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POL00139589
27.04.2016- Wednesday Call IT related issues.
1. AP mismatches-
October 2014- first raised on Wednesday call due to an issue at Petersfield
Crown 015937 branch. It was then found that issues were raised by a further
4 branches during Jan 2014- Dec 2014 with at least 68 customers affected as
follows:-
Frederick Street - 008 824, 6" and 7*" January 2014, 10 incorrectly credited
transactions to Allpay. All sorted apart from one for £11.00
High Street - 539 246, 4'*-10'" February 2014, 42 incorrectly credited
transactions to Allpay. Only 7 of these transactions have been sorted and
credited to the correct accounts.
Silsoe - 113 106, 3-7" July 2014, 7 incorrectly credited transactions to
Received with Thanks. Only 3 of these transactions have been sorted and
credited to the correct accounts.
West Calder - 139 807, 14" and 15" July 2014, 8 incorrectly credited
transactions to Allpay. Only one of these has been sorted and credited to the
correct account.
2 further incidents up to and including May 2015:-
Bramley, 052 904, 08/04, 10/04, 11/04, 15/04,16/04, 17/04, 20/04 and
21/04/15. Client: South East Water Ltd:22 incorrectly credited payments
Value: £1002.56
Corporation Street, 523 201, Transaction Date 01/05/15, Client : Allpay -
Birmingham CC 11 incorrectly credited payments, Value: £1501.60
The issue described is that a branch scans an AP transaction with a bar code
reader, all works fine, when the next customer arrives with an AP barcode
the payment the customer makes goes to the previous client account with all
future customer barcode scanned payments taken on that particular
terminal, in that branch defaulting to the first client account at the time the
barcode reader becomes faulty.
The incidents are resolved by replacing the barcode reader once the branch
or customers alert the IT helpdesk or CCU of the problem. By this time
however a number of customer payments may have gone to the wrong
client. FSC have a process for putting things right but it relies on the
customer, client or occasionally the branch alerting IT service desk or POL
that something has gone wrong, this doesn’t always happen and FSC hold the
amount pending resolution.
The response to date from Atos or IT was that this type of incident was
expected to be resolved with Horizon Next Generation rollout. When it was
found it wasn’t resolved a review of the incident took place in 2010 anda
report was produced. Ian Humphries was trying to get a copy of the report
from Pete Newsome in Fujitsu.
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What POL need for assurance is:-
e The report detailing the incident & the root cause.
¢ Confirmation that the incident is resolved.
e An understanding of how many incidents occurred/number of
branches/customers affected.
« Whether any branches/customers may have been affected by the
issue without knowing about it.
08.04.16 Update from Tracy Middleton (FSC) to say no further incidents
received since May 2015. Chased Ian Humphries with regard to the 2010
report on 07.04.16 no response received.
2. Transaction Corrections- CLOSED DOWN
August 2015, first raised on Wednesday call.
27.08.15 response received from Katie Austin to incidents raised by NBSC with
affected branch FAD codes:-
FAD 2242176 :FAD 020323:FAD 2652013:FAD 186405:FAD 221340:FAD
3228320.
Katie's initial feedback was that the incidents were user error.
07.09.15 Update from Katie -to say she had discussed the incident with Fujitsu
who had confirmed that there was an issue for which a fix would be needed.
09.09.2015 Further branch affected Rugby Post Office, branch code 1512463.
Update from Katie-Fujitsu stated that the code change to resolve the issue was
currently in testing and would be applied to the Fujitsu model office over the
weekend. Pilot test would occur the following week with a view to it being
deployed to the majority of the estate overnight on the 17".
15.09.15 Katie confirmed that Fujitsu had accelerated implementation of the TC
fix which was rolled out to all branches the previous night. Any further TC issues
should be routed to the Atos Service Desk who would pass to Fujitsu directly.
Revisited Feb 2016 as no update on affected branches had been received.
Chased Katie Austin (ATOS) but received no reply, since found out she’s moved
on so I've emailed Ian Humphries (ATOS) 01.04.16, Chased with Ian on
08.04.16. No update received. Confirmation is needed that
e Fix was put in place and was successful.
e Root Cause Analysis was completed and a documented outcome is
available if needed.
e Details of affected branches, FAD codes any loss amounts etc. How have
any losses been resolved (specifically have Atos passed across any details
needed to FSC to allow Transaction Corrections to be issued if needed).
e¢ Can we (POL) be assured that there will not have been any branches
affected without the branch being aware of the issue.
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3. Feb 2016 Remittance Mismatch- First reported to Gayle Peacock by Sean
Farrow Supply Chain. Details of 5 branches where an unexplained mismatch had
occurred between the amount remitted out by cash centre and remitted into
branch. 6" branch also noted by FSC. Remittances affected as follows:-
These are cases were the value on Barcode was incorrect as was value posted to
G/L 553001
Office Name I FAD Actual Value I Value on Delivery Barcode Make Up
Code Sent Barcode Number date
Wallsend 0083903 I 24000 26000 25395791 301376042 I 11-Feb-
29X 497 16
Aston 0082684 I 22000 24000 25387370 301375933 I 9-Feb-16
586 888
Drakes 0082292 I 2500 4000 25379066 301375873 I 5-Feb-16
Broughton 475 917
Churchstoke I 0082976 I 16000 18000 25314458 301375150 I 8-Jan-16
412 483
City of 0080215 I 16000 22000 25289657 301374840 I 24-Dec-
Exeter 198 668 15
In this case an extra barcode was created with apparently an associated value
which did not affect G/L 553001
Office FAD Actual Value on I Delivery Barcode I Make S96 I G/L
Name Code Value Barcode Number Up date I 2 5530
Sent 01
Llanfechai I 008539 I 2500 2500 25353495 I 3013755 I 27-Jan- I 4500 I 2500
n 6417 88712 16
Nil — no 2000 3013755
pouch 90210
made-up
08.04.16 -Incident reopened with Atos as they stated they had no record of the
original incident number. New Incident number provided is A12063578. Fujitsu
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(Graham Heywood) has confirmed receipt of this from Atos, Sean Farrow will be
asked for further details if needed by Fujitsu. No further incidents have occurred
but no reason has been provided to FSC or Supply Chain to explain what caused
these mismatches. Explanation needed from Atos/Fujitsu to understand the root
cause and what if any fix is needed or has already occurred.
4. SSKs
First raised October 2014 by Security Team who had received Crown Office loss
reports where it was alleged the SSK had contributed to the loss. At that time
there was project resource still assigned and ongoing engagement was in place
between IT areas and Crown team.
A number of incidents have been raised by Crown team which have resulted in
checks being made by Security Team.
A further issue brought to light on 03.03.16. Trowbridge Crown branch
complaining of losses attributed to SSK. Open security investigation. AEI
Engineer had been to the crown branch and following this, had sent an email to
the branch making statements about the system that were misleading.
Subsequently engagement has been made between IT, Atos, NCR, 3M and
Fujitsu to clarify the comments made. Crown team have an action plan in place
for day to day management of SSK with the current position being that security
team continue to update the Horizon call on Wednesday.