POL00448733 - POL ARC meeting 2024: Audit, Risk & Compliance Committee [re-issued with fewer redactions at POL00462646]

Evidence on official site

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POL ARC MEETING @
21/05/2024 09:00 AM - 12:00 PM
Agenda Topic Page
Agenda 3
1. Welcome & Conflicts of Interest
2. Previous Meetings 7
2.1 Minutes of 20 March 2024 7
2.2 Action List 20
2.3. Risk and Compliance Committee Summary (7 May 2024 22
3. Risk, Compliance, Assurance and Internal Audit Updates. 27
3.1 Risk Update 27
3.2 Compliance Update 34
3.3 Assurance Update _» SPMP Integrated Assurance Update 39
3.4 Internal Audit Report + Investigation action assurance 63
4. Data Governance Update 71
5. Branch Data Plan and Controls 79
6. Transformation Office Changes Update 84
7. POI Board Update 90
8. SPM Risk Update 96
9. Cyber Security Update + AWS Access Controls lessons learned * DLP Update 100
10. Climate risks and our approach under TCFD (Task Force on Climate-related financial 115
disclosures;
11. Banking Deep Dive 122
12. Procurement Governance & Compliance 128
13. Postmaster Policies for Approval 131

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15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Policies for Approval
Post Office Insurance ARC update
IR35 Update

Tax Update and Strategy

Payment Practices Reporting Compliance

Review of External Audit (post account approval

External Auditor Procurement Exercise — Outcome and Appointment

Committee Forward Plan
Any other business

External Audit to meet with ARC Members

Speak Up Report

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141
143
155
163
167
169

170

175

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Audit, Risk & Compliance
Committee

21 May 2024

09:00 - 12:00 hrs

Location: 100 Wood Street, London, EC2V
7ER /Microsoft Teams.
Meeting Rooms: Alder & Pine
Present: d Attendees:

Simon Jeffreys (Chair)

Woodley (Deputy Chief Executive Officer)

Andrew Darfoor (NED)

Kathryn Sherratt (Interim CFO)

Lorna Gratton (NED, UKGI)

Elliot Jacobs (NED)

Tim Bennett (Senior Internal Audit Manager): Item
3.4 and observing full meeting

Chris Brocklesby (Chief Transformation Officer):
Items 3.4, 8 &9

Martin Roberts (Group Chief Retail Officer): Items
3.4 &13

Simon Oldnall (Branch Technology Director): Item
3.4

Vishal Thanki (Data Governance Lead Contractor):
Item 4

Regular Attendees:

Chris Russell (Interim Data Management Director):
Items 4&5

Tim McInnes (Strategy and Transformation
Director): Items 4,5 &6

Nigel Railton (Interim Chair)

Kayleigh Dodd (Digital/Physical Records Manager):
Item 5

Nick Read (Group CEO)

Jo Welch (Head of Change Risk & Assurance):
Item 6

Sarah Gray (Interim Group General Counsel)

Ed Dutton (Product Portfolio Director POMS): Item
7

Andrew Paynter (Partner, PwC)

Carol Murray (Deloitte Partner)

Kelly Goodwin (Programme Director) :Item 8 _
Neil Bennett (Chief Information Security Officer):
Items 9 & 14.4

Anshu Mathur (Group Assurance Director)

Jonny Lonsdale (Business Continuity Manager):
Items 10 & 14.2

Johann Appel (Director of Internal Audit)

Mark Cazaly (Head of Corporate Responsibility &
Social Impact): Item 10

Jonathan Hill (Group Compliance Director)

Ross Borkett (Banking Director): Item 11_

Rebecca Barker (Head of Risk) I

Liam Carroll (Procurement Director): Item 12

Marie Molloy (Senior Assistant Company
Secretary)

Jo Milton(Senior Operational Improvement
Manager): Item 13 __

Apologies:
Alisdair Cameron (Group CFO)

Ben Foat (Group General Counsel)

Russell Hancock (Supply Chain Director); Item 13
Martin McKee ( Head of People Services): Item
14.1

Claire Hamilton (Speak Up and Intelligence
Manger): Items 14.3&24 _ 7

Karen McEwan (Group Chief People Officer): Item
16

Haydn Horner (Senior Manager, PwC)
Elysia Knapp (Senior Manager, PwC)

Strictly Confidential

Rachael Hill (Head of Talent Acquisition): Item 16
Andy Jamieson (Head of Tax): Items 16 & 17

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Tom Lee (Group Financial Controller): Items 16,
_ (17,19820,.
Antony Ray (Specialist Senior Procurement
Manager Professional and Financial Services): Item
20
Amanda Burton (NED & Speak Up Champion):
Item 24
Time Item Owner Action
09.00 (1. Welcome & Conflicts of Interest. Chair Noting
09.01 2. Previous Meetings
2.1 Minutes Chair Approval
(i) 20 March 2024
2.2 Action List Chair Noting
2.3 Risk and Compliance Committee Sarah Gray Noting
Summary (7 May 2024)
RISK ITEMS
3. Risk, Compliance, Assurance and Internal
Audit Updates
09.10 3.1 Risk Update Rebecca Barker Noting/
Approval
09.20 3.2 Compliance Update Jonathan Hill Noting
09.30 3.3 Assurance Update Anshu Mathur Noting/
« SPMP Integrated Approval
Assurance Update
09.40 3.4 Internal Audit Report Johann Appel/ Noting
« Investigation action Tim Bennett/
assurance Martin Roberts/
Chris Brocklesby/
Simon Oldnall
09.50 I4. Data Governance Update Vishal Thanki/ Noting
Chris Russell/
Tim McInnes
10.00 I5. Branch Data Plan and Controls Kayleigh Dodd/ Noting
Chris Russell/
I_ Tim McInnes
10.05 I 6. Transformation Office Changes Update Jo Welch/ Noting
Tim McInnes
10.15 I7. POI Board Update Ed Dutton Noting
10.25 I 8. SPM Risk Update Chris Brocklesby/ Noting
Kelly Goodwin
2

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10.30 I9. Cyber Security Update Neil Bennett/ Noting
« AWS Access Controls lessons Chris Brocklesby
learned
[ » DLP Update
10.40 Break
10.45 I10. I Climate risks and our approach under Jonny Lonsdale/ Noting
TCFD (Task Force on Climate-related Mark Cazaly
financial disclosures)
10.55 I 11. I Banking Deep Dive Ross Borkett Noting
11.05 I 12. I Procurement Governance & Compliance Liam Carroll Noting
11.10 I 13 Postmaster Policies for Approval:
13.1 I Network Cash and Stock Martin Roberts/ Approval
Management Jo Milton/
13.2 I Network Monitoring and Branch Russell Hancock
Assurance
13.3 I Postmaster Complaint Handling
14. I Policies for Approval:
11.15 14.1 I Employee Vetting Requirements Martin McKee Approval
Policy
14.2 I Business Continuity Management Jonny Lonsdale
Policy
14.3 I Speak Up Policy Claire Hamilton
14.4 I Cyber and Information Security Neil Bennett
Policy
11.20 I 15. I Post Office Insurance ARC update Not Presented Noting
11.20 I 16. I IR35 Update Karen McEwan/ Noting
Tom Lee/
Andy Jamieson/
Rachael Hill
AUDIT ITEMS
11.30 I17. I Tax Update and Strategy Tom Lee/ Approval
Andy Jamieson
11.35 I 18. I Payment Practices Reporting Compliance Not presented Noting
11.35 I 19. I Review of External Audit (post account Tom Lee Noting
approval)
PWC to leave the meeting
11.40 I 20. I External Auditor Procurement Exercise — Antony Ray/ I Recommendation
Outcome and Appointment Tom Lee to Board
PwC to re-join meeting
11.45 I 21. I Committee Forward Plan CoSec Noting/Approval
3

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11.50 I 22. I Any other business All
11.50 I 23. I External Audit to meet with ARC Members
11.55 I 24. I Speak Up Report Sarah Gray/ Noting
Claire Hamilton/
Amanda Burton
Next ARC Meeting:
« 1 July 2024 at 14:00 - 17:00 Wood Street/via Microsoft Teams.
4

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MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE OF
POST OFFICE LIMITED HELD ON WEDNESDAY 20‘ MARCH 2024 AT 15:00
AT 100 WOOD STREET,LONDON, EC2V 7ER

Present:

Invited Attendees:

Simon Jeffreys (Chair)

Chris Brocklesby (Chief Transformation Officer):
Items 3.3 & 6 (CB)

Andrew Darfoor (NED) (AD) (joined 16.28)

Lorna Gratton (NED, UKGI) (LG)

Elliot Jacobs (NED) (EJ) (until 16.31)

Sarah Gray (Group Legal Director): Item 4 (SG)
Jonny Lonsdale (Business Continuity Manager):
Items 5 & 12.2 (JL) ——
Martin Hopcroft (Director of Health & Safety,
Environment and Business Continuity): Items 5 &
12.2 (MH)

Neil Bennett (Chief Information Security Officer):
Item 6 (NB)

Juliet Lang (Leadership and Culture Director):Item
7 (3L)

Simon Recaldin (Remediation Unit Director): Item
8 (SR)

Regular Attendees:

Abigail Mcgeever (Strategic Partnerships Director):
Item 9 (AMc)

Nick Read (Group Chief Executive Officer) (NR)
(until 16.40)

Liam Carroll (Procurement Director): Items 10 &
12.1 (LC)

Owen Woodley (Deputy Chief Executive Officer)
(ow)

Tracy Marshall (Retail Engagement Director): Item
11 (T)

Kathryn Sherratt (Interim CFO) (KS)

Tom Lee (Group Financial Controller): Items 14 &
15 (TL)

Ben Foat (Group General Counsel) (BF)

Andy Jamieson (Head of Tax): Item 14 (AJ)

Andrew Paynter (Partner, PwC) (AP)

Rachael Hill (Head of Talent Acquisition): Item 14
(RH)

Haydn Horner (Senior Manager, PwC) (HH)

Dan Ward (Head of Financial and Technical
Accounting): Item 15 (DW)

Elysia Knapp (Senior Manager, PwC) (EK)

Carol Murray (Deloitte Partner) (CM)
Anshu Mathur (Group Assurance Director) (AM)

Johann Appel (Director of Internal Audit and
Risk Management) (JA)

Rebecca Barker (Head of Risk) (RB) _ :
Jonathan Hill (Group Compliance Director) (JH)

Marie Molloy (Senior Assistant Company
Secretary) (MM)

Apologies:

Alisdair Cameron (Group Chief Finance Officer)
(Ac)

Action
1. Welcome and Conflicts of Interest
11 A quorum being present, the Chair opened the meeting.
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1.2

The Directors declared that they had no new conflicts of interest in the matters
to be considered at the meeting in accordance with the requirements of section
177 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Company's Articles of Association.

Previous Meetings

The minutes of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee meetings held on 29"
January 2024 were APPROVED and AUTHORISED for signature by the Chair.

The actions were reviewed in turn.

In relation to action 30, assurance over privileged access management, CM and
JA discussed that the scope of the EY report on Fujitsu was still being agreed and
a reassessment would be undertaken once that report was received. The ARC
highlighted the importance that POL had appropriate access to perform this
review.

Progress against the completion of actions as shown on the action log was
NOTED.

2.3

BF outlined the challenging environment that POL were currently operating in
and the risks these issues had caused POL, which had been reflected in the risk
paper. BF also highlighted the increase in FOI’s/DSAR’s and their complexity.

EJ was conscious of the AWS data issue and associated risks. BF advised that
CB would be joining the meeting for a later item and could speak to this matter.

The Risk and Compliance Committee (RCC) summary held on 12" March 2024
was NOTED.

Risk, Compliance, Assurance and Internal Audit Updates

Risk Update

RB outlined the intermediate risks outside of tolerance. Currently, POL were
operating outside of tolerance for 23 out of 81 intermediate risks, a 6% increase
from the January 2024 ARC update. RB highlighted ongoing pressures of the
Inquiry and the impact of DSAR’s/FOI requests upon a number of risks.

RB reported on the scheduled deep dives undertaken on Group General Counsel,
Group Commercial, Group People & Group Corporate affairs. Plans were in place
to address risks at specific dates in the future, but RB advised that some may
require more funding.

RB discussed the risk appetite schedule, at appendix 2 of the report for which
onward approval to the POL Board was being sought. The revised schedule
would ensure all risks are assigned to an agreed appetite and enable improved
reporting and focus on risks outside of appetite and tolerance.

As part of the continuous improvement to risk management, RB was seeking
ARC approval to adjust the Corporate Averse appetite scale from 1-5 to 1-6, as
outlined at appendix 3 of the paper. RB explained that the change would enable
risk owners to accept, as opposed to mitigate, the risk and there would also be
a reduction in the amount of resource and cost to mitigate something that
would still be unlikely to materialise.

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TB outlined that, in addition, introducing this change would result in a further 41
risks being in an accept state which will also discourage risk owners forcing a
lower score, which was not a risk culture POL wished to promote. RB outlined
that the change would benefit the prioritisation of financial/personal resources
across other risks that require action.

AM discussed the data breach paper on the ARC agenda at item number 6 and
considered the lack of preventative controls and potential root cause being poor
behaviour to override controls. RB planned to include control effectiveness in
the risk paper going forward. JA confirmed that data loss prevention was on the
internal audit plan for next year. OW noted that the underlying issues were still
being investigated. ACTION: The Chair requested that when the investigation
was completed a paper to be circulated to ARC members offline.

ACTION: The Chair outlined that, where risks are outside defined tolerance and
the activity is still ongoing, there should be an explanation provided by
management regarding how it was still acceptable to carry on the activity.

LG discussed the risks around the FOI and DSAR requests and the relationship
with the ICO. BF was mindful of POL’s ability to provide the information in a
timely manner and was conscious that the regulator may take a different
approach with POL, if improvement was not made.

AD had submitted a question via the Chair in relation to the about copper to
fibre risk. RB advised that this was currently an operational risk for technology
and the risk was currently outside appetite but within tolerance. RB confirmed
that this operational risk was due for assessment in June 2024.

In relation to risk appetite statements, the Chair clarified that some had not
been reviewed since 2015. RB confirmed this was correct and she would be
seeking board approval for the risk appetite statements schedule.

The ARC NOTED the Risk Update, APPROVED the adjustment of the Corporate
Averse appetite scale from 1-5 to 1-6 and APPROVED the risk appetite schedule
for onward submission to POL Board.

cB

3.2

Group Compliance Update

JH discussed the ongoing increase in both FOI requests and DSARs, mainly
driven by RU & Inquiry related issues. JH acknowledged that if timeliness trends
continued to dip, there was a risk that POL would be brought into special
measures by the ICO. The Chair noted this was a significant reputational risk.
JH was working on a plan to get back into compliance and there was a resource
request submitted for the DSAR and FOI team.

LG discussed the anticipation of more requests once the Inquiry restarted in
April 2024. JH planned to rapidly recruit and ask for support from the rest of the
business. LG also outlined her experience that senior level input was required to
steer people. JH confirmed there was experienced case workers and steerco
oversight. BF outlined the challenge of extracting information from the business.
OW asked if the resource was in the budget and BF advised it was within the
envelope submitted.

The ARC NOTED the Group Compliance Update.

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3.3

Group Assurance Update (including SPMP Integrated Assurance)
CB entered the meeting.

AM outlined the development of a new group assurance dashboard which would
cover all second line defence activity by his team. AM advised that he had
expected retail to be red rated as the continuous assurance model was in the
process of being implemented and AM reported upon the retail teams increased
engagement with group assurance.

In relation to the SPMP integrated assurance, AM reported that the integrated
risk assurance universe was completed. This comprised of 505 inherent risks
and circa 300 interdependencies. This would avoid duplication and facilitate
adequate end to end coverage of risks when creating/executing statement of
works. AM drew the committee’s attention to the draft statement of works in the
appendix and stated that it was his intention to present all statement of works
for ARC approval in May 2024.

AM was also undertaking pre-market engagement for external assurance
support/SME but outlined challenges in the appointment of external assurance
providers related to lack of participation (due to reputational risks perceived in
the market) cost and timing issues.

CB added that it was now known that DBT would like to appoint a third party to
conduct assurance as well and there was a need to avoid duplication so as not
to undertake the same work twice. LG considered this was not a substitute for
the POL Board doing its own assurance, as the Board needed to assure itself.
The ARC NOTED the Group Assurance update.

CB left the meeting

3.4

Internal Audit Report
JA outlined the three audits completed during this reporting period: Stamp

Stock Control rated ‘Unsatisfactory’, Postmaster Redress - Suspension
Remuneration Review rated ‘Needs Improvement’ and the Cyber Maturity
Assessment which was advisory and not rated.

Following discussion at RCC of the IDG 2.0 audit, JA had withdrawn the report
from March ARC in order to clarify the scope of the audit and this report would
be submitted to May ARC.

JA confirmed that completion of audit actions was progressing steadily. As of
12 March, there were 25 actions overdue, eight of which were older than 60
days.

The Chair discussed the Stamp Stock Control internal audit and the timetable
for fixing the issues. JA was content that management were taking action to
control the gaps identified but was not sure that the timetable was sufficient.
The Chair discussed the I" of stock and the unsatisfactory rated IA report.
AP discussed that stamps were not on the POL balance sheet but noted the
contract with Royal Mail Group.

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EJ outlined that going live with auto rem was not crystallising the risk, which
would be better going forward, but this would not remedy the past. JA discussed
the level of uncertainty in the stock holding. EJ outlined that potentially the new
system for stamps was to print them all.

EJ discussed historical detriment. BF advised that the HSS scheme included
stamp losses as part of the compensation scheme. EJ was not sure that
Postmasters understood that HSS covers that and he undertook to review what
he had been sent via correspondence and would re-raise this matter if
necessary.

ACTION: Update to be provided on the potential exposure/timing of activities in
relation to Stamp stock.

The ARC NOTED the Internal Audit Report including the progress being made
with delivery of the internal audit programme and completion of audit actions.

Annual Internal Audit Plan

JA presented the proposed internal audit programme for 2024/25. LG requested
that the IR 35 process was included as part of the Internal Audit plan which JA
agreed to add.

The ARC APPROVED the proposed internal audit programme for 2024/25.

Internal Audit CoSource Independence Report including non-audit fees

The ARC:

« NOTED the statement of independence of the Internal Audit function,
including Deloitte & Mazars in their capacity as the internal audit co-
source providers and

« APPROVED (ratified) the provision of other assurance work (specifically
assurance over the 22/23 ARA) that resulted in the agreed 80%
threshold for non-internal audit service provided by co-source providers,
to be exceeded.

Mel
Park

Legal Risk Review
SG entered the meeting.

SG outlined that the Solicitors Regulation Authority published its notice on
Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (“SLAPPs”) in November 2022.
The notice is aimed at addressing concerns that solicitors and law firms are
pursuing abusive litigation, known as SLAPPs, on behalf of their clients. A SLAPP
is a misuse of the legal system, because the bringing or threatening of
proceedings, in order to harass or intimidate another who could be criticising or
holding a party to account for their actions may discourage scrutiny of matters
in the public interest.

The SRA had written to POL in relation to obligation under SLAPPs. LG asked
who was written to. BF confirmed the SRA had written to him personally. SG
considered that another letter was anticipated in due course and a full review of
SLAPPS was being undertaken, with internal documents being updated. It was
also being flagged to external firms who worked with POL.

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SG also discussed challenges with governance, creation of the new leadership
team which excluded lines of defence and issues related to delegated authority
and authorised signatories which were being worked through.

The ARC NOTED the Legal Risk Review.

SG left the meeting.

Safety and Physical Security Practices

MH and JL entered the meeting.

MH advised that whilst procedures were being reviewed and strengthened, a
communication strategy was being developed to utilise appropriate channels
and methods to communicate to colleagues, depending on the scenario. A
threat level matrix was also being developed by the Security and H&S team
which will provide clarity on controls and solutions to be implemented in the
event of a threat.

The Chair checked if the onboarding of the external supplier was supported by
management and BF confirmed that it was and RCC had considered it
appropriate and compliant with POL’s duty of care.

The ARC agreed with the proposed onboarding of the external supplier to assess
and test security controls and to provide expert advice and guidance and
training to Post Office stakeholders.

The ARC NOTED the Safety and Physical Security Practices Report.

MH and JL left the meeting.

Cyber Security Update and Data Loss Prevention Suite

CB and NB entered the meeting.

CB introduced NB who had joined POL on 18'* March.

Cyber Security Update

CB advised that a recent independent assessment of POL’s Cyber maturity by
Deloitte had confirmed that POL had successfully increased its maturity to the
previous target level set in 2019. The target maturity has now therefore been
increased and a Cyber programme initiated, which aims to achieve this new
target by the end of 2026. CB noted that this target could be achieved faster
with additionaI riginal funding request for FY25 has been

The total Cyber investment required was
expected to be circa Phase 1 was now estimated to be which CB
advised was in line with available funding.

CB highlighted the threat landscape, with threat actors increased sophistication
and POL’s high profile. The ARC discussed thet=szitarget maturity and whether
this was correct. CB confirmed that the new target would be confirmed by NB.

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Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Suite

IRRELEVANT
iSpecific

the ‘business-ha
L_IRRELEVANT
CB confirmed that the March RCC had supported the short-term
recommendations to introduce more preventive controls and bring POL into risk
tolerance. It was acknowledged that this would impact the ease of access to
systems and prevent access to some personal applications but would
significantly reduce the risk of data loss. ACTION: DLP update to be provided to
May ARC.

EJ asked about the AWS data breach. CB confirmed that the control failures
were being investigated. OW outlined there were incorrect audit settings on the
database so there was no evidence that the data had not been seen.

LG asked about the reaction of those stakeholders informed. CB confirmed they
had been advised via the commercial team who looked after the commercial
relationship. OW noted that it was poor timing in relation to Banking Framework
4 negotiations and generally there had been understanding, but consciousness
of the impact on security of the NBIT release.

AD joined the meeting at 16.28.

From early root cause analysis, CB outlined that people had been assigned the
wrong access. LG asked about CB’s sense about wider controls. CB believed that
there was not widespread control indifference generally and an access control
roles based process was in place.

The ARC NOTED the Cyber Security Update and Data Loss Prevention Suite

CB and NB left the meeting.

Mandatory Training: Status, changes and enhancements

JL entered the meeting.
E] left the meeting at 16.31.

The Chair asked JL to interpret how good or otherwise the performance was
from the bar chart at the paper appendix. JL advised that reports had been re-
run and all modules now had a greater than 95% completion rate and so the
compliance target was met. JL reported that 88 individuals had one or more
compliance modules that were incomplete. The Chair asked if this would be
taken into account on their appraisal. JL advised they had until 31 March 2024
to complete the modules or they would be ineligible for any bonus opportunity.
ACTION: An update on compliance achieved at 31 March 2024 to be provided
to ARC.

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AD was interested in POI compliance adhere as a regulated entity. ACTION: JL I JL
to ascertain from POI its compliance adherence.
The ARC NOTED the Mandatory Training: Status, changes and enhancements
report.
JL left the meeting.

8. Remediation Unit (RU) Risk & Assurance Update
SR entered the meeting.
SR highlighted the RU Intermediate Risks, set out at appendix 1 of the paper,
and the worsening risk profile across the RU. SR discussed the impact of recent
government announcements. In addition, the number of late applications to
HSS, which was likely to materially increase, may not be capable of being
fulfilled by HSF and the current panel members. SR further outlined challenges
in the RU people space.
NR confirmed that POL were waiting on clarity on what DBT wanted to do. LG
confirmed that a solution was being worked on, but this was not
straightforward.
SR outlined that the outcome of the Internal Audit (IA) across HSS had provided
helpful improvements. JA confirmed that three of the five key actions raised by
IA had now been closed, with target dates for closure of the other two set for
the end of the year.
The ARC NOTED the Remediation Unit Risk & Assurance Update.
SR left the meeting.

9. Strategic Partner Risk & Failure Monitoring Deep Dive
AMc entered the meeting.
AMG presented the Strategic Partner Risk & Failure Monitoring Deep Dive.
The ARC NOTED the Strategic Partner Risk & Failure Monitoring Deep Dive.
AMc left the meeting.
NR left the meeting 16.40.

10. Procurement Risk & Compliance Report
LC entered the meeting.
LC presented the Procurement Risk & Compliance Report.
The ARC NOTED the Procurement Risk & Compliance Report
LC left the meeting.

11. Postmaster Policies for Approval
TM entered the meeting.
TM presented the following Postmaster policies for ARC approval:

« Network Transaction Corrections
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* Postmaster Onboarding
* Postmaster Training Policies (Annual Review)

TM outlined that specific feedback from the internal policy assurance reviews
completed by the Group Assurance (GA) team had been incorporated, where
applicable, into these policies. In addition, the assurance review had highlighted
a number of actions, and these are being worked through as quickly as possible
by the retail team.

TM confirmed that a review of risks and controls within all of the suite of
Postmaster policies would be completed by the end of July 2024. The GA team
were supportive of these three policies being submitted for approval in the
meantime, given the importance of ensuring annual reviews were undertaken.

LG asked about feedback from those impacted by the policies and what it felt
like to be on the receiving end of the policies. BF confirmed there was
stakeholder engagement and TM confirmed that the NFSP were involved and
signed off the policies.

AD enquired about how the success of the policies/any improvement was
measured, from the lens of the end user. TM confirmed there were KPI’s
monitoring this such as the training experience and support. TM was working
with GA to develop this dashboard further. AM agreed KPI’s/KRI’s needed to be
looked at end to end from a Postmaster lens.

ACTION: Presentation to ARC and Board of the dashboard, once it has been
developed.

T™ left the meeting.

™

12.

Policies for Approval

12.1

LC entered the meeting.

Procurement Policy

LC advised that the team were awaiting enactment of secondary legislation and
therefore the policy was likely to be further amended in the future, to take this
secondary legislation into account.

The ARC APPROVED the Procurement Policy.

LC left the meeting.

12.2

MH and JL entered the meeting.

Health and Safety Policy

MH presented the Health and Safety Policy.

The ARC APPROVED the Health and Safety Policy.

MH and JL left the meeting.

13.

Post Office Insurance ARC update

This item was not presented.

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The ARC NOTED the Post Office Insurance ARC update.

14.

IR35 Update & Decisions & People Risks

TL, AJ and RH entered the meeting.

TL advised that management were seeking ARC approval to pursue option 2, as
outlined in the paper. This would mean that POL could continue to debate the
position with HMRC, seek to review the contractor population and negotiate a
settlement, which should be considerably lower than the worst-case scenario,
albeit noting the precedent risk highlighted within the Corporation Tax funding
offer paper to Board of 28 Feb 24.

TL outlined that this option would still be likely to lead to a significant number of

assuming HMRC’s stance is followed. Contemporaneously, management would
seek to amend the policy.and.nracess.far.enaaagion.and.renewina..cantractors.....
de-risking the position by. IRRELEVANT

TL a

the: IRRELEVANT.
as RU an
of resource

discussed.

and so could consider

There was also a risk to programmes such
and the potential loss

in the assessments was

TL outlined that. «jhad been assisting with the HMRC correspondence . The
Chair asked about internal assurance and TL confirmed that the legal, people
and tax team had been involved. TL advised that HMRC had not shared a view
until December 2023. The Chair had the sense that POL thought that it had a
defensible position. LG noted the position was that another organisation has lost
on. TL are that DWP had lost a case but did not know this was in relation
tof 1, as this was not publicly available information.

AJ added that on 1 April 2017 were engaged to advise POL how to set
the scheme up. LG asked that when HMRC raised thi
did not change its policy or get legal advice on the stréngth of its position. TL
outlined that POL did not get advice on the strength of position, the advice was
on the policies, approach and HMRC correspondence. LG considered that
management decisions may have resulted in higher liability than may otherwise
have been the case. TL advised that management kept the ARC informed.

ACTION: The Chair requested that management put together a chronology of
events and rationale so what had happened could be understood in preparation
for discussion with DBT and there was urgent action on the contractor
population to de-risk the position.

In relation to the assessment of the current contractor population, KS advised

TL/RH

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The ARC was supportive of management pursuing option 2; to debate the
position with HMRC, seek to review the contractor population and negotiate a
settlement above.

AJ and RH left the meeting.

15.

FY23/24 ARA plan and Revaluation Policy Review

DW entered the meeting.

TL enquired if the Deloitte assurance activities undertaken in the prior year
should be repeated for FY23/24. The ARC confirmed that they should be as it
had been a useful exercise.

JA discussed the security headroom with the first breach projected falling within
the going concern period. TL confirmed he was monitoring the position and the
requirement for waivers and extensions of facilities was being considered and
worked on as required.

TL advised that overall, the payout levels across the Remediation Matters
schemes were expected to increase significantly when compared with the
estimated levels included in the FY22/23 provisions. The net effect was therefore
likely to be an increased provisioning level driven by late applicants to the HSS
scheme, policy changes to HSS to increase the minimal payment level to £75k,
the mass exoneration of previous convictions and the recognition of a provision
for the Post Office Process Review, which was disclosed as a Post Balance Sheet
Event in the FY22/23 ARA. TL outlined that the OC provision may decrease as the
mass exoneration may be fully settled directly by government.

TL outlined the key risk for the ARA was that the revised estimates for both the

IRRELEVANT

IRRELEVANT “T Wrongful t trading was discussed with LG

advising there was clarity that the department were fully funding the costs of RM.

In relation to: _ja provision will likely be recognised in the ARA in
respect of this and appropriate disclosures, outlining the change, the rationale
and the funding commitment will be included. TL advised that most recent
estimates indicated that historical liabilities will be significantly reduced vs the
previous estimates, due to the ability to utilise bui
albeit noting this exposes POL to the risk of futur H
as losses will be greatly diminished. LG outlines Marana n had
on the DBT and Treasury and was keen to ensure this was done differently to not
impact their budgets in this manner. TL was conscious that matters were still with
jand so the numbers could potentially change again, whilst also noting DBT
‘had requested a worst-case estimate, which was provided.

In relation to CGU Impairment, TL advised that the latest forecasts indicated a
slight strengthening of trading profit when compared with that used for the
FY22/23 analysis. However, trading losses are still forecasted presently, and
management remain cautious as the budget process for FY25/26 is still underway
and maintaining an impairment unless sufficient confidence in longer term trading
is established, would be sensible. Detailed modelling will be performed as part of
the yearend ARA process.

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TL discussed a key variable driving the timeline for signing of the FY23/24 ARA
was the going concern position, with ARC and PwC’s views on what constitutes
sufficient evidence and assurances to support a going concern assumption being
pivotal. Additionally, the timing of a General Election and what that means for
BAU funding, being NSP and Investment funding, should be considered. In
addition, the Fujitsu contract renewal was a key determinant of the going concern
Position.

The ARC determined that the working assumption should be that a summer
signing timeline should be aimed for with dates provided/mapped for when
decisions would need to be made to achieve this, albeit with close monitoring of
forecasts, funding/support requirements and other matters, such that signing
could be pushed back if required.

In relation to content, presentation and positioning, the ARC agreed with
managements recommendation to keeping any changes to a minimum until such
time as there is enough bandwidth in the organisation to deal with these.

Revaluation Policy

TL outlined that the implementation of a revaluation policy would not be in line
with expectations of a business of POL’s nature and would also introduce greater
cost and complexity into POL accounting processes and the associated external
audit. A move to a revaluation method would constitute a change in accounting
policy, rather than accounting estimate, adding further complexity Following
discussion, the ARC agreed that POL continue with the cost model.

The ARC NOTED a number of expected accounting and disclosure updates to be
included in the FY23/24 ARA, including some expected PBSE items.

DW left the meeting.

16. PwC Final Audit Plan
AP presented the PwC final audit plan and highlighted that the tax risk had
increased. HH outlined the ARC responsibilities in relation to fraud risk
referenced at appendix 3 of the report.
The ARC APPROVED the PwC Final Audit plan and the following non-audit
services in relation to the FY24 year end:
e Royal Mail AUP
@ DVLA AUP
e DBT AUP
¢ BoE Note Circulation Scheme NAAE
e Branch Network KPI NAAE
17. Committee Forward Plan
The ARC NOTED the Committee Forward Plan.
18. Any other business

There was no further business raised.

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19.

External Audit to meet with ARC Members

AP, HH and EK met with the Chair, LG and AD.
MM was present to capture notes of the meeting.
CM was in attendance.

There being no further business, the meeting was closed at 18.11

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‘OPEN ACTIONS

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AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

Title: Summary of key discussion and outcomes Mesting 21 May 2024
‘Author: Sarah I Gray, Interim Group General Sponsor: Na

Counsel

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to

« Note key discussions and actions arising from the Risk & Compliance Committee (RCC) on 7 May 2024.

e Please note this is not intended to override the formal RCC minutes, and that the full agenda can be found in
Appendix 1.

1.0 Summary of RCC -7 May 2024

14

RCC Structure and Approach

The Interim Chair reminded the RCC members that the RCC structure, content, coverage and governance
was still under review, and that the Group General Counsel on his return in June 2024, should be reaching
out to members to commence the assessment of how the RCC could be improved.

RCC Actions

The RCC debated whether the risk definition to capture ‘Treating Postmaster’s (PM) fairly’ was robust and
appropriate. The Committee was made aware that the definition had been updated by both Group Risk
and Retail in December 2023. The RCC requested that the definition be circulated outside of the meeting
to relevant members to ensure RCC was comfortable with the definition and its coverage.

Risk Update, including Strategic Risk Management Review
See 1.2.

It was observed that certain key risks needed to be captured to ensure the risk overview to ARC reflected
the environment in which POL was currently operating under, for e.g. SPMP Programme Deliverability,
People Wellness etc. The RCC requested that the paper should be structured to reflect the feedback from
the ARC Chair in March 2024 primarily — out of tolerance (OOT) risk, period since when OOT, whether
compensating control exists, can POL do more, or do these require formal risk acceptance.

RCC queried the divergence between the Retail Risk Deep dive showing 23 of 29 risks mapped to controls
and rated as effective, against the Assurance update which was predominantly red. The Head of Risk,
Retail and Assurance were to ensure alignment prior to ARC.

It was agreed that Risk team would be part of the 3-4 year business plan review to ensure an appropriate
assessment could be made on funding requirements and their impacts on associated risks profiles.

To allow for appropriate input from the Interim Chair, the RCC decided that the Strategic Risk Management
Review should be deferred to the next RCC/ARC.

Compliance Update
RCC was made aware that the ICO intended to issue a formal Practice Recommendation (PR) to POL
following concerns as to PO’s response times to FOls. The ICO had asked POL to respond by 17 May to
a number of questions; the responses to which will shape the PR. The RCC was made aware that should
there be noncompliance with PR and/or lack of engagement with the ICO, that this could result in a possible
enforcement notice.

FOIA request and resourcing levels in the team were discussed, and it was recognised that this continues
to be challenging, with impacts on people’s wellbeing becoming much more overt. Whilst funding was
available to resource the FOIA team to deal with volumes of request, recruitment had a time lag,
compounded by upskilling of new recruits.

The Compliance Director assured the Committee that the absence of a permanent MLRO was not having

a detrimental impact, and that interviews had begun to find a suitable replacement. HMRC has been
informed, and the Compliance team have in place 2 ‘Recognised Officers’ to ensure continuity.

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4.5 Group Assurance Update
RCC noted the continuing unsatisfactory assurance outcomes for Retail, for both Continuous Assurance
and Overdue Management Actions. The RCC was informed that whilst the overall status was red, the
engagement with the Retail Team, including a change in their approach to reviewing artefacts/evidence for
controls, should in the medium term begin to show improvements. That said it was challenging to determine
when this would be. In addition, the significant increase in overdue actions related to PM Policy Reviews
which were due end March, and now reforecast to the end of June

The RCC discussed whether Group Assurance resources should be diverted to support SPMP Assurance,
and RCC agreed that this should not be allowed given the criticality to assess the BAU control environment.

The Group Assurance Director (GAD) provided an overview of the SPMP Assurance Statement of Works
(SoW) and how coverage was assured across the SPMP Pillars. GAD highlighted that progress on
delivering the reviews was lacking pace, and that a risk existed that POL may not have the right composition
and experience within the internal POL Assurance teams to deliver. This is compounded by the process
to procure external assurance support. The SPMP programme recognise the importance to deliver the
Assurance plan and have approved the recruitment of 2 additional Assurance resources. The RCC
requested the GAD to keep them informed if this risk materialised.

1.6 SPMP Update - Risk Profile

RCC received a verbal update from the SPMP Programme Director, highlighting the significant amount of
progress that had taken place over the last three months to understand their risk profile e.g. creation of the
assurance universe, external reviews, draft release strategy. The Committee noted that whilst the direction
of travel was good, a formalised view on risk vs release strategy was still being developed and it was
unlikely to be ready for the May ARC. An externally facilitated risk workshop was planned. The RCC agreed
that a paper should be submitted to ARC outlining the steps taken to date, with a clear articulation of what
is still needed and by when in order to provide a formalised risk assessment vs release strategy.

1.7 Internal Audit Update
RCC discussed the Horizon Privileged Access Management update and enquired why the report remained
in draft and contained no opinion. Internal Audit will be updating their paper ahead of ARC to provide an
overlay.

1.8 Data Governance Update

interim Data Management Director provi his vision to enhancing the data maturity profile of POL to
“by June 2024, and to: IRRELEVANT I RCC challenged whether this was ambitious enough and
er this fell short of the ‘C received last year i.e. to speed up maturity with more
stretching timelines and targets. The Director will revisit the paper to make clearer how maturity will be

achieved and by when.

IRRELEVANT

1.10 Finance Update — 1R35/ Tax Update/Strategy
Finance presented their detailed update on the chronology of events and advise / input received in relation
to IR35, along with a detailed Tax strategy paper which the RCC fully endorsed. The RCC acknowledged
that a risk existed in relation to tax exposure and funding regarding IR35, and all roles will need to be
assessed based on their enduring nature and criticality, which is currently being worked through.

1.11 PM Policies / Policies for Approval
All three PM policies (Network Cash and Stock Management, Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance
and Postmaster Complaint Handling) and four other Group polices (Employee Vetting Requirements
Policy, Business Continuity Management Policy, Speak Up Policy, Cyber and Information Security) were
approved for onward submission for ARC approval in May 2024.

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Appendix 1 - Risk and Compliance Committee Agenda - 7 May 2024

Meeting: Risk and Compliance Committee

Date: I Tuesday 7" May 2024.

Time: 09:45 - 13:00

Location: Wood Street: Birch/via Microsoft
Teams

Present:

I Attendees:

Sarah Gray (Chair) Interim Group General
Counsel
Max Jacobi (Finance Director - Commercial)

Johann Appel (Director of Internal Audit)

"Rebecca Barker (Head of Risk)

Tracy Marshall (Retail Engagement Director)

Christian Spelzini (Interim Group Legal Director)

Nicola Marriott (HR Director) on behalf of Karen
McEwan

Jonathan Hill (Group Compliance Director)

Kathryn Sherratt (Interim Chief Finance Officer)

_Anshu Mathur (Group Assurance Director)
_Tom Lee (Group Financial Controller)

Marie Molloy (Senior Assistant Company
Secretary)
Ross Borkett (Banking Director): Item 4

Vishal Thanki (Data Governance Lead Contractor):
Item 5

Apologies

Julian Hilditch (Inquiry Data & Disclosure Lead
Contractor): Item 5

Alisdair Cameron (Group Chief Finance Officer) -
TBC

Chris Russell (Interim Data Management Director):
Items 5 & 6

Karen McEwan (Group Chief People Officer)
Owen Woodley (Deputy Chief Executive Officer)
Ben Foat (Group General Counsel)

Chris Brocklesby (Chief Transformation Officer)

I Tim Perkins (Programme Director

Tim McInnes (Strategy and Transformation
Director): Items 5, 6 & 7

Kayleigh Dodd (Digital/Physical Records Manager):
Item 6

Jo Welch (Head of Change Risk & Assurance): Item

7

/ Goodwi
Bennett

Programme Director NBIT): Item 8
f Information Security Officer):

_Items 9 & 17.4

Liam Carroll (Procurement Director): Item 10
Item 11

and Optimisation): Item 14
Martin Hopcroft (Director of Health & Safety,
Environment and Business Continuity): Items 16 &

(17.2

Jonny Lonsdale (Business Continuity Manager):
Items 16 & 17.2

Jazz Chand (Head of Cash Production, Planning _I

Mark Cazaly (Head of Corporate Responsibility &
Social Impact): Item 16

Martin McKee (Head of People Services): Item
17.1

Claire Hamilton (Speak Up and Intelligence

Manger): Item 17.3

John Bartlett (Director of Assurance & Complex
Investigations): Item 17.3

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2.3

Time Item Owner Action
09:45- 1. I Welcome & Conflicts of Interest Chair Noting
09:46
09:46- 2. Previous Meetings
09:50 7 2.1 I Minutes (12 March 2024) ChairI Ss Approval,

2. Action List
3. Risk, Compliance, Assurance and
Internal Audit Update
09:50- 3.1 Risk Update Rebecca Barker Approval
10:00 e Strategic Risk (onward submission to
Management Review ARC)
10:00- 3.2 Compliance Update Jonathan Hill Approval
10:10 (onward submission to
ARC)
10:10- 3.3 Assurance Update Anshu Mathur Approval
10:20 «  SPMP Integrated (onward submission to
Assurance Update ARC )
10:20- 3.4 I Internal Audit Report Johann Appel Approval
10:30 (onward submission to
ARC)
10:30- 4. Banking Deep Dive Ross Borkett Approval
10:40 (onward submission to
ARC)
10:40- 5. Data Governance update Vishal Thanki/ Approval
10:50 * POL Inquiry e-Data Assurance Chris Russell/ I (onward submission to
Review (Verbal Update) Julian Hilditch/ ARC)
Tim McInnes
10:50- 6. Branch Data Plan and Controls Kayleigh Dodd/ Approval
11:00 Chris Russell/ I (onward submission to
Tim McInnes ARC)
11:00- 7. I Transformation Office Changes Update Jo Welch/ Approval
11:10 Tim McInnes I (onward submission to
ARC)
11.10- 8. I SPMP Risk Update (Verbal Update) Kelly Goodwin Approval
11:15 (onward submission to

ARC and Board)

11:15- 9. I Cyber Security Update Neil Bennett Approval
11:25 « AWS Access Controls lessons (onward submission to
learned ARC)

« DLP Update
11:25- 10. I Procurement Governance & Liam Carroll Approval
11:30 Compliance (onward submission to
ARC)
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11:30- Break
11:35
11:35- 11. I IR35 Update Tom Lee/ Approval
11:45 Tim Perkins I (onward submission to
ARC)
11:45- 12. I Tax Update and Strategy Tom Lee Approval
11:55 (onward submission to
ARC)
11:55- 13. I Payment Practices Reporting Tom Lee Approval
12:00 Compliance (onward submission to
ARC)
14. I Postmaster Policies for Approval
12:00- 14.1 I Network Cash and Stock Tracy Marshall/ Approval
12:10 Management Jazz Chand I (onward submission to
14.2 I Network Monitoring and Branch ARC)
Assurance
14.3 I Postmaster Complaint Handling
12:10- 15. I SRA’s SLAPP Notice Christian Spelzini Noting
12:20
12:20- 16. I Climate risks and our approach under Martin Hopcroft/ Approval
12:40 TCFD (Task Force on Climate-related Jonny Lonsdale/ I (onward submission to
financial disclosures) Mark Cazaly ARC)
17. I Policies for Approval:
12:40- 17.1 I Employee Vetting Requirements Martin McKee Approval
12:50 Policy (onward submission to
17.2 I Business Continuity Martin Hopcroft/ ARC)
Management Policy Jonny Lonsdale
17.3 I Speak Up Policy Claire Hamilton/
John Bartlett
17.4 I Cyber and Information Security Neil Bennett
Policy
12:50- 18. I Audit, Risk & Compliance Committee Chair Noting
12:55 pre-meeting review
18.1 ARC Agenda - 21 May 2024
18.2 Forward Plan (including RCC
only items)
12:55 19. I Any other business All Noting
Next RCC Meeting: Thursday 13 June 2024 from 10:30 to 13:30 at Wood Street/via Microsoft Teams

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Risk Update Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024
Author: Rebecca Barker Sponsor: Sarah Gray
‘ (Head of Risk) P ‘ (Interim Group General Counsel)

Input Sought: Approve

The committee is requested to:
i. Note our key risk position and the target dates to bring into tolerance
ii. Approve: the suggested appetite & tolerance levels for Strategy & Environment risk
appetite statements

Executive Summary
This report is focussed on the intermediate risks outside of tolerance. Currently, we are
operating outside of tolerance for 23 out of 74 intermediate risks.

The report highlights risks with a RAG rating of red or amber, which denotes the status of the
remediation plan, and if it is on plan to remediate the risk within the agreed target date.

Change spend review has been agreed for 2024/25 which supports remediation activities for
several intermediate risks. This review has highlighted risks which may not have sufficient
funds to ensure remediation within proposed target dates.

We conclude: Risk appetite and tolerance levels play a crucial role in informed decision-
making. They provide the necessary confidence in our response to risks and ensure
transparency regarding the intermediate risks we face and how we manage them.

However, it is important to acknowledge that our control framework maturity is an ongoing
journey. At this stage, we cannot definitively state that the controls managed within our
governance risk tool effectively reduce risk. Nevertheless, risk owners are diligently working
on detailed remediation plans with specific target dates to bring risks within acceptable
tolerance levels.

The central risk team remains committed to collaborating with risk owners, ensuring timely
delivery, and addressing any concerns. Our remediation RAG rating (appendix 1) continues to
highlight areas of concern to the committee.

Throughout our discussions with the first line, a consistent theme emerges—the well-being of
our colleagues. The impact of the inquiry, negative social media, and the capacity of
colleagues to perform day-to-day activities are all critical factors on the management of risk
which we must consider.

Top risks outside of tolerance

Appendix 1 outlines all intermediate risks that fall outside of tolerance levels, along with
their target dates and RAG ratings. The risks mentioned below are flagged for awareness
because their current remediation status is either Amber or Red. This indicates concerns that
ongoing activities may not sufficiently reduce the risk by the agreed-upon target date.

1. Technology

e The risk of the End of Horizon support Agreement remains outside tolerance. Formal
discussions commenced with Fujitsu on extension beyond March '25 for a period up to

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5 years. Signing of the contract is planned for October '24. Remediation is unlikely to
complete by March 2025.

e The risk of moving the network from copper to fibre has increased and is outside
of tolerance. Failed install rates remain high, due largely to a recognised gap in
Postmaster communications across the programme portfolio, supplier communication
issues, and site-specific challenges due to prior site assessments not being funded. The
project is reporting the overall status of delivery as amber. A recent Internal Audit
determined that the project is a “Significant Delivery Risk”. Activity is underway by the
programme and business sponsor to address these issues to ensure end date of
December 2025 is met.

* Branches unable to process Paystation transactions currently outside of
tolerance. There is a Second Device project which will replace Paystations with the
Second Device supporting a bespoke software solution also providing legacy pre-paid
bill payment products. Funding has been agreed until June 2024 to purchase hardware
and continued to development, the project delivery status is currently rated red.
Remediation is unlikely to complete by March 2025.

2. Security
e Inability to prevent Cyber or ransomware attacks & Inability to recover from

3. Legal

« Risk of Non-compliance with Statutory & Regulatory Requirements risk remains
outside of tolerance. The number of FOI cases related to the Remediation Unit remains
high. The ICO are aware of the unique position of Post Office and have been provided
with a plan to bring this back into compliance. Eight new roles have been approved (1
already in place). Recruitment of the remainder is in progress. These are full time
contracts for 12 months to help & support achieve regulatory compliance. Currently
the remediation plan remains off-track.

¢ Inability to either retain or attract Legal talent risk remains outside of tolerance.
The risk is impacted by the increasing media attention and SRA (Solicitors Regulation
Authority) investigations. A decision on future funding is required, until such time the
remediation plan remains off-track.

4. Financial

¢ Tax exposure from IR35 remains outside of tolerance. HMRC raised protective
assessments covering the three years 17/18 to 19/20 totalling}
appealed the assessments, discussions a taking place. A project is in place
to re-assess the history of colleague:

2
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impact of the risk is cri ical due to the fact that Post Office may incur costs of

5. People

¢ The risk of

population o1
basis. Of 341 contractors in}
are currently

IRRELEVANT f the total population

Risk of Adverse impact on people's wellbeing remains outside of tolerance. This is
as a result of the ongoing media coverage, increasing workload to support the inquiry,
and the volume of work exceeding the resource capacity of the organisation. This all
continues to impact wellbeing. Currently the remediation plan remains off track.

6. Enterprise Governance

e The risk Ineffective Enterprise Governance has increased from 8 to 12. This is a
reflection of the heightened pressure on Co Sec due to the impact of the public inquiry
increased requests of FOI and Inquiry requests. The team are stretched to capacity
and, whilst Co Sec continue to administer the corporate governance framework, there
is no opportunity for reflection and continuous improvement.

7. Data Governance

« Risks Inadequate Data Governance for unstructured data and Inadequate Data
Governance for structured data remain outside of tolerance. Risks have recently
transferred over to the Interim Data Management Director (Chris Russell). The
remediation plan is currently being reviewed and whilst this will have a short term
impact on delivery, there is still confidence that imaturity can be delivered by
2027, though this_is dependent on some limited additional funding being secured in
2025/26/27. The: pex funding agreed for 2024/25 is for staffing costs only. A
plan of what can be achieved over the next two years will be presented to the ARC
separately by Chris Russell.

Risk Deep Dives

8. Retail & Franchise - We have performed the scheduled 6-monthly risk deep-dive for Retail
& Franchise. Risk deep-dives focus on all 3 levels of risk within the business unit - enterprise,
intermediate and local risks, after which risk assessments are released, and risk owners are
required to update and review risks. All 9 intermediate risks have been reviewed with the
senior leadership team. 1 risk was retired, 5 risks are outside of appetite, but within
tolerance, and 2 risks are outside tolerance (detailed in Appendix 1) and 2 risks are within
appetite.

« Emerging risks which are currently being reviewed; i) Compliance in branch ii) how
reactive and support procedures in place support the impact of robbery/burglary in
branch iii) Consumers will be disadvantaged or may suffer detriment (customer
experience)

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Inability to improve Branch Profitability - Risk score remains unchanged (14:L3).
Risk is outside of tolerance. Program progress: Network Strategy Acceleration program
is making progress, delivering ove in annualized savings by March 2024.
Network numbers remain robust, .8k branches (including nearly 600 D&C)
in March '24, blueprint branches have lower churn (c.3.4%) compared to non-
commercial branches (5.4%). Remuneration Prioritisation: £30 million package for
2024/25 was announced in March, which should help offset trading challenges and
increase income allocation to remuneration. Next Generation Solutions: Tender for
next-generation SSKs issued in early April, on track for deployment from late 2024/25
(subject to IT dependencies and SPMP business case funding). Commercial
Excellence: Over 13.5k Commercial Excellence visits completed in 2023/24, now
embedded as a BAU practice for Area Managers. Outlook Despite remediation efforts,
rising cost pressures and limited remuneration growth suggest that branch profitability
risks are unlikely to materially reduce in the foreseeable future.

Inability to identify, investigate, resolve and treat discrepancies with fairness
in the network - Risk score remains unchanged (14xL5). Risk is outside of
tolerance. Program progress: Lottery exit complete we are monitoring the impact to
transactions corrects which should decline, note counters to be rolled out to 2,781
branches by 10/24, auto stock rem pilot will commence in June. Renumeration
incentive: communicated to Postmasters, the first payment of which will be made in
their September Remuneration. BAU process: revision of the Ops Manual is due to be
issued to branches in May, revision of the branch support framework in progress, end
to end Dynamics discrepancy tracking, and Branch on a Page reporting has been
implemented, improving the Management Information and Insights provided to the
business in order to drive further actions which will reduce the volume of discrepancies.
Outlook: Remediation efforts to mitigate this risk are advancing, and retail remain
steadfast in ensuring that our actions across all remediations result in fair and
consistent treatment for our postmasters. This commitment aligns with our strategic
objective of rebuilding trust. However, the size and sustainability of improvements
maybe limited without additional resource, future funding has been requested through
the SPM project in order to facilitate a healthy network and support a successful NBiT
implementation.

Conclusion: The retail team oversees a total of 64 risks, with 7 pending risk assessments.
Currently, the distribution of these risks is as follows: Accepted Risks: 54% Mitigated Risks
(with plans to further reduce residual risks): 42% Awaiting Assessment: 4%. To improve risk
management. Risks have been realigned to the Retail Assurance Universe, connecting them
to relevant controls within our risk tool.

Key Actions and Considerations:

Alignment of Assurance Report: We recommend first line align the actions from the
assurance report to determine the actual risk position. Specifically, assess whether the
first line has considered these actions and recommendations within the residual scores.
Control Effectiveness: The risk owner’s assessment of control effectiveness plays a
crucial role in risk reduction. Early findings from SNOW GRC indicate that 29 risks are
effectively mapped to controls managed within the risk tool (separate from control
issues identified within the Assurance report), 23 risks have a control effectiveness of
effective thus reducing the risk, this conclusion has been determined by the risk owner
with the current information in the risk tool.

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- Holistic Approach: By integrating assurance findings, control monitoring, and risk
recording, we aim to enhance the overall Retail risk posture while streamlining
processes.

Change Spend Review 24/25

9. Change spend review has been agreed for 24/25 which supports remediation of several
intermediate risks in appendix 1 within currently agreed funding levels. We will work through
potential future funding options over the next 6 months, and will factor into this work the
intermediate risks which still require funding to be agreed, these risks are:

* Risk of Non-compliance with Statutory & Regulatory Requirements
e Inability to either retain or attract Legal talent

* Inadequate Data Governance for unstructured data

« Inadequate Data Governance for structured data

« End of Horizon support Agreement

* Branches unable to process Paystation transactions

* Tax exposure from IR35

Emerging Risks

10. While the Horizon replacement has been in progress for some time, the associated risks
are managed through the program. However, to enhance operational visibility and assess
potential impacts on the Post Office’s strategic technology transformation, upon agreement
of ownership in first line we will raise and track an intermediate risk. This risk assessment
should cover aspects such as strategic alignment with spending objectives, value for money,
affordability, achievability, and separation from past practices.

Policy Exception Notes

11.When the business is not compliant with a Post Office Policy, a Policy Exception needs to be
raised. These exceptional circumstances should not be considered a normal part of
business. The exception should be formally documented as a Policy Exception Note
(PEN) and approval obtained from the accountable business sponsor. Currently, there
are nine active PENs (please refer to the reading room). Six of these PENs are within the
NBiT program for the release of version 2.1, and the expansion to operate in five
DMBs is contingent on RMG approval. The programme will ensure that the timelines to gain
approval from RMG are adhered to. To maintain visibility and track progress in resolving
outstanding actions related to the PENs, the program engages impacted business areas
along with the Head of Risk in scheduled fortnightly meetings.

Risk Appetite

12. Strategy Risk Appetite statements. We seek approval of the proposed Strategy Risk
Appetite statements in Appendix 2. These statements will ensure that risks impacting our
strategic priorities are managed effectively. For instance, they address issues related to
strategic planning, execution, and maintaining shareholder confidence in our strategic
vision.

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13.Environmental risk appetite statements. We seek approval of the proposed appetite

statements in appendix 3. These statements will ensure that risks impacting our ability to
integrate climate considerations into our business strategy, as per the requirements of the

Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and SECR streamlined energy
and carbon reporting. A detailed report will be presented to the ARC by Mark Cazaly and

Martin Hopcroft.
Next Steps & Timelines

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14. “Deep Dive” risk review with Technology & Finance will take place in readiness for the June

2024 RCC.

Appendix 1: Intermediate risks outside of Tolerance for May 2024

Enterprise Ri:

: The Central Risk team have provided a RAG rating, which is our current view of whether

remediations plans are on track to the agreed target date.

- 23 risks are outside of tolerance which remains the same as March RCC, please note that the table below
includes the reputational risks which we do not have an approved appetite in place but due to the high scores

this should be reported within this pack.

- 22 risks are outside of appetite but within tolerance decreased 24 to 22 — please refer to the reading room
- 18 risks are within appetite which has decreased from 21 — please refer to the reading room
14 risks do not have agreed appetite statements — please refer to the reading room.

3 Office (4:4) Barbara

‘Latest Management Update: RAG Rating

two years and
“St owever the market
ding constraints our

case agreed

FK0020697 - Increasing mone
Iaundering tough banking products (4:4)

Ross Borie

There is evidence that cu ing multiple accounts to deposit
troney, making i harder to entity potential meney laundering There ia further

Glichands industry mesting hosted by the FCA on 23rd April 2024.

¥KK0021776 - Risk of Non-compliance
With Statutory & Regulatory Requirements,
(5:3) Jonathan Hil

Continue to Increase Post Office ls unable to comply
ory timeframes
proved in Opex Conimittee in March 2024
funding hag now been agreed for this from RU/Inquiry-te fund
TAgPSSsad resource needed for FOLA/DSAR

RROOZI765 Inabilh
attract Legal talent (

) Saran Gray

ithin the legal & investigations team to suppart the
tigations in 8 timely manner.

K0021767 Poor business planning?
Sub-Optimal engagement by the Business
of the Legal function (4:3) Sarah Gray

‘Poor data management and governance creates significant challenges ih
compiying with disclosure requirements,
Group General Counsel

FKOO21874 - Adverse Impact on people's
wellbeing. (4:5) Tim Perkit

‘Due to the recent changes with the People team, this Hak will naw be owned by
joing monthly meetings have been planned to continue to
this risk commencing April

RRoO2064)
(54) Tim Pe

pia ua Toa an soproach fore exiting
sELEVANT. Njond will review on a ‘ease by

RROOZI VOR Inabiity to laentiy,
investigate, ind treat

‘Operational excellence programme in fight, focus on GAU improvement activity
ote counter tial, auto stack rem pilot, fick ic expected to reduce January 2025,

RROODI701
Profitability

pe the network in line with our target blueprint to shift towards more
ble branches, supported by the investment in the ‘Network strategy
Acceleration’ continuous improvement programme and Network Maintenance

back offs no 19 prea
wategy Accemntug!

Network Matnesftance: foam

FRKOOZ1056 - inability to prevent Cyber or
Fansomware attacks
(5:3) Neil Benne

Security (5:3)

FK0021055 Inability to recover from a
Cyber attack (5:3) Neil Bennett

Security (5:3)

confirm target maturity and dates. as abo

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Intermediate Risk

Enterprise Rick

RK0021709 - Inadequate Data
Governance for unstructured data (4:4)
Chris Russell

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Latest Management Update RAG Rating

Funding agreed 7
This funding is not sufficient to reduce the risk. Without further investment POL,
will nt be able to implement a robust, sustainable and sealable solution for Data
Governance,

RKOOZI710 - Inadequate Data
Governance for structured data (4:3) Chris
Russell,

Funding ag mr ppex

This funding is Ht Zufficient to reduce the risk. Without further investment POL,
will nt be able to implement a robust, sustainable and sealable solution for Data
Governance,

Technology (5:4)
Chris Brocklesby

RKOO21876 Legacy Data Infrastructure
3:4) Wilson Gill

MIOM Credence Upgrade cont aman Aareed
Data Enablement Programme {imuman! agreed

Technology (5:4)
Chris Brocklesby

RK0020077 - Suboptimal Belfast
datacentre resilience levels (5:3) Simon
Oldnalt

Current refrech programme will be substantially completed by March 2025.
Bata Centre Fortification (Hybrid Funding)

Horizon Defect Remediation (DBT Funding)i cet

DBT Funding amounts are subject to business case approval from DBT

Technology (5:4)

RIKOO21031 - End of Horizon support
Agreement (5:3) Simon

Formal discussions commenced with Fl on extension beyond March "25 for @
period up to 5 years. Signing of the contract is planned for October 24
Horizon Contract Extension (DBT Funding) £1.36

BT Funding amounts are subject to business case approval from DBT.

Technology (5:4)

RKK0020673 - Inability to Support &
Maintain elements of Accenture Back
Office Platform (4:3) Paula Jenner

‘Original assesement was that the rick would reduce by March 2024 the rlek
requires a reassessment to consider the pranzanmme to remediate.
Back Office Operational Modernisation -femeathagreed

Technology (5:4)
Chris Brocklesby

RKOO20816 - inability to Wade chould the
full network of Post Office branches not be
migrated from copper to fibre-compatible
(5:3) Paula Jenner

Challenges within the project end BTs programme. These challenges are starting
‘to impact on the programme planned schedule, although we are stil planning to
complete in Dec 2025. The risks in the programme are actively being discussed
and plans for mitigation are being actioned.

Technology (5:4)

his Brocklesby

RK0022201 Branches unable to process
Paystation transactions (4:3) Simon
Oldnall

‘Second device programme is the remediation for this risk the programme status
is currently red Investment committee approved spend until the end of June to
purchase hardware and continue development

Finance (5:3)

FK0020025 Inability to implement
compliant health & safety processes across
the business (5:3) Martin Hopcroft

Processes and procedures are in place to effectively mitigate rick In relation to
Colleague safety and physical security practices

Finance (5:3)

RKOO21857 Tax exposure from IR3S (Se4)
atnrye Sherratt ried

HMRC correspondence in recent months states their position and they have
issued a protective assessment letter. next steps are currently being worked
through,

MEF 0021078 Lack of public rust dueto

Reputati
a historical issues (5:5) Simon Marshall

Tn (FYE) Q4 we saw a sharp drop in brand trust as a reaull ofthe ITV drama in
January 2024. We saw a slight improvement in February, and this also continued
into March 2024. However, we will not be able to determine the net lozs in brand
‘rust until the came period in 2025,

RKOO21013 - Uncertainty to Post Office
Brand Commercially (4:4) Simon Marshall

Engagement with the relevant stakeholders across the business to include both
‘the short-term and longer-term impact to identify plans to reduce risk

Appendix 2 ~ Risk Appetite - Strategy

sk Themes I isk appetite statement

planning and execution

2. Failure to maintai
shareholder confidence of
strategie vision

Risk
Tolerance

I Risk Appetite

‘Themes

IskAppetite I RiskToleranc

“Lineffective Environmental
strategy transitional risk

2.Physical impact of climate
change - (PO Branches) ~
physical risk

23. Physical Impact of elim
change - (PO Sites) - physical
rik

4. Inadequate Sustainable
Suppliers transitional risk

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Group Compliance Update Meeting Date: 21% May 2024
Author: donathan Hill, Group Compliance Sponsor: Ben Foat, Group General Counsel

Input Sought: Noting
The Committee is asked to:

POL
1.

CONFI

Note the Group Compliance update, particularly:

° The ICO’s decision to issue a Practice Recommendation to Post Office, following the decline in
our compliance with response timescales.

Compliance Status/Overview

*Please note Group Compliance does not oversee all areas of the business.
The areas in which we continue to identify potential and emerging risks are

Data Protection & Information Rights
(i) FOI requests

Since the start of 2024 there has been a huge increase in the number of FOls received, leading to a
drop in completion timelines. For context, POL has received 299 FOls since 1% January 2024,
compared to 104 FOls for the same period (1% January — 29" April) in 2023. The complexity of FO!
requests has also increased, with requesters asking for very specific information about
prosecution/conviction data, financial records and about branch closures. We have also seen an
increase in FOls about specific individuals as a result of recent evidence at the POHIT.

We met with the ICO on 30" April, and due to concerns the ICO has with Post Office’s compliance with
FOI timescales, it will issue a Practice Recommendation (“PR”) around mid-May. The PR is a support
tool used by the ICO to recommend steps for a public authority to take to help improve its compliance
with the FO! Code of Practice. It is a lower level than an Enforcement Notice and we expect it will
recognise the proactive engagement we have established with the ICO and the steps already taken to
manage the unique circumstances Post Office is going through. We are responding to the ICO’s initial
questions to help them draft the PRs. The ICO publishes details of PRs served to public authorities on
its website and we expect this to happen around mid-late May. It is considered likely that the ICO will
take similar action regarding Post Office’s compliance with data protection legislation and will issue a
further PR covering Information Rights. We will continue to meet with the ICO every two months.

We continue to raise sensitive cases with the SEG to ensure awareness, most of which pass without
comments.

We have had 4 new vacancies approved for the FO! Team and we are currently working with the Talent
Acquisition Team to recruit new members.

(ii) Data Protection Requests (including Data Subject Access Requests (DSARs))

We continue to experience a significant surge in applications for DSARs, with 285 cases outstanding
as of 13" May 2024. Most relate to HSS (235). To illustrate the surge, between 1°' January and 29"
April 2023 there were c.125 requests compared to c.413 in 2024. With the Select Committee and
upcoming phases of the Inquiry, the surge is expected to continue. It is also worth noting that the
requests being received are significantly more complex than the majority of those received in 2023.
Weare working on a resource plan to close these cases with the RU team in addition to the 4 additional
roles already approved.

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On a positive note, the ICO has stated that there is no further action required in relation to a DSAR
complaint and that the individual had been provided with the information to which they were entitled.

(iii) GLO Scheme

The project team is continuing the delivering of disclosure material and hitting the target for cases each
week.

We continue to meet regularly with the ICO, with the ICO remaining supportive of the work that Post
Office is undertaking with regard to Information Rights requests and commented on the continued
resilience of the teams, however we are anticipating more complaints to the ICO due to the ongoing
delays.

(iv) HSS

Delays in responding to DSARs connected to existing and new HSS applications are impacting on the

HSS and a Resolution teams, as _ are unable to ine some case:

(v) AWS Data Breach (“Over-permissioning” of Access)

A data breach was communicated to over 70 clients mid-March relating to potential access to client
personal data from two suppliers based in India (a ‘data transfer’), which is contrary to data protection
law and client contractual requirements. The personal data was contained within several ‘S3 buckets’
that were established to merge and split files coming to and from clients in preparation for parallel
running with of both NBIT and Horizon.

It is understood that at least three clients (including POI) reported the unlawful data transfer to the ICO.
The Data Protection team attended 11 calls with clients and responded to 200+_ questions. A Root
Cause Analysis document is being released to clients in early May. The risk is that the incident has
reduced client confidence in Post Office’s ability to deliver NBIT and will result in heightened scrutiny
of the future roll out.

For additional information, see paper submitted by the CISO and Internal Audit, who have been looking
at both the incident response processes and the design of the excessive access permissions at the
root of the issue.

Financial Crime/AML/ABC
(i) The Fit and Proper Remediation Prove Case

An IT Solution Design Review was held with key senior stakeholders. The key outcome was that the
business should restructure the project delivery to prioritise compliance risk reduction, consider a need
for broader Business Process Re-engineering to fully evaluate upstream business process issues
which impact CDP F&P (out of scope) and develop a 3-phased delivery approach to deliver the biggest
reducers of compliance risk first, within approved funding. The F&P SteerCo has agreed to go ahead
with the phased approach and re-engage Accenture to deliver Phase 1. The re-engagement with
Accenture is underway and currently focusing on planning the data re-baseline (to resolve historic data
corruptions) and new exception handling processes.

(ii) Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA)

Key stakeholders across the business have been identified and approached to set up the ECCTA
working group. A draft Terms of Reference has been shared and will be agreed by the working group.
The aim is to undertake and document a risk assessment and review of current processes and
procedures, identify key areas of risk for POL and document proposals to address those areas of risk,
along with relevant owners of any actions. An initial report will be prepared for the SEG by end May
2024. The working group will be acting swiftly in order to identify risks and strengthen controls before
the new failure to prevent fraud offence comes into force, which will be after the UK government

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publishes guidance on what constitutes reasonable procedures to prevent fraud, it is anticipated that
this could be in late 2024.

I) I FCA Roundtable — Cash Deposits at PO

On the 23” April, the FCA hosted a roundtable with the National Economic Crime Centre, the National
Crime Agency and Post Office Banking Framework Partners (BFP’s) regarding cash-based money
laundering. Mandatory cash deposit limits at Post Office counters has positively impacted the economic
crime landscape and imposed tougher measures for criminals to launder proceeds of crime through the
Post Office network. The taskforce has not been able to fully assess the impact of the change, however,
BFP’s & the NCA have seen a notable change in suspicious activity since the introduction of the new
deposit limits.

The FCA has indicated that it will now shift its regulatory focus on other cash-based money laundering
risks, such as cash deposits at Paypoint, and will maintain a degree of oversight for Post Office
everyday banking activity. It is anticipated that Post Office will, as a result of its network and service
coverage, continue to be exposed to high-volumes/high-values of money laundering risk. The Financial
Crime Team has recently launched the annual AML training campaign and continues to work with
internal and external stakeholders to raise awareness of risk and frequently assess the risk of money
laundering at Post Office counters to improve prevention, detection and correct controls.

(iv) I HMT MLR Consultation

On 11 March, HM Treasury published a consultation entitled “Improving the Effectiveness of the Money
Laundering Regulations” and closes on the 9" June 2024. In 2022, the Government reviewed the anti-
money laundering/ counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regulatory and supervisory regime and its
Economic Crime Plan set for 2023-26. The Government has now extended its aim to improve the
effectiveness of the current Money Laundering Regulations 2017 (MLRs) and will assess three strands
of legislation (proportionality and effectiveness of customer due diligence, the effectiveness of public
body/supervisor coordination and extending the scope of the MLRs for unregulated firms (i.e. crypto
providers)).

An initial review suggests that Post Office is unlikely to be impacted by current consultation, however
the FCT are reviewing the consultation questions, fully assessing the impact to Post Office and will
report full findings for June RCC.

Financial Services
(i) I Mystery Shopping

32 mystery shops were graded below expectation in March (19.9%) - Travel Insurance (32.5%),
Savings (8.2%), and Over 50s (5%). An improving trend is noticeable in Savings and Over 50s shops
when comparing below expectation grades Q4 v Q3. Savings (Q4-15.2% Q3-18.2%), Over 50s (Q4 —
3.1% Q3 — 33.3%). 8 Travel Insurance shops were impacted by branches using the new leaflet too
early rather than not following the sales process. If these are discounted the below expectation
percentage would have been 22.5%.

109 Branches were re-shopped in Q4 after failing a shop. 19 of these failed their second shop,
evidencing that the quality of plans is improving.

Conduct Compliance review improvement plans completed by Area Managers following a failed shop
and provide feedback to improve quality. Where a branch fails a second shop this is escalated to the
Regional Manager to investigate.

Further discussions are taking place to agree a process to permanently withdraw a product from a
branch following 3 failed mystery shops.

From April mystery shop reporting will change to align with how POI report. The percentage of shops
where the sales process has been able to be tested and passed will be reported rather than the
percentage of total shops.

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(ii) Compliance Oversight

Conduct Compliance has reviewed the work it currently carries out and has produced a RACI matrix
across Post Office business areas to align work to the first line where appropriate. This has been shared
with affected business areas for comment and is currently with POI as the lead Principal to review and
revert back to Conduct Compliance w/c 6" May.

3.2

i) Consumer Duty

The FCA set higher standards for consumer outcomes and introduced the Consumer Duty regulation
on 31% July 2023. To achieve this, it has introduced a new principle ‘A Firm must act to deliver good
outcomes for retail customers”.

To gain assurance that products sold in branch and online are meeting Consumer Duty regulations
Conduct Compliance have discussed with the Principals who have confirmed that appropriate steps
have been implemented.

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Appendix 1 - Status of Group Compliance Activities
The table below provides a status of 2023/24 Group Compliance Activities:

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Activity 2023/24 Status of I _ Current ‘Comments
Group Compliance Activities Group _I Compliance
Compliance I _ Results
Activities
‘ey revi ; We have restarted the Group policies annual compliance review cycle with the first
Group Policy Compliance Policy reviews to be restarted in Q3 @ Tec reviews to be Quality Assured by the Assurance and Compliance directors before being

2023/24

issued

¢160 shops were carried out in 23/24
(excl. Dec)

FS Mystery Shopping

32 mystery shops were graded below expectation in March (19.9%) - Travel Insurance
(32.5%), Savings (8.2%), and Over 50s (5%). An improving trend is noticeable in
Savings and Over 50s.

Accountability Framework planned
actions for 2024.

Data Protection and
Information Rights

A Data Governance Framework has been agreed with Post Office and all teams in Post
Office are working to get to Level 2 maturity

30 Risk assessments completed, 7
assessments in progress in Q1
2024/25

Financial Crime

Identity Services, Money Transfers and Travel Mony were assessed in March and the
services have been reported as medium risk with no significant findings or
emerging/increasing risks to report. Annual risk assessments for Anti-Bribery and
Corruption are currently underway for completion by 30 April.

New products/changes are prioritised with continued regulatory landscape monitoring for
emerging risks.

Quarterly policy assurance for
AMLICTF, ABC & FC policies and
HMRC F&P policy.

22 reviews complete to the end of
March 2024, three were joint CViT
and Processing site

Financial Crime

Supply Chain

Assurance against minimum control standards remains amber due to ongoing issues with
Fit & Proper agent data and current manual workarounds and occasional instances of G&H
non-conformance. Funding has been approved to implement 9 data and system changes
identified by the F&P Project, which will be delivered over the next 12 months.

The average results of Supply Chain assurance reviews decreased to 3.5 at March 2024
from 3.88 in January 2024

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AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

Title: Group Assurance Update Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024
Author: Anshu Mathur, Group Assurance Director I Sponsor: earan Gray, Interim Group General

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to note and discuss the Group Assurance (GA) update, particularly:

e Status update on Legacy Matters Continuous Assurance and associated risk(s).

e Status of Management Open Actions.

Group Assurance (GA) - Status / Overview
1. Legacy Matters Continuous Assurance

The status of the control environment for those business functions captured within Continuous
Assurance, as at 10" May 2024, is summarised in the table below:

at ‘Oth May 24 Functional activity progress _I Group Assurance opinion. Overdue Actions Status,

Seas Current I Previous" Movement] Gurent I Previous] Movement current [Previous [Movement

Function se¥ assessment {Thematic
[Retail IGAassessment sample checks I 0 0 ICUVPM Policy

IGA assessment En lonr
Leas Function set assessment t {Speak up
IA&Clin! Speak Up IGAassessment sample checks I 0

[GA assessment

INon-Detrment review _ I _I
/pssurance Review [overturned Convistans Review I I I

a es

*Previous figures for ‘Functional activity progress’ reflects activity from Q4 (Jan-Mar 24)
Q1 Continuous Assurance activity includes P1 and P2 risks, and are reflected in the ‘Current functional activity progress’.
Previous Q4 Continuous Assurance activity only reviewed P1 risks.

Continuous Assurance

Continuous Assurance continues embed across the various functions. The outcomes of assurance
activities range from Green to Red, which reflects the divergence in the complexity of the functions
involved and pace at which functional self-assessment is embedding becoming BAU.

° Retail
a) Retail responses to GA request for information and self-assessment has greatly improved
this quarter, however the quality of artefacts sent still needs attention.

b) GA are now asking each function if they consider their controls/mitigations are
sufficiently robust to manage risk. This question is ensuring the function lead
understands that it their responsibility to provide first line assurance over the

controls/mitigations.

c) Overdue open management actions remain significantly high and only 16% (13 out of 83)
actions closed to date. The significant increase since the last ARC is driven by 36 PM
Policies actions now overdue with a reforecast closure date of June 2024 for majority of
these.
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Risk

e In our opinion the status of Retail’s Functional Assessment (Continuous Assurance) and
level of open management actions have a direct correlation on Retail’s ability to
demonstrate their conformance with common issue judgement and impacts of actions
delivered particularly to Postmasters.

e Whilst engagement and communication between GA and Retail is continually improving
and we can see Retail moving in the right direction, i.e., changing their approach to self-
assessment and beginning to proactively challenging artefacts before sending to GA, these
improvements will take time to embed through Retail and trickle through to the dashboard.

° A&C

Engagement with A&Cl is exceptional with self-assessment fully imbedded and quality of
artefacts to demonstrate their control environment is robust.

e Culture and RU

Since April 2024 we are engaging with Culture and Remediation Unit to commence their self-
assessment, and we anticipate the outcomes of these activities should be included in our Group
Assurance dashboard from Q2.

Please refer to Appendix 1 for a detailed summary of Management Open Actions.

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Appendix 1 - Legacy Matters — Status of Open Management Actions
The status of all Open Management Actions as at 10 May 2024 is summarised in the table below:

Of the open actions:
Management Actions ; 2 :
7 recommendations 5 Overdue <] Overdue > 3
from Assurance ree Open Seerens 3 mths mths
Reviews
Speak Up Leas 1 1
‘Common Issues Retail 3 7 3 22
Judgement
Postmaster Policies —_ I Retail 36
‘Quality Assurance ,
Framework (QAF) Retail 4 6 4
A&CI Various 4 4
Grand Total as @
baaeltley 12 5 50 27
Grand Total as @
bepasee 112 73 29 10

As evident from the table the overdue profile has significantly deteriorated since the last ARC in March
2024:

Retail

The number of overdue actions has significantly increased significantly in April 2024 primarily due to
Postmaster Policy Review actions which became due 31 March 2024. It should be noted that a re-
forecast closure date for majority of these is 30 June 2024.

Of the 70 Retail overdue management actions, excluding QAF, the movement in the period can be
summarised as follows:
e No change — 34* (driven by PM Policy actions)

e Update received but no evidence provided — 3

e Evidence received and being assessed — 11

« Evidence received but still overdue as evidence is not to the standard required — 7
« Evidence received for part of the action(s) and assessed — 5

* Action to be moved to another business function — 2

« Re-forecasted dates for closure — 8

Quality and frequency of engagement / updates between Retail and GA are beginning to improve, with
the focus on Retail being able to self-assess efficacy of the artefacts before these are forwarded to GA
for review and closure.

A&CI/Speak Up

One Speak Up action continues to remain open and is dependent on the Speak Up strategy, which is
in its final stages of approval, in the meantime, awareness work is progressing.

Four A&Cl recommendations remain open, the recommendations are reliant on various areas of the
business to complete actions, and this may cause delays.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

Title: I SPMP Integrated Risk Assurance Universe I Meeting Date: I 21st May 2024 I
Author: I Anshu Mathur, Group Assurance Director I Sponsor: Sarah Gray, Interim Group General Counsel
Input Sought: Approval
The Committee is asked to:

Approve the additions made to the SPMP Integrated Risk Assurance Universe.
Note the status of the SPMP Assurance Reviews.
Approve the 34 Statement of Works.

1. SPMP Integrated Risk Assurance Universe — For Approval

In the period since the last ARC in March 2024, we have made the following changes to the SPMP
Integrated Risk Assurance Universe:

The

Governance Pillar

Based on feedback from the GE SPMP Sub Committee in March 2024, we have now added 4
P1 risk lines/items to capture Business Case (BC) and Benefit Realisation (BR) Assurance. As
a consequence the Governance pillar has 21 risks vs 17 previously.

Whilst the Assurance teams (both SPMP and Group) currently do not have the capability to
deliver BC and BR assurance, funding has been secured to recruit.

SPMP Integrated Risk Assurance Universe therefore comprises 509 (previously 505) inherent

risk spread across 16 pillars. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the current snapshot of the SPMP
Integrated Risk Assurance Universe.

2. Statement of Works (SoW) - Approval

As mentioned in the ARC in March 2024, we have now completed drafting 34 SoW defining the
assurance scope and coverage of risk lines. As shared with ARC, we have applied the following
principles to determine the coverage and scoping of SoW:

© 000000

Adequate coverage of material key risks (P1’s, where appropriate P2’s and P3’s).

End to End assurance to provide a programme and business view of readiness.
Assurance coverage across pillars to ensure efficiency and eliminate rework, if possible.
Clear assessment of Postmaster protection and or KRI’s.

Adequacy of design (where applicable — effectiveness) of Controls.

Identify SoWs that may need periodical refresh, contingent on release strategy.
Coverage and mapping of HlJ and Clu.

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By applying the above principles, we have ensured adequate coverage exists not only from a pillar
perspective but also from an inherent risk lens:

o Pillar coverage - The table below demonstrates that the 34 SoWs touch all 16 pillars:
Coverage of SoW per Pillar

a os 5 aaa aan
tS LT:

Pilla rs

A few key things to note are:

o ClJ spans across Transaction Integrity, Finance, Security, Retail, Business Support,
Data Privacy, Software Delivery.
Transaction Integrity spans across: Finance, Data, Security, Business Support, & Retail.

Culture will be a core underpin of all our reviews.

o Inherent Risk coverage - The 34 SoWs provide 100% coverage of all the P1. Please refer
to Appendix 2 which shows the coverage of inherent risk per SoW.

Appendix 3 provides the details of SoW scope and the assurance outcomes. Please note,
these SoWs form the initial premise from which assurance work will commenced and are
considered draft and not exhaustive, as input will be taken from Business / Programme / SMEs /
Stakeholders (internal and external) before finalising the Terms of Reference.

We have not provided anticipated timelines for when these 34 SoW would be delivered, as this
is very much contingent on resourcing, capability, allocation of external assurance support, risk
profiles of SPMP releases, and the completion of the first 5 Sow.

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3. SPMP Assurance Tracker

S sow
sow wy
i Ref
1 I Business Requirements sow 1
2 Defects and Risk Management SOW 6
3 I Security / User Access — Account
management, access control, audit I SOWS&8&.
logging and user access
4 Transaction Integrity SOW 3
5 Retail Readiness (NEW) SOW 26

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Whilst progress has been made, we have not in full earnest commenced fieldwork. This is primarily
driven by the Assurance Team(s) focus on ensuring all SoW are drafted. In addition, the drafting
and finalisation of Terms of Reference were more complex than initially thought and required wider

business engagement.

Group Assurance are engaging with the programme to assess whether we continue to have the
right composition and capability to deliver the assurance programme. The programme has
recently approved to hiring of two assurance resources to support delivery of the assurance

programme.

For SoW 5 and 8 (Security / User Access — Account management, access control, audit logging
and user access) the SPMP assurance team are engaging with a 3" party service provider TMC3
who have been brought into look at data breaches by the SPMP Programme management team.
The provider at present is planning to conduct a root cause analysis of the 2 breaches identified
and the Statement of Work for this Phase is being drafted by TMC3. The functional assurance
team will ensure that there are no duplications of assurance through understanding TMC3 scope

before executing any detailed work.

We have also, subject to ARC retrospective approval, are planning to commence SoW 26 to focus
on Retail Readiness to receive the SPMP platform (both pilot and waves). The ToR for this review
will be shared and discussed with the Retail Engagement Director to ensure key operational

insights are captured from a legacy perspective.

4. Other Updates

« Procurement - External Assurance SME Support

After the initial pre-market engagement held from February to March - the initial engagement
engaged with 10 suppliers, of which 5 remain (PA Consulting, Ernest & Young, Crowe
Consulting, Protiviti and Credera).

A sourcing strategy has been created (informed by market engagement) has been submitted
to PDB, Steerco, SEG in May and Board for approval to proceed in June 2024.

The preferred procurement option would be to release a single FTS procurement but as this
would take 4-6 months to complete the plan is to split procurement activity into two phases.

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o Phase 1 Review the current SPMP Integrated Assurance & Risk Universe for completeness
and against industry best practice.

o Phase 2 Create the invitation to tender (ITT) with a detailed set of requirements derived
from the universe and a plan for assurance that can be provided to the market, including
commercial protections for both the bidder and POL on ‘how’ assurance outcomes will be
presented.

Group Assurance are also working in parallel to create a contingency worst-case scenario
where POL may have to create their own internal pool of SME Contractors.

Recent external reviews on SPMP.

For the committees awareness two external reviews have been performed on SPMP, which
management are in the process responding to and preparing remedial action plans.

In our opinion, both reports highlight consistent concerns on the deliverability of SPMP. Key
extract from these reports are summarised below:

o Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) Draft Report

For the Committee’s awareness, in April 2024 IPA performed a review on Horizon

Replacement (SPMP, SDES, and Horizon Extension), this covered gates 0 to 3 to support

a Treasury Approval point of the Programme Business Case for funding between June

2024 and March 2026. Their scope covered:

e Gate 0 — Looks historically on the delivery of the Horizon replacement programme

e Gate 3 — Test the maturity and robustness of the Programme Business Case

e The review also assesses whether governance arrangements across interested and
invested oversight and delivery partners remains effective and robust.

IPA 's draft opinion is as follows: ‘RED - Successful delivery of the 3 POL Programmes
that deliver the Horizon replacement to time, cost (defined in the business case under
consideration) and quality appears to be unachievable. There are major issues which, at
this stage, do not appear to be manageable or resolvable entirely within POL. The
programme/project may need re-baselining and/or its overall viability re-assessed.’

According to their rating guidance — ‘This programme/project should not proceed to the next
phase until these major issues are managed to an acceptable level of risk and the viability of the
project/programme has been re-confirmed.’

The review identified three strategic issues that could help sustain these high-risk
programmes through to successful conclusion:
(1) Providing clarity of governance, now Horizon replacement is on Government Major
Projects Portfolio (GMPP). There is confusion about which of the 3 programmes are
coming onto GMPP and this needs to be resolved.
(2) We are recommending government consider if the financial arrangements are
appropriate for these programmes.
(3) It is the right time for a meaningful conversation about risk appetite as only a
common understanding of this across all governance bodies involved, will enable the
programme, and especially the technical development of NBIT, to be successful.

The review recognised that Programme Leadership has been tackling poor quality and
weak management controls (especially planning, monitoring, and reporting and proper

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tisk based assurance) and improving quality of technical development. The report has

identified 7 recommendations that management are in the process of working through.
o Public Digital (PD) Report - Final
On behalf of DBT, PD have completed a review of SPMP and New Branch IT. The goal

of the review was to assess the viability of SPMP in meeting POL’s future needs,
focussing on POL’s capability to deliver the programme, the technical approach being
taken, value for money and other factors. Their key observations are summarised below:

Whilst trending in a generally positive direction with pocket of excellent work and
deeply expert people, SPMP overall is not currently in a healthy place.

There are significant gaps in strategy, capability, technology and Governance that
need addressing.

A high level of management churn along with lack of corporate memory, presents a
risk of the past (lessons from previous failed attempt to re-platform) repeating itself.
Throwing ever more resources at the problem will not solve the problem.

SMPM's viability is being undermined by serious deficiencies in its governance,
technical, and implementation approach.

The responsibility and accountability to fix the issues does not sit only with the
Programme. It will require the whole of POL, and key partners in UKGI and DBT to
work together to do this.

Key findings:

The vision and dominant framing of SPMP does not align with an overall POL
strategy, is not agreed and understood by the wider POL business, and is not
consistently recognised within the SPMP programme

The organisation lacks permanent people with critical capabilities and experience,
and there is an absence of continuity in keystone functions, particularly in leadership
and management, which creates unacceptable risk to the programme.

Historical technology choices and development practices, adopted to attempt to meet
significantly different past programme goals, have left significant technical debt in the
heart of the product. Good practice and standards have now been codified, but are
not yet in place across the full delivery organisation.

o Weighing pros and cons, we concluded that if our review team was leading the
project despite the obvious sunk costs we would give very strong consideration
to reintroducing an off-the-shelf ePOS solution as the core retail element, while
retaining all the integration work that the teams have invested time in.

POL’s recent history is driving a fear of accountability for decisions, resulting in risk
aversion and a governance model unsuited to the need. The programme, business,
and wider stakeholder ecosystem must work as “one team” towards shared outcomes
The programme is not truly user-centred and the professional practice of “product
management” is not well understood inside POL. This has resulted in an inconsistent
approach to product development that has become disconnected from delivering
value to users.

5. Key Next Steps

1. Focus on commencing and completion of the 5 SoWs in flight.

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. Commence G-Cloud 13 engagement to commence work on Phase 1 of the work required

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. Assess adequacy / capability of Assurance resources — June /July 2024.

to support assurance - May 2024.

Obtain approval from the PDB, Steerco, SEG for the 2 Phased procurement approach -
May 24, followed by Board approval at the June 2024 meeting.

. SPMP functional assurance and Group Assurance to work on a paper to create a plan B for
an internal pool of SME Contractors - June 2024.

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Appendix-1- SPMP Integrated Risk Assurance Universe — 30 April 2024

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No Pillars Inherent Risks
1 Governance 26 (22)
2 Software Delivery 29
3 [Security 24 24 0 °
4 [Business Support 81 20 39 22
5 [Transaction integrity 19 7 12 0
6 Retail ; 48 a 22 2 4a
7 ILegal & Regulatory Compliance 27 B 6 8
8 [ClU/Speak up 57 57 o 0
9 [Data Privacy 23 20 3 0
10 {culture 14 fel 3 0
11 [Finance integrity 26 26 ° °
12 [Procurement 8 0 8 0
13 [Contract Management 8 1 7 °
14 _IGating & Business Readiness 10 0 1 9
15 Iinquiry Thematic 67 67 ° 0
16 {Cl (common Issue Judge) 42 19 14 9
Total 509 332 121 56

“Note: Change in the period is highlighted in yellow (prior figure).

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Appendix 2 - SoW Coverage of Inherent Risks

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[ere

ft)

Business Requirements ~
Capture and Execution

1, Governance
2. Business Support
3. Data

"I To ensure the programme hi

1as implemented a structured method:
for the ownership, capture, execution and change management of

This will be an End-to-End review with a focus on:

1) Compliance with all legal, regulatory, operational, commercial
requirements and how featured in the Business Requirements (including
HU / Cll considerations).

2) Alignment with the Business Case.

3) Ensure effective translation of the requirements covering Data and
Security into the Business Requirements.

4) Document management to support status and amendments
throughout the programme delivery cycle.

5) Construct of testing (e.g-UAT) to ensure essential elements of the
requirements are proven against deliverables.

6) Effectiveness of governance and oversight.

7) Clearly defined process, controls, reporting and organisation structure
(+RACI) to support all the above.

their lifecycle, including implemented vs net, and oversight.

Clear evidence / artefacts provided to support how Business: 1)
Requirements were initially captured and maintained /controlled
throughout the programme delivery cycles. including change controls
process.

2)Proof that all essential elements of the programme deliverables (e.g,
regulatory / data / Cli /Security, Tl etc) have been defined and
appropriately sign off.

3) All testing (e.g, UAT) has been aligned with Business Requirements to
ensure compliance as necessary.

4) Processes / controls in place, and followed, and aligned with best
practice.

Transaction integrity —
Data Flow and Access

LiTransaction Integrity
2.Business Support
3.Retail

4Security

To ensure key data flows are mapped and documented. And to ensure
that access to relevant data sets is defined by roles and transactions.

Obtain and review the Architectural design and set up of the new
platform and the data flow diagrams which sits alongside. Understand
ownership and change management protocols.

Review the Integration linkages to other systems to ensure these have
been identified and defined with dependencies/risks. Understand the
Integration plan and testing strategy, including the stage gate sign-off.
Review roles designs and set ups and how these relate to the transaction
objects and related information access through these objects.

‘SPMP has a defined data flows and data set. And that rule sets and roles
exist to manage the access and visibility, including security.

Clear Architectural design diagrams with supporting data flow diagrams.
With clear ownership and accountabilities for the different data sets.
Integration linkages clearly documented with risks and dependencies.
With relevant supporting integration plans.

Clear role designs and responsibilities with supporting access
‘management to data and transactions.

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doula Re
SPP ensures Finan ions are complete, accurate,

1. Finance To ensure the financial accuracy / completeness of transactions and ial Transact supported
Financial Accuracy and I) gay ‘relevant controls and monitoring ts in place. and evidenced. With reporting and monitoring in place to identify and
Completeness " correct any identified issues, exception, anomalies ete.

3. Legal & Compliance I Review the reports that are planned or available to support financial
transactions including reports that support the sub-ledgers and general
ledger and production of financial statements-cash flows, Income
Statement, Balance Sheet etc. Review and assess design of exception
reports designed to support daily, weekly, month, quarterly and annual
operations.

4, Business Support

Assess whether controls and reconciliations (Control Framework) built
into the process to ensure relevant Management Review Controls can
operate successfully.

a Platform Security All pillars, Key focus on I To ensure the platform can withstand insider threats - To validate that I SPMP is accessing and designing preventative and monitoring measures

Resilience ~ Insider 1. Security robust controls are in place to protect the platform from unauthorised I to manage Insider threats. Control's must be fully documented and
Threat 2. Finance access and DLP (Data Loss Prevention). supported by KPI/KRIs. Supported with the relevant Mil that is timely and

3 Retail Supported with the relevant training and awareness. accurate for management to take relevant actions to prevent or detect

. ture threats.
4, Business SupportI Assess whether tooling isin place to identify (proactively and
St retrospectively), capture and report on insider threats and assess
inquiry

whether remediation processes are set in place to counter such
instances.

Review adequacy of MI and EWI in place to support the business
processes reporting and management, including oversight/reporting at a
senior level.

Including a review of the following:
* Continuous vulnerability Management
* Audit Logging Management

‘+ Malware defences

'* Data Recovery

* Penetration Testing

* IT/DR Recovery.

And identifying and understanding Policies, Procedures and training in
place at POL and CISO input.

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Platform Security
Resilience — External
Threat

All pillars, key focus on

1. Security
2. Finance

3. Retail

4, Business Support

To ensure the Network Infrastructure can withstand external threats.
Adequate preventive and monitoring mechanisms are designed:

'* Assessment of network architecture, configuration, & security
controls.

+ Evaluation of firewall configurations, intrusion detection/prevention
systems, and network segmentation.

+ Review of network devices, such as routers, switches, and access
points, for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.

Including a review of the following:
+ Continuous vulnerability Management
* Audit Logging Management

+ Malware defences

* Data Recovery

+ Penetration Testing

' IT/DR Recovery.

And identifying and understanding Policies, Procedures and training in
place at POL and CISO input.

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PMP is accessing and designing preventative and monitoring measures
to manage External cyber threats. Control's must be fully documented
and supported by KPI/KRIs. Supported with the relevant Ml that is
timely and accurate for management to take relevant actions to prevent
or detect future threats.

Defects and Risk
Management

All pillars, key focus on
1. Software Delivery

2. Hyper Care
3. Business Support

4, Transaction
Integrity 5. Security

6. Governance

7. Retail

Software Delivery

All pillars, key focus on
1. Software Delivery
2. Hyper Care

3. Business Support

4, Transaction
Integrity 5. Security

6. Governance

7. Retail

‘To assess application and documentation of testing/defect
methodologies across the end-to-end software delivery life cycle.

To ensure appropriate ERM is applied in the assessment of defects.
(functionality, performance, Security, etc) and or acceptance of defects
vs risk profiles in isolation and or in aggregate.

Assess appropriate sign off and governance applied to testing and
defects management.

To ensure PEN's are managed, prioritised and addressed in accordance
with good business practice and reviewed and approved with those in
authority

Review of software di
processes and procedures.

Assess application of good practices, process methods, testing eg UAT,
defect management and compliance with the defined deliverables.

Assure whether all activities clearly controlled and documented.

Overlap - Controls around defect management will also feature as part,
of this review.

ery processes / development life cycles

‘SPMP has applied testing in a consistent manner, with appropriate
consideration to risks and key SME are involved in risk assessments and
decision making.

Clear evidence that defect management and PENs are well managed
with robust controls, measures and align with good business practice,
with the relevant approvals and oversight.

Clearly able to demonstrate throughout the Software delivery stages
that good practice has been applied and supporting documentation /
artefacts available to support decisions, conclusions and approaches
adopted.

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{Account Management,
User Access Control,
‘Audit Logging) & User
access (logical))

2Security

3.Retail

4,Business Support
5. Hyper Care

6. Transaction

fe aa a
To assess that adequate preventive and monitoring controls are
designed over Access and Identity Management.

To assess whether super users' profiles are commensurate with
roles/profiles.

Review whether all profiles accessing data (read only, edit, etc) are
identified and controlled.

Including a review of the following:

‘To assess whether the programme understands the technology

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landscape to pinpoint exhaustively points of access (PM. POL. Third
parties, etc).

SPMP user access is structured, defined, exhaustive and governed. And
authentication is robust from a security perspective, including the
Segregation of Duties (SoD).

Readiness

2. Business Support
3.Software Delivery
4. Retail, Security

5. Legal & Compliance
6. Gating

key SMEs input.
Review the E2E gating process / methodology to ensure appropriate
controls are in place to provide key decision and control points in the
programme's delivery life cycle,

Integrity
** Review of IAM (Identity and Access Management) processes,
including user account provisioning process, authentication, and access
controls, Access control lists
+ Assessment of privileged access management (PAM) controls.
‘+ Evaluation of single sign-on (SSO) and multi-factor authentication
(MFA) implementations.
*» Analysis of Access logs and audit trails
+ Automated tools or scripts used for scanning and assessing access
configurations.
And identifying and understand Policies, Procedures and training in
place at POL and CISO input.
9 Postmaster Support Retail To assess whether processes and procedure, designed and documented I Training and Detailed Procedures are in place to support Post master’s
2.Transaction integrity I to support PM transition to SPMP. both pre and post go-live.
3. Business Support I Assess efficacy of PM Training/communication etc. Hypercare arrangements and Business Support processes and
4 caltu procedures are fit for purpose to support PM in transition.
ulture i i opriz i
Review whether issue judgments have been appropriately considered I ob... governess supported by adequate and appropriate EWI, KPI's
5. Gating and actioned ~ HU, CU, Training. and KRI's.
6. Business Readiness I assess whether hyper care is designed around PM.
10 I Data Privacy 1 Data To review and assess whether Data Privacy principals are appropriately I SPMP has designed and deployed Data Privacy principles that protect,
2. Security designed and embedded to protect Postmaster, POL, and other key PM and POL, And other sensitive data.
3, Transaction sensitive data types. Appropriate and relevant restrictions and encryption are in place to
integrity Assess adequacy of: support security and protection of data and ensure compliance to
+ Data classification, encryption, and access controls. relevant data protection regulations.
+ Assessment of data retention policies and procedures.
+ Compliance with data protection regulations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA,
copa).
11 I Gating and Business 1. Governance ‘Assess whether Gating decisions are based on sound data and Mi, and I SPMP has a clear methodology and approach for gating and business

readiness, With the relevant governance to ensure that key SMEs are
involved in decision making and outcomes documented to evidence the
decision-making process.

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design, coverage,
‘monitoring including
efficacy of KRI, KPI, EWI
etc,

1. Governance
2c

3. Security

4, Business Support
5. Transaction

has adequate coverage on the £2£ platform and sufficient early
warnings designed to ensure no adverse impacts to PM or POL.

Assess whether appropriate RACI and DOA (Delegation of Authority) in
place to ensure timely visibility and decision making.

Review whether a library of controls, with clear ownership,

POL governance is designed appropriately with adequate Mi and.
escalation by design, to support and ensure an appropriate control
environment.

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and Release
Management

2. Business Support
3. Software Delivery
4, Finance

5. Gating & Business
Readiness

6. Legal & Compliance

with a good release strategy to support the release and rollout of SPMP
to branches. This will encompass:

1) Alignment of the Programme Planning with the Technology Delivery
Roadmap.

2) Current status of the Programme Plan in relation to targets, timelines
and budgets clearly defined. eg Backlog Management.

3) KPI's and related measures that demonstrate effectiveness of
planning and how poor trends (early warnings) are addressed.

4) Review process, controls, methodology supporting planning and
release. This will cover historic (eg lessons learnt) and planned (eg
identified risks) to ensure effective and aligned with good practice.

5) Reporting, communication, and document controls effective.

6) Application of good practice application and management of Agile
methodology.

7) Organisational clarity and defined R&R in this arena.

8) Integrated plan and milestone management/governance.

Integrity accountability and tracking exists.
6. Retail,
7. Data
8. Finance
9. A&C!

13 I CU/HU Conformance I Al pillars will be To assess that lessons from the past have neem embedded in SPMP SPMP can clearly demonstrate lessons have been learnt and all Hil /Cll
{Including Postmaster I engaged throughout I design and clear outcomes and that mistakes and errors will not be ‘observations have been addressed as part of design, build, test, and
Detriment) all reviews with a repeated. deployment.

specific focus at point I This will involve a line-by-line review to access how issues from the past I And that clear monitoring mechanics are in place contingent of the
of “go live’ {CU & HU) have been or are being address by the programme and BAU I release strategy of SPMP.
Assurance.
14 I Programme Planning I 1. Governance TTo assess whether there is a robust integrated Programme Plan along I A robust integrated programme level plan exists combining the

technology delivery roadmap, including clear documentation of
assumptions, dependencies, and milestones.

Also proving this has been tracked and regularly reported by PMO.

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Vendor Management /
3rd Party Management

Software Delivery Life
Cycle

T Security
2. Retail

3. Contract
Management

4, Legal & Compliance
5. Business Support
6. Procurement

1.Governance

2. Software
Development

3. Security

4, Data

5. Retail

6. Business Support
7. Transaction

To assess and review the robustness of POL policy, process and
governance applied to the selection, acceptance and controls
established to obtain vendor / 3rd party support for the SPMP
Programme.

Review the adequacy of vendor management and performance related
process and procedures.

Review design and oversight mechanisms for 3" parties.

The review will focus on:

+ Performing sample reviews on key process and procedures eg JIRA,
EPIC and User stories, Coding Standards, Tooling, test scripts etc.
Assessing application of standards, practices and quality frameworks.
'* Assess whether robust policies and procedures are in place to
manage ‘change control, to ensure alignment with business
requirements but also delivery of BC objectives and outcomes.

'* Review whether appropriate Governance (incl KPI/KRI) and oversight
exists,

‘There is clear evidence that the vendor selection process and
‘compliance to policy has been applied and effectively managed. With
the relevant up to date DOA applied to spends and approvals.

Ensure robust vendor performance management and monitoring isin
place.

‘To ensure that good practice has been applied across Governance
Gates and protects integrity of the code

For environment change requests a formal and established gating
process and procedure are embedded,

Detailed evidence retained to ensure that the correct level of attention
has been applied to ensure the desired outcomes of the SPMP platform
delivery/BC. Also, identification of any potential deviations and how
‘change management principles have been applied managed correctly.

Integrity a a
‘+ Review how PMO understand and assist in the identification of risks,
issues, assumptions, and dependencies.
‘+ Assess how the Programme Team drive continuous improvement.
17 I Enterprise Assets TSecurity To perform a deep-dive technical assessment into available system logs I To ensure that rigorous processes and controls are in place and
Logging relating to security and incident monitoring. followed to support enterprise assets logging and software.
Enterprise Asset The scope of the review will focus on: And detailed evidence exists to demonstrate the logging functionality
Software for security events and sensitive transactions are robust and in line with

‘ Assessing the processes and data sources available that relate to the
logging functionality for security events and sensitive transactions. e.g.
Review logging functionality for security events, review the logging
functionality for sensitive transactions

+ Review the process designed to analyse the logs and address.
exceptions

+ Review the process designed to respond to suspicious activity
discovered in the logs (manual, automated), and any incident response
and handling.

‘Management of PEN’ including planning, remediation and closure.

‘good practice and required policies. With relevant processes to
support monitoring, reporting and taking preventive action.

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18 Network Infrastructure

Network Monitoring

1. Security
2. Retail
3. Transaction
Integrity

Assessment of network architecture, configuration, and security
controls.

Evaluation of firewall configurations, intrusion detection/prevention
systems, and network segmentation.

Review of network devices, such as routers, switches, and access
points, for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.

Web & Em:

rrowser Protection / Cyber Security.

Assess whether good practice (eg ISO) have been applied to security
architecture, vulnerabilities, monitoring for change and configuration
controls.

Review will also focus on the network monitoring controls to ensure
countermeasures are deployed to prevent intrusions and attacks to the
network.

‘The review will also encompass:

1. Configuration management system: to track and manage
configurations of network devices

2. Baseline configurations: establishing and maintaining secure baseline
configurations for different types of network devices to reduce
vulnerabilities

3. Change management processes: to ensure that any changes to
network decide configurations are documented, reviewed, and
authorised

4, Vulnerability scanning tools
5. Patch management

6. Network segmentation

7. Logging and monitoring systems
8. Incident response plan

9. Employee training

10. Regular audit and reviews.

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Clear evidence of robust controls & processes, with supporting
evidence / artefacts, confirming the network infrastructure and
measures are managed in accordance with good practice and defined
POL / Regulatory requirements.

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Application Software
Security

1. Security
2. Software Delivery
3. Retail

4. Data

5. Inquiry

Review of Application Security to ensure that relevant

deployed and monitoring activities are in place to prevent and detect
intrusions and attacks.

Assessment of application development practices, including secure
coding standards and vulnerability management.

Review of application architecture, design, and access controls.

Penetration testing and vulnerability assessments of web applications,
mobile apps, and other software systems.

The review will also encompass:
1 Static Application Security testing (SAST)

2. Dynamic application security testing (DAST)

3. Security training for developers

4, Secure development frameworks

5. Incident response plan for application security
6, Dependency scanning.

tools have been

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Programme can demonstrate that there are robust processes and
procedures in place to demonstrate practices and testing to prevent
and detect security risks at an application level.

People & Culture

All pillars, key focus on
1 Governance

2. Legal & Compliance
3. ARC!

4, Contract
Management

5. Culture

6.cu

7. Business Support

8 Retail

9. Inquiry

Review will focus on SPMP Roles and include validation:

To assess whether the SPMP programme has adopted and embedded
the appropriate process and procedures in place to embed the right
culture and people into the organisation aligned with achievement of
strategic and operational objectives.

Assess how key cultural and people thematic from CU and HJ are
applied and sustained.

To review the establi
across the programme.

the effectiveness of WoW and how managed

Assess how TOM for business support and BAU Retail Operations
embed the right cultural and people values aligned with the issue
judgements.

Review the training in place upon entering the POL and the subsequent
training that supports employees understand and adhere to the culture
aspects of POL,

Assess how new roles and specs are created to ensure alignment with
business purpose and objectives.

Set KPI's / measures in place to identify success in this area (eg
attrition) and how poor trends are addressed.

Clear evidence available demonstrating good practice covering all
elements of people and culture across the programme. This will
include: 1) Records of training covering onboarding new staff and
‘ongoing training supporting identified training needs

2) Effective comms to support staff and advise of current / new
initiatives in this area of the business

3) Measures of effectiveness of WoW culture

4) How lessons learnt have been addressed

5) KPI's / Measures in place to identify poor trends (eg attrition) and
how they are resolved / mitigated

6) Clear reporting to the senior team on status, risks, issue resolution
and planning.

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Incident Response and

To ensure that Penetration Testing is fully controlled in alignment with

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2 1. Software Delivery To have obtained details of established processes and controls around
Management - 2. Security good (business / Regulatory /1SO) practice. the E2E penetration testing activity.
Penetration Testing 3. Retail Scope of this review will also look at:
4. Legal & Compliance I * intelligence gathering eg network and domain names, mails server to
5. bata see how targets are focussed and vulnerabilities identified.
5. Da
‘Process and controls around incident management including but not
6. Inquiry limited to:
* Incident response plans, procedures, and capabilt
* Backup and recovery processes, including testing and validation.
* Incident detection and response tools, processes, and training.
22 I Business & IT Controls I 1.Governance ‘Assess Business Controls/IT that have been documented to date for POL is able to monitor and measure the efficacy of it control

Library

2. Software Delivery

programme/POL.

Assess how control coverage and design is adequate and covers the risk
landscape of SPMP/POL.

Assess the applications of these controls and identify and gaps of
application/remediation.

Scope of this review will also look at
+ Risk library (business and IT)

* Control library (business and IT)

‘* RACI by process and controls
*DOA

SoD and Access Management

= Security and integrity

‘+ Mi/Reporting and Governance, including REN and PENs.

environment vs the release profile of SPMP.

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Governance

All Pillars

Review the Governance arrangements within SPMP to ensure robust
practices exist for:

+ Progress Tracking and Reporting ~ tracking and reporting of progress
including the programme financials is in place on the programme;
status reporting takes place to ensure that progress is being tracked
and reported on the programme.

Tracking, monitoring SPMP progress

* Monitoring of KRI/EW!

+= Sufficient objectivity is in place to constructively challenge SPMP.
direction, risk assessments and outcomes.

* Change management process and practices

+ Monitoring of BC and delivery of BR

+ Oversight of issue judgements

+ PM protection

+ Efficacy of reporting data sets with key business and SME input

+ Decision making and risk assessments

+ Planning and Dependency Management

+ Programme Structures - a RACI matrix is defined and in place for the
programme and roles, responsibilities and accountabilities have been
clearly defined and key roles on the programme have been filled.

* Communications and Stakeholder Management stakeholder
mapping and communications plan for the programme is defined;
lower-level communications plans outlining the timing of activities and
responsible individuals has been defined for the programme.

* Resource Management — there is a resource plan defined for the
programme; ensure that the plan is maintained, and regularly reviewed
and updated
+ Risk acceptances, inputs and continuous monitoring.

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‘A robust governance approach in place to ensure successful delivery
SPMP in line with BC and BR.

Integration strategy

{To POL strategies and
wider systems)

1. Software Delivery
2. Data

3. Legal & regulatory
4, Contract
Management

Review approach to systems integrated with the new NBIT platform to
ensure they are/will be integrated and transferring, providing
information accurately and timely between different systems.

Review and understand what MI/reports and KPI's are in place to
manage and monitor transference of data between systems, to ensure
completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of transfer.

Review whether sufficient and relevant integration testing has been
carried out and signed off as part of the stage gating process by
relevant and authorised individuals.

Evidence of a robust integration Strategy with other systems (SWIFT,
Banking apps)

Master data being relied upon by the programme is accurate and there
are no inaccuracies in product set up or mapping. le no risk that results
in incorrect postings to downstream systems.

Systems integrated with the SPMP platform are providing accurate
information and supporting evidence (controls/measures) are in place

‘Accurate MI/KPI/Reporting available and evidence of effective action
taken to address issues/poor trends.

Evidence of testing conducted and completed with supporting
processes and best practices controls

Evidence to demonstrate that the key stakeholders have been engaged
as part of the sign off / gating process.

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1. Security
2. Legal & Regulatory

mS a nso i
Review the Legal Risk Framework to evaluate and assess how:
1) Sources of legal risk are identified, e.g. contracts, regulatory,
structural changes, and compliance.

2) Risks are defined vis a vis risks vs issues vs potential risks and
potential issues.

3) Risks processes and controls to ensure risks are appropriately
identified, managed and monitored.
4) RACI and DoA for management and assessment of Legal risk is
appropriate and understood,

4) Monitoring and KPI - Aligned with high and low risk legal issues with
appropriate planning to support.

5) Defined controls and measures aligned with Hii / CU, and lessons
learnt.
6) Alignment is assured with Programme Deliverables and Gating / No
Go decision making.

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Clearly defined processes with supporting evidence to demonstrate the
controls and management of legal risks.

Retail Readiness and
‘Support to Post Masters

Retail
Business Support /
Hypercare

The purpose of the review is to ensure the SPMP programme can
demonstrate robust processes and procedures, which validate the retail
readiness to receive the new platform from a Postmaster lens (PM).

‘Retail PM readiness plans ~ coverage and conformance with
principles laid out within issue judgements.

‘+ PM Support and Training.
+ PM comms/engagement plans.

+ BSC Readiness — detailed procedure manuals etc.

‘+ Hypercare Arrangements.

+ PM Hardware and Commissioning.

* Communication to PM's ~ clarity, approach and impact.

‘+ Role of BA and AM / RACI.

‘Transferring and cut off procedures from Horizon to SPMP.

'* PM routes to escalation and POL resolution SLA, and approach.
‘Approach and role of A&C! and Retail Assurance teams.

+ Plans for resourcing to ensure delivery.

* Governance, KP! and Risk Management.

‘+ Adequacy and effectiveness of early warning indicators, with a key
focus on PM wellbeing (Cli).

‘Culture -Has Pol/Retail identified the right and appropriate
mechanism and triggers to capture culture.

To have ensured that all elements of the Retail Readiness process is
effectively Managed and providing the best level of control and support
‘to Post Masters as part of the programme delivery requirements.

Evidence obtained to demonstrate planning accuracy, efficiency in
stock control, delivery planning, product verification, KPI's monitored to
‘ensure poor trends/performance addressed, swap out and post-
delivery support. Evidence of financial controls/planning and alignment
with the Programme Plan will also have been validated.

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Cloud Security

Security

Ger).
+ Review of cloud service provider (CSP) security controls and shared
responsibility models.

+ Evaluation of cloud identity and access management, data
encryption, and compliance posture.

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infrastructure, CSP security controls and identity and access
management are in place and align with good business practice le ISO
27001.

28 I End Point Security Security ~ Assessment of endpoint protection solutions (eg, antivirus, Ensured that robust controls, processes, and effective measures are in
endpoint detection and response). place to manage endpoint protection, configuration, patch
‘+ Review of endpoint configuration management and patch management and mobile device management. ISO 27001 / 27002.
management practices.
‘+ Evaluation of mobile device management (MOM) and bring-your-
own-device (BYOD) policies.

29 I Compliance & Security + Assessment of IT controls against relevant regulatory requirements I Validated, with supporting evidence, that all the programme IT controls
Regulatory and industry standards (e.g, SO 27001, NIST Cybersecurity are in compliance with POL and regulatory requirements. (e.g., PCI DSS,
Requirements / Framework) HIPAA, GDPR). The application and management of this being aligned
Frameworks ‘+ Review of compliance with specific regulations (e.g., PCIDSS, HIPAA, I to good business practice le ISO 27001.

DPR).

30 I Security Risk Security + Evaluation of risk assessment methodologies and riskmanagement I Ensured the E2E Risk Management process is robust and followed in
Management processes. line with defined controls & processes.

Potential to merge with * Review of risk treatment plans and mitigation strategies. Evidence / artefacts seen to confirm good practice supporting risk
sow 24 * Assessment of risk monitoring and reporting mechanisms. assessment methodology, risk treatment / mitigation and effective
monitoring. Good industry practice being aligned with !S027001

31 I Security Operations Security ‘The scope of Security Operations will be to look at the designed or to__I Ensured that robust and defined Organisational Design including
(Organisation) be designed Security Organisation (TOM) and assess: controls and processes are in place and followed to manage the

* Evaluation of security operations centre (SOC) processes and security operations centre.
capabilities. ; : Validated, with supporting evidence, the effectiveness of security
** Review of security monitoring and incident detection tools. monitoring / incident detection and response controls. This all being
+ Assessment of security incident response workflows and procedures. I aligned with POL, regulatory requirements and good business practice
le ISO 27001.
32 I Disaster Recovery and _I AllPillars Review to ensure that POL standards are adhered to for Disaster ‘To ensure robust DR and Business Continuity plan is in place with

Business Continuity

Recovery and Business Continuity.
Review to include assessment of:

‘s measures of effectiveness and how controls are tested and enhanced
to align with pre and post (Final Platform) deliverables.

+ DRand BC RACI.
'* Approach to integrated testing, including approach to cyber threats
+ Roll back process and procedures

supporting processes. Detailed evidence of how the plans are tested to
ensure effectiveness and alignment with the platform during release
phases and current planning(preparation) for final release. Full
‘ownership and RACI to support this model has been defined. All
planning aligned with good business practice and POL / Regulatory
requirements

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33° I Finance & Cost Model 1. Governance To review the Financial Cost modelling of the SPMP programme to Ensure that there are robust processes and procedures in place to
2. Finance ensure that costs being incurred are accounted for are completely and I capture and appropriately account for SPMP cost, including the
3. Inquiry accurate. including the accounting principles being followed. monitoring and reporting against budgets /forecast.
Review the linkage of the cost model to the Business Case and BusinessI Ensure alignment with BC and BR.
Requirements. And how changes in the Business Case and Business
Requirements are being reflected into the Finance Cost Model.
Review the processes in place to monitor and manage Actuals to
Budget/Forecast. How exceptions and deviations are being escalated
and addressed.
34 I Business Case and 1.Governance ‘The scope of the Business Case and Benefit Realisation review will Ensure that there is a robust model in place for the Business Case and
Benefit Realisation consider: the linkage into Business Requirements and delivery.
Assurance ‘a Modelling for business case and benefit realisation is sufficiently
robust and appropriate Provide an opinion on the Cost, Benefits realisation model and
b Sufficient to support funding draw downs assumptions.
Captures impacts of risks, issues and assurance reviews/outcomes
BC and BR change management process is robust. Provide opinion on the monitoring and reporting mechanisms of the
Business Case and change management.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

——
Title: Internal Audit Report Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024

. Johann Appel - Director of Internal . _ .
Author: ‘Audit & Risk Management Sponsor: Kathryn Sherratt - Interim CFO

Input Sought: Noting
The Committee is asked to:

i. Note the progress being made with delivery of the internal audit programme and
completion of audit actions.

Previous Governance Oversight
RCC of 7 May 2024.

Executive Summary

Following are the key messages from this report:

* Progress with Internal Audit Programme: We have now completed the 2023/24
internal audit programme. Six audits were completed during this reporting period:

Financial Services Conduct Risk Management - Needs Improvement

International Money Transfer - Needs Improvement

ATM Link Scheme Assurance - Satisfactory

Copper Stop Sell Programme - Significant Delivery Risk

Pin Entry Device Replacement Programme - Significant Delivery Risk

Management of Post-GLO Improvements - Needs Improvement

000000

« Progress with Audit Actions: Completion of audit actions is progressing steadily. As of
13 May, there were 22 actions overdue, 14 of which were older than 60 days.

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Report

Progress against plan for 2023/24
1. We have completed six POL audits since the March ARC.
2. The final status of the 2023/24 plan is as follows:

POL Internal Audit Plan 23/24 Status: PO! Internal Audit Plan 23/24
Total Audits = 26‘ Status: Total Audits = 6 ©

a

26

«= Completed Reporting = Fieldwork

Planning = Cancelled

Target number of reviews based on revised plan for 2023/24 approved by ARC in Sept 23 is 26 (20 Internal control reviews & 6 change assurance reviews).
Details of the audit plan can be found in Appendix 1.
®)P01 ARC approved baseline plan for 2023/24.

3. Progress against the 2024/25 plan will be reported from July.

Internal Audit reviews completed
4. The following POL audits have been completed since the March ARC meeting:

Audit Title Report Ri ig
ae

1 Financial Services Conduct Risk Management

2 International Money Transfer

3 ATM Link Scheme Assurance

4 Copper Stop Sell Programme

5 Pin Entry Device Replacement Programme

6 Management of Post-GLO Improvements

5. Key risk and control themes from these reviews are:

* POL does not separately identify subsidiary or appointed representative risk in SNow
and, as such, these areas have no assigned risk owner.

* MoneyGram and Western Union products are generally well managed, although there
is a need to improve risk management and to validate management information
received from product providers for revenue calculations and performance KPIs.

« The Copper Stop Sell programme experienced high failure rates due largely to a
recognised gap in Postmaster communications across the programme portfolio,

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supplier communication issues, and site-specific challenges due to prior site

assessments not being funded.

e There is a lack of coordinated communication with postmasters and a single source of

contact details for postmasters when rolling out changes to the network.
« Whilst good progress continuous to be made with Post-GLO improvements, there is
need to improve the tracking of actions and deliverables.
6. Below are summaries of the adversely rated reports.
7. Copper Stop Sell Programme (Ref.2023/24-21)

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3.4

a

\ Audit actions: Sponsor: Chris Brockelsby (Paula
Jenner)
a : : Reading Room attachment 2

Significant Delivery Risk

BT Openreach are replacing the existing copper Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines (ADSL) with a
new fibre infrastructure, ending the sale and support of copper products where fibre alternatives
were available by September 2023, and completely withdrawing copper services by December 2025.
The Copper Stop Sell programme aims to mitigate impact on the network of the loss of copper ADSL,
address the existing router estate running out of manufacturer support in May 2025, and expand
LAN Port availability to meet future demand.

The objective of this review was to assess the effectiveness of governance and control of the
programme, and management of delivery risk.

Whilst some areas for improvement have been identified, the programme is generally well managed
in line with the Change Excellence Framework (CSF), and it has shown resilience and innovation to
meet external challenges. However, failed install rates remain high, due largely to a recognised
gap in Postmaster communications across the programme portfolio, supplier communication
issues, and site-specific challenges due to prior site assessments not being funded.

At date of reporting BT Openreach cannot provide technical solutions for 800 branches
(down from 3000 at date of review). Use of traditional ADSL lines can be extended, but there is a
hard cut-off to migrate these branches before NBIT roll out. This highlights the dependency on BT
Openreach, for whom this is a large, complex programme. Based on our findings we have rated this
report “Sig ant Delivery Risk”.

Management Comment by Paula Jenner, Core Products and Platforms Director

“Whilst I agree with the recommendations and agreed actions it should be recognised that the transformation
being undertaken by BT is a major and complex programme of work with is inherent with its own challenges
and changes to previously communicated schedules. Post Office are dependent on BT's wider programme to
enable successful delivery of the Copper Stop project, and this coupled with the complexity in the branch
landscape and the numbers of vendors involved in delivering means there is more risk of a domino effect if
there are failures in each of the transformation activities.

Area 1:1 note the mention of a central database of CAD drawings for each branch are already available within
the business. Given the Retail involvement in the programme and the representation on the Steering Group
I’m concerned this has only just come to light. The data within this database would have been invaluable to
the project during the planning stages and may have prevented some of the failures to date. It would be
prudent to ensure the existence of this database is common knowledge within the Change Portfolio.

Area 2:While a formal Contingency plans and a clear critical path have rightly been identified as priority actions,
given the complex nature of the programme it should be understood there is likely be a level of uncertainty
regarding milestone dates within the critical path. It is also worth noting the agile way in which the project
team have been operating in conjunction with our Vendors. The project team are focused on meeting the Dec

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2025 date and are agile in the way they respond to changes in plans to ensure we meet that date. The significant
decrease in numbers of branches without a solution is further evidence of Post Office’s reliance on the BT
Transformation programme and how quickly the risks and plans can change.

Area 3: Postmaster communications - I am in complete agreement with the assessment documented. It is well
recognised across the project delivery landscape that the absence of a centralised team for branch
communications along with robust and reliant contact information for our Branches is a challenge for any project
that touch the branch estate. Postmaster representation - Although I agree with the findings it should be noted
that some of the current project team roles are filled by previous postmasters.

As a final note - I would like to commend the PM, project resource and BAU Technology team on their input
and management to date on what has been and continues to be a challenging project for Post Office. Regardless
of the importance of this project to continued trading; it has been difficult to secure the realistic funding required
and therefore the project approach has had to take this into account during resourcing and planning. The agility
and tenacity of the team has enabled the delivery so far.”

9

Pin Entry Device (PED) Replacement Programme (Ref.2023/24-24)

Audit actions: Sponsor: Chris Brockelsby (Greg
Hunt)
a . Reading Room attachment 3

Significant Delivery Risk

The PIN Entry Device (PED) enables the processing of credit and debit card payments either through
keying a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or using Near Field Communication (NFC) to complete
a contactless transaction. The IPP350 terminals reached their end-of-life in April 2021 and will no
longer be supported or repaired by Worldline post December 2023. Furthermore, the PCI PTS
(Payment Card Industry Pin Transaction Security) certification is no longer compliant with PCI
requirements after April 2026. The programme aims to address both of these challenges by
replacing these devices.

A number of common themes have been identified with the Copper Stop Sell programme which IA
reviewed in February 2024, many of which are outside the control of the programme. In particular
a need for a more coordinated approach to communicating with postmasters, drawing on a single,
complete and up to date source of postmaster contact details which is compliant with General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements. However, it should be noted that steps have been
taken during these reviews to start to put in place a central function, and a ‘single source of truth’
database.

Overall, project management and governance were reasonably robust. However, greater focus on
lessons learned and contingency planning is required. Reporting of PED replacement installations
in branches through the pilot phase should also be strengthened, and there is a need for greater
clarity on counter rationalisation, in order to effectively deliver procurement and rollout planning.

The programme has been delayed by three months while Worldline attain PCI certification on the
new PED. This compounds other significant risks to delivery, including the dependency on, and lack
of visibility of, the counter rationalisation programme, the absence of a rollout plan, and the
dependency on approval of a yet to be submitted change request in order to agree contingency
funding. These collectively present major delivery risk, and at the date of our review the programme
had rated itself red to reflect this. However, there is clear evidence of steps being taken to mitigate
these risks and on this bases we have rated this report “Significant Delivery Risk” moving towards
“Some Delivery Risk”.

Management Comment provided by Greg Hunt, Head of IT Service - Branch Products and Platforms

Whilst I recognise and agree with the findings within this report, it's worth pointing out that a number of the
key priority findings and risks fall outside of the PED programme's scope to resolve.

Specifically, the P1 findings in relation to the dependency on the counter rationalisation; the finding with

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regards to no central function for coordination of postmaster engagement on projects and programmes and
there being no reliable single source of postmaster contact details.

For the other findings that have been highlighted during the audit - the programme has either resolved the
finding, or there's a clear plan in place to address.

Update on Horizon Privileged Access Management

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Following a management request in 2023, Deloitte have completed a review of Privileged
Access Management (PAM) in Horizon. The full report is available in the reading room
(appendix 8).

Due to a lack of cooperation provided to the fieldwork team by Fujitsu, who are responsible
for managing privileged access to key components of HNG-A, several intended scope
elements could not be completed and the review therefore focused on POL operated
controls only. As the auditors were unable to test access controls operated by Fujitsu,
Deloitte could not reach an opinion and therefore have not rated this report

Five key areas were highlighted for improvement, which are:

(a) A lack of oversight and governance by POL over controls performed by third parties;

(b) A lack of up-to-date policies and procedures;

(c) Ineffective branch-level privileged access management;

(d) Lack of robust user access review processes; and

(e) An excessive number of Global users with privileged access to account management
and transactional activities across all branches.

A service organisation controls (SOC) (ISAE 3402) review for Fujitsu is currently being
performed by EY, who are expected to finalise their report by August 2024.

We propose that Internal Audit review the scope and results of the SOC review to
determine if this provides adequate coverage and assurance over PAM. In addition we
propose a follow-up audit to validate that the findings from Deloitte’s review have been
addressed.

Internal Audit reviews in progress

14. The following audits from the 2024/25 programme are in progress or being planned for

delivery at the July ARC:

Review Sponsor Status
1 I Incident management and Breach Reporting Chris Brocklesby Fieldwork
2 I SPM Security Phase 1 (Data Breach Root Cause) I Chris Brocklesby Fieldwork
3 I Support & Maintenance of Back-Office Systems I Chris Brocklesby Planning
4 I 2023/24 STIP Metrics Karen McEwan Planning
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15.

16.

17.
18.

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Following a recent data breach incident, management requested that Internal Audit
perform an investigation to establish the root cause of the incident. This work will be
done in two phases as follows:

e A ‘lessons to learn’ review of the Incident Management and Breach Reporting process
to establish why the breach was not escalated and reported in a timely manner. This
is an addition to the 2024/25 plan;

* A root cause analysis to understand how and why a third party outside of the UK had
access to customer data. This work will be done as part of the scheduled SPM Security
review, which has now been brought forward.

DBT have requested that IA provide assurance over the design of the POL Process Review
(PPR) redress scheme. This assurance is a condition for DBT to release the funding.

Management have requested that IA validate the 2023/24 STIP bonus metrics outturn.

The ARC Chair have requested that IA provide assurance over the completion of actions
from a recent speak-up investigation.

Status of Audit Actions

19.
20.

21.

There are currently 22 actions overdue, 14 of which are older than 60 days.

The movement and ageing of audit actions are shown in the table below (status as of 13
May 2024).

Audit Action Status (POL): Ageing:

Open actions at last ARC 63 Open (not yet due) 55
Less: Actions closed in period 8 Overdue (<60 days) 8
Add: New actions in period 22 Overdue (>60 days) 14
Total open actions 77 Total open actions 77
Breakdown of the actions that are overdue for more than 60 days:

Audit / Area No. of actions > 60 days
Payroll 2

IT Control Framework
Contractor Hiring

Cyber Resilience “!

Horizon Change Management

Total 14

N1 One action from the Cyber Resilience review has been overdue for 13 months (key security
controls and tools to mitigate malware attacks). This action comprised multiple activities, most
of which have been completed (including implementing Multi-Factor Authentication). However,
the Branch Security Risk Assessment has not yet been finalised, although we understand a draft
assessment has been created.

Ble loin

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POI Audit Programme

22. The table below shows the status of the 2023/24 POI audit programme, which is reported
to the POI ARC:

1 “Webhelp Transition Plan - Phi ~ Unrated
2 I Webhelp Transition Plan - Ph 2 Unrated
3 I Third Party Oversight sds Improvem
4 I Cyber Security Fieldwork
5 I Risk Management Reporting
6 I Fin Ops Controls Jan-24 "Needs Improvement
7 Pricing Controls Delayed to 24/25 Plan
8 I Demonstrating Independence
Follow-up (focused) Delayed to 24/25 Plan
Appendices?

Appendix 1: Internal Audit Programme for 2023/24

Appendix 2: Internal Audit Report - Copper Stop Sell Programme

Appendix 3: Internal Audit Report - PED Replacement Programme

Appendix 4: Internal Audit Report - ATM Link Scheme Assurance

Appendix 5: Internal Audit Report - Management of Post-GLO Improvements
Appendix 6: — Internal Audit Report - International Money Transfers

Appendix 6: Internal Audit Report - Conduct Risk Management

Appendix 8: Deloitte Report - Horizon Privileged Access Management

1 Appendices are accessible in the CoSec ‘Reading Room’

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Appendix 1 2023/24 IA Plan - ARC approved March 2023, refreshed September 2023

No. I Title/Subject I Sponsor [Resource I Comments (changes tracked inred) I Timing _I Status / Rating
Internal Control Reviews

1 __I ATMLINK scheme assurance Owen Woodley In-house _ I Original pian March 24

2 30 Party Revenue Data Validation - NFS. Al Cameron In-house Carried forward from 2022/23 April 23

3 _ I 3 Party Revenue Data Validation — ATM revenue Al Cameron In-house _I Carried forward from 2022/23 April 23

4 _ I Financial Reporting Controls "I AlCameron Co-source I Original plan June 23

5 Postmaster On-boarding Financial Approvals Process I Martin Roberts Co-source I Original plan with scope change July 23

6 _ I Stamp Stock Controls Martin Roberts Co-source I Original plan Sept 23

7 _ I Management of Post-GLO Improvements (IDG 2.0) Nick Read Co-source I Original plan Oct 23

8 _ I Overturned Convictions (Phase 1) ‘Simon Recaldin Co-source I Original plan July 23 Unrated Report
9 _ I Overturned Convictions (Phase 2) ‘Simon Recaldin Co-source I Original plan Jan 24 Cancelled

10 I HSS ‘Simon Recaldin Co-source I Original plan June 23

11 _I Postmaster Redress (Suspension Remuneration Review) I Martin Roberts Co-source I Original plan Dec 23

12 _ I FS Conduct Management Owen Woodley Co-source I Original plan Oct 23

13 _I Sales (International Money Transfer) Owen Woodley Co-source I Original plan March 24

14_I Contractor Hiring Process lan Rudkin Co-source I Original plan July 23,

15 I HU Phase 3 Jeff Smyth Co-source I Original plan Dec 23

16 _I Cyber Security Maturity Assessment Zdravko Mladenov I Co-source I Original plan Oct 23 Unrated Report
37 _I Cloud Security Zdravko Mladenov I Co-source I Original plan June 23

18_I IT Vendor Risk Management Zdravko Mladenov I Co-source _I Original plan @

19 _I Validation of 2022/23 Bonus Metrics lan Rudkin In-house _I Addition to plan, management request I QI Unrated Report
20 _I Inquiry Programme (Disclosure Processes) Diane Wills In-house _ I Addition to plan, management request I Nov 23 Cancelled
Change Assurance Reviews

1 _ I Data Centre Fortification Jeff Smyth Co-source I Original plan June

2__I Application Modernisation Jeff Smyth Co-source I Original plan May

3 I PCICompliance Jeff Smyth Co-source I Original plan Oct

4 _ I Copper Stop Sell Programme Chris Brocklesby __I Co-source I Addition to plan, management request I Feb

5 _ I Pin Entry Device (PED) Replacement Programme Chris Brocklesby I Co-source I Addition to plan, management request I March

6 _ I SPM Programme Placeholder Chris Brocklesby I Co-source I Original plan Q3 Delayed to 2024/25
7 _ I SPM Programme Placeholder Chris Brocklesby I Co-source I Original plan @ Delayed to 2024/25
8 _ I SPM Programme Placeholder Chris Brocklesby I Co-source I Original plan Qa Cancelled

w
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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE

Title: Data Governance Update Meet ting 21% May 2024
. I Chris Russell, Interim Data Management . Tim Mcinnes, Strategy &
Author: Director Sponsor: Transformation Director

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to note:
e The status and progress being made on improving the data maturity profile of POL.

e The next steps to drive a sustainable and robust approach towards data management.

Executive Summary

Based on feedback from the ARC in 2023, the Interim Data Management Director has been re-
assessing options available to bring forward the data maturity targets that were initially set at

achieving

(Please

The current status is as follows:
« All Functions with exception of RU and Inquiry are expected to achieve

y 2027 and thereby bringing the data management risk within appetite sooner.
refer to Appendix 1 for maturity levels).

maturity by

July 2024. Given the current pressures within RU and Inquiry, we have agreed a revised
maturity timeline of September 2024, and additional Group Data Management support is being
provided to ensure this timeline is met and or brought forward.

« To assess how the timelines fori"
pilot scheme is being stood up
and one TBC business area) t

e The key risks associated with reaching}

maturity can be brought forward from August 2027, a
ll be taking three areas of the business (SPMP/FDP
maturity by the Q4 24/25.

aturity by 2027 or earlier are.
o time taken to reduce the risk score to be within risk appetite.

o The impact of remediation required within the business weighed up against business
as usual.

o Regulatory, legal, contractual, and reputational impact of any non-compliance with
obligations.

o A lack of conformity across POL in key definitions of data terminology leading to
inconsistency within different programmes of work.

o Further work that may need to be added to the programme because of
recommendations from the ongoing statutory Inquiry.

ity of additional resourcing (during 2025-26) during the latter stages of Levels
to ensure the integrity of the data captured within the Data Governance
ramework is not compromised.

e Weare now adopting a revised approach to assess the core components of data maturity and
the timelines associated with these, such as:

o Criticality of Data Sets — working with the business and Data SME’s across POL the pilot
will define ‘Critical Data Set’ and then focus maturity activities on those sets.

o Impact on all POL’s business given that the activities are resource intensive.

o Considering the activities set out in the Maturity Framework (See Appendix 2) and revising
the framework accordingly to be shared with ARC at the September 2024 meeting.

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o Managing POLs risk exposure.

Whilst we have not prepared a detailed revised timeline, we believe we have created the right
approach based on risk, critical data sets and burden on the business. During the proposed pilot
scheme, we will keep ARC updated on progress and issues arising and on conclusion of the pilot
scheme present the more detailed timelines to ARC.

Report

. The Data Management Team has been in operation since 2021 with an initial focus of baselining
a programme of work to deliver a sustainable, scalable, and robust level of maturity for data
governance across POL. At the heart of this work was three core principles:

a. All data sets across POL identified and assigned Data Owners.

b. To support and facilitate data governance related objectives borne out of HIJ Remediation
Actions.

c. In addition, the quality of the data assessed and where the quality of the data is found to be
low then enhancements to that data will need to be made.

Work on delivering enhanced data governance maturity commenced in March 2023 with
agreement from ARC to targe' maturity across POL (see Appendix 2). Data Sponsors
and Deputy Data Sponsors were assigned and briefed on POL’s aim to deliver a satisfactory
level of maturity. At recent RCC meetings members have been briefed on progress as POL
moves towards the first milestone of Level 2 compliance.

Key to ongoing activities has been the identification of what progress can be made with current
funding levels and we believe that 13 out of 14 activities towards; !can be progressed
without any immediate additional funding for the Data Management Team (see Appendix 3).
However, this will be burdensome across POL specifically around the identification of critical
data sets, the collation of metadata for data cataloguing and data quality reviews. Whilst this is
the case it is noted that all business areas are required to maintain a robust control environment
of which data is an integral part.

For the long-term sustainability of aturity POL will need to consider investment for the
automation of data cataloguing and quality. Any additional investment required will be scoped
out and presented over the next 12 months with additional funding being sought in the FY25/26
plans. In the interim the Data Governance Team are in discussions across POL and key data
areas to assess where additional resources may be shared.

The Pilot scheme mentioned earlier will be targeted in key areas to POL and determined by
the level off associated risk and criticality of data sets. Thus, the proposal is to include:

a. SPMP: Given wide internal and external scrutiny on SPMP there is a clear need to progress
data governance workstreams to ensure robustness and credibility of NBIT. This will be a
critical input into building Postmasters’ trust in the new system.

b. Future Data Platform (FDP): Including FDP in the pilot will be beneficial given the criticality
of the datasets sitting within this platform. In addition, this will help reduce the risk of
implementation inconsistencies in key areas such as data cataloguing and data quality, and
ensure alignment with the Data Governance Framework.

c. TBC: The Data Management team are currently discussing inclusion in the pilot with three
business areas all of which are deemed to hold critical data sets.

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10.

A review of the Data Governance Framework was conducted. As a result of this review a
Version 2 of the Data Governance Maturity Activities (see Annex 3) will be presented to the
Data Governance Committee and subsequently the September 2024 RCC. Key changes to
include.

Include key Data SME’s from across the business to reduce the risk of inconsistencies (see
point 8)

remove the activities linked to Records Management which should not be measured by levels
of maturity but by compliance with key controls.

Identification and categorisation of Critical Data Sets.

Breaking down the activities into smaller pieces of work to reduce the burden on the
businesses.

Data Governance was a key component of the recent HlJ remediation project. An assessment
of the work undertaken will be conducted to ensure that those requirements have been
incorporated and in line with at least! ‘maturity obligations.

Currently across POL there are many initiatives looking at how we manage and use POL data
such as the FDP, MDM, NBIT, EAP and Data Management. It is proposed to bring these areas
of expertise together to meet on a regular basis to ensure efficient use of resources, sharing of
ideas and a consistent approach to all programmes.

Obtaining fi maturity is the objective of the Data Management Team. However, we are
also looking to the future and how the use of data can give POL a strategic advantage.

Al is being adopted by suppliers and there are existing use cases for Al within the POL
enterprise estate. There are multiple requests from grass roots within POL on policy and use
of Al within the organisation. Therefore, we need to put controls and management around our
use of Al within the business. Chris Darriet-Jones will be presenting a paper to SEG and July
2024 RCC to drive Al maturity within POL. It is our belief that Al, effectively managed, can bring
significant operational and commercial benefits to POL and support the organisation to meet
its strategy objectives.

Financial Impact

11.

12.

At this point in time the Data Management Team are asking for no additional funding to support
the work needed to reach i'RRELEVANT maturity for data governance. However, for maturity to be
sustainable then POL will need to consider investment for automated Data Cataloguing and
Quality tooling. The ARC will be kept informed on requirements with a business case for any

additional funding likely to be included for the financial year 2025-26.

The activities of work that need to be undertaken by the business are likely to put a strain on
resources as some of the activities are resource intensive. The Data Management Team has
a dedicated resource to support the activities and advise on how best to meet the required level
of maturity. However, demands for their time are expected to be high, hence why it is proposed
to have a staggered roll out of the: lactivities.

Risk Assessment, Mitigations & Legal Implications

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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

There are two key Intermediate Risks identified and currently worked through SNOW. The
Risks are that inadequate Data Governance for Unstructured and Structured Data could lead
to legal, regulatory, and statutory infractions. In addition, failure to develop POLs data
governance culture could impact on the HiJ remediation work and Phase 7 of the Inquiry.

At a local level, these risks should be replicated on business risk registers, and bespoke risks
based on criticality of data sets with clear sustainable action plans to reduce risk exposure.

There is a risk that all data sets may not be captured as part of the { mactivities as Deputy
Data Sponsors are reliant on their businesses identifying and recording data sets they own. To
help mitigate this Data Management is now part of the formal Gating process with no proj

‘smaturity and a commitment to reach:

prescribed timeframes.

We believe that current resourcing levels can maintain a controlled roll out of{
However, this is being monitored to ensure that support to businesses is sufficient and not
causing delays to their progress.

As identified previously the remediation work needed to_reach maturity will place a resource
challenge on the business. Therefore, work on thé IRRELEVANT activities need to be balanced
against requirements to operate in a business-as de. To mitigate this the Data
Management Team will support the Deputy Data Sponsors in their creation of a workplan where
activities will be broken down into discrete manageable activities.

Due to inconsistencies to key terminologies and definitions POL does not currently have a
consistent and reliable approach to data management. This leads to uncertainty and impacts
the quality of data held by PO. As set out above key data SMEs from across the business will
form part of the Data Governance Committee to reduce this risk and in addition will meet
monthly to develop a standardisation of key definitions.

Stakeholder Implications

19.

20.

The biggest implication for stakeholders on maturity; IRRELEVANT js the impact that the required
work will have across the business. We will work with the various stakeholders to minimise
disruption as much as is possible. As a result of ongoing business obligations, a flexible and
fluid approach to delivery will need to be adopted.

There is a potential impact for other areas across the IT community as businesses call on areas
such as Service Delivery and Cyber Security to provide support and assistance in some of the
activities to be undertaken. The Data Management Director is meeting with the Service
Director, newly appointed CISO and other key stakeholders to make them aware of the next
stages.

Next Steps & Timelines

21.

Data Management presented their proposals to the Data Governance Committee and the Risk
and Compliance Committee for notification and discussion before being presented to the May
ARC.

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23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

In Q1 24-25 meet with SEG members and Deputy Data Sponsors for those areas involved in
the pilot for activities leading to Levels 3 & 4 maturity.

In Q2 24-25 work with Key Stakeholders involved with data across POL to create the sub-
committee of the Data Governance Committee to ensure that a sustainable, scalable, and
consistent approach is adopted to the management of data across all business functions.

In back end of Q1 24-25 convene a half day workshop to take those areas involved in the Level
3 & 4 Pilot through the next round of activities. This meeting will include other key stakeholders
recognised in the previous point above.

In H1 24-25 work with the Inquiry and Remediation Unit to complete Level 2 Maturity to bring
them into line with rest of POL.

In Q1 24-25 working with the Records Manager develop an Accountability Framework for
Records Management for adoption across all POL business areas.

As a result of the Assurance of the HIJ programme being conducted by the Group Assurance
Team there may need to be additional changes made to the Data Governance Framework. If
any gaps are identified, then these will be added to the Data Governance Maturity Dashboard.

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Appendix 1

Data Governance Maturity Dashboard — Level 2

Status as at COB 10-05-2024

erie,
‘Dota Goveensace framework planted to be prruented to Pest Office insurance ARC in Anuary 2024 for aproval Agenda sot TAK) Enpapernent in progres wih lan Notmay to progress elout ahead f this.
is erent Ae posible te provide estorance thet dots owners forall dtavets within the Business have been ienefied: is is becouse Tere snot a complete histo ll tases thet ext within the ergensaton.

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Appendix 2

ta Governance Maturity Dashboar

The following metrics will be used to measure maturity for each of the POL business units”,

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* The doto governonce moturity actnties hve been defined within the contest ond constroints ofthe mite funding evetoble for resource ond tooling, With regard to tookng secs, the plan i to document erica ata elements ona SharePoint boxed Business Glossary and
‘perform dato quote essessment wing itesnaty avasabie too, for example IDEA

** a ote domain isa conceptual grouping of data elements ether foro specif process, business unt or system. ln this context the dato domains the datose doses that the date owner hos responsibly for

"1¥ me security clssfiction ofthe data element based upon the ifermation Cosfcation Stondard

POL-BSFF-WITN-010-0000033_0076
Appendix 3

Data Governance Maturity Activities and Fu

‘tase the Deputy Data Sporene and al Data Oumersand Data Stewardsbeen kentified?

pendencies

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(asthe “Glossary Term and “Description” forall Citical Data Hlement sbeendonmentes inthe Rasiness Glossary?

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—Famiag red ede at ake em ety

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Management of Physical Branch Meeting pate: I Tuesday 215 May 2024
_ I Kayleigh Dodd - Digital / . Chris Russell - Interim Data
Author: Physical Records Manager Sponsor: Management Director

Input Sought: Noting and discussion.

The ARC is asked to note and discuss the approach to the management of physical (i.e.,
unstructured) data held in Branch.

Executive Summary

The report [3.0_POL_RCC_Unstructured_Data_20230314_FINAL] was submitted to RCC and
subsequently ARC in March 2023, drawing attention to some of the risks presented to POL
through the poor management of physical data. The ARC requested an update on the plan to
address these risks, which is the topic of this paper, with a particular focus on the poor
management of physical and digital data in POL’s Branches. Management of physical and digital
data in back-office areas of POL is not considered in this paper.

Note that this risk is currently summarised under RKO021709 within ServiceNow - Poor
management of unstructured information (hard copy material and unstructured digital
information such as documents saved in SharePoint). The risk is currently outside of appetite
and tolerance. The specific risk in relation to the management of Branch data is in the process
of being defined and agreed in terms of the risk ownership, with an expectation that an update
can be provided at the September ARC.

Report

What risk is presented through the poor management of physical data across the
Branch network?

1. I POL has more than 11,500 Branches each generating and storing a significant volume of
physical data. This data includes but is not limited to:

e Branch trading reports (retained for 6 years)

e MoneyGram records - containing customer data (retained for 5 years)
e ATM weekly balancing statements (retained for 2 years)

e Banking deposits/withdrawal receipts (retained or 2 years)

« Passport receipts (retained for 2 years)

* Remittances in/out receipts (retained for 2 years)

2. In some Branches this paperwork is stored in a way that increases the risk that the
integrity of the data may be compromised (e.g., documents do not appear to be disposed
of in a timely fashion with little ability to identify when a disposal date has been reached,
etc.). Postmasters must fund any disposal costs themselves (excl. DMBs) and paperwork
is only archived with POL's storage provider Oasis when they close. These factors lead to

1
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minimal disposal taking place and over retention of data on site, and a consequent risk of
loss or compromise to this data. No auditing activity takes place on how Branches manage
their physical data.

When a Branch does close and is required to archive paperwork, there is little control over
the process with many not following guidance. This results in boxes of unindexed records
and often rubbish arriving at Oasis for storage, creating a further risk that POL does not
have knowledge of what data it holds in archive. This also has a cost impact on POL.

Where personal data is referenced in Branch records, POL is contractually responsible as
a data processor for handling this in accordance with the Data Protection Act, with the
Postmaster recorded as a sub-processor.

The risks associated with poor management of physical data are referenced in Appendix
1. Whilst the likelihood of one of these risks materialising is considered minimal in relation
to Branch data specifically, there remains a material risk of non-compliance to the Data
Protection Act for products such as MoneyGram, where over retention or accidental
disclosure of personal data could lead to significant fines and reputational damage to POL.

What steps are the Data Management Team taking in relation to this risk?

6.

Historically branches have been required to retain extensive physical transactional records
on site for a number of years, even though these requirements have not been reviewed
or updated in some time. This means it is currently unclear what records must be retained,
for how long and for what reason. Until these requirements are updated and documented,
Branches will continue to retain physical records in the manner they have historically done
so and potentially when POL has no legal, regulatory or business reason to require it.

Through the Data Governance Framework, the Data Management Team are formalising
the accountability, ownership and responsibility for records retained in Branch. Initial
discussions have been held between with Deputy Data Sponsors for Retail, Commercial
and Finance which a view to understanding who within these units (or elsewhere across
POL) requires physical records to be retained within Branches. It is possible that there is
no longer a requirement to retain many of these physical records due to process changes.

Once Data Owners have been assigned, this ownership and the retention requirements of
any records will be documented in the POL Record Retention Schedules. As with all other
business records across POL, the ongoing management of records is the responsibility of
the Data Owner, with the accountability assigned to the relevant Data Sponsor. Any risk
identified in relation to this must be raised, explored and mitigated by the Data Owner.
This includes the way any physical records are managed and disposed of within Branches.

The Data Management Team will offer support and guidance with practical ways to manage
physical records, especially those that are not under the direct control of the Data Owner.
Once the retention requirements have been confirmed, POL will explore the opportunity
for NBIT to include the functionality to retain relevant records digitally, rather than in a
physical format (i.e., in circumstances where retention continues to be required).

Risk Assessment

The Board agreed risk appetite is AVERSE in relation to risks materialising from unauthorised
access to sensitive data, unauthorised changes to data and ineffective processes and
procedures for the management of data. As things currently stand POL is outside of risk
appetite which potentially has legal, contractual and reputational consequences. The risk is not

2

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considered significantly out of appetite through the management of Branch data alone, but in
conjunction with the management of data across the organisation as a whole.

The Data Management Team are seeking to address the accountabilities point through the Data
Governance Framework and clear definition of data roles and responsibilities. Appendix 1 sets
out more detailed information on the risks and their potential impact, although as previously
stated these risks are considered more likely to crystallise from the poor management of
physical and digital data in back-office areas of POL rather than from Branch data.

Stakeholder Implications

Any changes proposed to the way in which Postmasters manage paperwork within branch
through to disposal must be led by the Data Owner and fully scoped with the Retail Team with
Postmaster engagement. Reduced retention requirements would be expected to be welcomed
by Postmasters due to the time saved and efficiencies from freeing up space otherwise used
for records’ storage.

Next Steps & Timelines

Aworkshop will be arranged with colleagues from the Commercial, Retail and any other relevant
teams identified to:

e« Agree on the ownership of any physical records stored in Branch.

e Review the legal, regulatory or business reason to retain these and update the relevant
Record Retention Schedules with these requirements.

e Refresh Postmaster guidance in this area.

e Assign ownership of any risk in relation to the management of physical Branch records
and collaboratively explore mitigation options.

It is recommended that this action be kept open to maintain the focus of the ARC that this issue
needs to be addressed, with a recommendation that the Data Management Team provide an
update at the September ARC.

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Appendix 1 - Risks associated with poor management of physical data.

Potential risks

Breach of legal obligations of
disclosure associated with the
Inquiry.

For example, inability to identify and
locate relevant documents to respond to
the Inquiry’s requests.

Potential Impact

¢ Criminal offence for any person who fails to
produce any documents in his custody or
under his control that relate to a matter in
question at the Inquiry.

¢ Criminal offence for any person who
intentionally suppresses or conceals a
document that is relevant or intentionally
alters or destroys any such document.

e Risk of Inquiry reaching adverse inferences
from inability to identify and locate
documents.

e Negative press coverage and/or reputational
damage.

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I Non-conformance with or a material
breach of UK GDPR, as well as the
Data Protection Act 2018 legislation

For example, unauthorised access to and
use of sensitive personal data held
securely in the Network, resulting in
customer detriment.

« Maximum fine of £17.5m or 4% of annual
turnover, depending on which is the greater
amount, and significant reputational impact.

Breach of criminal disclosure
requirements in the CCRC, CACD and
triage processes

¢ Could result in the CCRC or CACD finding
against POL, which could result in it having
to pay damages.

e Adverse costs orders against POL.

Breach of POL’s disclosure
obligations in civil litigation

For example, being unable to locate or
identify documentary evidence to
support POL’s legal position in civil
proceedings.

¢ Could result in POL losing a civil claim,
which could result in it having to pay
damages, as well as its own legal costs and
the other party’s legal costs.

© Inability to comply with court disclosure
orders.

e Adverse costs orders against POL regardless
of the outcome of a judgment.

Breach of regulatory obligations

For example, unable to comply with
Regulator’s order to deliver up certain
categories of documents.

e Risk of Regulator drawing adverse
inferences from POL failure to identify,
locate and provide documents ordered,
which could result in negative findings in a
Regulator’s investigation.

e Data Protection Officer may not be able to
give annual regulatory confirmations to ICO.

Confidential

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Potential risks

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Potential Impact

Negative statements from the Regulator
(ICO) as a result of failure.

Negative press coverage and/or reputational

damage.

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Breach of contractual obligations
For example, POL being unable to
to provide required regular reporting to

evidence meeting its contractual
obligations.

comply with audit rights in a contract, or

Potential contractual damages payable by
POL. Value will depend on each contract’s
limitation caps.

breach of Freedom of Information
Act 2000

For example, inability to identify and

FOIA requests.

locate relevant documents to respond to

Non-conformance with or a material I «

Negative statements from the Regulator
(ICO) as a result of failure.

« Negative press coverage and/or reputational

damage.

Confidential

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

<ehae Transformation Office Update . .
Title: May 2024 Meeting Date: 21 May 2024
. Jo Welch, Head of Change . Tim Mcinnes, Strategy and
Author: and Risk Assurance Sponsor: Transformation Director
Input Sought:

1.

For noting, a Strategy and Transformation Update.

Executive Summary

Since our last update in September 2023 the S&T Change and Risk Assurance function has
focussed its efforts on inter alia: (i) delivery against our Integrated Assurance Schedule; (ii)
working with Central Risk to update our risk profile and intermediate level risks and (iii)
reviewed and refreshed our control framework.

Over the same period it is worth RCC noting that Data Governance and Management has now
moved its reporting line under S&T, and that S&T is now part of POL’s CFO Function reporting
to SEG through the Interim CFO. These structural changes are not considered in this note but
can be covered in a verbal update if required by the Committee.

S&T Update

Assurance Undertaken Against the Change Assurance Framework

1.

Since the last update Project Health-checks by Portfolios have been introduced, and four
of these have now been completed (i.e. Data Enablement Programme, Project Darwin,
Auto-stock REM and Future DMBs). This has resulted in a marked improvement in project
control data and the quality of project status reporting for the reviewed activities, with
less rework required during the monthly performance reporting cycle (e.g. reports for
IADG, UKGI and Investment Committee). There is a desire to continue this cadence of
reviews into FY24/25 however tightened resourcing arrangements and associated
Pressures might make this challenging. Current planned assurance activities are detailed
in Annex 1.

Independent assurance reviews that have been completed by the Change Risk Assurance
team include four assurance project reviews (i.e. Copper Stop Sell, Payment Electronic
Devices (PEDs, Project Columbus, and Belfast Exit, two Thematic Reviews Project Closure
Process and Project Lessons Learnt) and one facilitated risk workshop (i.e. Fit & Proper).
A summary of these activities is listed in Annex 2. Common themes identified in these
reviews / workshops relate to effectiveness of sponsorship arrangements, membership of
steering committee to include suppliers for increased oversight, the lack of a consistent
business change management framework to improve outcome success and the need to
drive improved co-ordination across projects / programmes to minimise impact on
Branches and organisational capabilities to implement. Business risks identified during
change assurance reviews outside of S&T influence & control and transferred to business
teams has been provided in the reading room.

In addition, following the recent POHIT Inquiry workshop, it is clear that work is needed
to ensure alignment of SPMP to the Change Excellence Framework and POL’s Business
Change Policy (following recent re-planning). In particular improved visibility of reporting

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will enable robust challenge to provide S&T confidence in SPMP, and help support a wider
integrated picture of cross-POL change.

Risk Workshop

4.

Central Risk facilitated a risk workshop using industry benchmarks and standard risk
management practices to challenge existing risks and to identify potential gaps. Several
duplicate risks were retired, while others were moved from intermediate to local oversight,
with ownership transferred to drive accountability at a portfolio level for both unexpected
costs & data quality. As a result of the review the total number of intermediate risks has
decreased from five to two; three of the prior five have been retired as their scope
duplicated other local risk, two have been realigned so that they will now be managed at
local level, and two risks that were previously managed at a local level have now been
elevated to intermediate level (i.e. a net reduction of three intermediate risks).

Updates against the two new intermediate risks are set out below. See Annex 3 for further
details of these new intermediate risks.

ARC are reminded Change risks are reported monthly to IADG and UKGI, and these are
also submitted to the Investment Committee for visibility. For completeness these have
been provided in the reading room.

Controls Refresh

7.

To ensure our controls are aligned to the correct risk we have remapped our controls to
our risks. These controls have also been reviewed in full control Owners resulting in an
overall reduction in the number of controls from 36 to 22. A number were retired as
deemed process activities and not controls (not directive, detective, preventive, or
corrective). See Annex 4. The next annual review of controls is September 2024.

RKO021313 - Incorrect Stakeholder Engagement (TBA)

8.

10.

This risk has now been elevated to intermediate level (it was previously a local risk) in
recognition that the sponsorship role on some projects has on occasion been incorrectly
assigned (e.g. Copper Stop Sell, PED Replacement), which has impacted successful
delivery as well as the successful transition of these activities into BAU operation. This risk
is undergoing assessment, so its impact / likelihood scores are still to be determined.

The recent assurance reviews of Copper Stop Sell and PED Replacement identified that
sponsorship does not always meet assurance standards and sponsorship expectations
under the Change Excellence Framework, as sponsorship in these areas in particular had
been assigned to CIO rather than Retail (i.e. sponsorship was separated from end
outcomes). These contrast to successful sponsorship arrangements, such as in Lottery
Transition (PIR due to be shortly published), where sponsorship focused on the end
outcome has helped to support successful delivery. Sponsorship for these projects has
now been changed.

Furthermore in response to a recent Internal Audit (Copper Stop Sell) which identified that
business readiness assessment needed strengthening with addition clarity being required
to Stakeholder Gating the Terms of Reference on members’ responsibilities, to ensure the
areas they represent are ready to accept change, where relevant. Although this has always
been in scope of the Stakeholder Gating process these changes make the responsibility
explicit. Once complete all members will be retrained accordingly.

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RK0022259 - Dependencies Between Programmes / Projects Not Understood (TBA)

11.

12.

13.

This risk has been previously been recognised in S&T as a Change Risk (i.e. managed
within the project management module of ServiceNow, not the GRC module which
captures Business Risk) and it was reported as such, however following the Risk and
Controls Refresh this has now been raised as an intermediate risk due to the number of
significant, complex and interdependent programmes currently in-flight across POL (e.g.
SPMP (and other Horizon Replacement workstreams), Copper Stop Sell, Auto-Stock REM,
MDM Credence, etc.). If interdependencies across these activities are not fully understood
and managed this could have a material negative impact on change delivery schedules,
including benefits and timelines, while also having a negative operational impact on
internal teams and Postmasters. This risk is undergoing assessment, so its impact and
likelihood score is still to be determined.

To help provide better oversight of interdependencies the Strategic Alignment Module has
now been implemented in ServiceNow, which enables project-to-project dependencies to
be captured on delivery roadmaps and aligns change projects to strategic priorities,
business goals and targets. This has also increased transparency which is helping identify
data quality issues which are now being remediated.

In addition the ServiceNow Project Planning Workspace has been upgraded to a more
user-friendly interface, which enables task level project-to-project dependencies to be
linked, automatically informing projects if predecessor tasks slip. Compliance against
these and other planning standards remains a focus of all portfolios in S&T with some
areas more advanced than others; SPMP in particular is considered a high risk as this is
managed outside POL’s chosen strategic PPM tooling, constraining POL’s ability to have a
single integrated view of all change activity (including but not limited to dependencies)
taking place across the business.

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Annex 1: Change Assurance Reviews Planned in Next Quarter*
Future DMB PRJ0045332 Change Risk Assurance (2nd Line) - IFR ‘Shaun Hamilton 17/05/24 Not Started
Project Darwin PRIOO3S717 ‘Change Risk Assurance (2nd Line) - FR ‘Shaun Hamilton 19/04/24 In Progress
Multi Functional Devices PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Baljit Cheema 19/04/24 In Progress
‘National Lottery Transition PRIO043970 ‘Shaun Hamilton 12/04/24 In Progress
In Branch Sales PMO (ist Line) - Health Check Baljit Cheema 19/04/24 In Progress
Branch Hub 2.0PRJ0033524 Shaun Hamilton 31/05/24 Not Started
Identity and Access Management (DAM) ‘PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Kate Singer 10/06/24 Not Started
Second Device PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Kate Singer 22/04/24 Not Started
Fit and Proper Remediation ‘PMO (ist ine) - Health Check Balit Cheeme 21/06/28 Not Started
Bulk Cheque processing PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Baljit Cheema_ 17/05/24 Not Started
POI Reg, Contractual & Compliance PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Baljit Cheema_ 17/05/24 Not Started
NSA (NDA) Change Risk Assurance (2nd Line) -IFR ‘Shaun Hamilton 31/05/24 Not Started
‘Next Generation Mails Automation PMO (ist Line) - Health Check Sarah Amos 30/04/28 Not Started
PDA Replacement PMO (1st Health Check Sarah Amos 31/05/24 Not Started
Copper Stop Sell PMO (1st Line) - Health Check Sarah Amos 28/06/24 Not Started
Full PUDO ‘Shaun Hamilton 30/06/24 Not Started
Risk Management ‘Change Risk Assurance (2nd Line)-Thematic I__ Jo Welch 30/04/24 Not Started
“Annual Maturity Assessement I Change Risk Assurance (2nd_ine)= Thematic I Jo Weleh 31/05/26 Not Started

*This does not include assurance reviews commissioned through IADG or Gating

Annex 2: Change Assurance Reviews Undertaken Since Last Update

Project/Area

‘Copper Stop Sell

Project
Size
Gold

Overall
Rating

Review Type

2nd Line- IFR

Findings

Priority 1 I Priority 2 I Priority 3

Health-check
Action

Payment Electronic Devices (PEDS) Gold

Project Colombus

Data Enablement Platform

Project Closure
Belfast Ext
Future DMBs
Lessons Learned
Project Darwin
‘Auto Stook REM

Gold
Silver
Thematic
Platinum
Gold
Thematic
Platinum
Silver

2nd Line - iFR
2nd Line- PIR
‘1st Line Healthcheck
2nd Line - Thematic
2nd Line - PIR
‘1st Line Healthcheck
2nd Line - Thematic
4st Line Healthcheck
‘4st Line Healthcheck

*Health-checks do not prioritise their actions so reported in a separate column.

10
14

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
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Annex 3: Intermediate Risks Position April 2024
Risk ID Title Description Previous Risk Owner
Score
RKOO21313 Ineffective (CAUSE: Due to the lack of willingness, education, defined criteria, inconsistent New George Cross

stakeholder project/sponsor ownership and processes being not robust enough
engagement.

RKOO022259 Dependencies
between
programmes/ projects
not understood.

RK0022302 _Inability to deliver
complex programmes

EVENT: There is a risk of incorrect stakeholders (e.g. sponsors, Postmasters)
engagement,

IMPACT: which may result in inadequate communication with key stakeholders,
partial delivery of projects/programmes outcomes, incorrect constitution of
SteerCo, projects missed, negative impact on business continuity, reduction of
business benefits, misaligned objectives or expectations between interested
parties.

CAUSE: Due to lack of transparent and accurate plans with programmes not New
following the Change Excellence Framework, detailed plans not available, and
programmes being allowed to operate outside of standard process,

EVENT: There is a risk that dependencies between programmes/projects and
therefore potential conflicting objects and decisions effects on other
projects/programmes are not understood,

IMPACT: which may result in significant delivery delays, additional costs and
delayed benefits realisation.

Cau: As business needs evolve, including the requirements of increasingly New
complex and interdependent transformation initiatives (SPMP, Copper Stop Sell,

PEDs etc) POL’s change governance framework will need to mature to

accommodate (e.g. business change management, business capacity to accept

change, better co-ordination of branch impacting activities, visibility of

dependencies and key decisions, etc.).

Event: There is the risk that complex programmes may fail to deliver their
expected outcome, to cost, quality or schedule

Impact: which may impact POL ability to deliver its strategic priorities or
remediate significant enterprise risks.

Tim McInnes

Tim McInnes

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Annex 4: SPO Controls Assessment (April 2024)

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Post Office Limited (POL) and Post
Title: Office Insurance (POMS) Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
relationship and obligations
. Ed Dutton Product Portfolio . Owen Woodley, Deputy Chief
Author: Director ‘Sponsor: Executive

Input Sought: Decision

The Committee is asked to note the attached paper regarding the relationships between Post
Office Limited (POL) and its regulated subsidiary entity, Post Office Insurance (Post Office
Management Services Limited - POMS)

Executive Summary

This paper aims to remind POL ARC members of the relationship(s) between POL and POMS,
the complexities, and potential conflicts it brings, and the obligations on parties as a result. It
also reflects on recent changes in regulatory scrutiny of such relationships, some of the recent.
events and challenges associated with it, the progress made in improving aspects of it and
further plans to continue doing so.

Report

The relationship

1. The relationship between POL and POMS is multifaceted, and each element of the
relationship brings with it rights and obligations which need appropriate navigation and
respect. In other words, individuals in either party will sometimes benefit from
consideration or indeed precise thinking as to which role an individual or firm is operating
in when managing business matters.

2. There are four main aspects to the relationship:

a. Post Office Insurance (Post Office Management Services Ltd) (POMS) is a
subsidiary of Post Office Limited (POL). In this respect, POL may act as the
group owner of POMS, delivering the Groups strategy and ensuring the subsidiary is
performing to group standards, etc. There are also some reserved matters/control
rights retained by group, with the need for POL Remco approval of appointments to
subsidiary Boards being a good example.

b. POMS is an Insurance Intermediary statutory entity, authorised and
regulated by the FCA, which it must be to co-manufacture and distribute Insurance
products. This means that POMS must be able to demonstrate independent
governance and an ability to operate on its own. POMS has its own Board with Chair,
NEDs and an Audit, Risk and Compliance committee.

c. POL is an Appointed Representative (AR) to three principal firms, one of
which is POMS (the others being Bank of Ireland and Capital One). Certain
regulated activities (mainly branch sales and financial promotions which includes
website distribution) are performed by POL on behalf of POMS (and the other
principals). It does this as an AR, which allows POL to not be regulated in its own
right, but meaning the principal firms take regulatory responsibility for POL activity.

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That brings with it the need for POMS to effectively oversee POL and the activity it

performs. It also hands POMS other obligations - for instance ensuring the

management and governance of their AR is performed by fit and proper people.
Note: Regulations regarding the Appointed Representative regime have recently been
strengthened and continue to be a focus for the FCA. These changes are outlined further
below.

d. POL provides other services to POMS for it to function, utilising group
departments such as IT (for desktops), legal, company secretarial, HR, digital and so
on. These are set out in a multi-services agreement (MSA), with specific services,
roles who provide the interface between entities and the service standards expected.
This too means POMS must be able to oversee delivery of these services and
intervene and escalate if required, to ensure it, as an independent regulated entity is
delivering for its customers as it (and regulations) requires.

Potential for conflicts

3. The rights and obligations that each of these aspects of the relationship brings have the
potential to create conflicts

4. The obvious generic challenge is POL operates at two different levels in POMS eyes - crudely
a ‘superior’ sense as Group and owner, but in an ‘inferior’ sense as Appointed
Representative and service provider.

5. This means that potentially straightforward conflicts between owner and regulated
independent subsidiary have further nuance because the owner is also the appointed
representative and/or service provider for which POMS is responsible.

6. Whilst POL is the owner, POMS must be able to demand and oversee that POL performs to
the standards and deliver on the obligations required in its other roles. Furthermore, whilst
POL as parent sets group strategy and retains some reserved matters, POMS must be able
to evidence that POL as unregulated owner does not have undue influence over regulated
activity.

7. Conflicts may occur in the normal course of business - such as the priorities and challenges
facing POL may lead to group decisions that have a consequential impact on POMS without
POMS being considered or informed. In more dramatic terms, such a decision might (or
might be perceived to) interfere with POMS independence.

8. Other examples might include that POMS may identify risks that are a priority to mitigate
that do not align with POLs risk profile: i.e. what's important to one entity might not be
similarly important to another. Or POL becomes aware of something that might impact its
fitness and propriety as an AR but does not consider that aspect and does not inform its
principals. The current inquiry has amplified this risk recently.

9. Another subtler addition to the challenge is that we have increasingly integrated personnel
over the last few years, such that some POL staff are performing roles for POMS alongside
other POL roles, where previously POMS consisted of predominantly dedicated staff,
employed by POMS.

Increased Requlatory focus on Appointed Representatives

10. Changes to the AR regime were launched in December 2022, hand-in-hand with the new
Consumer Duty regulations, which came into force on 31 July 2023. The rules supporting
the AR regime and Consumer Duty are designed to reinforce each other in increasing
protection for consumers dealing with ARs.

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11. The FCA summarise the new obligations on POMS as:

« Enhanced oversight requirements: Apply enhanced oversight of ARs, including
ensuring having adequate systems, controls, and resources.

« Annual self-assessment: Prepare a single document demonstrating compliance with
obligations as a principal, identifying any risks and gaps. The firm’s governing body
should review and sign off this document at least annually.

« Annual review of AR’s activities and business: Annually review information on the
ARs’ activities and business, including the fitness and propriety of senior management,
the ARs’ financial position and the adequacy of the principal’s controls and resources to
effectively oversee the AR.

« Review oversight approach: Principals should review whether their oversight remains
appropriate in certain situations, for example, the size or volume of the AR business
involving regulated activity increases significantly in a short period of time.

« Notification of planned AR appointments: Notify us of an intended AR appointment
30 calendar days before it takes effect. New FCA forms gather more detailed
information.

« Annual reporting: Provide complaints and revenue information for each AR to the FCA
on an annual basis and confirm AR details are correct as part of annual attestation.

12. The FCA have also performed various data gathering exercises and held meetings with
some firms (including POMS).

13. There are some specific aspects of the new rules which might apply to POI’s relationship
with POL, which they describe clearly in their own publication.

14. The first relates to the relative size and scale of principal firm to AR.

"......where an AR or the group in which they operate is disproportionately large relative to the
principal, we are concerned this could lead to harm. For example, where a principal becomes
overly reliant on an AR to sustain its business, this might undermine the independence and
effectiveness of its oversight. The relative size and complexity of larger ARs can also mean a
Principal does not have sufficient skills and resource to effectively oversee them....”

15. The other is a clear need for POI to have adequate controls over POL’s AR activities and
means of enforcing compliant delivery by POL.

Meee To be able to oversee ARs effectively, principals need to consider their oversight
arrangements carefully. Principals are required to have ‘adequate’ controls over the AR’s
activities, and resources to monitor and enforce an AR’s compliance with the relevant
requirements that apply to its regulated activities. That assessment must be reviewed at
least every 12 months.”

16. Since late 2022, these new rules, and some of the more specific focus areas of the FCA,
correctly heightened POMS interest in the effectiveness of their oversight of POL, and POL’s
delivery as AR (and other service provision).

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Examples of recent issues

17. Over those last 18 months or so, several challenges have combined with that heightened
awareness to create good examples of the need for both parties to understand their
respective roles and responsibilities. These issues have generally been resolved
successfully, but in many cases, the escalations and time required to do so did not give
confidence that POMS was as effectively overseeing its AR or service provider as it would

wish.

18. These include:

a.

The first enhanced Fit and Proper checks took too long: The enhanced FCA regulations
regarding management and oversight of ARs were implemented by POMS last year
as part of a regulatory change programme that included new Consumer Duty rules.
The first attempt at the enhanced Fit and Proper checks of POL Executives and Board
members was frustratingly slow and took too long to complete. It was not helped by
significant changes to personnel, but this gave an impression of an apparent lack of
urgency or awareness of importance.

. Clarity of POL view on Cyber Risk: POMS is predominantly a digital business and

treats Cyber-attack as one if its top risks. It is regularly attacked, and as it has its
own IT environments has significantly strengthened its own firewalls, preventative
and detective software and its escalation and resolution processes. Last year, on
further review of potential vulnerabilities, POMS discovered some acknowledged
weaknesses within the POL estate, notably regarding Horizon and Belfast that had
not been shared with POMS, meaning POMS were operating outside its risk appetite.
It took too long to establish whether POLS view of cyber risk was consistent, was in
tolerance with its own appetite and whether POLs plan to mitigate certain
vulnerabilities offered sufficient comfort.

Understanding of importance of services provided: within service provision, POMS
contracts with POL to receive certain amounts of dedicated resources in various
functions, and over an extended period an unfortunate sequence of changes of
personnel in different departments combined with a sequence of minor events or poor
service provision led to a period of dissatisfaction with POLS service provision and
how effective POMS were at overseeing their delivery.

. IT controls and procedures: the more recent data access control incident in the NBIT

programme, and the speed of its escalation and notification, added a further layer of
discomfort that POL inherently has the controls in place to perform its duties to POMS
in a satisfactory manner.

. There is currently a recruitment process underway to identify a new chairman for

POMS. This has clear relevance to potential conflicts. On the one hand, the
appointment is a matter reserved to the owner POL and must be approved at POL
NomCo, but care must be taken that the AR of POMS is not having undue influence
on deciding the members of the principal’s board. As POL Nomco retains
appointments as a reserved matter, POL may have its own group reasons to advise
on candidates it will not approve, but the identification of suitable candidates and the
selection process leading to a recommendation for approval must be (and seen to be)
performed by the regulated entity independently from its AR, before recommendation
to NomCo. Notably, any appointments to FCA regulated subsidiary boards do NOT
required DBT/ultimate shareholder approval, unlike many other group director
appointments. I will provide a verbal update on the latest progress.

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19. This combination of several incidents and frustrations did create questions regarding the
level of understanding of the nuanced nature of the intercompany relationships and the
impact of wider decisions made by the group on the regulated business. Ultimately this has
led to this paper being presented at ARC.

20. A range of improvements have been made to improve the interfaces between POL and
POMS which means governance and oversight is now generally working well.

Oversight in practice and recent improvements

21. The Owner and AR interface is predominantly managed via governance arrangements:
each entity has its own independent board and audit committees and POMS has clear Terms
of References reflecting its own responsibilities and reserved matters. POMS has a suite
of policies and procedures - not withstanding it formally adopts POL ones whenever it can.

22. There are contractual agreements in place between POL and POMS regarding the AR
arrangement and service provisions. These have been recently reviewed and updated.

23. Whilst POL is not regulated, the CEO of POL is recorded as acting in a ‘controlled function’
by the FCA and carries the responsibility for POL as an AR. POMS has met with Nick to
update him on the AR and MSA obligations and the actions taken to oversee them.

24. One (Non-Independent) NED on POMS board (currently me) acts as a shareholder
representative. Notwithstanding the need to navigate my own potential conflicts as an
employee of the group and AR, portfolio director of all the financial services businesses
(including POMS and the other Principals) and director of POMS, this role should act as a
conduit between Group/subsidiary and principal/AR. I have recently agreed that I will meet
regularly with the senior NED outside formal meetings to ensure the board are aware of
any relevant POL activity, where appropriate and necessary.

25. The Senior NED of POMS (who is chair of POMS ARC) already meets regularly with the POL
ARC chair to enable sharing of risk, audit and compliance activities in the two entities and
POMS updates POL ARC via regular reporting.

26. Beyond these communication channels, we have a documented POMS policy regarding
management of conflicts between the entities. This includes recourse to legal advice for
POMS board members, and formal escalation routes via POMS shareholder director, or from
POMS chair to POL MD, etc)

27. The most recent round of fit and proper checks of POL directors and executives is
progressing significantly smoother than the first. All documentation has been received and
checks are underway. This is a material and welcome improvement.

28. Specifically, regarding execution of services provided within the MSA, we have identified a
role within POL (Finance Director for Commercial) to be a single point of contact for
monitoring and escalation, and this has already made a material difference to the ability
for POMS to effectively oversee POLS service performance.

29. There are changes to HR personnel underway, including the designated HR support to the
POMS board, but it has been pleasing with the early engagement of the need for that focus
and the identification of a suitably senior HR manager to take over from the incumbent.

30. The proactive approach to the change in HR personnel is good example of where POMS can
be reassured by evidence of the AR recognising its obligations to the regulated entity and
resolving issues promptly and with consultation. More examples of this level of
consideration as matters arise in the course of business over the coming months will also
be very welcome.

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Recent FCA letters

31. The FCA have recently written to POMS (and many other connected firms) referencing the
inquiry, and a reminder of the need for fit and proper personnel in both POMS and their AR.
They also have reminded firms of their obligations to share any material information that
might be of relevance to the FCA.

32. Both other principal firms have recently requested that POL inform them of anything they
might need to share with the FCA, and POMS requests the same.

33. We have documented material examples of possible information that principal firms would
want to be aware of to fulfil their disclosure obligations under the FCA Handbook
Supervisory Principle 11. These include:

a. POLas a legal entity is charged in respect of any criminal matter or is formally placed
under investigation.

b. Any Board Member of Member of Senior Management within POL are charged with a
criminal offence or are notified formally that they are under investigation.

c. POL becoming aware that any regulatory body has initiated an investigation or
disciplinary proceedings against any Director or Senior Manager. This should include
but not be limited to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), The Law Society of
Scotland (LSS), The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (CAEW)
and the Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland (ICAS).

Conclusion

34. The nature of an owner/regulated subsidiary/AR relationship is complex. Potential conflicts
must be borne in mind, and care taken to ensure entities (and their governing bodies and
management) are conscious of which capacity they are operating in when making decisions,
the obligations that come with those capacities and that other entities may be impacted or
considered during business matters.

35. POMS as a trading business is not generally operating at a high regulatory risk level. It is
financially strong, has implemented the consumer duty regulations seriously and
effectively, understands its risks and is governed well.

36. But the relationship with POL is a regulatory focus. It is an important arrangement and
more complex (as owner and AR and service provider) than many principal/AR relationships
and some aspects have required POMS management focus to improve.

37. A lot of good progress has been made. But with a focus on the new AR rules and the further.
heightened environment and interest generated by the inquiry, the FCA potentially has an
even higher interest in POMS and POL than normal.

38. POMS had considered writing to POL to remind them of the matters outlined in this paper,
and hopes that it, and the discussion at POL ARC, serves a useful purpose to ensure all
parties are aware of the unusual, and potentially complex inter-entity relationship, and the
need for POMS to be able to evidence effective oversight of its AR, notwithstanding its AR
being its parent.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT
Title: I SPM Assurance Update Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Author: I (ely Goodwin, Programme Sponsor: _I Chris Brocklesby, Group Transformation Officer

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to note the interim update, particularly:
« Work being undertaken to formalise the SPMP risk profile for current and future releases

1. Executive Summary

This paper is to provide the committee with details on the current status of work undertaken by SPMP.
since the last ARC update in February 2024 on identifying, assessing, and defining the key inherent risks
and profiles for current and future releases.

As the Committee is aware, the programme successfully deployed Release 2.0 to Aldwych in February

2024. As well as the functionality previously available on R1, a subset of Mails, Postage, Stamps and
Mails admin journeys were added.

The programme deployed 2.1 to Aldwych, and subsequently to St Johns in Leeds. The plan is now to
deploy Release 2.1 to Melville Road at the end of May 2024. By late summer SPMP plans to expand to
3 more DMBs and anticipate to 1 Non DMB by the end of 2024.

Since January 2024 the programme has been undertaking a number of key activities to ensure a great
foundation exists to understand the risk profiles associated with SPMP and how these translate to our
approach to releases:

e Draft Release / Deployment Strategy DMB vs Non DMBs
e Integrated Assurance & Risk Universe

¢ Mapping to past conformance requirements (WIP)
e IPA and Public Digital reports

Whilst we are not in a position to provide the ARC with a clear risk profile vs release, this paper identifies
the next steps and timelines needed to achieve this.

2. Risk profile for current and future releases

As part of the Programme Business Case draft submission in March 2024, the programme developed a
five-year technical roadmap overlaid by a deployment and release plan which provides clarity on the
branch types for NBIT rollout through to 2028. This identifies 3 distinct phases:

¢ Pilot with DMB’s

e Pilots including independent Postmaster branches / Strategic Partner branches
* Cutover branches to NBIT

In addition, over the last few months the programme has been preparing a deployment strategy which
considers the optimal path to roll out the new platform across the POL footprint of 11199 branches".

* Number as at end March 2024 including outreach and excluding Drop & Collect.

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Release / Deployment - Risk profile - WIP.

In alignment with the Group ERM policy we will be developing the risk appetite and tolerance for a number
of release / deployment scenarios, namely:

1) Pilot in Directly Managed Branches (DMB’s)

2) Pilot in Independent/ Non-Directly Managed Branches (Non DMB’s)
3) Full migration to Wave 1 (Simple local branches).

4) Full migration to all branches.

The 4 scenarios provide the optimal balance between operational, legal and regulatory risks as these
comprise risk to both the organisation and postmasters. We will be applying the following lens to our
deployment / release profile to ensure all material inherent risks will be robustly assessed, monitored
and tracked:

e Post Master Detriment, including platform integrity, is addressed as a part of the programme criteria

e Defects and backlog of defects are assessed at an individual and holistic aggregate level.

e Reputational Risk to the POL is considered.

« Hyper care/ Operational support processes and system are fit for purpose.

* Customer Experience is considered as part of the programme 'Go-Live’

e Ensure that system is operationally resilient to address legal and regulatory requirements and
security risk

Please refer to Appendix 1 which provides a draft visualisation of how we will summate the risk appetite and
tolerances.

Initial pilots to DMBs will have limited impact if any problems were encountered due to dual running
with Horizon. If any critical issues arise from NBIT, it can be switched off and colleagues will revert to
using Horizon. The DMB risk profile has been reviewed by CISO and confirmed as low

Once Risk Tolerances have been agreed, a robust oversight and monitoring arrangements will be in
place to ensure the deployments / releases continue to operate within risk thresholds. The governance
applied will be :

« SEG — Responsible for Oversight

« RCC —Responsible for objective oversight and challenge — Sign off on risk appetite / tolerance and
monitoring of exceptions.

« GESPM Subcommittee — Accountable for assessment, monitoring and reporting of risks, including
recommending risk exceptions and sign off's*

*Risk exceptions and sign off’s will be subject to a formalised process including opinion sought from:

e Stakeholders impacted — Business, Banking partner etc
e Formal opinions from second line of defence (Group Assurance)
e RCC Sign off.

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3. Next steps

As mentioned above, we recognise this still does not provide a view to ARC on our risk profile, and
therefore we have outlined below the key next steps and timelines we will be adhering to:

e Engage 3" party specialist support to facilitate a risk workshop, to bring all key inputs and
stakeholders to create the risk and appetite tables in Appendix 1 for the various release /
deployment scenarios — May 2024.

* Create and reach alignment within POL (program/business/stakeholders) on how the risk appetite
and tolerance are to be operationalised i.e. the definition of each risk statements clearly quantified
so that these can be then tracked and reported against by June 2024

« Embed clear risk exceptions and sign off's processes and procedures — June 2024

« Obtain RCC/ GE SPM Subcommittee approval for release / deployment risk appetite & tolerances
— June 2024

« Update ARC — July 2024

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Appendix —
Risk Appetite yo

DMB Pilot

Risk Tolerance <=>

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Category

Averse

Cautious

Neutral Flexible Open

Legal Regulatory

Platform Robustness
&integrit

—*k

———— >

PM Detriment

Issue Judgment conformance

——

Platform Security

Banking Framework

Post Office Reputational

Dual running

EC
t 0 wo,

Business Continuity

Cut over

Retail Readiness

ial

Non DMB (Independents) Pilot

Category

Averse

Cautious

Neutral Flexible Open

Legal Regulatory

Platform Robustness
&integrity

PM Detriment

Issue Judgment conformance

Piatform Security
Banking Framework

Post Office Reputational
Dual running

Business Continuity

Cut over

Retail Readiness

Ati

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AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Cyber Update Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Author: Neil Bennett, Chief Information Sponsor: Chris Brocklesby, Chief
‘ Security Officer P ‘ Transformation Officer

Input Sought: Noting
Executive Summary

e Our Cyber operations continue to be effective in the face of increasing Global threats with
no business impacting incidents in the reporting period

IRRELEVANT

e The two strategic cyber risks remain outside of tolerance. The underpinning intermediate
risks will be addressed through a combination of the Cyber Security Maturity Programme,
other Technology Portfolio Programmes, and BAU activity.

* The Cyber Security Maturity Programme is on track to present the business case to POL
Board in June

« A new CISO arrived on 18' March to lead the Cyber team, he will provide verbal
observations to the committee

Report

1. Our Cyber Operations continue to provide effective defence against attacks despite a
continued increase in the global threat.

2. Over the last month (March), our SOC successfully closes IRRELEVANT I This is higher
than normal due to additional monitoring that has been introduced on the AWS platform
and a need to tune that monitoring. This additional monitoring is related to the NBIT
production platform and is in direct response to a purple team exercise that was carried
out in February which identified the priority use cases to be monitored.

4. In February, we conducted two phishing exercises: a traditional password reset
simulation and a more complex holiday policy change exercise. The results in terms of
click through and reporting are shown below. The results indicate that our current

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NFL : >

A
A
Tl
rr
<
>
=<
—I

5. All users who fail the exercise
however, at the time of writing
have commenced with HR to agre
behaviours.

ess Factors,
Discussions

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IRRELEVANT

11.A new CISO joined the organisation on 18th March. Verbal observations will be provided
to the committee.

Financial Impact

12.The total Cyber investment required for the maturity programme is expected to be

Next Steps & Timelines

13.Present business case to for phase 1 to SEG 20th May
14.Present Business case to POL Board 4th June
15.IADG Draw down for phase 1 18th June

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024 I
Author: Neil Bennett, Chief Information Sponsor: Chris Brocklesby, Chief
‘ Security Officer P ‘ Transformation Officer

Input Sought: Noting

Executive Summary

‘IRRELEVANT

In response to the incident all impacted clients have been communicated with and a
number of reviews were commissioned to ensure that the root causes are identified and
truly understood and that remedial actions are implemented to ensure that the issue does
not occur again. The immediate reviews were a Post Incident Review (PIR), an internal
audit review of incident handling, and an independent external review of the changes
made to access permissions in response to the incident. A further internal audit review is
also underway with a wider remit but this will take longer to complete.

IRRELEVANT

A summary of the Internal Audit Review findings will be provided to ARC via a verbal
update from Johann Appel, and the independent review of the changes made to access
permissions is forecast to conclude on 9* May.

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At the time of writing this paper further communication to clients was being prepared to
appraise them of the PIR findings and resultant actions.

A further consideration that this incident prompts is the broader governance and
oversight of our IT Controls Framework. A separate review will be conducted to assess
this area.

The report contained in this paper is intended to provide the committee with a further
level of detail on the incident, the causes and actions taken in response. It should be
noted that whilst the cause of this specific incident has been remediated, until all actions
have been completed there is still a risk of a similar incident occurring.

Report
What happened

1.3

IRRELEVANT

2. Delays were experienced in the impact assessment of the incident by technical

teams and although detail of the incident was emailed to the Data Protection team,
proper process was not followed by technical support teams which resulted in
delays to the incident being formally logged and subsequent delays in an initial
assessment being performed from a Data Protection perspective.

rs)
r.)
m
-
<
>
zZ
=_I

What was the impact’

_IRRELEVANT _

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IRRELEVANT

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What is happening to ensure it doesn't happen again?

IRRELEVANT I

17. A summary of the Internal Audit Review findings will be provided to ARC via
a verbal update from Johann Appel, and the independent review of the changes
made is forecast to complete on 9% May.

18. The full set of actions can be found in Appendix I.

19. A further consideration that this incident prompts is the broader governance
and oversight of our IT Controls Framework. A separate review will be conducted to
assess this area.

Financial Impact
20. The financial impact of this incident is currently not quantified.

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Stakeholder Impl

IRRELEVANT

Next Steps & Timelines

24. The next steps are to proceed with the actions identified in each of the
reviews. The full set of actions from the PIR can be found in Appendix I.

25. Delivery against actions will be tracked and overseen at the Technology Sub-
Committee.

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NB: At the time of writing this report work was still underway to determine assignees and due date for some actions.

Appendix I

[Confidential]

Add SOC to the Service Now form, so the
. team are alerted once an incident is reported
PRBO0042209 - 1 I Process J elevated access requests to production is Clare Mapes Closed
requested
Create an automated response to emails
sent to the Data Protection Inbox and raise a
PRB0042209 - 2 I Process ticket via Service Now for all potential data Clare Hammond Closed
incident to prevent further issues being
delayed
Caoimhe
PRB0042209 - 3 I Process I RRE L EVAN T Clare Hammond McManus High 31-May-24 I Open
Assess whether to provide additional data Caoimhe
PRB0042209 - 4 I People protection training to all new/existing NBIT Clare Hammond McManus High 31-May-24 I Open
resources
I ' Paul Smith, Mark A
PRB0042209 - 5 I Process I Nash, Clare racine High 31-May-24 I Open
i Hammond
! Caoimhe
PRB0042209 - 6 I Process Hi l RR E L EVAN T I Clare Hammond McManus High 31-May-24 I Open
PRB0042209 - 7 I Process i ; Mike Braithwaite High Jun-24 I Open
Review and enhance the JML process for the 1 - -
PRB0042209 - 8 I Process programme Mike Braithwaite High Jun-24 I Open
7

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Review the JML process with Service
ppn042209 ~ I Process Operations before the process is rolled out Mike Braithwaite High Jun-24

into production
PRBO042209-9 I Process I Confirm Ifthe JM process is within the IT ike Braithwaite High Jun-24 I Open
#RB0042209- I Process Sophie Drury Aaron Saunders Open
re0042209 ~ I Process Mike Braithwaite High Jul-24 I Open
pnon2209 - I Process Mike Braithwaite High Jul-24 I Open
wpn0042209 ~ I Process I R R E L EV, iN N T Mike Braithwaite Urgent May-24 I Open
#RB0042209 “I Process Ben Owens Open
PRB0042209 - I Tools Ben Owens Open
paeanazone - I process Ben Owens Open

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pee mas I IRRELEVANT som oxen
PRB0042209 - Identify old and outstanding risks that are r i
17 Governance stored outside of Service Now Mike Braithwaite High May-24 I Open
PRBO0042209 - Review the risk / impact and assign a new r ‘i
18 Governance owner for all outstanding risks identified : Mike Braithwaite High Jun-24 I Open
rend2209 - Governance IRRELEVANT H Mike Braithwaite High Jun-24 I Open
PRBO0042209 - ‘Provide training on the management of riskS I yy Braithwai .
People (SPM Engineers / People on the programme) _ Mike Braithwaite High Jul-24 I Open
PRBO0042209 - Ensure better governance and management " 7 I
Pr] Governance of risk within the programme I Mike Braithwaite High Jul-24 I Open
PRB0042209 - Calculate our risks appetite against the Retail
22 Governance I Deployment plan for non-functional Mike Braithwaite Medium Jul-24 I Open
requirements
PRB0042209 - I process H Sophie Drury Open
PRBO0042209 - : i 31-May-
24 Process 1 IRRE LEVANT : Graham Bevan Jeff Burke Low 2024 Open
{
pe ee09 - Process H Graham Bevan Urgent Close

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Complete a mapping exercise between AIS
PRB0042209 - Process and the HLD to validate that we have created Graham Bevan Jeff Burke Low Closed
26 documentation to the right design

specification.
prB0042209 - People i I RRE L EVAN T Mike Braithwaite Urgent Apr-24 I Open

Create a BAU process for maintenance of the
PRB0042209- I Brocess _I data flow documentation (to ensure a single I Graham Bevan Jeff Burke Low 31-May- I Open
28 - 2024

source of truth is available at all times).
PRB0042209 - I process { ! Graham Bevan Richard N Cater I Low 31-May- Open
29 2024
BRB0042209 “I Process H I Graham Bevan High Closed
preood2209 “I Process Graham Bevan Low Closed
peno2209 - People i I Clare Hammond Medium Open
pR80042208 - Process i Graham Bevan Cliff Concious High Oct-24 I Open
ep a2208 . Process i Sophie Drury Urgent Jun-24 I Open

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pre d2208 ~ I Governance I! I R RE L EVAN T I Mike Braithwaite High Oct-24 I Open
‘GST Exterhal Verification thatthe Witial tx

£r°80042209- I Process _I activities are sufficient to prevent a Mike Braithwaite Urgent Apr-24 I Open
reoccurrence of this issue.

BR80042209 . Governance Mike Braithwaite Medium Oct-24 I Open

grn0042209 . Process Graham Bevan Richard N Cater High Ot Maye Open

PRB0042209 - I brocess Graham Bevan Richard N Cater I High O1-May- Open

38 2024

eee ~ I Process Rob Wilkins Medium Open

r0042209 . Process I R R E L EVA N T Clare Hammond Graham Bevan High Open

PRB0042209 - Governance Rob Wilkins High Open

80042209 . Process Rob Wilkins Medium Open

pRB0082209 . Process Rob Wilkins High Open
“Conduct a review between architectural

PRB0042209- I process _I design and what has actually put in place for I Ben Owens Open
NBIT

PRB0042209 - Create Low Level designs for new services

45 Process and architectural changes Ben Owens Open
Create an assurance process between

Fooenz209 . Process requirements, architectural design and Ben Owens Open
architectural delivery

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PRBO0042209 - Review the prioritisation of technical debt / i 7
Process remediation within the programme Mike Braithwaite High Apr-24 I Open

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Taskforce on Climate related
Title: Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024
ESG Journey.

Mark Cazaly - Head of Corporate
Responsibility.

Author: Martin Hopcroft - Director of Sponsor:
Health, Safety, Environment and
Business Continuity.

Kathryn Sherratt - Interim Chief
Finance Officer

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to note the approach to TCFD, with quarterly updates provided to
RCC.

Executive Summary

The UK Government has set requirements through the Companies (Strategic Report) (Climate-
related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022 that companies and limited liability partnerships
(LLPs) with more than 500 employees and a turnover of more than £500m must report a ‘Non-
Financial and Sustainability Information Statement’ (NFSIS) in line with the recommendations
of the TCFD. Companies and LLPs are encouraged to embrace the ‘spirit’ of the regulations, not
just the letter, by truly embedding climate-change considerations into all aspects of managing
a business.

Businesses within scope will be required to include disclosures on climate change-related risks
and opportunities, where these are material. The disclosures should cover how climate change
is addressed in corporate governance; the impacts on strategy; how climate-related risks and
opportunities are managed; and the performance measures and targets applied in managing
these issues. As a company with more than 500 employees and a turnover of more than £500m,
Post Office must report in line with these requirements for FY 2023/24 - this has been confirmed
by our auditors, PwC. Much of the content and processes for the report are already covered by
our overall risk management approach and we have recently added four climate-specific risks
to the risk register to expand our coverage in this area, along with appetite statements which
have been included in the latest risk paper for approval.

In order to provide a Non-Financial and Sustainability Information Statement, we will work with
our existing supplier, Inspired Plc, which already supports our Streamlined Energy and Carbon
Reporting (SECR) for our ARA.

This will require Board sign-off as part of our ARA and we must be able to highlight that the
appropriate governance is in place to show that climate risks and opportunities are being
considered by the Board - this will be done through the RCC quarterly and through the ARC
annually.

Report
Climate Action and Carbon Reduction

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1. With the legal requirement that all UK business are Net Zero by 2050, POL should begin
to set out a roadmap for achieving this goal, or even going further by implementing Net
Zero earlier. Many key partners and clients such as Royal Mail, Bank of Ireland, Amazon
and Tesco have already set Net Zero dates; WH Smith have even set a Scope 3 Net Zero
target for 2040 - this means a decarbonised supply chain, including Post Office. For many
of our financial services partners, they will also be captured by the FCA’s regulations
around climate reporting and as a supplier, will be expecting POL to provide them with
information to inform their own reporting - we are already seeing this with emissions data
with a number of banking clients requesting our emissions data — we can expect further
queries around our climate strategy as they build out the scrutiny of their supply chain.

2. There is a significant amount of work to do to put ourselves on a credible trajectory to
meet the 2050 deadline. Over 2024/25 we will build our capability and maturity on issues
around Net Zero beginning more formal work such as setting science-based targets.
Getting to Net Zero is likely to require significant investment in due course.

Carbon Reduction Plan

3. Weare building our capability around Net Zero by working with existing suppliers such as
OCS (FM Service Supplier) and Inspired Plc, and there are a number of significant actions
we can take to improve our environmental credentials;

* Reducing Water and Energy Usage across our estate, energy efficient technologies and
education to encourage responsible behaviour.

« Reducing Transport Emissions - clear roadmap to switch to a low carbon fleet,
commercial (red fleet) and company cars to EV (Electric vehicles).

* Business Travel — reduce impact of business travel by educating colleagues and sharing
trip CO2 emission data, encouraging responsible ‘method of travel’ choices.

e Facilities Management e.g. reduce waste and single use plastic.

4. Conclusion from Internal Audit (22/23) of Readiness to report TCFD from the 23/24 ARA.

a) POL has been reporting under Streamlined Energy & Carbon Reporting legislation, in

its Annual Reports & Account for the past three years. For the financial year 23/24,

there is a requirement to also report under the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures.

b

There are sufficient mitigations to assess, manage, and disclose ESG positions and
associated risks. However, the alignment of ESG goals, targets, and strategy with Post
Office strategy/priorities is work in progress.

c) We confirm that there is readiness for ESG reporting under the Taskforce on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures with sufficient planning in place to assess, manage, and
disclose ESG positions and associated risks. Whilst it is not mandatory to disclose
Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3 greenhouse emissions under the climate-related
Financial Disclosure regulations for UK, it is required under the SECR legislation, and
the data currently being reported is sufficient.

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Climate-Related Scenarios

5.

One of the Taskforce’s key recommended disclosures focuses on the resilience of an
organisation’s strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related scenarios,
including a 2° Celsius or lower scenario. An organisation’s disclosure of how its strategies
might change to address potential climate-related risks and opportunities is a key step to
better understanding the potential implications of climate change on the organisation. The
Taskforce recognises the use of scenarios in assessing climate-related issues and their
potential financial implications is relatively recent and practices will evolve over time, but
believes such analysis is important for improving the disclosure of decision-useful, climate-
related financial information.

Post Office will need to undertake an analysis of how different climate change scenarios
will impact the business and the mitigations the business will need to implement. This will
require the support from an external third party.

TCFD recommendations and UK government implementation

7.

Recognising that climate-related financial reporting is still evolving, the Taskforce’s
recommendations provide a foundation to improve stakeholder’s ability to appropriately
assess and price climate-related risk and opportunities. The Taskforce’s recommendations
aim to be ambitious, but also practical for near-term adoption. The Taskforce expects to
advance the quality of mainstream financial disclosures related to the potential effects of
climate change on organisations today and in the future and to increase shareholder
engagement with boards and senior management on climate-related issues.

Improving the quality of climate-related financial disclosures begins with organisations’
willingness to adopt the Taskforce’s recommendations. Those organisations in early
stages of evaluating the impact of climate change on their businesses and strategies can
begin by disclosing climate-related issues as they relate to governance, strategy, and risk
management practices. The Taskforce recognises the challenges associated with
measuring the impact of climate change, but believes that by moving climate-related
issues into mainstream annual financial filings, practices and techniques will evolve more
rapidly.

The UK government's implementation of the TCFD recommendations means that
companies and LLPs are both required to disclose the following information:
(a) a description of the governance arrangements of the company or LLP in relation to
assessing and managing climate-related risks and opportunities;

(b) a description of how the company or LLP identifies, assesses, and manages climate
related risks and opportunities;

(c) a description of how processes for identifying, assessing, and managing climate-
related risks are integrated into the overall risk management process in the company or
LLP;

(d) a description of—

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(i) the principal climate-related risks and opportunities arising in connection with the
operations of the company or LLP, and
(ii) the time periods by reference to which those risks and opportunities are assessed;

(e) a description of the actual and potential impacts of the principal climate-related risks
and opportunities on the business model and strategy of the company or LLP;

(f) an analysis of the resilience of the business model and strategy of the company or
LLP, taking into consideration of different climate-related scenarios;

(g) a description of the targets used by the company or LLPs to manage climate-related
risks and to realise climate-related opportunities and of performance against those
targets; and

(h) the key performance indicators used to assess progress against targets used to
manage climate-related risks and realise climate-related opportunities and a description
of the calculations on which those key performance indicators are based.

10. POL will be required to report in line with the points above in the Non-Financial and

Sustainability Information Statement.

Considerations and Next Steps

Service 1. TCFD Compliance Statement 2023/24

11.

The TCFD Compliance Statement disclosure service provided by Inspired Plc is a
compilation of information required to align with the TCFD framework of eleven
disclosures, each representing an element of governance, risk management, strategy, and
metrics and targets within POL. Inspired will produce a comprehensive compliance
statement, detailing efforts undertaken by POL through the reporting year, and actions
identified to be completed in future reporting years to ensure full compliance with its
government reporting requirements. This compliance statement will cover the four key
themes of the disclosure: Governance, Strategy, Risk Management and Metrics and
Targets. (See Appendix A).

Service 2. TCFD Workstreams 1 - 8. 2024/25

12.

Climate - Related Governance

Stakeholders are interested in understanding the Board's role in overseeing climate-
related issues and how management is assessing and managing those issues. Inspired
Plc’s services will build capacity with the Board to enable them to consider climate-related
issues better when reviewing the business strategy and operations. The services will
support the development of practical management processes to monitor and report on
climate-related matters. The climate-related governance deliverables include: Board of
Directors capacity building session. Project updates for Board, Committee and SteerCo
packs and attend some meetings, if required.

Climate Scenario Modelling and Risk Management Framework

13. Climate scenario analysis is a tool that can inform POL’s strategy and financial planning.

Scenarios are hypothetical constructs that provide a way for organisations to consider how
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the future might look if specific trends continue or certain conditions are met. The tool will
enable POL to evaluate its operational resilience to climate change utilising three warming
pathways over three ‘time horizons’. All risks and opportunities are considered in relation
to the appropriate sector and/or geography. The analysis is delivered to key stakeholders
in the climate risk and opportunity workshop.

Climate Risk and Opportunity Workshops

14. The analysis from the scenario modelling and risk assessment is delivered to key
stakeholders in the climate risk and opportunity workshop. The two-hour interactive
workshop is an essential step in building a comprehensive climate risk and opportunity
register. The climate scenario modelling and risk management framework deliverables
include climate risk and opportunity workshop materials. It is recommended that the
Board participate in this session.

GHG Emissions Workstreams

* Scope 1 and 2 emissions calculations.

e SECR Compliance - Carbon consumption and emissions report and efficiency
implementations and methodology.

* Carbon Balance Sheet - POL’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions metrics and targets.
Metrics and Targets are used to assess the organisation's climate-related governance,
progress against strategic objectives, and management of climate-related issues.

* Net Zero Strategy Emissions Modelling and Net Zero Strategy Report.

e Net Zero Workshop and materials.

TCFD Deliverables

« Fully branded TCFD Report to communicate to stakeholders how POL is responding to
climate-related risks and opportunities.

e Fully branded TCFD Index to provide a simple overview of progress.

e TCFD Annual Report Disclosure ensuring POL complies with its government and FRC
reporting requirements.

Financial Impact

15. Costs of the reporting. £60k + VAT / annum. 23/24 Statement and Q1 report have been
covered under the current OCS contract. Q2 - Q4 (24/25) contract to be procured and
funding identified. Inspired PLC have provided us with a cost proposal and ESG framework.

Risk Assessment, Mitigations & Legal Implications

16. We are obliged to publish annual SECR and TCFD reports in our Annual Report and
Accounts. In order to be compliant we must evidence Board oversight, governance and
strategy, risk assessment and targets and metrics. Failure to do this would leave us in
breach of the TCFD Regs 2022 from 24/25.

Stakeholder Implications

17. Internal - resource will be required from existing colleagues, primarily through the
Environment and Sustainability Support Group including H&S and Environment, Property,

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Fleet, Supply Chain, Procurement, Business Continuity, Corporate Affairs, Strategy and
Transformation and Contract Managers

18. External - this will help us satisfy regulatory reporting requirements and provide comfort
to key clients around our approach to climate risk.

Appendix

Further background on TCFD requirements

Climate change affects all entities to a greater or lesser extent and presents both risks and
opportunities to businesses. Climate-related reporting focusses on the way in which climate-
related risks and opportunities are identified, assessed, managed, and reviewed. Reporting on
climate-related matters needs to be proportionate to the way in which each business is affected
— one size does not fit all.

In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority and UK Government have set us on a path to
mandatory reporting. The UK Government is making TCFD-aligned disclosure mandatory for
over, 1,300 of the largest UK-registered companies and financial institutions; making it the first
G20 country to do so. The objective of the regulations The Companies (Strategic Report)
(Climate-related Financial Disclosure) Regulations 2022 have been introduced in the UK to help
support informed investor decisions as the UK progresses towards a low-carbon economy. The
regulations state that Companies and LLPs with more than 500 employees and a turnover of
more than £500m must report in line with the recommendations of the TCFD. Companies and
LLPs are encouraged to embrace the ‘spirit’ of the regulations, not just the letter, by truly
embedding climate-change considerations into all aspects of managing a business. Companies
and LLPs within scope will be required to include disclosures on climate change-related risks
and opportunities, where these are material. The disclosures should cover how climate change
is addressed in corporate governance; the impacts on strategy; how climate-related risks and
opportunities are managed; and the performance measures and targets applied in managing
these issues. (See Appendix). Given Post Office’ position as an arms-length body, POL is in
scope for reporting in line with these requirements.

A comprehensive TCFD report enables Post Office to clearly demonstrate to its stakeholders,
including UKGI, that it is taking the issue of climate change seriously. The workstreams that
support the annual preparation of the TCFD report will help Post Office develop the necessary
internal processes and streamline its reporting requirements. Apart from the government
compliance requirement, a TCFD report is an excellent way of communicating with stakeholders
at a time when society is seeking more sustainable operating solutions. The disclosure will help
establish that POL is a robust asset for the government.

POL has worked with Inspired PLC for mandatory compliance solutions for SECR (Streamlined
and Carbon Reporting Scheme) since inception in 2019. They will support Post Office to
produce an effective and impactful annual Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure
(TCFD) Statement for the 23/24 Annual Report and Accounts and subsequent TCFD quarterly
reports for RCC and ARC, commencing Qi 24/25.

ESG is a journey and the disclosures evolve over time as the company develops its ESG strategy
and competency. Whilst Inspired PLC are contracted via the FM service supplier, OCS, to
produce the initial TCFD statement for 23/24 and the Q1 (24/25) Report, POL are seeking to
engage a single partner that can provide all of the services and in addition, provide strong

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support on delivering an actionable transition plan to net zero. Commencing Q1, Inspired PLC
will work with stakeholders to assess Post Office’s entire value chain against the TCFD disclosure
recommendations. The identified gaps and areas of development will inform the workstreams'
next steps. Inspired PLC will also provide workshops with key stakeholders to build climate-
related capacity within Post Office e.g. climate-risk and opportunity workshop. Inspired PLC’s
‘delivery’ aims to build ESG knowledge from a data perspective and work with Post Office to
improve data collection and quality. They will produce a ‘compliance statement’ for the
purposes of compliance with the government’s Climate-Related Financial Disclosure
requirements, detailing efforts undertaken and planned for the future for mitigation of Post
Office’s ecological footprint. Inspired PLC will also continue the production of a full Streamlined
Energy and Carbon Reporting disclosure for Post Office, detailing annual operational emissions
for the reporting year. This disclosure will also support the compliance statement narrative
within the theme of Metrics and Targets. (See Report and Appendix for TCFD Framework).

SEG Sponsorship for Post Office ESG is shared between the CFO and Corporate Affairs Director.
The Director of H&S, Env and Business Continuity has responsibility for the Environmental and
Sustainability Policies and is supported by stakeholders who are members of an Environmental
and Sustainability Working Group (ESSG - Heads of CSR, Property, Fleet, Supply Chain, Risk,
Business Continuity, Procurement and Strategy and Transformation). This group ensures data
is supplied to our supplier, Inspired PLC, who undertakes data validation and produces
compliant reports for the ARA. The group will work closely with Inspired PLC to undertake a
climate scenario modelling and analysis during 24/25 to help identify risks and impacts on
financial disclosures. Quarterly reports will be produced for RCC and ARC to review risk and
impact, and Board will be sighted to ensure climate risk and opportunities are considered in
strategic thinking and planning.

An overview of the TCFD 11 recommendations
The TCFD suggest 11 recommendations to be included within a company’s main financial reporting.

Strategy Risk management
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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Banking Deep Dive Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024

Author: Ross Borkett Sponsor: Owen Woodley

Input Sought: Noting

ARC has requested a bi-annual deep dive into Banking and the Committee is asked to note
the contents of the report.

Executive Summary

This paper provides a deep dive into specific banking risks for consideration and noting by the
Committee, covering:

e Access to Cash legislation
e Banking Framework 4

i Money Laundering

Access to Cash legislation has now passed through parliament and into law. The FCA has
consulted with the industry and the new rules will be published in July 2024 and be live by
September 2024. This brings new obligations on the banks to provide access and new
information gathering powers over the Post Office for the services we offer.

We are in the middle of BF4 negotiations with the banks to secure a continuation of.

Negotiations will continue through the coming months.

Money laundering remains a significant risk for the business —- the National Economic Crime
Centre believe we are still being targeted by criminals. Deposit limits have now been
implemented and improved controls at the banks are believed to be creating more “friction”
to deter criminals, but it remains an ongoing challenge to manage and mitigate in partnership
with the banks.

In the last year the banking service has_exnerienced disruption through the
underperformance of a supplier called: !RRELEVANT; These outages are causing issues for
stomers and the banks and
sae, Senior IT leaders are engaged in escalations but our leverage to resolve these issues is
‘poor. Further fixes are being implemented in the coming months to reduce the impact of
further outages.

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Report
Access to Cash Legislation

1. Access to Cash legislation was part of the Financial Services and Markets bill that passed
into law last year. The FCA consulted on new regulations in January 2024 and are expected
to publish the new rules in July 2024, with implementation by September 2024.

2. The legislation places obligations on the largest financial institutions to provide access to
withdrawal and deposit services, with the FCA gaining new powers to regulate for this.
This will be set out as a minimum geographical access criterion, similar to the access
criteria Post Office has with UKGI, for cash withdrawal and deposit services, with Great
Britain and Northern Ireland being treated separately recognising the different banking
environment across those regions. The consultation on the new rules suggested that banks
are expected to assess local needs for cash, for example if there is a need for an assisted
service or extended hours. They are not defining a single, nationwide standard to be met.
This allows banks to adapt the provision over time as cash declines.

3. HMT are expected to announce which firms are “designated” in June 2024. This will
certainly include the largest financial institutions but may stretch into some of the medium
sized and regional banks too, including those in Northern Ireland. It is unclear if
Nationwide will be caught or not.

4. LINK will be regulated by the FCA for this too in their role as the coordinator for cash
solutions (deciding if a community needs a banking hub or deposit solution).

5. Cash Access UK (the banks’ delivery company) believe they will escape direct regulation.

6. The FCA will gain information gathering powers over the Post Office. They have shared
their initial requirements with us, and we are reviewing these internally. We have recruited
a new role, Head of Access to Cash, who’s priority is to coordinate our response to these
information gathering requests. This will provide the FCA and industry with much more
visibility of changes to our network (closures, openings, etc).

7. Some banks have not responded well to the FCA consultation. They believe that the FCA
have over-regulated compared to the original Treasury policy statement. They believe the
FCA’s approach will create a greater demand for interventions to provide access to cash
and are threatening the FCA with further bank closures to cover the cost. We don’t
anticipate the FCA to change their rules materially from the consultation.

Banking Framework 4

8. Ourcurrent agreement with the banks, Banking Framework 3, ¢
We commenced negotiations with the banks in
final offer to the banks in ;

ind aimed to present our

to agreement, these negotiations are expected to continue through to

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final POL Board governance sign off in im
sign up to the deal.

_IRRELEVANT.

12. There ______ IRRELEVANT

IRRELEVANT
alternati
assumed

I On the first of these, we should expect the industry to test

13.

Deposit Limits and Money Laundering

14. The FCA have put significant pressure on financial institutions to strengthen their money
laundering controls to combat growing concern over financial crime. This follows some
banks being fined significant financial penalties over the last 2 years for previous failings.

15. With bank branch networks continuing to be rationalised, there is a greater reliance on
the Post Office network for cash deposits. Over the last year we have performed over £2bn
in cash deposits every month, supporting personal and business customers with their cash
needs. In this role we are underpinning the cash system and are aligned to the
Government's aims to protect access to cash.

16. However, there are concerns that with such a heavy reliance on our network for deposits,
and with Postmasters having less information available at the counter than in a bank
branch, that criminals are targeting our network. The National Economic Crime Centre still
believe that criminals are laundering hundreds of millions through the Post Office network
annually.

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18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

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In response to this, the FCA has put pressure on banks to implement deposit limits on
transactions through our network. This has resulted in banks implementing various limits
over the last 2 years to attempt to reduce the impact.

These limits have acted as a blunt instrument and have had an impact on legitimate
customers trying to deposit. We have made numerous interventions and escalations over
the last 2 years to get the balance right between access to cash and reducing money
laundering. This has achieved some changes to limits and a more sensible approach from
those who implemented later. The FCA has closely reviewed the impact and generally
believes the banks have achieved the right balance but encourages them to continue to
review them over time. All banks have now implemented limits and there are no
expectations they will be removed.

Our view remains that these limits will not have a significant impact in reducing financial
crime as criminals will simply use multiple accounts to deposit, making it harder to detect.
Evidence from the last year suggests this is the case. However, the FCA are representing
the significant implementation of limits as a successful intervention and intend to close
this programme of activity - moving back to BAU interactions with us on AML. Their next
focus will be on deposits through the PayPoint network.

There is a reluctant acceptance of these limits by Postmasters and customers. It remains
a topic that is raised when visiting with Postmasters but is no longer something we receive
proactive complaints about. We have made efforts to improve the customer experience
through the inclusion of limits on Horizon Help, and the introduction of a receipt message
detailing how much a customer has left of their limit (only a subset of banks has
implemented this to date). Both interventions have been received positively.

The industry continues to face challenges over money laundering and until greater
coordination between banks it is hard to see material improvements. This includes the
need for easier information sharing between banks to identify customers who are using
multiple accounts, improved monitoring, detection, and looking at customer account
behaviour (for example, looking at where customers deposit and immediately move the
money out of the account). The Home Office is imminently announcing some changes that
may aid information sharing.

We will continue to collaborate with the industry in mitigating this issue as our role in
deposits continues to grow. This could, for example, include further checking of ID as part
of the transaction.

Worldline Service Issues — Risk 0022230

23.

Since April 2022 there have been a number of incidents connected to the banking services
infrastructure where the Worldline interface has been subject to an outage / issue. The
main focus of the risk are instances associated with the processing of bank customers
whereby withdrawals / deposits have been declined on Horizon, however the debits and
or credits have reached the customers bank accounts - e.g. withdrawals have been

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25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

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declined, the customer has not been given the money but their account has been debited
/ deposits have been declined, the customer has not handed over the funds but their
account has been credited. It is not a Horizon issue.

These failures result in differences in the settlement files whereby the Post Office has to
pay banks funds to recredit their customers’ accounts and work with banks to attempt to
recall finds deposited in error in their customers’ accounts. All losses sit at POL level, there
is no impact on Postmasters accounts. The impact on the banks under Banking Framework
is they have to manually work all erroneous transactions, contacting all impacted
customers therefore taking up time and resource within the banks. This also impacts
customers and could have real impact on their ability to manage their finances, miss key
financial commitments and lead to distress and potentially financial hardship particularly
concerning withdrawals. These issues lead to poor customer outcomes.

Since May 2023 these instances have significantly increased, 12 instances of outages with
7 different root causes. 3 of these instances led to significant volumes for banks to correct,
May 2023 - 1,053, November - 733 and February 2024 - 539. To date £89.4k has been
written off and £41k has been provisioned for the latest February incident.

A number of fixes have been deployed by Worldline to address the failures in the system
with 3 further fixes in the process of being tested / built and scheduled for deployment.
This includes a service from Vocalink that should reduce the amount of manual work
needed by banks and establish an auto reversal mechanism. The cost of this to POL is
circa £356,000.

The issues have been escalated within POL and several conversations have taken place
with senior executives within Fujitsu and Worldline. This is complicated as Worldline are a
subcontractor of Fujitsu, therefore POL does not have a direct contractual relationship with
Worldline. POL also faces the challenge that the volumes of transactions impacted are
very low from a Worldline / banking transactions perspective and only classed at low level
incidents. They do not take account of the customer / POL reputational risks / impact.

As well as the financial risk, banks are now asking for contributions to the distress and
inconvenience payments they are making to their customers (£50 for withdrawals), it is
having a significant reputational risk between POL and the Banking Framework
participants. The major banks have escalated this internally and we are seeing these
concerns play out in Banking Framework 4 negotiations. Most banks have little, or no
confidence POL is able to provide a sufficiently robust banking services platform.

Next year there may be an opportunity to move the Worldline contract to a direct
agreement with POL. Senior IT leadership are engaged in escalations, but we remain at
risk until these latest fixes are implemented.

PWC Audit of the Banking Framework

30.

In 2022 5 institutions in the Banking Framework exercised their right under Clause 15 of
the Banking Framework agreement to appoint an external auditor to perform an assurance
audit of Post Office’s compliance with Banking Framework 2.3. Banks could not agree who
(amongst them) should lead, and PWC stated that they would not work with a ‘group of
banks’ therefore we were asked, and we agreed, to be the lead organisation, giving us the
opportunity to review any output before any banks. PWC were appointed to undertake
this work, and started the audit on the 1%t August with the final report delivered March
2023.

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the completion of them in their risk committees and require POL to provide evidence,
including senior business owner sign off, the actions have been successfully delivered by

33. I

Stakeholder Implications

. IRRELEVANT

35. Access to Cash regulations will require Post Office to provide far greater insight of our
network to the industry, including accurate opening hours, accessibility features, and
details of any temporary and permanent closures. This will require us to improve the
robustness and integrity of our data. This is an activity we are progressing with the
relevant data teams.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

ets Procurement Risk & Compliance , .
Title: Report Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Author: Lian Carroll - Procurement Director I Sponsor: Kathryn Sherratt, Interim Group
Chief Finance Officer

Input Sought: Noting

The Committee is asked to review the report, noting the Procurement Risk Exceptions submitted
to the Post Office Strategic Executive Group or Board since March 2024. A visual breakdown of
all Open incidents as of 1 May 2024 is available in Appendix A.

Executive Summary

Since the last ARC report in March 2024 there have been no Procurement Risk Exceptions
submitted to the Strategic Executive Group or Board for approval. All existing risks as detailed
in agreed with Board. Our overall non-compliance value has
SREL This is due to bringing the contract with CACI into compliance
via POL's software reseller contract with SCC.

There are a number of issues with the data quality of contracts held in the Web3 system
which may lead to the discovery of further non-compliance.

Report

Across the Group Post Offices operates a decentralised contract management model whereby
individuals across the business are responsible for managing relationships between Post Office,
vendors, and the respective contracts. This model was approved at ARC in September 2020
being considered more cost efficient and less disruptive than creating a centralised contract
management team.

In 2021 a previous report to RCC and ARC highlighted the continuing issues with the adoption
and embedding of the management of contracts across the business. Several improvements in
training and reporting were implemented including the establishment of a centralised contract.
admin centre for revenue contracts. Despite the previous work undertaken to address the
aspects highlighted in 2021 we are still seeing significant compliance issues in the adoption of
the Contract Management Framework for cost contracts.

As a proxy measure for contract management failure we are monitoring the use of Regs 72,

contract modifications and Reg 32 direct awards and as can be seen in the graph below there
were 22 in FY 2023 and 3 so far in FY 2024.

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Post Office Limited - Document Classification: “€&®

To ensure compliance and mitigate the risks associated with poor contract management
including data integrity and the challenges of embedding the Contract Management Framework
in the business SEG is now looking at organisational design options together with changes in
the approach to contract management across the group.

Next Steps

Recommendations on how to address and resolve the issues highlighted in the report above
should be agreed by SEG before being taken to ARC for discussion and approval.

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Post Office Lim Document Cla:

ition “@&

Payment Services - Board approved a direct award in November 2022. Zunoma (previously
Smith & Ouzman), have been operating as POL’s security print provider since the
commencement of Payouts in 2006. The original contract was created in June 2018 and
backdated to 2015. The contract expired in July 2019. The Energy Payouts were put through
the Zunoma contract as this was seen by the Business as a continuation of a BAU service. The
direct award of the contract to Zunoma is non-compliant with the Public Contract Regulations.
It is Procurement’s view that we are unlikely to receive a challenge to this direct award.

HSF - In June 2019, a Non-PCR Compliant Direct Award was made to HSF to advise POL on

The Board did however consider PCR 2015
compliance in 2021 when a decision to appoint HSF as POL’s legal representative at the Inquiry
was made via a further Non-PCR Compliant Direct Award. With respect to the Inquiry, Group
General Counsel set out the following options to Board in 2021:

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

a Postmaster Support Policies — ; . st
Title: Annual Review Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024
Author(s): Jo Milton, Senior Process Sponsor: Martin Roberts, Group Chief
* I Improvement Manager Ps ‘ Retail Officer

Input Sought: Approval

The Committee is asked to approve three updated postmaster support policies to be effective
from the date of approval:

« Postmaster Complaint Handling
« Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance Support Policy
« Network Cash and Stock Management Policy

Executive Summary

Following the Group Litigation Order (GLO), Post Office created a suite of postmaster support
policies, all of which were initially approved by ARC in 2021 and have been in use since.

The purposes of these internal policies are to provide guidance, set down principles and
highlight risk areas, while also ensuring that Post Office can support postmasters effectively
and compliantly with the GLO.

In March 2022, ARC agreed that annual reviews should continue to take place, on a phased
basis.

The policies submitted here were last approved at ARC in December 2022 (Complaint Handling
and Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance) and January 2023 (Network Cash and Stock
Management).

Report
Policy Assurance Review Work

1. Specific feedback from the internal policy assurance reviews completed by the Group
Assurance team have been incorporated, where applicable, into these policies. The
Assurance review highlighted a number of actions, and a brief summary of progress
against these actions is included under each policy heading below.

2. In addition, a review of risks and controls within our suite of Postmaster policies has been

completed for these three policies, following guidance from Group Assurance. The rest will
be completed by the end of July.

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Overview of changes made

3. General updates have been made to the policies, since the last approval:

a) Risks and Policy Required Operational Standards have been updated and reflect those
managed and monitored on ServiceNow for consistency.

b) Policy owners have been updated following a decision for all policies to be owned by
the Retail Engagement Director, on behalf of Retail.

c) Wording has been updated to reflect what happens if a risk sits outside the agreed
Risk Appetite/Risk Tolerance level (this has been agreed with the Head of Risk).

d) Contact details for the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters have been added.

e) Name of the Postmaster Decision Review policy changed to Postmaster Contract
Termination Decision Review policy.

4. A list of more specific and minor updates in each policy are set out in Appendix 7, but the
main changes are summarised below:

Postmaster Complaint Handling

a) Inclusion of the Postmaster Experience Forum which is the forum that collates
postmaster complaint causes with other postmaster insights and reviews them in a
cross functional meeting, which includes postmaster representation.

b) Addition of the service levels Post Office aim to address complaints within.

c) Clarity around how Executive complaints are dealt with.

d) Removal of a section referring to the Investigations Policy as this is being rewritten.

e) Amendment to the process for the closure of a complaint, putting focus on a
postmaster’s option to dispute.

Related Postmaster Complaint Handling policy assurance actions
Six actions were identified by Group Assurance.
Of these, three are closed:

e Reintroduce the Voice of the Postmaster Forum (which was done by introducing the
Postmaster Experience Forum)

e Reintroduce meetings between the Issue Resolution and Speak Up Managers (this
is now used to Quality Assure decisions relating to Speak Up characteristics)

e Introduce tracking of service level data

The other three are complete and evidenced by the policy, which is being reviewed by
Group Assurance:

¢ Redraft risks
e Redraft Controls
¢ Introduce the Service Levels into the policy

Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance Support

a) Significant change to a branch visit. Previously, a contract advisor would be
contacted for any discrepancies found over £2000 (Local model/SPSO) or over
£5000 (Main model). Following approval at Retail Committee on 9" April, a contract

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advisor will now only be contacted if there is an admittance of theft or misuse of Post
Office funds.

b) Minor wording changes and additional sentences to support new ways of working:

e Made it clear that currently visits will not take place if the postmaster hasn’t
been informed and removed reference to “unannounced visits”.

e Removal of Post Office contractual rights regarding losses, as this is not relevant
to the role of Branch Assurance.

e Clarity around what happens when a discrepancy is found, and the support
signposted to the postmaster (Branch Support Centre and NFSP)

e Mention of the new Quality Assurance process by Assurance and Complex
Investigations.

« Mention of the new Postmaster Feedback method.

e Mention of the weekly stakeholder meeting.

c) Removal of a control to ensure known errors are checked before each visit, as this is
no longer relevant to the branch assurance role, which is simply to count the cash
and stock.

d) Removal of non-suspension monitoring section.

Related Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance Support policy assurance
actions

Five actions were identified by Group Assurance.
One is closed:
e Branch Assurance Quality Assurance relaunch

Two are complete and evidenced by the policy, which is being reviewed by Group
Assurance:

¢ Redraft risks
¢ Redraft Controls

It has been agreed with Group Assurance that the final two actions are not able to be
evidenced directly by the policy but relate to discrete pieces of work:

« Introduce end-to-end view of the network through MI (a revised dashboard to
replace the Retail Performance Dashboard is currently being created)

e Introduce clear KPIs to capture both quantitative and qualitative impact of activities
undertaken (a ist line Policy Assurance framework and schedule is planned to be
implemented, by the end of Q2)

Network Cash and Stock Management

a) Addition of a specific Foreign Currency discrepancy procedure for clarity.

b) Amendments relating to stock ordering being managed by the Inventory Support
Centre instead of the Branch Support Centre.

c) Addition of a paragraph on expectations around excess stock (anything over 12
weeks).

d) Removal of dispute escalation to the Decision Review Panel. The reason for this is
that in three years no discrepancy has required escalation. The panel now only hears

3

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Contract Termination challenges, but as Post Office develops a loss recovery
process, a new forum will need to be created to hear escalated discrepancy cases.
e) New section on external assurance (ISO9001 and PwC)

Related Network Cash and Stock Management policy assurance actions

Two actions, both relating to policy controls, were identified by Group Assurance. They
are both complete and evidenced by the policy, which is being reviewed by Group
Assurance:

« Redraft Controls
e¢ Implement control standards for the return of excess cash

How are the policies working in practice?

5. In March, ARC suggested that it would be useful, in future policy papers, to briefly describe
how we know the policies are working and what our colleagues think about the application
of the policy.

6. The Retail Performance Dashboard tracks metrics relating to each of the policy areas and
allows the Retail Committee and SEG on a monthly basis, and Board on a quarterly basis,
to identify any areas of concern. Specific to these policies it shows the number of
complaints received from postmasters, and the main reasons for those complaints, the
number of discrepancies found in cash pouches and the volume of activity carried out by
the Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance teams.

Group Assurance have provided feedback on how the dashboard can be improved to
provide more evidence of how the policies are working in practice, and this is in progress.

7. Seeking feedback from postmasters for each policy area is important to us, and for these
policies we know that:

a) 93% of postmasters (for FY 23/24), agreed or strongly agreed that they were
satisfied with the knowledge and expertise of the advisor they spoke to in the cash
management contact centre.

b) 1849 (for FY 23/24) postmaster complaints were dealt with by the Issue Resolution
team, and escalation requests were received for only 3% of cases. Complaints are
included in postmaster insights that are discussed and addressed at the Postmaster
Experience Forum.

Postmaster feedback is an area we are going to be working more on in the next few
months — for example, the Branch Assurance team have created a letter to leave with
postmasters following a Branch Assurance visit to request feedback, via a QR code.

8. For these policies we’ve reached out to a selection of colleagues and 100% of them are
aware of the policies and know where to find them. We’ve received some positive
comments on how important the policy is to colleagues’ roles, how the policies are up to
date and give clear guidance, the usefulness of the procedures, information and reporting
links and how they ensure that colleagues follow the principles.

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9. The National Federation of Sub-Postmasters have been consulted and are satisfied with
the changes made to these policies.

10. Please see Appendices 1 to 7 showing marked up versions of each policy, clean updated
versions and a more detailed summary of all changes made.

Next Steps & Timelines
11. Work will continue on the completion of the two outstanding actions.
12. Following approval of the policies, Post Office will ensure that:
e All relevant teams and stakeholders are fully trained on the updates to the policies by
the end of June 2024.
e The updated policies will be made available on the Post Office Intranet site.

13. The following policies are planned for June RCC and July ARC:

* Postmaster Account Support
* Postmaster Accounting Dispute Resolution

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All appendices are available in the Diligent Reading Room

Postmaster Complaint Handling Policy V3.0 Marked up

Postmaster Complaint Handling Policy V3.3 PDF

Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance Support Policy V3.0 Marked up
Network Monitoring and Branch Assurance Support Policy V3.3 PDF
Network Cash and Stock Management Policy V3.0 Marked up

Network Cash and Stock Management Policy V3.2 PDF

Postmaster Policy Review Changes

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

tle: Policy Update Meeting Date: I 21% May 2023
Jonathan Hill Group
Author: Reena Chohan, Policy Sponsor: Compliance Director / Ben

Compliance Manager Foat, Group General Counsel

Input Sought: Approval
The Committee is asked to review and approve the following updated policy for the business
to take forward:

i. Cyber and Information Security Policy;
ii. Business Continuity Management Policy;
iii. Speak Up Policy and

iv. Employee Vetting Requirements Policy

Previous Governance Oversight
Risk & Compliance Committee (RCC) 7 May 2024

Executive Summary
This paper provides a summary of changes that have been made to the policies below as part
of their annual review process for the ARC to consider.

Questions addressed

1. I Which policies were updated in this annual cycle review?

2. What updates were included and why?

3. What is Compliance’s assurance view of the status / Minimum Controls Standards for
each policy?

Which Group policies were updated in this annual cycle review?

In this review cycle the following group policies were revised, reviewed and updated as per the
annual review process.

Policy Last Reviewed Updates GE Sponsor Governance
‘Approval Body

ICyber and Information Security March 2023 Minor updates this Group Chief RCC/ARC

Policy annual review Information Officer

(Business Continuity Management [May 2023 Minor updates this [Interim Group Chief [RCC/ARC

Policy annual review Finance Officer

Speak Up Policy May 2023 Minor updates this Group General RCC/ARC

annual review (Counsel

[Employee Vetting Requirements january 2023 ‘Minor updates this (Group Chief People _RCC/ARC
Policy annual review (Officer

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What updates were included and why?

1. A summary that identifies the changes and updates to the policies and statements have
been added below:

2. Cyber and Information Security Policy: The policy has had Minor changes and
the following updates were made to the policy this annual review:

a. Minor updates to reflect changes in organisation structure, align with Policy Document template.
b. The core principles section has been enhanced to provide additional clarity.

The policy owner has confirmed in their attestation, the quarterly control attestation process
confirms that a number of controls are not currently being met, further work is also required
to confirm the coverage and effectiveness of those controls that are stated as met through
the attestation process. As part of the quarterly IT Control submission this provides an
overview of the compliance status to the Cyber and Information Security Policy controls.
This is further supported from the alerts we receive from the SOC team and a number of
approved Policy Exception Notes are also in place, these are managed through the standard
PEN process.

3. Business Continuity Management Policy: The policy has had Minor changes
and the following updates were made to the policy this annual review:

a. Reviewed the risk tolerance statements to ensure still accurate.

The policy owner has confirmed in their attestation, that the required operational standards
stated within the policy are working, being met and can be evidenced. A biennial BIA
programme is completed with Business Continuity Plans created. BC training is completed
with a set group of colleagues to manage incidents effectively and tests are conducted
throughout the group. Building resilience reviews are ongoing to ensure they meet our
recovery strategies.

4. Speak Up Policy: The policy has had Minor changes and the following updates were
made to the policy this annual review:

a. Minor appointment name changes from CIU to A&CI, Head of CIU to Director of Assurance
&Complex Investigations

The policy owner has confirmed in their attestation that the required operational standards
stated within the policy are working, being met and can be evidenced. The Control measures
form the continuous Comms Plan which is implemented by the SU Team and those who also
have obligations to promote SU.

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. Employee Vetting Requirements Policy: The policy has had Minor changes and

the following updates were made to the policy this annual review:

1.4 Application - first paragraph where is says (Post Office Insurnace and PayZone),
Insurance was previously spelt wrong, but we need to put ‘Post Office Insurance,
Postmaster/Agents and will apply to Payzone from 1% May 2024.
2.2 Policy Framework
2.4 Control Measures - Added
5.1 Document Control Record:
GE Policy Sponsor - Group Chief People Officer , Karen McEwan
Standard owner - People Director - Services - Tim Perkins
Standard Implementer - Head of People Support Services
Standard Approver — Head of People Support Services.
Revision History- needs adding to; 6, 28/02/2024, Martin McKee

. 5.3 Company Details - registered address needs updating to Wood Street

Appendix A - New POL Employee, need to add ‘(up to and including SLP) before
EXCLUDING

. Appendix A - CEO and GE - remove SLP, need to amend 10 year work history to say 5

year work history (unless CViT)

The policy owner has confirmed in their attestation, that the required operational standards
stated within the policy is being met and can be evidenced.

The policies in both clean and tracked changed versions can be found in the reading room.

Assurance

Group Compliance have commenced Policy Compliance Reviews and are in the process of
testing and assuring the Procurement Policy and Health & Safety Policy. The outcome of the
reviews and the report will be shared with the RCC and ARC in due course.

The purpose of the Policy Compliance Review is to understand, test and gain assurance based
on some point of control testing that the Group Key Policies that Post Office Limited have in
place are: -

7.

¢ working in pursuit of day to day business;

e the policies are being effectively implemented across the group and that compliance
with them is being met;

e the policies have effective required operational standards to mitigate any risks that
may arise.

Conclusion

We continue to work with Policy Owners and Company Secretariat to ensure we maintain our
policy governance responsibilities and undertake assurance that the polices are working as
expected. This is a key part of the wider Post Office controls work.

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Policy Appendices

Cyber and Information Security Policy (Clean)

Cyber and Information Security Policy (Track Changed)
Business Continuity Management Policy (Clean)

Business Continuity Management Policy (Track Changed)
Speak Up Policy (Clean)

Speak Up Policy (Track Changed)

Employee Vetting Requirements Policy (Clean)

Employee Vetting Requirements Policy (Previous Version)

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Post Office Insurance ARC Update Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Author: Tan Holloway, Director of Risk and Sponsor: Clare Ryder, POI NED and POT
* I Compliance Ps : ARC Chair

Input Sought: For Noting

Previous Governance Oversight

This paper is a regular update paper for the Committee. It provides key information on our
significant risks, how these risks are being controlled and any gaps in control.

Executive Summary

The full year 23/24 trading performance for POI remained strong with an EBITDA trading
performance of} } Some periodic impact to current
performance is being experienced as a result of the Horizon IT Enquiry and the related ITV
Docudrama. This has impacted both customer propensity to purchase our products and also
at times has limited our ability to carry social media and TV adverts. A watching brief is
being maintained as the enquiry progresses though there is no indication at this stage that
any brand damage is permanent. We have raised the score of our reputation risk to a
residual of 12 which we feel fairly reflects the potential impact on POI.

Cyber remains the highest graded risk within the POI business. Good progress has been
made in strengthening POI specific controls and further review by Deloitte has commenced.
POI note our dependency on the wider POL cyber environment and the Group cyber
improvement plan to further reduce the potential impact of our exposure. We understand that
exact budget and timescales are still being agreed.

POI has now successfully delivered the transition of our household call-centre from First
Source to Webhelp after a challenging start to the project. Initial performance indications are
positive though Management remain vigilant in this early period post transition.

The FCA wrote to POI on 17 April 2024 with a further information request on how POI
oversees POL as an Appointed Representative (AR). The request focuses on how conflicts of
interest are managed, our capital position and our key oversight controls. POI has responded
in full and no FCA response has yet been received. AR oversight controls remain a key focus
area for the FCA and given the current publicity surrounding POL it should be expected that
the FCA may return with further questions. A separate paper presented at this meeting
covers the importance of oversight controls.

The FCA has also written to POI specifically to remind us of our obligations to review our due
diligence on key POI and POL staff in the light of any findings produced by the Horizon IT

enquiry. POI has in response noted that it has appropriate due diligence processes and will
continue to review all relevant matters.

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By mutual agreement the POI Chair Tim Franklin will be leaving POI on 30 May 2024. This
follows completion of a second term of office. A search for a replacement is currently
underway.

POI have raised a specific risk relating to Executive and Senior Management recruitment.
Feedback from our Executive recruitment partner suggests that the Horizon IT Enquiry is
impacting the willingness of senior staff to apply for Post Office related jobs and that the
current pay on offer for NED roles is significantly below the average for financial service roles
of a similar type. Discussions are ongoing to find a solution to these issues.

AJ
AJ
ITI
re
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z
—

April mystery shopping results show an overall pass rate of 64% for travel and 83% for
protection sales within the branch environment. The travel score is down from an average of
c80% in recent months. The key failure point for travel is again a failure to provide
customers with the leaflet which contains the levels of cover, policy exclusions and
limitations. Further analysis shows that over the period there were supply problems with the
leaflet which has undergone some minor changes. For protection the main failure causes
were failing to provide the policy summary and failure to clearly ask the smoking

question. We are working with retail Management to address these issues.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

IR35 - Engagement of

Title: contractors - risks and Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024

decisions

Tom Lee, Group Financial

Andy Jamieson, Head of Tax Kathryn Sherratt, Interim
Author: Tim Perkins, People Services Sponsor: Chief Financial Officer

" ’ Karen McEwan, Chief People

Director , Officer

Racheal Hill, Head of Talent

Acquisition

Input Sought: Noting and comment

The ARC is asked to note the status of the financial risk stemming from the tax treatment of
contractors under IR35, including a timeline of events and advice taken, alongside the
businesses proposals regarding the contractor population and reducing any future financial
tax risk connected to IR35.

Previous Governance Oversight
e ARC paper of 12 March 2024 - “IR35 - Engagement of contractors — risks and decisions”
ARC paper of 23 January 2023 - “Tax Update and Annual Tax Strategy”
ARC paper of 24 Jan 2022 - “Tax Update”
ARC paper of 17 May 2022 - “Tax Update - IR35”
ARC paper of 29 March 2022 - “Future Contractor Profile”
ARC paper of 24 January 2022 - “Tax Update”
ARC paper of 30 November 2021 - “Tax Update
ARC paper of 12 January 2021 - “Tax Update”
ARC paper of 28 January 2020 - “Tax Update”

Executive Summary

In March 2024 a paper regarding the contractor population and the associated IR35 risk was
presented to RCC and ARC. This paper addresses the ARC actions following the March
meeting which included a) to provide a history regarding the IR35 risk and b) advise on what
actions the business proposes to take in relation to the contractor population and the
associated IR35 risk.

Regarding the history, both a detailed timeline (Appendix 1) and a key points section has
been presented. This shows that the HMRC review has been ongoing since 2018 with the
depth of questioning increasing in recent years and HMRC not presenting their view until
December 2023. In late 2016 POL engaged external tax advisors to assist and advise on the
implementation of the revised IR35 legislation which took effect from 1 April 2017. After the
legislation became effective external expertise has been provided to POL to assist in
understanding the developments in IR35 and in complying with HMRC’s revised guidelines,
reviewing our policies and, from early 2019, the HMRC review itself, with Deloitte initially
involved and KPMG taking over from September 2022. POL also employed a highly
experienced employment tax specialist in 2021 to assist in this area. ARC have been kept

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abreast of the situation since 2020, with the only notable decision being made in 2022 when
GE were tasked with addressing the future risk arising from IR35. A plan was put in place to
bring all contractors inside IR35 from September 2022, however following government u-
turns on policy decisions in this area during September and October of 2022 the planned
changes were cancelled. ARC were advised of this position in January 2023 with no further
action required. POL are currently debating HMRC’s view on POL’s right to reject a substitute,
which is a key clause impacting the determination of Inside vs Outside IR35.

To help mitigate future liabilities in this area a Contractor Review Project has been
implemented and SteerCo and Working Group established, with several key workstreams -
the review of Outside IR35 contractors being the priority. With the support of SEG, the first
stage of the project is to conduct an impact analysis assessing criticality of role, contingency
plan and duration of activity required amongst other items. This activity is due to be
completed by 10" May which will enable full completion of the programme plan.

RCC are requested to review and comment on this paper prior to onward submission to ARC.

Questions addresse

1. What is the history of the IR35 risk and business actions?
2. What is the status of the HMRC review and the next steps?

3. What are we going to do to mitigate the risks regarding the current and future contractor
population?

Report
Historical assessment of the IR35 position

1. A detailed history is included in Appendix 1 of this paper, with the below summarising the
key points for the committee to note.

2. The revised IR35 legislation was introduced in April 2017. From late 2016 POL began to
prepare for its introduction, with the Cost Reduction Group being made aware of the
requirements and likely impact. In 2017 training was also provided to the Talent
Acquisition (“TA”) team by Deloitte on how to run CEST assessments, with test CESTs run
with Sopra Steria, the original Managed Services Provider (“MSP”), to confirm answers
were being interpreted correctly.

3. HMRC first contacted POL regarding their intention to check compliance with the legislation
in 2018, with initial correspondence between HMRC and POL being slow and limited in
terms of the nature of questioning. This remained the case until July 2019 when the level
of information requested by HMRC deepened. POL continued to respond to HMRC’s
queries, which were delayed in 2020, due to Covid 19. Until this point POL had relied on
external support to advise on any employment tax issues. However, in March 2021 POL
recruited an employment tax specialist to provide further strength to the team, with the
individual having 20 years’ experience at HMRC followed by a career in practice, including
big-4 firms.

4. The depth of questioning from HMRC increased notably in 2022, albeit the speed of their
communications remained slow. This uptick followed POL providing evidence of a

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substitute being used by a contractor, culminating in 83 questions being asked in May
2022. It was expected that the responses to these would be sufficient for HMRC to
provide a view, however some further queries were raised in November 2022 and it
wasn’t until December 2023 when HMRC presented their stance, albeit in a manner that
was ambiguous as to how they formed their opinion.

5. Throughout this period POL management have kept ARC up to date with the status of the
HMRC review and the actions being taken, with regular updates provided from 2020
onwards. In November 2021 ARC were advised that the “substitution clause” was a key
driver in the determination of the inside vs outside IR35 assessments, that only 1
example had been identified within POL and that if HMRC disagreed with the treatment
there was significant financial exposure, subsequently estimated in May 2022 to be
£70m-£80m + penalties in a worst case position. Updates thereafter built on these points.

6. Following the May 2022 IR35 update to ARC, and building on a paper presented by the
People team in March 2022 regarding the future contractor population and the plans to
reduce this, ARC agreed that action should be taken to mitigate the future financial tax
risk, whilst noting that any wholesale changes could present a risk with regards to the
HMRC review and how they may perceive it, with the GE taking an action to address the
future risk.

7. In June 2022 GE established a Steerco on this matter, with the decision taken to change
the policy on substitution which would be likely to have the effect of bringing the majority
of contractors inside IR35. This was due to be enacted in September 2022 (over a 6
month period whilst contracts were renewed) however the day before the announcement
was due to be shared across the business Kwasi Kwarteng announced the repeal of IR35
legislation with effect from 1 April 2023. As a result the Steerco determined that the
changes should be abandoned given the future risk would be eradicated in several months
time. Jeremy Hunt then reversed the policy decision in October 2022 and there was talk
of an IR35 consultation being launched, which subsequently led to tax offsets being
announced. The government flip-flop and announcements indicated indecision at a policy
level and therefore uncertainty on the future of IR35 legislation. Given POL’s planned
changes would have resulted in increased immediate costs from bringing individuals
inside IR35, potential loss of resource which could have jeopardised the delivery of
business critical projects and the planned migration to a new MSP, Morsons, the Steerco
determined to abandon the changes and disband the Steerco.

8. The events and decisions presented above were brought to ARC in Jan 2023 with no
further action requested i.e. ARC were content to await HMRC’s decision. In hindsight,
had the business known HMRC would not state their view until December 2023 and
alternative approach may have been taken.

9. POL and HMRC are currently engaging around the decision making that has led HMRC to
their views, as the correspondence to date isn’t compelling in POL’s view. POL have a
draft letter awaiting to be sent to HMRC to challenge their views further, albeit noting the
likely outcome being HMRC will not change their stance based on historical dealings with
them.

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10. Throughout this process POL management have engaged with specialists:

a. Deloitte were engaged from 2016 through to 2022, initially to assist with the
implementation of the IR35 policy, including training POL management and
assessing interpretations for the CEST Tool. Deloitte support then expanded into
reviewing the HMRC requests and advising on POL correspondence given their
knowledge of the subject and POL’s policies.

b. POL employed an Employment Tax specialist in March 2021 to review the position,
correspond with HMRC and assist the People team in this area. The individual has in
depth knowledge on this subject, including creating an IR35 assessment tool used

in practice.
c.

d. Given the shift in HMRC focus a tender exercise was run, with KPMG tax and legal
being appointed from September 2022. All correspondence has been reviewed and
advised on by KPMG in this period. At no point have Deloitte or KPMG advised that
POL’s approach has been incorrect, but there was recognition when KPMG came on
board that any reassessment by HMRC across some roles may present a risk.

11. The risk and status has been known by UKGI and DBT, through UKGI representation on
ARC and Board throughout the period, in addition to regular discussions on this topic for
the purposes of the Annual Report and Accounts in regards to disclosure and funding
requirements.

Current status of the HMRC review

12,

13. Subsequent to the above, POL have been in communication with HMRC to seek clarity on
their rationale. POL have a further response prepared, see above, which is to be reviewed
by KPMG before issuing, in line with previous communications on this matter. However,

es the letter has not yet been issued.

In addition, HMRC have recently issued ‘protective assessments’ dating back to the tax
year 2017/18, to ensure that they are not out of time for raising an assessment, if they
conclude Post Office has been incorrect in its approach. The assessments cover PAYE,
NICs and Apprenticeship Levy, all of which would have been due if contractors should
have been Inside IR35. POL has appealed against the assessments as HMRC have not
issued a decision as yet. They confirmed recently in a call that there was ‘no decision’ as
yet. HMRC can go back 6 years if they consider Post Office has not taken ‘reasonable
care’ in managing the tax position.

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Next steps with HMRC

14. As stated above, the next step with HMRC is to reply to their letter of 21 March where
they set out further clarification of their view and also their view on the next steps. We
will respond once POL legal and KPMG have reviewed and advised.

15. HMRC’s view is that POL has a contractual right to reject a substitute (set out in 19
December 2023 letter). However, in the 14 February 2024 email they suggest that one
example of a substitute, which was supplied in detail in December ‘21, is not sufficient -
they also question whether would POL accept substitutes in all roles - indicating that they
might accept that POL can accept substitutes in some roles.

16. HMRC refuse to provide examples of contracts they have seen between an Agency and
Contractors stating that they cannot do so under GDPR. However, they infer that there is
something in these contracts that indicates we have a contractual right to reject a
substitute. We have asked HMRC to confirm what it is they draw from the contracts if
they cannot provide them, they state they are unable to do so.

17. HMRC state that POL’s Policy on engaging contractors suggests it has the right to reject
as it states POL can do so if the substitute contractor is not suitably qualified and does
not pass any security clearance required. These are standard terms and conditions that
any business would apply and should not constitute a right to reject.

18. Regarding HMRC’s next steps they suggested that POL supplies names and contact details
of all contractors so that they can contact a sample, and also contacts at Morson and
Intelligent Resource. As there are over 1,500 contractors POL has used since April 2017
this is not practical.

19. POL’s suggestion, which was agreed by KPMG, was so seek HMRC’s approval for POL to
sample check contractors in different roles across the years, to re-assess the outcomes.
This would then be reviewed by an external third party.

20. POL will also seek to understand how the tax offset announced by HMRC to take effect
from April 2024 will work in practice and then look toy HMRC
based on the above.

21. Since Morson took over as POL’s MSP, in January 2023, there has been a decrease in the
number of contractors for IR35 consideration. Around 40% of contractor now are
supplied through umbrella companies, meaning that they pay PAYE and NICs and there is
no risk arising of tax owing for POL. However, the remaining balance still are largely
Outside IR35. This will be examined in detail by TA with Tax team support, as Morson’s
processes do not allow for a substitute. This should mean that a larger proportion are
more likely to be Inside IR35. At present this does not appear to be the case.

What are we going to do to mitigate the risk of the current and future contractor
population?

22. To mitigate the risks of current and future IR35 related liabilities a Contractor Review
Project has been initiated with Executive sponsorship of the Chief People Officer. The
Project’s working group includes a range of subject matter experts from across the
business and a full time Project Manager has been assigned to the project.

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23. The initial workstreams that have been identified for the project are:

ganoo

Reviewing active Outside IR35 contractors;
Reviewing contractors with over 2 years tenure;
Reviewing all other active contractors;
Reviewing all contractor related policies, processes, and governance; and
Working alongside the separate procurement exercise being carried out to resolve

governance and procurement issues identified with the existing contingent labour

contract.

24. The table below shows the contractor population working in POL as of 26" April 2024:

Function Active Outside IR35 Over 2 Year’s “Highly Skilled”
Contractors Tenure
CEO Office 1 0 0 im)
Commercial 26 11 13 1
Finance 5 2 2 ie)
Inquiry 19 4 4 (3
Legal 1 0 o oO
People 11 11 1 8
Remediation 85 46 24 (11
Unit i
Retail 18 8 5 2
Strategy & 7 3 4 ie)
Transformation
Technology 169 88 63 24
Total 342 173 116 149

25. The Strategic Executive Group (SEG) and the Finance Directors have now conducted an

impact analysis on this population. The impact analysis assessed:

a. the criticality of active contractors (critical, important, semi-important and not

important)

b. the rationale for this rating

c. anticipated end date of activity; and

d. whether the contractor is truly a highly skilled (this is considered one of the
determining factors of an Outside IR35 result).

A decision tree was created to support these assessments.

26. The outcome of the initial criticality assessment is as follows:

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Critical I Important I Semi- Not No Review Total
Important I Important I Longer Outstanding
Required
CEO Office 1 1
Commercial 16 5 2 3 26
Finance 2 3 5
Inquiry 14 5 19
Legal 1 1
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People 3 8 11
RU 20 51 14 85
Retail 8 7 1 2 18
S&T 2 3 2 7

Technology 64 77 28 169
Total 126 149 39 22 2 3 342

27.

28.

29.

30.

There remain 3 contractors to review in Commercial that have not been able to be
reviewed yet due to absence of the key business stakeholder for those contractors.

Whilst the initial criticality assessment has been completed, further review is required of
the responses to ensure consistency across the business.

The assessment of whether the contractor is truly highly skilled has resulted in 33 of the
contractors originally deemed highly skilled to not be assessed as being highly skilled. The
remaining 16 contractors who have been assessed as being highly skilled will be reviewed
by the Tax team to provide assurance of their highly skilled status.

Once these further reviews are complete, the following will be assessed or created:

a. The feasibility of mitigating current and future IR35 related liabilities;

b. A timeline detailing what actions can be taken when to mitigate current and future
IR35 related liabilities whilst minimising delivery disruption;

c. The level of retained IR35 risk once all actions have been taken; and

d. Policies, processes, and governance that ensure that POL maintains or continues to
reduce the retained level of IR35 risk on an ongoing basis.

Timelines are not finalised or agreed on these deliverables for the project yet, but
indicatively (a) will be complete by the end of May, (b) and (c) will be completed in June
and updates on (d) will be provided to the July ARC.

Depending on the level of change required in the contractor population, the project may
also, in addition to the deliverables above, need to oversee the ongoing mitigation
activities outlined in the timeline.

It is worth noting that POL has changed its approach to engaging new contractors since
moving the contract for contingent labour to Morson (as the managed service provider
(MSP)) from January 2023, which has in turn reduced the existing IR35 risk. As set out in
the 12th March paper, the new contractor population has a lower number of Outside IR35
determinations than under the previous MSP. This is largely due to c50% of new
contractors being engaged through umbrella companies, rather than through the IR35
assessment process. Of the remaining new contractors (those engaged outside umbrella
companies), >90% of engagements remain Outside IR35, which is still very high and
contrary to hiring in the general contractor sector outside of POL. In terms of existing
(and therefore longer serving) contractors, 32% of active Morson contractors transferred
over from Intelligent Resource (the previous provider of contingent labour to POL), of
which, 75% are engaged Outside IR35.

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31. As referenced above, there are also a number of procurement and governance issues that
need to be resolved with regards to the contingent labour contract. The Contractor
Review Project will oversee resolution of these issues. The issues are:

a. POL has exceeded the total contract value for the contract awarded to Morson. A
modification to the existing contract and a re-procurement are therefore required
(and will go through SEG and Board).

b. The contract award notice for Morson was never published. SEG have agreed to
publish this immediately.

c. POL continue to have a payroll contract with Intelligent Resource which ends in
March 2025. 18% of POL’s active contractor base are still engaged via Intelligent
Resource and will need to move to Morson or another contingent labour provider
from March 2025 at the latest.

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Appendix 1 - detailed history of the IR35 position
2016

1. POL - the Cost Reduction Group were advised of the expected changes and impacts of
HMRC’s planned IR35 legislation.

2017

2. POL - the Talent Acquisition (“TA”) team received training from Deloitte and ran test
CESTs with Sopra Steria, the original Managed Services Provider (“MSP”), and received
confirmation they were interpreting the answers correctly. The TA team continued to run
the CEST review process thereafter.

2018

3. HMRC - in June 2018 HMRC wrote to POL to ‘check compliance’ and asked for a
description of how POL had complied with the IR35 legislation. Following some initial
delays in responding, exchanges of information occurred with HMRC through to July 2019.

2019

4. HMRC - planned to introduce new legislation for IR35, impacting the private sector, from
April 2020.

5. POL - in December 2019 POL Tax sought further advice and training from Deloitte to
assist HR colleagues on using the new CEST tool. A training session was run for the POL
TA Manager and team.

2020

6. POL - sought training from HMRC in Jan 2020 on the use of a new CEST, following the
planned introduction of new rules for IR35 from April 2020. HMRC cancelled the training
and the introduction of the new rules was subsequently delayed until April 2021 due to
Covid 19.

7. ARC - at the January 2020 ARC an update was presented on IR35 noting that HMRC have
an ongoing review which could result in financial impacts, internal assessment shows the
CEST tool may have been incorrectly applied in some instances and Deloitte were
supporting in an assessment of the position.

8. HMRC - in October they followed up on responses provided by POL to previous queries,
from July 2019.

9. POL - determined it was appropriate to recruit an employment tax specialist to help
address the queries. Agreed with HMRC that responses would be delayed until in house
expert recruited.

2021

10. ARC - at the January 2021 ARC an update was presented on IR35, including details of
planned recruitment of an Employment Taxes specialist, HMRC review ongoing and level

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of queries increasing, responses being prepared for HMRC and noting that it appeared
HMRC’s tests had been applied in a consistent manner in line with guidance.

11. POL - in March 2021 the post was filled by ex-HMRC Inspector with 20 years Employment
Tax Advisory experience, an IR35 expert who had developed Grant Thornton’s IR35
software tool, started in post at POL. He assessed POL’s position, revisiting earlier
evaluations and concluded that although certain CEST questions may have been
incorrectly answered, the outcome of Outside IR35 remained correct on the basis that
POL had no right to reject a substitute if one was required/ provided. Noting this latter
point is crucial in the assessment.

12. HMRC - in May 2021 responses were provided by POL to queries received from a new
HMRC officer. Further back and forth on queries occurred between September and
December.

13. ARC — at the November 2021 ARC a specific paper was presented on IR35 compliance.

2022

14. HMRC - In Jan 2022 HMRC asked for more evidence around the example of a substitute in
POL’s business, this was supplied providing contracts, copy invoices, etc, in the same
month. HMRC continued to state they were ‘fact finding’ and provided no indication that
they believed POL’s approach was incorrect.

15. ARC - in Jan 22 a general IR35 update was provided as part of a wider Tax update. Noted
Deloitte, MMM snd People teams were assisting with the HMRC responses
and that POL faced significant financial risk if HMRC have found incorrect application.
Additionally, one instance of a substitute had been identified, with documentation
provided to HMRC following Deloitte review. Identifying substitutes was difficult as the
process in place would not require the use of a substitute to be recorded by the business
or the TA team.

16. ARC - at the March 2022 ARC a paper was present by the People team on the Future of
Contractors within the POL business. This focussed on the need to reduce reliance on
contractors. The increased use had been driven by the requirement to reduce headcount,
however, large business critical projects such as SPM and RU activity put pressure on the
business to use contractors. It was stated that plans were in place to convert contractors
to FTC and permanent roles.

17. HMRC - in April 2022 HMRC introduced an IR35 specialist team (and the 4th different
officer looking at the case), promising to bring the matter to a conclusion. In May 2022
HMRC wrote an 11 page letter asking 83 questions around the contract between POL and

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Sopra Steria. POL decided at this point that many questions were contract law questions
and not tax questions and went to tender for support in answering, KPMG Legal and Tax
were appointed and helped the Tax team send a 21 page response to HMRC’s questions,
in September 2022. Based on discussions with HMRC it was expected that they had all the
information required to make a decision.

18. ARC - at the May 2022 ARC the Tax team confirmed there remained concern over IR35,
the historical risk was £80m plus penalties, there was large reliance on the substitution
clause of which we only have 1 example and that i lear HMRC will contin look
in depth at the position.

19. GE - in June 2022 a paper was presented to GE recommending that the Policy was
changed to de-risk the tax position, with Outside IR35 being an exceptional treatment
rather than the norm. A SteerCo involving CIO, CFO, CPO and Tax and TA was set up to
oversee the project reviewing the position and making recommendations. The paper
recommended that for all new engagements and renewals of contractors that they be
engaged on an Inside IR35 basis. GE approved the project, though concerns were
expressed over the potential commercial implications if bringing contractors Inside IR35
resulted in an increased cost base.

20. Steerco - in August 2022 plans were confirmed including revised policy and draft comms,
to advise contractors of the move to bring individuals inside IR35, over a 6 month period.
Comms were planned for 23 September 2022 however in an unexpected move Kwasi
Kwarteng announced as part of a mini-budget the repeal of IR35 legislation with effect
from 1 April 2023. The SteerCo was approached and a unanimous decision was made to
cancel the project and to maintain the process based on no right to reject a substitute.

21. Steerco - On 17 October 2022 Jeremey Hunt, the new Chancellor, announced a u-turn,
scrapping Mr Kwarteng’s repeal of IR35 and continuation of the existing rules. In mid-
November 2022 the SteerCo held a call regarding the u-turn. It was concluded that in
light of the reversion to the post April 2017 rules that the business awaited HMRC’s
decision. The increased immediate cost of bringing individuals inside IR35, the potential
loss of resource, the tender to appoint a new MSP, and therefore jeopardising the
delivering of business critical projects swayed the decision. With hindsight had we known
HMRC would take a further 14 months to issue an opinion, which is still not a firm
decision, the business decision may have differed. Any change in Policy enacted in
November 2022 would have only prevented a tax exposure from that date and not altered
the historic position. The new MSP, Morson, has provided greater challenge to status
determinations and around 40% are now provided through Umbrella companies,
removing POL’s tax risk on this proportion.

22. HMRC - in November 2022 HMRC asked further questions, most of which have already

been answered in earlier communications. POL provided an 11 page response to HMRC’s
questions in December 2022.

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2023

23. ARC - in January 2023 the Annual Tax Update was presented to ARC including a section
on IR35. The SteerCo decision was explained, as stated above, with ARC accepting the
position taken. HMRC continue to ask further fact-finding questions.

24. HMRC - on 6 April 2023 HMRC sent a 5 page letter containing 30 additional questions.
POL provided a 12 page response to HMRC on 19 June following KPMG Tax & Legal
review. Further correspondence was received from HMRC in August and October advising
of absences in their team causing delays but that they expect to respond by the end of
October. On 19 December 2023 HMRC responded with their ‘opinion’ that POL have a
contractual right to reject a substitute.

2024

25. POL - HMRC’s letter of 19 December was not entirely clear. POL discussed it with KPMG
and then held a call with HMRC to seek clarity. On 7 February 2024 POL requested
confirmation in writing of some of the points HMRC raised in the call. HMRC responded by
email on 14 February setting out that one example of a substitute is, in effect, not
enough to convince them, stating that consideration needs to be given as to whether POL
would accept a substitute in each and every role. Further correspondence between POL
and HMRC was held, to seek clarity on HMRCs view with POL now due to respond to

HMRC, albeit the response is on pause

26. ARC - on 12 March TA and Tax team present to ARC setting out the financial risk that is
beginning to crystallise now that HMRC have provided their opinion and some clarity on
their thinking.

27. HMRC - on 2 April HMRC raised a protective assessments totalling £27m. These cover
2017/18 to 2019/20. The assessments are raised to prevent earlier years falling out of
time for HMRC to assess, should they conclude that POL has been wrong since April 2017
in its categorisation. HMRC make clear in a call that the assessments are not an indicator
of a decision, the matter is still under consideration and they are issued on a worst-case
basis as HMRC cannot increase an assessment once 6 years has elapsed, but can reduce
one. POL appeals against all the assessments.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT, RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title:

Author:

Tax Update and Annual Tax
Strategy

Tom Lee, Group Financial
Controller

Andy Jamieson, Head of Tax

Meeting Date:

Sponsor:

21 May 2024

Kathryn Sherratt, Interim
Chief Financial Officer

Input Sought: Noting and Approval

The Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee (“ARC”) is asked to note the Tax Update and
approve the Tax Strategy following the annual review.

Previous Governance:

Approved by Risk and Compliance Committee on 7 May 2024.

Executive Summary

This paper is an annual tax update, the last of which was presented to the ARC in January
2023. The paper provides an update on tax for the ARC to note and discuss, as well as providing
a copy of the tax strategy following for its annual review, last published in January 2023 (the
“Tax Strategy”), for the RCC to approve ahead of submission to ARC for final approval. No
significant updates have been made to the Tax Strategy compared with the prior year.

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Questions addressed

What are the strategic tax challenges for POL?

. What are the current key tax issues for POL and what are we doing to address these?
. What other tax updates should the RCC be aware of?

What is the requirement for reviewing and updating the published tax strategy?

Awne

Report
What are the strategic tax challenges for POL?

1. The current primary tax risks are around our management of employment taxes and a
specific potential corporation tax (CT) issue, linked to expenditure incurred, settlements
made and funding receipts received from DBT for the OCC, HSS, PPR, SRR and Tax top
ups - ‘the schemes’. VAT compliance remains a risk due to the throughput of tax and the
complexity, but with much improved processes and controls the risk and incidence of
errors has reduced.

2. Our relationship with HMRC has become more challenging over the past couple of years.
This appears to be driven by a number of factors including i) the complexity of items we
are engaging with them on, which have become more challenging recently (CT and ET in
particular) ii) the speed of their response, they are extremely slow to respond in general,
with responses taking c. 4-6 months and iii) they do not appear prepared to approach
issues with commerciality or pragmatism in mind. Based on conversations with tax
advisors and other business contacts this shift has been consistently noticed across the
tax paying community. This shift is making it difficult to manage our taxation position
effectively, with risk and exposure continuing to increase.

Current Key Tax Issues

Employment Tax, IR35 — correct treatment of contractors’ employment status

3. A full paper covering this topic is being presented at RCC separately. We have therefore
not commented in any detail in this paper. HMRC have reached an opinion that we have
a fettered (contractual) right to reject a substitute which, if correct, would mean that we
have completed the check employment status for tax (CEST) (HMRC’s online tool)
incorrectly since April 2017. If HMRC is correct in a worst-case scenario going back 6
years we could owe as much as £150m, broken down between £110m of tax and £40m of
penalties and interest.

4. Our Policy and assertion has been that we do not have the right to reject a substitute,
HMRC’s view is that we have a contractual right. The ‘substitution’ question is vital in
determining the employment status of contractors.

5. In early April 2024 HMRC issued ‘protective assessments’ totalling £27m of tax covering
2017/18 to 2019/20 regarding this issue. These were issued as the early years can fall
outside of a 6 year time limit if not assessed. HMRC started asking POL questions about
this issue in June 2018 and we have continued to provide them information ever since,
whilst maintaining the same approach to classifying contractors. As set out in previous
RCC/ ARC papers should HMRC be proved to be correct we could owe as much £150m in

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tax, interest and penalties. The assessments have been appealed and no further action
will be required until agreement is reached with HMRC.

Corporation Tax - deductibility of compensation payments, running costs and treatment of

DBT subsidy funding

6.

10.

The CT issue relates to the deductibility of costs associated with the schemes, both the
compensation paid to affected Postmasters and the running costs of the schemes - HMRC
contend that none of these costs are deductible as they were not incurred wholly for a
business purpose, basing this on the ‘oppressive’ behaviour shown by POL regarding the
affected Postmaster. In contrast to their view on the costs HMRC contend that all subsidy
provided by DBT to POL to pay the compensation and any provided to cover POL’s
running costs associated with the schemes is incurred wholly for a business purpose and
that is therefore taxable trading income. On 10 May 2024 we received a response to our
sent to HMRC in October 2023, reaffirming their stance.

In earlier discussions HMRC estimated that there could be as much as £100m in CT owing
as a result of this incorrect treatment, this figure was also quoted in the press in January
of this year. However, we have worked with KPMG on building our tax model, covering
reworking of the last 6 years of CT returns and based on following HMRC's stated position
we have no tax owing, but possible penalties to pay for having filed returns with higher
brought forward losses than would have been the case if we had applied HMRC’s
treatment from the outset. We are working on the complex calculations, but it would
appear the worst-case figure is c.£5m to £8m. It is possible that HMRC could offer to
suspend any penalties which would then be wiped from the record if no further errors
arose. The tax position has been calculated using all reliefs available to POL, including
brought forward historic losses and capital allowances, thus potentially creating future tax
liabilities for POL.

DBT provided a funding offer letter to POL in December 2023 which contained several

conditions. These included obtaining external assurance over the tax model, hence the
KPMG review stated above, and that POL must cease its challenge with HMRC over the
taxation treatment.

Following Board approval, POL have responded to accept the offer of funding, albeit with
a number of additional requirements such as i) the ability to continue to discuss the
details with HMRC, as the discussions to date have been at a high level and each scheme
is different, and ii) that the acceptance of HMRC’s views will result in future CT liabilities
therefore funding needs to be assured for future costs and not just historical. Note future
costs will arise both as a result of continued expenditure and funding for RM matters but
also because POL is utilising its significant levels of taxation losses in order to reduce the
liabilities. Current modelling indicates that by following HMRC’s position we are likely to
face a CT liability c£20m to £30m for 24/25 and c£5m to £10m for 25/26, however this is
driven by RM forecasts for compensation in these years which will continue to be revised,
and the estimates could therefore vary widely.

Following receipt of the HMRC letter we will be discussing the position further with DBT to
confirm what additional subsidy we will require to pay the additional CT liability arising
from DBT’s subsidy funding provision to pay compensation to affected Postmasters.
Applying the principles set out in HMRC’s latest letter not all funding for all ‘schemes’ will

3

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be deemed to be taxable trading income. We therefore will work through the detail and
revise the model to take into account the complexities.

11. Once agreement is reached with HMRC and DBT we will submit revised CT returns for the
affected periods. As a consequence of agreeing to this treatment we will need to pay
quarterly instalments of corporation tax to HMRC as we will be deemed a ‘very large’ tax
payer.

VAT - general

12. The primary VAT risk is to ensure that POL pays and claims the correct amount of tax. This
year we have continued consolidating and refining our systems and processes for reporting
VAT to HMRC. This is the second year in a row where we have not had to report a VAT
error to HMRC.

VAT - liability of Postmaster services to POL

13. HMRC have questioned the VAT treatment of services supplied to POL by Postmasters in
branches. HMRC asked whether it was correct that Postmaster remuneration should be
split on a transaction-by-transaction basis, between all VAT exempt supplies and all taxable
supplies. They have queried whether it would be more appropriate for it to be single supply
of ‘Postmasters Services’. If this was the case this single fee would be entirely subject to
VAT, it would cost the business around £20m in additional irrecoverable VAT per year and
cause thousands of Postmasters to exceed the VAT registration limit. We engaged KPMG
to help us provide a robust response to HMRC which we sent on 2 February 2024. We await
HMRC’s reply.

Corporation Tax - CT returns 22/23

14. We have submitted the CT return for POL and POMS for 22/23. The CT return for Payzone
is under final preparation and should be filed by the end of April. The Payzone delays have
occurred due to the late signing of the Payzone financial statements, which were delayed
until such point as POL was in a position to provide an appropriate Board approved letter
of support.

Tax forecasting and maximising use of available reliefs

15. Historically our VAT recovery position remained very stable with little fluctuation in our
VAT recovery rate on a year-on-year basis. It was consistently around 65% for 2016/17
to 2020/21. However, since the disposal of the telecoms business unit combined with the
growth of Banking & Travel related income and the decline in Mails income our VAT
recovery rate has significantly to around 50%. We expect that it will remain around 50%
for 24/25 based on business income forecasts, representing a c.15% reduction on prior
years and c.£8.25m of annual cost to operations in the form of additional irrecoverable
VAT.

16. We have informed colleagues in FP&A of the possible impacts of the changing income
profile and confirmed the amendment to the system set recovery rate of 50%, introduced
in 23/24 is appropriate for 2024/25. This is sometimes referred to as iVAT (irrecoverable
VAT) which is classed as 10%.

17. We expected to remain in a tax loss making position, despite making trading profits.
However due to HMRC’s stance on costs deductibility and subsidy receipts from DBT we

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now expect to be in a CT paying position in 2024/25. Much depends on whether POL or
DBT pay the compensation directly to affected Postmasters. If, as it appears likely at
present, OC is administered directly by DBT this will reduce any future CT liability.
However, as it appears likely that POL will pay the £75k flat compensation for HSS to
affected Postmasters then this will create a large CT liability for us. We are working on
modelling the scenario as we will then be required to pay CT each quarter to HMRC as a
‘large taxpayer’ and we will therefore require additional subsidy from DBT to cover this.

What other tax related issues should the RCC/ARC be made aware of?

Historic Settlement Scheme (“HSS”) and Tax Top-ups (TTU)

18. In June 2023, in a welcome turn of events, HMRC announced an exemption for HSS tax
top-up compensation payments. In 2021 we reached agreement with HMRC over which
heads of loss were taxable and which were outside the scope. We have paid c£6m in tax
withheld on compensatory interest and colleagues in payroll have paid PAYE and NICs for
the same claimants. The TTU was established in August 2023 to start paying top ups to
compensate claimants for the tax we withheld and paid to HMRC on their behalf. The
formula, prescribed by DBT, sees claimants paid as if they had been taxed at 45% on their
compensation, but then has a deduction to reduce the payments down ensure no-one has
paid more than the equivalent of basic rate tax, addressing the unfairness point.

19. In late 2022/23 the RU team responsible for paying HSS compensation started to make
some Interim Payments where a claim was under dispute. Unfortunately, they failed to
report to the PM remuneration team and the Tax team that these payments were being
made. The letters issued with Interim Payments made it clear tax was being withheld from
payments, but no payment of tax was made to HMRC as the relevant teams responsible for
reporting were unaware.

20. An exercise is underway to correct the position and disclose the sums to HMRC. This is
being calculated by the TTU team as a part of their complex calculations work. The TTU
team have obtained copies of all letters issued to claimants and are cross referencing these
to the Integrity system, which is the single source of truth for claims. However, it does
appear that this system does not contain all tax calculation details, therefore extreme care
is being taken to update the system. We expect the tax due to HMRC to be substantial, in
excess of £1m and we are likely to incur penalties and interest for not having taken
reasonable care.

Governance and Tax controls

21. We continue to produce a quarterly tax summary report highlighting activity across all taxes
which is circulated to the CFO, Head of Legal Services and the Group Chief People Officer
and also disseminated more widely to senior parties in Finance and HR. We also hold
regular meetings with Risk colleagues and sign off tax controls, every month through
ServiceNow with supporting evidence uploaded into the system.

Tax team resource

22. As can be seen from the above there are several high profile tax issues under consideration
at present. It is our desire to bring IR35 and the CT issue to a close and settle with HMRC
in 24/25, albeit noting the timeframes are driven by HMRC. This will help provide more
certainty to the business in terms of cost management.

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23. Our Employment Tax Principal, Peter Gomersall, is retiring in May having already reduced
his working hours. We have recruited a part time resource, Steph Dahl to replace Peter's
part time work and will be seeking additional Employment Tax resource in the coming
months to provide the expert knowledge we require to manage the issues and support
colleagues across the business.

Tax Strategy — Annual Review

24. HMRC require that the POL Tax Strategy is reviewed, updated where required, and
published on an annual basis. The initial strategy was presented to and signed off by the
ARC in November 2017. The Tax team has reviewed the current strategy and have made
minor amendments to ensure it remains fit for purpose and reflects our position and after
sign-off will be published on our Corporate website and highlighted in a One News article.

25. The Tax Strategy is set out in Appendix 1.

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Appendix 1 — Post Office Group Tax Strategy

This publication sets out the tax strategy of Post Office Limited and its UK subsidiary
undertakings (referred to hereafter as the “Group” or “Post Office”) for the financial year
2024/25, and in making this strategy available the UK Group is fulfilling its responsibilities
under the Finance Act 2016, Chapter 24, Schedule 19, Part 2, Paragraphs 16 & 17.

This tax strategy applies to UK taxes applicable to the Post Office and its affiliated entities both
in the UK and overseas. The document is ultimately owned by the Board of Directors of Post
Office Limited (“the Board”).

The tax strategy is reviewed annually, updated as appropriate and approved by the Board each
January to cover the next financial year. The Board, along with assistance from the Group
Finance teams, take ultimate responsibility for setting, monitoring and amending the strategy
as required.

In summary, the Post Office is committed to:
« following all applicable laws and regulations relating to its tax activities;

* continuing to have an open and honest relationship with HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”)
driven by collaboration and integrity; and

* applying diligence and care in our management of taxes and ensuring that our tax
governance is appropriate.

How the Post Office manages its tax risks

The Group’s on-going approach to UK tax risk management and governance is based on the
principles of reasonable care and materiality. The Post Office maintains on-going application of
tax governance, including frequent risk metric assessments and the review of applications of
strong internal control procedures in order to substantially reduce tax risk to materially
acceptable levels.

As part of this governance, the Post Office has identified tax risks, which are maintained
internally on risk registers, with their materiality being assessed based on a corporate risk
matrix. The matrix then records the potential impact, subject to two contributory factors, the
exposure if the tax risk crystallises and the relative likelihood of the risk crystallising.

Monthly review processes are carried out, based on the risk areas, and confirmation reports
and evidence are logged in audit software. A quarterly tax issues report is then presented with
significant / material issues to the Chief Financial Officer for their consideration, further
discussion at Board level and with HMRC should the issue merit engagement of the tax
authorities. Where decisions are deemed to be complex or have an element of uncertainty
assistance from third parties may be sought to aid the Post Office’s decision-making process.

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Given that the Post Office is owned by the Government's Department for Business & Trade, it
understands the importance of its transparent business operations.

Tax planning

The Post Office will not engage in artificial transactions the sole purpose of which is to reduce
UK tax. As well as the above the Post Office will not engage in tax efficiencies if the underlying
commercial objectives do not support the Group’s position, or if the arrangements impact upon
the Post Office’s reputation, brand, corporate and social responsibilities, or future working
relationships with HMRC.

Approach towards dealings with HMRC

The Post Office have always been and remain committed to maintaining integrity and
transparency when dealing with HMRC. The Post Office underlines these principles by agreeing
to:

« Accurately disclose all information required in correspondence and returns, and
efficiently respond to communications as and when required. Where additional work is
required, such as in the event of a disagreement, we will look to resolve this in the most
professional and efficient way possible.

« Be open and transparent about decision-making, governance and tax planning, firstly by
ensuring that it is liaising directly with our dedicated HMRC team and secondly by
publishing our tax strategy easily accessible within the public domain.

« Ensure all interactions with HMRC are conducted in an open, collaborative and
professional manner.

Signed

Kathryn Sherratt
Interim Chief Financial Officer and Senior Accounting Officer
(Updated April 2024)

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK & COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

nan Payment Practices Reporting a .
Title: Compliance Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Author; I Lom Lee, Group Financial Sponsor: Kathryn Sherratt, Interim
. Controller Ps . Group Chief Finance Officer

Input Sought: Noting

The ARC is asked to note Post Office Limited’s compliance with Payment Practices Reporting
requirements for the financial year ended 31 March 2024 (“FY23/24”).

Previous Governance Oversight
*  RCC- 7 May 2024

Executive Summary

Post Office Limited (“POL”) has a statutory duty to file Payment Practices Reporting (“PPR”)
with Government on a bi-annual basis. Post Office Management Services Limited (“POI”) and
Payzone Bill Payments Limited (“PZ”) fall outside the scope due to their size. Reports are still
produced for POI as they use the same Purchase Order (“PO”) system but are retained
internally. The reporting includes payment policies, practices and performance. No changes
have been made to the filing requirements in year.

POL has filed PPR as required for the past six financial years (FY18/19 to date) for the entities
in scope. POL has controls in place within the Financial Reporting Controls Framework to
ensure timely and accurate reporting. The reporting is shared with the Group CFO for POL
and the CFO for POI to review and approve before filing or reporting internally. Note that a
statutory director is required to approve the reporting for filing, therefore the CEO has
formally approved the POL PPR reports for FY23/24. This report focuses on POL as the only
reportable entity.

Payment performance has been consistently strong within POL. Paid to time rates averaged in
excess of 90% for FY18/19 and FY19/20 with a slight drop to 85% in FY20/21 due to the
introduction of a new procurement system, Web3. Following the bedding in of the new
system the average paid to time rate increased to 95% in FY21/22 and was 93% in FY22/23.
In FY23/24 the average paid to time rate was 95%, showing a slight improvement on the
prior year. The primary drivers in late payments were late good receipting by the business
(40%), changes to Purchase Orders / system issues (40%) and late receipt of invoices from
the business into the AP team (20%). Additional training was rolled out at the start of the
financial year to the business by the payment and procurement teams to remind colleagues
of the importance of goods receipting and how to accurately do it in Web3, which appears to
have had a positive impact.

Internal audit (“IA”) completed a review over the process in Q4 FY21/22. The result was
positive, with the findings being minor. Amendments, including some efficiencies and

enhancements to the reporting process were made in FY22/23 as a result of the IA review.
No further reviews have occurred in the year.

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Questions addressed

1. What are Payment Practices Reporting requirements?

2. Has Post Office Limited Group been compliant?

3. What have the payment performance trends been to date?

4. What processes are in place to ensure compliance?

Report

Overview of payment practices reporting

1. Payment Practices Reporting (“PPR”) is a statutory duty for companies, which exceed the
size criteria as outlined in para 2, to publish information about their payment policies,
practices and performance in relation to qualifying contracts for each reporting period in
the financial year.

2. Companies are in scope for the financial year if on their last two balance sheet dates they
exceed at least two of the following thresholds:

i. £36 million turnover

ii. £18 million balance sheet total
iii. 250 employees

3. POL has been in scope for PPR for the last four financial years.

4. POI was in scope until end of FY20/21 when it dropped out due to a downturn in revenue.

5. PPR must be filed twice a year (April and October), with each report covering the previous

6 months.

Compliance to date

6.

7.

10.

POL has filed PPR reporting since the rules came into place for financial years ending on
and after 6 April 2017.

The payment performance statistics which have been reported to date are shown in
Appendix 1. The table represents the percentage of invoices which have been paid within
30 days, 31 to 60 days or over 61 days for financial years.

The reporting includes policies and practices such as (i) standard payment terms (ii)
changes to terms made in the reporting period (iii) dispute resolution processes. Appendix
2 shows a template of all of the required reporting information.

The reporting rules allow for different payment terms (i.e. more than 30 days) for different
types of contract. However, POL primarily has standard 30-day terms across suppliers and
therefore reports on this basis as standard.

POL has not received any Government correspondence in response to any PPR submitted
to date.

Reporting trends

11.

12.

As shown in Appendix 1, the proportion of invoices paid within 30 days has been
consistently high, remaining in excess of 90% in all periods, with the exception of H1 in
FY20/21. The decline in that period was due to the impact of migrating to a new
Procurement system, Web3, with a move towards 3-way matching driving much of the
decline as the business got used to goods receipting.

In FY23/24 the performance has increase to 95%, which may in part be due to increased
training on the system and goods receipting at the start of the year.

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13.

14.

15.

@

Where payments have not been made within 30 days, the majority of the remaining
payments are made within the following 30 days i.e. within 60 days.

POL has identified the main reasons for late payments as (i) late goods receipting, (ii)
issues with purchase orders and system issues, including setup, errors and replacements,
and (iii) invoices being shared with POL stakeholders instead of Accounts Payable and only
being shared with Accounts Payable for processing once they are already overdue i.e. due
process not being followed. In some cases invoices are also held back purposefully whilst
negotiations are ongoing with suppliers, which impact the statistics also.

One of the IA findings in FY21/22 was that POL should determine a target level by which
performance can be measured. Given the performance has been consistently high, this
has not been a priority. However, the voluntary prompt payment code has a target of 95%
within 60 days which POL has consistently achieved against and sets a good marker to
continue to compare with. Although not formally a target we have achieved against this
in year.

Processes in place to ensure accurate reporting

16.

17.

POL has controls in place within the Financial Reporting Controls Framework to ensure
that it is compliant with the PPR rules and files accurate information on a timely basis:

a. Bi-annual control whereby the Accounts Payable team prepare the PPR before the
required deadlines. The reporting is reviewed by an Accountant outside of the
Accounts Payable team to ensure independent assurance has been provided over the
accuracy of the reporting.

b. Bi-annual review of POL group entities against the scope criteria in section 2 to
ensure POL is filing PPR for all required entities.

The final report is shared with the Group CFO for POL and the FD for POI Limited to review
and approve before filing (where required). The email accompanying the report includes
details of key trends in the period, as well as any changes to policies where applicable.

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Appendix 1

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HL H2 HL H2 HL HL HZ HL H2 HL cra
36% I 97% I 94% I 92% I 85% 96% I 94% I 94% I 93% I 95% I 95%

d 3% 1% 4% 6% 10% 3% % % a o% 3%
days 0 1% 2% 2% 2% I 5% 1% I 2% 2% 3% I 1% 2%

Appendix 2

Start Date of reporting period - per Govt notification

Day 27th

Month [Sept

Year 2023

End date of reporting period

Dey Sst

Month March

year [2028

Payment Statistics

‘Average time to pay in days

A) % of invoices paid between day 1 and 30 (inclusive) 95%)

8) % of invoices paid between day 31 and 60 (inclusive) 35%6I

C) % of invoices paid on or after day 61 2%

% of payments due in reporting period which have not been paid within agreed period (ss)

Payment Terms and Qualifying contracts

Enter you standard payment period in days [30 standard terms

Describe your standard payment terms [Payment terms range from immediate paymentto30days I

Was there any changes in payment terms in reporting period [No

Enter the maximum contractual payment period [Maximum contracted payment term is 30 days or less

Dispute resolution process

Does your business offer e invoicing No

Invoice document management No

Does your business offer supply chain finance options No

Can your business deduct sums from payments as a charge for being on the supplier list No

Has your business deducted sums from payments as a charge for remaining on supplier list No

is your business a member of a code of conduct or standards on payment practises No

4

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Review of External Audit - post

Title: account approval Meeting Date: I 21 May 2024
Tom Lee, Group Financial
Author: Controller; Sponsor: Kathryn Sherratt, Interim

Dan Ward, Head of Financial Chief Financial Officer

and Technical Accounting

Input Sought: Discussion
The ARC is asked to discuss the external audit process ahead of the audit for the financial
year ended 31 March 24 commencing in full.

Previous Governance Oversight
* None

Executive Summary

Management has undertaken a retrospective review of the audit process following the
completion of the FY22/23 Annual Report & Accounts (“ARA”). The review encompassed
internal management discussions on the overall process, including the ARA completion
process and the associated PwC audit, as well as detailed discussions with PwC regarding the
testing conducted and areas for improvement by both parties.

Regarding quality, no issues were noted, with PwC providing robust challenge throughout.
Management is also satisfied with the level of knowledge and skills within the PwC team. The
makeup of the team, especially at the senior level, is suitable for the size and complexity of
the audit. Similarly, the minimal number of audit findings indicates that the processes on the
POL side were robust in ensuring an accurate financial position was reported.

The main findings from the review were around efficiency with two key areas noted:

- POL management has a streamlined financial accounting team and this can create
bottle necks and single points of failure. In order to address this, additional band 4
support has been reallocated to the audit for FY23/24, with an experienced financial
and technical accountant assisting on the audit process to help with capacity.

- Remediation Matters provisions require a significant level of assessment both by POL
management and PwC. The nature of the provisions means they can fluctuate
considerably, and the level of support required can be significant. Having to re-audit
the provision models as assumptions altered due to the elongated audit process
created inefficiencies. In order to reduce the risk of re-auditing these provisions,
management will assess the likelihood of a summer signing at the start of July. Should
it not seem feasible, the audit of these balances will be halted until a revised signing
timeline is agreed.

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In addition to the above, the overall ARA creation process was complex and time consuming
in the prior year and management is working on revising the approach to reduce the number
of reviews by stakeholders and to identify ways to get better engagement from business
stakeholders.

ARC is requested to reflect on and discuss the audit process, and the external auditor, ahead
of the FY23/24 audit progressing in full. It should also be noted that the tender for the
external audit has been concluded and a recommendation is being brought to ARC on this
matter.

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POST OFFICE LIMITED
AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

aa bias External auditor tender exercise . .
Title: - outcome and appointment Meeting Pate: I 21 May 2024
Tom Lee, Group Financial
. I Controller . Kathryn Sherratt, Interim
Author: Antony Ray Specialist Senior Sponsor: Chief Financial Officer
Procurement Manager

Input Sought: Approval

The ARC is asked to approve managements recommendation to appoint PWC in the role of
external auditor for the Post Office Limited group of companies (“POL”), with the appointment
being for a period of 4 years, with the option to extend for a further 2 years, commencing
with the financial year ended 30/3/2025 (“FY24/25”). The ARC Chair is requested to
recommend the decision to POL Board for approval of appointment.

Previous Governance Oversight
° None

Executive Summary

The current external audit contract expires in October 2024, which covers the FY23/24
financial year. The incumbent auditor is PwC, who will have been in place for 6 years at the
end of the contract. An FTS (Find a Tender) procurement exercise was undertaken using the
Restricted Procedure. This approach was selected due to the complexity of the POL audit and
the need to ensure respondents were limited to Tier One firms as defined by Financial
Reporting Council (FRC), to ensure adequate quality of the audit firm.

Pre-market engagement activity was undertaken whereby all potential firms except for PwC
advised they did not wish to participate in the procurement. The reasons were primarily
linked to actual or potential conflicts of interests, due to other work undertaken or the
ongoing Statutory Inquiry, and the risk associated with the audit (high risk client). PwC were
therefore the only bidder in the process. A formal tender process was still undertaken,
including bid submissions and presentations with associated scoring by POL assessors. PwC's
bid was strong in all regards and the fee quote was competitive, with the estimate being in
line with current year audit.

ARC are requested to approve PwC as the external auditor for a period of 4 years with the
option to extend for a further 2 years, recommending this decision to Board. Finalisation of
the contract will be undertaken by management and Board will be requested to delegate
authority to Interim CFO for finalisation and signing of the contract.

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Post Office Limited
‘Audit, Risk & Compliance Committee Forward Plan March 2024 - March 2025

tem origin of Request owner ‘action Required I 20/02/2024 I 24/05/2028 I 01/07/20:

‘seyoo/20z4 I 24/21/2024 I 27/01/2025 I 25/03/2025, Notes

‘STANDING ITEMS FOR PRESENTATION

[welcome and Conflicts of Interest [Companies Act 2006 3.277 enor not x x x x x x x

laRc minutes trom previous meeting ITerms of Reference para 67 & 72 cosee Noting & approvat I 1/29/2028 I s2oyzozs I syasyaoze I 7ysy20ze I 91gy2028 I sx/s4/az0zs I s/27/2028
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Risk, Compliance & Int proceeding

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combines compnce teal ave internal ava Ithe Internal Update to every meeting shoul Inclede
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lany ARC meeting ever 2 hours should have at east »

5 minute break lve minate break,

ion 2020/2021 lcosee wa x x x x x x x

IUniess agenda time aows, these tens wil be approved
cer ly writen resoltion sent in paral with the meeting

/EN RESOLUTION ITEMS lpapers. They are therefore approved outside ofthe
meeting.

[Each review and approval request eto nelude
lassurance and conformance testing te show the poly i
[operating effectively Including detats on
lexceptions/walers and supporting evidence. ll poles
Ii be presented in one poticy summary paper

(2) Fare
crime rieasecneck with Peley ompance Manage before
Business I (2) ant CTE leach meting as ts subject to change and reer to
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” instances, where I (2) Health and IWihistebiowing/I Statement I (3) HMRC Fe & a) custome’ I vetting leompletenes, bt wil nt form part of the writen
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ser) {a} Employ I interest oiey I Standards eter
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requirements I "icy [ninor changes“ reveed ean and rack changed
etay henson
Laser changes clean evsed version pls od esting
Inone: omer pote requiring RCC approval are inthe
Jc secon ofthis forward plan as pa he Group Key
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nese items wil not be presented tothe
[Committe uriess itis agreed otherwise, They are
on simply published ard not discussed atthe meetrg
Lele ueadpditbalail dont padhligl areca hcl) IIf there are any comments or questions, these are
lsert to casec. The commerts/questions and
lerswers are then appended to the minutes,
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POTARC chav or POT
[arms of petarece para STARE CT " vce Fn noting ony nem wth no presentation cies
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[committee Forward Pan [cones Batten 2027, Secretary etna x x z x x x x

REGULAR ITEMS: EVERY SIX MONTHS, YEAR OR TWO YEARS (avery year unless otherwise stated in notes column)

POL-BSFF-WITN-010-0000033_0169
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rem Corian of Reavest owner Action Required I 20/03/2024 I 24/05/2028 I 01/7/2024 I 12/08/2020 I 4/21/2028 I 27/01/2025 I 25/02/2025 Notes
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POST OFFICE LIMITED

AUDIT RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Title: Quarterly Speak Up Up-date Meeting Date: I 21% May 2024
Mair Haynes, Speak Up Analyst

Author: John Bartlett, Director of Assurance I Sponsor: Sarah Gray
& Complex Investigations

Input Sought: Discussion/Noting

Executive Summary

This relates to Speak Up reports received during Q4 (1 January - 31 March 2024)
Increased reports relating to conduct of POL senior managers are being received.
Volumes of Speak Up matters reported have almost doubled from last quarter.
Currently 15 Speak Up matters open. A higher proportion relate to POL staff, and the

compl

Purpose
The purpose of this report is to provide ARC with an overview of Speak Up activity, the risks
raised by those reports, and action taken to mitigate those risks.

lexity and scale of these can be time and resource intensive.

Speak Up Reports this quarter

In this quarter (January to March 2024) twelve reports were made to the Speak Up team;
almost double the number reported in the previous quarter (7), and are back up to
previously seen average levels. 75% of these were reported by POL staff.

1.

Three allegations of ethics violation: one relating to a proposal of satisfaction
scores in the colleague survey being used as metric for staff bonuses (this
matter was closed when the metric was changed to measure participation);
the other two included mention of the Inquiry and have both been passed for
external investigation and will be reported on separately.

Five reports relating to discrimination and / or bullying concerns: ‘Dignity at
Work’ and ‘Grievance’ policies were shared where appropriate. Three matters
have been closed and the reporters referred to the ER team in two instances.
Further information is being sought in the remaining two matters.

Two matters recorded as ‘Out of Scope’: one related to concerns around the
relocating of a branch (closed and referred to Postmaster Onboarding and
Contracts); the other related to a compensation request following an accident
at work (agency branch) in 2021 (closed and advised to contact ACAS as
postmaster was the employer, not POL).

One report recorded as ‘Other’: concerns include feeling upset around previous
postmaster terminations, and the cash declaration process; further details are
being sought from the reporter.

[Highly Sensitive]

24

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v. One matter recorded as ‘Modern Slavery’: Limitations with the current Speak
Up recording system means we are unable to amend Issue Types once they
have been selected. This matter related to an assault within a branch some
years ago which had been previously reported to the police which led to non-
receipt of wages. Matter was closed and the reporter was referred to ACAS for
advice regarding wages issues. This matter was also duplicated on our system
as TBC which was closed immediately.

Eleven reports were closed during this period, with six of these referred to other
departments / agencies to deal. In addition to those opened and closed this quarter and
detailed above, four further matters were closed:

i. One queried metrics used in the 2022/2023 STIP as it was believed certain
elements were not communicated to all staff. People Team contacted and
confirmation of metrics for that year shared with reporter.

ii. One was a follow-up report of a matter that is already being investigated by
the police, so this allegation was passed over to the police for action.

iii. One was a report by a postmaster who had been arrested by police for his
behaviour and was concerned a DSAR request had not been properly fulfilled.
Liaised with Information Rights and matter closed.

iv. One reported concern of how much time a colleague was ‘available’ on Teams.

There are currently 15 open Speak Up matters which have been passed to investigators
who will report on these separately via the A&CI monthly MI.

Themes

4.

Ingrained culture and behaviour of senior leaders: Reports of the same types of
behaviour and involving the same departments continue to be received. Matters include
dismissive behaviours, bullying, non-compliant recruitment processes and concerns
around timescales for compensation payouts. Investigators have been assigned to these
cases with enquires underway, upon completion of which, a report will be provided to
Group Assurance with findings and recommendations.

Mention of Inquiry: The screening of the ITV drama ‘Mr Bates v the Post Office’ at the
start of January prompted an increase in reporting of matters to Speak Up that made
mention of the Inquiry. These matters range from triggering memories of experiences
that happened in POL / branch many years ago, to reports providing details of alleged
fraudulent compensation claims.

Challenges

6.

The continued lack of reliable, comprehensive reporting system with functionality for
direct reporting, analysis, and data sharing hinders the effectiveness of the team in
managing individual cases but also in thematic analysis. Difficulties around extracting

2

[Highly Sensitive]

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and maintaining data in the current stand-alone Speak Up reporting platform leads to
potential duplication of work also being recorded elsewhere. Work is underway to identify
a suitable system.

7. Sickness and secondment from within the Speak Up team to the investigation assurance
part of A&CI meant an extended duration before some matters were closed. Recruitment
for a replacement investigation manager is taking place.

24

[Highly Sensitive]

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Appendix 1
Speak Up Matters Rec'd Jan - Mar 2024
Discrimination Closed POL Staff 1 Yes POL Staff ER
Discrimination investigation POL Staff 1 Yes. POL Staff
Employee Relations Closed POL Staff 1 No POL Staff = NFA
Employee Relations Investigation POL Staff 1 Yes POL Staff
Ethics Violation Closed POL Staff 1 Yes POL Staff NFA
Ethics Violation Investigation POL Staff 1 Yes POL Staff
Ethics Violation Investigation POL Staff 3 Yes —- POL Staff
Modern Slavery Closed Postmaster / Branch 1 No Postmaster Training
Other investigation POL Staff 1 Yes POL Staff
‘Out of Scope Closed Postmaster / Branch 1 No Postmaster Business Support Manager
Out of Scope investigation Postmaster / Branch 1 No
Recruitment Closed POL Staff 1 No POL Staff NFA
TBC Closed Branch Staff 1 No Postmaster NFA
24
Speak Up Matters Closed Speak Up Matters Received
Jan - Mar 2024 10
10
NFA &R Business Police Training g “
Support 2023 2024
Manager ae e008
4

[Highly Sensitive]

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