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Draft Response -In Strictest Confidence
CWU and alleged Horizon Errors:
Summary of Facts:
e On 8 October 2015, the Postmaster of Dalmellington Post Office who also
operates hosted outreach services at Bellsbank and Carsphairn raised an
issue with NBSC.
« The issue concerned the transfer of cash from her core branch into her
outreach service. It is reported that she experienced issues whilst
undertaking the ‘branch to branch’ remittance process. This resulted in
the remittance of cash being replicated a further three times, meaning
that the Horizon derived figure would show a £24,000.00,shortage.
¢ On 8 October 2015 the Postmaster also contacted her CWU representative
who consequently contacted Ian Thomas, Service Director for Post Office
at ATOS.
e Asa direct result of this and various correspondence between several
parties, Tim McCormack, wrote on his blog 10. November 2015; ‘The error
in Horizon’, asserting that there is an alleged fault on Horizon which if left
undetected will lead to cash shortfalls. Further, that Post Office was
unable to help the Postmaster and’ that if left.undetected, this can lead to
cash shortfalls.
e¢ The CWU sent an email to its’members, which was seen by Computer
Weekly advising of the alleged fault, which incorrectly duplicates
payments.
e The issue has been fully investigated by Post Office investigation team to
ascertain whether thereis a need to implement recommendations and/ or
make a change in process. This is detailed below.
e The root cause Of:the issue raised is understood and the significant and
overarching, point is that at all times the Horizon data is visible to both
Post Office and Postmasters and there are resolutions to manage this.
¢ Post Office was aware of the issue in branch and this has been resolved
prior to the.completion of the Branch Trading Statement.
e Post Office will revisit its point of entry contacts for Postmasters to ensure
that,consistent and accurate support is given to Postmasters.
1. Issue Raised:
1.1 The Postmaster of Dalmellington Post Office who also operates hosted
outreach services at Bellsbank and Carsphairn raised an issue with NBSC on 8
October 2015. The issue concerned the transfer of cash from her core branch
into her outreach service.
1.2 It is reported that she experienced issues whilst undertaking the ‘branch to
branch’ remittance process. This resulted in the remittance of cash being
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replicated a further three times resulting in a £24,000.00 shortage at her
outreach.
1.3 The Postmaster also contacted her CWU representative on 8th October 2015
who consequently contacted Ian Thomas, Service Director for Post Office at
ATOS. It is asserted that she did not think Post Office and ATOS understood the
issue. As a direct result of this and various correspondence between several
parties, Tim McCormack wrote on his blog 10 November 2015; ‘The error in
Horizon’.
1.4 The CWU emailed its Postmaster members warning of a problem with
Horizon and advising them of the alleged fault, which incorrectly duplicates
payments and if left undetected can lead to cash shortfalls.
2. Background:
2.1 Dalmellington Post Office operates hosted outreach services at Bellsbank and
Carsphairn. Dalmellington is the core branch and the, branch»code for this is
168843. The Dalmellington outreach services operate under a different branch
code, 224843. Although both outreach branches have the same branch code,
they also have a ‘level 3’ code which is unique’to them and relates to the access
point code which distinguishes the branches within the outreach cluster so that
the location is easily identifiable; Bellsbank is 214471 and Carsphairn is 165471.
2.2 Cash deliveries are received at the,core branch and then cash is transferred
to the outreach services via/a ‘branch to branch’ remittance. This involves the
scanning of a bar code to transfer the’cash onto Horizon from the core branch to
the outreach services.
2.3 On the 8 October)2015;'the Postmaster undertook the transfer to her
outreach services by. scanning the bar code. The Postmaster asserts that when
she accepted this into her outreach branch this replicated four times for which
she has Horizon receipts totalling £32,000.00. The core office was not showing a
discrepancy however the outreach was showing a £24,000.00 discrepancy.
2.4 The Postmaster asserts that she had spoken with NBSC and given a call
reference of 1358666 and advised that this was a technical issues and to report
it to the IT helpdesk. She did so and obtained a call reference from IT helpdesk
17972295. There is the assertion in the email of 8 October 2015 from the CWU
representative, Helen Baker to Ian Thomas, Service Director, that the
Postmaster was not convinced that the IT helpdesk had understood her
message as they had said ‘they would probably rectify remotely’.
2.5 The Postmaster contacted the IT helpdesk again at the end of the day on 8
October 2015, chose option seven and spoke to Rich who it seems told her to
call NBSC.
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2.6 On 8 October 2015 Helen Baker, CWU emailed Ian Thomas, Service Director
requesting his assistance with what she called ‘a very strange case’. Ian Thomas
responded on 9 October at 10:40 that he had requested one of his service
managers to look into the issue. At 18:23 on 9 October 2015, Helen Baker
emailed Ian Thomas reporting that the Postmaster had heard nothing and that
she was due to serve customers at the outreach the following Monday 12"
October 2015, but would be unable to until the problem is resolved.
2.7 On 13 October 2015 Helen Baker contacted Ian Thomas to advise that apart
from a brief call on12 October 2015 there had been no contact with the
Postmaster.
2.8 On 15 October 2015 Helen Baker updates Ian Thomas of the information she
has on the issue. This includes that she has been given information that another
Postmaster had a similar issue a couple of years ago and that FSC were, aware of
the issue and can issue a transaction correction (TC) for,this,, She further adds
that the Postmaster had been in contact with FSC who advised)that they can see
that the one barcode accepted the £8,000.00 remittance four times and
something similar happened with another Postmaster the previous week. That
FSC were unable to issue a TC as the branch had’aunique code’ and the advice
was to rem out £24.000.00 to the core branch and that FSC would
correct/remove from her suspense account.
2.9 Helen Baker expressed concernythat FSC were unaware of the issue until
other Postmasters had alerted her and that it would appear that the IT helpdesk
and NBSC were unaware that the.error of duplicating remittances can occur, and
FSC only know if it is pointed out tothem. She further questioned ‘what if the
Postmaster doesn’t realise ithappened’?
2.10 On 21 Octoberm2015, Ian Thomas provided Helen Baker with an update of
the actions of the teams involved and the root cause of the issue of the
replication that had\been, raised.
2.11 Ian Thomas advised that the issue was caused by the user forcing log off
when the post-login checks have not been fully completed and there have been
previous,issues in other branches that have caused the same effect.
2.12 Whilst the issue is not a technical one, the ability for this to occur can be
addressed by a system code change that will avoid further instances of this
across the estate. This code change will be included within Release 13.05 which
will be developed by Fujitsu and deployed in March 2016. Ian Thomas further
advised that the preferred approach for this issue currently is the issuing of a TC
by FSC and that FSC are currently working on allocating a customer account to
Dalmellington.
2.13 On 5 November 2015, an article published in Computer Weekly referred to
an email sent by the CWU warning of the flaws of the Horizon accounting
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system. On 10 November 2015, Tim McCormack in his blog gives an account of
his version of events on the issue above, though does not refer to the branch
name, and gives an outline of events which primarily mirrors the email
exchanges between Helen Baker and Ian Thomas.
3. Findings:
3.1Root cause:
The likelihood of this issue occurring can arise when certain actions are
made by the user in a very particular and rare set of circumstances. The
user actions involve timeout on logon/ log off and subsequent multiple use
of the ‘enter’ button when Postmasters who run Core and Outreach
branches move cash between their branches.
The issue is confined to Core and Outreach branches as the transfer of
cash requires manual transfer of cash pouches.
3.2 Sequence of Events:
The user logged onto Horizon into stock unit AA which»then required an
immediate cash declaration. Following thissthe stock unit timed out and
logged off due to inactivity
Later the user then logged back into the stock, unit and undertook the
remittance delivery transaction,.(pouch delivery, manual transaction).
After the two delivery receipts were printed ‘Enter’ was pressed which
then printed the Rem In slip.
However, instead of the 'Remittances & Transfers Home' screen being
displayed, the Pouch Delivery screen was still showing, with ‘Enter’
enabled. Pressing,Enter’ again repeated the remittance in and further
receipts printed.
The user pressed ‘Enter’ four times, instead of the required once and
subsequently, the»amount of £32,000.00 was entered into Horizon instead
of the £8,000.00, the actual amount of cash that had been remitted out of
the;Core branch.
3.3 Visibility of the Events:
Each of these actions is highly visible to the user with separate receipts
being printed for each transaction.
These are also listed in the transaction log reports available to the user.
The multiple remittances created by the Postmaster are easily
recognisable as such in transaction logs and Horizon’s integrity is
maintained - all the events are captured accurately and indeed separately
within the system.
The actions are highly visible and very simply corrected either by the user
or through Post Office back-end reconciliation processes.
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e It is important to underline that the Post Office’s back office reconciliation
processes identify and correct the mistake (either via Transaction
Correction or by helping the Postmaster to reverse the transaction).
¢ This is the case including in the highly unlikely event that it is not quickly
noticed by the Postmaster and reported to Post Office.
3.4 Examination of HORIce data:
As part of this investigation, Horizon logs have been examined to ascertain the
sequence of events, the entries made on Horizon and the discrepancies revealed
during the period that the issue has occurred.
Horizon Transaction Data: Core 168843 (Dalmellington)
Date Time Product code/Transaction Amount. }Branch Code
/User ID
08/10/2015 I 09:07:54 I 1 / Cash £8000 I 168843/AA
08/10/2015 I 09:08:08 I 9931/Rem out cash -£8000 I 168843/AA
Outreach 224843 (Bellsbank)
Date Time Product code/Transaction Amount I Branch Code
/User ID
08/10/2015 I 12:54:24 I 1/Cash -£8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:24 I 6287/Rem in.cash £8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:31 I 1/Cash -£8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:31 I 6287/Rem in cash £8000 _ I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:41 }.1/Cash -£8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:41 I 6287/Rem in cash £8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:46 I 1/Cash -£8000 I 224843/AA
08/10/2015 I12:54:46,I 6287/Rem in cash £8000 I 224843/AA
Summary:
« The above tables show that one transaction of a Remittance out from the
core branch was made between 09:07:54 and 09:08:08. The table also
shows that there were four entries made as a remittance in from the core
branch into the outreach at Bellsbank. This corroborates the events
outlined by the Postmaster and significantly also confirms the visibility of
the actions at all times. In summary, one transaction took place from the
core; however there were four in total undertaken at the outreach which
means that at that point there would have been a cash discrepancy on the
Horizon derived figure of £24,000.00 provided that the actual £8,000.00
in cash had been added to the existing cash on hand at the outreach.
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Horizon Event Data: Outreach branch 224843 (Bellsbank):
Date: Time: Event: Stock Unit
08/10/2015 I 09:01:10 I User AIROO1 Logged on AA
08/10/2015 I 09:06:57 I Declare Cash Total £955.15 AA
08/10/2015 I 09:21:59 I User AIROO1 has been temporarily AA
logged off by system
08/10/2015 I 10:20:59 I User AIRO01 logged off by system AA
due to inactivity
08/10/2015 I 12:53:36 I User AIROO1 logged on AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:28 I Pouch Receipt AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:34 I Pouch Receipt AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:44 I Pouch Receipt AA
08/10/2015 I 12:54:49 Pouch Receipt AA
08/10/2015 I 12:55:40 I Report Balance Snapshot - Office AA
Copy
08/10/2015 I 12:59:07 __I Report Transaction Log - Office Copy I AA
08/10/2015 I 13:14:03 I User AIROO1 has been temporarily AA
locked by system.
08/10/2015 I 13:18:19 I User AIROO1 has unlocked temporary I AA
lock.
08/10/2015 I 13:44:38 I Report Remittances In by:Day - AA
Office Copy
08/10/2015 I 13:49:31 I Report Remittances In by Day - AA
Office Copy..(Previewed)
08/10/2015 I 13:49:34 I Report,Remittances/In by Day - AA
Office Copy
08/10/2015 I 14:12:15 I User AIROO1 has been temporarily AA
locked by system.
08/10/2015 I 15:11:15 I User AIROO1 Logged off by system AA
due. to inactivity
08/10/2015 I 16:03:17 I\yser AIRO01 logged on. AA
08/10/2015 I 16:03:48 I Report Balance Snapshot - Office AA
Copy
08/10/2015 I 16:18:30 I User AIROO1 has been temporarily AA
locked by system.
08/10/2015 I 17217:30 I User AIROO1 Logged off by system AA
due to inactivity
Summary:
e The above table shows the sequence of events that User ID AIROO1
undertook on the 8 October 2015. It also clearly shows the events of
logging on/off/on due to inactivity and this corroborates the sequence of
events that is detailed above as being the root cause; a sequence that in
very rare set of circumstances can lead to the issue that has been
experienced at the outreach at Bellsbank. Fundamentally, there is clear
visibility showing that four entries were made for pouch receipts between
12:54:28 and 12:54:49.
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The sequence of events above also shows that the cash on hand was
declared as £955.15, with no variance check being made.
Below is the sequence of events in terms of cash declarations and discrepancies
which give the system derived figure compared to the actual cash declarations
made by the user.
Cash on hand declared at outreach versus Horizon system derived
figures at outreach:
Date Time Cash on hand Horizon Horizon
declared system derived I derived
figure variance
08/10/2015 I 09:06:57 £955.15 £1004.98 -£49.83.
10/10/2015 I 09:12:30 £955.15 £33004.98 =£32049.83
27/10/2015 I 13:51:38 £955.15 £33011.98 7£32056.83
28/10/2015 I 10:02:07 £955.15 £9011.98 -£8056.83
29/10/2015 I 11:27:04 £9012.98 £9012.98 £0.00
Summary:
The above table shows the amount.of cashion hand declared by the User
compared to the Horizon derived figure. It is clear to see that the cash on
hand has not changed even though there was an additional £8,000.00 in
the branch, hence the Horizon derived figure showing a variance of
£32,000.00 short instead»of the true figure of £24,000.00 based on three
additional remittance.in of £8000:00. (This figure does not include the
additional £49.83 that is separate from the issue highlighted).
From the information in the above tables, Post Office concludes that the
User ID remitted outfrompthe core branch £8,000.00 and remitted into
the outreach branch*£8)000.00. However, the cash declared was not the
true amountiin branch; rather the amount of cash on hand remained the
same until 11:27:04 on 29 October 2015. The event report above clearly
denotes that the user undertook checks to ascertain what happened when
remitting in the £8,000.00, as can be seen from the request for balance
snapshot, transaction logs and remittance reports. These would have
clearly indicated to the user the events at the time in branch and the
shortage at that time which if the additional £8,000.00 had been included
in that day’s cash declared would have shown the £24,000.00 shortage
and not the £32, 000.00 as is shown.
As can be seen above, the cash on hand remained the same until 29
October 2015 at 11:27:04. An earlier cash declaration on 28 October
2015 at 10:02:07 showed the same amount of £955.15 being declared as
cash on hand with a Horizon derived figure reducing to £9011.98 anda
recorded system variance of £8056.83 shortage. This can be explained by
the fact that a credit TC for £24,000.00 was processed on 27 October
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2015 at 13:13:27, hence the reduction in the shortage. Once the true
amount of cash had been declared, the Horizon system figures agreed
resulting in no variance. (It is assumed that the £56.83 shortage which
was not impacted by this issue was either made good or an error in the
declaration of cash had been made earlier in the week/TP.) The TP was
completed on 29 October 2015 and there were no discrepancies reported,
hence the issue had been resolved
3.5 Impact on Branches:
The issue is contained to core and outreach branches only. The ‘Branch to
Branch’ remittance procedure is limited to core and outreach»branches.
Less than 500 branches (i.e. core and outreach only) are potentially
affected but, in reality, there have been very few instances, because it
involves a number of actions in a particular sequence.
This issue is specific to Horizon Online and could not occur before 2010.
3.6 Branches Affected by this Issue:
Within the last three months (Sept- Nov), there have been five branches
reporting this issue, this includes Dalmellington:branch.
The other branches affected are: Barvas Hosted outreach (214869);
Coningsby Mobile (106444); Colsterworth Mobile (110444); Kinlochleven
(207828).
All these branches have been rectified by the user or through Post Office
back-end reconciliation processes.
Dalmellington branchshas been resolved by the issuing of a transaction
correction on 27 October/2015 for the £24,000.00, prior to the completion
of the Branch Trading Statement on 29 October 2015.
3.7 Examination of NBSC call logs: See Appendix 1
Summary:
There are five.calls recorded on the Bellsbank NBSC log that relate to the
issue above. It would appear that the initial call made at 14:10 on 8
October 2015 was made by the Postmaster and that the remaining four
calls have been made by internal post office colleagues or the IT helpdesk.
There is one call recorded on the Dalmellington branch that relates to the
issue above. This call was made on 12 October 2015 and it would appear
that this call has been made to the branch as a follow up to the issue
raised on the 8 October 2015.
There is evidence of email exchanges between NBSC and ATOS regarding
the resolution of the issue raised and a request to undertake a conference
call.
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3.8 FSC Information:
As part of this investigation, conversations have been undertaken with FSC to
ascertain at what stage they became aware of an issue in the branch, and the
actions that would be taken to remedy the issue. Additionally, FSC were asked
for any record of its involvement with the branches that have been impacted by
this issue. The responses are recorded below.
How does FSC become aware of issues of this nature and take action?
FSC will be alerted to a mismatch in the ledger system on thefollowing
day, i.e. 9 October 2015 in this specific issue. The branch account would
in this case show that there were no corresponding entries for the
additional three £8000.00 remittances in to the outreach.
FSC would usually contact the branch within two.weeks, (this can be
longer if sick leave, other urgent projects need priority, timescale could be
increased to approx. five weeks).
In this specific case, FSC did speak to the Postmaster and suggested that
she complete three remittances out from the’outreach branch, but deter
from remitting them into the core branch. This would enable these further
three remittances to be offset against.the outstanding ones already held
in POLSAP.
The Postmaster was not comfortable with taking this action, and therefore
an alternate approach was actioned, which meant the branch waiting for a
TC. In this specific case, it meant that a customer account needed to be
allocated.
When Postmaster’s are appointed a customer account is set up in order
that the Postmaster can be remunerated, and any errors can be rectified
through that account. In order to have a customer account there is a need
for a branch code. In the case of the outreaches for the Dalmellington
branch there is a branch code, however the reference data which allocates
the customer account had not been allocated. (Usually outreaches do not
have many issues and therefore a customer account may not be needed).
In this case, there had been no previous issues at the outreach so to date
a customer account has not been required). (Apparently there has been
issues since NT as the ref data box needs to be ticked as part of for
example a transfer to PO local, however this can and has been missed on
branches).
FSC issued a TC for £24,000.00 on 27 October 2015 and this was
processed on 27 October 2015.
FSC checked on the four other branches and their involvement with the
Postmaster is detailed below.
NBSC call logs from branches impacted by the issue:
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Branch /Code
FSC Advice/Resolution
NBSC advice
Barvas /214869
Spoken to branch and resolved in
branch with opposite entries on
Horizon. HORIce data confirms
that the issue has been resolved in
branch- logs show entries on
15/09/2015 which is the initial
issue and the resolution on
18/09/2015.
No record at NBSC
from the core or
outreach branch
Colsterworth
Mobile /110444
No TC issued or record of contact
with FSC. HORIce data confirms
that the issue has been resolved in
branch - logs show entries on the
14/09/2015 which is the initial
issue and the resolution on
15/09/2015.
No recordat NBSC
fromthe outreach.
Core logsson 14/09/15
and 2.calls on
15/09/15 record call -
mobile office showing
as a loss of £6000,
due to rem in has
gone through 3 times,
how to correct.
NBSC advised check
logs/reverse and on
3" call refer to FSC
Coningsby
Mobile/106444
2 TCs have been issued by FSC.
(23/06/15 £5600 on 22/06/15 and
11/09/15 £150 on,09/09/15)
HORIce data confirms that the
initial incorrect entries are shown
in the logs of 22/06/2015 and
12/09/2015 and TCs have been
processed on 24/06/2015 and
14/09/2015.
NBSC contacted on
09/09/15 and advised
to contact FSC
Kinlochleven/
No TCs issued or records of
NBSC advised to rem
207828 conversation. HORIce data out to core but don’t
confirms that the initial issue is rem in
recorded in the logs of 12/10/2015
and the resolution on 19/10/2015.
Bellsbank/224843 FSC spoke to Postmaster The PM has
suggested that she complete three
remittances out from the outreach
branch, but deter from remitting
them into the core branch.
Postmaster not comfortable with
this so FSC arranged for a TC to be
issued. HORIce data shows that
the issue is recorded on
08/10/2015 and a TC process on
27/10/2015.
Transferred £8k in
cash from her Core
Office to outreach but
it has transferred 4 x
£8k = £32k.
The Core Office
doesn’t have a
discrepancy but the
outreach has a£24k
discrepancy. Advised
as the Core does not
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carry any discrepancy
this would indicate a
system issue the PM
should report to the IT
Helpdesk
Summary:
e As indicated above, the other branches appear to have been comfortable
with the advice offered or resolved the issue at the branch. However, it is
clear that in spite of the willingness of colleagues to support the branch,
there has been a lack of consistency when considering a resolution.
e It can be difficult to understand the messages as individuals will convey
the issue and resolution in different styles; however the above.messages
do not seem to vary greatly whilst the resolution does.
« There is a requirement to ensure that a consistent and)appropriate
message is conveyed so that the Postmaster can feel supported and has
confidence in Post Office.
¢ Itis clear that from the initial call from the Postmaster of the
Dalmellington branch that Post Office. has taken:action and liaised with
different departments, however, itis appreciated that this has not been
wholly visible to the Postmaster, which has in turn led to the issue being
raised and the issue being flagged without the knowledge of the full
context by the CWU and Tim,McCormack.
3.9 Communication between parties (NBSC, ATOS, FSC):
As part of the investigation of this issue, the communications between parties
has been examined.
¢ It would appear from the call logs that four of the calls from Bellsbank
outreachsare between other parties other than the Postmaster. This is
deduced from the annotation on the caller name section and the message
detail.
e Itis clear from email chains that ATOS did take a call from the Postmaster
and advised the Postmaster that this issue would need to be dealt with by
NBSC and offering the solution of completing a rem to correct the system
cash holding.
¢ Itis clear that ATOS were aware of this issue at the four other branches
which had been resolved.
e ATOS also suggested a conference call with NBSC to resolve the issue.
e Although NBSC were happy to support branches they were reticent to
agree to the conference call on this issue as they did not have a process
for managing such an issue. They were concerned that any advice that
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they offered could make the issue worse without the full line of sight of
back office processes (similar to a disconnected session issue).
NBSC liaised with FSC who also shared concerns on best way to support
branches as there was a clear lack of explanation of the issue and no
communication on the root cause.
Subsequently, FSC suggested a method of resolving this which involved
the creation of three remittances out from the outreach or of an alternate
approach to wait for a TC to clear the branch account.
Subsequently an explanation was provided to FSC from ATOS on the root
cause and a resolution for this offered by means of a code change which is
targeted for deployment in March 2016.
4. CWU email communications:
It is clear from the speed in which the Postmaster contacted Helen Baker,
CWU representative (some four hours later) that the Postmaster either did
not have confidence in Post Office or felt this may be the,appropriate
channel for her to raise the issue with to ensure a resolution was
forthcoming.
In doing so, this has given the CWU the opportunity to receive
communications that have subsequently been used without the full
context and full understanding of the issue.
The accuracy and content in Helen Baker’syemails are incorrect in part;
the storyline on occasions is inconsistent with the full facts and sequences
of events in branch carried out,by the user which is visible at all times to
both the Postmaster and Post Office as is explained above.
5. Tim McCormack blog:
e It is clear.that this,blog has been written having the benefit and sight
of communications, nonetheless it is considered to be littered with both
assertions and inaccuracies. This is understandable when in receipt of
information that is not intended for use by persons without full
understanding of the holistic picture.
e Whilst the outline of his storyline is a synopsis of the issue and there
are elements of the scenario unfolding, it lacks the evidence to back up
the alarmist view point portrayed which is to be expected when using
material from a source that may not be in full possession of the facts.
e The fundamental point here is that the issue is visible to parties in
branch and back office, it has a footprint and the issue was reported
by the Postmaster, as is stated by the Postmaster when recording the
references numbers from the helplines in her emails. There was no
attempt at hiding a loss or problem that had been encountered, which
is principally the right thing to do.
Conclusion:
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The issue is a known one that can arise when certain actions are made in a very
particular set of circumstances. The issue is known to have occurred in five
branches including the Dalmellington outreach service. The reach of this issue is
limited to core and outreach branches due to the manual transfer of cash
between the core and outreach. All branches impacted have been resolved,
including the Dalmellington branch. This was resolved by issuing a transaction
correction and this was processed prior to the completion of the branch trading
statement.
The postmaster from Dalmellington is the only Postmaster known by Post Office
to have raised the issue with a CWU representative; all other branches resolved
the issue with sole contact with Post Office. Horizon logs of the other branches
impacted have been examined to confirm this and all entries are visible.to both
the branch and back office reconciliation processes.
It is evident that in the enthusiasm to support, there has, been a crossover
between departments which has resulted in mixed messages, which has not
been conducive in this case. There is also evidence of inconsistency in the
deployment of advice to Postmasters and the resolutions offered. Post Office
needs to ensure that there is a consistent tone and,language used in the
recording of conversations held and care néeds to.be exercised when speaking
to Postmasters and colleagues to ensure the right messages are given and
received.
The opportunity has presented itself,for the CWU and Tim McCormack to write
communications based on the issue that the Postmaster of Dalmellington raised.
However, it is disappointing that these communications lack a depth of
knowledge and understanding.of the issue, which can only serve Postmasters
poorly, instead of supporting them, and shows a lack of having Postmasters best
interests at heart.
Fundamentally, the issue, is visible to both Postmasters and back office functions,
which means in the unlikely event of a Postmaster not realising the error, the
back office reconciliation processes would pick this up and action, so as the
Postmaster would not be responsible for the discrepancy emanating from this
issue. As is described above, the sequence of events in the branch is recorded
and can be seen on transaction logs in the branch or on Horizon data logs and
through back office reconciliation processes.
Recommendation:
e Clear consistent script needed within NBSC. Scripts are needed to form
part of knowledge base so that Postmasters can be supported from the
initial point of entry.
e Clear information needs to be supplied to FSC from branch, NBSC, ATOS,
Fujitsu or other stakeholders to allow FSC to provide a consistent
resolution to branches and Postmasters. Suggest that a TC is the
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preferred method of clearing and at the time of the issue the emergency
suspense account to be utilised.
e¢ ATOS Service Centre to agree with Post Office standard line of
communication in instances such as this.
e All touch points with branches to receive a reminder of ‘do’s and don'ts’
when communicating on business related enquiries.
Resolution:
Horizon Online is continually updated and improved and as part of this a
software update is being issued to prevent users from being able to make the
actions involved; this will be issued with the next release of Horizon,updates in
[March 2016]
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Appendix 1: NBSC Call Logs
NBSC call logs: Bellsbank outreach service:
Reference I Date Comment
CAS1358666 I 08/10/2015 Caller: Ann Ireland
Issue: The PM has transferred £8k in cash from
her Core Office to this Outreach & has the rec's to
prove but it has transferred 4 x £8k = £32k.
The Core Office does not have any discrepancy but
the Outreach is showing a gain of £24k.
Resolution: Verified with ESG - PauhT ;
As the Core does not carry any,discrepancy, this
would indicate a system issue the PM.should report
to the IT Helpdesk.
CAS1367538 I 12/10/2015 Caller: Alman
Issue: Wanted to, know what checks would have
been made for the branch to branch transfer on
call
Resolution: Advised transaction log- transfers in
and transfers out and balance on both stock units
CAS1367831 I 12/10/2015 Caller: Mr,
Issue? checking previous ref - 135 8666
Resolution: advised as per details from previous
call that the office was advised to raise the query
with IT,helpdesk as a system issue
CAS1382490 I 19/10/2015 Caller: xx
Issue: what call did office make about transfer in?
Resolution: advised info that was in Neil Edwards
call (1358666)
CAS1382734 I 19/10/2015 Caller: Mr
Issue: checking on previous calls - issues with a
discrepancy wanting us to pass on that cannot
resolve
Resolution: needs to report to office directly
NBSC calls Dalmellington Core:
Reference I Date Comment
CAS1364483 I 12/10/2015 Caller: x
Issue: branch to branch transfer query - see
attached email for details
Resolution: none annotated
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NBSC calls Kinlochleven outreach service:
Reference I Date Comment
CAS1366926 I 12/10/2015 Caller: Andrew
Issue: What to do if they have transferred from
core to outreach 500 but its remmed in 5 times
Resolution: Advised to transfer £2000 back out to
core but don’t rem in and they should balance
NBSC calls Colsterworth Core:
Reference I Date Comment
CAS1299565 I 14/09/2015 Caller: Shirley
Issue: mobile office, got cash loss/of 6000
transferred money over today though but shown
up as 3 rems, why? what to do?
Resolution: checked to make sure not been
remmed out 3 times. off other system, checking to
see if got gainisGhecked all logs and reports, shows
that wasn’tremmed out’3 times but has gone on 3
times, no reason, netty advised to try reversing it
but didn’t work. advised to get fresh barcode label
rem,out,6k, keep separate with all paper work if
chesterfield call advise them what’s happened
CAS1299726 I 15/09/2015 Caller: Shirley
Issue:called re - 1299565
mobile office showing as a loss of £6000, due to
rem in has gone through 3 times, how to correct
Resolution: closed call as rob has dealt with when
office called back
CAS1301353 I 15/09/2015 Caller: Shirley
Issue: Remmed in cash 3 times by mistake at
outreach have loss of £6000
Resolution: ESG Paul refer to cash section at
chesterfield for TC
NBSC calls Coningsby outreach service:
Reference I Date Comment
CAS1288672 I 09/09/2015 Caller: Martin
Issue: has remmed in £150.00 twice.
branch to branch transfer has been completed
twice on mobile van, due to loss of signal,
shows twice on the txn log and balance report
shows loss for this amount
Resolution: advised to contact chesterfield 01246
542015
*No record of calls from outreach Barvas or the core Shawbost
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