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Witness Name: Sir Alex Chisholm KCB
Statement No.: WITN00180100
Dated: 14 October 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF SIR ALEX CHISHOLM KCB
I, Sir Alex Chisholm KCB, formerly Permanent Secretary at the Department for
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, will say as follows.
Introduction
1. I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's request for evidence dated 1
August 2024 (‘the Rule 9 request’). I have prepared it with the support of the
Government Legal Department and counsel, and I have relied on others to provide
me with relevant documents.
2. I welcome this opportunity to make a witness statement, as I support the work of
the Inquiry and its commitment to set the record straight, especially for the many
unfortunate victims of the misguided and damaging Horizon-based prosecutions.
I also welcome the Inquiry’s evident determination to draw lessons on the wider
conduct of Post Office Limited (“POL”) to help ensure this institution mends its
ways and returns to public trust. There may also be valuable lessons of more
general import around the conduct and governance of public bodies.
3. I experienced just less than 4 years at the Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy (“BEIS” or “the Department”). The main focus of the Inquiry
concerns actions taken by POL years before my appointment. I have had no
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involvement with POL since leaving the Department in April 2020. I have had the
benefit of sight of some hundreds of documents from my time at BEIS, and the
Inquiry has also shared with me for comment a few dozen more selected
documents from before my tenure era. Nonetheless I am very conscious of the
range and depth of the evidence heard by both the High Court in the Group
Litigation and by this Inquiry. My view as a witness is necessarily partial and I will
be very keen to hear what the Inquiry concludes and recommends when it
concludes its work.
4. POL’s prosecutions of subpostmasters (“SPMs”) had ceased before I joined the
Department, 33 cases had already been referred to the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (“CCRC”), and the civil litigation that definitively exposed the multiple
failings within POL had already begun. Nonetheless during my time at BEIS I can
testify to the conduct of POL, UKGI and my Department, and will do so by close
reference to the contemporaneous documents and try to resist reinterpreting in
the light of what we learnt subsequently. Even with this constraint, it does not show
the leadership of POL in a favourable light. I make some separate comments on
the documents the Inquiry has shared with me from before my time in the
Department, and also draw on them in making reflections in the final section.
5. The Group Litigation initiated a process of reformation within POL and marked the
beginning of providing redress to SPMs. I regret that it took so long for this work
to commence. This was, in the main, due to the length of time it took to resolve
the litigation marked by POL’s inability to accept its errors. I wish that the litigation
had concluded far earlier and the work to compensate SPMs and reform POL’s
practices and culture had begun much sooner than it did.
Background
6. I read history at Oxford University before obtaining a Masters of Business
Administration at INSEAD business school. I began my career as a civil servant
in 1990, working in various roles at the Department of Trade and Industry and the
Office of Fair Trading until 1996. For the most part, those roles involved
competition policy and the media, communications and financial services sectors.
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I then worked for Pearson plc, the Financial Times and several technology
companies.
I returned to public service in 2006 when I was appointed Commissioner at the
Commission for Communications Regulation in Ireland. In 2013 I was appointed
as Chief Executive of the newly formed Competition and Markets Authority and
held that position until 2016. I then served for a short period in the Department of
Energy and Climate Change (“DECC”) as Permanent Secretary. The DECC was
merged with the Department for Business Innovation and Science (“BIS”) in July
2016 to create the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(‘BEIS” or “the Department’). Each of the merging departments had their own
Permanent Secretary; me from DECC and Martin Donnelly from BIS.
On 5 September 2016 I was appointed as Permanent Secretary of BEIS and
Martin Donnelly moved to the Department of International Trade (which later
merged with BEIS to form the Department of Business and Trade (“DBT”)).
I remained Permanent Secretary at BEIS until 13 April 2020. I was then appointed
as Chief Operating Officer for the Civil Service and in parallel Permanent
Secretary for the Cabinet Office. I remained in those roles until April 2024.
I left the Civil Service in April 2024 and in July 2024 was appointed Chairman of
EDF Energy UK. I remain in that role to date.
In summer 2016, and in the four years that followed, BEIS faced a number of
priorities. As I have said, the Department was formed by merger in 2016 between
BIS and DECC and this required considerable changes in organisational
structures, systems and resourcing.
The UK in June 2016 had voted to leave the EU, and this entailed fundamental
and widespread changes to laws, regulations and codes embedding the economic
frameworks for business and consumers, employers and employees, directors
and investors, and much else. The UK was already committed to climate change
actions and these intensified in this time with accelerated decarbonisation of the
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power sector, and the passing of ‘Net Zero 2050’ into legislation in 2019. BEIS
also made important progress in addressing the nuclear legacy, working with and
through the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, and procured the first new
nuclear power station in a generation. British industry across multiple sectors and
including both large corporates and smaller enterprises were affected by these
changes in EU and energy policy but also influenced by the government's new
Industrial Strategy. As part of this Strategy the Department at this time embarked
on a major increase in public spending on R&D and higher level science and
innovation, spearheaded by UKRI. In the final quarter of my time at BEIS we
experienced for the first time the impact of Covid 19.
As Permanent Secretary I was involved in all of these activities. I was the senior
civil servant with lead responsibility for the management and oversight of the
Department and its resources, I was the Principal Accounting Officer, the senior
adviser to ministers, and a public representative of the Department in dealings
with Parliament, other departments, other governments, and other stakeholders.
I was responsible for chairing the Department's executive committee and
representing the Department before the Public Accounts Committee. (Martin
Donnelly’s witness statement to the Inquiry (WITN11250100) provides
comprehensive detail in respect of the responsibilities of the Permanent Secretary
and Principal Accounting Officer.)
In these responsibilities I was very well supported by many hard-working and high-
quality colleagues in the Department, including the executive management and
the wider leadership group, by our Board Members and specialist advisers, by my
Private Office, and by colleagues in other departments with which we necessarily
worked closely, including HM Treasury (“HMT”), International Trade and the
Cabinet Office. All of us officials in the Department worked closely and
supportively with ministers to deliver on their proactive priorities and to help with
the many challenges that arose.
As Principal Accounting Officer, I was accountable to Parliament for Departmental
expenditure. This covered funds directly spent by the Department, for example the
funds required to employ the approximately 4000 staff who worked at BEIS. It also
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covered the funds spent by over 40 Arm’s Length Bodies (“ALBs”) sponsored by
the Department both in respect of resources (around 40,000 people) and capital
programmes. In, for example, 2018/2019, the expenditure of the core department
and agencies was £13.6 billion (BEIS annual report and accounts 2018 to 2019
(WITNO0180101).
16. These ALBs, also known within BEIS as ‘Partner Organisations’, included POL,
UK Research & Innovation, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Ofgem,
CMA, as well as public service bodies such as the Land Registry, Ordnance
Survey and Companies House.
17. \Ihave provided a Departmental Overview which details the core structures of BEIS
and its Partner Organisations in October 2019, so towards the end of my tenure
at the Department (BEIS0001149 ).
The Government's interest in POL
18. The Government's relationship with POL is reasonably narrow and defined
through POL’s Articles of Association (BEISO0001105 ). Government has various
powers including powers of appointment and in respect of funding and I set some
of that background out below. Whilst BEIS had no legal responsibility for POL
under its Articles of Association, BEIS had political responsibility for the company
which it took very seriously. BEIS had responsibility to account to Parliament, and
the Secretary of State was answerable for POL’s performance. As is clear from
the evidence given to the Inquiry by former ministers from BEIS and its
predecessor and successor departments, ministers took a broad view of its
responsibilities for POL given the company’s social function, and were engaged
with POL on its delivery against its social objectives.
19. When I was appointed Permanent Secretary of BEIS on 5 September 2016, the
Right Honourable Greg Clark was the Secretary of State. He served in this role
until 24 July 2019 and so was the Secretary of State for the majority of my tenure.
Mr Clark sets out the structure of the Department and its portfolio of responsibilities
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at the time at paragraphs 12 to 15 of his witness statement dated 28 June 2024. I
agree with this summary.
In the general course of conduct, the Department's oversight of POL could be
described as supervisory and advisory. The aim was to check the organisation
was operating within defined boundaries on use of public funds, conformance with
employment and other legislation, and adherence to policy steers. In the
Department we were heavily reliant on the reporting that came to us from POL,
mostly via UKGI, and the additional interpretation and commentary added by
UKGI. I agree with Martin Donnelly’s comments at paragraph 25 of his witness
statement (WITN11250100) in which he makes the point that in the role of
Permanent Secretary, one must rely on being provided with accurate information
from officials. I agree that it was not realistic or desirable to be across all of the
detail on all issues within BEIS or need to check the accuracy of the information
being provided. I trusted that officials would provide objective, honest, and
comprehensive advice and commentary.
In my case, POL activity including regular reports, relevant correspondence, and
meetings would be tracked by my Private Office and they would bring matters to
my attention as necessary, usually as part of the evening boxed set of papers,
arranging follow-up meetings as necessary to discuss. At times I would proactively
seek an update or a meeting because of a particular concern or issue that arose.
My initial focus on POL given my responsibility as Principal Accounting Officer was
the viability of the branch network and POL’s long term funding requirements. My
primary concern was whether POL had sufficient funds to maintain their network
of post offices which played an important part in the life of the nation, providing
not only postal but also banking and other vital services, including in less highly
populated areas.
At that time POL was mainly self-funding through the paid-for services it provided.
However, in addition it benefitted from top-up funding by HMT by way of an annual
subsidy paid through BEIS to cover loss-making branches within the rural network
and a separate annual investment as part of a 3-year transformation programme
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spanning the period 2018 to 2021. Funding was not evenly split across the 3 years.
The subsidy was £60m in 2018/2019, £50m in 2019/2020, £50m in 2020/2021,
and the investment was £168m in 2018/2019 with the remainder of the £210m
funding earmarked for the next two years. As Principal Accounting Officer I had
oversight responsibility for ensuring proper use of those public funds by POL for
the designated purposes.
I recall that POL was concerned that the subsidy element of its funding was not
sufficient and an early focus for my work upon my appointment was supporting
the Secretary of State in negotiations with HMT to secure POL’s funding needs. I
recall that this led to much discussion about diversification of income streams
within POL and the longevity of some of their existing contracts.
Those concerns were recorded in the BEIS Single Departmental Plan of 2017 to
2018. It was the Department's stated aim in mitigation of those concerns to
“safeguard the post office network, including protecting existing rural services,
work with the Post Office to extend the availability of business and banking
services to families and small businesses in rural areas, and support the Post
Office through its ongoing transformation programme” (BEIIS0001146 ). That aim
expressed the priorities of the elected administration and had been previously set
out in the Conservative Party Manifesto for the 2017 general election
(WITNO0180102).
As well as the usual supervisory issues about funding, appointments and such
like, the litigation became a strong point of focus for ministers and myself because
of the picture it revealed about POL - which gave us increasing concern - and
because the Department would need to be directly involved in bringing a
settlement and in consequential actions to bring redress. As I will describe further
below, we also became increasingly concerned about the leadership of the
organisation as revealed through the litigation but also in the handling of issues
such as executive remuneration (bonuses). Notwithstanding POL’s status as a
Public Corporation, and as such at the longer end of the Arm’s Length spectrum,
BEIS in the shape of ministers, myself, Departmental lawyers and policy officials
all became quite heavily involved in 2018 and even more so through 2019 when
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POL became for BEIS a first order priority to resolve, equal even to the others I
have highlighted above.
The Department's roles and responsibilities in relation to POL
27. At the time of my appointment in September 2016, POL was not technically an
ALB, but a public non-financial corporation. It had been so for many years. Whilst
POL was publicly owned, it was run at arm’s length from the Government with its
own chair, chief executive / managing director, and senior management team. The
creation of POL as a public corporation was legislated for in the Postal Affairs Act
2000 and Postal Services Act 2011. The origin of that legislation was the Post
Office Act of 1968 which moved the General Post Office from a department of
state to a public corporation, the Post Office.
28. The Inquiry has asked me to consider document UKGI00017317 entitled “POL
Strategy”. I do not have any personal knowledge of this strategy. Whilst it is
undated, I understand it was drafted before I was appointed. I am not therefore
able to comment on it with any authority.
29. I agree, however, that it was the policy intent of successive Governments that the
Post Office should have commercial freedom to raise funds, invest in new
technologies and products, and operate as a retail company in a competitive
market. It was considered that those freedoms were crucial to POL’s ability to grow
commercially and reduce its dependence on the public subsidy. It was my
understanding that part of the Government's arm’s length position in respect of
POL was to allow POL to sell or provide a wider range of good and services than
it would otherwise be able to do. There was also a recognition that retail business
was nota core function or competence of government ministers and their officials,
and the company would need to employ management and staff with the requisite
experience and skills.
30. The Post Office was, and still is, a large complex retail company undertaking
millions of transactions every week. It had around 11,500 branches at the time
and a turnover of approximately £1bn. It was the largest retail network in the UK.
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For such a company to flourish a high degree of operational freedom and
specialised skill was required. A company as large and complex as POL would
have floundered if day to day operational decisions had to go through Government
approvals processes.
Those freedoms meant the separation of the functions of ownership and
management; that is separation of ministers and their officials from the operations
of POL. That division was clearly understood and was a sincerely held
Departmental view over many administrations including during my time as
Permanent Secretary. The policy intent that POL as a public corporation should
have operational independence was more than convention or practice. It was
embedded in the 2016 edition of the Public Bodies Handbook, Classification of
Public Bodies: Guidance for Departments which was extant during my time in the
Department. It provides that a public corporation, “is controlled by central
government, local government, or other public corporations, and it has substantial
day to day operating independence so that is should be seen as an institutional
unit separate from its parent department’ (RLIT0000325).
In line with that guidance, the executive team of POL had responsibility for its day-
to-day management. The first line oversight of those operations was the
responsibility of POL’s Board. POL had a full ‘fiduciary’ Board, not simply an
advisory one. The company was run as a business and in a similar way to a private
corporation, albeit one with a public role and requiring continuing public support.
POL’s executives owed their duties to the company and were accountable to
POL’s Board rather than directly to the government of the day.
By extension, this meant that POL’s IT system, aside from issues of public
investment and budgeting for that investment, were matters of operation. Issues
surrounding whether Horizon was functioning as it should and POL’s contracts
with its SPMs had also been seen as matters for POL to resolve as part of its
operations (UKGI00016211 makes it clear in a letter from me to the NFSP).
The Department was responsible for setting POL’s broad strategy, policy and
objectives. I was, for example, involved in high level discussions in early to mid
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2018 on future options for the ownership and governance of POL (BEIS0001106
; UKG100008031; UKGI00008031 ). Government would also set the framework in
which POL would operate. That would include a spending review and providing
guidance on the size of the network and funding to support this. The government
as shareholder wanted the company to be run efficiently, effectively and
responsibly, and as such exercised its shareholder rights to appoint key personnel
such as the chair and CEO, and to set goals on performance.
The role of the minister in respect of Postal affairs was to lead for the government
in any parliamentary debates on matters related to POL, answer parliamentary
questions, and lead on any relevant legislation. The Secretary of State had overall
responsibility for the Department including overarching responsibility for the
departmental portfolio and the ministerial team.
That was the broad division of responsibility at the start of my appointment. It was,
however, never my understanding that BEIS was under a legal requirement which
prevented ministers from becoming involved in POL’s operations. POL’s
operational independence was a practice and not an immutable right. My own view
is that POL came to use its operational independence in a self-protective way.
Ministers and BEIS officials were provided with carefully worded summaries
without the benefit of sight of many of the key documents. The result was that,
over time, the reality of the situation as it concerned the Horizon IT system and
SPMs was obscured by POL. POL came to use its operational independence, and
legal arguments about privilege and confidentiality, as a defence to certain
decisions and to restrict the flow of information to ministers.
POL's right to continue functioning at this level of operational independence was
always contingent upon it fulfilling its responsibilities; both financial and social.
POL forfeited its claim to operational independence when it failed in its public
duties, and ministers were entitled to intervene accordingly.
The difficulty was that by obscuring the reality of the situation as stated above,
ministers and officials had a very limited picture of what had been happening within
POL, at least until the Judgment of Mr Justice Fraser was handed down in the
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Common Issue trial in March 2019. Had more fulsome and honest information
been provided to the Department by POL over the course of these events, I believe
ministers would have intervened sooner and more decisively in POL’s operations.
UKGI’s roles and responsibilities in relation to POL
39. UKGI exercised the shareholder function on behalf of the government. It was a
company wholly owned by HMT and formally sat outside of BEIS, although UKGI
worked closely with the Department. UKGI had a wide portfolio of work that they
undertook for the Department which included the British Business Bank,
Companies House, the UK Green Investment Bank, the Insolvency Service, Land
Registry and the Ordnance Survey. UKGI would prepare advice, briefings, and
submissions for Ministers on issues relevant to POL as well as draft parliamentary
answers and sit in on meetings with POL’s senior management team and
represent the shareholder at POL Board meetings.
40. Atleast at the start of my tenure, UKGI officials were the experts on postal affairs
within the Department. They had the corporate and commercial expertise and
experience to properly exercise the government’s shareholder function in a large
and complex retail business. There were some obvious advantages in this
arrangement. UKGI were the centre of excellence in government on how to be a
good shareholder with highly trained and experienced professional personnel who
had built up knowledge and skills performing this role for government. In the
specific context of POL, UKGI brought considerable knowledge of Company Law,
of post office legislation, policy background, and POL as a business.
41. UKGI acted as the shareholder representative for BEIS. As part of this role UKGI
held a NED seat on the POL Board and sat on its Audit and Risk Committee, the
Renumeration Committee, and the Litigation Sub-Group. During my tenure at
BEIS this role was performed by Richard Callard followed by Tom Cooper.
42. The relationship between UKGI and BEIS was set out in a Memorandum of
Understanding (BEISO001164 is a draft dated 20 December 2019). The Principal
Accounting Officer of HMT had overall responsibility and accountability for UKGI,
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both for its policy direction and for its wider corporate finance objectives and
activities through the UKGI Accounting Officer.
Governance and oversight of POL
43. I agree with what Mr Clark says at paragraph 44 of his witness statement, that the
proper conduct of POL was always an important concern of the Department, not
only in recognition of the important role Post Offices played in national life, but
also in recognition that the Department retained responsibility for policy and
enforcement of Company Law and directors’ duties.
44. When I was appointed as Permanent Secretary, UKGI were responsible for
oversight of POL in respect of both governance and policy. This was the structure
I inherited and had been the status quo for many years. I have addressed the
general advantages of UKGI serving this function above. UKGI monitored POL’s
performance monthly as against government policy and provided the Department
with quarterly reports. That UKGI were responsible for the management of the
Department's relationship with POL was clearly understood by POL, UKGI and
BEIS (UKGI00018076, see page 4 in respect of UKGI'’s intention to transfer some
responsibility (in respect of policy) to BEIS. This arose from the creation of the
BEIS Post Office Policy team, as described below).
45. Whilst I was not involved in the detail of UKGI’s oversight of POL, as Principal
Accounting Officer I was accountable to Parliament in respect of POL’s funded
expenditure, as defined above, and for ensuring that arrangements were in place
for effective shareholder oversight.
46. This is a role that I took seriously throughout my tenure. I was actively involved on
core shareholder issues throughout my tenure including the issuing of annual
guidance letters to the POL Chair (UKGI00011146), appointment of the new CEO
following Paula Vennells’ departure (BEISO001135 ; BEISO001133 ;
BEIS0001107 ), assisting in setting of future strategy including funding the network
(BEIS0001139 ; BEISO001140 ; BEISO001114 ; BEISO001152 ), engaging in
discussions about the future status and strategy of POL (UKGI00008031), and
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checking, challenging and correcting POL practice where it fell outside agreed
requirements, for example challenging POL’s use of public funds as set out below.
47. Oversight of UKGI in its function as overseeing POL and POL’s operations was
achieved in several ways. Political oversight was provided by ministers through
their policy portfolios. There was a clear line of policy accountability from UKGI to
the relevant minister and to the Secretary of State. UKGI reported to HMT overall.
UKGI also had a Board which exercised oversight. The Board had a majority of
non-executive members with experience in running boards and corporate finance.
Both HMT and BEIS Permanent Secretaries were by convention invited onto the
UKGI Board. I was a non-executive member of the UKGI Board and would attend
Board meetings when available, usually limiting my attendance to the parts of
meetings relating to BEIS interests (See, for example, UKGI00009838 at items 6
to 8).
48. When I joined the Department, I welcomed the steps UKGI took to strengthen
government's representation on POL’s Board through the appointment of UKGI’s
Non-Executive Director (“NED”), Tom Cooper (UKGI00007796; UKGI00007865).
49. Mr Cooper was presented to me as a senior and highly experienced professional,
having had a long career with Deutsche Bank and UBS Investment Bank. When I
met him I could see that Mr Cooper was bright and well versed in matters of
corporate finance. I noted he had not had experience of working with ministers or
in a public policy context but others in UKGI had this experience and I expected
they would help with this aspect of the role.
The BEIS Post Office Policy Team and the Framework Document
50. In early 2018, I looked to produce a new Shareholder Relationship Framework
Document to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of BEIS and UKGI as
they pertained to POL (UKGI00010387). The Framework Document defined the
relationship between POL and Government. The final version was agreed in mid-
December 2019 (UKGI00010964 ) and I (as Principal Accounting Officer) signed
off on the document on 9 January 2020 (BEISO0000091 . The Inquiry has provided
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me with document UKGI00010387 which is an early draft of the document). Whilst
it took some time to finalise the document, in practice the contents nonetheless
guided the relationship through 2018 and 2019. The Framework document was a
significant step forwards in formalising the reporting and line of accountability as
between BEIS, POL and UKGI.
The key feature of my tenure in relation to the core issues of governance was the
establishment of the BEIS Post Office Policy team. This, together with the
Framework Document, fundamentally and permanently changed the structure and
mechanisms for oversight of POL by BEIS. To my mind these changes made a
significant positive difference to the way in which POL, UKGI and BEIS worked,
and I note those arrangements have persisted in the four and a half years since I
left BEIS.
As noted above, UKGI were responsible for oversight of POL in respect of both
governance and policy. In practice this required UKGI to be both the available
experts on POL as a business to help advise ministers and also the corporate
governance experts acting as shareholder representative and members of POL’s
Board. Whilst this should not be the case as POL is a public corporation and its
foremost duty is to the public, the policy interests of BEIS as it concerned POL
and the best interests of the company could potentially come into tension. One
such example was the issue of executive bonuses which I return to below. Where
such opposition could be said to arise, the Shareholder can bring some objectivity
and reflective focus on POL’s social policy objectives, and I wanted to encourage
a structure where BEIS could provide more readily that constructive input.
Further, my impression was that UKGI felt expert and confident in the corporate
finance aspects of their role, but less so where there were political judgments to
be made. This may not have caused much concern if policy issues were limited
within the company in question, but this was clearly decreasingly the case in
respect of POL. To my mind there was a structural issue inherent in UKGI’s work
as it pertained to POL which needed to be resolved to both address that tension
in UKGI's dual role and to ensure that the government's policy intent was being
communicated. UKGI themselves told me they were uncomfortable with the dual
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role and they too wanted a clearer demarcation, with BEIS assuming responsibility
for the policy function, including within this routine administrative work such as
ministerial correspondence.
In consequence in 2018 I began the process of separating the policy and
governance functions of UKGI. The groundwork for this move was set in mid-
December 2017 when I wrote to Paula Vennels outlining ways in which the existing
sponsorship arrangements within UKGI could be strengthened (INQ00000074).
The substantive work began in early 2018 as reflected in a submission dated 23
March 2018 (UKGI00007866), “as you (are) aware UKGI and BEIS are having
wider discussions about the division of responsibilities for BEIS assets between
them. Currently UKGI retains responsibility across the board for POL, including
policy matters. The identity of the BEIS policy sponsor for POL is still subject to
discussion. We intend to work with the BEIS policy sponsor, once the identity of
that person is settled, to establish a more formal POL-specific oversight protocol’.
In May 2018, I asked UKGI to provide a briefing on the sort of work which they
could expect to move to the BEIS Policy Team (UKGI00020995 ; UKGI00020990
). The areas in which UKGI handed over responsibility to BEIS included:
a. Formally owning the key policy remit of minimum network size, access
criteria, path to commercial sustainability.
b. — Critiquing and supporting UKGI advice to the Secretary of State during key
events such as Spending Reviews and advocating on the funding proposals
once the position was settled.
c. Acting as two-way conduit for BEIS related issues that may affect POL, or
vice versa (e.g. employment policies, industrial strategy, business rates and
living wage).
d. Reviewing and providing clearance on UKGI advice before it is sent to
Ministers. In some exceptional cases, advice could instead come directly
from BEIS officials, with support from UKGI.
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e. Supporting UKGI's lead in establishing improved funding and budgeting
flexibilities to better accommodate the needs of a profit making commercial
business, and longer term considering ownership options.
f. Working with UKGI to consider key strategic ownership issues, at the
appropriate time.
g. Meeting with UKGI on a monthly basis to horizon scan for areas which may
impact the Department.
h. Crafting the long-term vision and social purpose of POL(BEIS0001128 ;
BEISO001129 ; BEISO001132 ; BEISO001156 ; BEISO001155 ;
BEIS0001136 ).
i. Approving POL’s business plan and setting the overall targets for the
organisation.
j. Ensuring consistency with the wider government policy framework.
In terms of operations, the areas for handover from UKGI to BEIS included BEIS
taking responsibility for providing advice and briefings for Select Committee
inquiries, parliamentary questions and correspondence (with support from UKGI
and POL where required).
In June 2018 further work was done to scope current policy responsibilities and
restructure responsibility as between UKGI and the BEIS Policy Team
(UKGI100021033 ). The policy role was formally handed over from UKGI to BEIS
in August 2018 (UKGI00018076) but work continued after that date to refine the
new relationship.
At a meeting with UKGI officials in April 2019 about POL I noted that capacity
within BEIS on POL had been increased and that “government invests in post
office for more than the return — there is a social purpose. Benefits from
developing, clarifying and articulating what this is” (UKGIO00009606). This
sentiment was really at the heart of the BEIS Post Office Policy Team; to bring
home the social purpose of POL as a guiding principle in policy decisions.
By July 2019, it seemed to me that the newly structured relationship was working
well. As I wrote to Nick Read, POL’s CEO upon his appointment, “some of this
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61.
62.
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complexity lies in the company’s relationship with Government. Fortunately, this
has been well-managed in recent times by dedicated colleagues in UKGI and our
team in BEIS led by the excellent Carl Creswell’ (BEISO001107 ).
The Framework Document discussed above was really a piece of the work to
reflect and embed this new triangular relationship between POL, BEIS and UKGI.
The litigation was firm in my mind when establishing these structures. Indeed, in
January 2020 and just before I signed off the Framework Document, I noted that
whilst I was “broadly content” I wanted “to add...'information on the relationship
with the community of postmasters’” or similar, given our keen interest in this in the
light of the litigation and indeed POL’s obligation arising therefrom”
(UKGI00025637 ).
By 13 September 2019 the division of responsibility as between UKGI as the
Shareholder Representative and the BEIS Post Office Policy Team as the policy
sponsor was well developed. The final division of responsibilities was decided on
4 October 2019 (BEISO001170 ; BEISO001168 ). The policy unit focussed
exclusively on postal affairs and was, and still is, led at Director level by Carl
Creswell. The unit enabled ministers to benefit from the expertise and advice of
dedicated Departmental officials, and BEIS officials benefited from having regular
exposure to ministers and the wider Department which helped them to perform
their policy role.
Coinciding with finalisation of the Framework Document in early 2020 was an
increase in resourcing of the BEIS Policy Team to ensure that POL policy was
prioritised, and ministers were effectively supported. We expanded BEIS policy
and sponsorship capacity by creating a new Deputy Director role. It also coincided
with an invitation to increase the frequency of shareholder meetings with the POL
Chair and CEO to quarterly to review POL’s performance and assess their
progress on key issues (BEISO001158 ). This was an increase from six monthly
meetings in January 2018 (UKGI00008918).
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64. On6 March 2020, towards the end of my time in the Department, ministers and I
were provided with a submission regarding the ways in which POL exercised
oversight of POL and proposals for further mechanisms by which BEIS could
exercise enhanced oversight of POL (UKGI00027361 ). In respect of the levers
already in place to oversee the performance of POL, the submission noted that
BEIS Ministers oversaw Chair and CEO appointments, UKGI’s NED represented
BEIS’ interests as explained above, BEIS approved POL’s business plan and
target, quarterly meetings would be held with the Chair and CEO, the BEIS
Permanent Secretary would write annually to the Chair with government's
expectations for POL, and that UKGI would have their part to play in scrutinising
information provided in relation funding. As to the further mechanisms, it was
noted that BEIS Ministers could have attended the quarterly performance reviews
that officials held with the POL Chair and CEO. Our understanding was that POL
would — at least by this time - have welcomed this. Second, there was work in train
to consider POL’s incentive framework for 2020/2021 to better align bonus
payments with the successful delivery of POL’s change programme. Third, most
of the POL Board had changed over the course of 2019/2020 with two new NED
appointments and a new CEO, Nick Read. There was, in my view, appetite to keep
the process of regeneration of the Board going whilst avoiding excessive
disruption to the business. I recall being supportive of those proposals in addition
to the mechanisms already in place for oversight.
65. Matters have moved on significantly since that time and I consider below some
potential additional enhancements, put forward in the light of what has
subsequently come to light about the conduct of POL.
Mechanisms for reporting and feedback
66. The Inquiry has asked me a number of questions regarding the mechanisms in
place for reporting, feedback and the provision of information in respect of POL’s
strategy, operations and escalation to the Minister and Secretary of State. I have
explained the general structure above, which was governed by the Framework
Document and the division of responsibilities as between UKGI, POL and BEIS.
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68.
69.
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At a more granular level, I would have regular meetings with Tom Cooper of UKGI
regarding POL’s strategy and operations (UKGI00008032). Those matters would
be circulated to the BEIS Post Office Policy Team. I would also have formal
meetings with UKGI for which I would be briefed by the BEIS Policy Team
(UKGI00009589; BEISO001110 ). Officials of BEIS and UKGI would have their
own meetings on POL matters (BEISO0001157 ). As noted, ministers and I would
have regular meetings with POL’s Chair and CEO which would include UKGI and
BEIS officials. Readouts of those meetings would be circulated (UKGI00042465
). UKGI provided BEIS with quarterly updates on key POL issues to which I was
sighted along with the Secretary of State and minister (BEISO000488 ;
BEIS0001127 ; UKGI00043087 ).
Every week I would submit a briefing pack to the Secretary of State called the
“Weekly Update from BEIS Directors General’. Each of the Department's
Directors General would prepare a paper setting out the key issues that they and
their officials had been working on that week and a forward look to submissions
that the Secretary of State would be expected to decide upon. That briefing pack
would include any material issues concerning POL that required his oversight. The
Secretary of State would discuss that pack with me (and with the Director General
team) each week. The Secretary of State and I would also have weekly one-to-
one meetings.
There would be weekly “Industry Meetings” at which matters relating to POL could
be discussed (BEISO001141 ). The minister responsible for postal affairs and
officials would attend those meetings and it was at those meetings that
submissions would be discussed, and significant decisions made. I would usually
attend those meetings.
Aside from the formal structure of those meetings, I would regularly brief the
Secretary of State and minister on key POL issues, which included the GLO
proceedings, appointment of an interim CEO, NED appointments and
remuneration (UKGI00009128). I would also provide formal advice to them when
necessary (BEIS0001150 ; BEISO001121 (UKGI00009137 is a previous version).
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Contractual and personnel management at POL
71. The Inquiry has asked me about the extent to which the Department oversaw
contractual and personnel management at POL.
72. The Secretary of State was ultimately responsible for the appointment of POL’s
Chair, CEO and CFO albeit the lead for those appointments was taken by UKGI
and BEIS officials (Ultimately approved by HMT due to spending caps:
BEIS0001118 ). Whilst UKGI led the process for appointment of POL’s interim
CEO (BEIS0001120 ) and thereafter its CEO, BEIS took a significant role in Nick
Read's appointment, as I will summarise below.
73. The Secretary of State was also responsible for the appointment of POL NEDs
more generally (UKGI00010621 ; UKGI00010623 ; UKGI00010626 ;
BEISO001119 ). Again, the Secretary of State made those appointments on
advice, approving or rejecting the recommendation rather than having a direct role
in recruitment. That included responsibility for the appointment of Tom Cooper as
the Shareholder Representative (UKGI’s NED) on POL’s Board (UKGI00007796).
I supported this appointment as I have said above (BEISO001115 ; BEISO001116
; BEISO001117 ). BEIS also became involved in policy decisions regarding
executive remuneration (BEISO001112 ; BEISO001122 ; attachment
BEIS0001123 ; BEISO001124 ) and on the matter of bonus payments which I will
return to.
74. The Inquiry has provided me with document UKGI00008574 which is an email
chain dated 22 to 24 October 2018 between the BEIS Honours Secretariat and
UKGI. The Secretariat said that the Main Committee had “agreed the nomination
for Paula Vennells but have asked that it doesn’t progress until we’ve had the
opportunity to check with you that there are no known issues likely to emerge
around the Post Office in December or January’. That email was forwarded to
UKGI who provided brief details of the litigation and said that “our view is that this
shouldn't stop Paula’s nomination” and suggested that I also be asked. Through
my private secretary I said that I was “content for the information in (UKGI’s) email
below to be passed to the Cabinet Office”. I made the point that “the litigation
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76.
77.
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relates to Post Office Limited contracts and systems going back to 1999 and that
Paula Vennells has been CEO since 2011”. I accepted and agreed with the UKGI
view that the nomination could proceed.
My view, in October 2018, was that there were at that time insufficient reasons to
withdraw the nomination. I understand that I was one of a number of people who
confirmed the same. At that time, we were not aware of the deficiencies which
came to light in the March 2019 Judgment, and subsequently.
I was not on the committee that finalised the list of nominees. Had I or other senior
leaders in 2018 been in possession of the knowledge we acquired in March 2019
when the Common Issues Judgment was handed down, let alone the subsequent
information that has come to light, then clearly the nomination would not have
progressed. There is a mechanism for forfeiture of honours when substantive new
adverse information becomes available, from legal cases or otherwise, and this
mechanism was exercised in this case, and the honour was accordingly forfeited.
The Inquiry has asked me to comment upon the codes or principles of governance
and management that BEIS and I consider POL to be bound by. The Framework
Document described above was the core document which consolidated key
governance documents as they pertained to POL, for example, the entrustment
letter, funding agreement, and Articles of Association.
I did not consider that POL fell within the scope of the Cabinet Office Guidance on
Government Functional Standards for General Grants on the basis that POL was
not classified as an ALB but rather as a Public Non-Financial Corporation under
the ONS national account system. This was a matter raised by Mark Baker at the
Larkhill Post Office in his correspondence to me dated 20 March 2019. It is a
technical question, and I would have received advice on this issue and the
response, which I signed off, drafted for me (BEISO001142 ; UKGI00016211).
Regardless of the technical position, I would expect people working in a public
corporation to have acted in a manner consistent with the Nolan Principles.
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79. I have been asked by the Inquiry to explain the extent to which I believe there are
differences in governance between a publicly listed company and a publicly owned
company. I am aware that the Inquiry has had the benefit of expert advice on the
governance arrangements between the two. Very briefly, I am aware that publicly
listed limited companies have chosen to have shares listed on a public exchange.
The Companies Act 2006, and rules made by bodies such as the Financial
Reporting Council, apply certain requirements to companies and these include
specific requirements for publicly listed companies. Publicly owned companies
that are not publicly listed are not subject to the Stock Exchange Listing
requirements. Some publicly owned companies are wholly owned by the
Government and others the Government have a stake in.
Knowledge of relevant issues
80. The Inquiry has asked me a number of questions about what I knew of the Horizon
IT system, complaints made by SPMs about that system, and the investigation
and prosecution of SPMs arising from shortfalls.
81. Upon my appointment I had no specific knowledge of the Horizon IT system. I
was, however, aware that there had been concerns raised about its performance
for some time, and that these concerns were now the subject of a major piece of
litigation before the High Court.
82. As Permanent Secretary I believe that my office would have been copied to the
Introductory Briefs that incoming Secretaries of State were provided with by the
directorate in the Department. I have now had sight of the Introductory Brief for
the Post Office produced for Greg Clark in July 2016 which contained information
on a number of live issues including POL’s ownership, the company’s long-term
strategy, the future of the branch network, pensions, role in supplying cash to
external clients, and industrial relations.
83. That document records matters concerning Horizon in a paragraph subtitled
“Other Issues”. It states that “Following complaints from a small number of sub-
postmasters regarding the POL’s Horizon IT (point of sale) system, an
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84.
85.
86.
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investigation was undertaken by an independent firm, Second Sight, over two
years. Whilst this received relatively high profile press attention, no systemic issue
with Horizon has been found. However, affected sub postmasters continue to put
pressure on Post Office Limited, the Criminal Cases Review Commission are
considering some cases where individuals have received criminal convictions, and
group civil litigation is being launched against POL in the High Court’. Whilst I do
not specifically recall reading this document at the time. However, I may well have
done so as part of the full set of new minister briefing, and this may have been
how I first learnt about the civil litigation being commenced and the criminal cases
being under review.
On 29 March 2017, my office was copied to an email from a UKGI official attaching
a briefing pack which had been prepared for a meeting with Baroness Buscombe
ahead of the March debate on the future of the Post Office (WITN10910106 ;
UKGI00007572 ; WITN00180103 ). That pack included a one-pager on Horizon. I
can see that it stated that “civil proceedings have been issued against the Post
Office on the matter of the Horizon IT system”. The line to take was that “this is a
matter for the courts and I am unable to comment further’. \t states that “following
complaints from a small number of sub-postmasters regarding the POL’s Horizon
IT (point of sale) system, an investigation was undertaken by an independent firm,
Second Sight, over two years. Whilst this received relatively high profile press
attention, no systemic issue with Horizon has been found”.
Again, I do not recall reading this document at the time. In this case I consider it
unlikely that I would have done. Ministers were being briefed daily on a wide range
of topics and I would not have expected to see all of these as a matter of course,
However, I was certainly aware in March 2017 that High Court proceedings had
commenced. As to the prosecutions of SPMs by POL for theft, fraud and false
accounting, I was assured that this was an historic matter given that POL had
ceased such prosecutions in 2015, and that it was these matters that were subject
to review by the High Court and the Criminal Cases Review Board.
On 8 December 2017, my office was copied to an email from a UKGI official to the
Secretary of State’s office and others regarding an Urgent Question on POL
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funding (BEISO001113 ). I can see that a proposed answer was provided which
included some detail on the Horizon IT System (BEISO001165 ). It said, “Attack:
Will this investment be used to fix Post Office’s faulty IT systems?... If needed:
Post Office commissioned a detailed independent review of its Horizon IT system
from a firm of forensic accountant (sic) which identified no systemic issues. For
further information on this particular matter, including on the group litigation action
that is underway at the High Court, we would advise you to contact Post Office
directly’.
I note now the repeating advice that “no systemic issues” had been found following
independent review. I recall from that time that POL continued to stand by the
robustness of their system and repeatedly stated that the system had been
independently tested and also upheld through the criminal courts. I understood
that the High Court had been charged with determining these issues, with Horizon
the focus of the second stage in the litigation, as laid down by Justice Fraser in
the case management process.
I believe that May 2018 was the first time that I was read in to any detail regarding
these matters (UKGI00007881 (draft submission dated 12 February 2018);
UKGI00007912 (draft submission dated April 2018); POL00254872 (request for a
full submission dated 10 May 2018); POL00028072 (litigation facts dated 10 May
2018 — from metadata); POL00254873 (litigation facts dated 10 May 2018 — from
metadata; UKGI00008026 (draft submission dated May 2018). I have now been
shown a number of drafts of the submissions and notes on the Group Litigation. I
cannot recall the final form of document presented to me at the time. Nevertheless,
the contents of the most recent drafts dated May 2018 are familiar to me and I do
recall reading those documents, or documents very similar to them, at the time. I
have also been shown an email dated 10 May 2018 (POL00254872) in which a
UKGI official writes to POL’s legal department attaching drafts and commenting
that “/ believe you are aware that BEIS Permanent Secretary Alex Chisholm has
asked us for a full written briefing on the Horizon Litigation asap”. I do recall asking
for that information and the timing of that email suggests that I received the briefing
soon after.
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89.
90.
91.
92.
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I was told at paragraph 6 of the draft submission that “a small number of (mostly
former) subpostmasters, under the banner of the ‘Justice for Subpostmasters
Alliance’ (“JSFA”) and with support from some MPs led by then-MP (now Lord)
James Arbuthnot, claimed POL’s Horizon IT system had caused losses (shortfalls
in physical cash against cash holdings recorded on Horizon) which they had had
to make good. In some cases they had been prosecuted for these losses (usually
for false accounting, theft or both) while, in other cases, they claim that it led to
financial hardship, bankruptcy or consequential, personal losses ranging from
divorce to suicide”.
It went on to say at paragraph 7 that, “an independent firm of forensic accountants,
Second Sight, were commissioned to examine the system for evidence of flaws
which could cause accounting discrepancies. Second Sight’s initial report in June
2013 found no evidence of systemic flaws in Horizon. A final report in 2015 did
find that in some cases POL could have provided more training and support to
some subpostmasters, though Post Office disputes many of Second Sight’s
findings’.
I was provided with an overview of the Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme
and informed that it came to a close in early 2015 with the JFSA “not satisfied with
the outcomes of the scheme”.
I was told that the CCRC was in the process of reviewing 33 cases and this had
been ongoing for around three years. I was told that “BE/S/UKGI have disclosed
information to the CCRC, as required to do by law, for their investigations, as has
POL. POL does not know when the CCRC will reach a decision in any of these
cases”. My understanding was that the CCRC were considering any matters
arising from those prosecutions and it would not be appropriate to interfere with
that work. On 6 February 2020 I was provided with a submission concerning POL's
work on the cases being considered by the CCRC (UKGI00026411 ). On 20 March
2020 I was informed that the CCRC were expected to make a decision, and I was
sighted to an email from a UKGI official in respect of next steps (BEISO001 138 ).
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93.
94.
95.
96.
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I left the Department shortly following this and did not have any substantive
involvement in matters concerning those convictions. I did have some involvement
in the civil litigation, which was separate but related, with the view of accelerating
a resolution by means of settlement. I set this out below.
I was told that the complaints concerned the unfairness of the contract between
POL and SPMs which JSFA alleged, and POL disputed, did not reflect the true
nature of their relationship; being one in JSFA’s view akin to employment rather
than principal-agent.
Both POL and UKGI provided me with their commentary on the litigation. POL
made the point that it “considers that it has undertaken a significant amount of
work ever since the claims were first raised to establish the nature of the issues
raised by the subpostmasters’.
By way of my briefing on the Horizon litigation on or around May 2018, I was told
that, “in terms of mitigating against legal and operational risks, POL has
summarised its past and ongoing measures in paragraphs 21 and 22 above. In
addition to these, UKGI is aware from past discussions with POL that POL did the
following:
1. Appointed Deloitte in 2013 to look at the Horizon system to establish its
veracity. Whilst this was a limited study due to the passage of time, at that
time POL informed us that no issues were found.
2. At Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s request, when she was the responsible BIS
Minister, the then incoming POL Chair Tim Parker commissioned a new QC
to investigate the matter when he joined POL in October 2015. The initial
findings satisfied the Chair that POL had taken the appropriate action at each
stage. With the announcement of the group litigation in November 2015, the
Chair decided following legal advice not to conclude the investigation on the
grounds that it could have impacted the Court’s consideration of the claims.
3. POL has also investigated individual cases and at the time informed us that
no systemic issues were found”.
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97.
98.
99.
100.
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I did not receive a copy of the 2013 Deloitte report or the report of Jonathan Swift
QC (POL00028069; POL00006355). I had no knowledge of the substance of
those documents. The impression I was given in relation to the 2013 Deloitte
report and the report of Jonathan Swift QC was these were further lines of enquiry
in POL’s endeavour to investigate the allegations, the results of which had either
not satisfied SPMs or not brought a conclusion to the dispute.
The view taken by the Department at this time was that the litigation had been
commenced in order to get to the bottom of the issues and to bring authority and
finality to their resolution. It was up to the High Court to establish the truth of the
relationship between the SPMs and POL and the questions surrounding the
Horizon system. Neither I nor anyone else at BEIS or UKGI thought that a further,
parallel investigation would be acceptable to the complainants or otherwise
beneficial.
Having seen his judgment in the Magnox litigation, received in the month I started
at BEIS, I had every faith and expectation that Mr Justice Fraser would forensically
analyse with independence and authority the issues involved and come to the
correct conclusions. At that time I believe all parties were of the view that the
litigation brought by JSFA would bring a resolution, and the government in external
statements and correspondence stated this view.
I had no reason to question the legal advice reportedly given to POL Chair Tim
Parker not to conclude Jonathan Swift's ‘investigation’. However I now note this
was inconsistent with other advice given at the time that the Swift Review would
instead be redirected to work for the purposes of the litigation. I note the summary
of Tim Parker's review as contained in my May 2018 briefing stated “the initial
findings satisfied the Chair that POL had taken the appropriate action at each
stage”. Now that I have seen the Swift Review — shared with me as part of the
Inquiry process. I consider this statement, which can only have come from POL,
at best highly selective and at worst a manifestly erroneous summary of Jonathan
Swift QC’s review.
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101. I did not know at the time that Jonathan Swift QC’s report had not been shared
with the Department or indeed even with POL’s Board. I did not know that the Swift
Review had made 8 weighty recommendations and that these had not been
brought to the attention of POL Board and not been implemented. I have only
learnt these facts because of this Inquiry. The contrast between the summary and
the documents purportedly summarised is an example of the practice I call
attention to in this witness statement of POL rationing the supply of information to
BEIS, apparently to obscure the underlying reality, and deflect or defer critical
challenge. I reflect on those matters further below.
102. At a basic level of governance if expert advice is commissioned on a range of vital
issues, as it was by the POL Chair Tim Parker from Jonathan Swift QC, and the
recommendation was for a company to take certain necessary steps, one would
expect the Board to consider that report, and to oversee a programme of
implementation of the recommendations. The Board and/or the Shareholder
cannot do that job if the information contained in the advice commissioned is
withheld from them. This is what appears to have happened in the case of POL
and the Swift Review.
103. I had no knowledge of the existence of Simon Clarke’s advices of 15 July 2013
(POL00006357) and 2 August 2013 (POL00129453) or the Linklater’s advice on
the Mediation Scheme (POL00107317). These had been produced within POL
some 3 years before I joined BEIS and were never referred to in any document or
conversation I can recall from my time. I had no knowledge of the contents of any
of these documents. I had no knowledge concerning the ability of Fujitsu to insert
data in branch accounts without the consent of SPMs or that Fujitsu might be able
to delete or replace audit files containing transaction data. I am aware now that
the Department had received the reports authored by Second Sight. I did not read
them at the time, and I do not think that I was aware that the Department had a
copy of them until reading submissions in preparation for the BEIS Select
Committee in March 2020 (BEISO001 137 ).
104. To the extent that I would get into the detail of such documents, I would expect
Officials to identify those documents to me, providing summaries where
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appropriate and, if a document needed to be read in part or in full, to draw that to
my attention.
Oversight of the Horizon litigation
105. The Inquiry has asked me a number of questions regarding the GLO proceedings
including Departmental and UKGI oversight and accountability, my involvement in
and views on the handling of the proceedings, and my response to the outcome
of the proceedings including the recusal application. Given the breadth of relevant
topics and to avoid confusion I have provided below a chronological account of
the key aspects of my involvement providing my own views and reflections where
necessary to answer those questions.
106. On 3 January 2018 I wrote to Paula Vennells in response to POL’s recent funding
request (POL00024073). That request indicated that POL intended to use BEIS
funds for non-transformation programme purposes and specifically to assist in
funding the Horizon litigation. I had challenged this when it came to my attention
as I was strongly of the view that public funds approved for specific purposes,
namely network provision and organisational transformation, should not be
diverted otherwise and certainly not to fund the Post Office’s litigation. To provide
some additional assurance that BEIS funds entrusted to POL were being used
properly, I asked for that confirmation from Ms Vennells on a quarterly basis
107. On 8 January 2018, Ms Vennells replied to me saying that “/ will ensure we make
it clear that the source of funds for GLO work is Post Office, not Government’ and
when the reporting on expenditure had been brought to her attention in December
2018, “we removed the £2.4m from our quarterly request’. She said that “we will
not include GLO spend in future funding requests and will confirm this quarterly’ .(
POL00024074)
108. Whilst disappointed by such a categorical mistake in budgeting and reporting, I
was reassured by Ms Vennells’ prompt and appropriate response.
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109. On 3 April 2018 I met with Tom Cooper regarding POL matters. A read out of the
meeting was circulated in mid-May (UKGI00008032). At this meeting I was taking
stock of and given steers on a wide range of issues affecting one of our Partner
Organisations’— something I would aim to do at least once a year for each of our
key Partnership Organisations. At this time the litigation was far from a central
concern, the sustainability of the core network was much more so. This is probably
because of the relative importance of the issues at that time as BEIS understood
them, also the relatively early stage at which the litigation had by then reached As
I have noted above, the reality of the situation as it concerned Horizon had been
obscured by POL.
110. The read out records in respect of potential settlement costs of the litigation, “AC
noted presents another example of BEIS bearing responsibility for POL when they
should not. AC recommended that during next meeting we consider how to steer
responsibility for this to HMT.” The context for my comment is a continuation of
the 2016/17 tension over how to fund network losses and invest in transformation.
My view, which I believe was shared by Secretary of State Greg Clark, was that
we sponsored POL but we did not have funds for investment or a surplus
elsewhere to cover a large and/or unpredictable loss. This was a matter for the
central fund. It would be absurd and harmful, in our view, to cut an unrelated
budget — for example in science, or energy, or small business support - to pay for
legacy costs incurred by POL. Further this was a matter for Government and not
just for BEIS, given the important social role played by post offices, for example in
the distribution of welfare payments.
111. That readout of my 3 April 2018 meeting with Mr Cooper records that “lack of
named policy responsibility in BEIS makes it difficult to build momentum behind
decisions for POL”. This is a reference to the work in progress in separating
UKGI’s shareholder and policy functions and the formal handover of the policy
function to BEIS which occurred in August 2018.
112. I recall that following the May 2018 briefing which I have addressed above, I asked
to be briefed on the Horizon litigation by POL’s General Counsel (UKGI00000998
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). That briefing eventually happened in October 2018 and I address it further
below.
113. In July 2018 I received a copy of the Project Sparrow, Pre-Onboarding Protocol
(UKGI00008160) and the Disclosure Protocol. This followed provision in March
2018 of the UKGI Guidance for Litigation Monitoring Protocol (POL00041685) and
in June 2018 of the Information-Sharing Protocol (BEISO000079).
114. The Litigation Protocol and Information-Sharing Protocols were drafted following
concerns from myself and ministers that information flow in respect of the litigation
was insufficient. Whilst I did not see this document at the time, this seems to be
what is recorded in an email chain between POL and UKGI officials in March 2018
(POL00041686).
115. My impression all through 2018 was that POL’s position in respect of providing
BEIS officials and ministers with information regarding the litigation was on “a
need-to-know basis” and indeed that there was an institutionalised wariness about
what the Department should be told. I understand that concern to some extent:
there were real issues of legal privilege, commercial confidentiality and data
privacy which needed to be considered. It may be that POL leadership felt
motivated by a desire to ‘protect’ the institution they led. However, BEIS needed
to properly understand the risks involved and implications arising from POL’s
decision making regarding the litigation. More generally, restricted transparency
began to undermine the department's trust in POL. I recall POL being difficult
when ministers and I were asking for greater sight across the litigation and feeling
that POL were being overly protective when it came to document sharing. This
made me more determined to get proper briefings and to have the basis for
ministers and officials to question POL on their judgments and plans. In this I was
influenced by the learnings from the Magnox case, in which neither the NDA Board
nor BEIS had been given a sufficient view of the issues and risks in the litigation,
until it was too late.
116. In July 2018 when I received the Disclosure Protocol, I again got the feeling that
this was too restrictive in respect of information flow. I was being asked,
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fundamentally, not to onwardly disclose documents received from POL. I was
conscious of my obligations to the rest of Government and to Parliament. As such
I protested about this excessive restriction and requested further information and
changes before signing the document (UKGI00008205).
17 October 2018 meeting
117. Around 10 August 2018, I received a submission drafted by Mark Russell of UKGI
entitled “Horizon Litigation Update”. The submission explained the contents of
Annexes 1 to 5 which were attached to that email. It is recorded at paragraph 11
of that submission (UKGI00018266) that an “Oral briefing from POL’s Legal
Counsel was scheduled for 10 September. The intention at that proposed
meeting was for, “POL’s Legal Counsel, Jane MacLeod, Chair Tim Parker, and
CEO Paula Vennells... (to) brief you on the key issues at stake, as well as on the
financial, reputational and operational implications (which could be considerable)
of an adverse ruling at November's ‘Common Issues Trial’ and/or at the ‘Horizon
Trial’ in March 2019 and POL’s contingency plans for dealing with these risks. This
will be an excellent opportunity for you and the Minister to exercise Shareholder
scrutiny and seek reassurance on any issues of concern”.
118. At paragraph 8 of that submission, it was recorded that “following the agreement
of the Protocol, POL’s Legal Counsel provided an initial background briefing on
the litigation (Annex 3), including their QC’s view on the merits of the case”.
119. The document goes on to say that POL’s Legal Counsel “has since provided a
further update (Annex 4) following discussion of the case at POL’s last board
meeting on 31 July. For ease of reference in Annex 4 UKGI has highlighted in
yellow any information that is new and worthy of note. These briefings do not yet
address contingency planning, but Tom Cooper has asked POL’s Legal Counsel
to focus on this in the run-up to the November 2018 hearing, particularly the
question of how POL would handle the business implications of losing, and to
provide you with a paper addressing these issues in advance of the 10 September
briefing session”.
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120. I understand that Annex 4 is document UKGI00008345. That document addresses
procedural issues and the timetable for the Commons Issues and Horizon Issues
trials. I can see that the document contained some of POL’s thoughts on
settlement options and contingency planning (UKGI00008345 at paragraphs 5
and 6). Reading them now, I can see that POL’s contingency plans at this time
remained under-developed. This was also the view at the time of the BEIS Post
Office Policy team, as can be seen from the briefing discussed below.
121. As to the other annexes, Annex 1 was the Information Sharing Protocol
(BEIS0000079) and Annex 2 was the On-Boarding Protocol (UKGI00008348). I
have had sight of document UKGI00008347 entitled “Proposed Agenda and
Attendees”. This may be Annex 5, created in anticipation of a meeting on 10
September 2018.
122. For some reason the meeting did not go ahead on 10 September 2018 but was
instead re-scheduled for 17 October 2018.
123. I received a briefing paper for the meeting on 17 October 2018 drafted by POL
(POL00111214). The briefing was extensive, although section 2 setting out the
background to the litigation was relatively short.
124. Paragraph 2.3 of the briefing provided some more detail to that which I had
received in May 2018: “Post Office appointed independent forensic accountants
Second Sight to perform a ‘top down’ examination of Horizon. Second Sight issued
a report in July 2013 which concluded there was no evidence of system-wide
(systemic) problems with the Horizon software but identified some areas where
Post Office could have done more to support individual postmasters’. Brief details
of the Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme were also provided.
125. Paragraph 2.11 of the briefing stated that “in recent years, the focus of the
complaints by postmasters has expanded from issues with the Horizon IT system,
to the alleged “unfairness” of the contract between Post Office and postmasters.
Despite significant lobbying by the JFSA of Parliament and through the media,
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Post Office’s position has not altered, and consider that these disputes are now
best resolved through the Courts”.
126. This informed me that POL maintained the robustness of their system and
instructed me that a “litigation-foremost” approach was being taken; that is, the
resolution of the SPMs complaints was inexorably tied to the outcome of the
litigation.
127. The document then set out POL’s contingency plans (POL00111214 at paragraph
5 and Appendices C to E and D). I was also provided with a separate short
document entitled “Post Office: Horizon Trial Contingency Planning” for the 17
October meeting (UKGI00008519).
128. In advance of that meeting, I also received a briefing from BEIS officials
(UKG100021538 ). It correctly identified that the POL Briefing paper was “quite
light on risks and mitigating actions, as well as on indicating likelihood of
outcomes. You may want to press POL for more detail on the implications for the
business and the shareholder’.
129. Reflecting on POL’s briefing paper (POL00111214) I consider that the document
was not sufficient for me to understand the issues properly. I now know that a
number of external reports together with legal advice on those reports were vital
to the history of these issues. In my view ministers and I should have been briefed
on the contents of the Deloitte reports and Second Sights reports. We should have
been provided with copies of the Clarke advices, Linklaters’ advice and the Swift
Review. We should have been provided with the history on the existence of bugs,
errors or defects with Horizon and the steps taken to investigate them — which
were extensive — and their conclusions. Those matters were highly material to
achieving justice for SPMs and in properly understanding that POL’s prospects of
success in this litigation were, in fact, always poor. Furthermore, we should have
been made aware that there were important remedial steps recommended by
Jonathan Swift QC that had not been actioned, indeed had not even been shared
with the Board.
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Initial work on settlement
130. I do not recall when I first raised the issue of settlement, but it would likely have
been at the time I received a briefing on the litigation in May 2018. It would also
have been on my mind as I prepared for the legal meeting originally scheduled for
10 September, On 11 October 2018 I emailed HMT in order to prepare the ground
for settlement discussions (UKGI00008556).
131. POL’s Articles of Association required POL to have shareholder approval for any
spend over £50m. Given the requirements of Managing Public Money, any
settlement sum required the approval of HMT as well as BEIS Ministers. Further,
it seemed possible that ongoing investment would be needed if there was to be
wholesale change required to the SPM contractual relationship with POL and/or
the Horizon system. This is why I invited a representative of HMT to attend the 17
October meeting as I saw it as “the main opportunity before the trial starts to get
all the key stakeholder’s together to agree a common approach, including
discussing the impact on POL’s financial position, the issue of settlement and
POL’s approach more generally to mitigate against the risks posed”.
132. I could see from the beginning that resolution of these issues was bound up with
the litigation. That was obviously so with regard to relations with SPMs but also in
respect of the robustness of Horizon itself. There seemed no other way to get
through these issues than to conclude the litigation. However, the litigation was
bound to be time-consuming and expensive, and risked deferring resolution of the
issues and of justice for SPMs. This is why I opened the doors for settlement and
made those enquiries with HMT early on, and thereafter increasingly pushed for
settlement as a means to recognise failings, provide compensation and set about
repairing POL and its relations with SPMs.
133. There was not any serious discussion at the 17 October meeting about settling
the claim. To the best of my recollection this was due to POL’s overriding concern
that if it settled the group claim without a binding judgment on the facts there was
a risk of more claims being brought in the future. There was also a concern that
complex and repercussive legal questions of construction regarding the
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contractual relationship between POL and SPMs did not lend themselves to
voluntary settlement. This is, in short, what was recorded in the briefing document
at paragraphs 7.2(ii) and (iii) (POLOO111214).
February to May 2019 and the Common Issues Judgment
134. On 4 February 2019 I wrote to POL’s Chair, Tim Parker, with the Department's
Strategic Priorities for POL for the coming year (POL00132258). I made it clear,
as stated at the October 2018 meeting, that “Government needs to be kept fully
appraised of developments, ahead of decisions being taken”. As mentioned, we
had ongoing concerns that BEIS were not being fully sighted on the litigation. I
recall his was a strong concern of the Minister, Kelly Tolhurst MP, and one that we
did take up with POL on a number of occasions.
135. I recall in this period again raising the issue of settlement, probably with Tom
Cooper and possibly with my private office. I remember being told that there was
no prospect of settlement at this stage as POL remained confident in its position
and prospects. Periodically I continued to ask about settlement, and I raised it
directly at a later stage with POL. My concern was that the litigation was dragging
on and using up time, money and goodwill. POL and their legal advisers resisted
this and continued to pursue the litigation. As well as maintaining their own case
was sound, they continued to argue there were fundamental issues at stake,
including the nature of the relationship with SPMs, and a financial settlement
would not resolve this, nor could it bring a comprehensive solution.
136. On 4 March 2019 I had a meeting with Secretary of State Greg Clark about POL
including the Horizon litigation (UKGI00009125). I then met with Tim Parker and
thereafter sent a note of advice to Mr Clark dealing with, among other things, the
litigation and the appointment of the CFO Al Cameron as Interim CEO
(BEIS0001150 ; UKGI00009137).
137. My advice was that the Department should not be seeking permission for advance
notice of the judgment in the Common Issues trial on the basis that the Department
was not a party to the litigation, which had been brought against POL. POL had
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long exercised a high level of operational independence as a public company and
the Department’s view had always been that POL should account for its own
actions before the court. The Department needed to be able to respond objectively
and decisively to the outcome of the litigation and did not want to line itself up in
defence of POL. The Department was a separate body that had not been party to
POL’s actions or decision making as it pertained to the litigation. This was a point
I made to Greg Clark and Kelly Tolhurst in my note of 5 March 2019
(UKG100009137).
138. I was provided with a readout from that meeting with Tim Parker (UKGI00042465
). Of note in respect of the litigation was that I “went over the lessons learned from
the Magnox inquiry. These included: board should have substantive briefing from
the QC and not solely rely on the assessments of the CEO and that the advice on
appeal needs to be well thought through’.
139. I made the point on a number of occasions that greater thought was needed in
respect of POL’s contingency planning and settlement. Ministers, BEIS officials,
and I had real concerns about the litigation at the time and did not share POL’s
confidence that the litigation was relatively low risk and would likely conclude
overall in POL’s favour. My own view was that the consequences in the event that
POL lost the litigation would be significant. Not only was a financial contingency
necessary, but POL would need to be front footed in its repair of its relationship
with SPMs and in respect of the loss of the public’s trust and confidence in the
event of failure at trial. POL did not engage as substantively with the contingency
planning process as was required because, in my view, they continued to
overestimate their prospects of success at trial.
140. This is why I impressed upon Mr Parker at my March 2019 meeting with him that
the Board needed direct independent legal advice rather than relying on the
analysis and assessment of POL’s executive team and established legal advisers
alone. My concern was that the Board must be making decisions based on best
possible advice and fully appraised of the relevant risks.
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141. On 8 March 2019, I was copied to a submission for the minister regarding the start
of the Horizon Issues trial. It set out the matters in dispute and that written legal
updates should be expected under the existing Protocol (BEISO000066 ).
142. On 15 March 2019, I received notification of the judgment in the Common Issues
trial. I was initially briefed by Tom Cooper at UKGI(UKG100018997) before having
a number of discussions with BEIS officials, minister Kelly Tolhurst, and Secretary
of State Greg Clark.
143. The Judgment was resoundingly critical of POL and unexpected in its severity and
extent. Whilst I had been briefed that POL were unlikely to succeed on every issue,
the Judgment was devastating to POL on every key matter. I was shocked to read
of how reprehensibly SPMs had been treated by POL. My immediate thought was
that the legal advice POL received appeared to have been consistently completely
wrong. I was keen to ensure that, first, POL would change its litigation strategy,
second, that we could understand what the potential liabilities were, and third, how
POL would start on remediation and reform.
144. I relayed to Kelly Tolhurst, who in turn relayed to Tim Parker, Al Cameron and
Jane MacLeod, that having independent legal advice in relation to strategy was
crucial now so as to guard against the existing legal team — both the in-house legal
experts and their long-standing external advisers - being wedded to the existing
approach (BEIS0001125 ). This echoed the advice I gave to Tim Parker when we
met in early March 2019.
The recusal application
145. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on document UKGI00009208 which is a
chain of emails dated 15 March 2019 between UKGI. BEIS legal was copied to
some of those emails. I was sent the first email (chronologically) in the chain only
and have not until now had sight of the other emails in that chain.
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146. The email chain concerns “a possible recusal application on the grounds of bias”.
Richard Watson of UKGI writes, “while we think it is OK for Alex to be informed we
don't not (sic) consider the shareholder should be involved in a decision whether
or not to make a recusal application. That is properly a matter for the POL board”.
Mr Watson asks for BEIS Legal input saying, “whilst I’m not convinced that there
is a conflict of interest I think that given the concern, rightly, that HMG should not
be seen as questioning the independence and integrity of the judiciary it feels
presentationally difficult for a director appointed by the shareholder to be involved
in the decision”.
147. The advice of Patrick Kilgarriff of BEIS legal in reply was that the function of the
Shareholder Representative in respect of this decision was to ensure that the
Board fully realised the seriousness of the proposed application, the impact on the
shareholder, and had taken proper legal advice. Also, that the Board “had reflected
properly on whether there was a bias or (painful as it is) inferences drawn
ultimately properly from hearing the evidence expressed in pithy and robust
language”. Mr Kilgarriff's conclusion was that contingent upon those matters, the
Shareholder Representative could “stand back from the decision to take the
challenge or not’. Richard Watson forwarded those emails to Tom Cooper of UKGI
saying “/ think Patrick’s view is a sensible one i.e. flag the things the board need
to be cognisant of but not to be part of the formal board decision”.
148. On 19 March 2019 I was copied to an email from a UKGI official which aims, as I
understand it, to summarise the outcome of the above correspondence: “The
advice from BEIS Legal and UKGI Legal is that BEIS officials/Ministers and the
shareholder NED should not be involved in POL’s formal decision-making on the
recusal application, although they may participate in discussions and hear the
advice from POL’s legal team” (BEIS0001147 ).
149. I was also told that “POL have taken additional legal advice from very senior
barristers who have not had any prior involvement in the case and so have an
independent viewpoint. While the legal advice could change, the current legal
advice is a clear recommendation in favour of seeking a recusal. Tom Cooper's
feedback from the recent POL board call on this topic is that the board are not
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enthusiastic about making this application but feel there is no option given the
additional legal advice received. This is particularly the case given that the second
trial is currently being heard by the same judge and includes testimony from
witnesses who have been discredited in the first judgment’.
150. That same email sets out the possible grounds of appeal. I believe I became aware
of a possible appeal on or around 16 March 2019 following a meeting between
Greg Clark, Kelly Tolhurst and UKGI (UKGI00009213). I am sure Tom Cooper
would also have briefed me on POL’s initial thoughts regarding appeal.
151. Turning first to my views on the merits of the recusal application and responsibility
for decision making in respect of the application. On 19 March 2019 Tom Cooper
forwarded me an email from Jane MacLeod, General Counsel at POL, which
contained her opinion on the merits of the application together with papers drafted
by counsel (UKGI00009285; UKGI00009299). Mr Cooper told me that Norton
Rose (ie new solicitors - Womble Bond Dickinson had previously acted for POL)
had been instructed to advise POL’s Board and that UKGI would be meeting with
the Board together with solicitors and counsel the following day.
152. BEIS was unsupportive of the recusal attempt, deeming it unlikely to succeed and
too likely to aggravate the situation and prolong the litigation process, which we
saw as the only means by then available of resolving the dispute definitively and
to achieving a just resolution. Greg Clark, Kelly Tolhurst and I all expressed
ourselves in our own way but clearly all had real reservations about the recusal.
153. I thought it was the wrong move strategically and presentationally, as well as on
the substance. I told Mr Cooper the same in reply to his email (UKGI00009299). I
said that I did not find Justice Fraser “(to my layman’s mind) obviously wrong or
biased” and that the application “risks further antagonising him (if unsuccessful)
and also positioning POL in public as aggressive and in denial about its
shortcomings (which impression would be consistent with the judge’s findings to
date).”
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154. That said, my view, together with those of others in BEIS and UKGI, was that POL
had applied themselves to the facts and risks, and had availed themselves of the
best possible advice. I had seen and read the Neuberger opinion and so while
retaining my reservations I was conscious there was a plausible legal argument to
make, as set out by a former President of the Supreme Court.
155. As such, I relayed to Mr Cooper that it appears that POL had sought “the best
external counsel (not just the current legal team)” and had properly recognised
that “a recusal attempt is a high bar and presents significant risks”. As such I stated
that “proceeding with the appeal and recusal attempt risks identifying the
organisation’s leadership today with the negative historic behaviour of which POL
stands accused. But it is not obviously mistaken or otherwise inappropriate”.
156. It was also clear that the department (and UKGI) took the view that the decision
was for POL as the defendant in the litigation and accepted that it should not doa
volte-face on its longstanding and well-based position that BEIS was not a party
to nor controlling the litigation. This was the view throughout. From my own
experience in government the question of who has responsibility for decision
making is an important one and the answer should be made absolutely clear. I
made the point that POL had correctly identified that it was the responsibility of
the POL Board to make that decision. I therefore said to Mr Cooper that “the
Department should maintain its clearly distinct and detached position, so that it is
free and credible for dealing with the consequences as they unfold. Minsters may
want to show appropriate concern about the criticism and may express a desire
for POL to act appropriately but should not comment substantively in ongoing
litigation in which the department has a clear interest but no direct involvement’.
157. Mr Watson replied asking whether “we are agreed that we should not try to
engineer a position today whereby if the board decided to proceed with recusal
the Minister is given a chance to object’. I agreed that “we should not so engineer
a position — that would make the Department into a directing force in the litigation,
which is neither correct nor prudent’ (UKGI0000931 1).
158. This view that BEIS should not seek to supplant POL in making the recusal
decision was somewhat reflective of concerns voiced by legal advisers (as we
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have seen) regarding the separation of powers, and government not being seen
to question the independence and integrity of the judiciary through a recusal
attempt. But the core concern was that if BEIS directed POL in how to behave in
respect of the proposed application, then that would have created a direct, ongoing
and irrecoverable risk for the government in terms of the overall ownership and
direction of the litigation.
159. POL had been conducting this litigation for years. If BEIS had intervened to seek
to direct POL’s Board that they could or could not make an application in their
litigation, the government could be exposed to assuming the risks of the litigation
that it had no hand, to date, in defending. Not only were their potential financial
exposures for the taxpayer in that approach, for example the risk of being
responsible for payment of the entirety of any damages awarded, but the
Department wanted POL to own the consequences of the litigation. The
Department wanted POL to feel accountable for the necessary redress,
remediation and repair that followed the adverse judgment. Had the Department
“blocked” POL from making the recusal application then POL could have used that
intervention as an excuse to not take ownership of its failures. If the Department
had replaced POL as the directing force in the litigation, then this would have
risked giving POL cover for not learning the lessons required, for not making
cultural and practical changes, and for not repairing its relationship with SPMs.
160. I understand that Greg Clark’s view was that the litigation needed to run its full
course before those aims could be achieved (INQ00001181 , 25 July 2024, page
192 line 20 to page 193 line 14). There was a slight point of difference between
us in that my view settlement could bring about earlier financial resolution together
with genuine reformations to culture and practice; and indeed the terms of the
settlement when it finally came did make provision for POL to make some of those
changes. But fundamentally we were united in seeing the litigation as the means
to force an overhaul in POL’s whole approach.
161. What is less clear to me is how the Department's doubts and disapprobation on
the recusal application were actually conveyed to POL Board and what effect it
had.
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162. Kelly Tolhurst spoke to the POL executives on 15 March 2019, before the
proposed application had been communicated to the Department. I understand
that initially the Board were not in favour of making the application. I do not recall
speaking directly with POL and instead shared my views with the government's
shareholder representative, Tom Cooper. Mr Cooper clearly saw, agreed with, and
accepted my view, but I do not know how in practice that doubt and disapprobation
were communicated to POL’s Board ahead of the decision in respect of the
application.
163. I am aware now that Tom Cooper was advised to recuse himself from the meeting.
I do not recall being aware of this discussion at the time and I was not asked then
for my view as to whether Mr Cooper should absent himself from the decision.
164. This decision did not, however, inhibit Mr Cooper from conveying the
Department's views and BEIS expected him to do so. I expected that Mr Cooper
would participate in the discussion, and in so doing relay the Department's
objections as indicated in Stephen Clarke's (UKGI) email of advice dated 19 March
2019 (BEISO001147 ).
165. My understanding from listening to the evidence given by Tom Cooper to the
Inquiry was that he did not participate in any discussion with the Board regarding
the recusal application as he had interpreted our correspondence as a clear
instruction to “stay out of this thing” (INQ00001172 , 10 July 2024, page 94, line
8).
166. There was clearly a failure of communication or interpretation here between BEIS
and UKGI. Notwithstanding that, there was no basis upon which the POL Board
could have thought they had support of government for the application, albeit the
extent of the concerns may not have been sufficiently communicated.
167. The Inquiry has asked me to consider document UKGI00009303 which is a chain
of emails dated 13 to 20 March 2019 between POL and UKGI. Tom Cooper
forwarded that chain to me for my information. In that email alternatives to recusal
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were discussed. It does not appear that the strong opposition by the Department
to the application was picked up on in that email chain. In any event, a decision
was taken on 20 March 2019 to go ahead with the proposed application
(BEIS0001151 ), the alternatives not being pursued.
168. Instead of the Judgment being a wakeup call for POL and the spur they needed
to take responsibility and understand the need for change, POL’s reaction was
one of denial and defence. In launching the recusal application, POL
demonstrated that they considered the problem was with the Judgment and not
with them. This strengthened the department in its view that POL needed change
and this would need to begin at the top.
Changes in POL’s leadership
169. Following Paula Vennells’ retirement from POL, of which BEIS was formally
informed in November 2018 although it had been signalled earlier in the year, both
Minister Kelly Tolhurst and I were keen to appoint an external candidate as CEO.
We were both of the view that an external appointment for CEO would help bring
a fresh start and open up what we had come to see as a close and defensive
culture among the top leadership at POL (BEISO001134 ). The need for a fresh
start was made particularly clear by the Common Issues judgment which was
highly critical of POL’s conduct. We were sceptical that this could be achieved
through the appointment of an internal candidate. The difficulty was that there was
so little internal bench strength to replace Paula Vennells, with only one internal
candidate for interim CEO, and finding an external candidate would take some
time. This led to the appointment of Alisdair Cameron, then CFO and COO, as
interim CEO.
170. This is the context for the exchange between me and Ms Tolhurst on 20 March
2019 (BEISO001148 ). Ms Tolhurst said to me “/ agree we need an interim but I’m
very unhappy about not having a process in place or agreed in regards to
recruitment plan for new CEO and it would not be at all satisfactory for this to drag
on. I am getting increasingly concerned about what's going on with the post office”.
My response was that I “totally share your dissatisfaction (and have shared with
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POL and UKGI) and your worries. That said we need to help them get out of a
hole — even though they helped make it’.
171. It was not satisfactory to keep an interim CEO in place when the organisation
needed a complete turnaround and a public resetting in its mission. The minister
was keen that Alisdair Cameron was not automatically appointed as CEO after the
interim period (hori002:00041528 SAC). POL'’s Chair, Tim Parker, subsequently
recommended Alisdair Cameron for the permanent role of CEO. The Minister with
my support rejected this proposal in favour of an external appointment as being in
the best interests of the organisation (UKGI00010410). As I said to Tom Cooper
on 19 June 2019 in relation to the internal appointment of a permanent CEO, “quite
a lot of negative stuff about company culture comes through from litigation.
Arrogant and unwilling to see it’s (sic) own faults” (BEISO001162 ).
172. I spoke to Mr Parker on 10 July 2019 regarding the appointment of an external
candidate, Nick Read. Mr Parker expressed his disappointment noting how
unusual it was for a Chair to be overruled on a CEO appointment (BEIS0001163
). Subsequently Tim Parker with support from others on POL Board and from UKGI
gave their support for Nick Read as the most promising of the external candidates
identified through the recruitment process, and he was duly appointed in
September 2019.
A change in litigation strategy
173. On 2 April 2019 I was notified by Tom Cooper (UKGI00009505) that POL had
decided to change its external legal team with a mandate to “revisit the approach
to the litigation (both substance and tone)... and the strategy for reaching
resolution”. Mr Cooper wrote that “this is a very positive development in my view”
and I would have agreed.
174. On 23 April 2019, I was copied to a briefing on the Post Office from UKGI jointly
with the BEIS Policy team (BEISO001109 ; UKGIO0009590_ ;
hori002:00012491_SAC). That briefing was for a meeting with UKGI officials that
day. The briefing mainly but not exclusively concerned shareholder and corporate
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governance matters. I see that it refers to the appointment of a new external legal
team saying, “the Board is looking for a material change in substance and tone”. I
would have been encouraged by this as this matched the departmental view that
the March 2019 judgment was highly critical of POL’s conduct of litigation. We
were sceptical of the previous legal team whose approach to litigation seemed,
we thought, overly defensive and narrow.
175. In my view, this document showed that the range of ‘oversight’ issues were very
properly being considered, both classic shareholder/corporate type issues, for
example the new CEO, dividend policy, investment facility, but also more strategic
and policy-oriented, for example postmaster remuneration.
176. I met with UKGI officials on 24 April 2019 to discuss the litigation and POL more
broadly. I can see from the read-out of the meeting (UKGI00009606) that my
overwhelming concern was “to ensure that POL gets high quality legal advice, that
the Board takes responsibility and that we move towards a just solution”. I did
express my concerns regarding settlement; first that the window for settlement
discussions may or may not reopen depending on the outcome of the appeal or
recusal, and second that in any event the chances of achieving a settlement were
probably quite low given the large number of claimants. My view remained
steadfast that “POL needs to repair the damage to POL’s brand and make sure
that it is behaving as we would expect’. I was concerned that the decisions on
litigation strategy that POL had taken in respect of the recusal and appeal were
compounding and affirming the very serious criticisms made of it by Mr Justice
Fraser.
177. On 9 May 2019, the Court of Appeal refused POL’s application for permission to
appeal the Judgment in the recusal application stating that the application “never
had any substance and was rightly rejected by the Judge”.
178. On 23 May 2019, POL’s application for permission to appeal the judgment in the
Commons Issues trial was refused. The Judgment again criticised POL for its
handling of the case and expressed concerns about the escalating costs of the
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litigation overall. I understood that POL’s preferred next step was to seek appeal
before the Court of Appeal.
179. On 23 May 2019, I attended part of a UKGI Board meeting (UKGI00009838. Items
6 to 8 of the minutes). It was recorded that given the repeated failures in legal
strategy and ongoing judicial criticism that “it was felt that may be necessary to
consider wider changes that would effect a change of the culture that had led to
this position”.
180. In advance of that meeting, I had the benefit of a note from Carl Creswell setting
out his views having been in post for roughly two months. He told me that, “The
POL Chair and CEO also seem slightly complacent to me and at risk of not hearing
the Minister's concern about their judgment on issues like the litigation”
(BEISO001143 ). This was my impression also. I felt at that time that change
always seemed to be down the line and POL were not willing to grasp the nettle.
My view was that POL should at least try to settle the litigation and start the
process of remediation and repair. I was frustrated that it was taking so long to
make progress and resolve these issues when it was by this time clear that POL’s
position in the litigation was seriously compromised.
181. On 5 June 2019, I raised with Tom Cooper the issues surrounding POL’s potential
liabilities in the litigation. I was concerned that still very little had been scoped in
terms of planning. I said to Mr Cooper that “the Minister quite reasonably expects
the company to have made some estimates of exposures under various scenarios.
Not having seen them she may feel they don’t exist. I don’t know whether she
knows about - or has been briefed on - the relevant FRS but quite possibly not.
From memory this requires provisions to be made when sufficiently specific in
time, quantum and probability; I can see why this threshold might not yet be met;
also why one would not want to advertise worst or expected losses to potential
beneficiaries. So I would organise a brief note to explain the situation and the
constraints and risks that apply. And offer a more detailed breakdown perhaps
lawyer-to-lawyer to provide reassurance that proper estimation is occurring, while
preserving legal privilege” (BEISO001166 ).
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182. I had very frequent internal meetings at this time regarding POL, with matters
discussed at the weekly “industry meeting” and at my one-to-ones with the
Secretary of State. It was our shared view at that time that we were very concerned
about POL (BEIS0001145 ).
183. Kelly Tolhurst informed me that she considered making a radical change to the
composition of the POL Board and wanted to meet formally to discuss taking that
step. BEIS drafted a note for me and for Ms Tolhurst explaining the composition
of the Board so that we could talk through possible solutions when we met on 10
June (WITN10930111 ). I know that Ms Tolhurst wrote to Tim Parker asking for
him to essentially “consider his position” (UKGI00019116) and that she had “been
thinking about what further action Government could take to challenge the POL
Board” (BEIS0001111 ).
184. I met with Greg Clark and Kelly Tolhurst on 10 June 2019 to discuss the options
Ministers had to address concerns over the management of the ongoing litigation
(BEIS0001108; UKGI00026905 ; UKG100026906 ). The Minister and Secretary of
State were provided with a submission by BEIS (Gavin Lambert and Craig
Watson) for that meeting to which I was copied. The recommendations included
in the submission included:
a. Challenging the POL Chair and Board to review their litigation strategy and
consider opportunities for early settlement and set out a plan to do that.
b. I Commissioning POL to carry out a project on how to structure and operate a
settlement, including a fund which would assess claims, consider effect, and
award compensation according to pre-agreed criteria.
c. BEIS Ministers “to state publicly that they want to see justice resulting from
litigation for claimants with valid claims”.
d. Challenge POL to announce that it is “taking on board some of the legitimate
criticism in the judgments to date and is taking action to address them”.
e. Putting UKGI lead legal counsel or another legal adviser on the POL litigation
subcommittee as director or observer.
f. Invite Nigel Boardman, chair of the BEIS Audit and Risk Committee, to carry
out independent due diligence on POL’s litigation strategy.
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g. Put in place clear information-sharing arrangements via the proposed
Framework Agreement with POL.
185. The options set out in the schedule (Annex A to the submission)
(hori002:00004698_SAC) ranged from challenging the existing POL Board to
changing the litigation strategy through to replacing the POL Board or BEIS
assuming control of the litigation. The submission set out that “forcing further
changes to the leadership team will risk disrupting the progress POL have been
making in other areas of the operation of the business’.
186. It was concluded that the steps set out above at sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) were
the more prudent and in the best interests of POL rather than the more radical
changes to the Board which may have been originally envisaged. I am aware that
Kelly Tolhurst took those matters up with Tim Parker and Alisdair Cameron when
she met them on 24 June 2019.
187. I was supportive of those measures for the reasons set out in the 11 June 2019
submission in preparation for that 24 June 2019 meeting (BEISO001144 ;
BEIS0000075 ). At that time, and knowing what I did then, I sympathised with
ministers’ decision not to take the most extreme step of sacking the entire Board.
Our shared view then was that it would not have been in the interests of SPMs or
POL’s millions of customers to have a totally leaderless POL. The better option
was to appoint new executive leadership, prompt POL to appoint new legal
advisers, increase UKGI and BEIS oversight of POL, and apply pressure to
resolve the legal proceedings; all of which we did. Had we known then what we
now know, I consider it likely that ministers would have taken even more decisive
action at that time in respect of POL’s leadership. I address those matters below.
188. On 23 July 2019, I was emailed by Tom Cooper with POL’s proposals for
performance bonuses for approval by the Remuneration Committee. Mr Cooper
supported the proposal and wanted my views. I replied saying that whilst I
appreciated the need to respect contracts and that the financial performance of
POL had been quite strong, “the judgements in this case from both the High Court
and the Appeal Court reflect very poorly not only on the Post Office as it has been
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but the Post Office as it has prepared for and conducted this litigation. I do not
accept that this is all from yesteryear or can be blamed largely on one legal
executive. There is a shared accountability. On all scenarios considerable damage
has been done to the Post Office’s reputation, and tens of millions (conservatively
calculated) of costs run up in a company that depends on continuing public
subsidy and is expected to perform an important public role to the highest
standard”. I recommended that the POL Board and the Remuneration Committee
should “make a_ significant deduction to the executive remuneration”
(UKGI00010443).
189. I think that Tom Cooper was probably too invested in the Board’s thinking on this
issue and perhaps lacked the objectivity that you would expect to see from the
Shareholder’s representative.
190. I followed up that steer formally in a letter to Tom Cooper on 29 July 2019
(BEIS0000085). I noted, in addition to the above points, that the payment of
bonuses should take in to account the wider context and, “in particular, reports of
postmasters struggling due to falling remuneration as well as the criticism levied
at POL in relation to the Company’s culture, treatment of postmasters’. The
Department's view was that executive bonuses should only be paid at a much-
reduced amount until tangible improvements to POL’s culture and practices had
been proven. This is what I relayed to Mr Parker and to UKGI.
191. On 30 July 2019 I spoke to Mr Parker on the telephone to discuss the bonus
position. Mr Parker provided me with another proposal on bonuses which again I
found to be misjudged. I said to Mr Parker that, “whilst the liabilities may be for
future accounts, they (Mr Justice Fraser's Judgments) are very critical of the
leadership of POL, and the executive had a role to play. If large payments were
made to the executive this year, then there would be not holding to account those
who have overseen the litigation’. I concluded that those who had the capacity to
oversee the issues raised in the litigation, the senior team, should have this
reflected in their discretionary bonus this year and next year with a “substantial
reduction” made (BEIS0001 167 ).
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192. On 29 July 2019, I was provided with a briefing on the litigation. I was informed
that POL was developing its settlement strategy with Nigel Boardman and that an
initial mediation was planned for September/October (POL00438030 ). Mr
Boardman chaired the BEIS Audit and Risk Committee after a long career as a
solicitor at Slaughter and May, BEIS ministers valued his counsel and wanted him
to bring additional external independent challenge to the litigation approach, as
recommended in the submission discussed with ministers on 10 June.
193. On 6 September 2019 I wrote to Nick Read, congratulating him on his appointment
and setting out the Department's expectations in terms of governance and
financial management, as well as other matters (POL00288398. I sent a similar
letter to Alisdair Cameron when he was appointed interim CEO: UKGI00010163).
194. I attended the UKGI Board meeting in September 2019. I have seen a readout
from this meeting which records that I had spoken of “a disconnect between POL’s
Board and BEIS. This had ‘shaken our confidence’. Highlighted the issue around
STIP bonus payments in the summer, as well as the handling of the litigation”
(UKGI00016078).
195. That “disconnect’ between POL and BEIS concerned the litigation and the
proposals regarding bonuses. POL seemed to be dug into litigation and not
realising the need to learn lessons and effect change. BEIS had been giving the
same steer for a year or more and POL had been unable to listen to and accept
the need for tangible change. Like the recusal application, its appeal, and the
appeal of the Common Issues Judgment, POL had again misjudged the situation
in respect of bonuses and failed to appreciate the reality of the situation.
196. That guidance was recorded by UKGI in its Quarterly Update on POL
(BEIS0001127 ). I stressed at the UKGI Board meeting that the litigation had
exposed historic failings in POL’s dealing with SPMs and POL’s complacency in
preparing for and reacting to the adverse judgment. I said that the bonuses issue
reflected the same. I said that “culture change must become a primary focus for
the senior leadership of POL and especially its Chair, Tim Parker’. Encouragingly,
POL’s Board had a discussion on corporate culture at September's Board
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meeting, with Tom Cooper of UKGI suggesting that POL commission an
“organisational health check’ to provide a better picture of the current situation. I
understand that this work was conducted, as set out below.
197. The Inquiry has provided me with document POL00284970 which is an email from
Ben Foat, POL’s General Counsel, to Nick Read (POL’s new CEO) dated 26
September 2019. I was not sighted to this email, and it was sent in advance of my
introductory meeting with Mr Read on 30 September 2019.
198. The email summarises some key issues such as the move to the new Framework
Document. Mr Foat notes that “we have already discussed the context of GLO
where Alex’s view was that POL should have mediated and settled the case. As
discussed, he clearly was correct about this and you can provide reassurance that
there has been a change of: - leadership and management (new QC; HSF being
appointed; change of internal legal lead) given some of the strategic errors and a
need to avoid group think; - strategy to one that embrace(s) alternative dispute
resolution”.
199. It is disappointing that it took over a year for POL’s leadership to recognise the
importance of settlement negotiations as a key part of the litigation strategy. It is
perhaps even more disheartening that POL needed to change pretty much the
entirety of its legal team, both internal and external, to get away from the defensive
groupthink that had held back its whole approach to the litigation.
200. I was briefed in advance of my meeting with Nick Read on 30 September 2019
(BEISO000955 ; UKGI00016309 ; UKGI00010606 ; UKGI00010561 ). In respect
of the litigation it was noted, “emphasise that the judgement of the first trial and
the verdict associated with the failed bid to recuse the Judge were damning about
the approach and culture of the Post Office, and this needs to be reflected in both
how the company approaches the ongoing trials and how it treats the litigants with
regard to any potential settlement, but also, in how the company behaves towards
its agents’. The meeting was also an opportunity to work with POL on the Long
Term Vision for POL that the BEIS Policy Team were drafting with UKGI.
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201. I have since been provided with a read out of that meeting (UKGI00018641). It is
noted that I gave my view on how POL handled the litigation, “recounting that POL
were initially very confident and seemingly dismissive of BEIS concerns — recusal
attempt was not a good call’. I said that the judgments were very critical of both
POL’s culture and the way it conducted the litigation and that it was important now
that “POL has since taken on board findings and taking steps to reset relationships
with postmasters". I said that POL must “think hard about what it says about the
organisation and its culture” and that the litigation judgment can now be used as
“an opportunity to accelerate much-needed change”. I made clear that the POL
recommendation of 100% bonuses did not reflect well on them and had left me
with the sense that the POL team did not view the judgment as their responsibility.
This was part of the “disconnect’ that I had raised at the UKGI Board meeting in
September 2019.
202. It was an open and frank discussion and one which I think Nick Read appreciated.
POL’s behaviour had to that point been marked by repeated and damaging errors
of judgment. My view was that the litigation could be used as a ‘burning platform’
to drive real change in leadership, culture and practice at POL. Nick Read
appeared to listen with interest and concern and I remember thinking he had
conveyed a genuine desire to turn the ship around.
203. One of the matters mentioned to me by Mr Read at that meeting was his aim to
“establish clear purpose/vision — mentioned feedback from colleagues on ‘lack of
clarity’ around mission”. I think that concern may have arisen from POL struggling
to reconcile financial priorities such as reducing dependence on public subsidy
with its social purpose as a public institution. I address that matter in more detail
below.
204. I believe I made those matters absolutely clear to POL in my letter to Tim Parker
of January 2020 (UKGI00011146) outlining the Department's Strategic Priorities
for POL for the year. These included,
a. “agree(ing) to start to deliver a new strategy, which should clarify POL’s
vision and simplify the business. It should prioritise culture change and
must have the buy in of employees and postmasters.”
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b. “Work with the department on an SR bid and development of a long-term
policy vision under which POL will deliver the products and services that
Support a renewed social purpose.”
c. “Build a more productive relationship with postmasters that helps them
to deliver better services to consumers. We would like to see an update on
the OHI and postmaster surveys to gauge performance.”
205. I was provided with a briefing for a meeting with Nick Read on 17 October 2019
(BEIS0001126 ; UKGI00024480 ). I did not end up attending that meeting, but
Kelly Tolhurst and Carl Creswell did. This was an introductory meeting. The clarity
of POL’s mission was a key element of that brief, stating “explain that you have
asked the policy team to address strategic questions on the future role of the post
office. Emphasise that the aim of this work is to develop a clear aspiration for
Government on the future post office”.
206. In respect of the litigation the briefing stated, “BE/S and POL communications
must be aligned in preparation for the imminent Horizon judgment. POL should
maximise this opportunity by striking the right balance in its communications to
signal a change in its litigation approach since the failed recusal attempt’. The
Department continued to apply pressure on POL to approach the litigation anew
and shift the focus from defensiveness to working towards a resolution.
207. The Inquiry has provided me with a “steering brief” for the meeting authored for
POL for the benefit of Nick Read and Patrick Bourke (POL00286851). I did not of
course see this document at the time. It states, “while have (sic) a decent working
relationship with the teams at both BEIS and UKGI, you should use this first
meeting to begin to develop a more direct link with the Minister. Although the
meeting is scheduled to last just 30 mins, Kelly often overruns and, now Alex
Chisholm is no longer attending, the conditions are potentially better for
developing rapport’.
208. I cannot assist the Inquiry with any authority regarding that comment; the
document was not written by or for me. To my mind, the most natural way to
interpret this is that a smaller meeting with only two principals could be an easier
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one in which to establish some kind of personal relationship or “rapport”. A
possible inference is that the meeting might be more challenging or less conducive
to rapport by virtue of my presence. I was often challenging of POL, and so this
too is a plausible explanation.
209. I met with Tim Parker on 31 October 2019. The Inquiry has provided me with
document POL00103682 which is another “steering brief’ authored by POL for the
benefit of Tim Parker ahead of our meeting. It states that “we understand that Alex
wishes to focus on the litigation, his expectations of the culture change which it
should prompt, and an early sense of the direction of travel for the business with
Nick’s PSG work’. This is entirely correct. The reference to PSG here is a
reference to Nick Read’s Purpose, Strategy and Growth work that was already
afoot. I was updated on the progress of that project on 25 October 2019 and its
three main phases (BEISO001154 ).
210. It goes on to say, “confidentially, we understand that he remains dissatisfied with
the final position arrived at after the bonus discussions which he considered to be
‘tone-deaf’ and he will likely return to this theme as part of a broader discussion
around Post Office culture, with the primary concern being for an improved
relationship with postmasters”. I have addressed the matter of bonuses above.
POL were right to discern my dissatisfaction with bonus payments, and my view
that POL needed to renew its organisational culture and repair its relationship with
postmasters.
211. The meeting with Tim Parker went ahead on 31 October 2019. I am not listed as
an attendee on the briefing, but I was present, and I received the submission for
the meeting (BEISO001130 ). The key objective was “to ensure Tim understands
our desire to see cultural change at POL”. I was told POL had commissioned an
Organisation Health Index survey to gauge the satisfaction of SPMs and
employees with POL. This was a piece of work to inform Nick Read’s PSG project.
It was noted that “POL’s culture needs to change and, as shareholder, we expect
the Chair and Board to be leading this” and that “the leadership’s decisions on the
litigation (such as the failed, expensive recusal attempt) and the proposal to pay
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bonuses in full appeared tone-deaf and complacent’, points on which I strongly
agree.
212. I have now seen Carl Creswell’s readout from the meeting. It records that I
“underlined the importance of culture and reputation”. I also note Mr Creswell’s
view that “Tim (Parker) was still quite defensive and his initial reply about how POL
would respond to a negative judgment was that they would commit to do more to
tackle errors, rather than seeming to accept any POL blame. Tim was also very
confident that the Horizon system would still be viable in any scenario”. Mr
Creswell’s view does accord with my own that POL were still defensive and slow
to accept any responsibility, even by the end of October 2019.
213. On 8 November 2019 I was provided with a briefing on the approach to mediation
which had been scheduled for 27/28 November (BEIS0000493 ). I knew from this
that POL would absorb up to £100m in settlement costs and should the settlement
sum be less than this then the expenditure would be funded entirely by POL.
214. On 15 November 2019 I was provided with a briefing on the approval for a
settlement offer in the litigation (BEISO001159 ). I was being asked to approve a
settlement sum up to £65m on the advice of POL’s litigation sub-group and the
BEIS/HMT/UKGI settlement working group. I was also provided with various
Annexes including a paper on POL’s approach to the mediation, an advice on
settlement drafted by POL’s legal advisers, and an advice regarding claimants
with convictions.
215. I read all of those documents and agreed with the proposed settlement range. I
noted that given the sums involved that I expected to be consulted at all steps of
the negotiation (UKGI00018578 ).
216. By way of background, the government has a somewhat mechanical ‘value for
money’ approach to the approval of settlements which is applied across all
litigation. The settlement sum is compared to the judgment sum that would
hypothetically be awarded at trial, according to an analysis of expected outcomes.
If the proposed settlement is below the hypothetical judgment award, then
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government would approve the settlement sum, unless there is some overriding
benefit to waiting for the final judgment, or some other offsetting disadvantage to
early settlement.
217. On 20 November 2019 I provided my view on the question of delaying the
mediation due to the dates now falling within the pre-election period
(BEIS0001131 ; BEISO001153 ). My advice was that the court's timetable should
be respected and take precedence. I was keen to get on with the mediation and
bring this matter to a resolution. In my judgment the settlement was “essential
business” which should be allowed to continue during the pre-election period
(BEISO001159 ).
218. On 3 December 2019, Tom Cooper of UKGI emailed me to ask for my view on
POL appointing two SPM NEDs to its Board (UKGI00017686). I replied positively,
it being a step towards “strengthen(ing) partnership and mutual respect between
the executive and postmasters”. However, aware that the Chair and other NEDs
might not welcome the addition of SPM NEDs, because of the possible impact on
Board dynamics, I provided an alternative, should POL’s Chair resist the initial
proposal — namely a stakeholder event at Board level biannually with postmaster
representatives. Ultimately two SPM NEDs were appointed, though not until 2021.
219. On 4 December 2019 I was emailed by Ben Foat, General Counsel at POL,
regarding the proposed terms for settlement. I provided comments the following
day (UKGI00010819 ; UKGI00010819). I was keen to understand the extent to
which the settlement was comprehensive against the likelihood that further civil
claims might be brought in the future. - this being a key concern raised by POL in
October 2018 when we first began the work to open the doors to settlement. I was
told that this settlement would resolve all the current claims but that future claims
were possible.
220. I was told by Ben Foat that the settlement was “quite a risk for the claimant
committee because they will be responsible for deciding who gets what by way of
compensation (and this could be disputed as all the claims are different). But that
isn’t POL’s problem”. I understood and accepted the point that, as in any litigation
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as I understand it, it was for the Claimant group through its legal representatives
to negotiate a figure with POL that they were comfortable settling at. It would then
be their decision as to how to divide the settlement sum achieved between the
claimant group.
221. On 10 December 2019 I was told by Ben Foat that the parties were close to
settlement. Carl Creswell had kept me fully abreast of the negotiations and terms
during this period (BEISO001160 ). I asked Mr Creswell to remind me of “the range
of potential costs for ‘historical shortfalls’? With some sense of more zone?...
Please also confirm how you/UKGI/GLD/POL see this as falling within the agreed
terms set by ministers ie how it achieved finality and comprehensiveness within
the acceptable sense of those words in the specific legal context’ (BEISO001161
).
222. I wanted to understand whether this would bring a full conclusion to the dispute or
came with ongoing liabilities and reputation risks for POL and HMG arising from
the settlement. I understood from Mr Creswell’s response to me that this
settlement would fully resolve the Claimant's claims, but that the potential costs to
POL and likely to HMG of compensating SPMs for historical shortfalls could be as
much as £9m according to an approximate estimation methodology.
223. I gave my consent to the settlement. The settlement sum was within the threshold
of £65m set by HMT and had been approved by BEIS, UKGI, POL and the
Government Legal Department. I understood that the terms of the settlement had
been negotiated and agreed by both parties with the benefit of proper legal advice
and was therefore mutually acceptable.
224. I was relieved that the matter had been concluded. Indeed, on 13 December 2019
I wrote to Carl Creswell, Tom Cooper and Richard Watson to express my thanks
to them for having a “firm grip” on the litigation and settlement negotiations
(UKGI00010937).Our focus could now be undivided in supporting POL to
implement the commitments made in the settlement and to begin on a remediation
of its culture. This would be informed by, but should not wait on, the independent
review which would undoubtedly be needed after such significant failings in POL.
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The Department and UKGI should also not delay in learning and applying lessons,
and for this purpose I commissioned advice on what ways we could further
strengthen the oversight and scrutiny applied to POL by BEIS and UKGI
(UKG100027361 ).
225. As noted above, with the litigation resolved POL’s attention could be undivided on
the reforms within POL that were so obviously and badly needed. On 9 January
2020, I wrote to Nick Read saying “in light of the recent settlement, I also remain
keen to hear about the implementation of further improvements in the culture of
the Company, including training and support for postmasters and any
consequential action required from the litigation” (UKG100016146). I asked for Mr
Read to provide me with a presentation on his PSG work.
226. It was universally recognised that the whole Horizon matter would need be subject
to further independent review, notwithstanding the highly detailed findings from
the High Court judgments in 2019. Initially I and others in BEIS were focused on
POL implementing necessary changes in light of the High Court's findings, the
settlement, and the internal change programme initiated within the organisation.
We wanted POL to focus on redress and reform, and were wary that a full external
inquiry might take years and incline the organisation towards justifying its actions
in the past rather than fixing the present and future. In the event the political
judgment was that nothing short of a full independent judge-led inquiry would
suffice, and the Prime Minister announced this on 26 February 2020
(UKGI0001 1062) (BEISO001 169 ).
227. I also recall inquiring about the resolution of cases brought before the CCRC, and
being told that these would likely be expedited now the civil litigation had
concluded and in such a decisive way (the Horizon Issues judgment having been
handed down in December) (UKG100026411; BEISO001138 ).
228. On 26 February 2020 I wrote to Tim Parker with the Department’s Strategic
Priorities for the coming year (POL00104200). The first priority was to “ensure full
implementation of the commitments made in the litigation settlement’. I asked for
Mr Parker to share his actions with me and to provide regular updates on progress.
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The second priority was “culture change, in particular building a more productive
relationship with postmasters”. I asked to see an update to the Occupational
Health survey and Mr Parker's plans on how he was to reflect the feedback and
implement a strategy.
229. On 12 March 2020 I met Nick Read together with BEIS and UKGI officials to
discuss progress on the matters I raised with him on 9 January 2020 and with Tim
Parker on 26 February 2020. I received a briefing for this meeting (UKGI00027296
). Whilst it does not record my attendance, I recall the meeting, and my presence
was recorded in a later submission (UKGI00011581). As set out, I was keen to
“seek an update from Nick on POL’s implementation of commitments following the
Horizon settlement’ and to “share developments on (an) independent review’.
BEIS remained “committed to establishing an independent review to ensure that
the Post Office has learned the necessary lessons and to provide an external
assessment of its work to rebuild its relationship with postmasters’.
Reflections
230. Much will no doubt have changed in POL and in the governance arrangements
involving UKGI and the Business Department since I ceased any involvement with
Postal matters in April 2020. So my comments address the reality as I perceived
it during my period of tenure at BEIS (July 2016 to April 2020), and are not a
commentary on the organisation and governance as it exists today.
231. The Inquiry has asked me to reflect on my time as Permanent Secretary and
provide my views as to whether those who I worked with fulfilled their roles or
responsibilities.
232. I found the civil servants that I worked with to be hardworking, honest and
effective. They did a diligent job, and at times had to show real fortitude and
resilience in the face of escalating challenges. I also found the ministers that I
worked with to clearly fulfil their roles, engaging meaningfully and productively with
the issues, particularly in driving POL to change their litigation strategy.
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233. The Inquiry has asked me to reflect on matters of culture or leadership at POL,
and the role played by government.
234. The relationship with POL was challenging and often frustratingly unproductive.
Even as we began to lose confidence in POL, we had no instant solution to
shortcomings in culture and conduct which were by then deeply embedded within
POL. In fairness to POL, I would add that the comments which follow are only a
partial picture; reflecting the impressions I personally formed during my time in the
department. Some of the comments are made with the benefit of hindsight and
having been provided with a number of documents by the Inquiry. The Inquiry has
seen and heard much more evidence and is better placed to judge the matter.
235. I was not a member of POL’s Board, and I did not know then all that we have learnt
since. I only experienced POL directly through meetings and written
communications, aided by the advice of UKGI and, later, the BEIS Post Office
Policy Team. Indirectly I was assisted by reading very carefully Lord Justice
Fraser's March 2019 judgment about the conduct and behaviour of POL. I also
observed POL’s response to events and in particular external challenge, whether
within the litigation or in Parliament or with the media or when their judgment on
appointments and bonuses were questioned by me and others in the department.
236. From this the impression I began to form was of a defensive and complacent
leadership, quick to reject external views and to explain away awkward facts. The
typical pattern was that POL would come to BEIS when consent was needed or in
response to direct requests. POL did not come across as wanting government
involvement and demonstrated an attitude throughout of providing information on
a “need-to-know’” basis.
237. I think that attitude is typified by the briefing paper I received from POL for the 17
October 2018 meeting (POL00111214 briefing paper for the meeting on 17
October 2018 drafted by POL). This encapsulates the way that POL presented the
litigation, without any regret or admission of even partial culpability, and in a tone
suggestive of resentment and indignation. Examples from that paper might include
POL pointing out the asymmetry in disclosure, that POL felt it did not receive fair
treatment in the courts on costs, that POL were dealing with errors at the points of
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sale or in usage, that they were up against an ‘offshore hedge fund’, and how POL
had been strenuous in making operational improvements. The document does
speak to a quality of self-deception as well as defensiveness in POL’s top level
leadership group.
238. I think that this weakness in POL also comes through in their failure to provide any
of those key underlying documents (POLO0028069; POL00006355;
POL00006357; POL00129453; POL00107317) which I have addressed earlier in
my statement to BEIS. My view is that taken together and as revealed
subsequently but not at the time, these documents and the POL’s handling of them
present a picture of a dysfunctional, self-deceiving organisation that was failing in
its public duty but in denial about this. It has taken a series of court actions, intense
media and parliamentary scrutiny, and this Inquiry, to reveal this picture in full.
POL misused the doctrine of operational independence and the requirements of
legal, commercial and data confidentiality to obscure its own weaknesses and
failings from the sponsoring department, from Parliament, and from the wider
public.
239. It is only from this Inquiry that we have learnt how POL had been involved in the
disgraceful actions identified in the Simon Clarke advices. The Inquiry provided
me with Mr Clarke’s advice of 15 July 2013 (POL00006357) and 2 August 2013
(POL00129453). As I have said, as far as I can recall and am aware now, neither
I nor BEIS received those documents. It is by virtue of considering them for the
purposes of this witness statement that I came to learn of POL’s failures to
disclose relevant material in the prosecutions and the destruction of relevant
evidence. Had I known what I know now it would have given me a different and
more strongly negative view of the organisation than I had at the time. POL was
an important public institution with an especial duty to treat its customers, staff and
partners fairly. The information that has come to light paints a more damning and
darker picture of POL than we were presented with at the time. Our confidence in
the Board and the Executive would have been dissipated if we had been fully
appraised of the proper information. I do not doubt that Ministers would have made
more decisive interventions in the leadership and oversight of POL if that
information had been provided to the department, as it should have been. POL
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should also have used it to examine more deeply its own culture and conduct, and
begun on the transformation required.
240. I worry that Tim Parker's failure to disclose the Swift Review to POL’s Board is an
example of POL falling into a state of self-deception regarding its position on the
Horizon IT system issues. Tim Parker was aware of the problems identified by
Jonathan Swift QC but evidently felt that he was prevented by legal considerations
from sharing the Swift Review with his own Board. I consider that this is indicative
of an attitude within POL that scrutiny of the company that might be difficult,
alarming or contrary to POL’s reputation should be avoided, or ring-fenced within
legal processes. In this case the invitation for scrutiny provided by the Swift
Review was denied because the Swift Review was wrapped in a legal shroud.
241. POL also came across at times as resentful of the Department's oversight and the
further scrutiny they received in Parliament and from the media. When judgments
in court went against them, they were quick to challenge these, and slow to accept
their own manifest failings. I note in this regard the briefing for my 31 October 2019
meeting with Tim Parker recorded that “Tim often gives the impression that he
thinks Government is too interventionist’ (BEISO0001130 ). That was very much my
impression of his attitude; but my reflection is that if we had known what was
happening within POL, we would have been much more interventionist.
242. Evidence of poor organisational culture and leadership judgment became clear in
2019 in POL’s response to the litigation, the bonuses issue, and the CEO
succession. This was why I worked with ministers to affect an external
appointment as the new CEO, as well as new legal advisers for POL, and why we
made cultural renewal such a priority for the new CEO and the Chair. We took
the view that the misguided decision making by those in senior positions at POL
was reflective of a weak organisational culture and an insufficient sense of public
duty.
243. Overall, POL acted too much like a private company, but unlike a private company
it had a monopoly. It was not subject to the same competitive pressures and threat
of customer rejection if it did not perform. As a publicly owned company with an
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inherent social function, and unlike a private company, the state would not allow
POL to fail financially. In the same vein POL did not regard itself fully as part of
the public sector and did not, it seemed to me, internalise that special sense of
public responsibility by virtue of surviving on public subsidies and providing vital
public services. It lost sight of the public mission in terms of organisational culture,
integrity, honesty, team working and plain speaking.
244. Section 172 of the Company Law Act 2006 should at least have guided POL’s
activities more fundamentally. The success of the company should have aligned
with the Shareholder’s social purpose objectives for it, and the Board should have
realised that.
245. The prosecutions had ceased before my time in the department, and so I cannot
testify to POL’s conduct during that period, Nonetheless, seen from the
perspective of their responsibilities as a public body, and in the knowledge we now
have of the terrible harm visited on SPMs incorrectly prosecuted, I consider it
extraordinary that some POL senior executives from their testimony to the Inquiry
do not seem to have even been aware of the use of POL resources to prosecute
its SPMs. Furthermore, when evidence came to their attention raising doubts as
to the safety of these prosecutions, based as they were on the Horizon system,
they do not seem to have shown a proper interest in questioning the strength of
these convictions and the processes used to obtain them, nor in remediating
shortcomings and miscarriages of justice.
246. My impression of POL’s operation at the time is that we really had the worst of
both worlds: it upheld neither the standards expected of a public body nor a private
company. This was, however, to my mind first and foremost not a question of
organisational form but a failure of leadership and of understanding of what is
required to perform a public function.
247. In relation to the governance and oversight mechanism between POL, the
Department and UKGI, I think that following the separation of UKGI’s shareholder
and policy roles in 2018 and the further work done through 2019 to demarcate
those responsibilities, that there was sufficient clarity of roles in respect of the
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oversight and governance of POL. This made the role of UKGI clearer and more
manageable.
248. UKGI plays an important and valuable role across government. UKGI officials
dealing with POL were under considerable pressure throughout my tenure. I never
had reason to doubt their integrity, workrate or professional skill. At times we
reached different judgments on certain matters, notably the bonuses issue. I think
they also struggled at times to reconcile the tension between identifying with POL,
and standing at one remove to challenge POL. Reading back through the
hundreds of submissions and briefings, I am struck by the use of stock phrases
and summaries regarding the litigation and the history of Horizon which tended to
reassure the reader rather than direct them to the unresolved and concerning
aspects of the situation. In this way it may have unintentionally allowed the status
quo to persist for longer than it should, and in this way postponed the crisis and
the beginning of recompense and recovery. I would make the point again that this
is only a partial and personal view, and one formed with hindsight. As I have said,
the Inquiry has seen and heard much more evidence and is better placed to judge
the matter.
249. I do not consider that there is something inherently defective in the governance
structure of POL. POL’s Board was a properly constituted fiduciary and not merely
advisory Board. The responsibilities of the Board were clearly set out in the
Framework Document and they had considerable operational freedom. The Board
was able to offer relatively high pay packages to attract and retain the best
possible talent within their executive team. They also received a great deal of input
and advice both internally and from UKGI and BEIS on how they should think
about and exercise their responsibilities. The Board had the prime responsibility
for the sound conduct of POL and manifestly failed to discharge this.
250. As concerns the relationship between POL and SPMs, there was no attitude within
BEIS of “us and them” and I am pleased that the new structure of POL’s Board
gives proper representation to SPMs. There are, however, wider questions to ask
about what model of ownership SPMs would wish to encourage under Company
Law and how this would affect the shareholder interest against that of POL’s
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customers. When over half of a company’s work force is not an “employee” there
are serious questions to ask about whether the company structure works in the
best interests of SPMs.
251. I have been asked if I would recommend any changes to the ALB model. I have
been involved in these discussions since at least 2018 (UKGI00007987;
UKGI00008031; UKGI00009606). ALBs are very varied. There are over 300 of
them and within the taxonomy of ALBs there are different levels of separation.
There are executive agencies, usually closely integrated with departments and
with civil servants in leadership roles directly answerable to ministers. At the other
end of the spectrum there are ALBs which are departments in their own right but
not headed up by ministers, such as Ofgem and CMA. Between these are non-
departmental public bodies which come in many different forms, ranging from
large national bodies such as NHS England to much smaller and specialised
bodies such as The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew.
252. One size cannot fit all, and I do not think that any general truths or lessons
applicable to all ALBs can be derived from the specific circumstances of POL. I
also do not think that one can be fully confident that these issues with POL would
not have arisen if the company had been a different form of ALB, or BEIS had
supervised directly without the benefit of UKGI. In my view, the precise institutional
form is less important than the quality of leadership and the strength of institutional
culture; and UKGI brought a lot of skill and experience to their role and did a lot of
good work. That said, I am sure the Inquiry and the government will want to reflect
on the structure, mandate and governance structures applying to POL, to bring
additional transparency and accountability.
253. There are mechanisms that government could insist upon to encourage
accountability, such as enhanced reporting, pre-defined issues for escalation,
enhanced external scrutiny through audit, and public hearings in Parliament. I
expand on these further below. . Ultimately, however, there is no single solution.
For POL the path ahead must be one of cultural renewal which should be led by
the Board and especially the Chair and the CEO, and reinforced by government,
Parliament and the media. This, to my mind, should be the focus rather than
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expecting a change to POL’s statutory status to be a solution in itself. In my view,
there is a limit to how far structural solutions can address underlying problems with
behaviour. Those problems seem to have been significant within POL and
particularly within the leadership in respect of the management of information flow.
Steps to limit the sharing of information seem to have been taken in order to
protect the organisation though they ultimately had the opposite effect. The focus,
in my view, should be on reinforcing in ALBs their public duty and making it plain
that the Nolan Principles apply to those working in ALB structures.
254. I am not convinced that establishing an independent body to initiate investigations
into ALBs when concerns are raised would be helpful. That body would need to
be properly structured, governed, managed, and funded. That body would need
vast knowledge and experience to properly evaluate and stand in judgment of an
extremely diverse range of ALBs. The risk is that you are simply kicking the
problem in to the long grass: you are not dealing with the issues of accountability
and oversight but packaging the problem up and handing it off to a new body which
may or may not get the job done while extending the bureaucratic process and
incurring significant cost to the public purse.
255. To my mind there are other ways by which accountability of ALBs could be
improved across the spectrum. It starts with openness and pattern recognition. If
concerns are raised there should be formal, and publicly accessible, means of
reporting and tracking those concerns. That mechanism could be overseen by an
independent committee that has mandatory reporting responsibilities to the Board
as well as the authority to write to the Secretary of State annually with any
concerns. There could also be obligations to report periodically to Parliament. As
a basic principle, where an ALB has failed in the trust that the public places in it,
this calls for more frequent and more intrusive government scrutiny.
256. As I have said, it is very likely that more decisive intervention in the leadership and
oversight of POL which came about through 2019 and thereafter would have come
earlier if POL had not obscured the reality of the situation from UKGI and BEIS.
The unintentional consequence of UKGI and BEIS accepting POL’s formulaic
summaries of the situation was that further inquiry or attention was regrettably not
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given in areas where POL would have most benefitted from it. If POL had been
more transparent, forthcoming and candid about its shortcomings, reform of the
company and provision of compensation and redress to SPMs could have
commenced far sooner. POL’s defensiveness ended up magnifying the harm it
has caused to SPMs and its employees, and to public trust.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
GRO
Signed 2------2vneneee
Dated: 14 October 2024
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Index to the Second Witness Statement of Sir Alex Chisholm
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No.
[Document
Description
Date of
Document
URN
(Control Number
itness Statement
lof Sir Martin
[Donnelly
24 July 2024
1TN11250100
ITN11250100
IBEIS annual report
land accounts 2018
io 2019
111 July 2019
1TN00180101
ITNO0180101
IDRAFT
Departmental
(Overview
PowerPoint dated
(October 2019
(October
2019
IBEISO001149
IBEISO001149
ritten
Resolutions of the
sole Member of theI
(Company
2 April 2012
BEISO001105
BEISO001105
IBEIS Public Single
[Departmental Plan
for 2017-18
14
[December
2017
IBEISO001146
IBEISO001146
[The Conservative
land Unionist Party
Manifesto 2017
2017
ITN00180102
ITN00180102
Post Office Limited
Strategy
Undated
IUKGI00017317
IUKG1027324-001
(Cabinet Office,
Classification of
Public Bodies:
(Guidance for
[Departments
(Undated
IRLITO000325
IRLITO000325
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Mark
Baker re: Post
lOffice Litigation
land Post Office
(Grant to the
National
Federation of Sub-
ostmasters
8 April 2019
IUKGI00016211
IUKG1027004-001
10.
IUKGI email on
IPOL strategic
options
12 February
2018
IBEISO001106
IBEISO001106
11.
Meeting note of
Post Office
Ht May
ko18
UKGI00008031
IUKGI018843-001
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Limited. RE: POL
Strategic Options
12.
IPOL Strategic
Options meeting
11 May
2018
IUKGI00008031
IUKGI018843-00
Draft MoU betweenIUndated
13. BEIS and UKGI BEISO001164 BEISO001164
IUKGI - Post Office I16 April
Ltd - Portfolio 2019
14. pummary . UKGI00018076 — UKGI028083-001
resentation slides
dated 16 April
2019
Letter from Alex Wanuary
(Chisholm to Tim [2020
15. [Parker re: IUKGI00011146 IUKGI021954-001
Strategic Priorities
for 2020/21
20190207 POL 7 February
16. IInterim CEO and [2019 BEISO001135 BEISO001135
ay
[Email from Kelly [28 February
[Tolhurst to 2019
17.
Rebecca Lowe re
(Commission: Info
lon POL dated 28
[February 2019
BEISO001133
BEISO001133
18.
Letter to Nick Read
rom Alex
(Chisholm dated 19
Wuly 2019
119 July 2019
IBEISO001107
IBEISO001107
19.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Alex
(Chisholm re POL
sub dated 27
(October 2017
27 October
2017
IBEISO001139
IBEISO001139
20.
Briefing note:
Secretary of State
ICST meeting
\Undated
BEISO001140
BEISO001140
21.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to David
Keenan Re: Draft
letter SoS to CX-
Post Office Limited
dated 29
November 2017
29
jovember
2017
IBEISO001114
BEISO001114
Page 70 of 92
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22.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Sarah
IMunby re
Allocation Of
2019/2020 Budget
And Delegation Of
Financial Authority
dated 15 July
2019
115 July 2019
IBEISO001152
IBEISO001152
23.
Meeting note of
Post Office
Limited. RE: POL
Strategic Options
dated 11 May
2018
111 May
2018
IUKGI00008031
IUKGI018843-001
24,
IUK Government
Investments
Limited Minutes of
la meeting of the
Board of Directors
t. 23 May 2019
23 May
2019
IUKGI00009838
UKGI020646-001
25.
[Email from MPST
(Clark to Permanent
Secretary cc Mark
Russell, Laura
[Thompson and
others re NED
appointments for
POL
19 February
2018
IUKGI00007796
IUKGI018609-001
26.
[Email from Richard
(Callard to Helen
Lambert CCing
[Tom Cooper and
Elizabeth O'Neill
re: 2018 03 12
Submission to
Perm Sec on Tom
(Cooper
Appointment to
Board dated 23
March 2018
23 March
2018
IUKGI00007865
UKGI018678-001
27.
Post Office Limited
Shareholder
Relationship
[Framework
[Document
31 January
2018
IUKGI00010387
UKGI021195-001
28.
Email from Cecilia
‘andini to
Permanent
17
[December
2019
Secretary re
IUKGI00010964
UKGI021772-001
Page 71 of 92
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1171219Framework
grt agreed by
Policy dated 17
[December 2019
29.
Annex E:
Shareholder
Relationship
[Framework
[Document
(Undated
BEISO000091
BEISO000071
30.
Letter from Alex
Chisholm (BEIS) to
Paula Vennells RE:
lupdate on
sponsorship model
dated 19
[December 2017
9
December
2017
INQ00000074
1$00000400
31.
Submission to
Permanent
Secretary on
Appointment of
[Tom Cooper to
Post Office Board
dated 23 March
2018
23 March
2018
IUKGI00007866
\UKGI018679-001
32.
[Email from Gavin
Lambert to
Permanent
Secretary, Laura
Robinson re: POL
Policy Sponsor
dated 16 May
2018
16 May
2018
IUKGI00020995
IUKG1029890-001
33.
IBEIS Policy
Sponsorship
Undated
IUKGI00020990
IUKGI029885-001
34.
[Email from Pranita
Bhargava to Kelly
[Tolhurst re Update
lon Government's
Long Term Vision
ior the Post Office
dated 23 October
2019
23 October
2019
BEISO001128
BEISO001128
35.
Submission on
Post Office Long
[Term Vision dated
23 October 2019
23 October
2019
IBEISO001129
IBEISO001129
36.
Update on the
(Government's
Spending Review
115 January
2020
IBEISO001132
IBEISO001132
Page 72 of 92
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for Post 2021
Subsidy and draft
Long-Term Vision
dated 15 January
2020
37.
Draft - The
(Government's
ision for the Post
Office
[February
2020
BEISO001156
BEISO001156
38.
LT Vision 8 week
Plan
(Undated
IBEISO001155
IBEISO001155
39.
Submission on
IPOL long-term
strategy — Final 3
Uuly 2019
3 July 2019
IBEISO001136
IBEISO001136
40.
POL
responsibilities
roposal
(Undated
IUKGI00021033
IUKG1029928-001
41.
Email from Tom
Aldred to Alex
(Cole, Tom Cooper,
(Oluwatosin
(Adegun and others
+ Re: Perm Sec
meeting 24 April:
IReadabout
24 April
2019
IUKGI00009606
UKGI020414-001
42.
Email from Joshua
Scott to Permanent
Secretary, Cecilia
‘andini RE: OFF-
SEN: POL
Framework Doc -
IFOR CLEARANCE
dated 9 January
2020
9 January
2020
IUKGI00025637
IUKGI034532-001
43.
Post Office
Limited: HUG
division of
responsibilities
Undated
BEISO001170
BEISO001170
44.
20190124 POL
IRASCI document
\Undated
IBEISO001168
BEISO001168
45.
Meeting with Nick
Read, CEO of Post
(Office Limited
dated 12 March
112 March
BEISO001158
BEISO001158
46.
Briefing Note re:
Annual Letter to
lhe Post Office
(Chair - sent to
118 January
2020
IUKGI00008918
UKGI019726-001
Page 73 of 92
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[Permanent
Secretary dated 18
January 2018
47.
Post office: what
controls do we
Ihave to ensure
post office behave
properly? Dated 6
March 2020
6 March
2020
\UKGI00027361
\UKG100027361
48.
[Email from Henry
(Carruthers to
Madhav Bakshi
IRe: POL/ Tom
(Cooper Readout
11 May
2018
IUKGI00008032
IUKGI018844-001
49.
[Email from Tom
Cooper to
Alexandra Bower
IRE: FW: Post
Office Update
Perm Sectary
23 April
2019
IUKGI00009589
UKGI020397-001
50.
Post Office update
ior Permanent
Secretary_24 April
2019 FINAL
(Undated
BEISO001110
BEISO001110
51.
Perm Sec Post
lOffice meeting with
officials 27
February 2020
27 February
2020
BEISO001157
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52.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Tom
Aldred re Perm
Sec/ Tim Parker
readout 15 March
2019
115 March
2019
IUKGI00042465
IUKGI051360-001
53.
IPOL Quarterly
IUpdate-Perm Sec
4 March 2019
4 March
2019
BEISO000488
BEISO000468
54.
IPOL Quarterly
Update 26
September 2019
26
September
2019
BEISO001127
BEISO001127
55.
[Email from Nick
IRead to Ben Foat
IRE: Alex Chisholm
Meeting dated 29
September 2019
26
September
2019
IPOL00284970
POL-BSFF-0123033
56.
(Quarterly Update
20 January 2020
20 January
2020
IUKGI00043087
IUKGI_CR_00000045
Page 74 of 92
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57.
Agenda Setting
Grid - 21st Jan
2019
Undated
BEISO001141
BEISOO01141
58.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Tom
Aldred, Tom
(Cooper and Gavin
Lambert re: Official
Sensitive: Post
(Office Litigation:
Legal Advice and
IUQs dated 4
March 2019
4 March
2019
IUKGI00009128
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59.
[Email from
[Permanent
Secretary to Kelly
[Tolhurst re POL
Memo form Perm
Sec dated 6 March
2019
6 March
2019
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IBEISO001150
60.
Post Office-
itigation trial and
leadership
succession dated 5I
March 2019
pb March
2019
BEISO001121
IBEISO001121
61.
[Email from Laura
[Thompson to Clark
IMPST; Permanent
Secretary re NED
appointments for
IPOL dated 16
February 2019
16 February
2018
IBEISO001118
IBEISO001118
62.
IPOL: Appointment
lof Al Cameron as
Interim CEO
7 February
2019
IBEISO001120
IBEISO001120
63.
Email from Joshua
Scott to Kelly
[Tolhurst re FAO
Jess - Submission
for Minister
[Tolhurst - Approval
io Appoint POL
INED
Zarin Patel dated
(16 October 2019
116 October
2019
UKGI00010621
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64.
Letter to Kelly
[Tolhurst from Tim
Parker re
[Shareholder
116 October
2019
IUKGI00010623
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Page 75 of 92
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Approval:
lappointment of
INon-Executive
Director dated 16
(October 2019
65.
Post Office:
Appointment of a
INew Non-
Executive Director
dated 16 October
2019
116 October
2019
IUKGI00010626
IUKGI021434-001
66.
[Email from
Stephen Clarke to
Kelly Tolhurst,
Permanent
Secretary re
Urgent
Submission: POL
INED
IReappointments
dated 7 December
2018
I7 December
2018
IBEISO001119
IBEISO001119
67.
[Email from MPST
(Clark to Permanent
Secretary cc Mark
Russell, Laura
[Thompson and
others re NED
appointments for
IPOL dated 19
February 2018
119 February
2018
IUKGI00007796
IUKGI018609-001
68.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to
Griffiths MPST re
INED appointments
for POL dated 9
February 2018
9 February
2018
IBEISO001115
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69.
Post Office,
Appointment of
Inon-Executive
Directors dated 14
January 2018
24 January
2018
BEISO001116
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70.
POL NED
Appointments - 2
February 2018
2 February
2018
BEISO001117
BEISO001117
71.
[Email from Claire
Roberts to Clark
IMPST re
Submission to SoS
20
September
2016
BEISO001112
BEISO001112
Page 76 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
ion Post Office
executive
remuneration
dated 20
September 2016
72.
Email from Tom
Aldred to Kelly
[Tolhurst Clark re
Submission:
remuneration for
IPOL CEO dated 15]
March 2019
115 March
2019
IBEISO001122
IBEISO001122
73.
(Official Sensitive
Proposed
Remuneration For
INew Ceo Of Post
(Office Ltd dated 15
March 2019
115 March
2019
BEISO001123
BEISO001123
74.
IProformas for BEISI
ISCS Recruitment
Panel
Undated
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75.
[Email from
Permanent
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Honours’ RE:
(Official Sensitive:
Post Office dated
24 October 2018
24 October
2018
IUKGI00008574
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76.
Email from
Permanent
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Baker RE: Misuse
lof a Public
Authority Grant
dated 2 May 2019
B May 2019
IBEISO001142
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77.
Email from Jessica
illiams to Twinley
Leann Re-worked
briefing pack for
IHoL debate on
Post Office
lomorrow dated 29
March 2017
29 March
2017
1TN10910106
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78.
(Questions for Short
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March 2017
30 March
2017
UKGI00007572
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79.
[Hansard Debate:
Local Post Offices
80 March
2017
ITN00180103
ITN00180103
Page 77 of 92
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‘olume 782:
debated on
[Thursday 30 MarchI
2017
80.
[Email from
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Adegun to Clark
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re Post Office
iunding UQ dated
(8 December 2017
8 December
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81.
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\Undated
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82.
Post Office-
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dated 12 February
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112 February
2018
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IUKGI018694-001
83.
Post Office-
Litigation re
Horizon IT System
dated April 2018
April 2018
IUKGI00007912
\UKGI018725-001
84.
[Email from
Stephen Clarke to
Jane MacLeod,
IRodric Williams re
In Strict
(Confidence:
Briefing to fact-
check dated 10
May 2018
10 May
2018
IPOL00254872
IPOL-BSFF-0092935
85.
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facts of the case
ior BEIS
Permanent
Secretary Alex
(Chisholm
Undated
POL00028072
IPOL-0023075
86.
[Horizon Litigation -
facts of the case
or BEIS
[Permanent
Secretary Alex
(Chisholm
(Undated
IPOL00254873
IPOL-BSFF-0092936
87.
IDRAFT briefing
paper for
Permanent
Secretary of BEIS
ay 2018
IUKGI00008026
UKGI018838-001
Page 78 of 92
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WITNO0180100
regarding Litigation
re Horizon IT
system dated May
2018
88.
POL criminal cases
lupdate dated 6
February 2020
6 February
2020
IUKGI00026411
IUKGI035306-001
89.
[Email from Tom
(Cooper to Minister
Scully and Private
Secretary re Post
Office - CCRC.
dated 20 March
2020
20 March
2020
BEISO001138
BEISO001138
90.
Deloitte Draft
Board Briefing
document further
lo report on
[Horizon desktop
review of
lassurance sources
land key control
features dated 4
Wune 2014
4 June 2014
IPOL00028069
IPOL-0023072
91.
Review on behalf
lof the Chairman of
Post Office Ltd
concerning the
steps taken in
response to
arious complaints
made by sub-
jpostmasters dated
8 February 2016
8 February
2016
IPOL00006355
IPOL-0017623
92.
Advice on the use
lof expert evidence
relating to the
integrity of the
Fujitsu Services
Ltd Horizon
System
115 July 2013
POL00006357
IPOL-0017625
93.
Advice re:
Disclosure - The
[Duty to record and
retain material -
Post Office Ltd
B August
bo13
IPOL00129453
IPOL-0134937
94.
Report re initial
complaint review
land mediation
20 March
2014
POL00107317
IPOL-0105625
Page 79 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
scheme legal
issues
95.
(Cover note for
IBEIS Select
(Committe Inquiry
lon Horizon dated
(19 March 2020
119 March
2020
IBEISO001137
IBEISO001137
96.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Paula
ennells Re:
ransformation
jprogramme dated
3 January 2018
3 January
2018
IPOL00024073
IPOL-0020552
97.
Letter from Paula
ennells to Alex
(Chisholm Re: letter]
discussing ongoing
changes following
lhe GLO dated 8
January 2019
8 January
2019
IPOL00024074
IPOL-0020553
98.
[Email from Henry
(Carruthers to
Madhav Bakshi
Re: POL/ Tom
Cooper Readout
dated 11 May
2018
11 May
2018
IUKGI00008032
IUKG1018844-001
99.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to
Richard Callard re
[Horizon Litigation
Submission dated
22 May 2018
22 May
bo18
IUKGIO0000998
1S00009136
100
Project Sparrow -
IPre onboarding
Protocol
Undated
IUKGI00008160
UKGI018972-001
101.
IUKGI Guidance for
Litigation
Monitoring
[Proposal
Undated
IPOL00041685
IPOL-0038167
102.
Protocol between
IPOL, BSEI and
IUKGI for the POL
Litigation
(11 June
2018
IBEISO000079
IBEISOO00059
103.
Email from
eronica Branton
io Jane Macleod,
Mark Underwood,
22 March
2018
IPOL00041686
IPOL-0038168
Page 80 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
IRodric Williams,
Andrew Parsons
land Amy Prime re
Litigation and
Appointment- next
steps dated 22
March 2018
104.
[Email from
Elizabeth O'Neill to
Stephen Clark re
(Official Sensitive:
Post Office:
[Disclosure and
Protocol for Civil
Litigation dated 5
Wuly 2018
p July 2018
IUKGI00008205
IUKGI019017-001
105.
Post Office Ltd -
[Horizon Litigation
Update Report
dated 10 August
2018
110 August
2018
IUKGI00018266
1S00011665
106.
IPO Group
Litigation: Litigation
Update for UKGI
following POL
Board Meeting on
31 July 2018
1 July 2018
IUKGI00008345
IUKGI019157-001
107.
Protocol between
POL, BSEI and
IUKGI for the POL
Litigation
111 June
2018
IBEISO000079
IBEISOO00059
108.
Project Sparrow -
IPre-Onboarding
Protocol
Undated
IUKGI00008348
UKGI019160-001
109.
Proposed Agenda
land Attendees -
key issues at stake
in the November
Trial
Undated
IUKGI00008347
IUKGI019159-001
1110.
Post Office Briefing
Paper for Meeting
lon 17 October
2018 with Kelly
[Tolhurst MP and
Alex Chisolm on"
(Common Issues"
rial in Group
Litigation
17 October
2018
POL00111214
IPOL-0108817
11.
IBEIS Agenda:
Post Office:
17 October
IUKGI00008519
IUKGI019330-001
Page 81 of 92
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WITNO0180100
Horizon Trial
(Contingency
Planning’
112.
Minister Perm Sec
ith POL on Trial
Contingency
Planning FINAL
dated 17 October
117 October
IUKGI00021538
IUKGI030433-001
113.
[Email from Tom
(Cooper to Tom
Aldred and Others
Re: POL Litigation
meeting dated 19
(October 2018
119 October
2018
IUKGI00008556
IUKGI019364-001
114.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Tim
Parker, re Strategic]
Priorities for
2019/20 dated 4
[February 2019
4 February
2019
IPOL00132258
IPOL-0121636
1115.
[Email from Tom
Aldred to Stephen
(Clarke, Alex Cole,
\Oluwatosin
(Adegun and others
re OFFICIAL
SENSITIVE: POL
Inote from Alex
(Chisholm to SoS
dated 5 March
2019
pb March
2019
IUKGI00009125
IUKGI019933-001
116.
Email from Alex
Chisholm to Greg
(Clark CC Kelly
[Tolhurst
[Department for
Business, Energy
& Industrial
Strategy Re Post
Office litigation trial
land leadership
succession dated 5I
March 2019
Pp March
2019
IUKGI00009137
IUKGI019945-001
M17.
Post Office Horizon
[Trial Update Sub
Final 8 March
2019
8 March
2019
IBEISOO00066
IBEISO000046
118.
[Email from
Permanent
115 March
2019
Secretary to Alex
IUKGI00018997
1S00012396
Page 82 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
(Chisholm and Tom
(Cooper CC
Permanent
Secretary re: RE:
Post Office
judgement dated
(15 March 2019
119.
Speaking note for
call with POL
Undated
BEISO001125
BEISO001125
120.
Email
correspondence
between Richard
atson, Tom
(Cooper, Patrick
Kilgarriff and
others Re: Post
Office judgement.
IRE: Post Office
Judgement dated
(15 March 2019
115 March
2019
IUKGI00009208
IUKG1I020016-001
21.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Alex
(Chisholm FW:
(Official Sensitive:
Post Office
Litigation
\Update.msg dated
[19 March 2019
19 March
2019
BEISO001147
BEISO001147
22,
[Email from Gavin
Lambert to MPST
Clark, MPSST
[Tolhurst, Tom
(Cooper and others
Re: POL
Discussion with
SOS and Kelly
[Tolhurst dated 16
March 2019
16 March
2019
IUKGI00009213
UKGI020021-001
123.
[Email from
[Thomas Cooper to
lex Chisholm RE:
Fwd: Recusal
(Confidential and
Subject to Legal
Privilege -
(Common Issues
Trial dated 19
March 2019
119 March
2019
IUKGI00009285
IUKGI020093-001
Page 83 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
24.
Email from Alex
(Chisholm to Tom
Cooper re Recusal
application dated
20 March 2019
20 March
2019
IUKGI00009299
\UKGI020107-001
125.
[Email chain from
lex Chisholm
io Richard Watson
[Tom Cooper, CC
Patrick Kilgarriff
land others - Re:
IRecusal dated 20
March 2019
20 March
2019
\UKGI00009311
UKGI020119-001
126.
Inquiry Transcript,
25 July 2024
25 July 2024
INQ00001181
INQO0001181
127.
Inquiry Transcript,
(10 July 2024
10 July 2024
INQ00001172
INQO0001172
128.
[Email chain from
Richard Watson to
[Tom Cooper, Alex
Chisholm, CCing
(Gareth Evans and
others re: Fwd:
Alternatives to
ecusal? Dated 20
March 2019
20 March
2019
IUKGI00009303
UKGI020111-001
129.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Alex
(Chisholm FW:
(Official Sensitive:
Post Office
Litigation Update
dated 20 March
2019
20 March
2019
BEISO001151
BEISO001151
130.
[Email from Kelly
[Tolhurst to Clark re
FFAO BEX: POL.
interim CEO dated
(14 February 2019
114 February
2019
BEISO001134
BEISO001134
31.
Email from Alex
(Chisholm to
Permanent
Secretary re With
Kelly re POL dated
20 March 2019
20 March
2019
IBEISO001148
IBEISO001148
132.
[Email chain from
IMPST Tolhurst to
[Tom Aldred, Alex
(Chisholm, Carl
7 July 2019
IUKGI00010410
UKGI021218-001
Page 84 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
(Cresswell and
(Others, Re Post
(Office CEO - Off
sen personal dated
(17 July 2019
133.
IBEIS email note re
itigation
H9 July 2019
IBEISO001162
IBEISO001162
134.
TBA 11 July 2019
(11 July 2019 JBEISO001163
IBEISO001163
135.
[Email from Tom
(Cooper to Tom
Aldred re FW:
Strictly Confidential
Post Office
Litigation
10 April
2019
IUKGI00009505
IUKG1020313-001
136.
Email to
Permanent
Secretary,
(Chisholm, Alex
BEIS), Steyn,
Benjamin (BEIS),
Creswell, Carl from
Beal, Eleanor Re:
Post Office Catch
Lip
23 April
2019
IBEISO001109
IBEISO001109
1137.
PowerPoint
Presentation - Post}
lOffice update for
Permanent
Secretary - BEIS:
IPOL Policy
Sponsorship Team
land UKGI: POL
[Team
\Undated
IUKGI00009590
IUKG1020398-001
138.
INote to Alex
(Chisholm on new
Directorate
23 May
2019
IBEISO001143
IBEISO001143
1139.
Email from Alex
(Chisholm to Tom
Cooper Re:
(Confidential - POL
itigation
pb June 2
019
IBEISO001166
IBEISO001166
140.
[Email from Jacqui
lard to
Permanent
Secretary re Read
lout: Perm Sec /
SoS 1-1 Tues 04
Wune
6 June 2
019
BEISO001145
BEISO001145
Page 85 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
41.
[Background on
IPOL Board and
(Governance
Undated
1TN10930111
1TN10930111
142.
[Email from MPST
Tolhurst (BEIS) to
[Tom Cooper,
[Eleanor Beal,
ICCing Carl
(Cresswell and
(Others RE: Final
raft letter to POL
regarding POL's
Board and
(Governance and
SpAds
4 June 2
019
IUKGI00019116
1$00012515
143.
[Email from Eleanor}
Beal to Steyn,
[Benjamin (BEIS),
Permanent
Secretary re OFF-
SEN: POL update
for Perm Sec
31 May
2019
IBEISO001111
IBEISOO01111
144.
Email to
Permanent
Secretary re
Meeting with
Minister Tolhurst
ion Post Office -
briefing and
documents
7 June 2
019
IBEISO001108
IBEISO001108
(145.
IPOL litigation sub
6 June 2019 [UKGI00026905
IUKGI035800-001
146.
Annex A of options
lon POL -
6 June 2019
IUKGI00026906
IUKGI035801-001
147.
[Email from Kelly
[Tolhurst to
Permanent
Secretary re Post
Office Meeting
Briefings
24 June
2019
IBEISO001144
IBEISO001144
148.
IPOL litigation sub
(11 June
2019
IBEISO000075
IBEISOO00055
149.
[Email chain from
[Tom Cooper to
IMark Russell and
Richard Watson re
Fwd: Post Office
bonuses
25 July 2019
IUKGI00010443
IUKG1021251-001
1150.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm
29 July 2019
BEISO000085
BEISOO00065
Page 86 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
io Tom Cooper re:
payment of
bonuses
151.
[Email from Beth
hite to Kelly
Tolhurst,
Permanent
Secretary,
(Creswell, Carl,
Cooper, Tom —
IUKGI Official
sensitive -
(Commercial: Post
(Office bonuses -
Permanent
Secretary call with
POL
30 July 2019
IBEISO001167
IBEISO001167
152.
Sub on POL
itigation strategy
29 July 2019
IPOL00438030
IPOL-0212969
153.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Nick
Read
IRe: Accountable
Person: Instruction
From BEIS
Permanent
Secretary To
[The CEO Of Post
(Office Ltd on
Accountabilities
land
Responsibilities
2019
6 September
IPOL00288398
IPOL-BSFF-0126461
154.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to
Alisdair Cameron
re: Accountable
person: Instruction
rom BEIS
jpermanent
secretary to the
(CEO of Post Office
Ltd on
laccountabilities
land
responsibilities
9 June 2019
IUKGI00010163
\UKGI020971-001
1155.
IUKGI Board
readout summary
lof meeting
(Undated
IUKGI00016078
IUKGI026871-001
Page 87 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
156.
[Email from Pranita
Bhargava to
Permanent
Secretary Briefing
ior Permanent
Secretary/Nick
Read (POL CEO)
introductory
meeting and POL
(Quarterly Update
26
September
2019
BEISO000955
BEISOO00955
157.
Introductory
meeting with Nick
Read, CEO of Post
(Office Limited
BO
September
IUKGI00016309
IUKGI027 102-001
158.
Email from Alex
(Cole to Tom
(Cooper and
[Tolhurst RE:
Briefing for Kelly's
meeting with Nick
Read
9 October
2019
IUKGI00010606
IUKGI021414-001
1159.
IPOL Quarterly
26
September
2019
UKGI00010561
UKGI021369-001
160.
[Email thread from
(Oluwatosin
Adegun to Tom
(Cooper re Readout
r Perm Sec
meeting with Nick
Read
110 October
2019
IUKGI00018641
1S00012040
161.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Tim
Parker re:
Strategic Priorities
for 2020/21
Vanuary
2020
IUKGI00011146
IUKGI021954-001
162.
Email from Pranita
Bhargava to
[Tolhurst; SpAds
Office; Permanent
Secretary; Post
Office
Team; Aldred, Tom
+ UKGI;
(Cooper, Tom -
IUKGI; Creswell,
(Carl; White,
Beth Briefing for
Kelly's meeting
ith Nick Read
9 October
2019
BEISO001126
BEISO001126
Page 88 of 92
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WITNO0180100
163.
Meeting with Nick
Read 1
17 October
2019
IUKGI00024480
UKGI033375-001
164.
Post Office -
Meeting with
Postal Services
Minister dated 17
(October
17 October
IPOL00286851
IPOL-BSFF-0124914
165.
Email from Alex
(Cole to Permanent
Secretary re FW:
IPOL: Nick Read
strategic review
29 October
2019
IBEISO001154
IBEISO001154
166.
Meeting with Tim
Parker final
31 October
IBEISO001130
IBEISO001130
167.
Annex A - POL
Approach to GLO
Mediation
8 November
2019
IBEISO000493
IBEISO000473
168.
POL GLO
Mediation approval
sub
15
November
2019
IBEISO001159
IBEISO001159
69.
Email from Joshua
Scott RE:
OFF:SEN -
LEGAL] Advice -
Approval For
Settlement Offer in
Post Office Ltd.
POL) Litigation
11
November
2019
IUKGI00018578
VISO0011977
170.
[Email from
Secretary of State
io Scott, Joshua -
IUKGI, Permanent
Secretary, Grant,
Calum (BEIS),
Tolhurst (Private
Office), SpAds
Office (Private
Office) re
OFF:SEN -
LEGAL] Advice -
Approval For
Settlement Offer in
Post Office Ltd.
POL) Litigation
20
November
2019
IBEISO001131
IBEISO001131
171.
[Email from
Permanent
Secretary to Carl
(Creswell FW: POL
mediation - ahead
bf SoS 121
21
[December
2019
IBEISO001153
IBEISO001153
Page 89 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
172.
Email from Alex
(Chisholm to Tom
(Cooper, Carl
(Creswell and Tom
Aldred RE: Post
\Office/ postmaster
land employee
epresentation on
he Board
4 December
2019
IUKGI00017686
IUKGI027693-001
N73.
[Email from Tom
(Cooper to
Chisholm, Alex
BEIS), Fleming,
Joshua - HMT,
(Creswell, Carl
Professional
Business Services,
Retail & Post
Directorate) RE:
GLO - Mediation
land General
Update - Do Not
Forward -
IEmbargoed
Judgment
Referenced -
Legally Privileged
And Confidential
pb December
2019
IUKGI00010819
IUKGI021627-001
174.
[Email chain from
Permanent
Secretary to Tom
(Cooper, Joshua
Fleming and Carl
(Creswell re: GLO -
Mediation and
General Update -
IDo Not Forward -
lEmbargoed
Judgment
Referenced -
Legally Privileged
land Confidential
b) December
2019
IUKGI00010819
\UKGI021627-001
175.
[Email from
Chisholm, Alex to
(Carl Creswell Re:
GLO - Mediation
Update -
confidential and
legally privileged
(9 December
2019
BEISO001160
BEISO001160
Page 90 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
176.
[Email from Carl
(Creswell to Alex
(Chisholm RE: POL
final draft
Settlement
Agreement - GLO -
off sen
commercial
0
December
2019
IBEISO001161
BEISOO01161
77.
[Email chain from
Richard Watson to
Justin Manson and
[Tom Cooper re:
IFW: Thank you
3
[December
2019
IUKGI00010937
IUKGI021745-001
178.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Nick
IRead re: Future of
lhe Post Office
Beyond 2021
dated
9 January
2020
IUKGI00016146
IUKGI026939-001
179.
Email from Joshua
Scott to Permanent
Secretary re.
Heads Up - Further}
Letter re POL
Litigation dated
16 January
2020
IUKGI0001 1062
\UKGI021870-001
180.
Submission
Proposal for POL
independent
inquiry
28 February
2020
BEISO001169
BEISO001169
181.
Letter from Alex
(Chisholm to Tim
Parker re: Strategic]
Priorities for
2020/21
26 February
2020
IPOL00104200
IPOL-0103783
182.
Meeting with Nick
IRead Final
briefing
112 March
IUKGI00027296
IUKGI036191-001
183.
Paul Scully, Nick
IRead and Tim
Parker introductory
meeting final
116 March
UKGI00011581
IUKGI022389-001
184.
[Email chain from
[Tim Jarvis to
Permanent
Secretary, CCing
Permanent
Secretary and
Waee Samant re:
IPOL Options
Paper
16 May
2018
IIUKGI00007987
IUKGI018799-001
Page 91 of 92
WITNO0180100
WITNO0180100
185.
Meeting note of
Post Office
Limited. RE: POL
Strategic Options.
Attendees: Alex
Chisholm, Tom
(Cooper, Richard
(Callard and
others
11 May
2018
UKGI00008031
IUKGI018843-001
Page 92 of 92