POL00129447
POL00129447
From: Parsons, Andrewf___.. GRO
Sent: Mon 09/03/2015 4:07:23 PM (UTC)
To: Rodric Williams...
Cc: Patrick
. ‘echsI
Subject: RE: Mediation Scheme Report [BD-4A.F1D26231777]
Rodric (and everyone else by copy)
On the remote access point mentioned below, Simon is referring to this extract in the Scheme Report:
"There is no functionality in Horizon for the Post Office or Fujitsu (suppliers of Horizon) to edit, manipulate or remove
transaction data once it has been recorded in a branch's accounts. The Post Office can only post additional, correcting
transactions to a branch's accounts but only in ways that are visible to postmasters e.g. transaction corrections (TC)
and transaction acknowledgements (TA). It is also possible for Fujitsu to view branch data in order to provide support
and conduct maintenance but this does not allow access to any functionality that could be used to edit recorded
transaction data. Having reviewed all the cases, no-one (including all the Applicants and Second Sight) has been
able to identify a specific transaction that did not originate in branch."
The Deloitte Report, cited by Simon below, describes the Balancing Transaction process. Based on our previous
discussions with FJ, the BT process allows FJ to inject new transactions into a branch's accounts but does not allow
transaction data to be edited or removed. The above extract is therefore accurate but arguably incomplete.
If we wanted to make the extract complete, we would need to add something like:
"It is also possible for Fujitsu to view branch data in order to provide support and conduct maintenance but this does
not allow access to any functionality that could be used to edit recorded transaction data.
Previously, we have adopted the position of not mentioning the BT process because it is so rare that it is immaterial.
However, this is the process referred to in the Gareth Jenkins witness statement I circulated last week (on M056 —
Wylie). This issue may therefore come to the fore once SS have seen the Jenkins statement.
On balance, my view would be to stick with the current approach and not include the additional language in the
Scheme Report. If this topic comes up in M056, then we address it on the individual circumstances of that case.
All thoughts welcomed.
Kind regards
Andy
Andrew Parsons
Managing Associate
Follow Bond Dickinson:
POL00129447
POL00129447
www.bonddickinson.com
From: Rodric Williams: GRO i
Sent: 09 March 2015 12:37
To: Parsons, Andrew
Subject: FW: Mediation Scheme Report
Pls see below re: remote access.
Can we please discuss when you get a moment?
POST
OFFICE
From: Martin Smith: GRO i
Sent: 09 March 2015 12:12
To: Rodric Williams
Subject: RE: Mediation Scheme Report
Rodric,
This paragraph was simply explaining that a loss in branch together with evidence of falsification
of figures will often be sufficient evidence upon which to base a charge of theft.
If the paragraph is to be redrafted to state the ingredients of theft, the message may well be lost.
The fact that a sub-postmaster may have falsified the accounts is not a necessary ingredient of the
offence of theft. It clearly adds to the strength of the evidence and that of course assists a case to
pass the evidential test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
The paragraph might well be rephrased;
“The Code for Crown Prosecutors requires prosecutors to consider in any individual case whether
there is sufficient evidence and if so, whether a prosecution is in the public interest. In cases where
an audit discloses a loss in circumstances where there is evidence of false accounting, this will
often be regarded as sufficient evidence upon which to base a charge of theft.”
May [also take this opportunity to mention a point which Simon Clarke has raised. He has noted
that the End of Term Report contains the following proposition:
"There is no functionality in Horizon for the Post Office or Fujitsu (suppliers of Horizon) to edit,
manipulate or remove transaction data once it has been recorded in a branch’s accounts. The Post
Office can only post additional, correcting transactions to a branch's accounts but only in ways that
are visible to postmasters e.g. transaction corrections (TC) and transaction
POL00129447
POL00129447
acknowledgements (TA). It is also possible for Fujitsu to view branch data in order to provide
support and conduct maintenance but this does not allow access to any functionality that could be
used to edit recorded transaction data."(see Annex J, point 2).
He has also commented that the Deloitte report includes a comment to the effect that they have
observed (in their desk-top audit) "a method for posting Balancing Transactions.....which allows
for posting of additional transactions centrally without the requirement for these transactions to be
accepted by SPMR's...." and later, "....controls that detect when an person with authorised
privileged access used such access to send a 'fake' basket into the digital signing process could not
be evidenced to exist."
Accordingly we are concerned that should the Deloitte report subsequently be disclosed people
may be able to compare both documents and argue that they are inconsistent.
Kind regards,
Martin.
Martin Smith
T
CartwrightKing
meee SOLICITORS
Offices Nationwide
www.cartwrightking.co.uk
formation. If you have received
ly privilege
us immediately by retu
1k you for your coop.
ble
uthority No: 312459.
this e-mail and any att
nail, do not copy it or its contents to anyone
Sent: 09 March 2015 11:31
To: Martin Smith
Cc: Mark Underwood1
Subject: Mediation Scheme Report
Martin — thanks again for your assistance over the weekend.
Our GC Jane MacLeod has come back with a comment on one of the amendments we made:
Where an audit discloses a loss in circumstances where there is evidence of false accounting, the
fact of the loss together with the false entries will often be sufficient evidence upon which to
POL00129447
POL00129447
base a charge of theft. Simply put, the fact that money is missing and the defendant has adjusted
the figures is sufficient evidence (in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors) to form the
basis of a theft charge; [MU1
I understand that the Code is not a prescriptive formula but a set of guidelines, but could you suggest a way to amend
the paragraph to address Jane’s coments?
Kind regards, Rodric
POST
OFFICE
This email and any attachments are confidential and intended for the addressee only. If you are not the named
recipient, you must not use, disclose, reproduce, copy or distribute the contents of this communication. If you have
received this in error, please contact the sender by reply email and then delete this email from your system. Any views
or opinions expressed within this email are solely those of the sender, unless otherwise specifically stated.
POST OFFICE LIMITED is registered in England and Wales no 2154540. Registered Office: 148 OLD STREET,
LONDON EC1V 9HQ.
This email and any attachments are confidential and intended for the addressee only. If you are not the named
recipient, you must not use, disclose, reproduce, copy or distribute the contents of this communication. If you have
received this in error, please contact the sender by reply email and then delete this email from your system. Any views
or opinions expressed within this email are solely those of the sender, unless otherwise specifically stated.
POST OFFICE LIMITED is registered in England and Wales no 2154540. Registered Office: 148 OLD STREET,
LONDON EC1V 9HQ.
JM
I would be tempted to reverse the wording to make it stronger and say (if true) that ‘In accordance with the Code for
Crown Prosecutors, the charge of theft requires evidence of [fact of money missing and defendant adjusting the
figures] ....
POL00129447
POL00129447
Question for CK — is this true?
Please consider the environment! Do you need to print this email?
The information in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and
access this e-mail and any attachments. If you are not mark.underwo
copies. Unauthorised use, dissemination, distribution, publication or copying 0}
leged and protected by law pos J only is authorised to
} please notify andrew parsong GR ‘hs soon as possible and delete any
his communication or attachments is prohibiied an o 2 tinlawful
Any files attached to this e-mail will have been checked by us with virus detection software before transmission, Bond Dickinson LLP accepts no liability for any loss or damage
which may be caused by software viruses and you should carry out your own virus checks before opening any attachment.
Content of this email which does not relate to the official business of Bond Dickinson LLP, is neither given nor endorsed by it.
This email is sent for and on behalf of Bond Dickinson LLP which is a limited liability partnership registered in England and Wales under number 0C317661. Our registered
office is St Ann’s Wharf, 112 Quayside, Neweastle Upon Tyne, NEI 3DX, where a list of members’ names is open to inspection, We use the term partner to refer to a member of
the LLP, or an employee or consultant who is of equivalent standing. Our VAT registration number is GB123393627.
Bond Dickinson LLP is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority