2010-03-04 12:41:59 [ Vasse, Anthony]
fru TELD='category’ OLD="RM
Migration issue
ICA.S Software.SD21 Reported software error’ NEW='RMCA.S Software.SD22 HNG M.
tion Issue.CB3 ENG
2010-03-04 12:42:04 [ Vasse, Anthony]
LOG : pm transferred one amount back to stock unit bb.
jession id 1-537252 at 16:16
transfer in slip for stock unit bb 2-192288
Jom did a cash declaration in MS that was fine.
m did a cash declartion in BB. that was out by 4000 pounds. ( a loss of 4000 pds.)
2010-03-04 12:45:34 [ Vasse, Anthony]
Ios : pm is not sure what has happend with a 4000 pds transfer.
jon is now showing a 4000pds loss in stock unit BB.
piease see details.
m had a system cra
fh when
he wa:
completing the transfer.
bo10-03-04 12:47:08 [ Vasse, Anthony]
Loc : pm had a number of crashes yesterday " unable to contact the data center errors "
Jom is not back in office until 1400 today.
2010-03-04 12:49:32 [ Vasse, Anthony]
IR : Transfer ‘group’ from 'HSH6’ to 'PEAK*
2010-03-04 12:49
Jzneut_en_rmg
2 [ Vasse, Anthony]
nsfer Notification
[Date:04-Maz-2010 12:59:33 User:Lorraine Elliott
product EPOSS & DeskTop -- Counter Common (version unspecified) added.
[Date:04-Mar-2010 12:59:54 User :Lorraine Blliott
fhe call summary has been changed from:
fee call 2083169. pm was trying to tansfer out 4000 pds. the.
[he call summary
PAD226542 pm was issued with 2 x 4000pds receipts
[Date:04-Mar-2010 13:13:36 Uscrihorraine Elliott
record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
was delivered to Consumer
: Cheryl Card
IDate:05-Mar-2010 16:58:10 User:Cheryl Card
[Start of Response]
on 02/03/10 on counter 2 at 15:04, the clerk attempted a Transfer Out of 4000.00 from stock unit BB to MS. Due to a system problem,
che Transfer Out doubled up, so when the Transfer In was done on counter 1 at 16:15, it was for 8000.00. The branch now has a loss of
4000.00.
It phoned the PM and explained that the problem was under investigation. The PM would like to have it sorted out before she rolls into
the next TP, which is due on Wed 17th March.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
[Date:09-Mar-2010 17:43:04 Uscr:Anne Chambers
KEL carde2628 authorised
Date:40-Mar-2010 08:43:45 User:Cheryl Card
[Start of Response]
[the PM attempted a Transfer Out of 24000. The settlement request timed out and the PM was logged out. Two Transfer Out slips were
printed, each with the following text at the bottom:
this session may or may not have worked. It will not be recovered. You will need to check its effect when you next login.
When the PM did the corresponding Transfer In, it was for ?8000 instead of the expected 24000. The branch now has a loss of 24000.
[The Transfer Reconciliation Report, printed by the clerk, contains:
192266 BB MS 2 02-Mar 15:04 TO 8000.00
i-537246 BB MS 2 02-Mar 16:15 TI 8009.00
Relevant cour
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
logs and database extracts are attached.
dent Under Investigation F/590/2
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Response was delivered to Consumer
@:10-Mar-2010 08:44:53 Uscr:Gheryl Card
Evidence Added - Database extract and logs for b
neh 226542 on 92/03/10
ate:i0-Mar-2010 08:51:33 User:Cheryl Card
[Start of Response]
After discussion with Gareth Jenkins, the suggested correction is to negate the duplicate transfer out by writing 2 lines to the
RDB_RX_REP_SESSION and BRDB_RX EPOSS_TRANSACTIONS tables, with:
h) Product 1, Quantity 1, Amount 4000.00, Counter mode id 7 (TI)
2) Product 6276, Quantity -1, Amount -4000.00, Counter mode id 7 (
[This should be done using the Transaction Correction tool. An OCP approved by POL will be needed.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
joate:4i-Mar-2010 11:35:17 User:Cheryl Card
[Start of Response]
IT spoke to the PM yesterday about the proposed repair.
the source stock unit BB is down by 4000 and has not been used since the problem occurred. The destination stock unit MS has balanced
correctly and has rolled into a new BP. Therefore I propose to make the correction by writing 2 1 records to both
IBRDB_RX_REP_SESSION and BRDB_RX_EPOSS_TRANSACTIONS to transfer out an additional 4000 from BB as follows
h} Product 1, Mode 13 (TO), Amount 4000, Quantity 1
P) Product 6277, Mode 13, Amount -4000, Quantity -1
\This reflects how they have handled it at the branch, and also matches the 2 records in the BRDB SU PENDING TRANSFER DET table.
Ithe PM is waiting for me to do the repair, then they will roll the BB stock unit into a new BP this week (TP rollover is next week).
(End of Response]
esponse code to call type L
Response was delivered to Consumer
Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Date+i-Mar-2010 15:22:14 User:Gheryl card
[Start of Response]
Advised PM to print a balance snapshot. Ran the Transaction Correction tool (BRDBX015). Advised PM to print a balance snapshot again
land she confirmed that it now looks correct. She will now balance and do 2 BP rollovers to catch up with the other stock units. Will
keep call open until she has rolled into a new TP (17th March).
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
esponse was delivered to Consum
[Date:di-Mar-2010 17:26:59 Uscr:Gheryl Card
vidence Added - SQL updates and output from the TC tool
joateri2-Mar-2010 16:54:08 Uscr:Gheryl Card
[Start of Response]
ked the BRDB DAILY SUMMARY table, which would have been populated overnight, and this shows the Transfer Out of 4000.00 against
3
che
roducts 1 and 6277 for stock unit
[End of Response]
esponse code to call type L
Response was delivered to Consumer
Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
[Date:2-Mar-2010 17:25:00 User :Cheryl Card
Whe call Priority has been changed from A
Ihe call Priority is now B
[Date:i2-Mar-2010 17:25:18 User:Gheryl card
[Start of Response]
Reducing priority to B now that the repair has be
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
Response was delivered to Consumer
successfully done.
[Date:15-Mar-2010 12:29:40 User :Cheryl card
[Start of Response]
bn 02/03/10 between 15:03 and 15:06, on counter 2, the PM attempted to do a Transfer Out of 4000.00 cash from stock unit BB to MS.
[the settlement request timed out and the PM was logged out. Two Transfer Out slips were printed, each with the following text at the
bottom:
This se:
in may or may not have worked. It will not be recovered. You will need to check its effect when you next login.
BAL logs show 2 instances of:
RequestEvent... for BasketSett lementService/SettleTransferOuthas timed out but
executing. Ignor
ng timeout
F/590/3
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
@ entry should have been written. This
ion tool).
fiwo entries for 4000.00 were written to table BRDS_SU_PENDING TRANSFER DST, but only o
the branch a loss of 4000.00 (which has now been corrected using the Transaction Corre
used
Routing to 4th line for investigation into why the Transfer Out doubled up. Evidence (logs and database extract) attached.
[End of Response]
code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under I
was delivered to Consumer
nvestigation
Ihe Call record has been transf
d Confirmed th
d to the team: xCtr_GDC
t this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
[Oate:i5-Mar-2010 12:34:08 User:Suresh Chitikela
sferred to the team: xCtr_CSM GDC
Ihe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
progress was delivered to Consumer
fhe Call record has been tra
Jbate:45-Mar-2010 18:11:16 User:Steven Porter
[Start of Response]
This looks like it would need to go into HNGX Rl at some point, and could not wait for R2.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Inves
Response was delivered to Consumer
joateri?-Mar-2010 07:14:46 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
When the BAL service is timed out, the data used to commit to the database before.
With the release of PC0194893 in CTRO25 10 HOTFIX, which resolved the issue of a transaction commiting data once a request has timed
ut. The fix will rollback the dat:
Je are trying to reproduce the issue in CTRO24 04 HOTFIX to get the receipt twice and check the db if the transaction data is
committed and check the same in CTR025 10 HOTFIX to find the transaction data not getting committed.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
©1i7-Maz-2010 08:34:18 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
Branch used to reproduce the issue : CTRO24 04 HOTFIX
steps to reproduc
Run the OSR in debug mode setting breakpoints.
jbo the transfer out in counter and hit settle to hit the break
Let the request timeout.
HSG10010 will be displayed on CTR.
Jit Retry and let the request timeout for the second time.
on MSG10010.
11 print two transfer out receipt with same session id.
sfully completing the printing of second receipt, ctr logs off.
It am able to produce two receipts for the same transfer out transaction and found the transaction details in
jordb_su_pending_transfer_det and brdb_su_pending_transfer
fer contac cate of PC0194893.
JPco194893 wi
ig OSR team, found that this
nt to release in CTRO2
ssue is a dupl
)_10_HOTFIX
lot able to reproduce the issue in CTRO25_10_ HOTFIX.
when BAL request is timedout, data is not committed to the database.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -
Response was delivered to Consumer
ending -- Incident Under
Date:17-Mar-2010 08:34:30 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[fhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Suresh Chitikela
progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:i7-Mar-2010 08:46:52 Uscr:Suresh Chitikela
(Start of Response]
when the request timedout BAL used to commit the data to databse.This has been addressed as part of peak PCO194893.
lanalysis looks fine
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consum
F/590/4
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
[ateri7-Mar-2010 08:49:33 User:Suresh Chitikela
ction placed on 7 Ctr_OSR_SME, User:Steven Porter
[Date:i7-Mar-2010 14:05:17 UseriMartin Tonge
[Start of Response]
jot totally convinced you have re-created what occured in live. You are r
ifferent to what occured in live.
ng breakpoints on the settlement request. This is
lh: Settlement requests have journal entries and in your test scenario the second request would have failed because the fisrt request
jould have commited a journal entry and you would have a duplicate entry.
lz: In live one of the settlements would have failed be:
se of the journal entry - if this was a genuine retry.
can you check your testing and get the OSR message logs to show that you have recreated what occured in live. My conscern is that
somthing else has occured here. One thing that is bothering me is cash declaraion on with respect to 2 different stock units.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
Response was delivered to Consumer
cident Under Investigation
Date: 7-Mar-2010 14:19:54 User:Martin Tonge
[Start of Response]
lot totally convinced you have re-created this with what occured in live.
settlement requests have journal entries and in your test scenario the second request would have failed because the first request
jould have commited a journal entry and you would errored with a duplicate entry with the second request.
Inf as in live the retry was committed before the first request completed then the first request would have failed with a duplicate
journal entry.
can you check your testing and get the OSR message logs to demonstrate what happended. Although the DB was the tri
che new OSR behaviour may avoid this issue - I'm not convinced we understand how the duplicate occured.
er for this and
leeds more analysis. Please ring if it will to discuss this one.
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
JDateri7-Maz-2010 14:20:15 Uscr:Martin Tonge
faction has been removed from the call
Date:48-Mar-2010 11:45:59 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
Ik am working on this and will put my analysis here in a shortwhile.
las the fix is already released, I would like to request the priority of the issue be downgraded to C as we are trying to investigate
[che root cause only. Please let me know your thoughts on this.
{End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
[Date:18-Mar-2010 11:46:35 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[the Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_OSR_SME
ithe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Martin Tonge
ser:Chaitanya Pothapragada Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
Progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:18-Mar-2010 13:17:54 User:Martin Tonge
[Start of Response]
What is missing
lcomitted. only th
m this Peek is an explanation of the events in terms of the requests, how they were ordered and when any was
en can we qualify the priority. The assumption is that we have a fix. The facts are -
A settement request to timed.
2: A retry of request timeout occured.
ccording to the DB entries both later succeeded.
low unlike other reconciallation Peeks this stands out because only one of the requests are specific to settlement. They sho." -e
fiorked because there would have been a unique constraint violation on the journal entry of one of them and if we are not gefF/59O/Bis
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
ffhen this is still an issue!
so what next -
luce the priority unless we understand what is going on.
Need to look at the logs and work out the sequence of even
If you have genuinely recreated this issue diring test. We also need to work out the sequence of events and to determine why no
lexception was thrown.
[End of ResI
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
esponse was delivered to Consumer
Under Investigation
[Date:18-Mar-2010 13:18:05 UscriMartin Tonge
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:18-Mar-2010 13:19:17 User :Martin Tonge
the Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Martin Tonge
progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:18-Mar-2010 13:19:32 User:Martin Tonge
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
progress was delivered to Consumer
Martin Tonge
[Jate:1@-Mar-2010 13:20:18 User:Martin Tonge
the Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_CSM GDC
[fhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
ser:Martin Tonge Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
Progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:18-Mar-2010 14:26:04 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
es, the second request is failing and the first request is committing the data in db.
message is seen in the logs :
1:01,296 UTC (settlement_queue pool-13-thread-9] com. fujitsu.poa-bals. filte
= [(3407]- Retry attempted for a request that already succeeded - BasketSettlement
pranch code(3407]. No further processing required
s.MessageJournalFilter INFO [3407-2-vU-
ce/SettleTransferOut from counter [2]
Please find attached the mess
e logs.
Nhen a transfer out is done to another SU, the data is committed in two tables, BRDB_SU_PENDING_TRANSFER and
BRDB_SU_PENDING TRANSFER DET , but here the duplicate row is added only in BRDS_SU_PENDING TRANSFER DET which contains the details of
ithe transaction.
ram not able to get the duplicate row in BRDB_SU_PENDING_TRANSFER_DET in my testin
It would like to request for more logs to investigate furthur as to how the duplicate row in BRDB_SU_PENDING_TRANSFER_DET is added in
live.
i)Need OSR message log for the following request ids +
Hapa. “osr.log" file for the following OSR i
iiprpbal005:20560"
i iprpbal008:20560"
rpbal006:20560" for the day 02-MAR-2010 from 15:00 to
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Inve:
Response was delivered to Consumer
5:20 for the branch id "226542" and counter id "2".
ation
Date:18-Mar-2010 14:32:21 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
Please provide the below information to proceed furthur on the issue
k)Need OSR message log for the following request ids :
226542-2-xH-0215-2
226542-2-KH-0215-3
226542-2-xH-0215-5
ii)Also the "osr
I" lprpbal005:20560"
I" lprpbal008:20560"
["Iprpbal006:20560" for the day 02-MAR-2010 from 15:00 to 15:20 for the branch id "226542" and counter id "2".
og" file for the following OSR instances :
F/590/6
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Ti) DB extract of BRDB_SU_PENDING TRANSFER DET includi
provided earl
Before it was BRDB SU PENDING TRANS
INSERT TIMESTAMP PROD ID AMOUNT QUANTITY IS BUREAU
p2-MaR-2010 15:08:22 1 4000 1 N
p2-Mar~ 15:08:31 1 4000 1 N
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending
Response was delivered to Consumer
ng the full data of all the columns for the rows given below, which you hi
Incident Under Investigation
[Date:18-Mar-2010 14:33:37 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
he Call record has been transferred to the team: EDS
ser:Chaitanya Pothapragada Confirmed that this Incide
progress was delivered to Consum
external company with the attached evid
t may be passed to th
joate:i8-Mar-2010 15:47:48 Uscr:Mark Wright
User:Cheryl Card Confirmed that this
progress was delivered to Consum
Incident may be passed to the external company with the atta:
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Membe: card
progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:i9-Mar-2010 14:16:06 User:Cheryl Card
ested
@:19-Mar-2010 14:18:02 User:Cheryl Card
e Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_CSM GDC
The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
d evidence.
@724-Mar-2010 14:45:49 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
[Timeouts were the underying cause of the and that
lin this case two of the requests were commited and two
here is an issue with the 2
However the behaviour of the OSR
transaction back on a timeout.
railed and no reconciliation is
from CTR25.07
In this scenario a
required.
onwards
we would
tn consultation with FJ SME,
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -
Response was delivered to Consumer
ending
mits because this shoud:
like to find the root cause of the issue as to how the dupl
there were long delays waiting on the DB to process the 4 request
correctly detected that the transaction had already succeeded.
t have happened.
is to roll the
1 the requests would have
cate entry was committed in the db.
request to kindly downgrade the priority to C.
-- Incident Under
Investigation
[Date:24-Mar-2010 15:30:48 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
s per above, please downgrade the priority to C.
for furthur investigating the root cause of the issue,
h. For branch
Please provide
JBRDB_RX_MESSAGE.
accounting code = 226542, counter id = 2,
2 message journal record (JOURNAL_XML)
JOURNAL.
Response was delivered to Consum
incase, if there are two records existing for the same
2. Also, provide the BAL request logs/message journal reco:
previous (3192265) and next (3192267) JSN requests
thanks.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending --
request to provide the below :
JSN = 3192266
in
JSN, pls provide both.
for
Date:24-Mar-2010 15:35:54 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[The Call record has been transferred to the team: EDS
lUser:Chaitanya Pothapragada Confirmed that thi:
progress was delivered to Consumer
Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
Date: 24-Mar-2010 15:37:38 User:Cheryl Card
he call Priority has been ged from B
the call Priority is now
\Date:24-Maxr-2010 15:50:00 Use::Darran Avenell
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
Cheryl Card
F/590/7
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
[Progress was delivered to consumer
Date? 25-Mar-2010 14:31:31 User:_Customer Call_
joiced Cheryl Card (SSC) and advised on the latest update in the call she stat
append befo:
POL are want to know why this has happend? - why does it keep happening
[Thanks
she was going to check if it was the same thing that
you advise on this.
[Date:25-Mar-2010 16:26:58 User :Cheryl card
[Start of Response]
Have checked the logs and it does not appear to be a system error. Checked the buttonpress details in the Post0ffieCounter log and
[this shows that the clerk:
pressed Enter to select the transfer
pressed Print to print the sfer In slip
nsfer - which also prints the
lbressed Enter to accept the tr
ansfer In slip.
It checked the relevant database tables and they look consistent. Phoned the PM to explain why the Transfer In slip was printed twice.
she maintains that the stock unit is now down by 182 agreed to do further checks tomorrow.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L a
jesponse was delivered to Con
Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Gte:26-Mar-2010 11:56:43 User :Gheryl Card
[Start of Respon:
transaction to the value of 182.00 was done in stock unit OOH on counter 1, on 20/03/10 at 09:23. A Transfer Out of 182.00 from oH
to AA was done immediately afterwards.
Ihe corresponding Transfer In of 182.00 was done on counter 2 at 09:24.
A Balance Snapshot for OOH was done on counter 1 at 09:27 showing zero cash. The PM has confirmed that this is as expected.
lA Balance Snapshot for AA was done on counter 2 at 12:17 showing 3285.01 cash. The previous balance snapshot was done on a previous
lay. I phoned the PM and suggested she contact the NBSC to see if the transactions carried about between the 2 balance snapshots can
© checked.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -
Response was delivered to Consumer
Pending dent Under Investigation
\Date:27-Mar-2010 10:35:59 User:Cheryl Card
Evidence Added - Extracts from Journal and BAL logs
Date:27-Mar-2010 10:40:24 User:Cheryl Card
[Start of Response]
Extracts from Journal and BAL logs attached as requested by Chaitanya Pothapragada
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
oate:27-Mar-2010 10:40:58 User:Gheryl Card
[The Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_CSM_GDC
[he Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
ser:Cheryl Card Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
lprog: was delivered to Consumer
[Date:4-Apr-2010 16:21:19 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[sta. onse}
to provide a few more logs to investigate the root cause of the issue
lec0195561 is now routed to you.
Ye need osr.log for lprpbal005:20560 & Iprpbal010:20559 from 15:04 to 15:10 for the day, 2010-03-02.
1so, please run the query below and provide us the result :
SELECT insert_timestamp
[FROM brdb_rx_message_journal
WHERE branch accounting code = 226542
ND journal_seq_number = 3192266
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -:
Response was delivered to Consumer
Incident Under Investi:
Pending
Joate:44-Apr-2010 16:21:51 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
Ihe Call record has been transferred to the team: EDSC
ser:Chaitanya Pothapragada Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
progress was delivered to Consumer
F/590/8_
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
[ater IS-Apr-2010 12:35:50 User:Anne Chambers
jrvidence Added - OSRlog extracts
[Jater15-Apr-2010 12:39:16 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
SELECT insert_timestamp
[FROM brdb_rx_message_journal
WHERE branch accounting code = 226542
IND journal_Seq_number = 3192266
found nothing because the journal entries are not kept for long on the database.
can't see that it includes the brdb insert timestamp.
ve found the journal entry in theaudit file but I
It ran a similar check on brdb_rx_rep_session_data; the insert timestamp of the 2 messages was 02-MAR-10 15:08:22.4782
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
[Date:15-Apr-2010 12:51:53 Uscr:Lorraine Elliott
[The Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_CSM_GDC
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
lser:Lorraine Elliott Confirmed that this Incident be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
progress was delivered to Consumer
[Date:22-Apr-2010 09:58:59 User:Cheryl Card
[the call Priority has been changed from C
[the call Priority is now B
[Jate:22-Apr-2010 10:00:46 User:Cheryl card
[Start of Response]
hanging priority to B - since this involves a loss of 4000.00 cash and POL are now concerned that this problem may reoccur.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
esponse was delivered to Consumer
[Date:22-Apr-2010 15:35:54 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
It have gone through the counter logs, OSR logs and the DB dumps provided in the peak. Lets analyze this from the scratch.
beak has been raised when a clerk attempted a Transfer Out of 4000.00 from stock unit BB to MS. Due to a system problem, the Transfer
ut doubled up, so when the Transfer In was done on counter 1 at 16:15, it was for 8000.00. The branch now has a loss of 4000.00.
It checked the counter logs and analyzed that the request ?BasketSett lementService/SettleTransferOut? with reque
fo215-22 (with JSN 3192266) has timed out. But note that in the BAL/OSR side this request was ignored by the ti
continued to execute and hence updated the table.
te id 2226542-2-xH-
e out monitor and
ce in the counter side the request was timed out, PM has retried the same request 3 more times with request ids (226542-2-XH-0215-
15-4, 226542-2-XH-0215-5).
since the first request 226542-2-xB-0215-2, updated the DB tables, the following retries should fail in the Message Journal Filter
itself. In this filter, system will check whether the JSN entry is already exists in the Journal table. Retried requests (226542-2-xH
[0215-4 and 226542-2-xH-0215-5) were failed with the same reason, since there already exists journal record due to 226542-2-xH-0215-2.
But, I have noticed that the retried request with id ?226542-2-XH-0215-3? was ignored by time out monitor in the BAL side and
continued to execute. But from the osr.log file and OSR message log, I couldn?t find this request was failed due to the duplicate JSN
record in the journal table (which was expected and the normal behavior of OSR), didn?t happen in this case.
It have requested for the journal table dump, to check whether duplicate JSN entries exists
ouldn?t find any duplicates.
in the table. But from the DB dump, T
lrven I have requested OSR logs for to investigate further. I didn?t get any clue on the request ?226542-2-xH-0215-3?. I could only
lable to see the following in the osr.log file.
2010-03-02 15:05:18,536 UTC lprpbald10:20559 {time _out_thread] com.fujitsu.poa.bal.osr.event .RequestEvent INFO [226542-2-XH-0215-3] -
U- Event :com. fujitsu.poa.bal.osr.event.RequestEvent@5d0efe for BasketSettlementService/SettleTransferOuthas timed out but is
lexecuting. Ignoring timeout-@@-
[The OSR message log shows the following log:
bo10-03-02 15:04:48,280 UTC Iprpbal010:20559 [httpWorkerThread-20559-9] message logger INFO [226542-2-XH-0215-3] - []- Request
Received: Uri (BasketSettlementService/SettleTransferOut]: Request [user-agent: Jakarta Commons-HttpClient/3.0.1
bontent-length: 1170
retry: true
imeout: 30000
bontent-encoding: gzip
host: vbal001:9000
ceqmessageid: 226542-2-KH-02
:ccept-encoding: gzip
kontent-type: text/xml
buthorization-signaturet
ball? fBegQf0/WGkTGP26PkwRN /xb+g7kixhenZMoU £XLuTYWC [pUMa9CrxZOhLZ0CkxOsT1tN4c9ZRIUCRVI'ySipeGEbyRIMUBS /42aFCeZ9CUcTPOSt-+Veng7\ 2a
[ Yod4TUSRGg/ 8JVWdg7£2wgZbjuh1gF 4 jaNz40= F/590/9
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Te TISNT3192260): Request length[5750)—ee—
2010-03-02 15:08
8,369 UTC lprpbald10:20559 [settlement queue pool-13-thread-37] message logger INFO [226542-2-xH-0215-3] - (226542)
Request Complete: Status[Response Sent]: uri[BasketSettlementService/SettleTransferOut]: Response length[143] : Duration{240090]-@¢-
It suspect there must be something gone wrong with this request i.e. 226542-2-KH-0215-3. But unfortunately no clue on this. I am not
sure why this might have happened. Normally, since this is a retried one it should have failed at the Jour
But from the DB dump, in the BRDB_SU_PENDING_TRANSFER_DET table we had 2 records as follows.
INSERT TIMESTAMP PROD ID AMOUNT QUANTITY IS BUREAU
p2-MAR-2010 15:0 1 4000
o2-MAR-2010 15:0 1
so, we can see that the insert time stamp is different for these 2 records and hence it might have entered from 2 different requests.
It have no doubt that one of the records was inserted by the request id ?226542-2-xH-0215-2?, which is the original request. But I am
@ how the second record was inserted. But I have doubt on the retried request ?226542-2-XH-0215-3?, wh
filter stage.
ce there wasn?t any evidence which shows that 2 txn has happened and up
so, I would request you to suggest on this, 5
tables.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- dent Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
\Jate:22-Apr-2010 15:50:33 User:Tyrone Cozens
[The call Target Release has been moved to Targeted At -- HNG-X 01.22.01
Date:@2-Apr-2010 15:50:42 Usori@yrone Cozens
[Start of Response]
futhorised for 01.22.01.00 as agreed in RMF
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 56 -- Pending -- Live Fix Authorised
Response was delivered to Consumer
[Dar
Action placed on
723-Apr-2010 08:17:31 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
BS Ctr_OSR_SME, User:Martin Tonge
[Jate:23-Apr-2010 08:32:25 User:Martin Tonge
[Start of Response]
It think we have done as much as we can on this one. In conclusion although we haven't been able to totally explain the beha
risk of this type Peek occuring again has been minimised in live due to a change of behaviour in the BAL with respect to
transactions. PCO194893 in CTRO25_10_ HOTFIX will not allow any timed out request to commit. The timeout ence of thi
ithe underlying cause.
dour, the
Peek and
[This may now be marked as a duplicate of PC0194893.
(End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 56 -- Pending -- Live Fix Authoris:
kesponse was delivered to Consumer
\Date:23-Apr-2010 08:32:30 UseriMartin Tonge
faction has been removed from the call
[Jate: 23-Apr-2010 12:03:24 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
luplicate of PCO194893
(End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 72 -- Final -- Duplicate Call
Routing to Call Logger following Final Progress update.
Response was delivered to Consumer
Defect cause updated to 40 -- General - User
[Jate:23-Apr-2010 15:09:05 Uscr:Cheryl card
[Start of Response]
It am sending this call back with Response Re
licate Call’ results in a black ma
has already been sent over in a p:
‘losing a call as against me. It basically means that I should not have sent the call over
e the same vious call.
lpco195561 (duplicate transfer of 4000.00 cash) may have been caused by the same underlying fault as PC0194893 (banking
reconciliation}, however I could not have been reasonably expected to link the 2 calls and take the decision that it was not
necessary to send PC0195561 over for further investigation.
please close this call with category ‘Advice After Investigation’
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L as Category 52 -- Pending -- Response Rejected
Response was delivered to
F/590/10
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
703 User:Gheryl Card
been transferred to the team: xCtr_CSM_ GDC
ned to the Team Member: Chaitanya Pothapragada
User:Cheryl Card Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
progress was delivered to Consumer
Ihe Call record has been as!
Date: 26-Apr-2010 09:06:26 User:Steven Porter
[Start of Response)
Thus we need to ensure there is a KEL for this (either an existing one, or a new one), then x
urn to SSC.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L
Response was delivered to Co:
Category 52 -- Pending -- Response Rejected
ume r
joate:26-Apr-2010 09:54:25 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
ction placed on Team:xCtr_GDC, User:Suresh Chitiki
Date: 26-Apr-2010 09:56:34 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
ctioned to xctr_gdc for visibility of the peak to GDC in future.
[End of Response
Response code to call type L as Category 52 -- Pending -- Response Rejected
Response was delivered to Consumer
[Date:26-Apr-2010 10:02:38 User:Chaitanya Pothapragada
[Start of Response]
lpco195561 covers the fix for this issue.
[End of Response
Response code to call type L as Category 95
Routing to Call Logger following Final Progr:
Response was delivered to Consumer
-- Advice after Investigation
Jate: 26-Apr-2010 10:03:57 Uscr:Chaitanya Pothapragada
My above comment is incorrect.
lpco194893 covers the fix for this issue.
Date:26-Apr-2010 11:42:41 User:Cheryl Card
[fhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Cheryl Card
Progress was delivered to Consumer
04-May-2010 13:41:57 User:Cheryl card
[Start of Response]
[The problem was fixed in release BAL_SRV_OSR_ROUTING 0108 D048-D047 /
BAL_SRV_OSR_0108_D056-D055, which went onto Live on 04/04/10. I have updated XI
closed.
(End of Response
Response code to call type L
carde2628 with this information. Call can now be
Category 60 ~ S/W Fix Released to Call Logger
Routing to Call Logger following Final Progress updat
service Response was delivered to Consumer
Joate:04-May-2010 13:41:58 Uscr:Cheryl Card
CALL PCO195561 closed: Category 60 Type L
[Date:04-May-2010 15:23:21 User: Customer Cali.
consumer XXXXXX@TFS01 has acknowledged the closure
General - User
Customer Call_ -- EDSC
POSS & DeskTop -- Counter Common (version unspecified)
Customer Call_ -- EDSC
44-May-2010 15:23 -- Customer Call_
F/590/11
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Reported In
Live Incidents/Defects
FAD506246 remmed in ‘some currencies and the figures got doubled ‘up
DevintRel-Director ITU SV&l
TRIOLE for Service 2140316
8-Mar-2010 10:48:58 Uscr:_Customer Call_
‘ALL PCO196154 opened
Details entered a
ummary:Pm states he remmed in some currencies and the figures got d...
‘all Type:L
‘all Priority:A
arget Release:
[Routed to:EDSC - _Unassigned_
86
(INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Ipriority: A
ntact. Phone
riginator:
riginator's
roduct Serial
Product Site: 506246
2140316
a
i
I
A
I
i
I
i
E
(Date/Time Raised: Mar 17 2010 5:39PM
: .
E
E
I
I
E
Q
I
Hem states he remmed in some currencies and the
iref: 2134128. POL state this is a system issue.
igures got doubled up on the system - previous call regarding this was closed,
Incident History:
2010-03-17 17:39:14 [I Beavis, Sean]
HINIT : create a new request/incident/problem/change/issue
2010-03-17 17:41:53 [ Beavis, Sean]
izneun_en_rmg : Open Notification
010-03-17 17:41:53 [ Beavis, Sean]
[pneut_en_rmg : Transfer Notification
010-03-17 17:42:13 [ Beavis, Sean}
LOG : Call has been voiced to NBSC but are still adamant it is a system issue
a requested by POL will send call across for investigation.
#2010-03-17 17:42:57 [ Beavis, Sean]
PLD : FIBLD='acbflag' OLD='NO" NEW="YES' :
[2010-03-17 17:45:07 [ Beavis, Sean] :
hog : *******sPlease investigates**#sseesnss L
2010-03-17 17:50:53 [ Beavis, Sean}
L0G : Contacted SSC - they state there is inadequate information in the call so even if we send it across it will get bounced
back.
[Will inform Sandie Bothick and requested we need to get more information on this call tomorrow to be able to progress it.
2010-03-18 10:20:55 [ Howard, Rachel}
iL0G : PM scanned in her rem ouch on Tuesday 16th March 2010 @ 12:54
SU
ode:
ap: 12
em session 2/113504
ouch number: 370207858026
for the total of the pouch as £2,104.42
7
2
2010-03-18 10:36:10 [ Howard, Rachel}
{LOG : 800 Australian dollars with a value of £482.98
i
i
900 Egyptian pounds with a value of £301.40
F/596/1
POL-0109936
200 US dollars with a value of £1,320.04
(otal - £2,104.42 - which matches the pouch value
2010-03-18 10:38:04 [ Howard, Rachel]
0G :
2010-03-18 10:47:01 [ Howard, Rachel]
1LOG : POL have requested this issue be looked into...
(2010-03-18 10:48:01 { Howard, Rachel)
[zneut_en_xmg : Transfer Notification
2010-03-18 10:48:03 [ Howard, Rachel]
[WR : Transfer ‘assignee’ from "Beavis, Sean’ to
[Bransfer 'group' from 'HSH3" to 'PEAK*
8-Mar-2010 11:06:52 User:Lorraine Elliott
‘Mhe call summary has been changed from:~
Hm states he remmed in some currencies and the figures got a...
le call summary is now:-
(he Call record has been assigned to the
rogress was delivered to Consumer
‘eam Member: Sudip Sur
"Date:18-Mar-2010 11:54:58 User:Sudip sur
{Start of Response}
Ham not sure why this is an "A" priority call!
‘As this is not a business stopper, I am reducing the priority.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type L
Response was delivered to Consumer
i
:
i
I
Date:18-Mar-2010 11:55:02 User:Sudip Sur
he call Priority has been changed from A
he call Priority is now C
jate:18-Mar-2010 14:06:33 User:Sudip Sur
{Start of Response}
i have investigated the problem and understand what has happened.
This problem is clearly documented in KEL:acha42210.
with the Print option, but he then pressed Prev twic:
Iscreens as expected.
Elgnd of Response]
Response was delivered to Consumer
jate:18-Mar-2010 14:07:06 User:Sudip Sur
Whe Call record has been transferred to the team: MSU-Indt Mgt
brogress was delivered to Consumer
ate:18-Mar-2010 14:08:30 User:Sudip Sur
[Start of Response]
states she got one slip printed out with these figures showing (which is corre
[amen got another slip printed showing a different session number as 2113504
4§PADS06246 remmed in some currencies and the figures got doubled up
[Date:18-Mar-2010 11:07:02 User:Lorx:
[Product EPOSS & DeskTop -- Counter Common (version unspecified) added.
(Date:18-Mar-2010 11:46:20 User:Lorraine Elliott
Whe first Delivery Receipt was printed, but then the PM pressed Retry (instead of Continue).
Pouch 370207858026, £2104.42 (Aus dollar £482.98, Egypt Pound £301.40,
Jon 16th March, due to a system problem when the clerk used the Prev button several times during the Delivery acceptance.
[Whey cannot reverse this transaction. The pouch acceptance will show up twice in
[Passing call to MSU to inform POL via BIMS - POL may have to issue
US dollar £1320.04) wa:
[When she went to do her report to check the bureau stock (as a customer came in asking for foreign exchange)
Her system showed as having a value of £4,208.84 in the bureau stock which is exactly double of the original amount she scanned)
the NBSC have said that she has just scanned it in twice but the PM sattes this physically cannot be done
as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
POLES as well.
Gmnis office has also raised another call PC0195380 which is currently with development.
Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
2 should have said; This office previously raised another call PC0195380 which is currently with development.
This returned him to the screen
back into the barcode scans. Then Enter, Print and forward through the
accepted TWICE at branch 506246
POL00112440
POL00112440
I
i
i
I
4
I
I
I
I
4
I
I
I
F/596/2
POL-0109936
[End of Response]
[Response was delivered to Consumer
Dat 8-Mar-2010 14:25:43 User:Joanne Ball
[start of Response]
“Many thank
E
(Pinal BIS issued to POL.
(Returning call to ssc.
I[und of Response]
[Response code to call type L as Category 40 -- Per
Response was delivered to Consumer
“Date:18-Mar-2010 14:25:48 User:Joanne Ball
me Call record has been transferred to the team: EDSC
[Progress was delivered to Consumer
IThe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Sudip Sur
Progress was delivered to Consumer
jate:18-Mar-2010 15:48:44 User:Sudip Sur
[istart of Response]
lease see my previous response which explains what has happened.
a
I
q
E
i
(Date:18-Mar-2010 15:28:20 User:Mark Wright
I
A
i
i
I
MSU has issued BIMS to POL which should i
[End of Response]
Routing to Call Logger following Final Progress update.
ervice Response was delivered to Consumer
:
E
:
:
I
Date:18-Mar-2010 15:48:44 User:Sudip Sur
CALL PCO196154 closed: Category 95 Type L
Date:18-Mar-2010 15:48:44 User:Sudip Sur
Defect cause updated to 42 ~~ Gen ~ Outside Program Control
Date:18-Mar-2010 16:00:39 User:_Customer Call_
Consumer XXXXXX@TFS01 has acknowledged the call closure
Response code to call type L as Category 40 ~~ Pending ~~ Incident Under Investigation
ing -- Incident Under Investigation /
@ a Transaction Correction for this problem.
Response code to call type L as Category 95 -- Final -~ Advice after Investigation
POL00112440
POL00112440
Gen - Outside Program Control
3 Customer Call_-- EDSC
- EDSC
Customer Cal L_
_ Customer Call_
EPOSS I & DeskTop - Counter Common (version unspecified)
F/596/3
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
__Peak Incident Management System _
eleted User
ive Supp.Test
- Progress stopped
losed -- Fix Released to Call Logger _
EDSC
PC0197797
KEL acha5259Q
CTR_APP_X0210 V209
KEL achaS2599
PC0203438
ITU SV&I
2240422
Live Supp.Test
Lorraine Elliott
22-Apr-2010 14:
17 discrepancy of £167.17
HNG-X 01.00
Anne Chambers
714:56 User: customer Call_
ALL PCO197797 9}
peta
[Summa
as reported... On 14/03/2010 office carri...
ve: T
ority:B
Release:
to:EDSC
YP
Pri
brahim @ NBSC has reported...
In 14/03/2010 office carried out Trading Period balance for period 12. The spmr balanced AA and ended up with a discrepancy of
167.17.
incident Bistory:
2010-04-15 14:07:56 [ White,
HNIT : crea new re
2010-04-15 14:11:16 [ White, Martin]
Jzneun_en_rmg : Open Notification
= F/630/4
POL-0109936
in]
nt /problem/change/ i
POL00112440
POL00112440
fO10-04-T5 14:11:35 I White, Martin)
ILOG : Office is on Horizon On Line.
on 14/03/2010 office carried out Trading Period balance for period 12. The spmr balanced AA and ended up with a discrepancy of
f:167.17. The was cleared from local suspense as normal and the spmr selected to make good cash. At this point the system printed
ut @ final balance report for TP12 with the cash figure amended and nil discrepancy. Normally the system would then come up with al
wessage to confirm rollover, but instead went back to the screen asking how the discrepancy was going to be made good. Again the
lspmr selected cash and this time a final balance report showing TP01 was produced, again showing nil discrepancy but the cash
igure had risen by £167.17. All the rest of the transactions in receipts and payments were still showing. The spmr says that againI
instead of allowing him to confirm the rollover, it again went back to the sc
IMgain cash was selected
en asking how the discrepancy was to be made good.
d another final balance report produce, this time with the cash figure showing £334.34 more cash than it
should have done. At this point the spmr managed to get out of the screen (he cannot remember how).
2010-04-15 14:11:48 [ White, Martin]
FLD
‘acbflag’ OL
‘Not NEW="YES*
po10-04-15 1 [ White, Martin]
0G : On logging on 15/04/2010 the spmr produced a balance snapshot that showed nil discrepancy and again the inflated
[the spmr had logged a couple of incidents with NBSC, and was referred to HSD, reference 2238224.
[the spmr was bounced back to NBSC as a balancing error rather than a system problem.
2010-04-15 14:12:48 [ White, Martin]
Jos : Can this issue by investigated further and the office contacted about dealing with the issue raised. The office is currently
iin Trading Period 01, balance period 01 and are open to the public. The spmr is called Robin, and the contact number is 01572
js23301.
2010-04-15 14:13:06 [ White, Martin)
10S : Branch - Uppinghom SPSO
FAD - 351217
pate - 14/03/2010
stock unit - AA
User - RBROOZ
lode 3
jalue £167.17
2010-04-15 14:13:23 [ White, Mart
0G : Can you please investigate this problem? NBSC second line
mpleted their inve
tigation and they cannot find a user error.
2010-04-15 14:13:59 [ White, Martin]
leneut_en rmg : Transfer Notification
2010-04-15 14:14:00 [ White, Martin]
IR : Transfer group from "' to 'PEAK*
[Jste:i5-Apr-2010 14:17:58 Us::Lorraine Elliott
fhe call summary has been changed from:-
tbrahim @ NBSC has reported... On 14/03/2010 office carri
fhe call summary is now:-
IFAD351217 discrepancy of £167.17
[Date:i5-Apr-2010 14:18:08 User:Lorraine Elliott
product EPOSS & DeskTop -- Counter Common (version unspecified) added.
joate:19-Apr-2010 17:27:46 User:Anne Chambers
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Membe:
Prog:
Anne Chambers
ss was delivered to Consumer
[Dateri9-Apr-2010 17:30:56 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
Ir think that the date of the problem was 14th April, not 14th
finding some useful evidence...
[End of Response]
Response code to call type J as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
esponse was delivered to Consumer
March as recorded above - if it is April, I stand some chance of
[Date:21-Apr-2010 10:18:57 User:_Customer Call_
[the date is supposed to be 14/04/10
BSC has just advised that another office had a similar problem, although the
Isite and problem are below for information...
crepancy has now been sorted out. Details of the
ffice - Hucclecote SPSO
IFAD - 186523
pate - 15/04/2010
stock unit - 008
DEFice rolling from TP12 to TPO1
ffice was dealing with the discrepancy in the office following the TP rollover, and selected settle centrally. The office reports
lrnat_notning happened and they ended up doing this a further 2 times before they could proceed. This has resulted in the office
Lettling the loss centrally 3 times. This showed as such as the total on the final balance. The Trading Statement and suspense
j:ccount seemed to be correct though. On Monday 19th April the office reported they showed a cash gain of double the origina!
nd after further investigation a suspense account was produced that showed 2 clear loss from local suspense entries. We haF/630/2
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
this by clearing gain from local suspense, which should clear the gain i
the office.
Jabe:22-Apr-2010 11:26:12 User: customer Call
nal figures in suspense w
showing on AA su from
k1997.62 to £3995.24.
the solution we thought we had for Hucclecote SPSO, FAD 186523, has not resolved the problem, but has act
e clear loss from local suspense in OOH su of £998.81 which was t
and this shows twice. We have entered a clear gain from local suspense but has doubled the discrepancy that
lly doubled the
pe original loss
[Date:22-Apr-2010 11:27:14 User
Ne have now
Customer Call_
so got a similar issue with Kingsbury Road SPSO,
n the suspense a
D 277201, who also had problems when clea’
from the trading period balance done on 15/04/2010 in OOH su. They have ended up now with 3 clear gain from local su
count for £235.52 from 15/04/2010 on OOH su. The office reports again they had problems when pressing the assign
ij a gain of £235.52
spense entries
mean there is no long t
fra.
em effect on the branch figures? I suspect thou
ke some adjustment between the Cleared from LS account and cash.
there will be
investigations continue.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type J
Respon
Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
was delivered to Consumer
to nominee icon and ended up pressing it several times to get the rollover complete. The suspense account and Trading Statement
from the 15/04/2010 show correct. This office reports there does not seem to be any related cash discrepancy in the branch
[Jate:22-Apr-2010 12:31:14 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
Looking first at 351217 Uppingham...14 Apr, counter 3, SU AA. Times UTC
h7:08 Print trial balance report. Shows net loss £167.17
17:14 Final balance repo:
ash 60834.12
Receipts section:Short Resolved 167.17
payments section: Short Transferred 167.17
7:15 Final balance report
ash 61001.29
Receipts section:Short Resolved 334.34
Payments section: Short Transferred 167.17
17:19 Final balance report
yh 61168.46
Receipts section:Short Resolved 501.51
Payments section: Short Transferred 167.17
checking on BRDB, I can see three pairs of ‘Clear loss from LS'/ cash.
[the bal report saved for reprint is the correct one (produced at 17:14)
The Suspense account and BTS are correct, and only show the single LS clearance
Ihe cash figure for the next period in the opening balance table is 60834.12 (again as on the correct balance report) - does this
n effect within POLFS and they may ni
ed tol
\Date:22-Apr-2010 13:05:15 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
[The two extra LS clearances, and their cash settlement, are in the new TP/BP - so there will
IBSC tried to clear Huccleco:
expected. I'll look at that branch too.
It can’t yet see any!
forced them to clear LS again.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type J as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Response was delivered to Consumer
be a knock-on effect at the branch.
SPSO, FAD 186523, via Housekeeping, which seems sensible, but apparently it hasn't worked as
the counter logs to indicate why the system apparently went back to the wrong screen twice and
Date: 22-Apr-2010 14:13:22 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
I''m going to clone this call and send the clone to development for investigation of the unde:
riginal call to work out what needs to be done to get the branches straight.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type J as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Inves'
Response was delivered to Consumer
ying cause,
while keeping the
@722-Apr-2010 14:13:26 Uscr:Anne Chambers
all cloned from original call:PC0197797 by User:?
[Date:22-Apr-2010 14:13:51 Uscr:Anne Chambers
Reference Added: 3S: PC 197
Date: 22-Apr-2010 14:13:54 User:Anne Chambers
F/630/3
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
ate:22-Apr-2010 15:07:47 User:Anne Chambers
[Start of Response]
Looking at the counter logs, after they pressed the Stock Balancing/Report button the first time, there was a ClassCastException /
system error 0437 (trying to process a corrupt ReportingService response), forcing them to start again.
. The reason for the exception is understood (PC0197409
[This happened at all
an 4th line please try to confirm that this exception and failure does subsequently cause the user to have to clear local suspenseI
wltiple times, as described clearly at the start of this call. Can anything be done to stop it doing this after an unexpected
[End of Response]
Response code to call type C as Category 40 ~~ Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
Jate:22-Apr-2010 15:16:24 User:Anne Chambers
fvidence Added - 351217 poc and message. log extracts
[Date:22-Apr-2010 15:19:08 Usor:Anne Chambers
[The Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_GDC
User :Ani s Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the atta’
hed evidenc
ne Chamber
Date:22-Apr-2010 15:21:02 User:Suresh Chitikela
s been transferred to the team: xCtr_BAC_GDC
[The Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Suresh Chitikela
[Date:22-Apr-2010 16:17:05 User:Gheryl Card
52590 authorised
23-Apr-2010 11:27:29 User:Suresh Chitikela
[Start of Response]
incident under investigation
[End of Response]
Response code to call type C as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
ation message instead went back to th
[The description given in the Peak says they didnt get the rollover confir previ
age (MSG01012) at 17:15:13 where the pm clicked
But in the counter log file it is clear that they got the rollover confirmation me:
[the Continue.
abled but pm able to click Enter button here at
After click Continue on the message (MS y Enter button will be dis.
7:15:31.
01012) norma
From the post office
i)pm able to rollover Tp
ble to get the message MSGO1
2)at this point pm was able to cli
sh 61001.29 .
counter log --~
2 and final balance report for tp 12 was produced which contains Cash 60834.12 and at this point he was
12 saying stockunit rolled over successfully to tpl and bpl.pm click continue on the message.
k Enter button,which is disabled .counter generated final balance copy for tpl and bp! wi
shows
enter i can see below lines in counter log which i couldn't understand
2010-04-14 17 3,882 UTC [AWT-EventQueue-0] com. fujitsu.poa.ctrc.businesslogic.startup.InactivityTrackerBLO INFO - []
artTimert timeri::start-@-
po10-04-14 17:15:43,882 UTC [AWT-EventQueue-0} com. fujitsu.poa.ctre.businesslogic. startup. InactivityTrackerBLO INFO - [] [J-
start Timerl DETAIL: timerl::start timer: java.util.Timer@b87c51; -@@-
lafter clicki
jot able to reproduce it in my counter.
lot able to understand how pm able to click enter(at 17:15:31) which is disabled.may be this is causing the counter to behave
iffrently here.
[End of Response]
Response code to call type C as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
joate:27-Apr-2010 11:27:43 User:Suresh Chitikela
ction placed on Team:xCtr_OSR_SME, User:Jon Hulme
F/630/4
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
S187
‘Apr-2010 14:07:14 User:Suresh Chitikela
s been removed from the call
Date:27-1
fAction p
‘Apr-2010 14:07:37 User:Suresh Chitikela
laced on Team:xCtr_OSR_SME, User:Steven Porte
ate:28-1
[Start o
Why am I
[End of
Response
Rpr-2010 09:34:17 UseriSteven Porter
£ Response)
actioned on this peak?
ponse]
code to call type C as Category 40 -- Pending -- Incident Under Investigation
2128-1
ion h
Apr-2010 09:34:19 User:Steven Port
s been removed from the call
bate: 28-1
ction p.
‘Apr-2010 11:11:02 User:Suresh Chitikela
laced on Team:xCtr_OSR_SME, User:Martin Day
5126-1
Action hi
Apr-2010 12:39:24 Uscr:Steven Porter
as been removed from the call
ater 29-1
on
222-1
ves the
lrhis prol
ges
kjenerate
Apr-2010 10:33:39 Uscr:Anne Chambers
ly suspect that this problem is c ted to the exception that occurred at the start of the pro! = see my Peak entry
Apr-2010 15:07:47.
PM clicked the Confirm button (at 17:15:08) - but then they were unexpectedly presented with sereen ag: You
the final balance being reprinted, and Confirm pressed again, at 17;16;45 and 17:21:02, before they finally Cancelled at
blem affected 33 branches in all, a few on 7/8 Apr thi
were being returned. Th
de
nm more 14/15 Apr. This fits in with the BAL problem where corrupt
were no instances last week - the OSRs had been restarted and corrupt messages were not being
Date: 29-1
evidence
‘Apr-2010 11:15:14 User:Anne Chambers
Added - Session dats and opening balance
Date:27-1
fe canno!
Log
addr)
At this
May-2010 12:16:28 User:Suresh Chitikela
t reproduce this error in any environment.
we can not identify wha
d by peak PCO197409,
through the log files only we need to
rious of cor
dentify the root cause. From th
upt messages came from bal at the point of error which wa
t wen
point I am not in a position to identify the root cause and propose a solution
she: 02—
ME Help
ie are ni
‘Tan-2010 11:42:13 User:Suresh Chitikela
Required
ot able to reproduce the issue.GDC UI team
to reprodi
uggested me to Unread user memos deta
e the issue and i am not able to figure out the root cause from the log files also
jpatero2—,
Action p
‘Tun-2010 11:42:37 User:Suresh Chitikela
laced on 7 SME, User:Steven Porte
e102,
videnc
‘Fun-2010 13:45:30 User!Steven Porter
Added - SMB Analysis
2102-1
sz Anal
Jun-2010 13:45:53 Use::Steven Porter
ysis provided as attach
[Dater02—
ction hi
Tun-2010 13:45:58 User Steven Porter
as been removed from the
pate:03-,
peak PCO
release.
‘Tun-2010 09:42:19 User:Suresh Chitikela
197261 address this issue.Hence a fix is ave
PC0197261 is not tar
lable with PC0197261 .This peak can be closed once PC0197261 is merged in ta
next release F/630/5
jetted for any release as of now.it should be considered for th
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Date:08-Jun-2010 15:52:17 User:Suresh Chitikela
rt of Response]
gq the status
(End of Response]
Response code to call type C as Category 41 -
Pending -- Product Error Diagnosed
SPECIFY THE HNG-X PLATFORMS IMPACTED:
ves - Counter
[TECHNICAL SUMMAR’
counter Java code
TO.
‘TR_APP
PARTS AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE:
OWN DIMENSIONS DE:
JARE ANY OF BY APPROVED CPs/PEAKS in HNGX Release 2:
lone
RELEASE 2 IMPACT:
lone
DEPENDENCIES :
lone
JDOES THE FIX REQUIRE ANY MANUAL DEPLOYMENT BASELINES
JR
[DEV EFFORT IN MANDAYS:
li day fix/test - fix availabl
ON USER:
accidental double settlements.
screen freezes and hence reboots subsequently.
further such significant errors.
Fixing this will ensure roll-overs ca
this can potentially affect any branch.
continue accordingly.
IMPACT ON OPERATIONS:
[These errors are costly for SSC and 41S to investigate/resolve. The impact ranges from discrepancies,
hich can be costly to support to resolve.
HAVE RELEVANT KELS BEEN CREATED OR UPDATED?
ves
IMPACT ON HORIZON TO HNGX BRANCH MIGRATIONS
lo impact, beyond ability to handle call volume.
LMPACT ON TEST
Basic Counter regression testing in CIT and LST.
specific error scenarios to be tested in Development.
Development regression test suite to be run.
low development automation test suite to be provided.
RISKS (of releasing and of not releasing proposed fix):
k of releasing is low - a low risk area.
Risk of not releasing is fairly high - these is
lo pilot required.
ues will continue to impact operations and busin
8
LIST OF THE ABOVE LIKELY TO BE REDELIVERED INTO THE PROPOSED OR A LATER RELEAS!
hanges. Improvements to error handling to mitigate screen freezes, double settlements and
screen freezes and roll-oversI
described above.
[Date:i-Sun-2010 17:06:36 User:Steven Porter
Product HNG-X Platforms -- CNT-ENG-X NT4 Counter (version unspecified) added.
[ate:i4-dun-2010 06:19:19 User:Steven Porter
[The call Target Rele: n moved Lo Proposed
has be: ENG-X 02.10.00.00
[Date:i4-Jun-2010 10:19:41 User:Suresh Chitikela
lan we get these two peaks tidied up?
It suggest:
lpco198077 2 please route to Sateesh
lpco197261 ? please close as covered by PC0198077
It? like to do it this way round since PC0198077 is B priority, wh
chance of being delivered even though it?s the same issue 
lote that I do not expect any mor
ateesh is fine.
Hence
as PC0197261 is C priorit
PCO198077
work on either peaks ? as far as I am concerned, the solution for PC0198077/ PC0197261
has a bett
“F1630/6
POL-0109936
POL00112440
POL00112440
Sa PCOLSBOTT for 02-10 on thi
fF have propo
steve
\Date:14-Jun-2010 10:19:55 Uscr:Suresh Chitikela
[the Call record has been transferred to the team: xCtr_UI_GDC
IThe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Sateesh Nellur
[Dateri4-Jun-2010 12:50:20 User:Sateesh Nelluri
HNGX CODE FIX
FIX DESCRIPTION
i) Add a new boolean flag to WorkspaceScreenControllerBLO ?applicationStarted?
ki) WorkspaceScreenControll for the APPLICATION ACTION EVENT NAME, which sets applicationStarted=true
li:ii) WSSC BLO sets applicationStarted=false, when it fires the APPLICATION ENDED EVENT NAME
kv) Add a new method ?isApplication? which returns applicationStarted II 13InCurZentApplication()
) Modify Applicat ionHelperBLO.abandonApplication(needToGolome) to use this new method instead of wssc.isInCurrentApplic:
i) Register ScriptControllerBLO to APPLICATION ACTION EVENT NAME, to log a warning if PDL BLO stack is not empty.
if applicationGettingStarted is true, and the new UIA is not an application screen - then isLeavingApplication() should return
tion()
)
true.
IPROPOSED BRANCH
Jo2.10
COUNTER JAVA FILES CHANGED
HorkspaceScreenController
0, ApplicationHelperBLO, iptControllerBLO. java
OUNTER PDL FI
lone.
S CHANGED
OUNTER
lone.
ES CHANGED
IsHARED CODE
ES CHANGED
PAL JAVA CODE FILES CHANGED
None.
OTHER FILES CHANGED
IAPPROPRIATE CODE COMMENTS
ves
JpEPENDENC.
RELATED PROBLEMS
lone.
UNIT TESTING EVIDEN!
lone
REGRESSION
Ieco1se0
T CLAS
hPrematureApp]icat ionTe:
‘1_Finis
sjave
BACKWARDS COMPATIBILITY
/R.
[DEVELOPMENT Docu
lone.
MENTATION
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION
HELP
[Date:14—Jun-2010 12:51:12 User:Sateesh Nelluri
Evidence Added - final code patch 2.txt
joate:14-Jun-2010 12:51:27 User:Sateesh Nelluri
Evidence Added - PC0198077 FinishPrematureApp]icationTest.. java
Jate:i4-dun-2010 12:51:55 User:Sateesh Neliuri
ion placed on Team:xCtr_OSR_SME, User:Steven Port
FI63017
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S7i5-Tun-2010 10:53:55 Uscr:Steven Porter
Review
hanges have been reviewed previously - production code is fine.
[Test is OK.
@715-dun-2010 10:53:57 User: Porter
has been removed from the
call
ction
DateriS-Jun-2010 11:39:22 Uscr:Sateesh Nelluri
action placed on Team:RelMngmntFo
pecific and subsequent
whe
lsuch example) .
when any unhand
his wider i is addressed by the fix for this peak.
discrepancy was addressed
Ifhere is a wider, general issue in relation to error handling that is still not addressed, hence which can and will still cause
jroll-over and subsequent discrepancies. This wider issue is outstanding, and can also contribute to screen freezes and double
Jott hence further discrepancie
d exception occurs in the early stages of the roll-over process
in PCO196767.
(PCO196767 was just one
@:28-dun-2010 16:17:53 User:Sateesh Nelluri
removed from the call
has been
ction
[Date:01-Jul-2010 10:58:32 User:Christopher Hammond
[The call Target Release has been moved to Targeted At -- HNG-X
10.03.00
[Date:09-Jul-2010 09:40:28 Uscr:Sateesh Nelluri
[Start of Response
[End of Response
Response code to c
ing -- Product
11 type C as Category 46 --
sriSateesh Nelluri
eenshot
16-Jul-2010 15:09:08 U.
Added - 22 sear
Dat
vider
e on test 3:
ess. 1 zip
jDate:i9-Jul-2010 08:51:43 Uscr:Sateesh Nelluri
lbefect cause updated to 15: Development - Low Level Design
oy iSateesh Nelluri
d to the team:
©119-gul-2010 08:52:15 0
[The Call record has been transfer
xCtr_REL GDC
@221-ul-2010 15:58:02 Uscr:Pavan Vejendia
0.03.00
CTR_APP_X0210_v209
fied at 4LS_CCIT and workin:
has ssfully veri
been
Test Scenario covered:
Front Off
we're at
able network
s Postal
ss RM Speed bulk",
System error will occur
Now enable network
Press RM Speed bulk",
Enter barcode
ress Enter
Complete the pr
Current screen
wean
uld be
nt office home
in
[Date:2i-Jul-2010 16:13:29 Usor:Kishor GaneshRao
IThe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member:
F/630/8
1
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6126-Gul-2010 13:14:23 User: Pavan Vejendia
FIX IMPACT
ves
EMPLATE FULLY COMPLETED?
= APPROVAL GRANTED?
ODE REVIEW
ves
FULLY COMPLETED?
CODE REVIEW PASSED?
ves
ODE CHECK-IN BRANCH SPECIFIED?
ves
CHECKED-IN
PEAK REFERENCE IN CVS COMME!
PIX
D CIT AND REGRI
ves
KEL UPDATED TO REFLECT
res
SCRIPT UPDATED TO
LECT PEAK?
SUL
©:26-dul-2010 13:14:42 User:Pavan Vejendia
Reference Added: Product Baseline CTR_APP_X0210_V209
€-Gal-2010 13:14:45 Uscr:Pavan Vejendia
[TOP Reference set to: Product Baseline CTR APP_X0210 v209
[Date:26-Jul-2010 13:15:04 Uscr:Pavan Vejendia
The Call record has been transferred to the team: Dev-Int-Rel
lUser:Pawan Vejendla Confirmed that this Incident may be passed to the external company with the attached evidence.
JDate;30-ul-2010 11:22:15 User:Vijesh Pandya
[Start of Response]
Baseline has been processed. and is available for release to tes
[End of Response]
Response code to
11 type C as Category 49 -- Pending -- Fix Available for IndependentTest
@130-Gul-2010 11:22:22 User:Vijesh Pandya
[the Call record has been transferred to the team: Int-Rel
[pate:30-Jul-2010 11:43:49 Uscr:Vijesh Pandya
[The Call record has been tr:
ferred to the team: Live Supp.Test
S710-Aug-2010 09:55:48 User:Sheila Bamber
erence Added: DevIntRel-Director
[Date:ai-Aug-2010 17:47:14 User:Sheila Bamber
[TOP Reference set to: Product Baseline CTR _APP_X0210_v209
Joate:24-Aug-2010 12:12:59 User:John Budworth
Reference Added: Release PEAK P 3438
@:25-Aug-2010 10:47:36 UscriLionel Higman
Reference Added: DevIntRel-Director Live Supp.Test
25-Aug-2010 11:02:43 User:Lionel Higman
nce Deleted: DevIntRel-Dir LST
[Date:03-Sep-2010 15:05:06 Uscr:Sheila Bamber
F/630/9
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ffhe Call record has been assigned to the Team Member: Release to Live
15-Sep-2010 16:47:21 User:John Budworth
t of Response)
ounter release RNT9612 delivering Tivoli Product COUNTER_X0210 54 1
ger for closi
(End of Response]
esponse code to call type C
Logger followi
Fix Released to Call Logger
has now commenced roll out to the live sstate.
Routing to call
se]
happened intermittently since April but never at the levels
s thatno instances have been seen this fix was applied. Closin
[End of Respo!
Respons!
le to call type C as Category 71 --
Logger followi
ix Released to Call Logger
Routing to C
. Being investigated on PC0204396. The good
joate:47-Sep-2010 16:31:58 User:Anne Chambers
ALL PCO198077 : Category 71 Type C
evelopment - Low Level Design
eleted User -- EDSC
POSS & DeskTop -- Counter Common (version unspecified)
eleted User--EDSC
7-Sep-2010 16:31 -- Anne Chambers
F/630/10
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Pack for James Arbuthnot and Oliver Letwin meeting scheduled for 17" May 2010
This pack contains:
1. Agenda
2. Key Messages
3. Potential Questions
4, Network Background
5. Horizon
6. Post Office Recruitment and Training Process for Sub Postmasters
7. South Warnborough Case
7.1 South Warnborough Timeline.
7.2 South Warnborough Cash Holdings Graph
8. Yetminster Case
8.1 Case Summary
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1. Agenda
Attendees: James Arbuthnot Member of Parliament for North East Hampshire
Oliver Letwin Member of Parliament for West Dorset
Alice Perkins Chairman, Post Office Ltd
Paula Vennells Chief Executive, Post Office Ltd
Susan Crichton Legal and Compliance Director, Post Office Ltd
Lesley Sewell (?) Chief Information Officer, Post Office Ltd
Case review: Rod Ismay Head of Produce and Branch Accounting, Post Office Ltd
Angela Van-Den- Head of Network Services, Post Office Ltd
Bogerd
Agenda Item Lead b Duration
1_I Introductions Alice 5 mins
2 Post Office Background Paula 5 mins
3 Horizon - Background Lesley 5S mins
4 I Training — Background Paula 5 mins
5 Introduction to case review Susan 2 mins
6a_ I Review Jo Hamilton Case — South Warnborough branch Angela 20 mins
6b I Review Tracey Merrick Case - Yetminster branch Susan 20 mins
7 I Conclusion and next steps Alice 10 mins
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2. Key Messages
Agenda Item Who Key Messages
1 I Introductions Lead by: Alice 5 mins co Thank you for coming today
© People round the table are...
© We understand you have raised some concerns, and are
representing the concerns of sub-postmasters in your areas
© Weare open to feedback and we will provide you the
information we have available, our aim is to be open and
transparent
2 Post Office Background Lead by: Paula 5 mins ©. Start off by providing you an overview of the Post Office
© 11,800 branches
© Over 10,000 agency branches
o We process over 150 million transactions each month
© 20 million people visit a Post Office each week
o. Post Office Ltd provides full infrastructure support to all
branches with a UK-wide cash and stock distribution
system, product and marketing support, a helpdesk who
provide telephone support for sub-postmasters, and field
support teams who provide on site support.
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Horizon - Background
Lead by: Lesley
5 mins
Horizon is the system used in branch to process counter
transactions and branch accounting
Although we recognize that Horizon is not perfect, no
computer systems is, it has been audited by internal and
external teams, it has also been tested in the courts and no
evidence of problems found (of the nature suggested by
JFSA)Horizon first deployed over fifteen years ago to
automate the branch accounting activities
An upgraded version of Horizon was deployed 2 years ago.
Both versions of Horizon were built on the same principles
of reliability and integrity.
Although we recognize that Horizon is not perfect, no
computer systems is, it has been audited by internal and
external teams, it has also been tested in the courts and no
evidence of problems found (of the nature suggested by
JFSA)
Training — Background
Lead by: Paula
5 mins
Run through the recruitment / training process from
beginning to end. Key points:
© Classroom training followed by on site support
© Help desk support available at all times
o Onsite support available on request
o Contract is available to the sub-postmasters before
they sign it. Key points are specifically reviewed
Effectiveness of training is independency assessed
co What we are do to improve our processes
°
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Introduction to case
review
Lead by: Susan
2 mins
°
Occasionally we do get incidents of fraud.
Process?? Eg, audit, internal review, interview, if cant be
resolved then dismissal for crown staff, court for sub-
postmasters (need to explain why)
Public money, important protected.
Direct xx into the next meeting room.
6a
Review Jo Hamilton Case
— South Warnborough
branch
Lead by: Angela
20 mins
Run through timeline of events. Key facts:
°
°
°
°
°
°
Cash holdings
Training received
Audit findings
She was in personal financial difficulties
She was provided an opportunity for an explanation
She did plea guilty to fraud
6b
Review Tracey Merrick
Case - Yetminster branch
Lead by: Susan
20 mins
Run through timeline of events. Key facts:
°
Produces a cheque for £9,500 when audited,
explaining that she had removed cash of that value
the previous night after declaring her cash balance
on Horizon
A further shortage of £3,500 was also found at her
outreach branch
The cheque for £9,500 bounces
Miss Merritt has said transactions were being done
after she had been excluded from the system.
There is no evidence of this, however, events that
would have been done are the balance following
audit and the remittance of the remaining cash back
to the cash centre.
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Conclusion and next steps
Alice
10 mins
What are your thoughts on the meeting? Do you have any
areas of concern?
We are considering commissioning an independent audit as
an assurance measure, but in light that there is no evidence
that there is a problem, we need to determine if this is a
good use of public money.
What are your thoughts?
Next steps?
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3. Potential Questions
Question Response
1
Why are crown staff and sub-post
masters treated differently if
found committing fraud
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Post Office staff are expected to balance in the same way as sub postmasters. If a clerk misbalances
resulting in a loss of more than £30:
oO. Three times in a three month period (or less) they receive an informal warning
co. Six times in a six month period (or less) they are interviewed
oO Nine times in a nine month period (or less) they are re-interviewed an put on an
improvement plan which could lead to dismissal if no improvement is forthcoming.
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Process
Post Office applies consistent investigation and prosecution processes across our Sub office and our
Crown estate.
Once any branch comes to our adverse attention we would raise an active investigation and proceed
in a formalised manner. Suspect offenders would be interviewed under the auspices of PACE (Police
and Criminal Evidence Act) and cases passed for advice to lawyers. The lawyers would apply the
“prosecutors’ guidelines” (in reality CPS checks and balances) to the matters in hand and advise
prosecution, or not, accordingly dependant on evidence and not branch type.
In terms of investigation and prosecution it is factually incorrect to state or infer that we treat the
branch office staff differently.
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What is our view of Computer
Weekly
Computer Weekly is well respected within the IT industry and widely read in Government.
Computer Weekly does not have in-house experts; it relies on using expert consultants from the
industry at large.
As we have external and internal experts available we don’t believe Computer Weekly can assist us
in this specific case. Although there is no evidence of problems with Horizon, as an assurance
exercise we are considering an audit of our processes, data, and IT systems. If we do proceed with
this audit, it is likely that we will use a professional audit organisation that are tried and tested in this
area as we require organisation who have the reputation and the experience of defending audits
against external scrutiny
We will, however be engaging Computer Weekly as part of our IT Transformation communication
plan, and will pick up any Horizon related matters through that forum.
If when suspected of fraud we bar
sub-postmasters from the system,
how can they be expected to
prove their case?
Sub-Postmasters should be balancing their accounts at the end of every day. If there are any
discrepancies they should be investigated by the sub-postmaster with assistance from the help desk
and P&BA. There should be no surprises at the time of an audit.
In cases where an auditor has found evidence of fraud, the previous trial balance (which the sub-
postmaster has approved) will be the baseline record. If there are found to be any discrepancies with
that Trial Balance the sub-post master should have followed the standard process to resolve.
If discrepancies are found during the audit, the sub-postmaster will have the opportunity to explain
any anomalies.
Does the system allow sub-
postmasters to understand why
errors occurred, eg can they
interrogate past transactions?
Yes, they can go back and look at past transactions
The help desk and P&BA can also provide assistance
Sub-postmaster should do a cash balance every day so, so should not be necessary for them to
integrate vast quantities of transactions.
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Why are we considering Deloittes
to perform the audit?
KPMG are excluded as they are Fujitsus’ auditor
E&Y are excluded as they Post Office’s auditor
PWC are not recommended because not on Post Office’s supplier short list, although this could be
bypassed if required.
Deloittes are on Post Office’s supplier short list and have proven experience in this area
The audit could cost in the region
of £250-£500k, why so expensive?
The audit envisioned is a thorough end-to-end review of processes, systems and data which not only
could reveal potential improvements but could be used as an assurance for court future cases. The
cost is a result and thoroughness of the audit and the expertise required. An alternative, reduced
scope audit could also be considered.
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4, Network Background
The Post Office has a unique and valued place at the heart of communities across the UK.
A third of the UK population and half of all small businesses visit a Post Office each week which helps to make it one of the nation’s most
valued and treasured organisations.
It is seen as a vital public service but it faces a challenging commercial environment.
Over the last ten years footfall has dropped from 28 million customers a week to just under 20 million. This is largely driven by the reduction in
government services and a shrinking consumer mails market in an increasingly digital world.
Following the enactment of the reforms contained within the Postal Services Act 2011, Post Office Ltd is now (as of 1 April 2012) an
independent company. It has its own Chairman and full Board including non-executive directors. The Postal Services Act has made clear that
the company will remain in the public sector — with the possibility of mutualisation at a later date.
The company provides services to just under 20 million customers (and to half of all small businesses in the UK) per week
We have a network of over 11500 Post Office branches. 373 of these branches are operated directly by Post Office Ltd. All the others are
agency branches operated by independent business people or multiple retailers - typically as part of retail premises. There are over 10,000
agency branches.
The network carries out over 150 million transactions a month.
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Post Office Ltd provides full infrastructure support to all branches with a UK-wide cash and stock distribution system, product and marketing
support, a helpdesk who provide telephone support for sub-postmasters, and field support teams who provide on site support.
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5. Horizon
Summary:
co Horizon designed with integrity in mind from day one
co Horizon has undergone external scrutiny
o Each transaction is audited and protected to prevent change or tampering.
o Reconciliation processes automatically detects any problems
Background
© The Horizon computer system is used in all Post Office branches to process counter transactions and process all in-branch accounting
processes. Horizon enables sub postmasters to account accurately for each transaction they undertake in their branch.
o The system has been operating for over ten years. In that time around twenty thousand sub postmasters have used it in performing
many millions of successful weekly and monthly financial reconciliations between the cash they have in the office and the transactions
they have handled.
o. The National Federation of Sub Postmasters (NFSP), which represents sub postmasters throughout the country, has expressed its full
confidence in the accuracy and robustness of the Horizon system.
co In 2010 Horizon underwent an upgrade. The upgraded system was tested and has the full support of the NFSP
External Scrutiny
o Horizon and Post Office Ltd systems environment have always been subject to external scrutiny for both assurance and accreditation
purposes. Ernst & Young carry out an annual financial systems audit; an independent auditor also carries out a yearly audit to maintain
the system’s Payment Card Industry (PCI) accreditation.
oO The system and its Data Centre are ISO 27001 accredited which requires an annual audit from an independent agency. Horizon is also
accredited by HSBC Payment Services and WorldPay (Post Office’s Merchant Acquirers) and must comply with the VocaLink standard
for card payment transactions. In addition to these regular audits, ad hoc independent audits of the system are initiated by Royal Mail
Group and supported by Post Office Ltd.
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Designed for Security and Integrity
°
Horizon was originally built to support benefit payments against requirements from Post Office Limited and the Benefits Agency. The
need for security, integrity and a strong audit trail has been emphasised since day one.
Horizon system keeps full audit records of all transactions undertaken by all log ins — so that it is always possible to track back anything
that has occurred within the system — or at an individual sub post office
The system is designed such that all data is sequentially numbered at the point of its creation and is separately stored in a secure
tamper proof facility for 7 years — so that recreation of situations and track back is always feasible
Horizon requires clerks to log on, using their own username and password before any transactions can be carried out.
Horizon captures ‘baskets’ consisting of items sold and payments in or out at the counter. When the clerk settles a basket this is clearly
shown on the counter screen. Software at the counter digitally ‘signs’ each basket.
Each basket is written to the audit trail where it is kept for 7 years. Data in the audit trail is cryptographically protected to ensure that
its integrity can be asserted.
Reconciliation and Validation
°
Each basket is checked to balance to zero at the data centre; if it did not (eg because of a bug in the software) it would be rejected. The
signature applied by the counter is checked.
The data centre also checks that each basket is the one expected (i.e. the count has gone up by exactly one). If it is not, then, if
appropriate, the clerk is notified of the need to recover.
Transactions are reconciled with all the banks and clients, any discrepancies are investigated and resolved.
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6. Post Office Recruitment and Training Process for Sub Postmasters
Prior to appointment
The key extracts of the contract are covered at the interview stage by the Contracts Advisor. One part of which is:-
Post Office cash & stock
e Balancing/branch trading.
e All discrepancies to be made good immediately.
e Fraud.
© Cash for PO use only.
e Robbery/burglary,
© Error, theft by assistants, cashing personal cheques.
Following Appointment
A copy of the contract is sent to the agent.
An appointment pack is also issued to agents when they take over a branch and is explained by the trainer to the agent whilst on site.
The following is an extract from the document:-
The Subpostmaster is responsible for all losses caused through his own negligence, carelessness or error, and also for losses of all kinds
caused by his Assistants. Deficiencies due to such losses must be made good without delay. Section 19:
Once the offer of appointment is accepted, training dates are then confirmed.
Training
Training processes are under constant review and can be modified to accommodate a variety of circumstances. Training commences within
classroom for larger branches and is delivered in advance of the site transfer, or delivered at the time of the on site transfer in smaller
branches. The Ops Manual is used as reference document during training and all subpostmasters have a copy, although most of the Ops
Manuals are now on-line in ‘Horizon on-line Help’ which is available at every branch.
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Both the classroom and on-site training includes how to complete the office balance and the trainer is on site with the agent for the
completion of the first office balance, which is always a Branch Trading Statement.
Follow up support is provided to assist with balancing or any other training needs. This takes the form of:
e Helpline support at NBSC. If unable to resolve the issue the agent is referred to the POLtd Branch Support team.
e The Branch Support Team is able to provide telephone support to the agent. If this support doesn’t fully resolve any issues (and in the
majority of cases this does) then this is escalated to the Field Support Team.
e Amember (trainer/auditor) of the Field Team will also telephone the branch to assist and if necessary then visit the branch to provide
face to face support.
e Remedial training would be arranged following the face to face support if the Field Support Advisor felt this was necessary.
Is the training adequate?
Customer satisfaction with training is tested through independent research questionnaires collated by an independent research company. The
field team leader receives a copy of each branch feedback form and if any comments cause concern or if any Agent raises an issue regarding
the quality of the training or lack of confidence this is followed up by the team leader. There is currently a 95% satisfaction from a response
rate of 69%.
Initial training
All new entrants to the business receive classroom training the length of which depends on the model of the branch, plus 6 days training on
site. All new Agents also have further follow-up contact to embed training, which includes:-
e At one month from appointment a follow up telephone call to check all is okay and they are confident;
e At three months from appointment a face to face visit to check all is okay and observe the branch operationally, provide a refresh and
support as necessary;
e At six to nine months after appointment a face to face unannounced follow up which is unannounced and includes a procedural and
compliance audit, an audit of cash and stock
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7. South Warnborough Case
7.1 South Warnborough Timeline
Date Action
24/12/2001 I — Josephine Hamilton (JH) begins working at the South Warnborough SPSO.
21/10/2003 I JH appointed as subpostmaster (SPM).
«SPM assisted by Mrs Partridge. Mrs Partridge denies (in her statement dated 31/07/2006) having ever assisted with balancing or completed any
cash declarations.
1/12/2004 * Cash held increases from £15,000 to £35,000 (See Graph at 7.2)
to 1/4/2006
03/02/2004 I Unidentified loss of £3,191.00. JH requested hardship payments to be set up to clear this loss. (Payment deducted from salary over a 12 month
period)
24/02/2005 I « Unidentified loss of £750.00. JH requested hardship payments to be set up to clear this loss.
01/05/2005 I Warning letter sent to JH for rolling balance not made good (£724)
01/09/2005 I Second warning letter sent to JH for rolling balance not made good (£188)
05/10/2005 I PO migrated to branch trading. (Formal balancing every month instead of every week). No onsite visit provided, but would have been provided with
an interactive training CD ROM, a Transition Guide, a Quick Reference Guide, a branch trading calendar and the relevant manuals. The SPM would
also have been invited to attend a number of face-to-face events explaining migration.
° Records indicate that no requests were made for replacement materials or that the CD-ROM be exchanged for a video.
08/02/2006 I « Branch Trading Statement for trading period 10 (13/01/06 to 08/02/2006) completed.
*® — Statement shows a shortage of £6.74 and cash on hand stated as being £35,515.83.
06/03/2006 Ie Rebecca Portch (Retail Cash Management Support) contacted the branch regarding high levels of cash holdings. Branch paying out approximately
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£2,500 on average per week, but declared cash holdings in excess of £20,000.
SPM requested by Ms Portch to return £25,000 by 08/03/2006.
SPM alleged to have advised a NFSP representative, Kam Matharu, that there were problems at this branch. The nature of the problems was not
specified.
07/03/2006 Ie — SPM signed off on sick leave.
08/03/2006 Ie — Excess cash holding not returned by SPM as per request.
09/03/2006 I Audit undertaken. Deficiency (including cash and stock) of £36,644.89 identified by the audit team.
© Cash figure on Horizon stated to be £37,360.06. The cash physically verified as being n hand only £1,933.48 (a difference of £35,426.58).
SPM precautionary suspended as a result of shortfall. SPM requested to attend an interview under caution.
15/03/2006 I lzzy Hogg, solicitor acting for the SPM, contacts POL and offers to provide a written statement. Ms Hogg informed that an interview under caution
will still need to be conducted.
12/04/2006 I e Second letter sent to SPM regarding interview.
21/04/2006 Ie Agreed interview will take place on 05/05/2006.
05/05/2006 I « Interview conducted by POL under caution at offices of the SPM’s solicitors.
. POL provided disclosure of documents to be put to the SPM in the course of the interview. Includes cash declarations and branch trading
statements.
* SPM provides a pre-prepared written statement. The statement states that the SPM did not receive adequate training and that the operation
manuals provided were out of date. Statement also makes reference to an error for £1,500 which is alleged to have doubled to £3,000 when
attempts were made to correct it. The SPM was invited to confirm when that error is alleged to have occurred, but the SPM declined to comment.
Statement also contains a denial that the SPM has ever stolen monies.
«Taped interview commenced at 12:13pm. The prepared statement was read and the SPM then gave “no comment” responses to all the questions
raised by the interviewing officers.
. Interview concluded at 13.32pm.
11/10/2006 I e Decision taken to prosecute for theft.
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30/10/2006 Summons issued requiring the SPM to attend before the Aldershot Magistrates Court.
09/10/2007 Defence offers pleas to false accounting by way of mitigation.
19/11/2007 Hearing before Winchester Crown Court.
SPM pleads guilty to 14 separate counts of false accounting. This is accepted by POL on the basis that the losses are repaid in full by 25/01/2008.
Count of theft to remain on file until payment made in full.
04/02/2008 SPM sentenced to 12 month Community and Supervision Order.
18/02/2008 Cheque for £37,644.89 received from the SPM.
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7.2 South Warnborough Cash Holdings Graph showing cash holding for J Hamilton until March 2006 and then subsequent
subpostmaster cash holding
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
South Warnborough - Cash Declarations
£ Cash
01-Dec-04
01-Feb-05
01-Apr-05 4
01-Jun-05
01-Dec-05 -
01-Feb-06
01-Apr-06
01-Jun-06
01-Aug-06
01-Dec-06
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8. Yetminster Case
8.1 Case Summary
The defendant Tracey Ann Merritt (D.0.B ia
Yetminster Post Office, but also operated an outreach Post Office at Chetnole.
An audit was conducted at the Yetminster Post Office on the 29t" September 2011 following concerns raised by a former holiday relief worker
at the Yetminster branch in August 2011 over alleged cash shortages.
Mr Constant and Mr Gilding arrived at Yetminster Post Office at 8:30am and introduced themselves to Miss Lisa Porter, the daughter of Ms
Merritt who was sitting behind the counter having already logged on to the Horizon system and accepted the Transaction Acknowledgements.
Mr Constant asked Miss Porter when she expected her mother to arrive, Miss Porter informed the auditors that she would be in later on as she
had gone to the cash and carry. Mr Constant asked Miss Porter if she would allow him access to the secure area, which she did, and also to
inform her mother that the auditors were at the Post Office. Ms Merritt allegedly told her daughter to ask the auditors to wait until she
arrived at the branch before they continued, Miss Porter remained quiet until her mother arrived.
Whilst waiting for Ms Merritt to arrive, Mr Constant logged onto the Horizon system for the Yetminster branch using the Global User name
and password as Miss Porter did not have Manager Access to the system. Mr Constant then created user ID BCO003 and logged on to the
Horizon system, using that ID to produce audit reports.
Mr Constant also logged on the Outreach Horizon system for the Chetnole branch, using the user ID BCO001. No other action was taken until
Ms Merritt was presents in the branch.
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Ms Merritt arrived at 09:15am and Mr Constant advised her that they were there to perform an audit.
Before t he audit commenced Ms Merritt advised Mr Constant of a cheque for £9500 and explained that she had removed cash to that value
the previous evening after she had declared her cash onto the Horizon system. The cheque appeared to be with her outstanding daily
documents, when questioned about this, Ms Merritt stated that she meant to put the cheque through the system the evening before but
hadn't done so, and was intending to process it that morning. Ms Merritt explained that the cheque was to pay for ‘something personal’ that
had nothing to do with the shop. She explained that she had needed the cash urgently but was unable to get to the bank(s). Ms Merritt
explained that she thought she was allowed to use Post Office cash as a cheque had already been put in to cover it. She expressed that she did
not intend to steal the money and that the cheque, if banked would be honoured.
Ms Merritt confirmed that this was t he first time that anything like this had happened. However the audit team noted that the date on the
cheque had appeared to have been altered from what appeared to be ‘5’ (May) to a ‘9’ (September). When asked, Ms Merritt said that it was
due to a writing error. There were no details recorded on the reverse of the cheque and it had not been date stamped.
Mr Constant confirmed with Ms Merritt that he should expect to find the cash at least £9500 short when it was counted, she confirmed that
was correct.
Yetminster Audit findings:
£8546.17 (-) Difference in cash figures
£404.74 (-) Difference in stock figures
£518.24 (+) Difference in postage figures
£17.40 (-) Difference in foreign currency figures
£8415.27 Total Shortage
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Chetnole Outreach Branch Audit findings:
£3517.96 (-) Difference in cash figures
£46.71 (-) Difference in stock figures
£933.17 (+) Difference in postage figures
£17.40 (+) Difference in foreign currency figures
£ 3471.55 Total Shortage
The total audit revealed a shortage of £11,886.77 at the two branches under the control of Ms Merritt. The event log balancing printout
showed shortages were apparent during August 2011.
Ms Merritt was issued with a without prejudice receipt for the £9500 cheque and a further without prejudice receipt for a second Santander
cheque for £2386.77 that together made up the discovered shortages on the day. Both cheques later returned not honoured.
Mr Adderley, Contracts Manager precautionary suspended Ms Merritt’s contract for services on the 29'? September 2011. Ms Merritt
admitted to Mr Adderley on the day of t he audit that she had taken the money from the Post Office on the evening of the 28' September
2011 for a personal matter, confirming what she had advised the auditors at the office that day.
On Monday 34 October 2011 Ms Merritt was contacted by Mr Thomas to informing her that he needed to interview her and explained her
legal rights and the Post Office Friend rule. Ms Merritt confirmed that she was receiving legal advice and that she would contact him once she
had done this.
On the 5** October 2011 Mr Thomas requested and received a personal printout from HR for Ms Merritt.
Whilst awaiting to hear from Ms Merritt, Mr Thomas continued to progress aspects of the case such as PNC results etc. Following a further
telephone conversation, Mr Thomas wrote to Ms Merritt again confirming that e still needed to conduct an interview with her under caution.
Mr Thomas was eventually contacted by Mr Mike Robinson of Morton Law Solicitors in Yeovil and an interview was arranged at their offices on
Wednesday 9*" November 2011. Mr Thomas and Lisa Allen attended the offices at 12:30hrs where disclosure was given from Mr Robinson.
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Interview
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The caution was explained to Ms Merritt and the interview commenced at 13.18 hrs in accordance with PACE. During the interview Ms Merritt
said the following:
1.
That she denied having taken the money the night before the audit as she had previously advised the auditors, and now produced a
large document regarding on-going litigation by Shoosmith Solicitors over the reliability of the Horizon system.
She only admitted taking the money during the audit because she was upset and would have said anything at the time, when shut
in a room with two men that she did not know. She went on to say that she felt intimidated and would have done anything to get
herself out of that situation. Mr Thomas confirmed that at no point was she locked in a room, but was in fact in a secure area in full
view of customers who were being advised that the Post Office was closed whilst the audit was being undertaken. She was only
present to monitor the audit taking place. Her daughter was also present.
Mr Thomas referred to an ‘Event Log Balancing’ printout which identifies an entry made by TMEO01 (Ms Merritt) on the 17"
September 2011 at 12:36 hrs that identifies a substantial discrepancy that was immediately followed by a re-entry increasing the
cash on hand by some £14,400 and resulting now in a surplus of £245.45. (This was not posed to Ms Merritt at the time of the
interview).
When asked, Ms Merritt denied taking any money but blamed the Horizon system. Mr Thomas then advised her that it was her
responsibility to arrange an audit following information received from the holiday relief Catherine Early which appeared to be true.
Ms Merritt denied that she had asked Catherine to inflate the cash on hand by £12,000. She stated that there had been occasions
where she needed to take money to Chetnole from Yetminster and had not been able to officially transfer the money as she had no
barcodes to do it. Ms Merritt conceded that even if that was the case, the two branches would not balance and t he amount still
would have been short. Mr Thomas asked why would Catherin Early advised POL about the shortages if they were not true? And
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was she, therefore suggesting that Ms Early was lying? To which Ms Merritt could not say if she was lying, but only that she had not
asked her inflate the cash declaration.
At the end of the interview, Ms Merritt stated she would be willing to allow searches of her home to be conducted. A search was
conducted at 16:27hrs and concluded at 16:41hrs. Three items were seized that related to various bank statements, copies of
which were forwarded to Dave Posnett.
The loss to POL was £11,886.77and Ms Merritt gave a signed undertaking to repay £9,500 within 14 days of her interview on the 9"
November 2011.
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9 April 2015
Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
BRIEFING REPORT - PART TWO
PREPARED BY
SECOND SIGHT
This Report is confidential and is not to be disclosed to any person other than a
person involved in the processing of Applicants’ claims through the Scheme.
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Introduction
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
15.
1.6.
17.
1.8.
This Report has been prepared by Second Sight, which is the trading name of Second Sight
Support Services Limited, the company appointed by Post Office to conduct an independent
investigation into a number of matters raised by Subpostmasters, or former Subpostmasters.
When Second Sight was first appointed by Post Office at the request of Members of Parliament
in July 2012, a number of undertakings were given by Post Office in order to satisfy MPs that
Second Sight would be able to conduct a truly independent investigation into the matters of
concern.
Those undertakings included the following:
. Unrestricted access to documents held by Post Office (including documents subject
to confidentiality and legal professional privilege); and
. No limitation in the scope of work determined necessary by Second Sight.
Those undertakings were reflected in the “Raising Concerns with Horizon” document signed by
Post Office on 17 December 2012 and sent to the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance (‘JFSA')
and to Mediation Scheme Applicants. A key paragraph was:
“In order to carry out the Inquiry, Second Sight will be entitled to request information
related to a concern from Post Office Limited, and if Post Office Limited holds that
information, Post Office Limited will provide it to Second Sight.”
This statement was intended to accurately reflect the undertakings set out in 1.3. above.
Many Subpostmasters and Applicants to the Mediation Scheme will have relied on that
paragraph, when reporting matters to Second Sight.
The investigative approach adopted by Second Sight, with the approval of Post Office, was to
identify discrete issues raised by Subpostmasters or former Subpostmasters and conduct an in-
depth investigation into those issues. These narrowly focussed investigations were referred to
as ‘Spot Reviews’.
Second Sight issued an Interim Report on 8 July 2013 incorporating the preliminary results of
four Spot Reviews. Shortly afterwards Post Office announced the creation of a Mediation
Scheme (the Scheme) to deal with the issues raised by a number of Subpostmasters and
former Subpostmasters. At that stage the investigative work that led to the Interim Report
being published was incomplete and it was intended that the further work, needed to support
the Scheme, would enable the original Inquiry to be completed.
One of the principle findings at that stage was the need to look at the totality of the user
experience of Horizon. Horizon is much more than just the software element and many of the
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1.9.
1.10.
1.11.
1.12.
1.14.
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concerns reported to us clearly demonstrated problems with the interface between Horizon
and other systems and the lack of effective investigative support from Post Office.
The Scheme received 150 applications before the deadline for applications expired on 18
November 2013 and 136 cases are now being processed in the Scheme. Second Sight issued a
Briefing Report - Part One on 25 July 2014, which dealt with:
a) General information about Post Office, its branches and the role of Subpostmasters;
b) A description of the training and support functions as well as the Post Office audit and
investigation processes;
c) An overview of the Horizon system and associated equipment;
d) — Anintroduction to the application of double entry accounting in Horizon;
e) A description of significant branch operating and reporting procedures and the
associated processing of transactions;
f) An outline of the treatment of losses and surpluses; and
g) An analysis of typical errors.
As a result of analysing the 150 applications to the Scheme, we identified 19 commonly
mentioned issues (often described as ‘Thematic Issues’) that were raised by multiple Applicants.
In the interests of efficiency we agreed with Post Office that, rather than deal with these
commonly mentioned issues within individual Case Review Reports (‘CRRs’), we would prepare
a Briefing Report - Part Two, that would deal with all of them in a single document that would
be sent to all Applicants.
Although the 19 commonly mentioned issues were identified as a result of analysing just 150
applications to the Scheme, the nature of the underlying issues may be applicable to a much
wider group of Subpostmasters.
. We issued a first version of this Briefing Report - Part Two on 21 August 2014. That document
recognised that a number of issues were still under investigation. Post Office issued a
response to the first version of that Report on 22 September 2014.
. Investigations have continued since the release of the first version of our Briefing Report - Part
Two and this updated Report presents further information relating to the commonly
mentioned issues dealt with in the 21 August document and takes account of further
information supplied by Post Office.
At the time of finalising this updated Report (9 April 2015) approximately 20 out of 136 cases
are still being investigated by us. It is therefore possible that new information will come to
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light that is relevant to the matters dealt with in this Report. If this happens, we will discuss
with Post Office how best to communicate such further relevant information - possibly in the
form of a supplemental report.
2. Limitation of Scope in Work Performed
2.1. We have experienced significant difficulty in obtaining access to a number of documents we
believe are necessary for the purposes of our investigation, notwithstanding Post Office’s
commitment to make requested documents available to us. The documents requested from
Post Office fall into three main categories:
a)
b)
c)
the complete legal files relating to investigations or criminal prosecutions commenced
by Post Office that relate to Applicants;
the complete email records relating to a small number of Post Office employees
working at the Bracknell office of Fujitsu in 2008; and
detailed transactional records relating to items held in Post Office's Suspense
Account(s) and to disputed transactions in a number of third party client accounts held
by Post Office.
2.2. The following paragraphs describe these matters in more detail.
Access to the complete legal files
2.3. Anumber of Applicants have raised issues concerning the investigative and prosecution
processes they experienced.
2.4. Typical concerns mentioned include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
An audit visit that was in reality only a cash and stock count;
An investigation process that had difficulty in considering the possibility that Horizon
itself might have caused any losses and often failed to establish the root cause of the
unexplained losses;
Criminal charges that were dropped just before trial despite the Applicant having been
suspended without pay for a long period (two years or more in some cases);
A charge of theft being brought when there appears to have been only limited
evidence to support that charge and where that evidence was not tested by the Court,
as the charge was dropped just before trial; and
A prosecution process that appeared to be focussed more on debt recovery than in the
interests of justice.
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2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
2.9.
2.10.
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Our review of applications, where criminal charges were brought, provides some limited
support for these concerns. However the issues raised by individual Applicants can only be
investigated by a review of the complete legal and investigative files held by Post Office. So
far, with the exception of only a few cases, Post Office has not provided us with access to the
complete legal files that we have requested. It has, however, reported that:
“Having now completed its reinvestigation of each of the cases, Post Office has
found no reason to conclude that any original prosecution was unsafe".
We however, consider that a complete and independent review of these criminal cases is the
only proper way to identify whether there are instances of possible misconduct by prosecutors
acting on behalf of Post Office and whether or not miscarriages of justice may have occurred.
Post Office has informed us that reviewing the individual "investigative and prosecution
processes" that Applicants have experienced does not fall within the terms of our engagement.
We find this position surprising since it is the consequences of those processes that have given
rise to many of the issues that Applicants wish to mediate. Also, the position adopted by Post
Office is contrary to the position taken by the Working Group which was set up to administer
the Scheme, of which Post Office was a member.
In the light of this apparent conflict of views between the Post Office and the independent
body set up to administer the Scheme (‘the Working Group') chaired by Sir Anthony Hooper, a
retired Court of Appeal Judge, we would normally have asked the Working Group to provide
guidance on this matter. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to do this, as on 10 March
2015 Post Office announced that the Working Group had been wound up with immediate
effect. This was the day before we were due to circulate a draft of this Report to all members
of the Working Group. It was also the day that Post Office notified us that our contract to
conduct an independent investigation into the matters raised by Applicants was being
terminated. Consequently, Post Office instructed us to issue a final version of this Report no
later than 10 April, irrespective of whether or not our independent investigation was complete.
Access to the emails of Post Office employees working at Bracknell
A significant number of Applicants have stated that they believe that transactions and balances
on Horizon were altered without their consent. It has been reported to us that some changes
appear to have been made outside of normal working hours and that some of those changes
suggest that some form of unauthorised remote access to transaction data may have occurred.
We have seen a witness statement from an Applicant who claims to have seen evidence of this
type of activity in August 2008, occurring in the basement of the Fujitsu office in Bracknell.
Post Office has stated that it is not possible for the type of activity described to have occurred.
However, we believe that, despite Post Office's reassurances and statements from its
employees and those of Fujitsu, the most compelling evidence on this point will be in
contemporaneous emails from the relevant period.
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2.11.
2.12,
2.13.
2.14.
2.15.
2.16.
2.17,
2.18.
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We first requested access to the relevant emails in 2013 and we were provided with some
emails from 2009. We have very recently been provided with a small number of emails from
August 2008, but this sample was too small to draw any meaningful conclusions about what
was really going on in the basement of the Fujitsu office in Bracknell.
We deal with this matter in more detail in Section 14 of this Report. Our current, evidence
based opinion, is that Fujitsu / Post Office did have, and may still have, the ability to directly
alter branch records without the knowledge of the relevant Subpostmaster.
We recognise that this conclusion is contrary to Post Office’s position on this matter and it is
regrettable that we have not been provided with the further evidence we have requested in
order to reach a properly researched conclusion on this important issue.
Transaction data relating to third party client accounts
Post Office operates a number of client accounts with business partners such as Royal Mail,
Bank of Ireland, HMRC, DWP, DVLA and many others. Transactions from branches relating to
these business partners are allocated to the appropriate client account before being reconciled
with information provided directly by the business partner. Normally these transactions are
matched without difficulty but occasionally errors occur or disputes arise where the
transaction details shown on Horizon and the transaction details reported by the third party
client differ.
In these circumstances an adjustment referred to as a Transaction Correction (TC) may be
generated in order to correct an error previously made in a branch. Post Office has advised us
that its policy is to write off unexplained debit balances on third party client accounts, but that
any unexplained credit balance will be left open in case the matter is subsequently resolved.
Eventually these long outstanding credit balances will be transferred to Post Office’s General
Suspense Account and may be taken to its Profit & Loss Account (P&L Account) if they have
remained unresolved for more than three years.
A number of Applicants have reported that they have suffered unexplained losses or have
received TCs relating to transactions with Post Office’s third party clients. We informed Post
Office, on 18 June 2014, of our wish to investigate the possibility that some of those
unexplained losses could be represented by transactions subsequently taken to the credit of its
P&L Account.
. We have been advised that, in each of the financial years 2012, 2013 and 2014, amounts in
excess of £100,000 have been taken to the credit of Post Office’s P&L Account and we have
asked for a detailed breakdown of those amounts, together with corresponding transactions
from the individual third party client accounts. This is a complex issue and, whilst Post Office
has agreed to provide us with this information where possible, this matter has not been
resolved at the date of this Report.
In addition to the credits being taken to Post Office’s General Suspense Account we have been
informed very recently that at each year end substantial unreconciled balances existed on
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many of the individual suspense accounts. These unreconciled balances for the 2014 financial
year were approximately £96 million in respect of Bank of Ireland ATMs and approximately £66
million in respect of Santander. These unmatched balances represent transactions from
individual branches that occurred in the preceding six months.
We have not been able to investigate these items but we remain concerned that these
unreconciled balances may include transactions that ultimately should be credited back to
individual branch accounts.
3. Our updated Briefing Report - Part Two
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4,
3.5.
3.6.
The limitation in scope reported above has, in our opinion, significantly restricted our ability to
complete our investigation into some of the issues commonly raised by Applicants to the
Scheme. It is particularly regrettable that two of the issues raised: access to the complete legal
files and to the Bracknell emails, appear to represent a policy decision, taken at a senior level
within Post Office, which is contrary to the undertakings previously provided to Second Sight,
to Applicants, to the JFSA and to MPs.
We are also aware that Post Office’s current view is that:
“Post Office does not accept that an analysis of the evidence in the Applicant’s
criminal case, whether served during the course of that case or not, is either within
the scope of the mediation scheme or something which is within Second Sight’s
remit.”
We disagree with this view and previously we would have asked the Mediation Working Group
to advise us on this matter. However, for the reasons described in paragraph 2.8. it has not
been possible for us to do this.
We are also aware that Post Office considers our comments on a number of other issues as
falling outside the scope of the Working Group and beyond our remit. These issues include:
a) _ the Contract between Post Office and its Subpostmasters;
b) _ the transfer of risk between Post Office and Subpostmasters; and
c) _ the error repellency of Post Office’s business systems.
These three issues are all, in our view, connected as described below.
The Contract between Post Office and its Subpostmasters (‘the Contract’)
Our detailed comments on the Contract are set out in Section 6 of this Report. The Contract
makes it clear that Subpostmasters are responsible for losses that occur at their branch. What
is not clear, is what support they are entitled to receive from Post Office.
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3.7. As set out in paragraph 6.8. i) there is no automatic entitlement to investigative support when
problems arise. There is also no automatic entitlement to be provided with data held by Post
Office with the exception of the data routinely made available to the branch by Horizon.
3.8. The Contract places Subpostmasters in a difficult position in these circumstances. Post Office
generally insists on losses being made good, but the Subpostmaster is not necessarily entitled
to receive all of the information and explanations necessary to establish the cause of the loss.
We regard this as unfair.
The transfer of risk between Post Office and Subpostmasters
3.9. The Contract transfers most of the risk of doing business to Subpostmasters. Our
investigations have shown that this is not a static situation and, over time, Post Office has
introduced a number of new products, and revised business processes, that may have
transferred further risk to Subpostmasters.
3.10. Many of these changes seem to have been introduced without adequate consultation. We
regard this as regrettable. Examples of business process changes that have transferred
additional risk to Subpostmasters include:
a) the phasing out of ATMs where a third-party, not the Subpostmaster, was responsible
for servicing and accounting for the ATM;
b) _ the removal of paper paying-in slips that provided a detailed audit trail indentifying
individual transactions;
c) the introduction of new products and services, such as Lottery products and Foreign
Currency (Bureaux de Change) services, subject to the overriding consideration of
whether it is reasonable to do so;
d) the removal of the facility to hold shortfalls in Branch Suspense Accounts beyond the
end of a monthly Trading Period (partly compensated for by the introduction of the
‘Settle Centrally and Dispute' function); and
e) the change from mandatory weekly to monthly balancing.
The error repellency of Post Office’s business systems
3.11. A consequence of the progressive transfer of risk from Post Office to Subpostmasters is that, in
our opinion, there is little incentive for Post Office to improve the error repellency of its
business systems. We are aware that Post Office has implemented some process changes,
such as 'Ping', in relation to Lottery Scratchcards, that have improved the error repellency, but
we believe that much more could, and should, have been done in this regard.
3.12. We regard the lack of error repellency in some aspects of Post Office's business systems as
regrettable. Our investigations have shown that the majority of branch losses were caused by
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“errors made at the counter”. Many of these errors might have been avoided, or mitigated,
had more robust, error repellent, systems been introduced.
3.13. Examples of inadequacies in Horizon's error repellency include:
a)
b)
¢)
d)
e)
f)
8)
h)
Hardware and technology that is old and suffers from avoidable rates of failure;
Telecommunication equipment that is prone to failure or to poor signal reception in
some rural locations;
Limited usability testing prior to deployment of new facilities on Horizon;
An icon based touch screen that does not auto-calibrate;
Software that does not detect and prevent password sharing or multiple logons by the
same user at a different branch;
The lack of secure, token-based, user identification that would uniquely identify the
actual user;
Software that does not prevent or detect suspicious out of hours transactions; and
Software that does not require additional process steps such as two person approval
or an additional approval measure for high value or high risk transactions.
3.14. These examples should be regarded as illustrative rather than exhaustive.
3.15. One of the difficulties that both Post Office and we have faced, in dealing with the concerns
that have been raised by Applicants, is that some of the alleged problems occurred more than
ten years ago.
3.16. A consequence of this is that many contemporaneous documents no longer exist and
memories have faded. We have repeatedly found that Post Office, in dealing with such
matters, describes how the (new) system currently handles things. Its answers have often been
expressed in terms of what was meant to happen, rather than what actually happened. Other
answers have been expressed in the present tense, asserting what now happens, or what now
cannot happen.
3.17. While such responses may seem to be helpful in dealing with those many instances where
evidence is no longer available, they have, in our view, little or no evidential value. Knowing
what Post Office's current policies or procedures dictate, or how the current system deals with a
matter that has been raised, cannot be expected to inform our analysis as to how a situation
really was dealt with at the time that it happened.
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3.18. Notwithstanding these limitations and issues, we continued to investigate the matters covered
in the previous version of this Report, and have produced this updated version.
4. The structure and content of this Report
4.1. The Report structure follows a modular approach, with each commonly raised issue, as broadly
defined by Second Sight, forming a separate section within the Report. There are some topics
on which our investigative work is incomplete. Further questions have been posed by Second
Sight to Post Office in respect of those topics and, where our questions have been adequately
answered, and where further evidence has been made available to us, the wording used in the
previously issued version of this Report has been updated to reflect that. A number of those
questions remain unresolved however, and these are clearly identifiable in this Report.
4.2. Acopy of the reply by Post Office (without Attachments) to the detailed questions submitted
by us on 9 December 2014 is attached at Appendix 1.
4.3. The number of occurrences of each commonly raised issue, from the total population of 150
applications to the Scheme, is indicated throughout this Report using the following groupings
and descriptions:
Few Fewer than 15 instances
Many Between 15 and 70 instances
Most More than 70 instances
4.4. In this context, the most commonly reported issue (complaints about Training and Support)
has been raised by over 130 Applicants, while the least reported issues (concerns about
Pensions and Allowances transactions and Motor Vehicle Licences) were each raised by fewer
than 15 Applicants.
4.5. In order to put our comments in context, the issues being considered are based on concerns
raised by 150 Scheme Applicants from a total population of approximately 8,000 serving
Subpostmasters. In its response to the previously issued version of this Report, Post Office
stated:
“Post Office is confident that there are no systemic problems with branch accounting
on Horizon and all existing evidence overwhelmingly supports this position".
4.6. Later, in a letter dated 14 January 2015 that it sent to those MPs who had voiced concerns
during the 17 December 2014 Adjournment Debate, Post Office referred to:
"500,000 people working in the Post Office network"
and said that:
"78,000 people use Horizon up and down the country, performing six million
transactions, and providing vital services in our communities".
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47.
4.8.
4.9.
4.10.
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It continued:
“against that backdrop, the 150 complaints we are addressing through the Scheme,
alleging that Horizon suffers from system-wide flaws, represents a tiny fraction of
the total number of people who have used, or are using, the system effectively
(0.03% and 0.19% respectively)".
Whilst we recognise that the number of complaints about which we have been informed
indeed represents a tiny fraction of the total user population, we must point out that the
impact, on most of the Applicants, of their problems with Horizon, and of their experience with
Post Office generally, has had significant personal impact.
The identification of a commonly mentioned issue first occurred at the time that an Application
Form, or its related Case Questionnaire Response (CQR), was initially considered by us. As the
Scheme process continued the underlying concerns were further explored and conclusions
were set out in the Post Office Investigation Report (POIR) and then in our Case Review Report
(CRR). This Report describes these issues in more detail.
In considering the CQRs submitted to us, Post Office's seven year Data Retention Policy has, in
some cases, limited the availability of evidential data. This Policy applies to both Horizon
transactional data (held by Fujitsu) and also to other business records such as emails, letters,
memos, interview recordings, transcripts and Audit and Investigation Reports.
Until recently, Post Office did not appear to operate a ‘litigation hold’ process whereby
documents that may later be needed to support a complaint or investigation are preserved —
irrespective of the seven year retention period.
5. Definition of ‘Horizon’ and its impact on the Scope of our work
5.1.
The definition of Horizon for the purposes of our work was considered in our Interim Report of
July 2013 as follows:
".. the name Horizon relates to the entire application. This encompasses the
software, both bespoke and software packages, the computer hardware and
communications equipment installed in branch and the central data centres. It
includes the software used to control and monitor the systems. In addition.....
testing and training systems are also referred to as Horizon".
Whilst we have adopted this definition of Horizon, as it had been agreed with Post Office, it
has been necessary, for the purpose of our investigation, to extend it so as to properly include
the totality of each Applicant’s experience of using Horizon. We have therefore found it
necessary to also consider issues such as the Audit and Investigative processes and the
Contract between Post Office and its Subpostmasters as well as the behaviour of Post Office
towards the Applicants to the Scheme when problems arose.
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6.
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.
FS
6.5.
6.6.
6.7.
6.8.
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The Contract between Post Office and its Subpostmasters
The Contract between Post Office and its Subpostmasters lies at the heart of many of the issues
that Subpostmasters wish to resolve by way of mediation. This Section deals with two separate
issues. First, the potential impact on Subpostmasters of some of the terms and conditions set
out in the Contract and, secondly, issues relating to the notification to Subpostmasters of the
terms of the Contract.
When invited to comment on a previous version of this Report Post Office stated that
“Matters such as the Subpostmaster contract and other legal matters are not within
the scope of the Scheme and are outside Second Sight's professional expertise”.
For the avoidance of doubt, we are commenting on the commercial aspects of the
Subpostmaster Contract, a matter which we are confident falls within our professional
expertise. We also believe that this issue legitimately falls within the scope of the Scheme.
. The following extracts are taken from the ‘Standard Contract' (dated September 1994) between
Post Office and Subpostmasters. This is a 114-page document, that now incorporates several
post-1994 amendments. A copy of the entire document is available on request. The Contract
should be considered in conjunction with other documents such as manuals, booklets and
operational instructions issued by Post Office from time to time.
The Standard Contract is described by Post Office as an arms-length, commercial transaction in
the nature of an agency contract. Post Office has also stated that, in its experience,
“the terms of the Contract are broadly similar to those used in franchising
arrangements across the UK".
We disagree with this view for the reasons set out below.
The contract allocates several financial and other risks to Subpostmasters who may not have
understood or appreciated those risks, particularly if they failed to seek independent legal advice
before taking up their posts. Our comments on the clauses most referred to by Applicants, and
therefore most relevant to our review, as set out below, are made solely from a business
perspective.
The Standard Contract spells out the rights and responsibilities of both Post Office and
Subpostmasters. The clauses most frequently referred to by Applicants are as follows:
a) Section 17: (in the November 2002 amendment) lists the Key Products and Services
(also referred to as the core products and services).
b) — Section 15: (in the November 2002 amendment) refers to responsibility for the training
of the Subpostmaster and, in turn, of the staff employed in a branch. Under this
Section:
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c)
d)
e)
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“Post Office undertakes to provide the Subpostmaster with relevant training
materials and processes to carry out the required training of his Assistants on the
Post Office Products and Services... and the Sub-Postmaster accepts the responsibility
to ensure the proper deployment within his Post Office branch of any materials and
processes provided by Post Office Ltd and to ensure that his Assistants receive all the
training which is necessary in order to be able to properly provide the Post Office
Products and Services and to perform any other tasks required in connection with the
operation of the Post Office branch.”
Also
“Post Office Ltd may request from time to time that where it has obligations as
described above the Subpostmaster should conduct specific training (whether
through written/distance learning that may require confirmation of completion or
via presentations) in relation to certain Post Office Services (such as, but not limited
to, money laundering). Failure by the Subpostmaster to arrange for such training to
be properly applied will be deemed to be a breach of this Contract by him.”
Section 1, paragraph 10: requires three months notice of contract termination from
the Subpostmaster to Post Office and allows Post Office to:
“Terminate a Subpostmaster’s contract at any time in case of Breach of Condition by
the Subpostmaster, or non-performance of his obligation or non-provision of Post
Office Services, but otherwise may be determined by Post Office on not less than
three months notice.”
Section 12: has a number of paragraphs, as set out below, addressing responsibility for
losses and shortages. These paragraphs are at the heart of nearly all of the cases being
considered in the Scheme.
Section 12, paragraph 12:
“The Subpostmaster is responsible for all losses caused through his own negligence,
carelessness or error, and also for losses of all kinds caused by his Assistants.
Deficiencies due to such losses must be made good without delay.”
Section 12, paragraph 13:
“The financial responsibility of the Subpostmaster does not cease when he
relinquishes his appointment and he will be required to make good any losses
incurred during his term of office which may subsequently come to light.”
Section 12, paragraph 14:
“Surpluses may be withdrawn provided that any subsequent charge up to the
amount withdrawn is made good immediately.”
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h) Section 12, paragraph 17:
“Subpostmasters may exceptionally not be required to make good the full amount of
certain losses at his office. If he feels entitled to relief in making good a loss he
should apply to the Retail Network Manager.”
i) Section 19, paragraph 12: deals with enquiries by officers of the Post Office
Investigation Division and states that:
“The main job of the Investigation Division is to investigate, or help the Police to
investigate, criminal offences against the Post Office, British Telecommunications
and the Department of National Savings. The Investigation Division does NOT
enquire into matters where crime is not suspected.”
j) Section 19, paragraph 19: allows:
“persons interviewed by Post Office's Investigators to have a friend present during
the interview but that person may only attend and listen to questions and answers.
He must not interrupt in any way, either by word or signal.”
6.9. Having considered the Standard Contract in some detail from a business perspective, we are of
the opinion that it can, in some circumstances, operate to the detriment of the Subpostmaster,
who may not have reviewed or fully understood the terms before deciding to enter into the
Contract. We have not seen any evidence that Post Office either advises or requires
Subpostmasters to seek independent legal advice before taking up their posts.
6.10. Although Post Office has likened the Standard Contract to a franchise agreement, we note
that the British Franchise Association recommends that a franchisee should always seek
independent legal advice before entering into a franchise agreement and we are surprised that
Post Office does not make a similar recommendation.
6.11. The Standard Contract places a number of financial and other risks with Subpostmasters
who may not have properly understood or appreciated those risks, particularly if they failed to
seek independent legal advice. Consequently, there is a risk that appropriate risk mitigation
measures may not have been implemented by the Subpostmaster.
6.12. We have been told by many Applicants that they were not given a copy of the 114 page
Standard Contract until long after they had committed to purchase their branch, or long after
they had started work as a Subpostmaster, or even at all.
6.13. Post Office denies this, stating:
“it is also Post Office's standard operating procedure to ensure that the
Subpostmasters have a copy of the Contract no later than the day that they
commence their position".
6.14. We have found that this "standard operating procedure" was not always followed. Instead,
it appears to have been common practice for a new Subpostmaster to sign a one-page
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“Acknowledgement of Appointment Letter’ without necessarily having been provided with a
copy of the Contract itself.
6.15. In signing that one-page letter, the Subpostmaster acknowledged receipt and acceptance of
the terms and conditions of that Standard Contract, without necessarily having ever received a
copy of it, and without having had the opportunity to understand and respond to those terms
and conditions.
6.16. It is, in our view, worth noting that retaining evidence of the provision of the Standard
Contract to the Subpostmaster seems never to have been part of Post Office’s Standard
Operating Procedures.
7. Automated Teller Machines (ATMs)
7.1. Our Briefing Report - Part One provides, in paragraphs 5.23 to 5.29, background information on
the installation and operation of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs).
7.2. Problems with ATMs, largely comprising unexplained shortages that were charged back to
Subpostmasters by Post Office, have been reported in more than 20% of applications to the
Scheme and all of them relate to externally-located Bank of Ireland (Bol) ATMs.
7.3. Thirteen of those ATM-related shortages exceeded £20,000, six exceeded £60,000 and one
exceeded £80,000. In other cases, large surpluses occurred, which caused concern to some
Applicants.
7.4. The normal cash dispensing process on Bol ATMs involves electronic interaction between the
Branch's ATM; Wincor Nixdorf (the service and maintenance provider); the LiNK platform and
the customer's bank. The ATM cash balancing/reconciliation process involves electronic and
also manual interaction between the Branch's ATM; the Branch's Horizon system; Post Office's
Financial Service Centre (the 'FSC’) and Bol. Branches need to account for the cash that they
load into the ATM; for the cash that is dispensed to customers; and for exceptions such as
banknotes that the ATM cannot deal with and notes that are ‘retracted’ (when customers fail to
take the offered notes).
7.5. Whilst the loading of notes is a relatively straightforward task, the accounting on Horizon for
branch ATMs seems not always to have been properly understood or correctly carried out and
we address the most likely reasons for this below.
7.6. The principal problem, reported by many of the Applicants who have raised concerns about
their branch's ATM, seems to relate to the manual extraction and use of the 'cash dispensed’
figures from the ‘Bank Totals' receipt that Subpostmasters are required to obtain each day from
their ATM, and the daily input of 'cash declarations’ into Horizon. This has been referred to by
some Applicants as having to deal with an ‘air gap' between their branch's ATM and the Horizon
system.
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7.7. This is a procedure that seems to us to be fundamentally flawed because what the
Subpostmaster is doing here is inputting data into his branch's Horizon system that the ATM
itself has generated and already communicated, through the LiNK system, to Bank of Ireland
and that Bank of Ireland will the following day onward communicate to Post Office.
7.8. Those figures, that are input by the branch staff into Horizon, are then subsequently
‘reconciled’ by Post Office with the numbers that came from the ATM itself. Whilst this process
will detect errors made by branch staff in transcribing the ATM's cash dispensed figures into
Horizon, it is driven by the figures that the ATM itself has generated. It follows that, if those
ATM-generated cash dispensed numbers have, for some reason, been under-stated, and more
cash has been dispensed than the ATM reports, then the Subpostmaster will be held
accountable for the resultant shortfall. In our view, although Post Office strongly disagrees with
us, this introduces a vulnerability to error and fraud that simply did not exist before. We return
to this matter in paragraphs 7.28 to 7.38 of this Report.
7.9. Any differences arising between those ATM-derived figures and the branch's declaration of the
cash that remains in its ATM results in Post Office issuing a Transaction Correction (TC) which
will impact the cash total that the branch needs to have in its ATM and its safe. In other words,
any shortfall has to be made good by the Subpostmaster.
7.10. By comparison, banks and ATM operators other than Post Office, faced with any material
ATM-related discrepancy, immediately send out their own investigators to establish the cause
of the difference or problem, and this is sometimes found to have been caused by external
theft. This triggering of an independent investigation seems not to take place in Post Office.
Instead, Post Office simply issues TCs to "resolve" (i.e. to correct) any discrepancies, and any
Subpostmaster wishing to challenge such a TC has nothing with which to support his claim,
other than the ‘Bank Totals Receipt’ that he has retained in his branch, but that was produced
by the ATM itself.
7.11. In the cases we have examined we found two instances where printed ATM-generated
figures had been corrupted by the ATM itself. Whilst acknowledging that erroneous data was
produced, Post Office states that it was not the vitally-important ‘cash dispensed' figures that
had been corrupted, in those two examples, but less important figures showing the number of
rejected notes. Post Office also suggests that the data, in those two examples, became
corrupted because branch staff had repeatedly filled, emptied and then re-filled cash cassettes
such that the ATM became hopelessly 'muddled'.
7.12. Post Office denies that such corrupt data could ever cause losses in any branch. We are
unable to endorse that reassurance, not least because it is self-evident that, were the more
important ‘cash dispensed! figures to be incorrectly reported by the ATM, then that would have
far more serious consequences. We must also put this matter in perspective by stating that, in
our view, the risk described in paragraphs 7.28 to 7.38 of this Report remains a far more serious
concern.
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7.13. When Post Office replaced some branches' fully serviced ATMs (where Subpostmasters did
not have to fill them with cash, or account for the cash going through them) with ATMs where
Subpostmasters were responsible for those tasks, that introduced, in our view, new procedural
complexities with which some Subpostmasters were unable to cope.
7.14. In that context, we note that, in February 2008, Post Office issued a Manual Update, which it
referred to as an ‘Operations Manual interim'. Post Office stated that it was issuing new
instructions because:
"a number of non-conformance issues are still affecting the processes for ATM
reconciliation and settlement and to explain the correct end-to-end accounting
processes relating to Bank of Ireland ATMs".
7.15. The Introduction to the Operations Manual interim stated:
"The Bank of Ireland, via the LiNK network, extracts a 16:30 - 16:30 ‘cash dispensed’
figure automatically from your ATM each day. This figure forms the basis of a
settlement to Post Office. This figure is the value of cash dispensed from your ATM.
from 16:30 the previous day until 16:30 on the current working day".
7.16. It would appear that some Applicants misunderstood parts of the Manual Update, or failed
to carry out every process they were meant to. Some Applicants say that they were repeatedly
told by Helpline staff, when they were investigating differences that arose as a result of those
misunderstandings and failures, that: "the problem will sort itself out" (though the problems
persisted). Any differences would normally be expected to be 'resolved' by means of
Transaction Corrections, but these sometimes led to further errors being made when the
specific actions that then needed to be carried out, in dealing with those incoming TCs, were
also misunderstood, or wrongly executed, by branch staff.
7.17. Many Applicants have also reported that they subsequently found that the Helpline's advice
(which had sometimes allegedly increased their branch's apparent shortfall or surplus) was later
countermanded. Comments referring to problems in understanding and/or implementing the
advice given by the Helpline are found in the CQRs in nearly every instance where the Applicant
experienced problems with an ATM.
7.18. Aconsequence of a user getting things wrong with the ATM's cash dispensed figures and
inputting incorrect data, and hence causing an initial discrepancy, was that an ‘out-of-sync’
situation would develop where the branch's ATM would be expected (by Bol and by Post Office)
to have an amount of cash in its cassettes that was materially different from the cash figure
that the Subpostmaster had entered into Horizon.
7.19. Based on comments in many CQRs, the problems reported by Applicants, relating to this
out-of-sync situation, became, it seems, what can be described as commonplace in some
branches prior to the February 2008 release of the Manual Update.
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7.20. The Manual Update confirms that, by following the new instructions, the process for
entering data and balancing ATM cash will change and states that "moving to the correct
process is likely to result in a cash balancing difference".
7.21. I Many Applicants have commented on the complexity of accounting, in Horizon, for their
ATM's figures and on the general lack of clarity of the instructions issued by Post Office. This,
many have said, led to them making mistakes when trying to comply with those instructions.
7.22. Many Applicants have stated that the only training that they received, when their branch's
ATM was first installed, was provided by a Wincor Nixdorf engineer who was only able (and it
seems only authorised) to teach them how to load cash into the cassettes and how to deal with
the mechanical aspects of the ATM. They say that they were left to work out for themselves,
primarily using User Manuals, how to carry out the ATM-related accounting on their branch's
Horizon system. They also bore responsibility, under the Standard Contract, to train their own
staff who, in many branches, would routinely thereafter carry out that accounting on their
behalf.
7.23. This seems to have resulted in some Subpostmasters and their staff systematically repeating
errors, not only in collecting the ‘cash dispensed’ and other figures from their ATMs and
entering those figures into Horizon, but also in responding to the resultant stream of high-value
Debit and Credit TCs that Post Office issued to correct the branch's accounts. Vitally, we believe
that many of those systematically repeated errors were made because the instructions had
been misunderstood, rather than because of carelessness or as a result of attempts to
deliberately conceal branch shortfalls. It follows that, not realising that they were doing
anything wrong, and consequently not realising that they needed to seek further training, they
carried on making the same mistakes and got their branch's accounts into a complete mess.
7.24. Many Applicants have also commented on the apparent impact on their branch's ATM of
power or telecommunication failures. Other than recording, in some cases, the dates and times
of such failures, it was difficult for them to relate those failures to specific deficiencies. It is
recognised that there are standard processes in place to deal with power cuts and connectivity
interrupts and to ensure that no data is lost or corrupted when those events occur.
7.25. Nonetheless, the need, in such circumstances, for an ATM to be re-booted by the
Subpostmaster, or for it to be remotely re-booted by Bol, could in our view, introduce a
possible risk of data loss or corruption. Post Office has given assurances that this cannot
happen, and that it never has happened, but some evidence seemingly contradicts those
assurances and we have not been able to carry out tests to determine whether or not data can
get lost, or be corrupted, by such interrupts.
7.26. Had we seen a practice of routinely, thoroughly and independently investigating ATM-
related discrepancies, we would have been less concerned that power and telecommunications
interrupts might have generated cash losses for Applicants.
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7.27. We are aware of 'retract fraud’, where externally introduced mechanical devices 'trap' cash
that customers are trying to withdraw, but our position on this is that, for the purposes of our
investigation, we remain relatively unconcerned about that type of fraud since it impacts
principally on customers and their banks, rather than on Subpostmasters. We have
consequently concluded that retract fraud has not caused losses to Applicants.
7.28. We are far more concerned about other, more sophisticated, types of ATM fraud and theft.
It seems plausible to us, although this is not evidenced, that some of the large discrepancies
reported by Applicants could have included losses brought about by those more sophisticated
attacks. We are referring here to newer risks like ‘transaction reversal fraud’ and ‘malware
attacks’ that circumvent an ATM's software controls. The risk and consequences of those types
of theft, and the need to thoroughly investigate every apparent ATM cash shortfall, seems to us
to have been under appreciated.
7.29. In referring above to "malware attacks", we mean attacks that are carried out by means of
software that, when deployed, allows large amounts of cash to be dispensed by the ATM
without leaving any record of it having been taken. In its response to our references to
malware in the previously issued version of this Report, Post Office said that it:
"is not aware of any form of fraud (including retract fraud) that creates a loss to
Subpostmasters provided they follow the correct accounting procedures".
7.30. In search of greater clarity on this matter, we asked Post Office to provide full details of any
instances, in the last three years, where Post Office, Bank of Ireland or Wincor Nixdorf has
detected an attack against a branch ATM using either malware or hardware devices.
7.31. Post Office has stated:
“Post Office is not aware of any malware attack on its BOI ATM fleet that has
resulted in loss to a branch. Hypothetically, if a loss of cash from a branch as a result
of a malware attack was detected, that loss would be passed to BOI and not be
absorbed by the branch"
and
"Neither Post Office nor BOI are aware of any form of ATM fraud that will create a
shortage in a branch if a branch is following the correct ATM accounting procedure"
7.32. We take little comfort from Post Office's reassurance that it is unaware of any malware
attacks or of any form of ATM fraud that can create a branch shortage. Post Office has also not
confirmed whether it has received similar reassurances from Wincor Nixdorf. Its response has
consequently not materially diminished our concerns that some of the Applicants may have
suffered as a result of such attacks where the resultant cash shortfalls have been wrongly
attributed by Post Office to errors made in the Applicants' branches, or to theft carried out by
their staff (or by the Subpostmasters themselves) rather than to the work of external
fraudsters.
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7.33. Post Office has pointed out that a reconciliation is carried out each day by the LiNK platform
to ensure that the sum of all cash withdrawals charged to customers' accounts equals the total
cash dispensed by each ATM. We accept that this reconciliation process delivers a reliable
control unless the outgoing cash dispensed figures, that are transmitted to LiNK and later
printed out by branch staff and input into Horizon, have been fraudulently manipulated, as
would be the case if the ATM's software has been successfully over-ridden (e.g. by malware) to
ensure that its cash dispensed figures were reduced and that the stolen money was not charged
to any customers' accounts.
7.34. We also observe, in response to Post Office's denial that this sort of attack poses a risk to
Subpostmasters, that Banking Industry experts have confirmed to us that external ATM cash
thefts have been relatively commonly encountered across all banks' ATM networks since 2008,
and that the most sophisticated of those thefts leave no traces, other than large amounts of
missing cash. We are aware, for example, of one malware attack, in May 2014 (that as far as
we know did not involve any Post Office branch ATMs), where £1.3 million was stolen from 51
ATMs ina seven day period (i.e. averaging more than £25,000 per ATM). We are also aware
that it was only the fact that many of those ATMs were completely emptied during the attack
that led to the banks realising that their ATMs had been attacked.
7.35. In this context, Post Office:
“accepts that there are other forms of fraud that may be occurring, however it is not
aware of any form of fraud (including retract fraud) that creates a loss to
Subpostmasters, provided they follow the correct accounting procedures".
7.36. Post Office responded to our question, as to what sort of routine investigations are carried
out (by POL/Bol/Wincor) when ATM cash shortages are reported by its Subpostmasters, by
saying:
"Any unresolved cash discrepancies can be escalated by the branch for further
investigation by BOI, POL or Wincor as appropriate".
7.37. We have seen no instances of any investigations that actually were carried out in response
to any Applicant's complaint about an ATM shortage for which he or she was later held
accountable.
7.38. In any event, we find it implausible that no such external theft-related cash disappearances
have occurred across all of Post Office's 'fleet' of ATMs. We therefore remain concerned that
Post Office accepts as correct whatever Bol reports as having been dispensed by each branch's
ATM, without immediately and thoroughly investigating every material shortfall reported by its
Subpostmasters.
8. Motor Vehicle Licences
8.1. Not all branches are authorised to issue Motor Vehicle Licences (MVL) and only a small number
of Applicants have reported problems with MVL processing. We have, however, seen a small
number of instances of a particular problem. This relates to V11C forms that were misprinted
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8.2.
9.
9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
9.4.
9.5.
9.6.
9.7.
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by DVLA with an incorrect bar code. This seems to have resulted in Horizon recording the sale
of a tax disc, at the wrong price.
. Post Office has stated that whilst this situation is undesirable, it would not give rise to a loss at
the branch.
Foreign Currency Transactions
Whilst only 24 Applicants have referred to problems encountered in processing foreign
currency transactions, our investigations of those cases, and particularly those ten cases where
deficiencies arose prior to 2004, have identified some matters of serious concern. Indeed, one
of those cases generated the largest loss of any of the 150 cases that we have examined. In
that particular case, the loss that Post Office discovered during an audit, and that it then
claimed back from the Applicant, was over £645,000.
Our investigative work led to us focussing on the interaction, in each of the branches that had
used the Forde Moneychanger ('FM') machine, between that machine and the branch's Horizon
system. The FM machine was a multi-currency ‘electronic till' that was used in over 1,000
branches until its use was discontinued early in 2004.
That investigative work resulted in us forming the preliminary conclusion that the accounting
for foreign exchange transactions was, prior to 2004, fundamentally flawed. Post Office has
rejected our conclusion. The problems that we have observed, in relation to the interaction
between the FM system and Horizon, have only been referred to by a small number of
Applicants.
The FM machine, which Post Office has described as "a component part of Horizon", was a
stand-alone device that converted sterling into currencies that were sold to customers, and
also, less frequently, converted back into sterling those foreign currency notes that were
bought back from customers. In effect, it was used to transact, and to support the accounting
for, each branch's foreign currency transactions.
Each day's foreign currency transactions were entered individually onto the FM machine, which
provided customers with receipts, and branch staff with a paper record of every transaction.
None of those individual transactional details could be recorded on Horizon.
Horizon was, and still is, a single-currency system and is only therefore able to account for
transactions in pounds sterling. It cannot hold records of individual foreign currency holdings.
Each week's figures, for each branch, were consequently entered into Horizon by the branch as
‘bulk totals' in pounds sterling.
The in-branch accounting process involved staff recording in Horizon, once a week, the net
sterling impact of all of that week's foreign currency transactions and this was shown as one
‘revaluation’ figure representing the branch's profit or loss on its foreign currency dealings. This
meant that Post Office was unable to 'see' any of the individual transactions. Because of this,
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all anti money laundering compliance responsibility necessarily devolved onto the branch but,
more importantly in our view, it meant that Post Office was unable to detect transactional
errors made in its branches.
9.8. This meant that, where any branch transacted at rates that were materially different from the
‘approved' rates, Post Office had no visibility of those transactions. We are aware of highly
material losses, that were booked to Post Office's Profit & Loss Account in 2003, about which
Post Office had no knowledge, until alerted by an external party.
9.9. Post Office seemingly remained unaware of the significant losses that it was taking to its P&L
Account because, as far as we can tell, those losses were all being subsumed in a mass of
revaluation figures from the 1,000 branches that were then offering foreign exchange services.
Post Office's accounting policy was to immediately book losses of around 5% of the cost of all
the currency it purchased in the Money Markets. It then transferred the currency to its
branches at a ‘revalued' cost figure that was 5% lower than it had really paid.
9.10. This meant that, even if a branch showed a positive revaluation 'profit' each week, the
reality was that, unless the profit achieved by that branch exceeded the 5% figure (which, at the
approved sales rates, it would do) that 'profit' would not be enough to offset the large (5%) loss.
that Post Office had already debited to its P&L Account. However, individual branches were
able to over-ride the authorised exchange rates and report a ‘local’ profit of far less than 5%,
without any response from Post Office, even though that meant that it had then suffered an
overall loss.
9.11. Had a sound multi-currency accounting system been deployed (as it is in any bank that
conducts foreign currency transactions), the huge losses that were being made by that
particular branch would have been immediately visible and doubtless quickly traced back to the
transactions being carried out by one customer.
9.12. We have been unable, as yet, to determine whether the systemic inadequacies, that allowed
the above-described losses to accumulate in that one case, might also have given rise to
unexplained shortages in other branches and/or to more losses in Post Office's own books.
10. National Lottery
10.1. Not all branches sell Lottery tickets or Lottery Scratchcards. Where these items are sold,
they are usually sold from the co-located shop's retail counter, but they have to be accounted
for using the Horizon terminal at the Post Office counter.
10.2. There is often a significant difference in the opening hours of the counter in the retail shop
and the shop's Post Office counter. The retail counter will therefore be selling Lottery
tickets/Scratchcards outside the hours when the Horizon system is operating at the Post Office
counter. Since branches are not allowed to sell National Lottery products other than through
the Post Office, each day's ticket sales have to be recorded, the following morning, in Horizon.
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Also, before any Lottery Scratchcards can be sold, they must first be ‘Activated’ on the Camelot
terminal and then 'Remmed in' to Horizon.
10.3. We have received many reports where Applicants have stated that their branch's Horizon
system would get ‘out-of-sync' with the quite separate Camelot system, thereby generating
material surpluses or deficiencies that were eventually corrected by Post Office issuing
Transaction Corrections (TCs) through the Horizon system. The average Lottery-related TC was
approximately £650 and many of these TCs were for amounts that were exactly divisible by
£160, that being the value of a full pack of Scratchcards.
10.4. Prior to 2012 most discrepancies on Scratch Card activations were caused by
Subpostmasters failing to 'rem in’ to the branch's Horizon system packs of Scratchcards (that
they had activated on their Camelot terminal). In February 2012 Post Office introduced a
system change (referred to as "Ping") that finally eliminated the possibility of synchronisation
errors between the Horizon and Camelot systems.
10.5. Under the new process, activating packs of Scratchcards initiates a process whereby
‘Transaction Acknowledgements' (TAs) are generated and sent electronically every morning to
each branch's Horizon system. Now, before any routine transaction processing can be carried
out, those TAs have to be ‘accepted’ by the Subpostmaster or by one of the branch's staff and,
once that has been done, all the necessary entries on the branch's Horizon system, including
updating the branch's stock of activated cards, are processed automatically.
10.6. This represents a considerable improvement on the prior process which, in our view, has
materially reduced the opportunity for error. It has also reduced the opportunity for
undetected theft of activated Scratchcards.
10.7. _ It follows that these Lottery-related problems appear to have been most serious and
frequent prior to February 2010, at which point Post Office made that significant change to its
Standard Operating Procedures. Although some problems still occurred during the next two
years, the February 2012 system change eliminated the possibility that a branch could have
packs of inactive Scratchcards recorded in Horizon or have activated packs that were not
recorded in Horizon.
10.8. We have also been told by Applicants that, before those important procedural
improvements, and that system change, were implemented, inconsistent and sometimes
conflicting advice was provided by visiting Post Office trainers and by the Helpline, which
further exacerbated their problems.
10.9. Occurrences of the out-of-sync problem appear to have been particularly prevalent in
branches where an associated retail shop sold Lottery tickets and Scratchcards late into the
evening, well after the Post Office counter had closed. A further complication often occurred
on the final Wednesday evening of the monthly Trading Period when Subpostmasters were
required to reconcile the Horizon and Camelot figures as a priority task on the Thursday
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morning, rather than at 17:30 on the Wednesday, but this requirement was not always advised
by the Helpline.
10.10. It is not clear whether the training and support that Applicants received always covered this
important point and, where it was not covered, or where it was not adequately covered, then it
seems Applicants and their staff sometimes made errors, and then systematically repeated
them. To make matters worse, not realising that they were making those errors, they failed to
seek from Post Office the further training that they needed.
10.11. When that happened, relatively high-value Debit and Credit TCs, that when viewed over an
extended period would almost completely offset each other, would routinely be issued to the
branch.
10.12. The receipt of such a repetitive stream of TCs generated two serious problems in affected
branches: first, the branch's books would routinely be out-of-balance and those
Subpostmasters who became conditioned to this state of affairs had to decide how to deal with
sometimes substantial, transient surpluses and shortfalls. Secondly, the routinely out-of-
balance situation would hide real discrepancies from view, such that they remained un-
investigated and uncorrected, thereby turning potentially recoverable errors into real losses.
10.13. Post Office’s position on this is that:
“if the correct procedures are followed, no loss will be suffered by the branch".
10.14. In our view this is a simplistic and dismissive response that fails to acknowledge the real
difficulties being faced by branches prior to those February 2010 process changes and the
February 2012 introduction of TAs.
10.15. Post Office's response seems to ignore the fact that, as with the streams of high-value TCs
issued to some branches in respect of ATM discrepancies (see paragraph 7.23 above), the
frequent receipt of substantial, frequently offsetting, Debit and Credit Lottery-related TCs
created a ‘pendulum effect' where mistakes that had been previously made in the branch were
hidden because of its almost permanently out-of-balance situation, such that, as mentioned in
paragraph 10.12, above, potentially correctable mistakes became real losses that had to be
made good by the Subpostmaster.
11. Training, Support and Supervision
11.1. The nature and extent of training provided by Post Office has developed over the years as
described in our Briefing Report - Part One. In our opinion, the training was probably adequate
for people who had reasonable levels of IT skills, numeracy and accuracy, though further
product-specific training, rather than the use of Operating Manuals, was perhaps required for
some Subpostmasters, especially those whose branches delivered a wide range of products and
services.
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11.2. We have been told by most Applicants that whilst their basic training was probably adequate
in regard to general ‘Business as Usual’ transaction processing, it was predominately sales
focused and weak in regard to End of Day, End of Week and in particular, End of Trading Period,
balancing. We have been advised by most Applicants that there was little or no coverage of
how to deal with discrepancies (both surpluses and shortfalls); how to identify the root causes
of recurring problems; or how to deal with Transaction Corrections.
11.3. Many Applicants have commented that, in the years prior to the installation of the Horizon
computer system in 1999, they typically had only minor monthly surpluses (less than £30
seemed to be the norm) and that they first experienced large discrepancies shortly after
Horizon was installed. Some have asserted that their problems became worse after Horizon
Online ('HOL') was introduced (for most branches this was in 2010).
11.4. The fact that many Applicants have reported that they or their staff only started making
serious mistakes after Horizon was launched, or after the branch migrated to HOL, could
indicate a lack of understanding of how the system was then meant to operate and be used.
That, in turn, could indicate that they had either been insufficiently trained; that they had been
unable to properly train their staff; or that the new screen-based counter processes had
introduced new ways of making mistakes that neither they, nor perhaps Post Office, was aware
of.
11.5. We note that the duration of basic training has varied widely over the years and is now far
more extensive than it was in 1998 - 2010 (the pertinent period for many of the Applicants).
Post Office refers to the current routine provision of two weeks’ training for Subpostmasters.
Many Applicants have reported in their CQRs that they received fewer than two days’ training
and were simply handed Operating Manuals for self-study and to train their counter staff.
11.6. Post Office's trainers, and in some cases Applicants’ line managers, do not seem to have
been well regarded by many Applicants and appear to have been considered particularly weak
when dealing with ATMs; Lottery processing; Motor Vehicle Licences; Foreign Currency and
other specialist products.
11.7. I Subpostmasters are responsible for training and supervising their own staff since Post Office
has no contractual responsibility to train branch staff, other than in its Crown Offices. Post
Office provides Subpostmasters with what it has judged to be relevant training materials for
themselves and their staff, but it does not operate an effective quality control function in order
to ensure that this further training is properly delivered. We have also found that further
training for Subpostmasters was predominantly delivered in response to user demand, rather
than being determined by Training Needs Analysis.
11.8. The problem with demand-driven training is that it only works when the users recognise that
they need further training. It seems to us that, where mistakes are being systematically
repeated, then the individuals who are making those mistakes will not be aware of that (or they
would stop making them), so they are unlikely to realise that they need further training. Absent
the necessary further training, mistakes become habitual and, where the Subpostmaster is the
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one making those mistakes, then it follows that his staff will never be taught how to do things
properly.
11.9. We recognise the complexity of the current product range and question whether a counter
process involving over 170 products, operated by more than 78,000 people, of vastly differing
levels of intellect, experience, numeracy and attention to detail, can ever be expected to work
well without a fully effective and comprehensive training and support regime that covers
everyone.
12. The Helpline
12.1. Many Applicants’ CRs have included examples where the Post Office's Helpline has, in their
view, failed to provide worthwhile support when contacted. The relevant call log (when
available) often does not provide sufficient detail, about exactly what advice was provided, in
order for us to form an evidence based conclusion. Specific criticisms include:
a) — difficulty in contacting the helpline due to its limited availability;
b) unhelpful, script-based, responses; and
c) _ instructions received during one call that are said to have later, sometimes months
later, been countermanded by another.
12.2. As previously stated, a frequently recurring response by the Helpline, relating to shortfalls, is
said to have been:
"don't worry about it, it will sort itself out".
12.3. I Many Applicants have reported that problems did not sort themselves out, nor was any
indication given by the Helpline as to how long they should wait before realizing that a problem
that had not sorted itself out would probably then not do so, nor how they were supposed to
balance the books during the intervening period.
12.4. Many of the shortfalls suffered by Applicants to the Scheme have, on the balance of
probabilities, been attributed to "errors made at the counter" but that does not, in our view,
always mean that more extensive initial training would have eliminated all of those errors,
although it would obviously have helped.
12.5. What we have observed is that, in many instances, the biggest shortages seem to have
arisen as a result of ‘errors made while trying to correct earlier errors'. We attribute this less to
inadequate initial training than to inadequate subsequent support when branch staff, when
they were attempting to correct errors that they had previously made, just made matters
worse.
12.6. Specifically, it has become clear to us that some Applicants and their staff became
hopelessly muddled when they tried to follow the verbally-communicated advice of Helpline
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staff. There have been numerous references to shortages doubling, trebling or even
quadrupling as branch staff tried to correct, under instruction from the Helpline, errors that
they had previously made.
12.7. Post Office's reliance on telephonically-conveyed advice was, in our view, misplaced. We
hold the view that, had written instructions been issued to branches after their contact with the
Helpline, fewer mistakes would subsequently have been made and fewer errors would have
been made when attempting to correct those initial mistakes. Such written instructions should,
in our view, have informed the branch staff exactly what sort of mistake they had made; exactly
what instructions needed to be re-read in order to avoid making such a mistake again; and
exactly what had to be done to correct it. We appreciate that this is not how the Helpline
function is structured but we believe that it would have improved error repellency and the
overall user experience.
12.8. That sort of (generally emailed) feedback has been standard practice among other
companies for many years, yet Post Office has continued to rely only on those telephoned
conversations. Even the records of those telephone calls, that Post Office has referred to as
“transcripts” are not transcripts at all: they comprise only those notes that the Helpline
operator typed out during the call. As such, they have, in most instances, provided us with only
a limited understanding of the advice that was actually given. Also, copies of those notes are
not sent to the person who called the Helpline. In that context, it has proved impossible for any
of the Applicants, or for us, to challenge Post Office's assertion, made in its response to the
previously issued version of this Report, that it has:
"found no evidence to support the allegations that Helpline would often merely
comment that matters would resolve themselves or be dismissive of any enquiry".
12.9. It is clear to us that some Applicants expected the Helpline, visiting Post Office managers, or
Post Office auditors to be able to tell them exactly how their branch's discrepancies had arisen.
It is, however, equally clear to us that Post Office's Chesterfield-based Helpline staff cannot be
expected to determine from afar how every discrepancy has arisen in every branch, so we
regard those expectations as unreasonable.
13. Limitations in the Transactional ‘Audit Trail’
13.1. I Many Applicants have claimed that, whilst acknowledging that some errors were probably
caused by their own mistakes, they were often unable to determine the root causes of
discrepancies (both shortfalls and surpluses) reported by Horizon, because the underlying
transaction data was not available to them.
13.2. Post Office controls the Horizon infrastructure including back-office accounting and
reporting functions. A consequence of this is that Post Office may hold Subpostmasters
accountable for shortages that they are unable to fully investigate due to a lack of access to
data. A Subpostmaster has very limited options in these circumstances and often has to make
good losses even where the underlying root cause has not been established or properly
understood.
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13.3. The concerns fall broadly into three areas:
a) data that isn't available even on the day of the transaction;
b) — data that was at first available, but after 42 days (later extended to 60 days when HOL
was introduced) is no longer available; and
c) data that isn’t available after suspension.
Data that isn't available even on the day of the transaction
13.4. Applicants' concerns principally relate to transaction types where Horizon produces, at the
end of day, only an aggregate amount and volume for that day's transactions. These
transaction types are those where customers have paid for goods or services by debit or credit
card.
13.5. In the event of an end-of-day discrepancy for one of these transaction types, and without
the benefit of a disaggregation of a total amount into its constituent transactional components,
Applicants found it difficult, if not impossible, to identify the individual transaction(s) that had
brought about the discrepancy.
13.6. Typically, a Subpostmaster would need to find items:
a) _ that should have been, but were not, included in the aggregate total; or
b) amounts that had been incorrectly entered, such as £50.00 entered as £500.00, £39.00
entered as £93.00, a withdrawal processed as a deposit; or
c) amounts that formed part of the aggregate total, but should not have been included in
that total at all.
13.7. Only by finding those errors and omissions could Subpostmasters begin the process of
correction and loss mitigation. This may sometimes have involved attempting to contact the
relevant customer, but in order to do that they needed not only to identify the incorrect or
missing transaction, but also to know the name, and perhaps also the address and telephone
number, of the relevant customer.
13.8. I Many Applicants have told us that, prior to the introduction of Horizon, it was easy to do this
since the paper dockets, retained to evidence each transaction, provided this information. It is
regrettable that the Horizon system does not appear to provide the same functionality as the
previous manual system.
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Data that was at first available, but after 42 days (later extended to 60 days) is no longer
available
13.9. The main concern expressed about data availability is the need to refer to a previous period
in the event that a Transaction Correction (TC) was issued by Post Office some while after the
transaction (to which the TC relates) was erroneously input into, or omitted from, Horizon. TCs
are issued for different reasons and different products may be treated in different ways. If the
delay in issuing the TC exceeds 42 days (now 60 days), the Subpostmaster may no longer have
data readily available with which to respond to the TC and may have no practical alternative
other than to accept it. We have been told by Applicants that, if further data was requested
from Post Office, such requests were often rejected on cost grounds.
13.10. We are also aware that the difficulty in printing and examining Horizon's 8cm wide 'till rolls’
was a significant issue in locating the transaction(s) that had created discrepancies. Post Office
asserts that branch staff are responsible for keeping records, typically for two years, and that
those records, supplemented by information supplied with TCs, ought to be sufficient.
13.11. Late-delivered, high-value, TCs can pose serious difficulties for some branches. If the
incoming TC is a Debit (i.e. a TC Invoice), that means that the branch ought to have been
maintaining a surplus from the time that the error occurred until the time that the TC is
accepted. In that Subpostmasters are contractually entitled to withdraw and retain surpluses,
this can mean that they might do that, only to later find that they should not have done so.
13.12. More seriously, if the branch has not shown an overall surplus, that is likely to be because an
offsetting shortfall was in existence as a result of an unseen, and consequently undetected and
un-corrected, error.
13.13. Conversely, if the incoming TC is a Credit, that means that the branch ought to have been
carrying a shortfall from the time that the error (that the TC is intended to correct) occurred
until the time that the incoming TC is accepted.
13.14. This means that the Subpostmaster may have had to ‘fund' that shortfall with his own
money during the intervening period (even though that shortfall was in due course going to be
corrected by the incoming TC Credit). In instances where Subpostmasters have been unable to
make good such transient (though sometimes very large) shortfalls, it is possible that there will
have been a temptation to falsify the branch's accounts while awaiting for the situation to "sort
itself out".
Data that isn’t available after suspension
13.15. Applicants have reported that their ability to investigate transactional discrepancies, or to
defend themselves against allegations made by Post Office, were often thwarted because,
following their suspension (usually on the day of an Audit) they were, as a matter of Post Office
policy, denied access to their Branch. In many instances we have been advised that Post Office
Investigators also removed records, often including personal documents such as diaries in
which Applicants had noted problems that had occurred; to whom they had reported those
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problems; what advice and instructions they had received; and what had resulted from
following that advice or instructions.
13.16. Applicants have also reported that, despite their requests, they never regained access to any
of the records they needed to establish the cause of shortfalls; to gather evidence of theft by
branch staff; or, indeed, to prove their own innocence.
14. Transactions not entered by the Subpostmaster or their staff
14.1. Many Applicants have reported that Horizon transactions appeared to have been entered,
or cash or stock balances changed, when the branch was closed and no one had access to any of
the Horizon terminals.
14.2. Post Office has stated that it is not, and never has been, possible for anyone to access
Branch data and amend live transactional, cash or stock data without the knowledge of
Subpostmasters or their staff. However, we are aware that certain error recovery and
correction processes can result in transaction reversals that carry the System Identity (ID) of the
user who entered the originating transaction that the system itself is reversing, or the ID of the
user restarting the system (see Section 15 ‘Transaction Reversals’).
14.3. We note that this fails to easily differentiate between entries made by a user and those that
are system generated.
14.4. One Applicant to the Scheme has given evidence relating to a facility in the Bracknell office
of Fujitsu where he alleged that it was demonstrated to him that it was possible to alter Horizon
transaction details without the knowledge of individual Subpostmasters. We have requested
that the relevant email files from the period in question be provided to us in order to
investigate this matter, but so far Post Office has only provided us with a small number of the
files requested.
14.5. Our review of those files has been inconclusive, possibly due to just one month of data being
provided, rather than the 12 months requested. We believe that it is essential to examine
contemporaneous documents from the relevant time, in order to form a reliable, evidence
based, conclusion on this important issue.
14.6. Several Applicants have stated that they believe (or suspect) that their branch terminals
have been, or can be, accessed remotely or that their branch data can be amended without
their knowledge or approval. Post Office has denied that it is possible to:
“amend branch data remotely".
14.7. It says that it does have access to branch data, but in a ‘read only’ format. It has also stated
that, if errors are spotted in the transaction data, the only way to amend the data is to issue a
TC or a TA to the branch and that only when the branch ‘accepts' that TC or TA is the branch's
data amended.
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14.8. We note, however, that Post Office has disclosed an October 2008 internal memorandum
that included the remark:
“Fujitsu have the ability to impact branch records via the message store but have
extremely rigorous procedures in place to prevent adjustments being made without
prior authorisation - within POL and Fujitsu".
14.9. At the time of our writing this Report, Post Office has not explained whether or not that
quoted statement was true at the time or whether, if it was true at the time, no such facility
currently exists, as it seems to be asserting.
14.10. In our Interim Report we referred to a software bug in Horizon that had impacted a small
number of branches. We have recently discovered two further documents that describe in
more detail how Post Office handled this issue. In both of these documents a process is
described that involves directly altering branch data. The fix for the error reported in the
document named “Correcting Accounts for “lost” Discrepancies”, created by a senior engineer
at Fujitsu in September 2010, stated:
“7. Fixing the Data for each Affected Branch
The data can be corrected by adjusting the appropriate Opening Figures and BTS
Data that relates to the current TP. This will result in the Discrepancy needing to be
processed when rolling over into the next TP.
I propose that if we are to do this then we take a copy of the data for one branch and
check out the proposed changes on a test system and then rollover the branch on the
test system to ensure that the discrepancy is handled correctly before we attempt to
correct Live data.
Having done one example in this way, we then need to agree a timetable with Post
Office Ltd to correct the other branches and ensure that this is communicated with
the Branches to ensure that everyone involved is happy. Note that if it is decided not
to correct the data in the branches (i.e. POL would prefer to write off the "lost"
discrepancy), then adjustments will be required to the Discrepancy account in
POLSAP to align this with the actual level of discrepancy seen at the Branches.”
14.11. This document refers to correcting live data - a procedure that Post Office denied was
possible. Of potential significance is the fact that this was not just an internal document made
available to a small number of Fujitsu employees, as the copy we were provided with was
printed out by the head of Post Office’s Legal Prosecution team in October 2010.
14.12. A further document titled “Receipts / Payments Mismatch issue notes” appears to be a
Minute of a joint Post Office / Fujitsu meeting probably held in August 2010. The document
refers to the impact of the bug in Horizon as being:
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“Impact
* The branch has appeared to have balanced, whereas in fact they could have a loss
oragain
* Our accounting systems will be out of sync with what is recorded at the branch
* If widely known could cause a loss of confidence in the Horizon System by branches
* Potential impact upon ongoing legal cases where branches are disputing the
integrity of Horizon Data
* It could provide branches ammunition to blame Horizon for future discrepancies".
14.13. The Minute reported three possible solutions.
“Proposal for affected Branches
There are three potential solutions to apply to the impacted branches, the groups
recommendation is that solution two should be progressed.
SOLUTION ONE- Alter the Horizon Branch figure at the counter to show the
discrepancy. Fujitsu would have to manually write an entry value to the local branch
account.
IMPACT - When the branch comes to complete next Trading Period they would have a
discrepancy, which they would have to bring to account.
RISK- This has significant data integrity concerns and could lead to questions of
"tampering" with the branch system and could generate questions around how the
discrepancy was caused. This solution could have moral implications of Post Office’
changing branch data without informing the branch.
SOLUTION TWO - P&BA will journal values from the discrepancy account into the
Customer Account and recover/refund via normal processes. This will need to be
supported by an approved POL communication. Unlike the branch "POLSAP" remains
in balance albeit with an account (discrepancies) that should be cleared.
IMPACT - Post Office will be required to explain the reason for a debt recovery/
refund even though there is no discrepancy at the branch.
RISK - Could potentially highlight to branches that Horizon can lose data.
SOLUTION THREE - It is decided not to correct the data in the branches (i.e. Post
Office would prefer to write off the "lost"
IMPACT - Post office must absorb circa £20K loss
RISK - Huge moral implications to the integrity of the business, as there are agents
that were potentially due a cash gain on their system”
14.14. Although it would appear that “SOLUTION TWO” was the adopted solution, it is clear from
“SOLUTION ONE” that Fujitsu have the ability to:
“manually write an entry value to the local branch account”.
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The risk of adopting this possible solution was described as:
"RISK- This has significant data integrity concerns and could lead to questions of
"tampering" with the branch system and could generate questions around how the
discrepancy was caused. This solution could have moral implications of Post Office’
changing branch data without informing the branch."
14.15. This ability to directly amend branch records is something that Post Office has consistently
denied was possible. This recently discovered evidence appears to confirm, that in 2010 at
least, it was possible for Fujitsu / Post Office to directly amend branch data without the
knowledge of the relevant Subpostmaster.
14.16. In commenting on a draft of this report Post of Office told us that the references to “amend”
and “correct” in the documents mentioned above, are not strictly correct as neither Post Office
nor Fujitsu have the ability to directly change or delete existing records. All that can be done is
that additional records can be added by Post Office / Fujitsu without the consent (and possibly
the knowledge) of the relevant Subpostmaster. This will, however, have the effect of altering
balances at the branch, as both debit and credit entries can be made.
14.17. Post Office also told us:
“All of the above processes for correcting / updating a branch's accounts have similar
features. All of them involve inputting a new transaction into the branch's records
(not editing or removing any previous transactions) and all are shown transparently
in the branch transaction records available to Subpostmasters (as well as in the
master ARQ data).
The language used in the documents produced by Post Office / Fujitsu and to which
you refer is unfortunate colloquial shorthand used by those working on the Horizon
system. I can see how it could be read to suggest that Post Office was "altering"
branch data but the above explains why this is not the case.”
14.18. This is not something that we have been able to test or validate.
14.19. Clearly, the fact that such an ability exists, is not necessarily evidence that such
‘amendments’ were actually made. This is not something that we have been able to investigate.
15. Transaction Reversals
15.1. As mentioned above, a number of Applicants have reported transactions that appear to
have been input when the branch was shut and no one had access to the Horizon terminals.
15.2. A few Applicants have reported that they had entered an original transaction, but had not
entered the reversal of that transaction, stating that the Horizon system appeared to have
generated a transaction reversal, without their knowledge or their intervention.
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15.3. This matter was also highlighted in a report by Helen Rose, Post Office Security - Fraud
Analyst - dated 12 June, 2013:
"... itis just that I don't think that some of the system based correction and
adjustment transactions are clear to us on either credence or ARQ logs."
“However, my concerns are that we cannot clearly see what has happened on the
data available to us and this in itself may be misinterpreted when giving evidence
and using the same data for prosecutions”
15.4. N.B. 'Credence' is a Post Office Management Information Reporting System and 'ARQ logs' is
a reference to a request for Horizon information archived through the ‘Audit Retrieval Query’
process.
15.5. Post Office has stated that:
“when this situation occurs it will not generate losses at the branch".
15.6. We believe that, where the system itself has initiated the reversal of a transaction (such as it
does when a terminal has not been properly logged off at the end of a day even though a
transaction, or a transaction 'basket', sometimes referred to as a ‘stack’, that had earlier been
entered on that terminal, has not been completed), Horizon should assign to that reversal some
indication of that fact, rather than leaving the records showing that the user who input the now
reversed transaction was the one who reversed it.
15.7. We also believe that Horizon should ensure that the person who originally input that (now
reversed) transaction is properly notified of the reversal in order to give him an opportunity to
mitigate any loss that might ensue were he to remain unaware of the reversal.
16. Cash and Stock Remittances (Rems) in and out of the branch
16.1. A number of Applicants have raised issues concerning 'Rems'.
16.2. 'Rems' are inward and outward remittances of stock or cash (including foreign currency).
Large amounts of cash and stock are routinely sent to and from branches using this process.
Robust procedures are in place to ensure that the process normally operates reliably and that
errors, or theft, are rapidly detected.
16.3. Occasionally however, branches will report that a Rem ‘pouch! was not received or that it
contained fewer items, or lower value, than the sender claimed. Similarly, Post Office will
sometimes find that a Rem pouch sent by a branch is missing or its content has been overstated
by the branch. Post Office deals with these discrepancies by issuing TCs that show the details of
the shortfall or overage. Because such discrepancies relate to physical items, it is necessary to
rely on witness statements and other documentary evidence as to the exact content of Rem
pouches.
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16.4. Some Applicants have described instances of foreign currency shipments being accidentally
sent to the wrong branch. We are aware that some of these errors have occurred due to Post
Office's Business Partner for Foreign Currency, First Rate Travel Services (FRTS) using an
incorrect delivery address. Clearly, this introduces the possibility that an Applicant might have
been held accountable for a shipment that was never received by his branch.
16.5. Post Office has told us that:
“if this situation occurs it will be corrected using TCs once that Rem is scanned into
Horizon" and that "if the Rem is not received there will be no loss to the branch".
16.6. It remains unclear to us whether those reassurances totally eliminate the possibility of losses
to Subpostmasters. Where, for example, an incoming Rem is never received by the branch that
ought to have received it then the shipment may well have found its way into the wrong hands
and a loss will sometimes ensue. We take it, from Post Office's reassurance, that such losses
are borne by Post Office and/or by FRTS, rather than by any Subpostmaster.
17. Missing Cheques
17.1. As with other outward Remittances (see Cash and Stock Remittances (Rems) in and out of
the branch above), branches 'Rem' to Post Office's main processing centre (in Chesterfield) all
cheques that the branch has taken in each day. These are put together into 'Stripey' envelopes
and collected by the Royal Mail after each day's cut-off time.
17.2. For almost all of the cheques that Post Office handles each day, everything normally goes
smoothly, but some cheques do get lost or are accidentally spoiled either within the branch or
at Chesterfield, while some envelopes do get lost in transit.
17.3. We have also been informed that is possible for cheques to get damaged in Post Office's
cheque processing equipment and therefore not be processed. In such cases, if the cheque is
so badly mutilated as to be unreadable, the possibility arises that a branch might be charged,
through the TC process, for a missing payment even though the cheque was sent to
Chesterfield. Also, where a customer's cheque ‘bounces’, it will be charged back to the branch
if the branch staff failed to follow Standard Operating Procedures. Post Office has stated that it
will attempt, where possible, to obtain a replacement cheque from the customer.
17.4. Assertions have been made by some Applicants that customers' cheques (received in
exchange for goods or services rendered at the counter) never cleared and they were held
accountable for the value of those missing cheques. Post Office has told us that:
“providing the correct procedures are followed there will be no loss to the branch".
17.5. The problem, as we see it, with this reassurance is that certain practices seem to have
evolved, as Subpostmasters have tried to provide the services that their customers need, which
are not in accordance with what Post Office describes as "correct procedures".
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17.6. _ Examples of this include repeated acceptance of cheques as the Method of Payment ("MOP')
when selling Foreign Currency notes (this practice seemingly having remained un-noticed by
Post Office for extended periods) and also cheques accepted as the MOP for bulk postage. The
latter occurs where, for example, home-based internet traders routinely leave large quantities
of outgoing parcels to be processed as time permits, these being settled to cash (even though
no cash has been received) and where the customer returns to the branch, usually later in the
week, to pay by cheque, at which point those earlier settlements to cash are reversed.
17.7. The point here is that, in our view, if branch practices have evolved, in respect of certain
products, such that branches are routinely accepting cheques where the "correct procedures"
say that they should not be accepted, then it becomes questionable whether those perhaps
outdated procedures can justifiably be enforced such that Subpostmasters carry all of the risk.
17.8. Some Applicants have also complained that the TC process was sometimes so slow (in regard
to cheques) that, by the time they had been advised that a cheque had been lost, mutilated or
returned by the paying bank, all chances of mitigating their loss were gone.
17.9. Post Office has confirmed that Subpostmasters will not be held liable for cheques lost in
transit and that, “if all required procedures have been correctly followed", they will not be held
liable for cheque-related losses.
18. Pensions and Allowances
18.1. A few Applicants have reported problems with Pensions and Allowances where Post Office's
Investigators made allegations that they, or their branch employees, had stolen money by
fraudulently manipulating Pension and/or Allowance payments. The allegations were that
amounts had been recorded as having been paid out when they were not (‘overclaims') or
where Green GIRO cheques or Pension & Allowance dockets had been used more than once
(‘reintroductions').
18.2. Post Office's response described the way that overclaim and reintroduction fraud can be
perpetrated and how the relatively easy to manipulate dockets have since been replaced by the
more secure ‘Post Office Card Account' (POCA) which uses ‘Chip and PIN' technology. However,
Green GIRO cheques are still in use by customers who have (or assert that they have) lost their
POCA cards and by those on temporary benefits.
18.3. It is clear that, while overclaims can arise as a result of errors innocently made in a branch
(e.g. by forgetting to remit a voucher), reintroductions involve a positive decision to re-process
a benefit pay-out even though the genuine transaction with the customer has already occurred.
Post Office concedes that reintroductions can happen by accident, but the Subpostmaster
would still be liable for such errors and it regards multiple reintroductions as being indicative of
fraud.
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18.4. Post Office has stated that:
“providing the correct procedures are followed no loss will be borne by the branch
and any fraud will be readily detected".
18.5. We were concerned that some Applicants, who had been accused by Post Office of fraud but
not ultimately convicted of it, but who had in some instances been required to repay the
allegedly stolen funds, might have themselves been the innocent victims of a far larger ‘pattern’
of fraud.
18.6. Post Office has informed us that no ‘pattern’ of fraud has been detected.
19. Surpluses
19.1. As stated in Section 6 above dealing with The Contract between Post Office and its
Subpostmasters:
“surpluses may be withdrawn provided that any subsequent charge up to the
amount withdrawn is made good immediately".
19.2. Post Office defines discrepancies as including both surpluses and deficits (i.e. shortfalls). We
believe that the cause of all material discrepancies should be investigated and corrected. This
should include consideration that discrepancies might have been caused by the system itself, or
by errors occurring outside of the branch. It is only by doing this that the underlying root cause
of the discrepancy can be established.
19.3. Feedback from Applicants has demonstrated to us that the preliminary investigative
assumption adopted by Post Office appears to be that discrepancies will have been caused by
“errors or problems at the counter or by theft". Post Office's confidence in the Horizon system
remains very high and as such, the system itself will normally be discounted as a source of
error.
19.4. In inputting data into Horizon it is possible that errors are made that generate a surplus,
unbeknown to the customer or to a third party. For example, a surplus can result where a
customer is underpaid at the counter, although this is likely to be detected straight away by
that customer. Errors that are less likely to be detected by customers include deposits that are
under-credited or not credited at all.
19.5. We understand that, although surpluses are expected to be retained by the Subpostmaster,
it is possible to hold them in suspense by ‘settling centrally’ so that future shortages and
Transaction Corrections can be offset against them. Many Applicants appear not to have been
aware of this facility.
19.6. The failure to always investigate and correct material discrepancies is perhaps unique to
Post Office's Business Model. Unlike commercial entities that do not operate on an agency
basis, Post Office has, in our opinion, little commercial incentive to establish the root causes of
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discrepancies because the burden of cost (and risk) is being carried in most instances either by
its Subpostmasters, in the case of shortfalls, or by its customers or its clients, in the case of
surpluses.
20. Cash withdrawals accidentally processed as deposits and other counter-errors that benefit
customers at the expense of the Subpostmaster
Cash withdrawals accidentally processed as deposits
20.1. I Mistakes can occur if the counter clerk accidentally touches the 'DEPOSIT' icon on the screen
instead of the adjacent 'WITHDRAWAL' one, thus generating a deficit of twice the size of the
customer's withdrawal. Such errors by branch staff can be difficult to isolate from the system-
produced totals of 'swipe-card' transactions (see Section 13, Limitations in the Transactional
‘Audit Trail’) unless the customer notices his windfall and then tells the branch about it. Absent
such customer honesty and diligence, shortages brought about by such mistakes are very
difficult to detect and mitigate.
Other counter errors that benefit customers at the expense of the Subpostmaster
20.2. We have been made aware of cases where Applicants have been held accountable for
shortages that have arisen through what Post Office refers to as “errors made at the counter",
where customers have profited at the expense of the Subpostmaster.
20.3. Where a customer has received cash or goods and later discovered that his bank account has
not been debited, or his credit card or POCA account has not been charged, it is quite possible
that he will keep quiet about it, leaving the Subpostmaster to be held accountable for the
resultant shortfall.
20.4. In mid-2008 the method of processing receipts into Girobank accounts was changed.
Previously, customers completed a two-part paying-in slip. One copy of the paying-in slip was
retained by the customer, another was retained in the branch and cross-referenced to the entry
made on Horizon. Note: Alliance & Leicester acquired Girobank in 1990 and Santander took
over Alliance & Leicester in October 2008 but, for ease of reference, all three organisations are
referred to as 'Girobank' in this Report.
20.5. Prior to that mid-2008 processing change, the Subpostmaster would have been able to
identify the amount of cash that had been recorded in the system by cross-checking with the
paying-in slip. Hence, a correction could have been actioned and the branch's books brought
back into balance. In such a case, the apparent cash shortage would have been eliminated
because the audit trail enabled the specific cause of the shortage to be identified and corrected.
20.6. However, after that processing change, paying monies into Girobank accounts was normally
actioned via swipe cards (Chip and PIN cards) with no supporting documentation being retained
in branch.
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20.7. After that processing change, the counter clerk would swipe the customer's card to access
the account details and then key in the cash deposit. After inputting the deposit, the system
printed out just one copy of a receipt (which specifically states on it "NOT TO BE RETAINED")
and this was then passed back to the customer along with his swipe card. No documentation is
retained in branch and nothing is sent to Girobank.
20.8. — It follows that, if the counter clerk did not immediately spot an error, any later branch
balance would show a difference between the cash holdings on Horizon and the actual cash
holdings. However, after the processing change, there would be no supporting documentation
available either to the Subpostmaster, or to Post Office centrally. Therefore neither the
Subpostmaster nor Post Office's central processing unit would be able to check whether or not
the cash deposit entries on the system reflected the actual amount of cash that had been
deposited.
20.9. Post Office has stated that, although this type of error may occur, it would be an example of
n “error made at the counter” for which the Subpostmaster would be liable in the normal way
if aloss occurs. It also states that, under the new process, "the audit trail is retained" and that:
“Horizon has a number of tools to assist Subpostmasters in identifying or tracing
transactions, including transaction logs, event logs and balance snapshots".
20.10. We cannot agree with those reassurances. Under the old (paper) process, the paying-in slips
would be sent to the Finance Service Centre (FSC) which compared them with the Horizon
transactional records and issued TCs if necessary. Under the new process, this after-the-event
control no longer takes place.
20.11. Instead, a control process is now carried out by the customer who confirms, using the
PINpad, that the amount shown on the screen is correct.
20.12. Our observation on this is that this new process introduces a risk, to Subpostmasters, that a
customer, whose account will be credited with an amount greater than he has deposited, or
whose account will be debited with an amount less than he has withdrawn, may either fail to
notice the error or, if he does notice it, may intentionally disregard it and choose to keep the
windfall.
20.13. It is clear to us that the process lost some important functionality when the change was
made to phase out two-part paying-in slips. We find that the reliance on branch staff to
accurately input data, and on customers to verify that the correct amount has been input into
the system, is far from fool-proof, given that not all customers will appreciate that they have
such an important role to play in checking that the transaction has been properly recorded and
also that the customer may be the beneficiary of any error.
20.14. Further, once an error has been made, it can be very difficult to match any erroneous
transaction with the customer who made it, and thereby recover missing funds. Relying on the
branch staff being able to remember, and being able to contact, a customer who carried out a
transaction, could, in our view, result in unrecoverable losses. As Subpostmasters are
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contractually responsible to make good any losses arising from those "errors made at the
counter", it is, in our view, vital that they are able to easily locate and correct such errors and to
recover missing funds.
20.15. Post Office asserts that:
“paying in slips were phased out by Girobank so this change was outside of our
control" and that:
"the automation of the process" was necessary to reduce the rate of errors made at
the counter".
20.16. While the new process has reduced the risk that errors made at the counter would remain
undetected at the counter, it will not have reduced the overall undetected error rate. The only
procedural difference being that the customer now communicates the intended transaction
verbally and then checks that it has been correctly keyed in but the Subpostmaster no longer
has the safety net of staff at the FSC later checking that all customer deposits have been
correctly processed.
20.17. Post Office does not seem to have considered the possibility that its perceived reduction in
the number of errors made at the counter (since the phasing out of two-part paying-in slips)
could be due to the possibility that some of those errors, that were previously detected by the
FSC, are no longer being found.
20.18. In regard to our perception that the new process increases the risk of collusive fraud, Post
Office has responded by asserting that:
“the process changes did not introduce a greater degree of fraud risk to
Subpostmasters".
and
“the potential for collusive fraud was just as likely with the old process as it is now
with the new one".
20.19. In stating that, Post Office has, in our view, failed to recognise that, following the process
change, the control designed to detect mis-keying at the counter is now carried out only by the
customer, whereas before, in the event that a surplus or shortfall was noticed later on in the
day, that check-back could be carried out in the branch (by reference to the paper paying-in
slips that would still be in the branch) and, if no discrepancy was noticed before those slips
were sent off, then the mistake would later be detected by the FSC.
20.20. Also, under the old process, collusion between a customer and a counter clerk would involve
the customer leaving a falsified paying-in slip in the branch, whereas, under the new process,
the customer would not need to incriminate himself in that manner.
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21. Error and fraud repellency and Horizon's ‘fitness for purpose’
21.1. Normally, when a business detects errors or fraud occurring repeatedly, investigative and
analytical work will be carried out to determine whether changes to its Standard Operating
Procedures, to its hardware or software, or to its employee training and support procedures,
should be made so as to reduce the likelihood and/or seriousness of future recurrence.
21.2. This process of investigation and analysis generates, over time, a ‘Virtuous Circle! of
detection, loss mitigation and process correction/improvement, which contributes to the entire
system's robustness and efficiency.
21.3. In not fully investigating "errors made at the counter", even where it is obvious that some of
those errors have been systematically repeated in a branch, or even across the network, Post
Office seems not to taken ‘ownership’ of finding ways to reduce (or manage) those errors.
21.4. This has led to a situation where Subpostmasters have been bearing the cost of losses
caused by errors and fraud that could, in our view, have been designed out of the system, or
where improved operational procedures and training could have reduced the incidence and
severity of errors made, both "at the counter" and also in branch back offices.
21.5. In this context, Post Office states that transactions cannot be lost as a result of being
interrupted by power cuts "as long as the correct recovery procedures are followed". After a
power cut has occurred, the system must be rebooted. Once the reboot has taken place,
Horizon should provide on-screen instructions on how to recover any transactions that could
have been interrupted by the loss of power.
21.6. Post Office's position is that shortfalls cannot occur if the recovery procedures are correctly
followed. It also states, in its response to the previously issued version of this Report, that it:
"remains confident that branch accounts will not be corrupted due to power and
telecommunications failures".
21.7. It incorrectly states, however, in that same document:
"This recovery process was reviewed in detail by Second Sight in their Interim Report
and found to work".
21.8. The reality is, as we stated in our Interim Report, that we have established, from our
investigative work, that the system may not have always performed as it was meant to after a
reboot, particularly if a power failure occurred at the same time. We have been told that, in
some cases after a power failure, the main processor will automatically restart and commence
the recovery process, but that the branch's screens will not automatically turn on. This means
that any messages that are displayed as part of the recovery process, will of course not be
visible to the user.
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21.9. Post Office seems to make the assumption that all of the important messages that Horizon
sends to the branch screens during the recovery process are visible on those screens and also
that they are visible in time to be effective in ensuring that transactions are neither lost nor
duplicated. This would appear to be an assumption that may not be correct in some
circumstances, such as when a power failure has been the cause of the reboot.
21.10. Whereas the detailed instructions contained in the 'Horizon Transaction Recovery
Guidelines' show Subpostmasters what they are meant to do if, when they are processing
transactions, the system loses power or connectivity, it is clear to us that mistakes are likely to
be made at this sometimes challenging time, particularly when the Horizon-produced
‘Disconnected Session Receipts' may have been misunderstood by branch staff or when the
recovery process fails.
21.11. This process can therefore, in our view, be prone to generating losses, particularly in those
instances where the customer has left the branch, sometimes without paying, after it may have
appeared, both to him and to the counter clerk, that his intended transaction had been
rejected.
21.12. Such a situation could result in the customer not paying for, or not receiving payment in
respect of, his intended transaction. This will either result in a loss to the Subpostmaster or to
the customer. The stress involved in such situations can, in our view, be materially heightened
when irritated customers add to the situational pressure or where further power or
telecommunications interrupts occur during the recovery process.
21.13. For the avoidance of doubt, we regard examples of this having happened as evidencing
Horizon's failure to record transactions accurately.
21.14. We have formed the view that, as messages sent by Horizon to the branch terminals might
not always be visible on the branch's screens, it can sometimes be difficult, or even impossible,
for a Subpostmaster to correctly follow those recovery procedures. Another consequence of
this is that transactions that appear not to have been processed (but have been) may then be
re-entered and if, for example, such an accidentally duplicated transaction results in an
extraneous credit to a customer's bank account, then it is possible for that customer to benefit
at the expense of the Subpostmaster and to be the only person who can detect and report that
error.
21.15. We have consequently concluded that it is possible for losses to occur in a branch as a result
of power and telecommunication interrupts where it has not been possible for the
Subpostmaster to "correctly follow the recovery procedures".
21.16. Applicants have referred to this issue in respect of Giro transactions that were being
processed when power or telecommunications interrupts occurred and the branch's terminals
and screens ‘froze’ or powered off completely. When this happens, Horizon invokes its
‘Recovery Mode' and the system goes through a complete reboot, then, when it has finally
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rebooted, a message appears (or is meant to appear) on screen (as long as the screen has been
turned on again) asking "do you need to recover any Giro transactions?".
21.17. A few Applicants have reported that, when faced with that question, they usually did not
know whether or not the system needed to recover any Giro transactions. They say that, if they
responded in the affirmative, the system then asked for the details of the Giro transactions that
needed to be recovered. As the user did not have the relevant details to hand (and could not
access the data as Horizon was still completing its reboot process), they say they were forced
into responding in the negative and hoping that this was the correct response.
21.18. This often resulted in the ‘wrong’ answer being entered and transactional errors being
generated where transactions that should have been re-entered were not, or transactions that
the system had already accepted were erroneously re-processed. Obviously, if such
erroneously duplicated transactions included any where a customer had paid in a cash deposit,
it was likely that the customer's account would be credited twice even though only one inward
payment had been received from that customer.
21.19. This would result in a shortfall that the Subpostmaster would, under the contract, be obliged
to make good unless that customer noticed the error from which he had benefitted, and then
chose to repay the duplicated amount to the branch.
21.20. The following key question, that arises from the above observations, is:
"Is Horizon fit for purpose?"
21.21. In trying to answer this question, we recognise that, in the vast majority of cases, Post
Office's Subpostmasters operate their branches year after year with minimal reported
problems. For them, the Horizon system appears (subject to our observation in paragraph 4.6
above) to be "fit for purpose".
21.22. References here to 'the Horizon system’ are mainly focused on ‘Horizon On Line’ (HOL),
which evolved from the original Horizon application and was deployed in 2010. Our comments
encompass not only the system itself but also supporting processes and procedures. However,
some comments received relate to earlier versions of the system, a number of enhancements
having been made following user experience and feedback.
21.23. For the Horizon system to be considered fully 'fit for purpose’ for all users, it would, in our
opinion, need to accurately record and process, with a high degree of error repellency, the full
range of products and services offered by Post Office, whilst providing a clear transactional
audit trail allowing easy investigation of any problems and errors that arise. The cases that we
have reviewed demonstrate that this design objective has not always been achieved.
21.24. A fully effective system would also need to be able to cope with a diverse collection of end
users and operate in areas where power and telecommunications reliability could not be taken
for granted. The cases that we have reviewed show us that errors are more likely to occur
when unusual sets of circumstances and behaviour are present. We have little doubt that
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branches with unreliable hardware, or poor telecommunications and power services and
supplies, appear to have suffered a disproportionate incidence of problems.
21.25. We have also come to the conclusion that some of the people appointed by Post Office as
Subpostmasters may have been unsuited, from the outset, to the ever-increasing complexity of
running a computerised branch. These include those who:
a) were relatively (or even in some cases totally) new to using a computer;
b) _ had insufficient time and knowledge to be able to investigate and resolve shortages
without substantial support and assistance;
c) relied upon staff whom they may have ‘inherited’ from the prior Subpostmaster and
who were either careless, inadequately trained or even dishonest; and
d) lacked the financial robustness to be able to ‘fund’ every shortfall as it arose.
21.26. In any event, Post Office's recruitment and selection process, which on paper appears to be
thorough and effective, seems to have sometimes failed to reject candidates who, when
interviewed, showed signs of inadequacy and later proved themselves to be wholly unsuitable
to hold the post of Subpostmaster.
21.27. Where such a person, who was either unsuitable, inexperienced or inadequately trained,
was faced with problems, perhaps associated with hardware or telecommunications failures
and the system's resultant restart and recovery procedures, it was at that moment that an
otherwise repairable situation often turned into a catastrophe. For them, and in those specific
and limited circumstances, Horizon could not be described as "fit for purpose".
21.28. In this context Post Office does not accept that it bears any responsibility for "errors made at
the counter" even though it has frequently asserted, in its POIRs, that these were probably the
root cause of a branch's losses. A simple example of this issue involves the common mistake of
settling a transaction to cash instead of selecting 'Debit Card or ‘Credit Card' as the MOP.
21.29. When that mistake is made, the customer will, in effect, receive goods or services free of
charge and the Subpostmaster will later have to make good the resultant loss. Post Office
accepts that this is “a common error’.
21.30. Whilst we recognise that no system can achieve a zero error rate, we hold the view that Post
Office should acknowledge that it bears responsibility for detecting and acknowledging those
system or procedural flaws that have allowed errors to repeatedly occur and also for then
designing and implementing improvements to reduce the frequency and seriousness of such
errors.
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21.31. We have seen little evidence that convinces us that Post Office has done everything that it
could have to discover the root cause of branch losses and to improve its processes and
software so as to ‘design errors out of the system'.
21.32. In that the contractual arrangement that underpins the Post Office to Subpostmaster
relationship places responsibility for branch errors squarely on the shoulders of the latter, it is
to us unsurprising that driving down branch error rates has seemingly not received the
attention that we would normally expect to see devoted to such a vital mission.
22. One-sided transactions
22.1. Many Applicants have raised concerns regarding transactions involving debit or credit cards
where Horizon has processed a transaction but the corresponding charge to the customer's
bank account appears not to have been processed. In other cases the opposite situation
occurred, where Horizon rejected (or appeared to have rejected) a transaction, but the
corresponding charge to the customer's bank account apparently was processed.
22.2. One possible cause for this might be that telecommunications failures have occasionally
prevented one side of a transaction being processed whereas the other side of it has been
processed properly.
22.3. These transaction processing failures would be less troublesome if they were always
detected, at the counter ideally, or later by additional control and reconciliation processes
carried out by the Subpostmaster or by Post Office itself.
22.4. It is however not yet clear whether Post Office's in-house (after-the-event) reconciliation
processes can be relied upon to always detect any one-sided transaction that the
Subpostmaster fails to detect.
22.5. Where a customer has been charged for something that he has not received, there is a very
high likelihood that he will detect this (for example if he receives a Final Demand for a bill that
he believes he has paid) and will then complain.
22.6. On the other hand, where the opposite has happened, and a customer has received cash, or
goods, and his bank account has not been debited or his card account has not been charged, it
is perfectly likely that he will be unaware of his windfall or will simply keep quiet about it,
leaving the Subpostmaster to be held accountable for the resultant shortfall.
22.7. It is important to understand that, where that sort of error occurs, no evidence of it is visible
to the Subpostmaster unless the customer discloses it.
22.8. Post Office says, in referring to ‘one sided transactions’ in its response to the previously
issued version of this Report:
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“this is an inevitable risk of transacting business across the internet and affects all
retailers and banks".
22.9. Post Office acknowledges that, in certain circumstances, one-sided transactions can occur,
but asserts that it has robust procedures in place to detect and correct any such errors. Once
again, it says that:
"if these procedures operate correctly, no loss to the branch will occur".
22.10. Our observation, in regard to those assurances, is to point out that the risk of such
transactional aberrations is, in our view, markedly higher where two electronic systems have to
operate in a synchronised way (as is the case with Horizon and the LiNK system), rather than
where a single system is used, as is the case with other retailers and banks. We must also point
out that few retailers, and no banks, hold their staff accountable for the losses that arise from
such risks.
22.11. We note that Post Office's control and reconciliation procedures rely on correct information
being supplied by third party clients. It follows that, if incorrect information is provided by any
client company, this can give rise to a loss being charged to a branch. We also note that, for
most of the past five years, substantial credits have been made to Post Office’s Profit and Loss
Account as a result of unreconciled balances held by Post Office in its Suspense Account.
22.12. It is, in our view, probable that some of those entries should have been re-credited to
branches to offset losses previously charged.
23. Hardware issues
23.1. An examination of the hardware in use in a typical branch reveals that much of the
equipment appears to be quite old. In some cases it was first installed more than ten years ago.
23.2. There also seems to be little routine hardware maintenance. Instead, faulty equipment is
replaced as and when needed. This process, referred to as "kit swap outs", principally involves
the replacement of broken units with reconditioned ones. Reports of several reconditioned
components or units being tried, and failing, before a working one was found, are not unusual.
This is because much of the bespoke equipment used by Horizon is no longer manufactured.
23.3. I The most commonly raised issues involved counter and back office printers, PINpads, touch
screens, telecommunications equipment and base units.
23.4. Many Applicants believe that faulty equipment could be responsible for otherwise
unidentified shortages. We have been unable to come toa reliable, evidence based view on
this matter, but recognise this as a possibility. Post Office’s position on this is that it cannot
happen.
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24. Post Office Audit Procedures
24.1. In many cases Applicants have told us that they were not given copies of the Audit Reports
relating to their branches and that their enquiries to Post Office, in respect of those Audits,
were never answered.
24.2. It is clear that Post Office's current practice is that each Subpostmaster is provided with a
copy of the Audit Report for his branch. We do not know when this current practice was
adopted or whether a similar policy was consistently applied in prior years.
24.3. A few Applicants have referred to having misunderstood Post Office's use of the term ‘audit',
saying that most of the ‘audits’ that they experienced were merely cash and stock counts that
offered them no comfort in regard to how their branch (and sometimes the existing branch
staff that they had been required to employ when they were appointed as Subpostmaster) was
really operating.
24.4. Some Applicants have also questioned the competence of the auditors sent out to their
branches, saying that some of them did not appear to have any professional qualifications in
auditing or accounting and that many of them seemed to have scant knowledge of how the
Horizon system was meant to operate.
24.5. For those Subpostmasters, particularly those who had prior experience of working in large
companies, they felt themselves to have been denied the reassurance that a "proper audit"
would normally have given them. We note that, once again, the Standard Contract places no
obligation on Post Office to provide such a service to its Subpostmasters.
25. Post Office Investigations
25.1. As a result of our investigations we have established that Post Office's investigators have, in
many cases, failed to identify the underlying root cause of shortfalls prior to the initiation of
civil recovery action or criminal proceedings. This includes cases where Applicants brought to
the Auditors’ or Investigators’ attention their own suspicions as to the underlying root causes of
their branch's losses.
25.2. Many Applicants, and almost all the Professional Advisors, assert that there was inadequate
investigation prior to suspension (in all cases without pay); termination; and civil/criminal
action.
25.3. Based on the cases examined so far, Post Office's investigators seem, in our opinion, to have
defaulted to seeking evidence that would support a charge of false accounting, rather than
carrying out an investigation into the root cause of any suspected problems. Evidence to
support a charge of false accounting is often easily obtained since, when confronted during
interview with evidence of obviously over-stated cash figures, the accused person will often
readily admit to falsifying the end of Trading Period Accounts.
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25.4. With the exception of any interview conducted in accordance with the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (1984) we note that the interviewee is not allowed to be legally represented,
although Post Office says that they may be accompanied by a ‘friend’.
25.5. Post Office's true position in respect of such 'friends' and what they are allowed to say and
do during, for example, interviews where contract termination is under discussion is, however,
far from clear.
25.6. _ In that context, Post Office reassured Ministers, in its 17 December 2014 'Response to the
Westminster Hall Adjournment Debate’, that:
“another person can attend with the Subpostmaster. This can be a friend, or another
Subpostmaster or assistant or a representative of the National Federation of
Subpostmasters. They can make a statement in support and working practice is that
they can speak on behalf of the postmaster, if the postmaster agrees to this".
25.7. Two months later however, in a letter dated 15 February 2015 to a Subpostmaster, in which
he refused that Subpostmaster's request to have his solicitor attend a ‘Branch Incident Appeal’
a Post Office Agents Contract Manager said:
“We allow Subpostmasters to be accompanied at interviews or at appeal by a
‘friend’; however it does not allow the friend the opportunity to represent the
Subpostmaster"
and
"A friend may only attend and listen to questions and answers. He must not interrupt
in any way, either by word or signal: if he does interrupt he will be required to leave
at once and the interview will progress without him".
25.8. We cannot accept, in the light of that 15 February letter, that the assurance that Post Office
has given to MPs really is its "working practice".
25.9. _ Interviews are usually recorded and, if an admission of false accounting has been made, this
will virtually always trigger a ‘Guilty’ plea by the defendant and often an associated repayment
proposal. As a result, Post Office's investigators seem to have found that obtaining admissions
of false accounting was the key to achieving relatively rapid, and (to Post Office) inexpensive,
asset recovery.
25.10. As a consequence of this, Post Office's investigators seem to have de-emphasized the
importance of unearthing the true root causes of the "mysterious shortfalls" that some
Applicants claimed to have suffered. When faced with requests from Subpostmasters for
investigative help, this has often been refused.
25.11. It is clear, from comments made by Applicants, that those refusals were contrary to their
expectations and it seems to have come as a surprise to many of them when they learned that
Post Office's Investigation Division has no mandate to provide general investigative support to
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Subpostmasters. The following quote, from one Applicant, was echoed by others who said that
they really believed that they were entitled to receive investigative support from Post Office:
“I believe that POL never embarked upon a genuine and meaningful investigation of
what was the root cause of the discrepancies"
and, referring to section 12 of the Standard Contract, he says:
“In light of this I believe that there was simply a culture at POL to hide behind this
clause without having to discharge their duty to properly investigate".
25.12. It seems that few Applicants were aware that Post Office's refusals to provide on-site
investigative support were in line with Section 19, Paragraph 12 of the Standard Contract, which
states that:
"The Investigation Division does NOT enquire into matters where crime is not
suspected".
25.13. We note that this 'double-negative' wording (and Post Office's established practice) does not
mean that the Investigation Division can be expected to carry out investigative work where
crime is suspected. This has led to situations where some Applicants have found that, even
where one or more of their employees was suspected - both by themselves and by Post Office -
of having stolen branch funds, no investigative work was carried out.
25.14. This then left them with a contractual responsibility to repay the resultant losses, but with
no help from Post Office in recovering any of the stolen money from those who had taken it. In
some instances Applicants faced with this situation received no meaningful help from the police
either, the police having adopted the position that the investigation ought to be carried out by
Post Office's investigators.
25.15. We asked Post Office to provide details of its Policy and Standard Operating Procedures in
regard to helping Subpostmasters recover shortfalls that they have made good as a result of
proven theft by branch employees and it has answered as follows:
"Recovery of losses caused by theft by branch assistants is a matter for
Subpostmasters as the assistants are their employees. Post Office may help, as a
matter of goodwill, but there is no policy in this regard".
25.16. It has been pointed out to us that Post Office's instructions to (and its training of) its
investigators seems to have disregarded the possibility that the Horizon system could ever be in
any way relevant to their investigations. A consequence of this flawed approach to
investigations is that many opportunities to develop process improvements have been missed.
25.17. This issue becomes even more important when criminal charges are brought against a
Subpostmaster. Post Office’s policy is to bring a private criminal prosecution against the
Subpostmaster rather than to report the matter to the Police and then allow the Crown
Prosecution Service to prosecute.
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25.18. By bringing private prosecutions (which it is entitled to do) Post Office itself becomes
responsible for ensuring that its lawyers adhere to the Code for Crown Prosecutors which
includes ensuring that any cases that it brings to the Courts pass the tests that the CPS itself
would apply.
25.19. These include determining whether it has sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect
of conviction against each suspect on each charge and whether a prosecution is required in the
public interest.
25.20. By carrying out those tests itself, Post Office runs the risk of being accused of circumventing
those checks and balances that a separate and independent body would otherwise have carried
out.
25.21. We are aware of cases where criminal charges have been brought which appear to have
been motivated primarily by Post Office’s desire to recover losses. In some cases, those
criminal charges do not seem to have been supported by the necessary degree of evidence and
have been dropped prior to trial, often as part of an agreement to accept a guilty plea to a
charge of false accounting, so long as the defendant agreed to repay alll of the missing funds.
25.22. We have also been told of agreements whereby no mention was to be made in Court, by the
defendant, of any criticism of the Horizon system.
25.23. We remain concerned that some of these decisions to prosecute may have been contrary to
the Code for Crown Prosecutors with which Post Office, as a private prosecutor, is required to
comply. In order to investigate this matter we had requested access to the complete legal files
held by Post Office in a number of cases.
25.24. Post Office has stated that this subject is outside the scope of our investigation. We strongly
disagree with this view.
26. Conclusions
26.1. When we started our work on these important matters in July 2012, we believed there was a
shared commitment with Post Office to “seek the truth” irrespective of the consequences. This
was reflected in us being provided with unrestricted access to highly confidential and sensitive
documents, including legal advice relating to individual cases. This position was recognised and
well received by other stakeholders, including the Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP and the JFSA.
26.2. However, as time progressed, and particularly in the last 18 months, it has been increasingly
difficult to progress our investigations due to various legal challenges by Post Office. There
have been considerable delays in receiving responses to requests for information and legal
issues have been raised, such as Data Protection and Legal Privilege, as being the reason various
documents could no longer be provided to us.
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26.3. We found that types of document previously provided to us without restriction, were no
longer being provided. Some of these documents were also not being provided to Post Office’s
in-house team of investigators.
26.4. We can only conclude that this represented a policy decision by Post Office at a senior level,
possibly based on legal advice. We consider this regrettable, particularly in the light of
assurances previously provided to ourselves, MPs and the JFSA.
26.5. In expressing our disappointment in finding ourselves unable to complete our independent
investigation in the way that we considered necessary, we wish to place on record our
appreciation for the hard work and professionalism of Post Office’s in-house team of
investigators, working for Angela Van Den Bogerd, Post Office’s Head of Partnerships.
26.6. Our work would have been much harder and taken much longer without the high quality
work carried out by this team. We have also received excellent support from the administrative
team set up by Post Office to support the Working Group.
26.7. We also valued the guidance provided by the Mediation Working Group, chaired by Sir
Anthony Hooper, until its abrupt dissolution on 10 March 2015.
26.8. We have described in this report the results of our investigations (some of which are
incomplete) into the issues and concerns raised by multiple Applicants. As we have previously
stated, when looking at the totality of the ‘Horizon experience’ we remain concerned that in
some circumstances Horizon can be systemically flawed from a user’s perspective and Post
Office has not necessarily provided an appropriate level of support.
26.9. We believe that Post Office should be much more alert to possible problems with Horizon
and encourage its staff to develop a much greater degree of ‘professional scepticism’ in this
regard.
26.10. We hope that this report, although incomplete in a number of important respects, will shed
some light on the important issues raised by the 136 Applicants accepted into the Mediation
9 April 2015
Ron Warmington CFE, FCA
Second Sight Support Services Ltd.
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Confidential
Appendix 1
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
A paper prepared by Post Office to assist Second Sight with the finalisation of their Briefing Report — Part Two
Version three
This paper and accompanying documents are confidential and are not to be disclosed to any person other than
a person involved in the processing of Applicants’ claims through the Scheme
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Confidential
Introduction ..
1. Transaction anomalies associated with CASH or STOCK Remittances ...
Transaction anomalies associated with Pensions and Allowances
Transaction anomalies following telecommunication or power failures.....
Transaction anomalies associated with ATMs
Transaction anomalies associated with Lottery Terminal or Scratchcards ..
Transaction anomalies associated with Foreign Currency.
Transaction anomalies associated with Bank / GIRO / Cheques...
Transaction anomalies associated with Stamps, Postage Labels, Phone Cards or Premium Bonds...
peneysPpye py
Hardware issues e.g. printer problems, PIN pads, touch screens and PayStation...
10. Failure to follow correct procedures or mi:
advice by POL's Helpline .
11. Training and Support issues including Helpline and Audit
12. The contract between the Post Office and Subpostmasters
13. Post Office Investigations Function
14. Surpluses.....
15. Suspense Accounts...
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Confidential
Introduction
As part of the Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme (the Scheme), Second Sight is engaged as a firm
of forensic accountants to provide a logical and fully evidenced opinion on the merits of each Applicant's case.
On 21 August 2014, Second Sight's Briefing Report — Part Two (the Report) was sent as a confidential
document to a number of Applicants and their advisors, as well as to Post Office. The purpose of the Report
was to describe and expand on common issues identified by Second Sight as being raised by multiple
Applicants (a thematic issue). The aim being to provide general information that could then be applied in
specific cases.
Post Office has been unable to endorse the Report. It wrote to recipients of the Report immediately after its
release setting out its reasons for this, and prepared a Reply which was released on 22 September 2014,
detailing its position on the issues raised within the Report.
Further, within Second Sight’s Briefing Report — Part Two, several issues were said to require further
investigation. With a view to moving the Briefing Report — Part Two to finalisation, the Secretariat offered to
assist Second Sight in resolving these matters.
The following paper is written to aid this process, detailing the additional questions posed by Second Sight and
the answers provided by Post Office.
Post Office was provided with the questions on 9 December 2014 and committed to provide answers to the
questions posed before a meeting with Second Sight on 9 January 2015. In line with the short timetable, Post
Office's approach was to identify a subject matter expert within its organisation to, where possible and
proportionate, answer each question. Post Office was not therefore able to comprehensively search for
information nor canvass views on each question from all parts of its business. The answers provided in version
one represented the best information possible given the limited time available but should not have been
considered exhaustive.
Note on version three
Version one of these answers was provided to Second Sight on 7 January 2015 and subsequently discussed at a
meeting between Post Office and Second Sight on 9 January 2015.
At this meeting and the face to face Working Group meeting on 14 January 2015, Second Sight clarified its
position on a number of the questions. This has enabled Post Office to provide furhter information (to those
included in version one) through the provision of version two (provided to Second Sight on 27 January 2015)
and version three (provided to Second Sight on 19 February 2015).
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1. Transaction anomalies associated with CASH or STOCK Remittances (including counterfeit
notes)
Post Office is aware that there is an issue of counterfeit notes being circulated within the UK economy
in general. This is an issue that affects all businesses and Post Office has in place various policies and
procedures in order to detect counterfeit notes and prevent them being circulated within the Post
Office’s network of branches.
The large majority of costs / losses associated with counterfeit notes are claimed from other
parties (e.g. clients, cash suppliers, etc.) with Post Office branches being held liable for a very
small number;
Where responsibility for allowing counterfeit notes to enter the Post Office network cannot
be established, Post Office absorbs the loss itself.
The process used in Post Office can be summarised as follows:
11.
Once a counterfeit note is identified by Post Office, it is verified by a second person.
Post Office then determines responsibility for allowing the counterfeit note into the network
based on the information included on the Plastic Bank Note Envelope (PBNE), an envelope
used to seal the cash as it is moved around the network;
If a branch is found to have not followed correct procedures, it may be held liable for the loss
created by taking a counterfeit note.
Please provide full details of the following:
a) All procedures and controls in place to detect and prevent damaged or counterfeit
notes being issued to branches as REMs;
The Post Office’s Cash Centre is responsible for issuing remittances of cash to
branches.
There are four key elements within the Cash Centre that ensure the integrity of notes
it sends out to branches:
© Use of High speed note counting machines. Each note is checked for all
possible characteristics and any notes that fail to meet the required standard
are rejected, either because they fail to meet the Bank of England’s note
quality standard or because they are counterfeit.
* Daily calibration. Each note counter (there are 7 in use nationwide) are
calibrated daily using a standard pack (a test bundle of mixed quality notes)
by specialist onsite engineers. This check ensures that the counters will
identify counterfeits and non-standard Bank of England notes and that they
are removed from circulation. The calibration check exceeds the standard set
out by the Bank of England and is subject to regular audit by the Bank.
The Note Circulation Scheme (NCS). Under the NCS, the Bank of England does
not distribute banknotes and instead, wholesale cash operators, including
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b)
¢)
d)
e)
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Post Office, sort and distribute notes. Under the NCS, all notes Post Office put
into circulation must be integrity checked.
All procedures and controls in place to detect damaged or counterfeit notes in
outward REMs sent from a branch to a cash centre;
There are comprehensive guidelines included within the Methods of Payments section
on Horizon Online Help. Please refer to Annex 1 for further information.
All procedures and controls in place that prevent notes included in an outward REM
from a branch being sent to another branch as an inward REM without being counted
or checked for damaged or counterfeit notes;
All inward remittances from Post Office branches are opened in the Cash Centre
before being sent out through the cash cycle again i.e. the notes are checked before
being remitted out to branches as per above. There is no process for cash to be sent
from branch to branch.
All procedures and controls used to ensure that notes issued as REMS for use in ATMs
meet the relevant quality standards;
All cash that leaves the Cash Centre for ATM use is checked to ensure it is counterfeit
free and is fit for ATM dispense in line with the Bank of England’s note standards.
Please refer to the answer provided in 1.1a for further information.
All procedures and controls used in branch to detect counterfeit notes;
There are comprehensive guidelines included within the Methods of Payments section
on Horizon Online Help. Please refer to Annex 1 for further information.
The procedures to be followed in branch when a Subpostmaster detects counterfeit
notes; and
There are comprehensive guidelines included within the Methods of Payments section
on Horizon Online Help, with seven different scenarios covered. Please refer to Annex
1 for further information.
The seven scenarios covered are as follows:
© — Identifying counterfeit banknotes;
* Treatment of counterfeit banknotes;
¢ —Remitting counterfeit banknotes;
* Counterfeit notes found loose in official cash;
© Counterfeit notes returned by a customer;
© Counterfeit notes impounded when presented by customers for a transaction;
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* Counterfeit notes found in a deposit prepared by an Alliance & Leicester (now
Santander) business depositor.
Who bears the loss associated with accepting counterfeit notes?
There are detailed procedures documented on Horizon Help to assist the branch in
dealing appropriately with counterfeit notes. If the branch follows the correct,
procedures as detailed on Horizon Help then the branch is not held liable for any
associated loss. Please refer to Annex 1 for further information.
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Transaction anomalies associated with Pensions and Allowances
One of the issues raised by a small number of Applicants to the Mediation Scheme relates to
alleged transaction anomalies which, it has been claimed, are connected to Pensions and
Allowances (P&A).
Typically, this has revolved around allegations of re-introduction fraud. This fraud involves P&A
vouchers being entered into Horizon twice (known as a “reintroduction”). The fraud occurs where
a customer visits a branch to receive a pension payment. First, the customer provides the staff
member at the branch with a P&A voucher and receives their pension as cash in return. The staff
member then enters the voucher into Horizon in order to account for the cash that has been paid
out to the customer. The P&A vouchers are sent on a weekly basis to the Department of Work
and Pensions (DWP). The act of entering the same P&A vouchers into Horizon twice is called
reintroduction. Where this is done in error, it creates a surplus of cash in the branch. Where
reintroductions are frequent and there is no surplus, these are strong indicators that
reintroduction fraud is taking place at the branch.
Post Office has previously provided Second Sight with a paper on P&As. Annex 2 supplements the
responses provided in this section.
2.1. Please provide full details of the following:
a) Data mining or similar techniques used to identify branches which have processed unusual
volumes of P&A vouchers or have processed previously used P&A vouchers i.e.
‘Reintroduction’ fraud;
P&A vouchers are no longer used by Post Office - DWP replaced them with the Post
Office Card Account. The information below is therefore a historic process about which
only limited information is available.
Typically the process may have involved some or all of the following:
« DWP staff in Lisahally used to conduct rota checks of all P&A submissions.
© If they identified a discrepancy in a pouch they would check the previous
month to see if this identified a pattern. The Date Stamp indicator would
often be used as a method of identifying potential suspects and the method,
e.g. over-stamping a voucher with a second date.
© If further discrepancies were found they would then go back as far as possible
which was normally no more than 12 months.
« Ateach stage their check would be corroborated and recorded stating who
had carried out the checks and what had been found.
* Asthis was happening, Post Office (FSC) was advised by the DWP of the
discrepancy and, if it was deemed necessary, an investigation may be begun
by Post Office.
* — Post Office Security would arrange for the branch P&A submissions to be
intercepted by Royal Mail.
«These would be manually checked, recorded and retained by the allocated
Security Manager.
Any discrepancies would be scheduled and recorded along with any DWP
findings in preparation for attending the branch.
An audit may be arranged at the branch and the P&A foils on hand would be
checked and recorded as live evidence.
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b)
c)
4)
e)
f)
8)
h)
2.2.
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© Fujitsu logs may be requested if required to confirm who had made the
Horizon entry for the fraudulent transaction.
All procedures and controls used to detect 'Reintroduction' fraud;
See answer 2.1a and Annex 2.
Any cases in the last 3 years where outgoing P&A vouchers have been stolen or lost in
transit;
As detailed within Annex 2, P&A vouchers are no longer used. They were replaced by the
Post Office Card Account in circa 2005.
Who bears the loss associated with lost or stolen P&A vouchers?
See Annex 2.
Any cases in the last 3 years where P&A vouchers have been re-presented at a branch
by a person unconnected with that branch;
As detailed within Annex 2, P&A vouchers are no longer used. They were replaced by the
Post Office Card Account in circa 2005.
Any cases in the last 3 years where forged P&A vouchers have been presented at a branch;
As detailed within Annex 2, P&A vouchers are no longer used. They were replaced by the
Post Office Card Account in circa 2005.
All procedures and controls used to detect forged P&A vouchers;
Please refer to answer 2.1a.
Who bears the loss associated with accepting forged P&A vouchers?
A Post Office branch would only be held liable for a loss associated with P&A vouchers if they
had been negligent, had not followed correct acceptance and processing procedures or acted
fraudulently.
Are branches required to ensure that the value of the cheques and vouchers being remitted
each week matches the value of benefit pay-outs recorded on Horizon?
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At the time of P&A vouchers being used for transactions within Post Office branches, those
branches would have been required to validate that the amount they were claiming as being
paid out to customers (as shown on Horizon) matched the value of the P&A vouchers on
hand.
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3. Transaction anomalies following telecommunication or power failures
Another issue raised by a number of Applicants to the Mediation Scheme was that of alleged
transaction anomalies flowing from telecommunication or power failures. Power and
telecommunications failures are a risk to any business as branches and Post Office are reliant on third
party suppliers for these services. Recognising this risk, Horizon was designed with "recovery"
processes in place to correct any issues caused by a power or telecommunications failure. Post Office
notes that as yet no evidence has been adduced to show that either of these events will cause losses
in branches where the recovery process has been correctly followed by branch staff.
3.1, Please provide full details of the following:
a) Any tests carried out that ensure that Horizon's screen-based recovery instructions are
visible to the person looking at the branch terminal when a power failure or
telecommunications failure (or both at the same time) has occurred or is occurring;
The recovery process is shown on the Horizon terminal screen and will therefore,
always be visible to branch staff.
b) The information that needs to be entered by the user to complete the screen-based
recovery process;
When the recovery process is carried out, a recovery receipt will always be printed as
part of the next log on after the failure and a recovery event will be recorded in the
Horizon Event Logs.
Depending upon the stage an individual transaction had reached at the time of the
failure, Horizon may ask questions of the Subpostmaster to help decide whether or not
that transaction was complete. Annex 3— ‘Transaction Recovery — Horizon Online
Reference Guide’ — details the questions asked for the different scenarios.
c) Any tests carried out that ensure that the backup mobile telecommunications facility
works effectively in all locations and in all circumstances including busy, multi-position
branches;
Branch back up availability is tested once a week on a rolling basis (one seventh of the
estate is tested every night).
d) Any tests carried out when a branch is upgraded to Horizon Online that confirm that a
reliable signal is available for the backup mobile telecommunications facility.
Please refer to the answer 3.1c.
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4. Transaction anomalies associated with ATMs
A number of Applicants to the Scheme have raised complaints in relation to alleged transaction
anomalies connected with ATMs.
Post Office has previously provided Second Sight with papers in response to their questions involving
ATMs. Annexes 4 and 5 supplement the responses provided in this section.
4.1.
4.2.
Please provide full details of any instances in the last 3 years where Post Office, Bank of
Ireland or Wincor Nixdorf detected an attack against a branch ATM using either malware or
hardware devices. Please describe the technical measures in place to prevent or detect this
type of attack.
Post Office is not aware of any malware attack on its BO! ATM fleet that has resulted in loss
toa branch. Hypothetically, if a loss of cash from a branch as a result of a malware attack
was detected, that loss would be passed to BOI and not be absorbed by the branch
Details of the technical measures in place to prevent malware attacks have already been
provided to Second Sight in Post Office's note on ATMs ~ see Annex 4.
It is not clear which types of "hardware devices" are being considered by Second Sight. If this
relates to cash trapping devices, Post Office has already explained that this type of attack will
not cause loss to a branch — see paragraph 7.4 of Annex 4.
Given the evidence that the Rejected Notes totals, in several 'Print Totals' output reports by
ATMs, have on occasions become corrupted, on what grounds does Post Office assert that
the Dispensed Notes totals could not also be corrupted, thereby showing that the ATM had
dispensed fewer or more notes than it really had?
The Print Totals receipt is only used for managing the ATM cash levels and to allow the
Subpostmaster to identify when the ATM needs to be reloaded with cash. As per all
transactions/inputs that take place on an ATM, Print Total details are recorded on the ATM’s
Electronic Journal. However, the information on these receipts is for the local management
of the ATM only, is not used as part of daily/weekly ATM accounting and the data is not used
outside of the local management of the ATM. This is demonstrated by the fact that the
Subpostmaster must zero the totals on the Print Totals receipt when they reload cash into
the ATM, which can be done as often as required.
Where some corruption of the rejected notes total occurred there is evidence of erratic and
unusual behaviour by the postmaster in the management of hardware (cassettes) and
software (Print Totals; balancing activities). For example, many activities were repeated
multiple times in a very short space of time. Cassettes were loaded, unloaded, reloaded.
Print Total instructions were performed multiple times, sometimes with different cassettes in
or out of the ATM, in the space of minutes, and then repeated. In these circumstances it is
not surprising that the ATM’s logical functions may have been affected. However following
the stated operating procedure would allow these totals to be reset without there being any
impact on the cash dispense/balancing of the ATM as it is the Bank Totals and the ATM
Totals receipts that are required to complete the daily and weekly ATM accounting
procedures.
Itis the Bank Totals receipt that specifically details the value of cash dispensed by the ATM
ona daily basis, The value of cash dispensed is taken from this receipt and recorded through
Horizon. This value is tied back to the value of cash that has been dispensed through ATMs
for each particular day. In summary, all ATM transactions are confirmed between Bank of
Ireland and the Card Schemes, the vast majority of which are processed via LINK, as having
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4.3.
44,
45.
4.6.
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successfully taken place. Any discrepancies between LINK and Bank of Ireland’s data would
be investigated before Post Office would be involved, The total value of ATM cash dispensed
is then settled on the next working day between Bank of Ireland and Post Office. This total
value is checked by Post Office and matched against the individual ATM dispense records.
Therefore any discrepancy in the cash dispense figures would therefore be identified as part
of the settlement process.
It should be noted that in 2011 a full investigation of ATM cash dispensed figures in relation
to M040 was undertaken by Bank of Ireland and Post Office Security. For the month of April
2009 the daily cash dispense figures were compared back to the actual settlement to ensure
these were aligned. No discrepancies were found.
In 2012 POL Security also undertook an investigation in relation to M042 that looked into the
number of Rejected notes that were reported on the ATM during April 2011. Bank of Ireland
provided electronic journal data for the dates in question. While no discrepancies were
identified with the daily cash dispense figures reported by the ATM the exceptional high
rejected notes figure appears to have resulted from the sequence of actions that took place
at the ATM. It was determined that resetting the Print Totals resolved the local issue without
any impact on the cash dispense records for the ATM.
Is it a Post Office requirement that when an ATM is installed that the branch immediately
creates a separate stock unit for the ATM? How is this policy monitored and enforced?
Yes, It is stated in the Post Office Accounting Instructions for Bank of Ireland ATMs that a
separate ATM stock unit must be created when the ATM is first installed. The ATM
accounting instructions then refer to this separate stock unit throughout, as required.
The use of an ATM stock unit is not monitored separately as it is just one of the mandatory
steps to be followed to properly account for the ATM. Post Office monitors the completion of
daily cash declarations and weekly balances. Where these processes are not being
conducted, this is followed up with the individual branches.
In circumstances where the Bank of Ireland generates incorrect ATM cash dispensed figures
for both the branch's ATM and in the figures supplied directly to Post Office, please describe
the controls and procedures in place to detect and investigate this type of error.
This question has already been addressed through correspondence with Second Sight around
Suspense Accounts. Please see Annex 6.
Please explain why it is necessary for Subpostmasters to manually print and enter onto
Horizon, the contents of the daily ‘16:30 - 16:30 ATM Reports’ when the same information is
sent electronically to the Bank of Ireland and then to Post Office.
Itis necessary for Subpostmasters to key the data in because the ATM is not connected to
Horizon and branches need to know the amount of cash dispensed from the ATM in order to
prepare the daily cash declaration.
Please provide full details of the following:
a) Any investigation in the last 3 years in which a technical fault was discovered with the
ATM which produced a shortage when balancing the ATM or a loss on the Horizon
ATM stock unit. How was the associated loss dealt with by Horizon?
Post Office does not collate statistics on the numbers of "technical faults" in the ATMs
across its entire network. It manages issues with ATMs on a case by case basis.
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b)
¢)
d)
e)
ATM related enquiries can be raised by branches through a number of routes
depending on the circumstances (Contract Managers, Field Support teams, NBSC, FSC,
BOI / Wincor, etc.). Only a fraction of those enquiries would relate to "technical
faults" — although it is not entirely clear what is meant by this phrase. It should be
noted that even where there is a "technical fault" this does not mean that cash has
been lost or a branch's accounts have been impacted. For example, there could be a
mechanical failure that causes the ATM to not vend cash.
If an issue raised by one branch may have an impact in other branches, this will be
escalated through the appropriate channels. The escalation route depends on the
nature of the issue but this could be through FSC, Post Office's network support
teams, Post Office IT or Bank of Ireland.
Asa general proposition, a "technical error" in an ATM cannot directly cause an error
in the Horizon ATM stock unit as the ATM is not directly connected to Horizon. Should
however a "technical fault" occur in an ATM that were to cause a loss to a branch, the
branch would not be held liable for that loss unless the branch had failed to follow the
correct ATM accounting procedures.
Any escalated investigation in the last 3 years relating to unresolved cash discrepancies
involving a branch ATM;
See answer to question 4.6a above.
Any instance in the last 3 years in which Post Office, Bank of Ireland or Wincor
discovered that any of their authorised engineers or representatives had stolen cash
from any branch ATM;
There is no record of an authorised engineer or representative (excluding
Subpostmasters) of Post Office, Bank of Ireland or Wincor stealing cash from an ATM.
The only incident that Post Office is aware of relates to a Wincor employee in 2013,
though at this juncture it remains only an allegation. No branch in the Scheme was
affected by these alleged incidents.
Any instance in the last 3 years in which Post Office initially determined that a cash loss
was attributed to a Subpostmaster but where it was subsequently found that the
Subpostmaster was not responsible for the loss;
As explained to Second Sight previously, Subpostmasters can challenge any cash loss
or Transaction Correction in their branch in relation to ATMs. In many circumstances
the information needed to determine the cause of a discrepancy is only held by a
Subpostmaster.
It is therefore likely that there have been occasions when a Transaction Correction
against a Subpostmaster has been challenged and reversed — in accordance with
standard operating practice.
The guidance issued to Subpostmasters relating to the '16:30 - 16:30 Print Totals
Reports' in circumstances where the rear door of the ATM is located in a retail shop or
other non-secure area. Is the Subpostmaster required to close the retail shop when
obtaining the '16:30 - 16:30 Print Totals Reports’ in these circumstances? How does
Post Office monitor and enforce this policy?
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The Print Totals Report is not required for balancing the ATM and does not have to be
printed out on a daily basis as it is only required when additional cash needs to be
loaded into the ATM.
As detailed in the Bank of Ireland ATM Operator Manual, this receipt is used to ensure
cash is correctly loaded into the ATM (i.e. to ensure the correct number of banknotes
is placed into the ATM).
As the ATM safe/cassettes would need to be accessed at this point, and in accordance
with the guidance included in the ATM Operator, Accounting Instructions and Post
Office Security Manuals, the premises must be closed to the public at this time.
It should be noted that the Bank Totals receipt (24 hour cash dispensed figures for
16.30 to 16.30) needs to be printed on a daily basis to allow the cash dispensed figures
to be entered into Horizon. As only the rear cabinet door to the ATM has to be
opened, and not the ATM safe, this receipt can be printed while the branch is open to
the public
Security procedures at branches are part of the compliance audits undertaken at
branches. Subpostmasters are asked about the branches security procedures at the
compliance audit so Post Office can verify that the correct processes are being
followed.
Any instance in the last 3 years in which Post Office, Bank of Ireland or Wincor became
aware of a customer receiving more cash than they were entitled to from an ATM.
Please also provide full details of how the resultant cash shortfall was dealt with in the
branch's ATM/Horizon balancing process and whether any Subpostmaster was held
accountable for losses that were later found to be attributable mechanical problems
with an ATM;
This question has already been addressed in Post Office's paper to Second Sight on
ATMs which explains the processes used to detect, and protect branches from third
party fraud.
In relation to the statistical information sought, see the answer to question 4.6a
above.
How Post Office detects and deals with incorrect items reported in the ATM '16:30 -
16:30 Print Totals Reports' in circumstances when the incorrect figures have also been
reported electronically to Bank of Ireland. Please also describe the accounting
treatment of any loss that occurs in these circumstances;
Post Office does not consider that ATM reports are unreliable. However, if there were
an issue with the 1630 report, it would be the same data feeding through to Bank of
Ireland. Therefore, if the Subpostmaster accurately keyed in the 1630 data (accurately
from the report which, it is being claimed, could be wrong) then the data in Horizon
and the data at the Bank would both be the same (and wrong). In that event, Post
Office FSC would not identify any issue as the two figures agree with each other.
It would be the Subpostmaster that would be in the position to detect the anomaly.
This is because the Subpostmaster is required to do a weekly physical balance of their
ATM at intervals, during which (if the 1630 report were wrong) they would find a
difference between the physical cash in the machine and the cash that the 1630 data
indicates should be in it.
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The Subpostmaster would then be able to make a call to the helpline as with any other
balancing issue.
There is no unique accounting treatment that would arise in such a situation. Post
Office finance systems would include the 1630 data and any enquiries/disputes about
that data would be handled in the same way as any other balancing queries.
Any instance in the last 3 years in which Post Office, Bank of Ireland or Wincor has
become aware of any theft relating to an ATM, that was carried out (or suspected of
having been carried out) by any person other than a Subpostmaster or a branch
employee. Please also describe the accounting treatment of any associated loss.
Please refer to the answer provided to 4.6 c.
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Transaction anomalies associated with Lottery Terminal or Scratchcards
Anumber of Applicants to the Mediation Scheme have complained of alleged transaction
anomalies relating to the lottery terminal in their branch or the accounting process for
Scratchcards. Post Office has addressed these issues in detail in its investigation reports and in its
response to Second Sight's Part 2 Report.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
Please provide full details of any instance in the last 3 years in which any Post Office or
Camelot employee or representative has been found to have stolen Scratchcards or any
other Lottery products/prizes.
There have been no such incidents that Post Office is aware of.
Has Post Office ever issued an instruction that unused Scratchcards must not be collected by
Camelot representatives? Please provide full details of the circumstances that gave rise to
any such instruction being issued.
Post Office procedures for the return of activated and Unactivated Scratchcards is detailed
on Horizon Online Help. The relevant extract is appended at Annex 7.
Further, there are regular Branch Focus updates reminding branches not to give packs to
Camelot Representatives. An example of which is appended at Annex 8.
Is it possible for a Camelot representative to activate packs of un-activated cards without the
knowledge or approval of the Subpostmaster? How would this unauthorised activation be
dealt with on Horizon?
Anyone with access to and knowledge of the Lottery Terminal in a branch (which is often
located in the retail side of the premises) would be able to activate cards. Unactivated packs
should, however, be held securely by the Subpostmaster and the Lottery Terminal would be
expected to be subject to a form of security in branch as it is sited with cash and retail stock.
Ultimately, preventing unauthorised access to the Lottery terminal is a Subpostmaster's
responsibility.
If an unauthorised activation were made, it would currently lead to a Transaction
Acknowledgement (TA) being sent to the branch to “rem” the pack in. Prior to the
deployment of TA’s, it would have led to a Transaction Correction (TC) being sent to the
branch, with the same effect of remming the pack in.
Both of these events (TA or TC) would lead to a message being presented on Horizon to
branch staff requiring formal acceptance by the branch. They could in turn be challenged
and more evidence asked for by the Branch. The TA or TC could be validated against records
from the Lottery Terminal.
Is it true that whenever a claim for a prize is made, in respect of at that point an un-activated
Scratchcard; the entire pack from which that card was taken is automatically activated?
Please describe the accounting treatment of any Scratchcards that are activated in this
manner.
Yes. The subsequent accounting would be the same as noted above in the response to 5.3
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5.5. Prior to the changes made to Standard operating Procedures in February 2010, and the
subsequent implementation of 'Ping' in February 2012, did Post Office find that many
branches were making similar mistakes in regard to processing Scratchcards? Please provide
full details of the types of mistakes that were routinely being made. Please also provide a
schedule showing for each month, how many TCs were issued and of what aggregate value
(separating TC Invoices from TC Credits) during the years 2005 - 2011 in respect of Lottery
matters?
There are number of reasons that a TC can be generated in relation to Scratchcards and each
is handled on an individual basis. However, in Post Office's experience some of the more
likely reasons for TCs are:
«Branch rems in stock on Horizon but does not activate it on the Lottery terminal —
This would mean that stock in Horizon is "inflated". A comparison would be made
between the records of stock activated on the day and the volume of stock entered
into the Horizon system. This scenario would require a debit TC to remove the stock
from the Horizon system. The TC would not affect the cash balance in branch.
Branch activates stock on the Lottery terminal but do not rem it in on Horizon — This
would mean that stock in Horizon would be lower than physical stock in
branch. Any sales made would potentially push the branch into negative stock. A
comparison would be made between the records of stock activated on the day and
the volume of stock entered into the Horizon system. This scenario would require a
credit TC to introduce the stock into the Horizon system. The TC would not affect.
the cash balance in branch.
© Stock adjustments — Branches have been known to use the stock adjustment
function to introduce stock into the branch. Lottery Scratchcards are “value stock”
meaning that they feature on the balance sheet and form part of the branch's
overall stock value. By adjusting stock into the branch rather than introducing stock
via a remittance the volume of the stock adjusted into Horizon reduces the cash
holdings in Horizon by the equivalent value, When the branch next declares their
cash, there will be a cash gain. This scenario would require a debit TC to introduce
the stock into the Horizon system. The TC would not affect the cash balance in
branch.
Itis noted that all of the above causes of TCs are a result of errors by branch staff however
none of them cause an actual loss to a branch. The TCs simply correct errors in the accounts.
On the following page is data on the volume of TCs issued for Scratchcard transactions. Post
Office does not have readily available data to separate this into credit and debit TCs, break
this down by month or on their value.
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Vea Volume
of TCs
2005, 7
2006 273
2007 2286
2008 4529
2009 12242
2010 9156
2011 9061
2012 2219
2013 123
2014 3368
Post Office considers that these figures are influenced by multipled business as usual
changes in process and procedure (both in the accounting for Lottery products and the
issuing of TCs). These can cause the number of TCs to fluctuate.
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Transaction anomalies associated with Foreign Currency
Post Office is not aware that alleged anomalies connected to foreign currency transactions have
been raised by a material number of Applicants to the Mediation Scheme. Second Sight’s
questions on this subject are answered below however this issue may be better addressed on a
case by case basis.
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
Please provide full details of how the Forde Moneychanger (‘FM’) system operates. Please
explain in detail how FX deals were accounted for and the instructions that were provided to
Subpostmasters.
The Forde Moneychanger was used to manage foreign currency transactions and stock in
branches before these functions were carried out on Horizon. Each morning, the branch
would receive a fax with the daily exchange rates on it and a member of staff would enter
each rate into the machine manually. The machines also sent rates to the rate board (which
displayed the rates to customers) and, once this was done, a member of staff checked the
rate board to verify that the rates were displayed correctly.
All foreign currency transactions were entered individually onto the Forde Moneychanger
throughout the week and the machine used a carbonated till roll to provide the customer
with a receipt and branches with a copy of all transactions and balances.
Each night a stock report could be run to check the daily totals. Each Wednesday the
machine was balanced and the totals were then transferred by a member of staff onto
Horizon where the foreign exchange stock would be ‘balanced’ again. The figures were
entered onto Horizon as bulk totals; individual transactions were not entered onto Horizon.
Also, how does the FM system, and Horizon, account for the difference between a
transaction carried out at a Special FX rate and the expected Normal FX rate? As an example,
if a customer was given €150,000 in exchange for £100,000, whereas the Normal FX rate
would have only given him €145,000, how did the FM and Horizon systems account for the
€5,000 difference? What flexibility was or is available to Subpostmasters when agreeing to
non-standard FX rates?
The Forde Moneychanger machine was a stand-alone piece of equipment used to convert
sterling into currencies bought and sold to customers. Print-outs from the machine detailed
the value of currencies on hand that the user would validate by way of a physical check. The
sterling equivalent of these currencies was then entered into the Horizon system. A
revaluation amount was also detailed on the print out and entered into the Horizon system.
Providing the amount of foreign currency on hand matched what the system stated should
be there, the branch accounts (specifically the foreign currency stock unit) would balance as
the revaluation figure accounted for the difference in exchange rates from one accounting
period to the next. The actual exchange rate at which currency was sold was irrelevant as this
was accommodated in the revaluation figure. So, by the Applicant selling currency at a more
favourable rate to the customer and processing this through the Forde Moneychanger
machine (i.e. manually altering the rate on the machine) the stock unit accounts would still
balance.
A special rate for foreign currency transactions over £2,000.00 could be obtained by
contacting First Rate Travel Services by telephone at the time of the transaction. The
transaction would then be processed via the FM machine at the special rate.
Allegations have been made about unauthorised access to transaction data by staff located
at the Fujitsu office in Bracknell. As previously requested and agreed, please provide the
email archives in PST or NSF format for Post Office staff working in Bracknell during 2008.
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In light of the discussions had with Second Sight and clarifications given, Post Office is
working with Second Sight to provide an appropriate response to this request. Further to
your conversations with Belinda Crowe on 20 January, you agreed to provide the specific
questions to which you were seeking answers and the key words you would use to undertake
a word search on any further data that it may be possible to provide. We are still waiting to
hear from you on that and will pick up with you separately.
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7. Transaction anomalies associated with Bank / GIRO / Cheques
7.1.
7.2.
73.
7A.
75.
We are aware that every night, a data file is sent to every bank into which its customers’
have deposited funds, and from which its customers have withdrawn funds. It is then those
banks that bear the responsibility to reconcile Post Office's record of what has taken place
with their own records of the entries that have been processed each day into their
customers’ accounts.
This is a statement with no question to answer
It follows that each of those banks is expected by Post Office to take action where (for
example due to telecommunications interrupts between a customer's bank and a branch's
Horizon system) a customer's account has not been debited or credited by the bank when
Post Office's records show that it should have been, or where a customer's account has been
debited or credited by the bank when Post Office's records show that it should not have
been. The bank would then usually use this data to correct its errors and remove the
additional deposits from the customer's bank.
This is a statement with no question to answer
Please provide us with a schedule listing all TC’s issued to branches in the last 12 months
relating to this type of adjustment.
Post Office does not understand the premise of this question nor the nature of data sought.
As Second Sight notes, in relation to certain (but not all) banking transactions, through a
reconciliation process banks make corrections to their records to bring them into line with
the actual transaction that occurred in branch (as recorded on Horizon). In the usual course
of events, this would not typically generate any return of monies back to POL — rather this is
a process for correcting an accounting error in the bank's internal records.
Post Office believes it may be useful for Second Sight to meet with individuals from Post
Office to discuss this matter in more detail.
Please provide us with a schedule listing all amounts received back from any bank, in
response to that reconciliation process in the last 12 months, clearly describing the
accounting treatment of those amounts.
Post Office believes it may be useful for Second Sight to meet with individuals from Post
Office to discuss this matter in more detail.
We are aware that in some circumstances a customer may benefit from a duplicated
transaction. Please provide full details for any such instances that have been occurred in the
last 3 years and state whether any Subpostmaster was held accountable (during any period
beyond the end of a Trading Period) and required to make good the resultant shortfall.
As described in Post Office's more detailed paper at Annex 11, this scenario does not give
rise to any loss to a branch.
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7.6. We are aware that the November 2008 phasing out of two-part paying-in slips increased the
possibility of error or fraud impacting Subpostmasters. Please state what compensating
controls were implemented as a result of this process change and describe the consultative
process that was used prior to implementation. Please provide details of the anticipated cost
savings associated with this process change together with the estimates of increased
financial risk i.e. the cost benefit analysis carried out by Post Office.
Issues regarding Girobank deposits that are in scope have already been addressed in the
paper at Annex 9, as previously supplied to Second Sight. As described in that paper, the
change from paying-in slips to "chip and pin" was driven by the client bank and was beyond
Post Office's control. Any cost-benefit analysis would therefore have been undertaken by
the client bank and not Post Office.
7.7. Please provide us with a schedule showing the monthly volumes (and the aggregate values)
of EN/TC Invoices compared to Credits that were issued to branches, in regard to Giro
payments and Girobank Deposits and Withdrawals, in the years 1999 - 2013.
Post Office does not have ready access to data for the whole of the period specified nor data
broken down by month. However, it does have the data below from September 2007 to
March 2014, Please note that in this data "deposits" includes "payments".
Post Office does not know which particular issue raised by Applicants this data is seeking to
address. If Second Sight requires data to a more granular level of detail, we should be
grateful for a discussion of the purposes behind this enquiry so we may determine what data
may be available.
Deposits Withdrawals
CR
INV Vol_I INV Val vo I CRVAL INV Vol_I INV Val CRVOL I CRVAL
12/09/2007 —
29/02/2008 394 I £506,933.38 I 405 I _£383,657.28 68 I _ £67,470.60 4 £2,552.53
01/03/2008 —
20/07/2008 512 I £775,872.53 I 1313 I _ £712,001.37 115 I £81,228.49 16 I _£10,298.19
21/07/2008 -
30/11/2008 536 I £713,095.51 I 1089 I £943,522.55 114 I £101,184.30 41 I £24,772.69
01/12/2008 —
29/03/2009 344 I £598,717.76 I 857 I __£709,507.76 121 I £67,745.68 47 I__ £42,509.91
30/03/2009 —
31/07/2009 809 I £637,728.32 I 1310 I _£622,835.14 200 I _£110,373.64 301 I _£164,959.51
01/08/2009 —
20/12/2009 953 I £711,573.85 I 1855 I _£826,017.44 363 I £146,115.00 241 I £108,235.80
21/12/2009 —
28/03/2010 725 I £374,822.88 I 994 I £339,616.36 357 I £164,125.79 127 I _ £44,357.28
29/03/2010 -
22/08/2010 922 I £466,555.30 I 1550 I _£668,247.50 468 I £312,902.88 193 I _ £80,220.78
23/08/2010 —
16/01/2011 1066 I 574,025.36 I 1471 I _ £606,932.02 336 I £109,771.19 129 I £43,713.69
17/01/2011 -
10/06/2011 918 I £368,104.06 I 2801 I _£1,298,855.06 243 I £51,066.72 89 I £48,359.15
11/06/2011 —
29/11/2011 1079 I £445,894.49 I 2228 I _ £904,488.57 246 I £61,975.34 88 I _ £21,932.00
30/11/2011 -
08/05/2012 1144 I _£478,580.60 I 1891 I £908,126.80 188 I £50,975.24 74 I __ £16,776.02
09/05/2012 —
31/03/2014 3846 I €1,536,867.77 I 8625 I _£3,738,560.29 957 I £426,747.32 233 I £80,811.08
£8,188,771.81 £12,662,368.14 £1,751,682.16 £689,498.63
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7.8.
7.9.
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We note that cheques not covered by a Cheque Guarantee Card were not an acceptable
Method of Payment for certain transactions e.g. the sale of Foreign Currency. Please confirm
whether or not Horizon is programmed to reject unacceptable Methods of Payment in these
circumstances. Also, if a branch has systematically been accepting cheques in amounts that
exceed approved limits, is there a process whereby those repeated errors are detected and
corrected?
Horizon can advise on the method of payment, but a clerk can in practice choose to take a
cheque instead of cash, for example, but still record the transaction as cash on Horizon.
Horizon is programmed to indicate the appropriate methods of payment for products. If
card payment is not acceptable then it would not be offered and the card would not be
recognised. If cheque is not acceptable then the cheque payment icon would not appear but
Post Office cannot control whether a branch chooses to ignore that fact and still take a
cheque and process at the point of settling the transaction as a cash payment
Whether or not a cheque was covered by a Cheque Guarantee Card was not the reason
behind whether a method of payment was acceptable regardless of whether a guarantee
card was presented, Acceptable payment methods were dictated by what range of payment
methods Post Office’s corporate clients wanted Post Office to offer.
As regards the Cheque Guarantee Card, these no longer exist as they were phased out by
banks.
We are aware that in some circumstances Horizon does not record transactions accurately.
Specific examples include:
Post Office is not aware of the "circumstances" alleged by Second Sight in this question.
a) Where, during Horizon's recovery mode processing, some transactions, that were not
processed, or were only partially processed, may not be properly corrected when the
system invites the counter clerk to correct the errors or omissions and, if the screen
instructions to the counter assistant are interrupted (as would be likely to happen
where there are telecommunications or power interrupts) then discrepancies may
ensue;
The transaction may not be recorded accurately but that is due to how the clerk
applies and follows the “recovery instructions” which have been issued to branches
(please refer to Annex 10). Whilst it may have been the system that had a connectivity
issue, the error in accounting would be due to the user’s failure to follow the recovery
instructions, not a failure by Horizon to record it accurately. Accounting process is
covered by the recovery instructions at Annex 10. The quick reference guide has been
provided in response to question 3.1b.
b) Where misalignment of screen icons results in the inadvertent execution of the wrong
type or value of transaction;
There is a screen calibration application which can be invoked at any time by the
Subpostmaster from the Engineering menu of Horizon. If the screen is out of
calibration then that would affect the whole screen and not individual icons so it
would be obvious to the user that the screen had gone out of alignment. If this issue is
noticed and a call made to the helpdesk then the subpostmaster or staff member
would be asked by the agent to re-calibrate their screen to fix the issue.
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7.10.
7.AL.
7.12.
7.13.
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c) Where Foreign Currency transactions have been incorrectly accounted for through
interaction between the Forde Moneychanger System and Horizon (Note: we regard
the FM system as a component part of 'Horizon'); and
As described in Section 6, such errors would be the result of user error.
d) — Where system-to-system interface problems result in incomplete transaction
processing e.g. where a PINpad, PayStation or other piece of equipment fails to
complete its part of a transaction.
If the above scenarios took place, the transaction would simply decline or the
customer would be asked for an alternative method of payment. As the transaction
would be declined and the branch's accounts thereby left in balance, there is no need
for any follow-up accounting process.
Please provide full details of the controls and procedures that will detect these types of error
and describe the accounting procedures that apply in these circumstances.
The accounting procedures for these are conducted in branch and, wherever a particular
process is necessary, it has been described above.
We are aware that if the root cause of a lost cheque is unknown or attributed to some other
cause outside the branch, Post Office will absorb this loss and not pass it on to the
Subpostmaster. Please provide monthly totals showing the aggregate of all such losses in the
years 1999 - 2013, describing how much of that loss was absorbed by Post Office and how
much was passed on to Subpostmasters.
Post Office has previously explained (via Spot Review 12) to Second Sight that lost cheques
cannot be the cause of loss to a branch unless it can be shown that the branch is at fault.
Further enquiries have been made into possible contextual data on this topic. Post Office
does not have data readily available regarding what, if any, “missing cheque" losses would
have been passed to Subpostmasters. As noted previously, compiling the data sought by
Second Sight would be a disproportionate exercise given that Second Sight accepts that in
principle this issue could not create a loss to a branch.
nevertheless, Post Office has conducted further analysis to specifically review the last 4
months of cheques submitted by branches. In that period, branches have taken
1,850,204. 452 cases arose of missing cheques (0.02% of the total processed). Further
investigations and action by FSC resulted in 35 Transaction Corrections being issued to
branches (0,0002%).
We are aware that some Subpostmasters routinely accept high-value cheques from
customers that are in excess of the monetary limits set by Post Office. Please describe the
procedures that were followed prior to determining these limits and state the accounting
treatment of losses that occur in these circumstances.
Products may have limits (e.g. savings may only be up to certain values); it is not the cheque
that is limited. There is no high value cheque limit set by Post Office.
We are aware that processing or technical failures can occasionally give rise to ‘one-sided!
transactions. We are also aware that Post Office has stated that ‘in any event a branch will
never be liable for an error caused by a ‘one-sided’ transaction’.
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This is a statement with no question to answer. But the statement that a branch will never
be liable for what Second Sight describes as a ‘one-sided transaction’ is correct.
Please describe the controls and processes that detect one-sided transactions in
circumstances such as when a customer withdraws funds from an account at the branch
counter but, although he has received the cash, the account never gets debited.
This question has already been addressed by a paper appended at Annex 11 which has
already been supplied to Second Sight.
Nevertheless, “One sided transaction” implies incomplete double entry. We would be
grateful if Second Sight would cease the inappropriate use of the phrase “One sided
transactions”.
What the question actually asks about is completeness of record keeping.
If the transaction interruption occurs during the Horizon accounting process, it would be
subject to recovery processes, referred to earlier and previously shared with Second Sight.
If the interruption is beyond the branch, the branch accounts are not affected. How banks
would then detect their own failure to debit their customer’s accounts is a matter of their
internal process. From a Post Office point of view, the withdrawals recorded in branch
would lead to debits in a central vendor account which Post Office would in turn clear down
by payments received from the bank. If the bank had not debited their customer’s account
then that would likely manifest itself in them not paying Post Office centrally and Post Office
would challenge them with evidence of the original transactional record. This is not a
situation that would lead to a discrepancy for a Subpostmaster.
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8. Transaction anomalies associated with Stamps, Postage Labels, Phone Cards or Premium Bonds
8.1. We are aware that occasionally postage labels are purchased by customers, but the printer
fails to print correctly. Please describe the procedure whereby the Subpostmaster can
recover the cost of the missing label in circumstances where the missing label has not been
processed as a ‘reject’.
After printing, Horizon explicitly asks the clerk “has this label printed correctly Y/N”.
If the label has not printed correctly then the clerk confirms “no” and another label is
printed.
Post Office is aware of situations of damage in the printing process and there is a process to
“spoil” them so that the branch is not disadvantaged. There is a clear process in Horizon and
the branch is required to retain the spoilt label. This is appended at Annex 12.
To be able to claim a label as spoilt, the branch is required to produce to Post Office the
spoilt label as evidence.
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9. Hardware issues e.g. printer problems, PIN pads, touch screens and PayStation
9.1. We are aware that occasionally branch Touchscreens get “out of alignment" and that in
these circumstances touching one icon generates a system response associated with another
icon. Please provide full details of the controls and procedures in place that detect or prevent
this type of problem.
Please refer to the answer provided to 7.9b
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10. Failure to follow correct procedures or mis-advice by POL's Helpline
10.1.
10.2.
10.3.
Anumber of applicants have reported that Helpline staff have said "don't worry, the problem
will sort itself out".
This is a statement with no question to answer.
Please provide full details of the actions taken to investigate these allegations and confirm
whether or not Helpline staff have been instructed to never say "don't worry, the problem
will sort itself out", or similar words.
Where such allegations have been made by Applicants to the Complaint and Mediation
Scheme Post Office has fully investigated the NBSC calls logs as part of its thorough
investigation and reported its findings in the Post Office Investigation Report.
In relation to certain transactions, Post Office has in place processes and controls to detect
particular errors by branch staff. Where an error is detected, a transaction correction may
be sent to a branch to correct a mistake. In these circumstances, it may well be correct for
NBSC to advise a branch to await receipt of a transaction correction amongst other steps.
Post Office understands that it is this scenario that is being referred to by Second Sight and
considers that this advice may be appropriate in the right circumstances.
Please provide details of Post Office's Policy and Standard Operating Procedures in regard
to those situations where customers leave parcels and come back some days later to settle
their accounts. Specifically, what is Post Office's position in regard to the credit risk that
Subpostmasters take, and the potentially ‘false accounting’ issues that those
Subpostmasters risk, when they routinely allow customers (such as eBay Sellers) to drop off
large quantities of parcels that are then dispatched by settling the labels to ‘Fast Cash’ (even
though no cash has at that point been received from the customer) and then reversing all
those Fast Cash payments to cheque when the customer later pays by cheque?
Post Office does not have a policy of providing credit to customers. Where Subpostmasters
have done so, they have contravened Post Office operating instructions which state that at
the point the transaction is completed the appropriate method of payment should be taken
from the customer.
Therefore, the risk would be the Subpostmaster’s in respect of an unsettled payment from
the customer.
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11. Training and Support issues including Helpline and Audit
Another issue running through the applications to the Mediation Scheme was the alleged poor
quality of training and support provided by Post Office to Subpostmasters.
Second Sight’s questions on this topic are dealt with below however Post Office considers that
issue relating to training and support are likely to be case specific and does not see how this can
be a thematic issue suitable for Second Sight's Part 2 Report.
11.1. Please provide us with full details as to how the following issues are dealt with during the
handover to a new Subpostmaster:
a)
b)
¢)
Ensuring that the new Subpostmaster has manager/supervisor-level access rights to
the branch's Horizon system;
The Field Support (FSA) team involved in the branch opening process would create the
User ID for the incoming Postmaster at the correct (maximum) level of manager. The
audit team would:
e Delete any obsolete users from the system and ensure that the incoming
Postmaster and any new staff members are added to Horizon in the correct
format.
* Check the Horizon User ID’s against the list of Registered Assistants.
© Any staff working in the branch that are not registered with HR should be
reported via the Anomalies Report that the FSA completes to notify HR so
that they can follow up with the Postmaster.
¢ Inform the Postmaster of the correct process for registering assistants with
HR.
© Set new alarm codes once the transfer is completed under FSA supervision.
© Add new user(s) to Horizon ensuring that all staff are also listed on the
reporting form to HR.
That every employee has a unique User ID and password;
Please refer to answer provided to 11.1a.
Ensuring that every till or employee and ATM is associated with a separate stock unit;
and
Some branches operate with just one “shared” stock unit as they don’t feel the need
to have individual units (this depends on the branch’s preference).
ATI's are required to have a dedicated stock unit. This is checked on branch audit. If
the branch does not have a separate ATM stock, one is created (instructions on how to
do this can be found in the Additional Horizon Procedures on EASE) which stands for
“Engaging and Supporting Effectively’ and is the library of tools, official forms and
processes from which the Field Team take all of their instructions in the deployment of
all types of Field Support Activity.
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d) Ensuring that all branch employees are approved by Post Office;
Please refer to answer provided to 11.1a.
11.2. We are aware that, when attempting to correct errors made at the counter, and to deal with
incoming TCs, some Subpostmasters make matters worse by making further mistakes at that
point. Please describe the controls and procedures in place to detect and prevent or correct
these types of commonly made error.
“Correcting errors” and “dealing with incoming TCs” are different things. A branch may be
seeking to correct an error it has spotted itself well before a TC becomes necessary.
When correcting errors, some Subpostmasters do indeed sometimes make further errors.
The controls and process are:
© Through their own vigilance in concluding a transaction they should spot issues;
© Through daily cash declarations and other routine supervision of their branch they
should spot errors;
* Having spotted an issue they can use local transaction logs to review and reflect on
transactions; and
If they cannot determine the root cause themselves then they can call the Helpline
who in turn may involve FSC. However, for many errors made at the counter by
branch staff, there may be limits on what investigative support Post Office is able to
provide because it is not aware of what is physically happening in each branch — only
a Subpostmaster knows this.
11.3. Please provide full details of the following:
a) Any surveys or other quality control procedures in order to measure user satisfaction
with regard to the NBSC and HSD Helplines;
NBSC performance is measured on the time advisors take to answer the phone,
referred to as a “Grade of Service”. The target is to answer 70% of calls within 30
seconds and to have no more than 5% of abandoned calls (i.e. where the caller hangs
up before reaching an advisor). For complaints, NBSC’s target is to resolve 95% of
complaints within 10 working days.
Further, the Subpostmaster engagement survey also measures satisfaction levels of
users of the NBSC ~ the most recent of which showed that 83% of respondents felt
that the support from NBSC was effective.
b) The extent to which that advice provided by the NBSC and HSD Helplines is monitored
and quality checked;
All advisors are coached through a robust quality process called ‘rewarding skills’. This
involves the team leader listening into a selection of calls and providing feedback on
call handling, customer service and quality of the response.
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¢)
d)
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The extent to which the written reports (call logs) of the NBSC and HSD Helplines are
routinely compared to the actual calls and quality checked;
As part of the quality monitoring as outlined in 11.3b, the actual call log is checked to
ensure that it has been categorised correctly and relevant details of the call are logged.
There are no written reports as all calls are logged onto a robust call logging system.
Any surveys or quality control techniques used to assess the adequacy of training
provided to Subpostmasters; and
Post Office uses the independent external organisation Kendata to collect feedback
from all customers of Field Team Activity, including Training, Audit and Intervention
activities.
Following these support activities which are supplied by the Field Support Advisors
(FSA) , across all branch segments in the Network, the FSA will ask the
Subpostmaster, Operator in Charge, and all training delegates, if they will complete
and return a double sided form to describe their experience in terms of the FSA’
performance and the effectiveness of the activity itself.
A form is handed out at every activity as described below:
At all Audits including Branch Closure Audits;
Classroom and on-site training (BAU & NT);
Post Transfer Visits;
Interventions visits - including Non-Conformance Visits (NCV’s) e.g. Mail
Segregation / Dangerous Goods / other Non ~ Compliance/ standards
activities.
Exceptions include:
© Anaudit resulting in Suspension;
© Special Request audits — where fraud is suspected,
Performance Management
All feedback is submitted directly to Kendata, then summarised and sent to the line
managers of the Field Team and the individual FSA. The reports are tailored to the
different levels of line management on terms of detail ranging from full detail
including comments at the FSA and FTL level, up to an overview of performance by
teams and activity at Senior Manager level.
Each Field Team Leader (FTL), the first line managers of the FSA’s, will discuss the
performance of the FSA’s at their appraisals unless there are any concerns raised, in
which case this is dealt with as soon as the reports are received. If further
information is needed to hold an effective discussion, the FTL will call and speak to
the person providing the feedback, wherever possible, to further understand the
issues.
The FSA performance, and the FTL’s team performance is discussed monthly as part
of their appraisal with the Regional Manager.
The feedback received on the activity itself is used alongside other information
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gathered by the Lead Team to drive and inform change and improvements to the
Field Team support offer.
Examples of the forms used are appended at Annexes 13, 14 and 15.
e) Any surveys or quality control techniques used to assess the adequacy of training
provided to branch staff other than Subpostmasters.
This is a duplicate of question 11.3d.
11.4. Process issues at the end of each Trading Period
This question is not understood.
11.5. Please provide full details as to how and when Post Office notifies Subpostmasters that they
may extend a Trading Period into what should be the next Trading Period.
Branch trading dates are communicated to branches annually through Branch Focus (the
branch newsletter) and are also updated on Horizon online help. If a revision was needed
during the year the same process would be followed.
If a branch wished to request permission to extend their trading period they should contact
NBSC. This would only be permitted in highly exceptional circumstances. NBSC would
contact the FSC Relationship Manager who may consult with the Network Contract Manager.
The formal response could come from any of the three parties, depending on the
circumstances.
1.6. Please provide full details as to the options available to any Subpostmaster who, at the end
of a Trading Period, discovered a shortfall that was:
a) Larger than they could ‘centrally settle’; or
The upper limit on being able to ‘centrally settle’ is 999,999.99, Should such an
incident occur, Post Office would manage by exception.
b) Only discovered after the Helpline had closed for the evening.
They could delay closing the Trading Period until the next morning — they could then
contact NBSC before opening the following day. However, well run branches would be
unlikely to have last minute surprises like that, because it would have become evident
during other daily cash declaration processes and checks during the preceding weeks.
Last minute surprises usually reflect poor planning / management by a Subpostmaster.
11.7. Bearing in mind that some TCs would be issued many months after the original shortfall,
what options are available to Subpostmasters to ‘fund shortfalls that exceed their ‘central
settlement’ limit?
Please refer to the answer provided to Q.11.6a.
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11.8. Please provide full details as to the consequences of introducing ‘Monthly Trading’ periods.
For example, did Post Office notice an increase in the number of branches suffering
discrepancies that led to contract termination?
Having made further enquiries on this question, Post Office confirms that it does not hold
this data.
11.9. We understand that when Post Office moved to Monthly Trading, Branch Suspense Accounts
thereafter had to be closed out to zero at the end of each Trading Period. Please provide full
details of options available to a Subpostmaster dealing with the investigation of a loss just
before the end of a Trading Period.
This is answered in Section 9 of Second Sight's Part 1 Briefing.
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12. The contract between the Post Office and Subpostmasters
Some Applicants have made complaints in relation to the contract between them and Post Office.
Second Sight’s questions arising out of these complaints are answered below.
12.1. Please provide full details of the following:
a)
b)
¢)
Any insurance coverage Post Office has ever offered to arrange for its Subpostmasters;
Though this question is out of scope, it is a function performed by the National
Federation of Subpostmasters. Discounted insurance rates have been offered to
Subpostmasters by the National Federation of Subpostmasters and it is their decision
whether or not they opt in.
The measures Post Office takes in order to reduce the risk that incoming
Subpostmasters, who take over an existing branch and its staff, may be inheriting
employees who have been found to be, or are suspected of having been, incompetent
or dishonest. In this context, was there, or is there now, any competency and integrity
verification, performance appraisal, or formal disciplinary/warning process whereby
‘outgoing Subpostmasters and Post Office's own Line Managers could warn incoming
Subpostmasters where questions had been raised?
Staff members/Subpostmasters’ assistants are employees of the Subpostmaster and
not Post Office Ltd. It is the Subpostmaster who performance manages the staff
members including any disciplinary action as appropriate. It is also a Subpostmaster
who needs to assure themselves that any assistants are suitable for the role by
conducting interviews, seeking references, etc.
When a Subpostmaster recruits a new member of staff there are a number of checks
that have to be undertaken (e.g. right to work in the UK, proof of identity and proof of
address along with their five year work history).
In addition, the individual must be registered with Post Office Ltd so the security
checks can be undertaken (e.g. criminal record check). There is an annual check of all
assistants to ensure they have been cleared through the pre-employment checking
system. A recruitment file has to be established and maintained holding the basic
paperwork for each assistant (please see section 15 of the Subpostmaster contract for
services, paragraph 4, for further information).
Under their contract for services with Post Office, every Subpostmaster must establish,
maintain and adhere to a formal disciplinary policy in respect of any assistants who fail
to comply with the Subpostmaster obligations as detailed in the contract. The
disciplinary policy must include the content as defined in the contract and records
must be retained (please see Section 15, paragraph 9, of the Subpostmaster contract
for services paragraph 9 for further information).
The measures Post Office takes in order to satisfy itself that potential Subpostmasters
have the necessary skills to meet the challenging requirement of being a
Subpostmaster?
This is undertaken through:
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a) The provision of a business plan to support an individual's application; and
b) Acompetency based interview of the individual which is undertaken by
trained assessors.
At interview, applicants are assessed on their ability to explain their business
proposition, answer any questions raised and provide examples to demonstrate their
understanding of what is required across a number of competency areas. The business
plan is also assessed financially by the Finance team.
How Post Office ensures that Subpostmasters have a copy of the Contract no later
than the day that they commence their position.
The contract document is issued with the offer of appointment when an individual is
advised they have been successful at interview. This has been the process since 2001.
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12.2.
12.3.
We understand that many Subpostmasters have only signed the one-page
‘Acknowledgement of Appointment’ Letter and not necessarily been provided with a copy of
the Contract. Please describe the basis upon which Post Office considers the Contract
enforceable in these circumstances?
Post Office has stated on a number of occasions that matters relating to the Subpostmaster
contract are out of scope and that, as this is a legal question, it is outside of Second Sight’s
area of expertise.
However, in the interests of providing Second Sight with as much information as possible,
Post Office’s position is that this question concerns the formation and enforceability of
contracts, the response to which will be informed by the particular circumstances of each
individual contract and their application to the relevant legal principles. Though it is not
therefore capable of giving rise to a general response it is worth noting that the
“Acknowledgment of Appointment” document, whilst not the main contract itself, states
that the Subpostmaster has been given and has accepted the terms of the standard
Subpostmaster’s contract.
We understand that Post Office considers the terms of the Contract to be broadly similar to
those used in franchising arrangements across the UK. Please provide full details evidencing
this proposition?
A franchise agreement is a private contract between two (or more) parties recording the
basis on which they agree to do business in their particular circumstances. The SPMR
Contract is similar in that it records the basis on which Post Office and Subpostmasters do
business.
Enclosed at Annex 17 is an extract from the Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents. This is a
leading legal text providing precedent agreements for various situations. The extract is Form
18 from Vol 16(4) and is a precedent for a "Non-Exclusive franchise agreement for a retail
business",
As can be seen from the Precedent, the terms of a standardised franchising arrangment are
broadly similar to the terms of the standard Subpostmaster Contract. There are obviously
some differences between the two as the Subpostmaster Contract is tailored to Post Office's
business whereas the Precedent is generic however the core principles are largely the same -
for example (number references are to clauses in the Precedent):
© Premises (4 and 9): Both Franchisee and SPMR are both responsible for leasing the
premises and ensuring that it is appropriate to operate the business.
© Setup costs (10.1.2): The Franchisee must pay for the initial fit out and equipment
costs if provided by the Franchisor. Post Office also requires this payment in some,
but more limited, circumstances.
* Training: Franchisor / Post Office to provide initial training to the franchisee / SPMR
(5.1.1) and the Franchisee/ SPM is required to train their own staff (9.2.11)
* Employees (9.3.5): The Franchisee / Subpostmaster is responsible for employing
suitable staff.
© Equipment / Software: The Franchisee / Subpostmaster is required to record all
sales and other financial information using the equipment and software provided by
the Franchisor (9.2.23 and 10.9).
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© Telephone lines (9.2.22): The Franchisee / Subpostmaster must provide the
communications line for the EPOS systems and credit card machines.
© Advice (6.2): At the Franchisor's discretion, it may provide advice to a Franchisee on
how to operate the Franchisee's business — this reflects Post Office's approach to
providing advice through its helplines.
¢ Problem support (6.3): Any support provided by the Franchisor to the Franchisee to
help resolve problems will be at the Franchisee's cost. There is a slight difference
here in that although Post Office's additional support is voluntary, it is provided at
nil cost to Subpostmasters.
© Changes in business (9.2.2): Both Franchisor and Post Office can change its business
model and products for sale.
© Information / Accounts (9.3.8 and 10.9) — the Franchisee is responsible for the
accuracy of all reports, information and accounts.
© Audit (9.2.13 / 13): Both Franchisor and Post Office have a right, but not a
requirement, to audit the Franchisee / Subpostmaster. Audit is described in the
Precedent (13.1) as an inspection of the business and books — not a full accountancy
audit. This is in line with Post Office's use of the word "audit".
¢ — Responsi for accounting errors (13.2) — Franchisee must "promptly rectify" any
accounting error — again this is very similar to the wording the SPMR Contract.
Liability: The Franchisee is required to indemnify the Franchisor for any loss
resulting (i) a failure to follow the business operating practices (9.3.7.3) or (ii) "any
deliberate or negligent act, error or omissions by you or your employees" (9.3.7.4) -
this is almost identical to the SPMR Contract wording.
In any event, the terms of the Subpostmaster Contract are the terms on which Applicants
agreed to do business with Post Office. It is the relationship described in those terms that
must be applied when assessing Post Office's and a Subpostmaster's actions. It is not open
to anyone to look to retrospectively impose new duties on Post Office that did not previously
exist. For this reason, Post Office maintains that challenges to the Subpostmaster Contract
are outside the scope of the Scheme, which was to focus on Horizon and associated issues.
Such an evaluation is also beyond Second Sight's expertise as they are accountants and not
lawyers.
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12:
uw
12.6.
12.7.
12.8.
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We understand that Post Office does not recommend that its would-be Subpostmasters take
legal advice (in regard to the Standard Contract) prior to entering into that contract. This
appears to be contrary to best practice procedures. For example, the British Franchise
Association recommends that independent legal advice should always be taken prior to
signing a franchise agreement. Please provide full details as to why Post Office does not
comply with this best practice recommendation?
Itis open to all Subpostmasters to seek legal advice at any time and Post Office does not
block this in any way.
The reference to the BFA standards is not applicable here. The BFA recommendation is
directed to franchisees (in a similar position to Subpostmasters). The BFA does not make a
recommendation franchisors (in a similar position to Post Office) to require on legal advice
being taken by franchisees.
. Several Applicants have reported their concerns that Post Office employees acted
inappropriately in connection with the closure of transfer of their branches. The inference of
the majority of the remarks made is that certain Post Office employees acted
unprofessionally, either by leaking confidential information (that was damaging to the
Applicants) to potential buyers and/or by thwarting their efforts to sell a viable branch until it
was no longer viable (and consequently of lower value).
These are very serious, but wholly unsubstantiated allegations that Post Office denies and
has not seen evidence or been provided with evidence to support these allegations. Further,
it was as agreed at the Working Group meeting on 15 January that this request for
information is too wide.
. The further inference is that certain Post Office employees seemed to be in some way
motivated or incentivised to find reasons to close branches, that were already destined to
close under the various closure and re-invention programmes, without cost to Post Office.
See answer provided to 12.5.
Please provide full details of the work performed to refute these ‘bad faith’ allegations.
See answer provided to 12.5.
Please provide full details of Post Office's policy and procedures in respect of writing off
amounts due from Subpostmasters. Please also provide similar information relating to Crown
Offices. Please also describe the write off authorisation limits applicable to different grades
of staff.
Subpostmaster write off levels are documented, Please see a copy of the write-off process
for agency branches appended at Annex 16.
Losses from Crown Offices form part of the individual Crown Office’s P&L and ultimately Post
Office’s P&L.
Though reports have been issued to Crown RSMs on levels of losses, it is not a case of
authority levels. Tolerance is set at individual level. As a general rule an ‘escalation’
investigation is initiated after three losses of in excess of £30, although there are variations
to this depending on local and individual circumstances. Branch Managers also implement a
series of surprise checks on stock units and separately carry out supervisory misbalance
checks when a stock unit is showing £30 or more loss on two consecutive daily cash
declarations.
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Discrepancies can also be identified at the end of each trading period where the Branch
Manager undertakes a full cash and stock reconciliation. An ‘escalation’ investigation can be
initiated as a result of errors found as part of that process.
Crown Offices discrepancies are rectified using the same Transaction Correction (TC) process
as is used in Subpostoffices. TCs are sent to the Branch Manager who is responsible for
accepting or querying the TCs based on the evidence in branch. This process could also
identify discrepancies which could result in initiation of an ‘escalation’ investigation
Depending on the circumstances, actions against an individual member of staff in cases of
persistent negligence or wrongdoing can include disciplinary action, dismissal and
prosecution.
. Please provide details of Post Office's Policy and Standard Operating Procedures in regard to
helping Subpostmasters recover shortfalls that they have made good as a result of proven
theft by branch employees.
Recovery of losses caused by theft by branch assistants is a matter for Subpostmasters as the
assistants are their employees. Post Office may help, as a matter of goodwill, but there is no
policy in this regard.
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13. Post Office Investigations Function
13.1.
13.2.
13.
w
13.4,
13.5.
Please provide full details of any criticism of Post Office’s (or Royal Mail’s) investigative
actions or of its employees in any Court judgement or ruling.
This question is very broad in scope - it could be interpreted to apply to the whole of Post
Office's business and not just those issues under review in the Scheme. Through further
discussions with Second Sight, Post Office now understands that Second Sight is looking for
criticisms of Post Office's security investigation team and not criticisms of other parts of Post
Office's business nor its legal / prosecutions practices.
Although this greater clarity is welcomed, the question still remains premised on an
assumption that there is an issue with Post Office's investigation function that would give
rise to criticism. To date, no such issue has been identified by Second Sight. This enquiry
also needs to be placed in context. Post Office, like all large organisations, is regularly
involved in legal processes. It also only separated from the Royal Mail Group in April 2012,
prior to which investigation functions were shared across both businesses. There is
therefore no single source for the information that Second Sight is seeking.
Against this background, those individuals currently responsible for the security team and
legal proceedings at Post Office have confirmed that they are not personally aware of any
criticism in a written Court judgment or ruling of the nature described above. For the sake of
clarity, no review of historic judgments involving Post Office has been undertaken in reaching
these views ~ such judgments are in any event a matter of public record and could therefore
be reviewed by Second Sight.
Please provide a schedule showing the number of requests from Subpostmasters for
assistance in investigating discrepancies their branch's accounts for each of the years 1999 —
2013. Please also show for each year the number of requests when assistance was provided.
Post Office does not hold this information. To undertake this exercise would require POL to
review 14 years of calls to NBSC and HSD from a network of almost 12,000 branches. This
request is clearly disproportionate.
. Please provide a schedule showing the number of investigations into branch surpluses or
shortfalls for each of the years 1999 — 2013 clearly setting out the number of investigations
in each category.
Post Office does not hold this information. To undertake this exercise would require POL to
review 14 years of data from a network of almost 12,000 branches. This request is clearly
disproportionate.
In relation to requests for assistance, we understand that, where several instances of the
same problem occurs, a ‘problem record’ is created and the root cause of the issue is
identified and fixed (i.e. to avoid further instances). Please provide a schedule of all
significant ‘problem records’ and all process and software modifications (excluding "minor
amendments to processes") that have been implemented, in the years 1999 - 2013, that
were designed to reduce the frequency and impact of “errors made at the counter”.
This is a disproportionately wide request for general information, without identification of a
specific issue raised by Applicants. If Second Sight is able to identify, with supporting
materials, specific cases where Applicants to the Scheme have been affected by these issues,
Post Office will of course reconsider this request.
Please provide full details and results of any user satisfaction surveys Post Office has
conducted into the Horizon system.
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Post Office constantly receives feedback on Horizon from its tens of thousands of users
through a variety of sources.
The primary sources are the NBSC, Horizon Service Desk, Branch User Forum and NFSP.
Feedback is also delivered through a variety of BAU processes, for example, from contact
with the Finance Service Centre, and through discussion in the field with Contract Advisors
and Field Support Agents.
That feedback is then implemented through regular system reviews and upgrades
implemented by both POL and Fujitsu, and in product development (e.g. to streamline the
processes for transacting a new product).
13.6. We understand that many of the unexplained branch losses are attributed to "errors made at
the counter". Please provide a schedule showing the number and value of unexplained
branch losses or "errors made at the counter" for each month for the period 2008 to 2013.
Please also provide similar information relating to Crown Branches including the amounts
written off each month
Post Office does not hold this information
13.7. Please provide a schedule showing the number and value of ENs and TCs issued to branches
for each of the years 1999 to 2013 (we need to see separate volumes and values for Credits
and Invoices).
Post Office has readily available data for 2012/13 and 2013/14 —see below. Compiling
information for previous years would require considerable data analysis.
Post Office does not know which particular issue raised by Applicants this data is seeking to
address. If Second Sight requires more data to consider individual applicant's cases, we
should be grateful for a discussion of the purposes behind this enquiry so we may determine
what data may be available.
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Year Debit TC Volume I Credit TC Volume Debit TC Value Credit TC Value
2012 / 13 74,748 47,939 £31.4m £33.7m
{approx.)
2013/14 59,149 44,509 £27.6m £28.0m
13.8, Please provide full details of changes to the Horizon system and/or to its Standard Operating
Procedures that were designed to reduce the risk, incidence and severity of errors and fraud,
as a direct result of investigations carried out into unexplained branch shortfalls, or in
response to problems, vulnerabilities and susceptibility to errors or fraud, for the years 1999
— 2013.
Second Sight has clarified that it is not seeking an exhaustive list of all the changes described
above; rather it is seeking a summary of the key changes over this period and brief
description of each change. This information is provided below.
* MoneyGram Automation — Quotes and financials are now provided directly
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into Horizon rather than the clerk telephoning and transcribing the rate /
amounts.
Broadband Sign Up — Addressing the issue of “slamming” (an illegal
telecommunications practice, in which a subscriber's telephone service is
changed without their knowledge or consent) accusations by onscreen
“Read to customer...” messages, and key terms being printed on the signed
receipt.
Bureau Pre-Order — Order lifecycle is now managed through Horizon to
ensure payment is taken at the point of order, and issuance is to the correct
customer.
Care Quality Commission / Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Identity
Checking — There is now automated customer identity verification to ensure
key data attribute checks are performed and the correct fee taken.
Motor Vehicle Licenses (MVL) — Stock lifecycle is now automated to track all
MVL stock from the point it leaves the warehouse to issuance or
destruction.
Post Office Card Account (POCA) Card Issuance — Automation is now in
place in terms of the issuance of new and replacement card stock to
customers.
Regulatory Compliance Training — The model has been simplified to allow
tests to be rolled out at reduced cost with full auditability based on Horizon
user log on.
Rod Fishing Licence ~ The licence issuance process is now automated for
both short term and annual licences; removing the paper licence from
branch.
Camelot Cheques ~ The cheque issuance process is now automated for
large prizes.
Stock Ordering — The creation of an online ordering process through
Horizon has removed the need to fax / post order cards; product codes and
allowable order volumes are now automated to ensure branches received
the correct stock.
Travel Insurance ~ Price look up for policies is now automated, these were
previously keyed manually from the brochure look up tables.
Horizon Recovery — Online transactions with 3rd parties (e.g. MoneyGram)
are recovered in the event of, for example, a temporary loss of power or
telecommunications to ensure synchronisation of branch, PO datacentre,
and 3rd party systems. The situation before the change was that the branch
had to remember what transaction they were in when the power/comms
went down, and then contact the service provider directly to find out if the
transaction had completed.
Bureau 2nd receipt —The production of a duplicate session receipt
(necessary for Bank security checks) is now automated, previously the clerk
had to remember to print it manually.
Lottery TA (PING) ~ Lottery sales figures are now incorporated into the
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Transaction Acknowledgement (PING) process. The branch confirms the
system reported figure for the previous days sales when logging in the next
morning.
Spoilt Postage Labels — There is a revised process for spoilt postage labels to
ensure labels are correctly accounted for and VAT automatically reversed
correctly, where applicable.
Display of long addresses in postcode lookup — Screen displayhas been
revised to allow long postal addresses to be displayed on two lines. This has
resolved an issue of postcodes not appearing.
(pending) Cheque Rem out - There are plans in place to implement a
revised process to bring all elements of the cheque Rem out and despatch
onto a single screen, with automation of cheque totals entry, and printing of
despatch slip. (expected May 2015)
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14. Surpluses
14.1. Please provide full details as to how Post Office tracks surpluses and shortfalls at the end of
Trading Periods at both branch level and in aggregate.
This data is not collated by Post Office but at an individual branch level it can usually be
reconstructed from the branch's Horizon logs so long as the branch has accurately conducted
its end of branch trading processes.
14.2. Is it possible that an error which has generated a surplus in one branch can result ina
shortfall in another branch? Please provide full details as to how this may occur.
No (except for in connected Core and Outreach branches where remittances of cash
between the branches are not correctly recorded by branch staff).
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15. Suspense Accounts
Post Office has already addressed Second Sight's questions on its Suspense Accounts in its Suspense
Accounts paper. This paper demonstrated that so long as a branch follows Post Office's standard
operating practices, it cannot suffer a loss due to the operation of a Suspense Account.
15.1.
15.2.
15.4.
Please provide full details of all Suspense Accounts held by Post Office. Please also provide a
schedule, for each year end between 2008 and 2013, showing the amounts transferred to
Post Office’s Profit and Loss Account (both debits and credits) for each Suspense Account
held.
Please also provide a schedule, for each year end between 2008 and 2013, showing the
balance held on each Suspense Account (both credits and debits).
. Please provide an electronic report in CSV format or similar showing for the last 3 years the
following information for every item posted to any Suspense Account:
a) Full transaction details;
b) _Originator’s reference;
) Any comments or notes associated with the transaction; and
d) — Full account details of the account the transaction relates to or is being transferred to.
Post Office provided a paper (included at Annex 18) prior to a meeting between
Second Sight and Post Office’s CFO. The CFO has subsequently written again with
more information and a further meeting is due to be arranged in the near future.
Please describe the controls used to detect errors in Post Office client reports that if not
corrected could give rise to an incorrect TA or TC being issued.
Where Post Office receives client reports, these are part of matching accounts, where
Horizon data is matched to the client data. Therefore, if the client report was wrong, it
should lead to a difference compared to the Branch data. Post Office would then investigate
that difference. If a wrong approach were made to a branch, the branch themselves could,
in turn, challenge it.
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Agenda — Operations Board - 23 May 2018
Purpose: To review and improve operational performance, enabling stakeholders to hold each
other to account and drive a SLA culture
Redacted
5 I 11.30-12.30 Network Review operational performance: sites Mark Ellis
Operations and access criteria; opening hours;
compliance; losses; robberies; cash decs;
agent support
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ACTIONS ~ OPS BOARD ~ MAY 2018
[Action Swner [Bue [Status [Update
1 I Deep dive, root cause and solution for 2,338 calls on balancing etc plan to resolve I Mark /Gayle I March Ongoing I Balancing laminates signed off and will be in branch by the end of March. Success of
I laminates to be tracked during April. Laminates are currently being dispatched from
I Swindon, Last ones due to be received 2
June.
I I
I I 19/03/18 ~ Case management will provide insight when it is in place. 5000 Knowledge
I I
I
I
I
May. Call volumes to be tracked during
Base articles have been re-categorised and streamlined to 3000 to provide greater
I granularity on what would previously have been logged as Branch Balancing and the
I solution advised.
I I This is now part of the work Neill Boulton and Rachel Conway are doing as part of
{ Contact Centre Strategy so suggest we close this and include further down,
Redacted
ZL v6LVA
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T ik Trowier is leading on this fromm an SC perspective andl will provide updates each
I month at Ops Board. Nick and Russell have engaged with senior stakeholders and Nick
I id now building the necessary products needed to support this initiative. Unit
4 SharePoint site is now up and running and capturing branch data.
Maret
I The recent Communic: have di
I cash instructions is low. Needs to be built into new training modules and we should
I revisit our language to improve understanding in direct comms (Doug) and via field
I teams (Pam)
765: Start soft reporting of polluter pays Coats of TCs and leadhin process” Stuart
[Anaiysis underway. Looking to start with REM TCs as there is no debate that this is
~-Lbranch.errot.
edacte
8°" Agree mhaagenint and correction of the stamps Aorizon Contision to ensive dawe "I Gayle RRB nn galnig 7 Takia ave held ia Pebraary to undératand inipact of the changes made at Christmas
I I identified. The full problem will only be solved once auto stock management processes
I I have been introduced. In the meantime, learning points include 1) Review of whether
I I change to button position will be used again at Christmas 2) improved comms to
l Lbranches. Christmas plans are starting again so we will include in work.
ei v6L A
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Redacted
Cash Management ~ follow-up on repeat offenders Kin ‘April “POntrack
Tin conjunction with Cash Management we started to fook at the branches that had
I I been on the report for a number of weeks. However, Doug discovered that there is a
I high value of cash in pouches sat in branches, which need TC’s issuing,
I I This is distorting the picture and is inflating the excess cash figures. Out of the first 4, 3
had CiPs and the fourth had already had an audit with a loss, we have now moved onto
the next batch,
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Confirna the number of open plan branches with cash peaks > ES0K and what we” ] Steve SAB
Redacted
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SAP GUI Bureau Value Issues
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» May 2018
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2.0 —- Former Agents Debt — Pi Movement
boi p62
Value £m
Pd9
Pd 10
Pdl Pd.
Opening Balance B/F
Debt Collected in Pd
New Debt (£<10k)
New Debt (£>10k)
Other (Balancing item)
Closing Balance C/F
(40.6) I
{10.6)
(10.9)
(11.6) (12.0)
Check
Debt written off in Pd
{0.0}
This table represents the movement in
Balance sheet provision for Former
Agent debt.
Added below the table is the in period
write off, summary criteria for this is:-
. All debt pursued by a quick
dunning letter to LBA (Letter
before action from solicitors).
. W/O if value below £3k as more
expensive to chase
. W/O between £3k - £10k where no
assets are visible
. W/O over £10k subject to further
approval
. All W/O cases are held in suspense
and subject to later review where
appropriate
. New debt sorted at £10k —
assumes less than £10k is
accounting errors Vs potenti °
Fraud (reporting purposes
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2.0 - Summary Debt movement
. This table represents the movement in volume of
tee ae ies ‘ge I Migr Ay cases (e.g. in P1 19 cases where paid in full)
fae voror 495 500 488 I 4g2 490
a I . 23 cases written off in the period (0.1m) with 4
paid in full “13 - I
cases c£10k each where no assets are available to
recover debt. (All W/O cases held on file for future
cleared credits “1
“= t action)
Writte Off -12 +22 3 I 6 -23
New Debt 19 32 24 I 30 59 . 19 cases paid in full (£50k), including one for
pn a an a ah — £17k that was over 6 months old.
New Credits 0 8 14 I 10 32
ee ae 500 288 482 490 531 + 273 cases had no movement at all in Pt
Cyl VELA
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2.0 — Current Agent Debt
P12 (2017/18) PL P2 P3
Value ae Value Value I Value —
ww ve ten I MO! ty I ty I Ol
INCORRECT GROUP
B- Current on Former _. {1307 6 I ni a
F - Former on Current 2951 6 i j
Sub Total 76 12 : : 0
DISPUTED DEBT
C- Contracts Advisor
C- Contracts Advisor (MoneyGram)
D-FSCDispute
M-FSCMiskey dispute
T-To clear at next TP
Sub Total
972.9
“Redacted
REPAYING
P - Paying by instalments (cheque or BACS) I i 89.7) 15 i ii
R-DFR 1,133.4 1,041.8 I 443 i i
‘Sub Total 1,236.0 468 1114) 458 - 0 : 0
[Grand Total [ 23814) 703] 207227 650 I 8 : a
[Debt Movement in Pd
]
evi yells
{o9.2) 7-53 [
Period 1 debt movement
Outstanding debt has reduced £309k (53 cases) in the
month, driven by:
£100k from in month payments from remuneration
£130k (40 cases) cleared by FSC
£100k debt now moved to Former Agents
£14k increase as 1 new case moved into Freeths
2.
4,
MoneyGram - (accurate figure reported in P1). Case
remains under review with Contracts team to decide if
we retain the agent. (note - this was a member of the
Agents staff)
Contract advisors cases - see separate sheet for
Baan] <1K-1 0) 16) 6 ee .
Note - current provision for the above debt is based on
over 60 days where there is no repayment pla ®
(£0.6m)
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2.0 — Current Agent Debt — with contract advisors
pei vets
Year Vol
I
I
Debt I Ave Debt
2016/17
[2017/4
2018/19
Note : this data is the most up to date and is slightly different to P1 slide
FSC & Contract team meet regularly to help clear cases.
The table below represents the outstanding cases from 2016/17
More detailed analysis will be generated from the review meeting to
include greater emphasis on when cases will be resolved
Branch Name
I
i
{
i Year
i
\
Detail I Debt
Bucknall
Shard End
_.. Wild Ridings
Waiting DFR approval from Contracts team
{2016/17
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4.0 — Transaction Corrections
Ov/Lv6LA
The volume of TC’s caused by bra’
by 1264 against the same period last year, all TCs issued are within current trend for
is down by 1264 TC’s YTD against last year, and down
volume with no products showing a trend to cause concern or highlight an issue.
Cash REMs remain the greatest issue, although this is predominantly an automated
interface with Supply Chain.
FYI - Back office programme looking at an auto TC process and part of transformation.
‘Camelot 2539 I 2587 I 2199 I 2433 I 374 I 2986 I 2281 I 792 44_I 3771 I 2130 I 2105 I 2401.
ATM. i 61g I 537 I 448 I 440 I 231 I 431 I 646 I 321 I 243 I aia I 345 I 429 I 1t6L
Moneygram : 433 I 291 I 384 I 512 I 442 I 450 I 497 I Gor I 413 I 554 I 462 I 395 I 565
DebitCards m0 I 243 I 276 I 311 I 195 I 197 I 288 I 201 I 259 I 285 I 275 I 336 I 42a
Suspense 449 I 28a I 277 I 463 I 320 I 373 I 263 I 44a I 286 I 405 I 903 I 851 I 305
Bureau f 244 I 431 I 280 I 377 I 252 I 317 I 588 _I 497 I 349 I 30a I 275 I 256 I 290
Automated Payments 267_I 232 I 111 I 263 I 140 I 85 I 240 I 258 I 223 I 250 I 176 I 185 I 209
brop &Go 1477 I 1512 I 963 I 595 I 90 I 103 I 124 I 143 I 231 I 122 I 120 I 118 I 140
Cheques To IPSt 357_I 223 I 234 I 262 I 298 I 185 I 393 I 293 I 265 I 284 I 298 I 227 I 135
Santander Le : 458 I 484 I 4c6 I 833 I 434 I 344 I 625 I 356 I 470 I 403 I 225 I 205 I 135
[Total other <100 (13 accounts) soe I 538 I 302 I 428 I 305 I 331 I 371 I 277 I 348 I 470 I 385 I 421 I 413
Grand Total ee) 0556 I 9390 I a57i I aousi I S904 I 9066 I iooz7 I ase6 I Goai I 12703 I sisi I 9528 I 10402
Pd 1 performance
Camelot:
Camelot volumes have reverted
back to a “normal” state until the
product is simplified. Working with
Product Simplification team to split
out prize payment from TA which
would significantly reduce TC’s -
currently working on the scope,
Note - Currently 3.5 FTEs working
on Camelot in FSC.
Cash REMs:
See separate analysis on P12
performance as well as Branch
analysis.
AT™
Increase in TCs issued as target
SLA reduced down to 2 months.
No increase in instances and
represents temporary workload
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4.0 —- TCs REMs
LviVv6Lb/4
Cash TC Analysis ii
Cash TC Analysis Branch Analysis
0. £250 1891 I £ 63,415.40 graysts supplied in P11 - no significant
£250 - £500 44 I £ 17,764.00 “
Cen Sao a TE 33,009. 00 63.5k TCs in last 23 months over 6,641
Debit ea cael Branches (58% of the network)
£1000 - £5000 21 I £ 42,990.38
fmm stone 5 E 34,955.00 1,497 Branches have had only 1 TC in 23
ee) emo Tee00 I 15 __I £368,505.54 months and a further 904 have had only 2.
Highest Value £249,500.00 £50000+ 4 I £769,501.00
sh 2141 ff 44,559.10 161 Branches have had more than 50 TCs
£250 - £500 22 _I-£ 9,044.00 (12,709 in total = 79 as an average)
credit £500 - £1000 28__I-£ 25,220.00
EUG 0 21 __tE 65,580.00 27 Branches have an error rate at more that 1
£5000 - £10000 1 I-£ 9,000.00 week (over 100 TC’s in last 23 months) at an
£10000 - £50000 9 __I-£211,719.00 average of 140 and a total of 3,770.
Highest Value £72,050.00 I #50000+ 1__[-£ 72,050.00
Grand Total I 4227. I £882,968.22 3 Branches are showing over 200 TCs with one
of these have had 335.
aS If you assume that all 11.5k Branches returns
i 9
11004 I EastFinchleyI € 52,001.00 Pouches 303184094637 £26,000.00, 303178586315 £26,000.00 and 303178586339 £1.00 cash once per week then we are seeing a 5.5%
booked out 10/4/2018 but not despatched. error rate.
_51940 I Betchworth I £249,500.00 Shortage in Rem £249,500.00 received at cash centre pouch 358141828268 I
216406 I NewBury I £234,000.00 Shortage in Rem £234,000.00 received at cash centre pouch 303188858150 Top 27 Branches to be contacted with the full
. Pouches 303187025010 £22,050.00, 303187025003 £25,000 and 303187024990 £25,000.00 161 that are seeing 50+ to be mana e
269324 I Birchwood I-£ 72,050.00 booked out and sent to Cash Centre, but reversed in Horizon appropriately
455246 I Lillington I £234,000.00 Shortage in Rem £234,000.00 received at cash centre pouch 303187240697
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P14 Balance (£k) Reconciliation Items lUnreconciled
T POL Data ae T
I Timing / i I Prior
Product GlientData Wh*FE MS I Bo. Data I Balance I ofctientI "2499 Enquiries PEP4"9 adjustme Other Total Total
I 3rd party dats hours Tes ite
ag i
iLottery fd a ak a ~ a ee
Banking f Ci.690 9) I @1.842.5) 4)
Banking (not FW) I (19.759.1) r 19,766 1) :
adc i (7,470 6) [
Bill Payments i
\Gift Vouchers
(75 989.6)
1,519.2
[Govt Services
MoneyGram
Parcelforce
[Passports i
Payout i :
PO Money i 6,965.
Postal Orders L oo I 19408.2) . {
Retail 4. 3.8) os .
Royal Mail I (8,749.3)
SIA [ 4172.7) i
‘Total I (200,571.8) i (201,949.4) 1,377.7
The above table remains manual and the detail is not yet easily available - currently included on Probity and sample reviewed, but the information in held on paper
file. Currently working on a solution to automate although might need to run the detail manually each month (from P2)
Passports unreconciled variance represents an estimated number of outstanding days as information from client not detailed - reviewing with the product *
although not expected to be a risk as value is in line with trends in sales.
Banking variances remains a concern and working with Vocalink to resolve miss match in Horizon data. Also, reviewing with Billing team to see if have a
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5.0 — Aged Open Item Recs
@
Vol / Val aus) PdOl Pd02 2 Pd 03 Pd 04 Pd 0S Pd 06 I Pd 07 Pd 08 Pd 09 Pd 10 Poll Pd 12
CurrentPd “vo II asasss> tt ae
month Vol - 6,263
2 months Vol 1,080 I i
3 months Na 260 I
" Val (Ek) £ 203.4 I
Vol 595 I
3 Month Vol a: if
PS Monins [Vai (ek) fe (2.2) I I
[current Provision __I Val (Ek) I Te 160.0 I [ I ~~]
Key Accounts (1 Month)
Camelot Prize Hol 2,138 L i
pear Val (Ek) £415 [ I
Cash (incl Bd) Vol 4,667 + - -
[Val (€l) £3505 I
The above table is new analysis looking at the aging of Open Items and shows the value currently held as a provision in the accounts.
P2 onward will include historic data to allow trend analysis as FSC move to bring down aged items from 3 months down to 2, then ultimately 1 month.
The Target to have aged down to 2 months before POLSAP migration and 1 month by Q4
This analysis doesn’t include MoneyGram Aged & ATM surplus as these are subject to separate issues (i.e not trading performance) and 100% provided for.
The vast majority (c90%) of open items in the current month are where we are waiting for client data to match against - next steps to strip this out
Key accounts that are over 1 month, includes Cash recs where we have experienced process and system issues since Belfast launch which is addin ®
reconciliation activity - Diverting resource to help clear and working to clear up the issue
Currently at P1 we are providing £160k debt on a prudent view. Note the above analysis doesn’t include MoneyGram & ATM surplus
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Branch Down
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The following branches have been unable to trade for in
excess of 20 days:
See
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Post Office®
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
wo
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Branch & Customer Support
Ops Board Update
Period 1
Post Office® Post Office Limited — Commercial in Confidencs
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Network Operations—Branch Support Volumes Pi
pn, ne
Sic icasemsnesante “i
ial ro ygaineensarianentt
oe
3007
Volume came in 2% below forecast and 7% below actuals last year
There were two key issues across the Period - Horizon connection ta datacentre failure and intermittent Orep and Go
time out failures.
® ATOS and tf worked with Verizon an the Horizon outage which was linked to the Manchester Datacentre and affected
circa 3k+ branches.
* Drop and Go product Manager and fT inforrned of the intermittent time outs which was resulting insame customer
cards locking or showing a zero balance.
® Call volumes on 10° April increased by 182% with 4.5k offered as a result of the Horizon outage, which in turn increased
the abandoned rate
e@ 97% of calls were resolved within 24 hours, with 178 cases still open and an hand. Many of these cases are being
managed by Branch Support Services team, such as apening hours, suspensions etc.
® Adherence an Branch Support was 87.7%, a drap In performance by 3%
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Branch Support Daily Volume Breakdown Pi
°
=
>
S
°o
~ Offered Mion -Fri
* Daily breakdown of calls across Mon-Fri is relatively static, averaging 1450/1500, with the
exception of 30 March and i April which was the Easter bank holiday - volumes are much
lower on Good Friday and Easter Monday.
@ We also saw a spike on 10° April as a result of the Horizon datacentre failure.
e Saturday call volumes are approx. 450-520 calls with Sunday averaging 40/50 calls
maximum. These are not shown on the above graph as the volumes are significantly lower
and would distort the view.
Post Offices Post Office Limited — Commercial in Confidence
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Network Operations — Branch Support Speed to Answer P1
Swerage Soaoed to answer and Max time Co eraowar
So0m
BERR
ROOD
ert
® Average speed to answer (ASA) overall was 157 seconds with customer waiting at 75 seconds.
The maximum time to answer during the period was 46 minutes, which was a Wednesday. It is expected
that due to branch trading, wait times on a Wednesday evening can increase dependant on the complexity
of the calls and which group are completing their branch trading.
On “customer waiting’ queue, the maximum time to answer was 30 minutes.
We have & new starters, 4 specific for NBSC who were trained in Pl. NBSC have also supported the
Customer side and the new resource won't have a positive impact until P2/P3.
® The IVR changes to Branch clasures (voicemail) should enable more resource to be available to take calls.
te
A }
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Total NBSC Abandon % i Overall abandoned rate was 13% with
45% abandoned in fess than 30 seconds.
6 On customer waiting this reduced to 10%
however, 52% abandoned within 30
seconds.
e During the Horizon outage, the
abandoned rate increased significantly to
54%.
¢ Ahigh percentage of abandoned overall
and under customer waiting is within 30
seconds which is difficult to influence.
® Changes to the IVR for Branch closures is
expected to have a positive impact on
- abandoned rate from P3.
— ey
A
'
:
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Branch Support Top Calls Type P1
PA Yap 5S Call Types 17/128
e The top call type continues to be stock related and is showing an increase on volumes last year, The key area is stec
code requests, jumping up by 355 with no specific driver for this. Larninates with stock codes and Branch Trading dates
« Telephone numbers has slightly increased on last year but is attributed to the Horizon outage as the calls were logged
as switchboard {this will change from P2 onwards as we have changed the categorisations as part of 365 launch).
« Branch trading, Royal Mail and Post Office limited are all showing a further decline.
@ Workshop planned for 18 May with Neill Boulton to lock at call types and analysis of the key drivers. Feedback on
I
I
;
have now been sent to branches so this should have a pasitive impact on P3 figures I
I
progress will be orovided in P2 undate. This is part of the Contact Centre Strateev work. I
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Branch Support Top Calls Type Breakdown P1
Supply ain Top 3B of fep 5
Axe Emergency Dreier pret
BED
iy
feleohone Numbers Top Sof Top §
c
sondiins AIRG
wadiiiiwe 203%
2 sees DYE F seat
ii
3
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Branch Traicing Yor 3 of Too 5
eas E538 gre
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Pi
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Network Operations post §
Branch Complaints about Post Office Support P1 “gags
An perinds Period 1 Period ? Period 4 Periad 4 petind 5 Periods Period 7 Berind H Pertode MUCH Period Period paring
Cash Services TAS 122 65 6
116 85 16h Bs Rd 2 2 35 22
Royal Mai Resolution ma aL 4 38 EE 42 56 38 iW at a n “4
Branch anc Retait 551 3t 38 3B 47 48 33 63 44 26 % 55 48
IT Helpdesk 439 ie 16 19 28 15 30 32 9 A 3 a 36 50
Bot ba7d 15 32 38 3 8 rey 36 42 4 16 18 9 48
Purcelfuree Resolution 198 7 i 13 4 16 R BS) 4 33 19 9 15 30
Helpdesks - Product/Custamer ies a “4 2 ie 5 $ B 8 3 f ? 4 3
NB 194 4 n ? ? 3 ? 9 2 3 w 9 8 7
Secwe Stock/Transacti a3 4 2 5 3 3 z ? s w 8 3 2 2
Conbacts Manager 308 0 2 3 2 i i 2 8 3 F 6 0 4
270 24 200 = 322 256 249 32R at 362 0-356 198 252 230
* Cash service complaints remain at iow leveis following the issues before Christmas. Complaints remain around
individual CVIT failures, lack of notification ar repeat failures.
® Royal Mail resolution— no change in reasons and are mainly related to failed collections or no mail bags. Small
volumes considering the number af collections across the Network.
* Parcelfarce Resolution complaints are also about faiied collections, again as a % of all collections made daily acrass
the Network, these are low.
® Those logged as Branch and Retail are a mix of variaus complaints that are either about another Branch or to advise
of a possible customer complaint. The new categorisations will improve the data accuracy on complaints logged by a
Branch.
® {TF helpdesk calls are still being escalated into NBSC clue to Branch frustrations with the IT helpdesk. Where a branch
has to close, these are now being escalated to Sree’s team in IT far immediate action as part of the ongoing process
improvements,
* Complaints categorised as NBSC are low considering the volume of calls handled each period and relates mainly to
alleged misadvice.
a
(483
Le
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Branch Support Email Volumes P1
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® Email volumes came in at 18442, of which 2565 (14%) being complaints.
« Daily patterns show that we receive, on average, the same level of valumes, with Monday being the busiest day due
limited volumes being responded to fram 2pm Saturday.
e 48hour turnaround shows a 2% drop ta 93%
e Analysis on emails will take place in Q2 once we have gone live on Dynamics 365 as all email traffic will be logged and
categorised. This will show more detail around the 86% of contact we get and what we can de to improve the customer
experience.
e Adherence on Customer Support has dropped fram 30° % to 86.4%
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Branch Support Emails Time to Respond P1
69/L VELL/A
Average Time ta respond
swoieniess Teeth
£Fanadd
*® The average time to respond was 20:41 hrs.
® Across the period, only 5 days missed the average response time by 24 hours.
e The maximum response time across the period was 113 hours, which was driven by the Easter weekend.
® Focus on Productivity in P3 once 365 is in place to understand benefits of email integration and auto
case creation, which should see a positive impact on time to respond from P4 onwards.
® 4new starters in olace gone live in P2 so no impact seen in P1 on performance.
fro
{20 3
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Branch and Customer Support Summary Pi
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Continued to support UAT and testing for 365 in readiness for Drop 2.
Preparing training for the roll out of 365 across Branch and Customer support and now live across
all of Branch Support.
Ongoing engagement with Verizon with discussion on outstanding issues including call recording,
call quality and reporting. Risk Exception Request for call storage in Oslo currently being circulated
for approval.
Opening hours project now in Chesterfield - full support managed through Branch Support
Services Team. 1647 branches targeted, 1588 in progress. 196 contract variations have been sent
out and 277 agreement to work contracted hours. 67 agreements have been returned and 110
contract variations.
Smart ID workshop to review screen prompts and processes for support when training controls are
made live following Horizon update in June/iuly.
Workshop for MemoView process — delivery of requirements and prioritisation for build into
Agent portal.
Successful delivery of Royal Mail Tariff change with no issues across Branch Support.
Balance Simplification awareness training for the Branch Support — review and delivery of the new
screens required for balancing with no reported issues.
ATM balancing process design — finalisation of process and sign off to support training an 17°
May.
HNGT lite engagement on changes to the product set and requirements for pilot.
Post Office®
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Agency Contracts
Ops Board Update
Period 1
~,
£29 %
\ ~ 3
Nn
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Suspensions
Total number of suspensions (branches)
Main
Local
SPSO.
Main core and outreaches
Local core and outreaches
SPSO coreand outreaches
MSPO:
Franchise
Temp PMRS appointed
Gross loss at the branches (£k)
Total recoveries by Contract Team (£k)
Total recoveries by Other Teams (£k)
Net loss at the branches (£k).
Carmmentary:
Network Operations Agency Contracts
Period 1- 18/19 Period 1 - 17/18 YTD - 18/19 YTD - 17/18
13 49 43 19
5 z 5 2
5 A 5 7
3 1 3 i
o 0 id o
oO 3 ic) 9
0 o ° 0
0 ° e) °
0 o ° o
4 ay A a
£5064 £310.8 £5084 £3108
EAQA £5.0 £49.1 £5.0
£0.0 £1545 £0.0 £1845
E4573 eggs : ps A873 £1513
Suspensions ~ 12 branches, total gross losses of £506.4k. One large losses in the period Scotter Road El41.1k. £49.1k recoveries against the
losses incurred in the period. When cornpared with the same period last year there are six less suspensions but the gross ammount lost is £195. 6k
higher. Service was maintained at four branches with the appointment of temporary PMR.
YTD ~
I gross losses are £506.4k. Debt recovery is running at 9.7% of gross losses, at the same point last yaar 5
f the debt had been
recovered. In comparison with last year there have been 5 fewer branches suspended but gross losses are 1.6 tirnes higher.
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Network Operations Agency Contracts
Non Suspensions
Period 1- 18/19. Period 1- 17/18 YTD -18/19 YTD ~ 17/18
Total number of non - suspensions (branches) v7 10 a7 10
Main 6 3 6 3
Local 4 6 9 6
SPSO 2 1 2 4
Main core and outreaches 0 0 0 °
Local core and outreaches ie) 0 () i)
SPSO core and'outreaches io) o ie) fey
MSPO 0 0 ° ie)
Franchise 0 0 0 °
Total Loss at the branches (£k) fal. £777 £811 £777
Total recoveries by Contract Team (£k) £764 £777 £761 : £777
Net loss at the branches (£k) £5.0 £0.0 £5.0 £0.0
Commentary:
Non suspensions ~ 17 branches, total losses of £81.1k of wh n recovered, When compared with the same
period last year there are seven more branches and the losses identified are £3,4k higher (average loss per branch is
£4.77}. The amount of £5.0k not recovered is being disputed by the PMR and is currently being investigated.
YTD ~ the average branch joss has reduced when compared to last year - currently it is £4. per branch compared with
£7.77 at the same time last year. The recovery rate is currently running at 93.7% of total losses, at the same point last
year all losses had been recovered. oo
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Fraud Analysis & Branch Standards
Ops Board Update
Period 1
L8/Lv6Lb/4
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Network Operations — Fraud Analysis Team Pi
PiPerformance __ a 2018-2019 I 2017-2019 I 2018-2019 I 2017-2018
FAT Activity : Sots! a Total
i Month : YD
Branches assigned for initial investigation
Branches assigned for escalation (e.g. training f
audit / case raised / referred to contract advisor}
Total Number of Audits scheduled
Totai Number of josses at audit
3 of auclits with a loss
No of suspensions at risk audits
I FAT Financials
‘fraud Analysis I. i a
Team }¥otal losses identified at audit
: Value recovered at audit
Total Met foss
Average value of loss.
[Number of losses over £50k
Value of losses over £50k
Surplus cash returned at audit
[Other intervention activity (benefits from non-
sudit intervention activity}
BENS £284,009
AML
Number of SARs processed
Number of SARs disclosed
Number of vulnerable customers
Fi
Z8/b VELL:
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Cash Declarations
12 week tracker 12 month tracker
92 00% 92.0096
F1.00% yA unity 90.00% oe —
oe si 7 ps a)
NOS pp’)
83.00% é
VY \/
Yous f 86.00%
29 00%
88.00% 84, 00%
82.00%
87.00% 22.08%)
28 4 a
4S ms parvo
& 6 6 5 5 0.00%
SES RE ROR
oS SR
oO Ot lod Oo Oo
cord xo x x x
ay Al Sf x St
og ff wow <
YU eS Boag
Year on year comparison
2017 I 88.00% I 89.06% I 88.88% I 89.25% I 89.70% I 89.20% I 89.69% I 90.40% I 88.35% I 88.57% I 90.78% I 90.19%
T
2018 I 90.18% i
onan ‘e 5
Lec
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Call Declaration calls
Top 5 reasons given
# BST Leck of trained staff
ring efter accepting TA’s
Not declaring e¢ last thir
# BST Not declaring in stock unit of acceptance
Top 5 failure points
antiy declaring
BON
« BST ATM _
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~ Commercial in Confidence
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Cash Declarations by Branch Type
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\CFPO 27 91.1%
(Crown 258 95.4%
LM 2224 87.4%
LPM 1546 89.4%
MAIN 3352 87.0%
MOB 60 96.4%
MSPO 33 91.5%
PART 53 91.0%
ISPSO 2601 95.6%
Ne
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Confidential
Branch Down Update and MI
* Branch Availability Team
» Update:
» Branch down volumes continuing
to reduce
e» Next Steps:
» Identify trends in branch down
and escalations
» Review team progress and create
plan for team beyond current 6
month trial
Recent feedback (May 11)
This is the best position I have ever seen us
in ~ thanks for ail your efforts.
0 — oe Mark Ellis °
a 2 2 ¢ : : é _ $ Network Operations Director
2-Jan
an
Feb
3.
13-Feb
10-Ap:
17-Ap:
24-A91
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Confidential
Questions from last time
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» Anecdotal input - HNGA reboots all the time... people saying happens more.
We have implemented an overnight reboot of the HNGA counters, this used to exist on HNGX and frees up memory and
improves performance, this has only just been implemented so need to see from stats over next month if this has had
benefits, but it has already reduced noise from barcode scanner and magswipe card issues.
e I What were the branch downs like 2 years ago? What do we think good looks like? 0 down? How low
can we go?
We only started recording branch down circa 18 months ago, but I only have data going back circa one year. In early
2018 we introduced measuring all branch down scenarios rather than just those impacted by a network issue. So now
we include as an example a single counter branch with a counter issue. Historically we used to have circa 10 branches
with a network related issue at any one time on the branch down report, we are now measuring ourselves to try and
keep all branch down related issues regardiess of network, hardware or software to <10.
° How many intermittent downs are there? How to we capture them? Should IT be measured by lost
trading hours in this regard? Mick Mitchell I indicated this is likely hard to do and will be an
estimate, but he's right we could do more than is in the packs. General theme of the Ops board is
that we get starting data, then drill deeper each month.
lam working with colleagues in the business to get a base line of average branches trading on any given hour of the
day over a 12 month view, this will then be used during any outage / incident to determine what the variant from the
norm is and measure it. This will be more accurate than service desk ticket volumes as not all branches will call us or
log an issue.
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General
FS &T
Retail
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Looking Forward: IT Security and Operations
Project Nelson, continue the operating model due to the impact of Project Nelson
OCC - Deliver the OCC pilot proof of concept, Service now, with Fujitsu, for delivery in June
Snow — Self service pilot continuing and extending, continuing full build of Service management Suite in Service Now
Self service - Increase the branches roll out
ASM (Application Support & Maintenance) meeting to understand how we best utilise the £3m PA budget for projects. Early adaptors for inclusion are: Sha 1 - 2, Connect
Direct upgrade, Operationalising HoRice, Ref Data and Horizon enhancements
Customer Hub - Work continuing to look at how we support the release of Customer Hub, Outsystems, Accenture and Atos all engaged.
Digital Check and Send, Go Live planned for 9*" July 2018 . Service Management team are creating e2e service design.
Connect Direct, Comms have been sent our to the affected banking partners informing them of the actions required to support the planned upgrade at the end of June
Implementing counter restarts to reduce the impact of Bar Code Scanner and Magnetic Card Reader issues
NCR Deep dive work on freezing issues to continue ~Further diagnostic work underway
NESP - Working with NFSP to get articles in their magazine on self help / self maintenance
Incident / Cost reduction - Trial Service Now with 10 branches for quick ticket logging and updates
Branch Down / Escalations - New weekly calls to be instigated to investigate root cause of branch down / escalation volumes
Branch Service Remediation - Following supplier workshop held in April, follow up with all suppliers to ensure actions are being completed
OBC - Progress the actions following the OBC Workshop to ensure that changes are delivered.
Finance, Central and Ops - TBC
Security
Data Assurance working group ~ First meeting 21% May.
Swindon Stock Centre -REP responses for service support, DR connectivity to Swansea
Service Design and Transition -Case Management and RPA Service proposals, sign off of Success Factors support.
Cloud Strategy~ further Cloud platform strategy discussions
BYOD - 1050 Sony handsets built with Intune Application, Circa 900 handsets dispatched
Office 365 Unrestricted access has been delayed, awaiting CC confirmation of new date
PCI - Computacenter and Fujitsu compliance with the outstanding issues identified during the QSA assessment. Computercenter to provide workable solutions for the
remaining PCI issues.
SOC - On-board initial log sources from Accenture, Computacenter and Fujitsu into the SIEM and configure the Use Cases.
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April 18 Service Update
Top 10 Categories
isa
Sheen ees ge
Year on Year Unique Incident
Volumes
14000
$2000 5
20000
axio - secon 2006
6000 2017
4000 owen BOB,
2000,
9
jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun ful Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
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Service Summary
High Severity Incident
ity 42
ee were 1 inctuding
two impactin etwork fone
Seve 2).
vices and
was related ter
tral and Operations. This
A related incident
affecting VPN.
Overall Incident volumes
© A réducti all incident
this month to 10,407, This 4
106 above fore
lume
s just
we to
unting
remains a priority
6 Month Change Volumes
Nov-17 Dec-17. Jan iB. Feb 18
Standard
Monthly
Total
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April 18 Service Update
Branch - ‘Top 10 call categories
. all nT I i
Bache 18
Admin - Yop 10 Call Categories
sce
Pres
q m@ information Request
q aul 7 Bystors Erres
ie wate aaivice/t.
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IT Security
No Major IT Security Incidents in April
MMS:
ee Quensew
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Ben Note — response from last Ops board question:
Once CC get the lronscaies implementation correct then we can run
phishing tests directly from there as it is one of the features of the
product and we'can then accurately measure phishing awareness across
the business and tailor the training accordingly.
Vulnerability Management: cuenta Moce OT
Open Vulnerabilities
a bee ee a
’ — ,
i 5 ° 2 0
‘x ass
“ Internet references to PO in April decreased
to 11M. 6.2k required investigation with 19
, ot te (down from March) escalated for PO action
YNOTRE SEYERTT
Ironscales: INCIGERT SEVERITY
Skybox: Alternative deployment solution CR raised with Lows High, 2
ae i a : CC, awaiting response. This will allow for full ¢
Initial Verizon remediations.In progress, deployment through 0365. Platform still
remaining towers requests in place. providing protection despite deployment issues.
Verizon Fieewall Compliance tow, 6
ue
The majority of incidents this month were related to
external APK websites hosting our apps and social
media incidents. Upon investigation no action was
— required.
Sts $
save i mint
The 2 High incidents were due to
expiring website certificates.
These have been renewed via the
New Entrust platform.
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New ‘CP-Contract Nears Gvibletion
SCOPE
Under the new contract we will move all
components and services from uk Cloud to
AWS, and migrate Hy Going projects to the
new platform in three months. We will upgrade
Strategic Relationship Me
Commercial Meeting
accelerated delivery on support Safe Haven
exit,
a CloudFoundry a core component of the
Accenture's responsiveness has been platform,
challenging at times during the month on. Commercial Change
complex BIGOSS OF Wark atid res Lam This isa two ¢ contract for the provision of
application Pees and maintenance, hosting
on AWS and infrastructure support ‘and Relationship
maintenance, As well as, on going: application
development.
BENEELS ane
Service
innovation oe
ee Ee AWS
Shannon N. Cozzolino
Rinantiine {ieitis ®B.
Ben Notes
~ Al wanted POMs
info in...
Awarded Tower Contract following a full GQJEU February £€150m OJEU threshold, £22.4m Governa nce not yet
procurement process on a 7 +1 +1 basis. 2016-2023 Fixed Price element set u p for Al to ta ke
cant change since February 2016 ant £idm average on spend
an hun emaAnean Fae
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confirmed,
Renegotiated on DATE to reduce £4m lability. Contract can be
extended out until 2020
Exec ‘Governance a Monthty
Commercial Review Weekly
Commercial ~
Outstanding aged geot
Relationship
Commercial - open
CMN’s and WO's
ye extensions has been October 2044-max -£1390m
2020
February 2017- £126m
max 2020
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Software Suppliers Dashboard - May 18
Microsoft: : 2
+) Microsall Sxtenpmse spre cart
wall ahead oft:
agnedon TOO Ape o> The potential sharsfet of SAP anging Heenses and
: “Cdllection: el needs
ist avordance have beer futhet investigation ©
is Soe petting vetted byFirance The + TRoreG a need tor
Is lonaats booking wah eohanced the SAG licen:
i
MAL 1B
inthe ture ol
ie case efor ‘the fast faw audits and nee
gation. All pending
completed this week ane ie ne!
Aa May
‘Termination ootilienion for GAP AR Uce
audit rear, jemppeted ie
baseline for Or.
+) Aworkcorder for OC ha
the Adobe bslate, co for Adobe
factional with all Users abel loak ta provide Adobe”
der ot Adobe Standard andyechice ave renewal costs
a
sy dpproved for rationalising
curses.
© Polential deepte exponure on Oracle!
Crecence MDM system
April 2048 Flash Results - IT Services Licenses
Month vp
Feast Budget % Mvmt Feast Budget % Mvmt Budget . % Mvmt
Budget Var Var Bud Act feast Budget Ver Var Bud Act Feast) Budget) Ver Ver Bud
Stalf Costs a g a a oa a a] g q o_o] qj a o_o]
Non Staff Costs #75] “Fae “786 7 7I 75) 77a, Fas] 7a 7 7 3563] 7 7) 985
TotaliT Services fl ae 8 I
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the extension notice was agreed between Post
Office and Atos. It was issued on 16 April, A
lack off meeting was held on 17% April to agree I
the. next steps; 2 largely positive tone was set and
an agreement ta work collaboratively going
forward. Governance for the extension was
agreed and Post Office are raising a CR for a full
Impact Assessment of the terminated and altered
services.
Servic rice Dask failed 2 SLA’s (Speed to I
answer & call abandonment) as a result of the
impact of the high severity incidents throughout
the month. Mitigation is being sought.
Onginal SISD Contract
4
_ CMN that supports the provision of the
26/08/2014/renegotiat
ed ‘17
year term 1 +1
year extension
Kulalumpa DR site dispute still unresolved
and CMN remains unsigned. With Post Office
to take a view and progress. Mick Mitchel!
and David Cooke to finalise the position
26 April
Bt May
ae
New Account Risk meeting has been
established starting 20% Apri!
Information Services remain an uncontracted
service. A commitment te review this was.
provided to Atos following the submission of
the extension notice has been provided to
Atos to agree a simpler charging model and a
Commercial
TOM Progr
agreed service.
Customer
Satisfaction
Target: 80%
Disengagement from Atos and reduction in.
Service
Tower: £8.434m
IT Prowects: ch10m
04/18
Framework Agreement for IT Consultancy
Services
TOM CMNS. Benefits to be applied from 1* July
David Cooke
GHent Executive
12/08/2022
3 October-3%
2017 September 2018
Keith Searle
Service Director
“c£impa saving on
Opex spend
Jeffrey Burke
Portfolia Manager
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Highlights:
Good progression with a number of activities + I CCN1637 Extension of Operational Business Change ° a Maren
including (Branch Change) Service from ist April 2018 until 31st “ eek
+ The following Project Everest activities: March 2023 awaiting a briefing from Mark Nash to Rob + .
i 1638 Revenue Swi and Houghton. Meeting scheduled Tuesday 10" April to
isation signed review.
2 Interim Application,
Port and Maintenance signed + CCN1633 POLSAP Hosting Service from Midnight on
+ WOW breakfast and workshops. 31st March 2018 to 23:59 on 31st December 2018
ve and eng. awaiting a reforecast of FJ & Accenture budgets in Commercial -
ic axtended under CT2531a until order to understand the fuil financial exposure to IT. Outstanding aged debt
20% April 18 to mop up approx. 70 si
(Funded by the Program)
+ SCN1636b Price Increase as per contract
Relationship
te to POL Signatures
Commercial - Open CT's
POLSAP SET. R CONS
Garry
Naylor- Stewart
a vee : ee Smith Delivery
Fujitsu has been working with the Post Offic i" February CO £200m
since May 1996 2016 Meo Enea
§ extensions of the contract with the most 6 year term Executive
nt taking us to 2023
Home Phone and Broadband contract to 2 2620 c, £100 PA
éNon TT)
owt
Saban - S thent
Feast Hi? feast Ricaét Feast Var fd7 Feast Var Bid acl i sf 0 v ct Fc “ast Feast Var Sud Var I Bad
Sua conts oo z
Non Staff Costs a z ai 15873 36.193 0.8%) I 35.209 I 36 183
[Tota Services eee I
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Highlights: OPEX: invest to save exercise underway, no silver
+ Network transition accomplished for end bullet exists to meet £1m Opex reduction target. " Wedhesday
March 2018 Multiple avenues under technical investigation and
+ No working at risk currently / business plan building
Lows
tion marks over Verizon’s strength and OPEX: continued new service additions for areas that
depth in UK did nat have a procured commercial price book lead to
: mobile solution from. ver izon unworkable, OPEX risks. Each business owner of new service now
direct award scurced from EE instead. asked to confirm they have OPEX budget si
« OBC process slow, weak and general not Commercial -
robust. The above are on the risks and ops spread Outstanding aged
« Board quest whether a correct sheet debt
procurement decision was made bac Relationship
2015, this challenge has bi
Other risk
are working through a weekly plan'to provide: + ated - Procurement risk of direct
RH with the correct level of comfort for his award of mobile services to incumbent EE.
report to the board in June E Risk notes from legal and CMS indicate this
Rob Nicol Michael
Es : Managing Roberts
arded May 2015 on a 7 4 41 basis {5 May b i acl
2015 Director
ervice added for 3 year fixed term
Info from finance
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One incident reported this week by FSC.
Primar
¥ Action
Owner
Date of Reporting
Incident BU
Impacted Event (what happened)
BU
Triplication of TAs (Transaction
Acknowledgements)into branches for Lottery
transactions dated 20/6/2019(£2,500,000):
TAs (Transaction Acknowledgements) for Lottery
transactions taken on 20/6/2019 have been triplicated
in branch causing discrepancies.
Accenture loaded the file 2 times in error, once
correctly. It is believed this is due to the introduction of
new RPOS system into pilot.
IFSC
All Lottery branches are unable to reconcile their stock
. a . i . Accenture
21/06/19 IFsc and cash. GL accounts in the Finance systems have
/06/ triplicated data. If a technical fix is not in place then
(25/06/19)
FSC will need to issue Transaction Corrections (TCs) to
enable branches to balance.
If a Technical fix is not in place and FSC do not issue
TCs, then emergency suspense accounting will cause
significant issues operationally for FSC to manage.
Communication sent to branches of the issues and
timeframe to resolve.
ATOS/FUJITSU/ACCENTURE is engaged in finding the
root cause and developing a fix. Conference call
atranged to discuss and if a fix is not in place TCs will
be issued from 25/06/19.
Please Note:
° Materiality - the threshold would be anything with a financial impact of over £50k and/ or a major adverse
reputational or regulatory reaction; the “Daily Mail test”. At this stage, it is more helpful to over report,
than to miss the opportunity.
© Incidents - {T incidents are reported separately by their respective teams and are not included in this report.
IPA (formerly ISAG) have discontinued their weekly reports. Their reports are now included in this weekly
submission.
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