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Witness Name: Mark Underwood
Statement No. WITN00990100
Dated: 12 November 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF MARK UNDERWOOD
I, Mark Underwood, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. I am currently employed by Post Office Limited (“POL”) as its Legal,
Compliance & Governance Operations Director. I have held this post since
April 2020. I joined POL in September 2014, initially as an independent
contractor before becoming an employee in 2016. I describe the previous roles
I have held at POL in the Background section of this witness statement below.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
(the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 27
September 2024 (the “Request”).
3. I have prepared this witness statement independently of my employer, POL
and with the assistance of independent legal representation from Farrer & Co
LLP. To assist my recollection and the preparation of this statement I have
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reviewed additional contemporaneous documents, requested and supplied to
me by the Inquiry. I have also had the opportunity to refresh my memory using
material held by POL that is relevant to these events. I have mainly relied on
the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, and in instances where I have
not and I have relied on other documents, I have supplied the Inquiry with
those documents. A full list of the documents exhibited with this statement is
included in the accompanying index. Where I have quoted from any of the
documents exhibited with this statement, these are in italics.
4. I have prepared this statement during October and early November, as
required by the Request. The Request contains 59 questions and I have been
directed by the Inquiry to review 202 documents. There are a very large
number of documents that relate to my time at POL. I understand many have
been disclosed to the Inquiry, however I am uncertain as to how many. Most
of these may not be relevant to the Request, but in any event it has not been
possible in the time available either for me or my solicitors to conduct an
extensive document review. I have instead sought to focus on identifying key
documents that will assist the Inquiry. The Request also included one
document that has not been made available to me by the Inquiry and that the
Inquiry confirmed on 29 October could be disregarded for the purpose of the
Request. I have therefore not had the opportunity to review this document.
Notwithstanding these limitations, I am comfortable that this statement is true
to the best of my knowledge and belief.
5. Owing to the timing of the Request (which relates to Phases 5 and 6 of the
Inquiry), I would like to make clear to the Inquiry that, prior to its receipt, I had
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already viewed some of the witness evidence for Phases 5 and 6 and read
parts of the associated witness statements. These are in the public domain on
the Inquiry’s website. The evidence already heard along with the associated
statements have also assisted in my recollection of events over the past 10
years or so. Where I have derived information from other sources, I say so,
and that information is also true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
6. I have addressed the questions asked within the Request in a narrative form
and I have broadly structured the statement to follow the section structure of
the Request.
BACKGROUND
7. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career and qualifications. I
graduated from the University of Manchester in 2005 with a degree in
Economics and Social Studies (BA Econ). This was an interdisciplinary
programme focused around economics, accounting, finance, politics, and
sociology.
8. Prior to joining POL, I worked within the research team of a small government
funded organisation named e-skills UK. The primary function of this team was
to produce annual research reports for the UK and its constituent nations and
regions. These reports analysed the UK’s IT & Telecoms workforce, providing
forecasts of growth rates over a ten-year period and the possible impact of
these on the labour market. Aside from contributing to these reports, my other
responsibility was in relation to modelling the economic impact of the
programmes the company delivered to remedy market failure and for which
they received government funding. Subsequent to leaving this organisation in
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2013, I worked as an independent contractor on numerous projects for various
organisations focusing on economic impact evaluation, research and analysis.
September 2014 — November 2016
9. In September 2014, I joined POL as an independent contractor to work on
Project Sparrow, which was the internal project name attached to the Initial
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme (“ICRAMS”). Initially I was asked
to produce cost projections, improve trackers, produce management
information, co-ordinate people internally and attempt to obtain clarity on
issues such as remote access.
10. I joined the team at a similar time to a number of other individuals to, I think,
replace PA Consulting who had, up until that point been supporting the Project
Sparrow Programme Director. The then Programme Director, Belinda Crowe
retired in March 2015 and soon after, her initial ‘successor’, Tom Wechsler,
became Chief of Staff to POL’s Chief Executive, Paula Vennells. By this stage
(March 2015), Second Sight had or were soon to be re-engaged onto a ‘piece-
rate’ (as opposed to the prior ‘time and materials’ basis), the Working Group
had been disbanded and POL had agreed to mediate all cases, save for those
that had been subject to a prior court ruling; civil and/or criminal. The focus of
the team, including mine, became ensuring Second Sight produced the
outstanding Case Review Reports (“CRRs”) according to the work plan they
created and scheduling mediation meetings. Evidently, there was also a
significant amount of political and media interest during this time which I, along
with others, assisted with POL’s response too - based upon the information
available to us at that time.
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November 2016 — December 2018
11. I joined POL as an employee in August 2016 as ‘Head of Corporate Services
Central Support’. This coincided with a larger internal re-structure at POL. By
this stage the last mediation in the ICRAMS had taken place (I think this was
on 2 January 2016), and my focus had shifted to facilitating the work Jonathan
Swift KC had been asked to undertake by POL’s then Chairman, Tim Parker
(‘The Chairman’s Review”) [POL00022635] though this changed once
Freeths LLP issued its letter of claim in April 2016. The Chairman’s Review
was the internal name for the review that Mr Parker instructed Mr Swift KC to
undertake into the adequacy of the ICRAMS and POL’s handling of the
complaints made by Postmasters. I do not recall exactly when, but a further
re-organisation at POL resulted in my reporting line changing to the then
General Counsel (Jane MacLeod) and my job title becoming ‘Head of
Portfolio: Legal Risk and Governance’. In this role I supported Mrs MacLeod
from a functional management perspective (e.g. budgets, away days, meeting
agendas and their cadence) and had specific responsibility for the
organisation of the Postmaster Litigation Steering Group (“PLSG”) meetings
and a number of Business as Usual (“BAU”) teams including POL’s
Information Rights Team, the Security Communications Team and the Group
Litigation Investigations Team — the latter aiding Womble Bond Dickinson
(‘WBD’) with the identification and collection of records and documents held
across the organisation and which were thought to be relevant to the claims
made against POL in relation to the Group Litigation.
December 2018 — April 2020
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12. In December 2018, my job title was changed to ‘Portfolio Director’. In this role
I continued to support the Group Litigation Programme but also inherited
responsibility for the delivery of projects that Mrs MacLeod sponsored. By way
of example, these included the latter phases of POL’s GDPR Programme, a
programme to define and implement retention schedules across the
organisation, and a programme initially set up to optimise the Group’s legal
entity structure (“Project LEO”). Project LEO was stood up to enable the
realisation of a then Board stated financial services strategy but which was
later re-purposed to deliver new Articles of Association for POL and its
subsidiaries and to agree the first iteration of the shareholder relationship
framework document, as between POL, UKGI and BIS (as it was known then).
13. Subsequent to the Common Issues Judgment being handed down and Mrs
MacLeod’s departure, a period of change followed. I had a number of line
managers and roles in the approximate 12 months before being appointed to
the ‘Legal, Compliance & Governance Operations Director’ in April 2020.
During this period I continued to support a number of the activities described
at paragraph 12 and the then Business Improvement Director (Angela Van
Den Bogerd) with the Horizon Issues Trial Contingency Planning. With support
from Deloitte, Mrs Van Den Bogerd and I were tasked with preparing the
business to be able to provide an effective response to an adverse Horizon
Issues Judgment and putting in place what was termed as being a ‘Rapid
Response Team’ [POL00279995]. I was part of this team and explain its
purpose and my involvement in this more at paragraph 157 below.
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14. Furthermore, and for completeness, I also assisted with the acquisition of
Payzone in 2019 and the pilot implementation of POL’s Contract Management
Framework, which led to the decentralised contract management model POL
currently adopts.
April 2020 - Present
15. Since April 2020, I have been in the role of ‘Legal, Compliance & Governance
Operations Director’, reporting to POL’s Group General Counsel, Ben Foat.
The title reflects the areas that were included in the directorate at the time
(Legal, Compliance and Company Secretariat) and my role being focussed on
Operations. My primary responsibility is to ensure the smooth running of the
Office of the General Counsel via an effective meeting cadence and operating
rhythm, aiding the directorate to operate effectively; underpinned by the
necessary budget and signature processes. I also support other members of
Mr Foat’s Lead Team and other areas of the business with the delivery of key
pieces of work, some of which are cross-functional in nature. The most recent
example would be the Grant Thornton review into the effectiveness of POL’s
corporate governance.
16. Mr Foat was the Executive Sponsor for the Remediation Unit and Inquiry
programmes from September 2021 until July 2023. During this time and
particularly in the early months, I also assisted Mr Foat by way of drafting and
reviewing papers, growing the Inquiry programme team and recruiting for an
in-house Inquiry Legal Team that stood outside of and was independent of the
BAU and Remediation Unit Legal Teams. During this time, I was also, for
example, tasked with conducting a review into POL’s data landscape and in
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operationalising POL's statement of 15 November 2021 in relation to legal
professional privilege which confirmed, as a general principle, POL was
prepared to waive its privilege for the purpose of the Inquiry over materials
that were created in the period up to 26 February 2020 (to the extent these
materials are relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference or requests). What
this meant in practical terms was collecting POL’s client files from its current
and historic legal advisers so as to provide POL with confidence that it had
within its possession those materials it had waived its privilege over.
17. Although I have worked closely with POL’s internal and external legal teams
throughout my time at POL, I was not, nor am I now, legally qualified.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM
18. I had no knowledge of the Horizon IT System (“Horizon”) prior to joining POL
in September 2014. Whilst working on Project Sparrow / the ICRAMS (the
detail of which follows below), I began to gain knowledge of the complaints
that had and continued to be made by postmasters regarding both the level of
support provided by POL and the Horizon IT System. I continued to gain
knowledge about these issues over a number of subsequent years through
my interactions with Fujitsu, my involvement in the Chairman’s Review, my
interactions with Deloitte (through Project Bramble), the Group Litigation Order
(“GLO”) and by virtue of the summary documents WBD produced post
handing down of the Horizon Issues Judgment — all of which is set out within
this statement.
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Bugs, Errors or Defects in Horizon
19. None of the roles I have performed at POL have involved investigating or
remediating the technical side of the bugs, errors or defects in Horizon
(“BEDs”), including those which had the potential to impact branch accounts.
However, my involvement in the programmes referenced within paragraph 18,
meant that I did become aware of certain BEDs, as they were reported on by
Second Sight, within the Chairman’s Review, and as part of or subsequent to
the GLO Proceedings.
20. For example, I believe I first became aware of the Receipts/Payments
Mismatch Bug, Callendar Square Bug and Suspense Accounts Bug as a result
of the work performed by Second Sight — all of which were reported on by
Second Sight within their Interim report of 8 July 2013. I can see from the
documents provided to me by the Inquiry that I sought information from Fujitsu
from as early as:
20.1 7 April 2015 regarding the Receipts/Payments Mismatch Bug
[FUJ00081950], including asking Fujitsu to explain what the statements
made by Second Sight about this bug meant, and specifically:
(a) How the alterations that Second Sight had cited would be made
(b) Whether they would leave a detectable footprint
(c) The effect they would have on data integrity
(d) Whether the alterations would be visible to branches
(e) What course of action was taken
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20.2 11 June 2015 regarding the Receipts/Payments Mismatch Bug,
Callendar Square Bug and Suspense Accounts Bug [FUJ00237386]
during which I note my intention to “...pull together the definitive detail
on each of these bugs...” and ask to be provided with “...as much
information as possible about each of the three bugs...”
21. Information about each of these BEDs was provided to Mr Swift KC and
featured within the Chairman’s Review. I do not recall being aware of the other
BEDs commented on within the Chairman’s Review prior to obtaining
information from Fujitsu to aid the production of this report. I do recall, on
occasion being frustrated by Fujitsu for not being able to easily provide the
information being requested, such as the “number of system errors identified,
by year, that could affect branch accounts together with the number of
branches that were affected and were capable of being affected by these
errors, together with reasons” [POL00323499], and that it was not always
straightforward to obtain information from them. For example, [POL00317146]
shows that as at 16 June 2015 Fujitsu’s view was that there had only been
evidence of two BEDs within Horizon, despite three being reported on within
the Second Sight Interim Report of July 2013 and, as included within my
subsequent challenge back to Fujitsu “...in terms of the third bug — this was
Said to have occurred at the Callendar Square Branch in Falkirk, so I presume
it does exist — not least because it was reference[d] in two separate court
procedures? Could you do some digging please?”
22. Nevertheless, I note Mr Swift KC’s concluding point on the “Bugs in the
Horizon System” section of the Chairman’s Review [POL00022635] where, at
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paragraph 120, it reports “We have seen nothing to suggest that these specific
bugs identified have been the cause of wider loss to SPMRs in the Scheme
cases or otherwise. We see no basis upon which to recommend any further
action in relation to those identified bugs now’. Evidently, my knowledge and
understanding of these BEDs was based upon information which already
existed and additional information I was then able to obtain from others,
principally Fujitsu — often to aid or better understand the investigations being
performed by third parties such as Second Sight and Mr Swift KC
[POL00323499).
23. Aside from the Receipts/Payments Mismatch Bug, Callendar Square Bug
(also known as the Falkirk Bug) and Suspense Accounts Bug, I do not believe
I had knowledge of any further BEDs impacting branches prior to the Horizon
Issues Judgment being handed down in December 2019. These BEDs
occurred in Horizon prior to me joining POL and my role was to attempt to
collate the information necessary in order to be able to try and understand and
then summarise the details for each of them (e.g. [FUJ00237386],
[POL00316930]), capturing how POL and Fujitsu responded, subsequent to
these BEDs being discovered e.g. how they were identified, resolved and
prevented from occurring again, along with whether their existence/
remediation was communicated to/done in conjunction with or in the
knowledge of Postmasters more generally. This exercise continued even post
handing down of the Horizon Issues Judgment when I asked WBD to produce
plain English summaries for each of the 29 BEDs that featured in the Horizon
Issues Trial. These summaries were later shared with POL’s IT Team in or
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around April 2020 to check whether all had since been fixed such that they
could not impact upon branch accounts going forward.
Training
24. Between 2015 and, I think, 2022, Post Office’s Head Office was located in
Finsbury Dials. Within this office space was a ‘dummy’ Post Office which was
used to provide demonstrations on and test certain products ahead of being
released on the live environment. I do not recall being provided with any
specific training on the Horizon system, save for attending the ‘model office’
ahead of the Christmas period, where POL employees were asked to work in-
branch for approximately 3 days, to support with the additional workload over
the busy period. The ‘model office’ provided a high-level overview of how the
system works. I have not however ever operated a Horizon Terminal — in
branch, over the Christmas period or otherwise.
ARQ Data
25. In lay terms, I understand Audit Retrieval Query (“ARQ”) data to be a record
of each transaction performed in a branch. I do not believe I have ever had
detailed knowledge of what is/is not contained within this data, nor that my
understanding of what ARQ data is has materially changed over time.
Remote Access
26. I have been asked to describe my knowledge of the ability of Fujitsu
employees to alter transaction data or data in branch accounts without the
knowledge or consent of Postmasters up to 2011. I was not at POL in the time
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leading up to 2011 and as such held no such knowledge ahead of joining POL
in 2014.
27. However, soon after joining POL and as noted in paragraph 18, I became
aware that a number of applicants to the ICRAMS believed the shortfalls they
had experienced in their branch accounts may have been caused through their
branch accounts being accessed and then altered without their consent or
knowledge. I believe this first arose as an issue reported on in the context of
Second Sight’s work and POL’s initial investigations ahead of the ICRAMS
being established through ‘Spot Review 5’ [POL00307820] which was
included in Second Sight’s Interim Report of 8 July 2013.
28. I have reviewed the email chain from 28 October 2014 to 31 October 2014
when POL and WBD were drafting responses to the CRR for M053 and M078
and specifically in relation to references to remote access [POL00211695].
The email chain aligns with my recollection that the information POL had
access to, and its own understanding of remote access was changing, and
further inquiries were being made of Fujitsu to understand the issue.
29. Subsequent to attending a meeting on or around 6 November 2014, Patrick
Bourke and I were tasked with producing a “straightforward statement’ which
captured in “plain English” what “Fujitsu confirmed for us yesterday’ regarding
remote access [POL00149488]. It is clear from this exchange and my email
of 7 November 2014, that my understanding, which was based upon my
recollection of what Fujitsu had told us during this meeting, was:
29.1 “...Regardless of what happens to branch accounts; there is a clear audit
trail left that is easily searchable by unique user and transactional ID's...”
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30.
29.2 It was only possible for Fujitsu (not POL) to ‘inject’ or ‘insert additional
transactions (not edit, delete, or alter existing transactions)’ and this
could be done through the insertion of a ‘balancing transaction’.
29.3 Retention periods allowing, Fujitsu would be able to search the
transaction data for each of the ICRAMS cases and had already
performed searches over these datasets to establish whether or not a
‘balancing transaction’ had been inserted into any of the branch accounts
for the period(s) of time they were operated by applicants to the ICRAMS.
Within this email (and my subsequent email of 11 November 2014) I note the
need to establish what audit trail a ‘balancing transaction’ would leave before
setting out my understanding of the ability of branch accounts to be accessed
remotely, as at 7 November 2014. This was as follows:
“Once a transaction is recorded in Branch by a SPMR or member of their
Staff, it cannot under any circumstance be edited, manipulated or
removed. That transaction, against the user ID of the branch staff
member who recorded it, will remain in the Branch accounts for ever and
leave behind it a clear and identifiable audit trail. Though existing
transactions cannot be edited, manipulated or removed, new transactions
can be added to branch accounts, but only in the following three ways:
1) There is the capability for Post Office employees to log on to a branch
terminal locally (i.e. by being physically in a branch) using a unique
user ID different to that of any branch staff. Such additional
transactions, once recorded will remain in Branch accounts for ever
and leave behind them clear and identifiable audit trails.
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2) POL can add transaction acknowledgements (TA) or transaction
corrections (TC) into branch accounts. TAs are used to record
transactions that have been processed in branch through other
systems (e.g. the sale of Lottery products on the Camelot terminal)
and TCs correct errors made by branches. Both, once added, will
remain in the Branch accounts for ever and leave behind them clear
and identifiable audit trails.
3) Balancing transactions. Where an error cannot be corrected through
a TAor TC, Fujitsu can inject a new transaction into branch accounts
using the balancing transaction process. This process has only been
used once since the introduction of Horizon online, is attributed to a
unique transaction ID and once injected, will remain in the Branch
accounts for ever and leave behind it a clear and identifiable audit
trail.
31. At this point, it was my understanding that POL would be able to discount
remote access from being a potential cause for the shortfalls experienced by
applicants to the ICRAMS by performing searches over the audit data. This
was on the basis that “there are only 3 ways transactions can be added to a
Branch’s account, such additions leave ‘identifiable scars’ that are easily
searchable and thus, if any SPMR feels they have been subject to ‘remote
access’ — we can search for said ‘identifiable scars’. If they are not in the
Branch’s accounts, we can categorically say this set of Branch accounts has
not had any transactions added to it by FJ or POL.” [POL00149488].
[POL00149598], includes an email within which I relay to POL colleagues that
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Fujitsu had confirmed to me on a call of 20 November 2014 that “where
SPMR’s have identified periods of time mysterious transactions have taken
place — the auditors have searched the data and no ‘remote access scar’ is
present and thus did not take place”. Though I note now that this references
‘auditors’ as having performed the searches and only in instances where
complaints had been particularised, which is different and narrower to what I
believe Fujitsu had said previously at the meeting of 6 November 2014, I still
would have taken comfort in my understanding that with the assistance of
Fujitsu, POL would be able to prove the negative where claims were
particularised. [POL00318209] makes clear the conclusion (based on
information from Fujitsu) that although searching for ‘Balancing Transactions’
across the whole POL estate and all versions of Horizon would be a “big job”
and could “take months’, it would be possible to do.
32. At this stage, late November 2014, my knowledge of remote access was
dependent upon the answers provided by Fujitsu in response to the various
questions posed of them, often by reference to papers that had been drafted
to try and bring clarity to the issue [FUJ00087133]. From reviewing the
documents provided to me by the Inquiry, I recall being “disappointed”
[WBON0000326] with the answers Fujitsu provided on the draft papers
[WBON0000327] I asked them to review and provide answers to questions
on. At the time I had a satisfactory rapport with Fujitsu, and I pushed back a
number of times to Fujitsu on these responses and re-explained the purpose
of the papers to get clearer and more robust answers from them. Based upon
the documents provided to me, I think this process of making the papers more
precise continued until 19 December 2014 [FUJ00236842] and was then
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again revisited in April 2015 [FUJ00237155]. I was, and remain, mindful that
POL was relying on Fujitsu’s knowledge of remote access, and in so relying
on Fujitsu’s knowledge, was making representations to other third parties on
remote access.
33. I believe my understanding of remote access remained as set out within
paragraph 29 until I aided in the production of the Chairman’s Review through
the collation and provision of relevant materials and, as a result, becoming
sighted on Deloitte’s “Horizon: Desktop Review of Assurance Sources and
Key Control Features” report, which is dated 23 May 2014 [POL00028062]. I
do not believe this report was shared with me until receiving an email from
Rodric Williams on Tuesday 13 October 2015 [POL00233987] and which, in
turn was sent to Mr Swift KC to consider as part of the Charman’s Review and
which, along with the accompanying Board Briefing, is commented on within
the Chairman’s Review and resulted in a number of the Chairman’s Review
recommendations (as set out in paragraph 117 below).
34. My belief that I was not aware of the existence of the ‘Project Zebra’ reports
nor its contents until October 2015 is evident from the information I suggested
be included within Paula Vennells’s briefing materials ahead of appearing at
the Select Committee in February 2015. Subsequent to providing my
understanding of what was/was not possible, I asked Fujitsu to confirm it as
being accurate and to provide details on tests performed on the Horizon
system [FUJ00087142].
35. Having become sighted on Deloitte’s desktop report on Horizon on 13 October
2015, it is at this point that I believe I would have become aware of the
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potential for Fujitsu to not only be able to inject additional transactions into
branch accounts (but leave behind it a clear and identifiable audit trail) but also
that Fujitsu could potentially delete files in an undetectable manner. I became
aware of this information through Deloitte’s desktop report and Mr Swift KC’s
synthesis of this information within the Chairman’s Review. The Chairman's
Review informed my knowledge on this subject. Within the Chairman’s Review
[POL00022635] Mr Swift KC records that in the context of the ICRAMS and
allegations of remote access, allegations were “generic rather than specific”
and “...in the vast majority of cases specific transactions of concern have been
readily explicable by common sense explanations; such as sharing of user
identifications, or SPMRs being on leave, or mistakes as to the timings...”
36. However, Mr Swift KC rightly also notes that they, unlike Second Sight, had
been provided with the two documents produced for POL by Deloitte in May
and June 2014 entitled ‘Horizon: Desktop Review of Assurance Sources and
Key Control Features’ and an accompanying ‘Board Briefing’. At paragraphs
140 and 141 of his report, Mr Swift KC writes:
“Deloitte note, following a review of the technical documentation, the
ISAE3402 and verbal discussions with POL and Fujitsu, that database
access privileges which “would enable a person to delete a digitally signed
basket’ do exist, but are “restricted to authorised administrators at Fujitsu”.
Those privileges “would enable a person to create or amend a basket and
re-sign it with a fake’ key, detectable if appropriately checked”. Deloitte
had not identified specific controls to prevent a person with the appropriate
authorisation carrying out this exercise in an unauthorised manner. The
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Briefing goes on to state that administrators had the ability to “delete data
from the Audit Store during the seven year period, which was a
matter...contrary to POL’s understanding...This could allow suitably
authorised staff in Fujitsu to delete a sealed set of baskets and replace
them with properly sealed baskets, although they would have to fake the
digital signatures”. When we spoke to Deloitte, they described this
functionality as resulting, in essence, from the level of security contained
in Horizon being a level down from the maximum”.
“We have seen a response from Fujitsu concerning this aspect of
Deloitte’s investigation, which is based upon a summary of it provided by
POL rather than the original Board Briefing itself. Fujitsu appear to accept
that Deloitte’s interpretation is technically correct, but emphasise the wide
range of security measures in the software, hardware and environment
which reduce the risk of interference. Fujitsu also, properly, stress that
there is no evidence that any such action has occurred and that likelihood
of all the security measures being overcome is so small that it does not
represent a credible line of further enquiry’.
37. Mr Swift KC goes on to reflect that just because “...such activity is possible
does not, of course, indicate that it has actually occurred” and queries why it
would have done so, finding Second Sight’s suggestion that “Fujitsu
employees could, in theory, run a fraud in collusion with an SPMR whereby
transactions were added to the branch records generating cash payments
out...” “inherently improbable”.
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38. Though described by Mr Swift KC in his report as likely being “wild goose
chases’, it was his finding that it was “incumbent” upon POL to commission
further work which is then reflected in his recommendations 3,4, 5 and 6
[POL00022635).
39. Mr Swift KC notes within paragraph 138 of his report, the 2014 Deloitte reports
were based upon “a desktop review of the operating documentation including
discussions with Fujitsu. It did not involve access to the system itself or testing
processes”.
40. Further work to attempt to confirm the ‘art of the possible’ and the likelihood
of occurrence was taken forward by Deloitte under the name “Project
Bramble”.
Project Bramble
41. I have been asked to set out the extent of my knowledge and involvement with
Deloitte on Project Bramble. I acted as Deloitte’s point person within POL for
Project Bramble. My role was to ensure that Deloitte had access to whatever
they needed in order to be able to produce their report. This involved agreeing
commercial terms, facilitating access between Deloitte and Fujitsu, arranging
meetings with POL colleagues such as Rob Houghton (POL’s then Chief
Technology Officer) to determine scope, and testing Deloitte’s confidence in
the system versus what they initially included within earlier draft versions of
their report. Deloitte produced a number of versions of their report. I recall
frustration within POL, WBD and the Counsel team on the contents of the
initial reports not reflecting the strength of opinion regarding the reliability of
the Horizon system when compared to the view expressed to us verbally by
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the Deloitte team. With WBD, I reviewed each iteration of the report and
sought to test and challenge the drafting where we felt it did not accurately
reflect the confidence expressed to us verbally.
42. As noted above, Deloitte produced a number of reports and versions of reports
and as their work progressed, the understanding grew, and scope widened.
The first report was dated 8 July 2016, and the last report dated 19 January
2018. It was, I believe, Deloitte’s first report of 8 July 2016 which confirmed a
small number of ‘super users’ at Fujitsu had the ability to delete branch
transactions (albeit it, at this stage Deloitte had not confirmed whether this
could be done without leaving a ‘footprint’) and is what led to Mr Parsons’s
email of 13 July 2016 [WBON0001030] to Mrs MacLeod, Mr Williams and Mr
Bourke. I suspect I was only copied owing to already being aware of the
contents of this report. Mr Parsons notes within his email that this finding
meant POL’s historic statements about not being able to edit or delete
transactions were, “at least on face value’, incorrect. WBD subsequently
proposed new wording on the remote access issue for the Letter of Response
to Freeths LLP. As part of this exercise, I reviewed the scheme chronology
and statements that had been made by POL regarding remote access,
circulating this to PLSG members on 21 July 2017 [POL00025209].
43. Following my interactions with Fujitsu during 2014, Mr Swift KC’s findings as
included within the 2016 Chairman’s Review, and prior to the handing down
of the Horizon Issues Judgment in December 2019; my understanding
regarding Horizon’s integrity and the extent to which it was possible and likely
that Fujitsu had remotely accessed and then altered branch audit data, which
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could have been responsible for the shortfalls complained of, would have
been based upon the findings as included within each version of the Project
Bramble reports between July 2016 and what I believe to have been the final
version as dated 19 January 2018.
44. For completeness, I paste the executive summary from Deloitte’s report of 19
January 2018 [POL00028928] below:
“In assessing the Horizon Online system, our work has focused on a broad
Suite of controls which, in collaboration, work to assure that the integrity of
transactional data is maintained from branch to Audit Store. The controls
respond to the fundamental risks of data integrity which are:
« Completeness — All data is transmitted from source to destination in its
entirety.
e Accuracy — Data is accurately transmitted from source to destination
without change.
« Validity — The data is valid and has not been doctored or changed such
that it is no longer representative of the information the original data
was recorded to capture, or has been created spuriously and not linked
to a real life data generating event.
The system controls across the areas of the Horizon Online system we
have examined are robust at the point our work was conducted with
minimal exceptions noted from our testing. They are appropriate to a
system the size and scale of Horizon, and the distributed electronic point
of sale (EPOS) function it performs. The system controls have been
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designed to meet a high standard of control and have been assessed
similarly in the reports of other independent assurance organisations such
as Ernst and Young (Service Auditor Report) - although not specifically in
the context of responding to these allegations.
Our work has focused on the core data flow within Horizon Online, from
the Counter in branch to the Audit Store. We focussed on this particular
core data flow because it is this data flow which leads to the initial capture
of transaction data and its subsequent long term storage and, in the event
of an issue or challenge, data is downloaded from the Audit Store to enable
Post Office to carry out an investigation. This data flow is subject to industry
standard cryptographic controls which are automated, inherent system
controls and they are applied by the system to each and every transaction
processed by the Counter. They represent the most reliable control type
possible over data integrity — they are hardcoded into the system and no
manual intervention is required for them to operate. As a consequence of
being inherent to the technology they have been in operation throughout
the life of Horizon Online
Working together, the Digital Signature (paragraph 1.3.3.1 (d)) and JSN
(paragraph 1.3.3.1 (c)) controls respond to the fundamental data integrity
risks of Completeness, Accuracy and Validity and make it extremely
unlikely that the record of transactions contained within the Audit Store is
not representative of the transactions input by staff in branch. As with all
large scale computer systems whilst it is theoretically possible that glitches
and coding errors in the system could have resulted in errors in the
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recording of transactions to occur, the likelihood of such errors occurring
in a manner which has adversely affected only certain branches materially
whilst not affecting other branches at all / minimally is in our view remote
given the controls in place. The testing we have performed over these
controls was designed and executed to assess their operation in
responding to these fundamental risks. Noting the assumptions and
limitations detailed in section 1.5, this testing has not resulted in any
matters being identified that would call into question the integrity of the
core data flow within Horizon Online from the Counter in branch to the
Audit Store.
While we have identified an exception in the cryptographic controls
(paragraph 1.4.2.10 and 1.4.2.11) which would theoretically allow a
malicious actor to undermine them and potentially change data, it is limited
to a third party (Fujitsu) and would be technically very challenging to
achieve. It would require significant motivation for one of the limited set of
Fujitsu staff members to exploit this vulnerability given the technical
challenges and risks of tripping monitoring controls and, although we have
not performed procedures in this area, it would almost certainly require
collusion with Post Office staff or Postmasters. Although our investigations
have not been exhaustive, they have been extensive and we have seen
no such evidence of malicious misuse of the system”.
May 2009 Computer Weekly Article
45. I created a chronology of events for Mrs MacLeod on 10 October 2015
[POL00104218], with an updated version provided on 13 October 2015
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46.
[POL00130960], which I then sought to keep up to date until Freeths LLP
served the Letter of Claim on POL. The initial purpose of this chronology was
for it to be shared with Mr Swift KC to aid his reading in and review. I provided
Mrs MacLeod with a suggested draft email for her to send to Mr Swift KC on
13 October 2015 [POL00162686]. This included the following:
“In my email of 10 October 2015, I sent you a draft chronology of events
over the last four years and said that! would provide you with the
documents it is drawn from early this week. Having now collected c75%
of these documents it is apparent that, due to their volume, doing so would
involve providing a huge (136MB) amount of documentation — not all of
which would necessarily be helpful to you at this stage of the work.
Can I suggest instead that, looking at the updated Chronology I attach,
you identify any documents you feel you would particularly like to see at
this juncture and I will ask the team here to get them over to you as soon
as possible? For information purposes, those ‘events’ that are highlighted
in yellow have been previously supplied and those with a ‘tick’ in the
‘schedule’ column have had their supporting documentation identified”.
In preparing this witness statement and having reviewed the chronology
[POL00041564], I have noted that the 2009 Computer Weekly article is
included within it. Although I cannot recall the motive behind including it, I
believe it would have been due its relevance to creating a timeline to explain
the genesis of ICRAMS. I do not recall the 2009 Computer Weekly article
being discussed within POL.
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POL’s Prosecutorial Function
47. I have been asked to set out my knowledge of POL’s prosecutorial function. I
have never had any involvement in a POL prosecution or prosecutions brought
by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) or equivalent. I believe that save for
three cases involving four defendants, POL ceased prosecuting cases related
to Horizon before I joined POL. However, through my involvement in the
ICRAMs, I would have been aware of the fact that POL had historically brought
private prosecutions against individuals. I believe that my knowledge of the
prosecutions being an abuse of process and convictions unsafe, with
inadequate investigation and/or that full and accurate disclosure was not
made, would have originated from reading the Court of Appeal Criminal
Division Hamilton & others -v- Post Office Limited summary judgment in April
2021 (the “Hamilton Judgment”).
48. The Inquiry has provided me with [POL00040517] which are talking points for
Jo Swinson MP during the Westminster Hall Debate. The talking points state,
“Since POL separated from RMG (1/04/12) Prosecution decisions have been
made by external lawyers i.e. solicitors and Barristers”. Although my role
included me having various interactions with various internal and external
legal advisors, I can confirm that I was not involved in overseeing the work
done by external lawyers regarding prosecution decisions.
SECOND SIGHT AND THE INITIAL COMPLAINT REVIEW AND MEDIATION
SCHEME
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Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme (ICRAMS)
49. Second Sight were a firm of independent forensic accountants who were
initially appointed by POL in July 2012 to conduct an independent investigation
into Horizon. Second Sight’s appointment was supported by Members of
Parliament. Following Second Sight’s Interim Report in July 2013, Second
Sight’s remit changed to reviewing the individual complaints of Postmasters
through the ICRAMS. The ICRAMS was developed jointly by POL, Second
Sight, the Justice for Sub-postmasters Alliance (“JFSA”), and overseen by a
Working Group Chaired by Sir Anthony Hooper. By the time I joined POL in
September 2014, the ICRAMS was already established and the window for
applications had closed.
50. My recollection of the process was as follows:
50.1 First, POL would re investigate and review the facts and circumstances of
each case admitted to ICRAMS. The reports produced by this team were
called Post Office Investigation Reports (“POIR’).
50.2 Then Second Sight would use the POIRs to conduct an independent
assessment of the facts and produce their own report, a Case Review
Report (“CRR’), with their recommendation of whether they believed a
case would be suitable for mediation.
50.3. The CRR and its recommendation would then be passed to the Working
Group, which would discuss which cases should or were capable of being
mediated. The Working Group included the Chair, members of the JFSA,
POL, and representatives from Second Sight. I did not attend the Working
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Group. The Chair, Sir Anthony Hooper held the casting vote when there
was disagreement and was appointed as Chair on the recommendation of
the JFSA.
51. Mediations were planned and conducted by the Centre for Effective Dispute
Resolution (“CEDR”). The mediations would be attended by the CEDR
mediator, a representative from POL with the operational know-how behind
the running of a Post Office branch and a legal representative from WBD.
Applicants were also allowed to bring legal representation to the mediation. I
did not attend the mediations. Provided below is a table which I believe to set
out the outcome for each of the 150 applications that were made to the
ICRAMS [POL00235243].
Applications to the Scheme 150
Applications rejected (ineligible) 4
Cases resolved prior to entry into the Scheme 10
Cases accepted into the Scheme 136
No. of cases not I Cases POL found unsuitable for mediation 42
suitable for Cases the WG found unsuitable for mediation 2
mediation: 48 Cases closed owing to a missing / ill applicant 4
Residual I 88
No. of cases Cases resolved during investigation 5
suitable for Cases resolved prior to mediation meeting 4
mediation: 88 Cases resolved at mediation 22
Cases not resolved at mediation 22
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Cases referred to CEDR for mediation by POL which 35
will not be mediated, owing to the Applicant’s decision
Residual I 0
52. As explained above, by the time I joined POL, Second Sight had already been
appointed in 2012 and their terms of reference had already changed following
the establishment of ICRAMS. On that basis, I was not involved in the
decision-making process, the terms of reference, or contract with Second
Sight, as it all predated my time at POL.
53. However, I was involved with POL’s response to requests for information from
Second Sight and supporting their investigation. Where Second Sight would
request documents or information, and after POL confirmed access was
approved, I would then facilitate the access to the correct documentation or
subject matter experts. In my role, I was asked to assist Second Sight with
finalising their Part Two Report. This included setting up a business wide
meeting between Second Sight and subject matter experts, and then following
up with colleagues over email and liaising between all parties for outstanding
questions. Various examples of me seeking answers to questions posed from
across POL are at [POL00216092], [POL00221743], [POL00221759], and
[POL00312099].
Project Sparrow
54. Project Sparrow was the internal project name for the ICRAMS
[POL00152996]. It was, in effect, the team that produced the POIRs along
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with the team whose primary functions were to act as the Secretariat for the
Working Group (during its existence), progress cases through ICRAMS and
arrange the mediations for those that proceeded to mediation. As a member
of the latter team within Project Sparrow, it was also our responsibility to
support with the production of papers and ensure the Working Group had all
the papers they needed to take a view on whether a case was suitable for
mediation. I do not believe these teams had any particular decision-making
role or authority and the material decisions relating to Project Sparrow were
taken at the Working Group level or through the POL Board or its
Subcommittee. I did not attend either of these meetings, but I would have seen
and provided my views on the papers I had sight of, and which would have
been taken to the relevant committee.
55. When I joined POL, I came into the organisation to support the Secretariat.
Initially, I produced case trackers (which have been withheld by POL due to
personal data reasons), budgets, and cost forecasts. I also looked at some
discrete issues that the team wanted analysis of, such as remote access, the
invoices received from Second Sight, and case data more generally (e.g. the
costs incurred by scheme activity). Initially my role was more administrative,
such as being responsible for version control, producing data, capturing key
details of each case on a spreadsheet, and recording the themes of the
complaints. As discussed above, I would also help to coordinate Second
Sight’s access to subject matter experts across POL and seek to obtain
answers to their outstanding questions to enable Second Sight to finalise their
Part Two Report. Subsequent to the changes in personnel referred to at
paragraph 10 and shift in focus for the team, I was responsible for helping to
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progress cases and navigate logistical issues. I was also asked to review
Second Sight’s reports and co-ordinate POL’s response to the Part Two
Report which is described in further detail at paragraph 63.
Second Sight
56. Shortly after I joined POL, I was sighted on an analysis of the first 10 CRRs
produced by Second Sight [POL00153248]. I believe this analysis to have
been conducted by PA Consulting. Within it at paragraph 1.5, it refers to
Second Sight’s signed letter of engagement dated 1 July 2014 and Second
Sight’s scope of services as including:
« ‘Investigating the specific complaints raised by each Subpostmasters
who has been accepted into the Scheme
« Acting independently in providing the Services and any assessment or
opinion given by Second Sight shall be without bias and based upon
the facts and evidence available
e Acting with the skill and care expected of qualified and experienced
accountants
* Conducting the Services in an efficient manner and with a view to
ensuring that the costs of the Scheme are reasonable
e Using its reasonable endeavours to comply with any deadlines or
timeframes set by the Working Group”.
57. It is this paper, I suspect, to be the reference included within the Board paper
dated 17 September 2014 [POL00027363] and which refers to having already
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addressed “privately” concerns regarding Second Sight'’s “...productivity,
costs, quality of work and general engagement with Post Office.” My reading
of this paper is that it is clear POL was moving towards setting out its concerns
in detail via a letter and at a formal meeting with Second Sight to discuss the
improvements required, manage their costs and link productivity with
payment, to incentivise Second Sight to work faster.
58. Following the circulation of the Board Paper dated 17 September 2014, I was
likely sighted on Chris Aujard’s subsequent letter to Second Sight
[POL00209725] of 24 September 2014 where he makes clear the
dissatisfaction POL had with Second Sight, reiterating the points in his paper.
It is clear from the Board Paper and this letter that at the point I joined POL,
significant concerns were held by POL with regard to Second Sight’s
productivity, quality of work product and value for money. This
correspondence also makes it clear that these concerns were discussed
internally (at Board level), within the Working Group Meetings and with
Second Sight directly at meetings with POL.
Second Sight’s Independence
59. I have been asked by the Inquiry to comment on whether I thought Second
Sight was independent in conducting its investigations. In order to answer this
question adequately, I will not consider the fact that there was a contract, in
which POL was paying Second Sight to run its investigation, as fettering
Second Sight’s independence. I will treat that as a natural byproduct of a
business using a third party to run an investigation.
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60. Subsequent to Mr Aujard’s letter of 24 September 2014, I believe I then
prepared a briefing paper [POL00209883] for Mr Aujard ahead of the meeting
with Second Sight on 30 September 2014. The purpose of this paper was to
provide evidence for each of the points raised in the letter. The contents of this
briefing paper also provided examples for some of the concerns POL had
regarding Second Sight forming conclusions which were neither reasoned nor
supported by evidence. I believe this will have been based upon
[POL00153248], which will have been added to and finalised by the team,
which I would have coordinated. The contents of the paper, which included
evidence against each area of concern (rate of delivery, quality of work,
manner of delivery and cost) will have informed my view on Second Sight’s
independence. For example, the paper records that Second Sight’s
conclusions were not seen to be reasoned or supported by evidence and that
the quality of their CRR had been subject to minuted Working Group concerns
over their style and quality. Further, Second Sight were failing to express what
standard of proof they were applying in giving its opinion on disputed issues
of fact.
61. Further to the concerns raised in September 2014 regarding Second Sight’s
quality of work, in an email to Mr Bourke on 21 November 2014
[POL00156544], I examined and explained a few of the mediation cases that
showed Second Sight’s lack of quality. I noted, “/ think the following cases
evidence the lack of quality and critical reasoning behind their
recommendations. Further they show a worrying tendency to appear willing to
be swayed easily be [sic] less than compelling and un-evidenced assertions
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or special pleadings, including where these contradict the findings of a Court
process.”
Strategies for Responding to Complaints about Horizon
62. I have been asked to comment on what, if any, policies or strategies were
adopted by POL in responding to complaints made about Horizon, regarding
the ICRAMS and more generally. I am not aware of any ‘policies’ adopted by
POL in responding to complaints about Horizon, either within ICRAMS or more
widely. However, I would suggest that POL considered and then acted upon
various options available to it to progress cases through the ICRAMS quicker;
seek to defend the claims made against it during the Group Litigation; and how
it responded to enquiries from media outlets. Taking these in turn:
ICRAMS options
62.1 [POL00219827] appears to be a draft version of a paper that would have
informed a paper to be taken to Board. This paper makes clear that by
January 2015 POL felt the ICRAMS was failing to satisfy all parties
involved save for itself [POL00219104]. The paper cites unfavourable
broadcasts, MPs withdrawing their support, the JFSA’s refusal to engage
in meaningful discussions (which I assume to be in reference to at the
Working Group) and appeals for the Department (BIS at this time) to
intervene. The paper notes that “there is a strong case that the Scheme
no longer serves as an expedient and fair way to explore and, where
possible, resolve a small number of individuals’ complaints...”
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62.2 It is against this backdrop that the POL team were asked to revisit and
present back to Board the options and choices available to it with regards
to the ICRAMs. [POL00149577] looks to be the set of slides that were
prepared earlier on (November 2014) [POL00149576], when it is likely
the team were first asked to consider by the Executive Committee
(“ExCo”) POL’s options. This email chain aligns with my recollection that
I was asked to produce the slides relating to “costs and scheme facts”,
though I also recall producing the more visual of the slides relating to the
“Impact & Risk Matrix’. Ultimately, the recommendation included within
this slide pack is to “Carry on as we are”.
62.3 By January 2015, evidently, we were revisiting POL’s options and this is
what resulted in the eventual decision to mediate all cases, save for
those subject to a previous court ruling, to disband the Working Group
(as it would no longer serve a purpose), and re-engage Second Sight on
a piece rate basis. I do not believe I attended any of the associated
committee level meetings at which this decision was taken, but
consistent with the role I have described earlier, I would have been
sighted on and fed into the papers that were prepared. [POL00352082]
shows that I am asked to provide information regarding costs, which I
do, for each of the five options being considered at that time.
Group Litigation
62.4 I have described at paragraphs 121-133 below my lay understanding of
how the Group Litigation would work in terms of the sequencing of trials,
the role of the PLSG and how it operated in respect of Decision Papers.
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I do not recall an overall strategy being discussed or adopted for the
litigation per se, save for proceeding in accordance with the legal merits
of POL’s arguments, as then thought. That said, a number of individual
strategy papers were taken through the PLSG. Though not necessarily
the definitive list, I am aware of the following such papers:
e PLSG of 14 February 2017 — Decision: Does Post Office agree with the
recommended strategy set out in this paper? [POL00025376]
« PLSG of 11 September 2017 — Decision: Does Post Office support the
general strategy set out below? [POL00006497]
e PLSG of 4 October 2017 - Briefing Paper: Update on case
management strategy [POL00006462]
« PLSG of 16 October 2017: Noting Paper: Update on Litigation Strategy
[POL00006634]
e PLSG of 17 January 2018 — Decision Paper: Does Post Office support
the proposed strategy for the Court Hearing on 2 February 2018?
[POL00006481]
e PLSG of 2 February 2018 — Noting Paper: Update on strategy for the
Court Hearing on 2 February 2018 [POL00006453]
62.5 Having reviewed these papers again, it is those for meetings on 14
February 2017 and 11 September 2017 which I believe most closely
align to an overarching strategy for the litigation as a whole
[POL00025376].
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62.6 The paper of 11 September 2017 [POL00006497] sets out what was
explained to us as the “general strategic direction that we recommend is
adopted by Post Office”, noting it is “...not possible to make definitive
decisions on future strategy at this stage as it will ebb and flow with
outside events”. The paper records the ambition for the claimants to
“...abandon the claim or seek a reasonable settlement” through a
preference for focussing on the Postmaster contract as the first
substantive issue to address in the litigation, seeking to have some
claims struck out, and asking the court to order the claimants to value
their claims more completely.
Communications
62.7 I don't recall a specific communications strategy being adopted but do
recall a need to maintain confidentiality and not speak about individual
cases. From the materials shared with me by the Inquiry I note that
[POL00216579], which is dated 7 January 2015, includes within it a
“Communications Analysis” and states within it:
“The communications strategy to date has focussed on providing
measured and proportionate response to key audiences on the central
allegation of faults within the Horizon system’.
POL’s Response to Second Sight Investigations and/or Applications to ICRAMS
63. By the time I joined POL, the window for new applications to the ICRAMS had
closed and those applicants which were accepted into the ICRAMS, from the
150 applications made, of which I believe there were 136, had all already been
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accepted. I did not therefore have a role to play in responding to the
applications that were made to ICRAMS.
64. Excluding individual CRRs, I believe Second Sight produced four reports, all
of which save for its Part 2 Report of 9 April 2015 were produced prior to me
joining POL in September 2014. As such, it was this report that I believe I
sought to obtain answers to the questions they posed and support Post
Office’s Reply [POL00224571]. With regard to the substance of the “Reply of
Post Office Limited to Second Sight’s Briefing Report — Part Two”, I believe
[POL00224571] and [POL00313587] set out the approach adopted for
producing POL’s Reply. Within these emails, it would seem that I prepared an
initial response, using the previous POL Reply to Second Sight’s 21 August
2014 version of the Part 2 Report. The date of that POL Reply was 22
September 2014.
65. Within my email of 17 March 2015 [POL00040954] I state that “Where
possible and drawing from other docs (Scheme Report, Select Committee
response, dossier etc) I have added and amended text where appropriate” but
note that “Where I do not have the technical expertise / knowledge, I have left
comments to indicate what additional paragraphs we need to formulae new
lines for. Where indicated, I will chase the relevant people at PO and ask
Angela — but could Bond Dickinson provide draft responses to the additional
paragraphs as indicated or where you deem necessary?”
66. I provided an update on 20 March 2015 [POL00040962], within which I state
“I thought it may be useful to share where we are up to in respect of our
response to Part Two.
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e I have been though our original reply to their original report and
tweaked & added words to cover, where warranted, any new assertions
/ points made over and above those included in their original report.
« Where I did not know the process / technical process aspects, Angela
has fed in and Andy P is drafting some additional lines.
* Once this is complete, the report is (today) being shared with Paul
Lorraine [who was a Solicitor at WBD] who will sense check and double
check that we have not missed anything important we need to rebut /
comment on.
e I will then tidy up and share with Angela and Rod on Monday morning
for proofing and legal sign off. Though everyone is welcome to read
and comment”
« We should then be able to share a draft of our reply with SS (if we
decide to — I am not sure we should but we can discuss). Note: the
section on Foreign Currency Transactions may not be included by
Monday as it is needs to be drafted by Angela and Kath as it relates to
M118”.
Briefings
67. Categorically, for any elements of any briefings I contributed to or led on, I
would not have purposefully “not passed on” any material. The briefings would
have contained what I believed to be the relevant and important points for the
individual or individuals to be briefed upon, as according to the purpose of
their briefing and who had asked for the information.
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68. During the ICRAMS, on occasion and when asked, I assisted Mrs Crowe with
producing briefings (slides) for POL’s ExCo in relation to projected costs, facts
and figures [POL00149576]. I did not attend an ExCo meeting during Mrs
Crowe’s tenure and I believe the slides I prepared were for the purposes of
Mrs Crowe (or someone else) to narrate and highlight certain issues, at their
discretion.
69. On occasion, I would also contribute to the briefings prepared for Mrs
Vennells. I would be asked to contribute or review sections about a certain
issue (e.g. remote access) when further input was needed. Due to my
involvement in the ICRAMS, I would also sometimes draft a section for
inclusion in the CEO reports. These reports would have been spoken to by the
CEO at Board.
70. Often, it would be the case that someone else would ‘hold the pen’ for briefings
for the Shareholder Executive or Minister [POL00408646], but I would be
asked about discrete points. For example, on 16 December 2014 Mr Bourke
asked me to find some quotes for inclusion in a Shareholder Executive
(“ShEx’) briefing [POL00150296}]. I would also add that I would at times be
asked to edit and review briefing notes for the Board or Board Subcommittee
[POL00216579]. Although the drafting could be done without my
contributions, I would sometimes be asked to provide extra detail, which due
to my involvement with the ICRAMS, I knew where to look for or had
knowledge of. Very often, I contributed, reviewed, or offered my views and
comments, but did not hold the pen on these briefings, nor did I attend the
meetings when these papers were then spoken to.
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71. Aided by documents provided to me by the Inquiry I can see that I provided
my thoughts to Mr Bourke on what additional points could be considered for
inclusion in a speaking note he required ahead of a meeting with Baroness
Neville-Rolfe, for a meeting she had scheduled with Second Sight on 14
October 2015 [POL00356012].
Suspense Accounts
72. Having reviewed [POL00423922] my understanding is that POL uses
suspense accounts in the following ways:
72.1. to house branch discrepancies arising as part of the normal course of
trading and which need to be cleared at the period end (either surplus or
deficit);
72.2 to house surpluses arising from Postmasters where the Postmaster does
not agree the surplus is due back to them; and
72.3 to temporarily hold differences in payments moving between POL and its
clients, where the client and POL’s view of what is payable or receivable
differ.
73. Differences are investigated but, in some cases, neither POL, the client, nor
the branch are able to determine the identity of the customer who performed
the transaction in question or the specifics of the transaction. For example,
POL may not be able to determine the details of the bank account to be
credited. In such situations, and following enquiries with branches, unresolved
differences are moved to POL’s customer creditor suspense account. Such
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discrepancies are held in its suspense account to give time for customers and
other parties to put forward more information to explain what has happened.
74. A long-standing assertion is that:
74.1. POL operates one or more suspense accounts in which it holds
unattributed surpluses including those generated from branch accounts;
74.2 After a period of time, such unattributed surpluses are credited to POL's
profits; and
74.3. POL therefore has recovered (through civil or even criminal proceedings)
sums from Postmasters which were not real losses to POL, as they were
housed in suspense accounts and ultimately taken to profit by Post Office.
75. I believe these allegations were first made in the context of the ICRAMS.
Second Sight’s final report, published in March 2015, said they had been
informed that at each year end, substantial unreconciled balances existed on
many individual suspense accounts and that these unreconciled balances for
the 2014 financial year were approximately £96 million in respect of Bank of
lreland ATMs and approximately £66 million in respect of Santander. Second
Sight stated that “these unmatched balances represent transactions from
individual branches that occurred in the preceding 6 months” and they
“remain concerned that these balances may include transactions that
ultimately should be credited back to individual branch accounts”.
76. In its ‘Reply’ to the Second Sight Report, POL stated that Second Sight had
misunderstood the information provided by POL. The balances of £96m and
£66m were taken from routine trading balances yet to be settled with other
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organisations at a particular month end. In other words, they represented
amounts due to other parties, not amounts that were unreconciled and which
may be due to Postmasters.
77. Second Sight were also provided with details of the credits released from
POL’s suspense accounts to profit for the period 2008 to 2013. As there was
a 3-year retention period — no amounts at that time had been released for the
years 12/13 and 13/14. The total gross credits released from suspense to
profit from 2007/8 onwards were as follows:
Years released to profit Value
2010/11 £612,000
2011/12 £207,000
2012/13 £234,000
2013/14 £104,000
2014/15 (YTD at the point I £8,000
provided)
78. In its reply to Second Sight, POL stated that amounts should be considered
within the overall context of POL performing around 2.5 billion transactions
per annum, with a combined value in the order of £60bn. The amount of
unresolved credits that end up in POL’s profit and loss account (at the time)
was therefore less than 0.001% of all transactions (by value) undertaken by
branches.
79. Allegations continued to be made in respect of POL’s suspense accounts. In
February 2020 Lord Arbuthnot met with and wrote to Nick Read. In Mr Read’s
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response, he committed to better understanding how POL operated its
suspense accounts.
Deloitte Review
80. Deloitte’s work with regards to how POL operated its suspense accounts was,
like a number of the recommendations included within the Chairman’s Review,
subsequently taken forward as part of POL’s preparations for the Group
Litigation.
81. I have been provided with [POL00241514] which provides a very high-level
summary of the work Deloitte were asked to perform as a result of
Recommendation 8 of the Charman’s Review. Within this draft email, which
was to be sent to Mr Parker in May 2016, it records:
“Suspense Accounts — You will recall that Deloitte are also conducting the
work, recommended by Jonathan Swift, into the existence and nature of
the relationship between POL’s suspense accounts and specific branch
accounts over the relevant period. This a materially different exercise to
the IT testing, since I understand that most of the relevant accounting
processes were/are based paper records and manual reconciliations.
Deloitte’s informal and provisional view, based on the scoping exercise
but before any more substantive work is undertaken, is that POL’s
systems and controls in this area may not have performed as well as they
might. We will shortly be having a specific meeting with Deloitte to discuss
this area of work to understand their concerns”.
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82.
83.
A briefing note I prepared [WBON0001080] ahead of a meeting with Alisdair
Cameron, POL’s then CFO, on 17 May 2017, describes the allegations being
made by the Claimants and that Deloitte had been asked to investigate: the
universe of suspense accounts that are or had been operated by POL, the
processes in place to control the operation of these suspense accounts, and
to test these processes and controls for the ‘most material’ suspense account.
A further briefing note [POL00408769], prepared for a subsequent meeting
with Mr Cameron on 6 July 2017, references what was agreed at the meeting
of 17 May 2017 and sets out the proposed next steps. It reads as follows:
“At our previous meeting on 17 May, we discussed the findings of
Deloitte’s investigations into the processes that are in place to control the
operation of accounts for which POL places sums, that could relate to
discrepancies at branch level, and from which unmatched sums are taken
into the P&L account.
It was agreed that once we had profiled these 119 accounts, according to
the volume and value of the transactions that have been taken into the
P&L account, we would return to agree with you the next steps.
Appended to this paper is the list of 96 accounts (from the 119) that have,
from 2010 - 2017, taken sums to P&L, ordered by the total value of these
transactions. Please note that this list is still in the process of being quality
assured by both Paul Smith (FSC) and Deloitte.
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Paul Smith is also reviewing this list of accounts to provide a view on which
accounts he believes should form part of the ‘sample testing’ described
below.
Bond Dickinson are providing a list of the Claimants along with the
branch(es) and the period(s) of time to which their allegations relate.
Proposed Next Steps
Our intention is to sample test sums taken to P&L from the most
pertinent account(s) to prove their legitimacy.
Which account(s) will be sample tested will be based upon the volume and
value of the transactions that have been taken to P&L, coupled with
people’s knowledge of the types of transactions that flow through these
accounts. For the agreed account(s), we intend to focus the sampling on
transactions that relate to branches and periods of time relevant to
particular Claimants and their allegations.
It is also our intention to establish for as many of the Claimants as possible
that, for the periods of time to which their respective claims relate, no
amounts relevant to their branch(es) were released to P&L.
Further, to give a sense of scale, we are currently attempting to establish
the volume and value of sums going in the opposite direction from these
96 accounts i.e. being credited back to branch”.
84. My recollection is that the goal for this piece of work was to be able to show,
for each claimant within the GLO and the period(s) of time they operated the
branch(es) in question — the extent to which sums of money were taken to
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POL’s profit and loss, via a suspense account. This is consistent with the
information included at [POL00024771] and [WBON0001163].
85. This work was being done in preparation for the subsequent breach trials I
describe at paragraph 122 but ultimately it was never completed. This is
because of settlement being reached in December 2019 (i.e. the Breach Trials
would no longer take place) and an issue with data extraction as is recorded
in an email from Deloitte [POL00460649]. Attached to this email is also, what
Deloitte believed to be the latest draft version of the report, ahead of the work
not being taken forward. Within this draft is the proposed methodology and
logic but also an explanation of some of the data, technical and knowledge
related challenges encountered with POL’s suppliers: Fujitsu and Accenture.
KPMG Reviews
86. As referenced in [POL00423922], in mid-2020 and subsequent to Mr Read’s
meeting with Lord Arbuthnot, KPMG were instructed to review how POL
currently operated its suspense accounts. The scope of this review was as
follows:
86.1. Confirm the number of relevant suspense accounts operated by POL into
which sums are placed which could, theoretically, relate to discrepancies
at a branch level and from which any unmatched sums may be taken into
a Profit and Loss (P&L) account.
86.2 For these accounts, assess whether how they are operated reflects the
associated documentation and best practice.
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86.3 Identify whether there are any gaps / challenges within existing processes
which could result in risk to POL and or Postmasters.
86.4 Assess whether the current resolution criteria adopted by Post Office for
dealing with discrepancies appears ‘fair and reasonable’ to both Post
Office and Postmasters, based upon KPMG’s understanding of best
practice.
86.5 Comment on any further work that Post Office might want to consider.
87. KPMG findings were presented to POL’s Audit & Risk Committee (“ARC”) on
27 July 2020. I drafted the papers that were presented to the ARC and explain
their findings below. KPMG had identified four relevant suspense accounts
which were currently operated by POL; details of which were provided within
a table in the paper. KPMG’s summary finding was that, given the robust and
transparent investigations process that were undertaken, these suspense
accounts should not result in POL pursuing Postmasters for sums it had or
could eventually take to profit.
88. This was because sums housed in these suspense accounts:
88.1 are either not taken to a profit and loss account; or
88.2 relate to unmatched transactions due to customers (not Postmasters); or
88.3 relate to surpluses rather than shortfalls.
89. For completeness and although purely hypothetical, included at Annex 1 of
the associated ARC paper [POL00423922] was a worked example for how a
postmaster could repay a shortfall which POL had or eventually could take to
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90.
profit via a suspense account. POL was not aware of any examples of this
having taken place and it was said to require, for example:
89.1 a Postmaster not following process;
89.2 refunding a customer, prior to an investigation taking place and without
contacting POL;
89.3 not recording the refund on Horizon; and
89.4 not recalling the refund during the subsequent investigation.
Owing to its nature therefore, the paper noted that it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for POL to prevent.
The KPMG report included a number of points to consider in terms of how
POL could improve its operation of suspense accounts to enhance best
practice. These included:
90.1 Implementing and documenting policies and procedures including details
of ownership, format, content and version control for all relevant suspense
accounts.
90.2 Ensuring all processes were adequately documented and that policies are
consistently applied within the documentation.
90.3. Implementing an overarching branch discrepancy process document
linking all relevant policies and processes.
90.4 Formalising the reporting and review by senior management of suspense
accounts and investigation outcome metrics.
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91.
92.
90.5
90.6
90.6.1
90.6.2
90.6.3
90.6.4
90.7
90.7.1
90.7.2
Undertaking a review of the branch deficits written off centrally to identify
whether any Postmasters are regularly benefitting from the policy.
Reviewing the policy and process for branch surpluses with specific focus
on:
Communicating surpluses to postmasters.
Repayment timescales not being determined by value.
Timeliness of investigation process.
Aligning the branch deficit and branch surplus policies and expectations.
Implementing a process to address the current backlog that had arisen in
the investigation of branch surpluses and the resolution of old branch
surpluses that are in dispute to ensure:
Repayments are made in a timely manner; and
Where appropriate, amounts are moved into the Agent Creditor Account.
Though not the accountable business owner for the areas of the business to
which these recommendations relate, my recollection is that all
recommendations were taken forward and implemented through business as
usual (BAU) over the course of the 20/21 financial year.
KPMG were then also instructed to perform a review into POL’s historical
operation of suspense accounts. I recall thinking it was important for KPMG to
be sighted upon the work Deloitte had begun but not completed, as part of
POL’s GLO’s preparation. With permission obtained from Deloitte, a grid
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93.
setting out the various engagements had with Deloitte regarding suspense
accounts, along with the associated work product, was shared with KPMG on
30 September 2020 and 16 October 2020.
As referenced in [POL00030907] the scope of KPMG’s review of POL’s
historical operation of suspense accounts was as follows:
93.1 Conduct research into historical suspense account operating practices
pre-March 2019, holding discussions with key individuals and reviewing
relevant documentation (where still available) to:
93.1.1 Identify any additional relevant suspense accounts to the 4 which were
identified during KPMG’s review of POL’s current operation of suspense
accounts.
93.1.2 Identify any changes in the suspense account operating processes
during the relevant time period, which would significantly alter the way
the identified accounts operated and whether these changes could have
potentially had an adverse impact on the Postmasters; and
93.1.3. Understand whether the historical resolution processes adopted by POL
for dealing with amounts posted into these suspense accounts were
sufficient to identify potential instances where amounts should have
been reconciled against branch discrepancies made good by
Postmaster.
93.2 Undertake historical analysis of balances held within the relevant
suspense accounts for the relevant time period (where data was still
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available) to establish whether postings to these accounts have altered,
and if so the potential impact.
93.3 Perform a high level review of the Tier 2 investigation data arising over
the past 12 months to inform their understanding of how amounts could
get posted to the relevant suspense accounts.
94. The findings of KPMG, from its review of how POL operated its suspense
accounts historically was presented to the ARC on 24 November 2020.
95. The associated paper noted that KPMG’s review into the historical practices
did not identify any additional relevant suspense accounts to those which
formed part of their review of current practices and that KPMG were informed
by POL employees, including the product team leaders responsible for posting
amounts to the relevant suspense accounts, that no changes had been made
in the operating processes since they had been established. However, no
formal documentation was found detailing what operational processes were
or were not in place.
96. As such, KPMG's overarching finding from its review into how POL currently
operates these suspense accounts was said therefore to also apply to the
historical operation of these suspense accounts, though it was also
recognised that, POL’s investigation into discrepancies had evolved and
improved, with the introduction of the Tier Two Investigation Team.
97. The two relevant suspense accounts identified by KPMG were the Agent
Creditor Suspense Account (“ACSA”) and the Customer Creditor Suspense
Account (“CCSA”). Taking these in turn. The paper described how:
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97.1. The ACSA holds surplus discrepancies which Postmasters (as opposed
to POL) dispute being due back to them. In respect of this account,
KPMG's finding from its review of historical practices was that it had seen
no evidence to indicate amounts posted to this account related to
shortfalls which should have been repaid to Postmasters.
97.2 The CCSA should only have items posted to it once it had been
determined that they related to outstanding customer funds (as opposed
to Postmaster shortfalls). Thus, branch affecting discrepancies should not
be included within this account, which is a holding account for customer's
money. KPMG’s finding was that overall, a robust resolution process
appeared to have been in place for each product type that is posted into
this account. This process identified instances where amounts needed to
be reconciled against branch discrepancies prior to them being posted into
this account. However, KPMG identified two exceptions:
97.2.1 Where Postmasters had accepted cheques made out to Post Office as
payment for certain services but had incorrectly recorded this transaction
as having been paid for in cash and the supporting information (which
would include branch details) also then became separated from the
associated cheque when the Postmaster sends the cheque to the Post
Office Cheques Team to process (“Post Office Bulk Cheques Issue”).
97.2.2 When, between November 2015 and April 2019, Postmasters failed to
follow the then prescribed two-part cancellation process for MoneyGram
Transactions, which also coincided with unrelated connectivity issues
(‘MoneyGram Issue”).
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Each of these were discussed in further detail within the ARC paper.
98. The KPMG report and paper for ARC noted that the CCSA was established in
April 2010 and the ACSA was established in January 2012. Prior to the
establishment of the ACSA, such surpluses remained on Postmasters
personal accounts, which were not released to POL’s P&L account and
remained on that account until claimed by a Postmaster. Prior to
establishment of the CCSA, the Client Creditor Suspense Account was used
to house unmatched customer monies (as well as unmatched client monies).
KPMG performed a high level review of transactions posted to Client Creditor
Suspense Account from 2005 (the earliest date for which data is available) to
2020 and held discussions with the relevant POL employees who managed
this account. Limited documentation was available for the Client Creditor
Suspense Account prior to 2018, but no further potential issues to those noted
above were identified by KPMG.
99. KPMG’s findings, which I summarised in the papers referenced above, is
representative of my knowledge of the investigations into POL’s suspense
accounts.
Disclosure Obligations
100. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP (“HSF”) and Peters and Peters (“P&P”) were
asked to advise whether the findings and the KPMG reports were disclosable
as part of Post office’s ongoing disclosure obligations to those it had
prosecuted historically and as part of any future claims made against Post
Office as a result of historical practices, in both a civil and criminal context
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[POL00460657]. I do not believe POL to have waived privilege over this
advice.
101. From reviewing [POL00030907], I recall that KPMG advised that further
investigation into these two potential issues was difficult given the lack of
available data held within POL and was unlikely to add any further information
especially in relation to quantification to that already included in their report.
In respect of the MoneyGram Issue, this is because of the time that had
passed, personnel which had since left the organisation and lack of
documentation which existed / had been retained / was ever produced. In
respect of the Cheques Issue, KPMG’s understanding was that it is not
possible to identify what proportion of the £134k (that had been posted to the
CCSA as a result of the Cheques Issue) is made up from matching errors,
customer losses or potential Postmaster losses due to the lack of available
supporting information documented on the cheque in question. This is
explained in further detail within [POL00030907].
102. Although POL’s operation of suspense accounts did not feature in the original
terms of reference for Inquiry (which was on a non-statutory footing at that
point) - subject to obtaining legal advice, the ARC was asked to approve
disclosing KPMG’s findings in full to the Inquiry. This was to provide the Inquiry
with a level of comfort that POL had not been improperly recovering shortfalls
from Postmasters which were housed in its Suspense Accounts, as had been
alleged. The Chair of the ARC felt this was a decision for Board, who
subsequently approved the recommendation.
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103. By this stage POL had received a number of questions from the Inquiry
regarding “Branch Suspense Accounts and Trading Statements”. Subsequent
to receiving approval from Board, POL went further than just providing
responses to the questions received from the Inquiry and also disclosed the
KPMG Reports. Within an email I sent to Declan Salter (who was POL’s
Historical Matters Director at the time) on Friday 4 December 2020
[POL00460656], I noted that by disclosing KPMG's reports:
e “Post Office will demonstrate a genuine willingness to engage with, and
aid the Inquiry.
e It will allow Nick Read to demonstrate that he has discharged the
commitment he gave to Lord Arbuthnot in February to better
understand how Post Office operates its suspense accounts.
e It will enable Post Office to get ahead of the curve and relieve the
business from having to service further questions on this topic in the
future, which otherwise seems likely.
e It will demonstrate to Sir Wyn that Post Office has not, as has been
alleged, been improperly making a profit from the operation of its
Suspense accounts — as has been an assertion made regularly since
2012 (ish)”
104. Subsequent to drafting the Papers for the ARC [POL00030907,
POL00423922], I recall confirming with KPMG that they were happy the
contents accurately reflected their reports prior to submission. I also recall
seeking and receiving the legal advice from both HSF and P&P regarding
whether any disclosure obligations were triggered by the findings and
contents. I believe all recommendations that KPMG made in relation to our
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current operation of suspense accounts were tracked and taken forward
accordingly.
Email from Jarnail Singh
105. I have been asked to consider [POL00040516] and the attachment
[POL00040517]. This is an email from Jarnail Singh to Mr Bourke on 17
December 2017 with an attachment. I am not aware of any documents relating
to ICRAMS being destroyed, and I can say with certainty that I have not
destroyed any documents.
Project Zebra
106. I have been asked to comment on my involvement or awareness of the
instruction of Deloitte on Project Zebra. I can confirm that I believe I first
became aware of Project Zebra when I was collating documents for Mr Swift
KC, as described in paragraph 115.
POL’S RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS FOLLOWING THE MEDIATION SCHEME
107. I have been asked to summarise the extent to which I was involved in POL’s
responses to concerns raised by sub postmasters, MPs and journalists. As
the Inquiry will be aware, the ICRAMS involved a re-investigation of
complaints previously made by Postmasters. This took the form of the
aforementioned POIR. I recall Second Sight including within the Part 2 Report
their “...appreciation for the hard work and professionalism of Post Office’s in-
house team of investigators, working for Angela Van Den Bogerd...”, “...our
work would have been much harder and taken much longer without the high
quality work carried out by this team...” [POL00226185]. I had no involvement
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in the conduct of these re-investigations. I would however consider myself to
have been part of the team that supported the Working Group and which
Second Sight said, “We have also received excellent support from the
administrative team set up by Post Office to support the Working Group”. More
generally, and with regards to responses to concerns raised by MPs and
journalists, I cannot recall any specific times when I was asked to lead on
responses, but I suspect I would have been asked to contribute and feed my
thoughts in to POL’s responses, based upon my understanding of the facts at
the time.
108. The extent to which I was involved in briefing the POL board and senior
managers on the integrity of the Horizon IT system is covered above in
paragraphs 67 onwards. One such example is at [POL00162583] where Mrs
Corfield and I worked together to amend a briefing note prepared for the then
Chairman, Mr Parker.
109. With regard to journalists and other media (including BBC panorama) running
or proposing to run stories on Horizon, as noted above, I would expect my
involvement to have been limited to contributing, reviewing, and offering my
view, but not being the primary drafter. Insofar as they existed, I do not recall
regularly attending any communications related decision-making committees
nor was I part of the communications or press team (though I would of course
engage with them on a regular basis as part of my role). With specific
reference to the BBC Panorama programme, the document I have been asked
to consider by the Inquiry, [POL00139184], sets out some example responses
for a colleague to consider deploying, if the assertions included within the 2015
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Panorama Broadcast were raised during an upcoming mediation. As is noted
within the email chain, these were based largely upon what an employee at
Fujitsu had told us. I did not attend any of the meetings with the BBC.
110. The Inquiry has also specifically asked me to consider [POL00318987] and
explain my response to Mr Davies’ observation that Baroness Neville-Rolfe “is
unconvinced by our rebuttal to the Panorama programme.” I note my email
response on 6 August 2015 is “Fantastic — thanks.” I suspect my response
was actually in relation to the point also included within Mr Davies’ email where
he notes “Jane and Paula did a v good job”. I would certainly not have mean
it was “fantastic” that Baroness Neville-Rolfe was unconvinced by the rebuttal.
THE CHAIRMAN’S REVIEW
111. I Mr Swift KC was instructed to assist POL’s then Chairman, Mr Parker, to
review the adequacy of the ICRAMS and POL’s handling of the complaints
made by Postmasters. Internally, I recall this work being referred to as the
“Chairman's Review” (however, I note the Inquiry has referred to it as “The
Swift Review’). Broadly speaking, I believe that it ran from September 2015
until June 2016 and was stood up subsequent to Mr Parker receiving a letter
from Baroness Neville-Rolfe [WITN10010104] (who was the Postal Minister
at the time), in which he was asked to undertake a review.
112. I have been asked to consider [POL00233179]. Though I do not specifically
recall the email chain, it looks to be a set of draft speaking notes prepared for
Mrs MacLeod ahead of an early meeting with Mr Parker regarding his review.
I am asked to comment on the draft speaking notes, which I do, though this is
limited to what the review could still achieve (instilling confidence), if its
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findings did not deliver against the expectations of key Parliamentarians. I
cannot recall exactly why I was sent these notes to review, other than that I
likely would have attended the meeting on 23 September 2015 where Mr
Bourke and Mr Williams discussed this upcoming review. My suggested
amend is a product of me actively listening in the meeting and ensuring that
nothing discussed was missed off in Mrs MacLeod’s notes.
113. I have also been asked to consider [POL00153429]. Though it is evident from
this email chain that I shared my thoughts on what the focus and scope of the
Chairman's Review was, the instructions to Mr Swift KC are clear in that
ultimately it was he who was asked to advise Mr Parker regarding “the scope
of the review and how this is framed”. Regarding the instructions themselves,
I do not believe I would have drafted them. Although I have not been provided
with documents by the Inquiry to evidence this, it is likely that I would have
seen draft versions of the instructions prior to them being sent to Mr Parker
and Mr Swift KC, for their consideration. As part of this process, I would have
also likely shared with colleagues any thoughts and views on drafting points I
wished to be considered ahead of them being finalised and sent.
114. I am aware that the chronology I produced in October 2015 and continued to
refine thereafter, as referred to in paragraph 45 above, was provided to Mr
Swift KC as part of his initial briefing and suite of background materials. This
was in conjunction with correspondence with Mrs MacLeod and a conference
that took place with Mr Parker, again in October 2015.
115. Although I have not been provided with documents from the Inquiry to
demonstrate this, my recollection is that whilst being part of the POL team
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assembled to assist Mr Swift and Christopher Knight with the Chairman’s
Review, we primarily assisted through providing them with information and the
documents they requested, providing access to individuals they wished to
speak to, and arranging on their behalf the associated meetings. I do recall
having more interactions with Mr Knight, albeit primarily over email, and most
probably as he was the junior barrister working on the Chairman’s Review,
rather than speaking directly to the King’s Counsel for each request or
meeting.
116. Throughout the duration of the Chairman’s Review, I believe Mrs MacLeod
provided weekly or fortnightly updates to Mr Parker via email, which were
supplemented by verbal briefings. An early example and draft version of an
email update, for Mrs MacLeod’s consideration ahead of sending to Mr Parker
is dated 30 October 2015 [POL00153429]. Mr Bourke prepared a first draft,
which he asked me to review [POL00153429].
117. Following Mr Parker receiving a draft version of the report on 10 January 2016,
I reviewed the Chairman’s Review. Having reviewed [POL00238693], it is
apparent that my comments were not substantive but rather, many were
regarding grammatical errors and syntax, correcting factual inaccuracies,
typos, and suggesting amends in the drafting. From memory, I believe these
suggestions were accepted by Mr Swift KC.
118. Mr Swift KC issued his final version of the report on 8 February 2016
[POL00022635]. It included within it 8 recommendations.
119. I was involved in taking forward recommendations 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8
[POL00022635]. Recommendations 3, 4 and 5 were taken forward by way of
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engaging Deloitte, for whom I believe I acted as POL’s lead, enabling them to
produce their Project Bramble Report (the latest version of which is dated 19
January 2018). Similarly, I believe I acted as POL’s lead for discharging
recommendation 7, by aiding WBD in its production of a report dated 4 May
2016 and which Mr Swift KC confirmed as being a “thorough job” and that it
“meets the recommendation in the report, and what could reasonably be done
in this regard has now been done” [POL00024741]. Regarding
recommendation 8; again, Deloitte were engaged to take this forward and this
is covered in detail at paragraph 80.
120. I was made aware on 12 April 2016 that POL had received notification from
Freeths LLP that they had filed a claim against POL in the High Court on 11
April 2016 on behalf of 91 claimants, including Alan Bates [POL00390517].
This email chain indicates that I arranged and attended a meeting on 12 April
2016 where I can see from the same email chain it was at this meeting
consideration was given to whether, in light of this development, the work
being taken forward by Deloitte should stop and Mr Swift KC be asked for his
view / advice.
GROUP LITIGATION
121. In respect of the group litigation, as explained above in paragraph 120, I was
part of an initial group of people with whom Mr Williams shared Freeths LLP’s
letter on 12 April 2016 [POL00390517]. Mr Williams shared the letter with Mrs
MacLeod, members of the Communications Team, Mrs Vennells’s Chief of
Staff, Mr Bourke and me. I arranged and attended the initial meeting later that
day during when, I suspect, we discussed some of the points included within
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Mr Williams’s email of 12 April 2016, regarding, for example, its implication on
the work being taken forward to address the recommendations made by Mr
Swift KC. I can also see from this email, that at this stage we had very little
information about what the claim included and who the claimants were.
122. The litigation was significant and complicated, but at its highest level, my lay
understanding was that the Common Issues Trial would determine the
meaning of the Postmaster contract and the obligations which fell on POL to
discharge and those which fell on Postmasters. This would be followed by a
trial regarding the adequacy (or not) of the Horizon computer system which
would be technical in nature and involve expert evidence. With the ‘meaning’
of the Postmaster contract settled and a determination on whether or not the
Horizon system was fit for purpose, a series of ‘breach’ trials could follow —
though ultimately these did not occur owing to settlement being reached in
December 2019.
123. AsIhave throughout my time at POL, I was involved in various pieces of work
during the Group Litigation, whilst supporting the litigation itself. Regarding the
litigation, I believe my primary role was as a member of the Postmaster
Litigation Steering Group (“PLSG”), which I explain further at paragraph 130
below. In addition to being a member of the PLSG, to assist the Inquiry, I have
listed some of my additional responsibilities:
123.1 I frequently acted as a conduit between POL and WBD, to ensure that
instructions could be requested, given and received. For example, on 14
December 2017, Mr Parsons emailed Mr Williams and me with a draft
PLSG paper on the long-term strategy and a draft letter to Freeths LLP
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[POL00041593]. My response shows I helped to facilitate instructions to
WBD in a timely manner and, shared my view on internal sign off
requirements. Another example is provided via [POL00241025], where
although I attended a meeting with Mr Parsons, Mr Williams, and two other
lawyers from WBD - Gavin Matthews, and Elisa Lukas. My only action
point was to circulate a “time bar’ letter. I believe this was shorthand for
providing some examples of the previous public statements POL had
made regarding not relying upon limitation periods. Later, on 20 April
2016, I circulated some examples [POL00041136].
123.2 I was heavily involved in the administration, sequencing, organisation, and
facilitation of the PLSG, along with participating in its collective decision
making. I was included on email chains with the PLSG as a member of
the PLSG, but also to arrange the agenda and documents required for the
efficient and productive running of those meetings [POL00023013]. By
way of example, on 8 July 2016, Mr Williams suggested that, “/f you have
any other items to add to the agenda, or any questions generally, please
let me know (copying Mark Underwood, cc’ed, who will help coordinate as
necessary” [POL00024988].
123.3 Due to the nature of my role, I was copied into most things regarding the
PLSG. My approach was, and remains, that if I was copied into something
I would seek to read it and then if I had questions, I would ask them. An
example of this is at [POL00024165]. I believe I was included in the
distribution list of this email, because I had to know what was happening
in order to be able to arrange the PLSG and understand what papers were
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required for the meeting. I would also then be able to flag things to Mr
Williams and Mrs MacLeod which I thought they would need to read,
respond to, or brief others about. Lastly, I hoped I asked sensible
questions which, if I did, would then help shape the subsequent papers
that needed to be drafted and taken to the PLSG.
124. From memory, WBD led POL’s disclosure exercise, based upon the model
ordered by the Court. I believe I was WBD’s principal point of contact within
POL for access into the business subject matter experts and would, for
example, co-ordinate meetings between WBD and the POL teams that were
required, particularly in relation to data extraction exercises. I recall arranging
a meeting early in the litigation that was attended by WBD, Millnet and POL’s
Data Protection and Information Security Teams ahead of extracting data from
POL’s systems. Further detail is provided at paragraph 142.
125. I note I am recorded as being the joint author of the GLO — GC Briefing Note
- [POL00253137]. During the Group Litigation, there were a vast number of
papers and emails produced which were rich in content. I also attended the
PLSG. Though not legally trained, I believe I had a reasonable lay
understanding of what was going on. Briefings being reviewed by individuals
with a lay understanding is a helpful way to test whether the drafting is too
technical, or as per the goal, easy to understand, or not. Often, the briefings I
prepared would be produced by ‘stitching together’ content from pre-existing
material.
126. With regards to POL’s preparation of lay evidence, I do not recall being
involved in any of the strategic decision making. I was involved in arranging
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pastoral support for witnesses and arranging accommodation for the duration
of the Common Issues Trial. I cannot recall exactly when, but it is likely I did
receive a copy of the witness statements before they were filed. The
statements were probably circulated to me for awareness purposes, rather for
any substantive input from me, which I am confident I did not provide for any.
127. I dorecall being asked to attend the interviews held by POL and WBD to select
an expert. I attended those interviews not as a subject matter expert but
probably owing to Rob Houghton (POL’s then Chief Technology Officer) not
being able to attend all of the initial interviews and WBD and POL valuing my
view. Mr Houghton did however subsequently meet with Mr Worden, when it
became apparent that POL’s preferred candidate (Gill Hunt) may have had
pre-existing commitments. Although I have not been provided this document
by the Inquiry, it is likely that the decision of who POL ultimately chose as their
expert would have been a decision made by the PLSG, subsequent to a
Decision Paper drafted by WBD. I have been shown [POL00266141], which
is an email chain between Mr Parsons, Mr Williams, Mrs Van-Den Bogerd and
me. This chain is simply me processing the information Mr Parsons has
passed to us and asking follow up questions to confirm my understanding of
the situation along with the subsequent steps to be taken.
128. With regards to the decision to seek that Fraser J recuses himself, I was not
involved in instructing Lord Neuberger nor Lord Grabiner, nor this decision
more generally. By virtue of working closely with those who were advising the
decision makers, I was generally aware of the decision being taken to the
Board. The Inquiry has provided me with [POL00359886], which having
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reviewed, I can see I was made aware of the claimants’ statement of costs
and shared thoughts regarding POL’s statement of costs, in response. This
would have been something that naturally came to my desk due to my ongoing
work with POL’s finance teams on POL’s budgeting and cost forecasting, as
explained below in paragraph 149.
129. I did not own the relationships with nor was I responsible for keeping the Board
or government informed regarding: POL’s general litigation strategy; its
approach to the disclosure of documents; its preparation of lay and expert
evidence; the recusal application. I would not have been directly interfacing
on a regular basis with members of the Board or government with regards to
these issues. I would have contributed to and prepared papers, briefings and
PowerPoint slides which would have gone to the Board and/or government,
but I would have rarely attended these meetings and in circumstances where
I did, I would not have spoken to these materials.
130. I have been asked to set out who was responsible for decision making in
relation to POL’s conduct in the Group Litigation. My recollection is that initially
the PLSG was the POL governance forum from which WBD received
instructions on material items. The internal ‘client’ was the network / retail team
and I recall Kevin Gilliland (then the CEO, for Retail) originally being asked to
chair this meeting, though he delegated this role to Thomas Moran (Network
Development Director). I understood the internal and external legal teams’ role
to be one of advice regarding legal risk, whilst that of PLSG members’ and its
Chair were to provide instructions to these legal teams’, having considered the
advice — which usually took the form of decision papers drafted by WBD and
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which often included a recommendation. The PLSG was comprised of senior
colleagues from across POL who had the authority and business experience
to provide instructions sought and make the necessary decisions. Typically,
WBD would prepare the decision papers, which I would often review with Mr
Williams before they were shared with PLSG members ahead of each
meeting. The papers would seek to set out what decision needed to be made
and include the relevant information and context surrounding the decision,
with, ultimately, a summary of the risks and associated issues PLSG members
needed to be aware of. From my recollection, more often than not, but not
without proper debate, the PLSG would follow WBD’s recommendation and
the legal advice. The decisions made by the PLSG ultimately did inform the
strategy of how the Group Litigation took place. However, no one single
person was the decision maker, these decisions were made collectively as the
PLSG. I explain my role within the PLSG further at paragraphs 131 and 132
below. In addition to the PLSG, the Postmaster Litigation Sub-Committee
(“PLSC”) was later established on 29 January 2018 to provide a forum for
members of the Board, including the Shareholder Representative to oversee
the Group Litigation, in a greater capacity than what the Board agenda
allowed. I attended the PLSC on 26 March 2018 [POL00006764] where “it
was explained that day-to-day decisions on the litigation were taken by the
executive [Group Executive], but the Board was consulted in advance of any
Significant decisions being taken.”
131. I have been asked how POL and/or I satisfied itself/myself that the substantive
positions taken in letters and court documents (including the Generic Defence
and Counterclaim) were accurate, including in respect of remote access.
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While I arranged PLSG meetings, reviewed materials and facilitated access
to POL subject matter experts and POL’s suppliers such as Fujitsu — I will not
have seen all letters and court documents prepared by POL and was not the
signatory on any. My understanding was that POL’s external legal advisors,
who were holding the pen on drafting the letters and court documents, were
using all the available facts and resources available to them at that time in
order to produce accurate representations of POL’s position and knowledge.
It was not my role and I did not have sufficient technical detail or understanding
to be able to state that the substantive position was accurate.
132. I have also been asked to set out the nature and extent of my involvement in
drafting POL’s letter of response. I did not draft the response, and my
recollection is that POL’s external legal team held the pen, with WBD in
collaboration with external Counsel providing the drafting and subject matter
experts including Fujitsu and Deloitte reviewing (and signing off on) relevant
sections. Having read Mr Williams’s email of 8 July 2016 [POL00024988], it
is apparent that once WBD finished their first draft of the response, specific
members of the PLSG were asked to review certain sections. Mr Williams
further explains that he would circulate a table directing each member of the
PLSG to the relevant part of the response which relates to ‘their’ section of
‘the business’ (e.g. POL). I have reviewed the table [POL00025299] which
referenced the 14 sections and 7 schedules that needed to be reviewed and
can see that I was asked to review parts of the letter of response relating to:
(1) Section 3 Post Office’s knowledge of the dispute; (2) Schedule 1:
Documents to be disclosed; and (3) Schedule 3: History of Events. I have now
seen the agenda for the PLSG meeting on 20 July 2016 [POL00139292]. I
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recall providing comments around 19 July 2016, and do not believe they were
substantive in nature [POL00424926]. From reviewing the emails provided to
me by the Inquiry I can see that there was further discussion and a call on 27
July regarding the formulation of words to be used for Remote Access. I did
not however join this call owing to be out of the country on annual leave from
23 — 30 July 2016. I note POL filed its Letter of Response on 28 July 2016.
133. I have been asked to set out my involvement in POL’s position on remote
access throughout the Group Litigation. My role was to enable Deloitte to
complete their Project Bramble Report, which was then shared with POL’s
internal and external legal team. I have further explained my knowledge of
remote access and my role regarding the Project Bramble Report at
paragraphs 26 to 44 of this statement.
Preparation of the Defence
134. I have been asked to describe my involvement with the drafting of POL’s
Generic Defence and Counterclaim. With respect to the drafting of POL’s
Generic Defence, I note that on 12 July 2017, Mr Parsons circulated a
summary of the “fact heavy section of the defence” with different subject
matter experts from POL listed against each section [POL00117755]. My
name is not allocated to any of the sections, and I do not recall being asked
to review the Generic Defence ahead of it being filed.
135. Other than my periodic receipt of updates via the PLSG, my input into the
Generic Defence was with regards to Deloitte’s investigations into POL’s
operation of suspense accounts. I have explained my role in suspense
accounts at paragraph 72. Around 13 July 2017 it became apparent that
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Deloitte’s report would not be ready in time for the Defence to be filed
[WBON0001163]. As such I had proposed to WBD that we have three
possible drafting scenarios for what the outcome of Deloitte’s investigation
would be. I can see that WBD and Anthony De Garr Robinson KC were
concerned about getting the position wrong (owing the Deloitte’s work being
ongoing) and as such “decided to go very light on the drafting of this section”
[WBON0001171].
136. I have been asked by the Inquiry to comment on specific paragraphs of the
Defence. To confirm (and as is consistent with the substance of earlier
paragraphs) I do not recall nor have I seen any documents provided to me by
the Inquiry that suggest I have commented on the following paragraphs of the
Defence, therefore I am unable to explain the basis on which POL pleaded or
denied certain elements of the Defence:
136.1 Paragraphs 43(1) to (3)
136.2 Paragraph 48(3)(b)
136.3 Paragraph 48(3)(c)
137. I have considered the contents of paragraph 57(4) of the Defence, and
specifically, “To have abused those rights so as to alter branch transaction
data and conceal that this has happened would be an extraordinarily difficult
thing to do, involving complex steps...which would require months of planning
and an exceptional level of technical expertise. Post Office has never
consented to the use of privileged user rights to alter branch data and, to the
best of its information and belief, these rights have never been used for this
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purpose.” Upon reviewing the email chain of 20 November 2016
[POL00245359] between Mr Parsons, Mrs MacLeod, Mr Williams, and me, I
can see I suggest qualifying the statement “that transaction data can be
deleted / changed by detailing that — although theoretically possible — because
the logistical challenges that would need to be overcome are so huge, it really
is not a credible line of enquiry.” Although I was not actively part of the drafting
team of the Defence, from now reading this email chain provided to me by the
Inquiry, it is possible that this pleading stemmed from my view of November
2016, which was based upon Mr Swift KC’s findings (as referred at paragraph
39) and the conclusions within the various versions of the Project Bramble
reports.
138. IMy understanding at the time regarding POL’s decision to bring counterclaims
against Postmasters in the Group Litigation was informed by WBD’s Decision
paper (number 4) [POL00024989] presented to the PLSG on 14 July 2016
[POL00024650]. I do not specifically recall the meeting or the discussion we
had around counterclaims, but having reviewed the documents provided to
me by the Inquiry, I understand that in order to further substantiate the line of
argument in POL’s Defence and confirm its legal position, it was logical and
consistent with POL’s Defence to pursue counterclaims. WBD explained that
approximately £700,000 was owed to POL, and provided there were “fair legal
grounds” to do so, POL could legally pursue and recover these debts if the
counterclaims were successful. I do not recall the discussions we had on 14
July 2016 at the PLSG or to the extent which I contributed, but I believe we
were in agreement with WBD’s recommendation.
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Ongoing Management of the Litigation
139. As discussed above at paragraph 130, POL oversaw the conduct of the
litigation through its governance structure which included: (1) the PLSG; (2)
the PLSC; and (3) the Board. Notably, the governance structures were not
purely made up of legal professionals within POL, instead the composition of
the PLSG, particularly, were non-legal professionals from across the
organisation.
140. The PLSC was chaired by Mr Parker, the then Chairman, and was attended
by Board Members and the then Shareholder Representative, Tom Cooper.
On occasion, I would attend PLSC meetings in addition to PLSG meetings.
For example, I attended a PLSC meeting on 26 March 2018 [POL00006764].
I did not have a speaking role in the PLSC meetings, as noted by my name
under the ‘In Attendance’ section of the minutes, nor was I a member of the
PLSC (as I was not and am not a member of the Board). However, I did help
to ensure that those meetings were timed correctly in alignment with the
litigation timetable, and that the members of the PLSC had the correct
supporting papers available to them to make the decisions being asked of
them.
Disclosure
141. I From memory, my role in disclosure was limited to facilitating access to people
and systems so that WBD could disclose the documents POL was required
for (what we believed to be at the time) an effective disclosure exercise. I
believe I was the main point of contact for WBD into POL for disclosure in this
regard. The approach taken would have been in a manner consistent with the
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decisions taken at the PLSG subsequent to the WBD Decision Papers that
had been drafted.
142. An example of how I assisted in respect of the disclosure, is with regards to
relevant SharePoint sites. Owing to POL operating an outsourced service
support model for its IT, extraction exercises involved multiple suppliers
including, for example, ATOS and ComputaCenter. Such extraction exercises
also had to be considered by POL’s IT Security and Data Protection Teams.
As our solicitors on record for the GLO, WBD would also be involved and as
POL didn’t have the technical expertise to extract SharePoint sites in the
forensic manner necessary, we had to engage a third party to do this on our
behalf — this was Millnet (now Consilio). In addition to identifying the right
individuals to be on the calls / attend the meetings, I would also then have to
ensure the relevant Change Requests, approvals and suite of contractual
documentation was complete and POL governance followed. This was a
significant task; made more complicated by the deadlines we were working to.
143. Prior to this litigation, I had no prior experience of disclosure for litigation. I
gained knowledge through the decision papers taken through PLSG and my
conversations with the WBD team. I understood that the disclosure in the
Group Litigation was managed on a trial-by-trial basis, and for each trial,
disclosure was mainly given under ‘Model C Disclosure’. For some of the
categories, document disclosure was provided via ‘Model D Disclosure’ which
I understood was more akin to standard disclosure obligations.
144. During the course of the Group Litigation, I also inherited the team of
individuals who had aided with the production of the POIRs in the ICRAMS
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and who, post ICRAMS and owing to their knowledge of what documents were
held where, were re-purposed to service questions from the WBD and locate
materials from across the organisation that should be reviewed by the WBD
team for relevance. There was no natural home for these individuals within the
organisation which is why I temporarily line managed them before they
returned to Mrs Van Den Bogerd when her reporting line changed to Mrs
MacLeod in, I think, mid-2018.
145. I have been asked to consider a letter from Freeths LLP to Andrew Parsons
dated 13 September 2017 [POL00003414]. In this letter, Freeths LLP
reiterates that the Known Error Log (“KEL”) had not yet been disclosed, and
that the claimants were entitled to inspect the KEL. My recollection is that POL
was willing to provide access to the database in its entirety and that an offer
was made for the Claimants’ expert to be able to inspect the actual KEL
database rather than be provided with a copy of it. This was on the basis that
it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to extract a complete
copy of what was, as I understood, a living database that was regularly
updated and — based upon what Fujitsu had told us — did not actually contain
details of the types of BEDs the Claimants’ expert was interested in. Though I
have not seen papers included within my bundle, I would expect papers on
how to respond to these requests to have been taken through the PLSG via
decision papers.
146. I have also been asked to set out my knowledge of the PinICL/PEAK database
during the Group Litigation. I cannot recall any specific knowledge that I may
have held at that time, but having read the documents provided to me by the
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Inquiry, I believe we discussed disclosure of the PEAK system to the
Claimants at the PLSG on 26 September 2018 [POL00023013]. However, I
cannot recall the discussion regarding the PLSG’s decision on disclosure of
the PEAK system, nor have I been provided with a Decision Paper within my
bundle to aid my memory. Nevertheless, I expect the PLSG would have acted
in accordance with the legal advice provided which would have been based
upon the information provided to POL and WBD by Fujitsu. At the time I
genuinely did not believe POL was ‘restricting disclosure’.
147. I have been asked to explain the basis on which POL pleaded Paragraph 50(4)
of the Defence which relates to the KEL. I cannot recall being asked to review
or feed in thoughts into this drafting. I believe it would have reflected the
understanding at the time, based on what Fujitsu had told POL.
148. Subsequent to the decisions made by the PLSG, I would sometimes assist
with ensuring the associated actions were discharged. [POL00254487] is an
example of this. Freeths LLP had asked for 100 technical documents to be
disclosed. I believe the PLSG had asked for these documents to be reviewed
by Deloitte ahead of disclosure for any content that could contradict the
conclusions within the Project Bramble report or content that could pose an IT
security risk, and any content that could cause reputational damage. I would
have agreed the commercial terms for the statement of work and provided
Deloitte with access to the documentation in question. On this occasion, it
looks from reading the materials that I authorised disclosure ahead of when I
should have but immediately admitted my mistake, apologised, and set in train
the necessary remedial action [POL00254556].
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Preparation for the Common Issues Trial
149. Similar to as described within the paragraphs above, my role in preparing for
the Common Issues Trial was primarily focussed around being a member of
the PLSG and the collective decision making required to provide clear
instructions to WBD, as I have explained above at paragraph 123.2 Outside
of the PLSG, I sought to assist in facilitating access to the subject matter
experts across POL, and I worked with our Finance Team [POL00253439] to
obtain cost estimates, provide cost forecasts, and ensure an appropriate
budget provision was in place for the litigation. I ended up taking on this role
of working closely with our Finance Team because it aligned with my previous
work during the ICRAMS and the broader functional management type
activities I assisted Mrs MacLeod with. POL had and continues to have finite
financial resources so a lot of effort must go into forecasts, re-forecasts, along
with assumptions, risks and opportunities attached to those forecasts.
150. Toconfirm, I cannot recall preparing for the Common Issues Trial with regards
to the assertion of privilege in redacting documents, the preparation of witness
evidence, or how POL’s case on the effect of the “settle centrally” button was
prepared. In the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, I have not seen a
Decision Paper or meeting minutes of the PLSG which record the decision-
making process related to the technical arguments about “settling centrally”,
though I would expect such a paper to exist. My involvement with witness
preparation was confined to pastoral care and logistics.
151. With regards to the cross-examination of the claimants, I understood that was
within the remit of POL’s external counsel. As I explain above at paragraph
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121, my genuine understanding of the Common Issues Trial was that it was
about the construction of the contract between POL and Postmasters.
However, during the litigation the claimants introduced ‘post signature’ type
evidence which POL sought to strike out. On 5 September 2018, the PLSG
considered a Decision Paper titled “Should Post Office apply to strike out
inadmissible parts of the Claimants’ evidence?” [POL00023285] wherein
WBD have explained that, after reviewing the claimants’ witness statement
evidence, evidence has been introduced which relates to events that took
place after each claimant entered into their contracts with POL. WBD
explained that the strike out application would not be for the statements as a
whole, but approximately 30-50% of the Lead Claimants’ statements. The
PLSG agreed with WBD’s recommendation and decided that POL should
make the strike out application, which was heard on 10 October 2018 by
Fraser J. A key reason for doing so was to mitigate the risk of the Judge
becoming prejudiced with the evidence put forward by the claimants and which
POL believed would be better heard at subsequent trials of breach, once the
meaning of the contract had been determined.
152. Mr Parsons informed us on 15 October 2018 that POL’s strike out application
was not successful [POL00023209]. Ultimately, the view was that if the
evidence was to remain in play during the Common Issues Trial, POL should
be able to use it to put their case forward, just as the claimants had used the
evidence to make allegations about POL’s behaviour. The mechanics of how
that was done in the form of cross examination was in the hands of David
Cavendar KC and WBD, as POL’s external legal counsel. I do think I recall a
paper being circulated to the PLSG regarding the strategy for cross
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examination, however I have not been provided with a copy of it by the Inquiry,
nor have I been able to locate it.
153. On occasion I would be asked by key members of POL for updates on the
Common Issues Trial. For example, Mrs Vennells asked me directly on 5
November 2018 for the major activities of the GLO during that week
[POL00158363]. I was asked these types of questions frequently because I
attended each day of the trial and, on this occasion, because I believe Mrs
MacLeod had to unexpectantly return to Australia for a short period of time.
Horizon Issues Trial
154. I have been asked to summarise the nature and extent of my involvement in
preparing for the Horizon Issues Trial. My role in the Horizon Issues Trial was
similar to that in the Common Issues Trial, as I explain above at paragraph
149. I was not involved in the decisions to assert privilege in redacting
documents, nor was I involved in the preparation of Mr Parker or Mr Godseth’s
witness evidence. I may well have retained a pastoral witness preparation role,
in organising logistics or accommodation, but due to the passage of time, I am
unable to confirm any details of that.
155. In September 2018, the PLSG was presented with a WBD Decision Paper
[POL00257368] regarding the sequencing of evidence during the Horizon
Issues Trial. As I explain above at paragraph 121, my understanding was the
Horizon Issues Trial would be considerably more technical and involve expert
opinion evidence. By virtue of this, POL would need to heavily rely on its expert
witness. Furthermore, there would be a required reliance on the information
and analysis provided to us by Fujitsu. WBD expressed that there was an
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inherent risk in relying on a third party’s evidence, because the accuracy of
Fujitsu’s data could not be fully tested. To confirm, the PLSG was not asked
to make a decision on the sequencing of evidence, instead the WBD Decision
Paper [POL00257368] was a record of the proposed approach and
instructions POL (via Mr Williams) had given to Mr Parsons (WBD).
156. The PLSG, and specifically me, had limited, if any, involvement in liaising with
Fujitsu and Gareth Jenkins for assistance with preparing the case for the
Horizon Issues Trial. My recollection (and I have not been provided documents
that prove contrary to this recollection) is that I have never met, spoken or
exchanged emails with Mr Jenkins directly and it was WBD (and Deloitte for
the purposes of Project Bramble) who liaised with Fujitsu and perhaps Mr
Jenkins directly.
157. As mentioned above in paragraph 13, part of my then role included working
closely with Mrs Van Den Bogerd and Deloitte on the Horizon Issues
Contingency Planning. This was during the approximate 12-month period of
significant change I reference at paragraph 13 within the background section.
This work involved preparing the business for an effective immediate and
short-term operational response, if the judgment from the Horizon Issues Trial
ended up being averse to POL. My specific role in this team was: to aid Mrs
Van Den Bogerd with the preparation of materials ahead of workshops with
the business, aid in briefings to GE which took place on a weekly basis in the
immediate run up to the Horizon Issues Trial and prepare walk throughs / run
throughs with the Rapid Response Team that was assembled
[POL00155129].
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GENERAL
158. I have been asked whether there are any other matters I consider relevant to
the Inquiry and that I would like to draw to the attention of the Chair. I would
like to draw the Inquiry’s attention to a line of questioning that featured in oral
evidence with Mr Read, Mr Foat, and Mr Recaldin. All three witnesses were
presented with an email chain from January 2020 [POL00155397], within
which Mr Foat seeks views on a paper containing legal advice from HSF about
the design of the Historical Shortfall Scheme (“HSS’). I have been told by POL
this paper is privileged and that this privilege has not been waived by POL.
Nevertheless, the assumption that the comments in my email of 10 January
2020 sought to prevent people from being able to enter the HSS is incorrect.
I can see how this view could be formed when reading the email chain in
isolation and without the benefit of being sighted on the underlying paper. This
is unfortunate but, again, incorrect.
159. IThe comment in question as included within my email of 10 January 2020 was
as follows:
“My strong view is that you cannot seek payment from applicants —
however small and regardless of the rationale behind it. Optically this
would be extremely challenging and would be a position that I believe the
business would struggle to maintain under political and media pressure. I
think you can achieve the same desired outcome though having a very
tight and clearly communicated set of eligibility criteria and requirements
in terms of the documentation applicants have to provide in order to be
accepted into the Scheme”
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160. My comment was made in the context of claimants having already been
accepted into the HSS and being asked to pay a mediation fee, if the claim
was not resolved at a preceding stage. The “desired outcome” referred to is
not in relation to preventing entry but rather, in assisting to manage claimants’
expectations and preventing unreasonable claims being made. The paper,
which is privileged, makes this clear.
161. My legal representatives received a letter on 16 October 2024 from Burgess
Salmon Fieldfisher, on behalf of POL. This letter states, “the inference drawn
by Mr Henry from Mr Underwood's email was incorrect; entry fees were not
mooted before access to the HSS Scheme would be allowed in the paper to
go the GE”.
162. The BSFF letter continues, recording the Group Executive were being made
aware that an applicant could be “...asked to pay a mediation fee if the claim
had not been resolved at the preceding Assessment, Good Faith Meeting or
Escalation Meeting in order to discourage unreasonable claims (such as
claims for amounts which bear no reasonable relation to the actual amount
which could be claimed on customary principles of causation and loss) but no
such fee was included in the structure of the scheme”.
163. I think it is also relevant to highlight the paper was clear in that any criteria
included within it was indicative and for the Group Executive to consider (and
ultimately determine — not HSF, Mr Foat, Mr Williams or I) and that this criteria
could not be finalised until the extent of the claims were known as upon receipt
they may need to be recast. Further, the paper, email chain and my comment
were all prior to the Hamilton Judgment. Though Lord Justice Holroyde, Mr
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Justice Picken and Mrs Justice Farbey DBE’s findings relate to criminal law,
they likely inform what should be (and likely now are) considered as being
reasonable claims within the HSS (which I understand considers only civil
claims).
164. Finally, towards the end of 2021 and in January 2022, KPMG were asked to
assist POL, by way leading a number of workshops, regarding the design and
“critical success factors” of POL’s remediation schemes. Though I believe the
primary focus to have been the schemes set up / being set up to consider
claims involving criminal convictions, thought was also being given by Mr
Recaldin as to whether to undertake a similar exercise for the HSS. My view
of what the various schemes (including the HSS) should seek to achieve is set
out clearly within the emails I sent to KPMG on 11 August 2021
[POL00460651] and which I forwarded to Mr Recaldin on 6 January 2022
[POL00460652] ahead of an upcoming workshop taking place. Within this
email I state:
“my view is that whatever remediation / compensation Scheme is set
up, it needs to:
¢ Be capable to bringing closure to this matter for interested parties.
e To be funded appropriately to enable those affected to be properly
compensated
e For it to be independent of Post Office, to avoid conflicts
e To be properly but not overly governed, so that affected individuals
receive compensation swiftly
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e Not distract and therefore prevent POL from being able to deliver
on its forward facing strategy
e Represent good value for money for the public purse — the
administration of the scheme and how much that costs must be
proportionate but not to the detriment of those affected — i.e money
going to law firms rather than affected individuals
e Be properly documented - processes, controls, delegated
authorities, ToR.
¢ The ‘client’ and decision makers must be identified and trusted”.
165. _I have also been asked to reflect upon my time at POL and whether there is
anything, with the benefit of hindsight, I would have handled differently.
Throughout my time at POL, I have acted in good faith based upon the
knowledge I had and the information available to me but there are of course
things I wish I knew earlier and could, as a result, have acted on. At the time
however, I was not, for example, aware of the existence or extent of the issues
referred to within the Hamilton Judgment.
166. At its heart, the cause for this Inquiry is POL prosecuting people but not
discharging its duties whilst doing so. As a result, those who were prosecuted
by POL and others were prevented from something everyone should be able
to take for granted - a fair trial.
167. Given the nature of POL’s failings in this regard (not investigating all
reasonable lines of enquiry nor making disclosure to the defense of anything
which might reasonably be considered to undermine its case), it is not only
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those individuals who were prosecuted that have been treated unfairly; the
application of these failings and the consequence of them is much broader.
168. Reflecting upon this now and particularly in the context of when bringing
private prosecutions (but also more generally), it seems to me that POL could
and should have taken a step back and not ignored what was understood to
be the legal position but first, satisfied itself that Postmasters were set up for
success (from the point of which their relationship with POL began, until it
ended and everything in-between) and with this in mind, also challenged itself
with regards to what the fair-minded course of action to take was.
169. If it had asked itself these questions and concluded that it could not satisfy
itself in either of these two respects, then that should have been reflected in
how it responded when, for example, shortfalls were identified and potential
courses of action considered.
170. Of course, I have not and do not attend every meeting that was / is held at
POL, nor do I routinely interact with its operational teams so it may be that
these questions had been considered. Nevertheless and to the extent these
questions are not already being considered and reconsidered by POL, I think
they should be, to ensure this can never happen again and that the
relationship between Postmasters and POL is truly reset — to the benefit of
Postmasters and the millions of customers they serve; a great number of
whom are vulnerable.
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STATEMENT OF TRUTH
itement to be true.
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Index to First Witness Statement of Mark Underwood
WITNO0990100
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No.
URN
Control Number
Document
Description
Date
POL00022635
POL-0019114
A review on
Behalf of
the
Chairman of
Post Office
Limited
Concerning
the Steps
Taken in
Response
to Various
Complaints
and by Sub-
Postmaster
s
08/02/2016
POL00279995
POL-BSFF-0118058
Email from
Mark
Underwood
to Ben Foat,
Tim White
CC'd Katy
Thorpe and
others
RE;Handov
er Note
27/07/2019
FUJ00081950
IPOINQ0088121F
Email from
Mark
Underwood
to Kevin
Lenihan and
others re:
Second
Sight
assertions
about
editing data
07/04/2015
FUJ00237386
IPOINQ0243491F
Email from
Pete
Newsome
to Steve
Bansal RE:
FW: Bugs
11/06/2015
POL00323499
IPOL-BSFF-0161549
Email from
pete.newso
me to Mark
21/12/2015
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Underwood
CC ing
Patrick
Bourke. RE:
presentation
- Strictly
Private &
Confidential
- Subject to
Legal
Privilege
POL00317146
IPOL-BSFF-0155196
Email from
Melanie
Corfield to
Mark
Underwood
RE:
Updated
Information
16/06/2015
POL00316930
IPOL-BSFF-0154980
Email from Mark
Underwood to
/Andrew Parsons,
cc Patrick
Bourke and
Melanie Corfield
re bugs
according to the
Interim Report
11/06/2015
POL00307820
IPOL-BSFF-0145870
Horizon Spot
Review 5 -
Response
31/10/2014
POL00211695
POL-BSFF-0049758
Email from Mark
Underwood to
Andrew Parsons
cc'd Belinda
Crowe, Patrick
Bourke and
others re: M031 -
POL Response to
CRR [BD-
4A.F1D25887227]
31/10/2014
10.
POL00149488
IPOL-BSFF-0008608
Email chain from
Patrick Bourke to
Mark Underwood
re: Horizon
questions
11/11/2014
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11.
POL00149598 IPOL00149598 Email chain
including Mark
Underwood
(POL); Patrick
Bourke (POL);
Tom Wechsler
(POL) & others
Re: Remote
Access
Question
Raised
20/11/2014
12.
POL00318209 POL-BSFF-0156259 I} Email from
Andrew
Parson to
Rodric
Williams, Mark
Underwood,
Gavin
Matthews RE:
Horizon -
balancing
transactions
08/07/2015
13.
FUJ00087133 IPOINQ0093304F — I Email from
Mark
Underwood)
(POL) To:
Davidson
James
(Fujitsu), Cc:
Patrick Bourke
(POL),
Parsons,
Andrew
(bonddickinson
), Sub: Remote
Access
Papers: for
review
25/11/2014
14.
WBON000032 WBD_000196.00000 I Email from
6 1 Mark
underwood to
Andrew
Parsons, Cc'd
Patrick Bourke
Re: Remote
Access paper -
V2 returned by
FJ
10/12/2014
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15.
WBON000032
7 1
WBD_000197.00000
Initial
Complaint
Review and
Mediation
Scheme -
Horizon Data
08/06/2012
16.
FUJ00236842
IPOINQ0242947F
Email from
Davidson
James to
Newsome
Pete, Harvey
Michael. CC:
Godeseth
Torstein. RE:
FW: Remote
access paper
19/12/2014
17.
FUJ00237155
IPOINQ0243260F
Email from
Pete
Newsome to
Michael
Harvey, Steve
Parker,
Godeseth
Torstein and
others re: FW:
Remote
access paper.
08/04/2015
18.
POL00028062
IPOL-0023065
Report:
Horizon
Desktop
Review of
Assurance
Sources and
Key Control
Features —
draft for
discussion,
Deloitte
23/05/2014
19.
POL00233987
POL-BSFF-0072050
Email from
Rodric
Williams to
Mark
Underwood
‘RE: Project
Zebra — Draft
Report’ and
‘hold harmless’
letter
13/10/2015
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20.
FUJ00087142
IPOINQ0093313F
Email from
James
Davidson to
Mark
Underwood
CC: Kevin
Lenihan,
Newsome
Pete RE:
URGENT
ACTION:
Accessing
Horizon
30/01/2015
21.
0
WBON000103 ft
WBD_000900.00000
Email from
Andrew
Parsons to
Jane
MacLeod,
Rodric
Williams,
Patrick Bourke
& Ors RE:
Deloitte
Preliminary
Report
13/07/2016
22.
POL00025209
IPOL-0021688
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons,
Thomas P
Moran cc:
Mark R
Davies, Jane
MacLeod, Tom
Wechsler and
others re: RE:
Remote
Access
wording -
subject to
litigation
privilege [BD-
4A.FID268592
84]
21/07/2016
23.
POL00028928
POL-0025410
Deloitte
"Bramble" -
Draft Report
16/01/2018
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24.
POL00104218
IPOL-0103801
Email chain
from Jane
MacLeod to
Jonathan Swift
re: FW; Draft
terms of
reference
10/10/2015
25.
POL00130960
IPOL-0120804
Mediation
Scheme
Chronology —
Confidential
and Subject to
Legal Privilege
13/10/2015
26.
POL00162686
POL-0151078
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane
MacLeod, cc
Patrick Bourke
and Rodric
Williams, RE:
Draft note to
accompany
the updated
and attached
chronology for
Jonathan Swift
ac
13/10/2015
27.
POL00041564
IPOL-0038046
Bankruptcy,
prosecution
and disrupted
livelihoods -
Postmasters
tell their story;
reported by
Rebecca
Thomson —
Article
11/05/2009
28.
POL00040517
IPOL-0036999
Report on
Further lines
for Jo Swinson
MP —
Westminster
Hall Debate
17/12/2014
29.
POL00235243
IPOL-BSFF-0073306
Update on
Project
Sparrow
Report
20/11/2015
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WITNO0990100
30.
POL00216092
POL-BSFF-0054155
Email from
Sean Farrow
to Mark
Underwood
and Michael R
Haworth Re:
Counterfeit
Notes
30/12/2014
31.
POL00221743
IPOL-BSFF-0059806
Email from
Belinda Crowe
to Chris
Aujard,
Andrew
Parsons,
Rodric
Williams and
others RE:
Note of telecon
with lan
Henderson
20Jan
11/02/2015
32.
POL00221759
POL-BSFF-0059822
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Dave M King
cc Kevin
Lenihan,
Belinda Crowe
and others Re:
Second Sight
data provision
— Bracknell
11/02/2015
33.
POL00312099
IPOL-BSFF-0150149
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons, Paul
Loraine RE:
FW POL
Response
11/02/2015
34.
POL00152996
IPOL-BSFF-0012108
Note re:
Bulletpoints for
Project
Sparrow
including
Panorama and
Current
Position
26/08/2015
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35.
POL00153248
POL-BSFF-
0012360
Review of the
first ten Final
Case Review
Reports v1.0
14/09/2015
36.
POL00027363
IPOL-0024004
Strictly
Confidential
Post Office Ltd
Board Initial
Complaints
Review and
Mediation
Scheme:
Update Paper
by Chris
Aujard and
Belinda
Crowe.
17/09/2014
37.
POL00209725
IPOL-BSFF-0047788
Letter from
Chris Aujard to
Ron
Warmington
and lan
Henderson
RE: Second
Sight's
Engagement
24/09/2014
38.
POL00209883
POL-BSFF-
0047946
Annotated
Agenda for
Second Sight
dated 30
September
2014
29/09/2014
39.
POL00156544
IPOL-0145696
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Patrick Bourke
CC Belinda
Crowe Re: A
few cases to
show SS lack
of quality
21/11/2014
40.
POL00219827
IPOL-BSFF-0057890
Draft of the
available
options to
handle the PO
scandal.
22/01/2015
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41.
POL00219104
POL-BSFF-0057167
Email chain
from Tom
Wechsler to
Mark
Underwood,
Patrick
Bourke,
Belinda Crowe
& others RE:
Options
19/01/2015
42.
POL00149577
POL-BSFF-0008697
Post Office
Options for the
Scheme
20/11/2014
43.
POL00149576
POL-BSFF-0008696
Email chain
from Mark
Underwood to
Belinda
Crowe, cc'ing
Tom Wechsler
and Patrick
Bourke re:
Commercial in
confidence -
ExCo
presentation.
20/11/2014
44.
POL00352082
POL-BSFF-0177803
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Tom Wechsler,
Belinda Crowe
and Melanie
Corfield re
Project
Sparrow Sub
ctte grid
v1.docx
17/02/2015
45.
POL00025376
POL-0021855
Bond
Dickinson PO
Group
Litigation
Steering
Group Meeting
RE:
DECISION:
Does Post
Office agree
with the
recommended
strategy set
14/02/2017
Page 95 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
out in this
paper?
46.
POL00006497
POL-0017802
Bond
Dickinson
decision paper
- Case
Management
Strategy
11/09/2017
47.
POL00006462
POL-0017767
Steering
Group Briefing
Paper: Update
on case
management
strategy
15/12/2014
48.
POL00006634
POL-0017892
Steering
Group Noting
Paper: Update
on Litigation
Strategy
27/01/2015
49.
POL00006481
POL-0017786
Steering
Group
Decision
Paper -
Update on
Litigation
Strategy
17/01/2018
50.
POL00006453
POL-0017758
Steering
Group Noting
Paper: Update
on Litigation
Strategy
02/02/2018
51.
POL00216579
IPOL-BSFF-0054642
Working doc
on Post Office
Ltd Board Sub
Committee
Initial
Complaint
Review and
Mediation
Scheme
04/01/2015
52.
POL00224571
IPOL-BSFF-0062634
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons, cc'ing
Patrick
Bourke, Tom
Wechsler and
17/03/2015
Page 96 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
another re:
Response to
Part Two -
Second Sight's
Part Two
report
53.
POL00313587
POL-BSFF-0151637
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Belinda Crowe
RE: P2 update
20/03/2015
54.
POL00040954
POL-0037436
Email sent
from Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons and
others re :
Response to
part two of
second sights
report with
track
17/03/2015
55.
POL00040962
POL-0037444
Email sent
from Mark
underwood to
Patrick Bourke
and others re :
Update to the
response to
part 2 of
second sights
report
20/03/2015
56.
POL00408646
IPOL-BSFF-0233111
Meeting with
Baroness
(Lucy) Neville
Rolfe,
Parliamentary
Under
Secretary of
State
19/07/2016
57.
POL00150296
POL-BSFF-0009414
Email chain
including Mark
Underwood
(POL); Patrick
Bourke (POL);
Richard
Callard (BIS) &
Others Re:
Project
16/12/2014
Page 97 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Sparrow
Actions
58.
POL00356012
POL-BSFF-0181733
Email from
Melanie
Corfield to
Rodric
Williams, Mark
Underwood)
and Patrick
Bourke re:
BNR -SS -
concerning the
amount of
money spent
on Second
Sight
14/10/2015
59.
POL00423922
POL-BSFF-
0238737
Post Office
Limited Audit,
Risk &
Compliance
Committee
Report: The
Current
Operation of
Suspense
Accounts
08/01/2024
60.
POL00241514
IPOL-BSFF-0079577
email from
Mark
Underwood to
Patrick Bourke
and Rodric
Williams Re:
Tm Update
13/05/2016
61.
WBON000108
0
WBD_000950.000
001
Suspense
accounts
briefing note -
Meeting with
Alisdair
Cameron
17/05/2017
62.
POL00408769
POL-BSFF-
0233234
Call with
Alisdair
Cameron -
Briefing Note
06/07/2017
63.
POL00024771
IPOL-0021250
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons and
Jane MacLeod
14/07/2017
Page 98 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
RE: Draft
Defence -
Suspense
Account
64.
WBON000116
3 4
WBD_001033.00000
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons RE:
Private &
Confidential -
Subject to
Legal Privilege
13/07/2017
65.
POL00460649
POL-BSFF-WITN-
068-0000007
Email from
Mark
Westbrook to
Mark
Underwood
RE: FW:
Private &
Confidential:
Subject to
Legal Privilege
- Suspense
Accounts
Report
26/03/2020
66.
POL00030907
POL-0027389
POL Audit,
Risk &
Compliance
Committee
Report into
The Historical
Operation of
Suspense
Accounts,
Mark
Underwood,
24 November
2020
24/11/2020
67.
POL00460657
POL-BSFF-WITN-
064-0000270
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Kathryn
Sherratt with
others cc’d in
RE KPMG's
Investigation in
to how POL
Operates its
Suspense
Accounts.
08/01/2024
Page 99 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
68.
POL00460656
POL-BSFF-WITN-
064-0000273
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Declan Salter
RE:
Confidential -
Contains Legal
Advice: Draft
response to
the questions
posed by the
Inquiry on
“Branch
Suspense
Accounts and
Trading
Statements"
04/12/2020
69.
POL00040516
IPOL-0036998
Email from
Jarnail Singh
to Patrick
Bourke cc
Belinda
Crowe, Mark
Davies and
others re:
Legally
Privileged and
Confidential -
further lines for
WHD
17/12/2014
70.
POL00226185
IPOL-BSFF-0064248
Email trail from
Andrew
Parsons to
Andrew
Parsons and
others re: FW:
Future
Arrangements
and Part II
09/04/2015
71.
POL00162583
IPOL-0150986
Note for Tim
Parker - MU
and MC
amended
06/08/2015
72.
POL00139184
POL-BSFF-0001396
email from
Mark
Underwood to
Angela Van-
Den-Bogerd,
Lorraine
Lynch,
23/08/2015
Page 100 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Alexandra
Ward and
others re
Transcript of
Panorama
73.
POL00318987
IPOL-BSFF-0157037
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Mark R Davies
cc Melanie
Corfield RE:
POIRs -
responses to
Panorama and
Second Sight
Report findings
06/08/2015
74.
WITN10010104)
WITN10010104
Letter from
Baroness
Neville-Rolfe
DBE CMG to
Tim Parker
RE: confirming
their
conversation
last month
regarding the
Post Office
Horizon
system
10/09/2015
75.
POL00233179
POL-BSFF-0071242
Email chain
from Mark
Underwood to
Rodric
Williams,
Patrick Bourke
RE: Draft
Speaking
Notes for JM
/TP Meeting
on 25.09.15
24/09/2015
76.
POL00153429
IPOL-BSFF-0012541
Email trail from
Mark
Underwood to
Patrick Bourke
re: What about
this ?
30/10/2015
77.
POL00238693
POL-BSFF-0076756
POL's
Comments on
the Chairman's
Report
21/01/2016
Page 101 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
78.
POL00024741
IPOL-0021220
Email trail from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane MacLeod
cc: Patrick
Bourke and
Rodrick
Williams re:
FW: Private &
Confidential -
Subject to
Legal
Privilege.
Findings in
relation to
Recommendati
on Number 7
21/06/2016
79.
POL00390517
POL-BSFF-0217404
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Tom Wechsler,
Melanie
Corfield,
Rodric
Williams & Ors
RE: Group
Action against
Post Office
Limited
13/04/2016
80.
POL00041593
IPOL-0038075
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons and
Rodric
Williams re:
URGENT -
Omnibus Trial
14/12/2017
81.
POL00241025
POL-BSFF-0079088
Email from
Rodric
Williams to
Andrew
Parsons Re:
Group Action -
action list
20/04/2016
82.
POL00041136
IPOL-0037618
Email sent
from Rodric
Williams to
Mark
Underwood
and others re :
21/04/2016
Page 102 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Group Action -
action List
83.
POL00023013
IPOL-0019492
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane Macleod,
Angela Van-
Den Bogerd,
Mark R.
Davies and
others, ccing
Aimee
Daughters Re;
Postmaster
Litigation
Steering
Group call
Tomorrow@
14:30.
25/09/2018
84.
POL00024988
IPOL-0021467
Email from
Andrew
Parsons to
Rodric
Williams,
Thomas P
Moran, Andela
Van-Den-
Bogerd and
others RE:
Postmaster
Litigation
Steering
Group -
Confidential
and Subject to
Legal Privilege
13/07/2016
85.
POL00024165
IPOL-0020644
Email chain
between Mark
Underwood,
Andrew
Parsons,
Rodric
Williams and
others Re:
Tomorrow's
Hearing.
01/02/2018
86.
POL00253137
POL-BSFF-0091200
Postmaster
Group
Litigation-
General
27/01/2018
Page 103 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Counsel
Briefing Note
87.
POL00266141
POL-BSFF-0104204
Email from
Mark
Underwood)
To:
andrew.parson
s, Rodric
Williams,
Angela Van-
Den-Bogerd
and others re
Expert joint
memo
[WBDUK-
AC.FID270324
97]
25/02/2019
88.
POL00359886
IPOL-BSFF-0185607
Email from
Mark
Underwood) to
Rodric
Williams, Jane
MacLeod and
CC Ben Foat
re: Recusal
Application -
Claimants’
Statement of
Costs
02/04/2019
89.
POL00006764
IPOL-0018022
Meeting
Minutes of the
Postmaster
Litigation
Subcommittee
of POL
26/03/2018
90.
POL00025299
POL-0021778
Section/Sched
ule -
attachment to
draft letter of
response
20/07/2016
91.
POL00139292
POL-BSFF-
0001480
Postmaster
Litigation -
Bates & 90
Others v. Post
Office Limited -
Agenda for
steering group
meeting
19/07/2016
Page 104 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
92.
POL00424926
POL-0202873
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Mark R
Davies, Patrick
Bourke,
Thomas P
Moran and
others re: Draft
Letter of
Response
19/07/2016
93.
POL00117755
IPOL-0114692
Email from
Patrick Bourke
to Andrew
Parsons RE:
PLSG meeting
on Wednesday
24 May 2017
@12in
Tonbridge
13/07/2017
94.
WBON000117 1
1
\WBD_001041.00000
Email from
Andrew
Parsons to
Jane
MacLeod,
Mark
Underwood
and others re:
Draft Defence
— Suspense
Account
14/07/2017
95.
POL00245359
POL-BSFF-
0083422
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Andrew
Parsons, Jane
MacLeod and
Rodric
Williams re:
Remote
access
wording
20/11/2016
96.
POL00024989
IPOL-0021468
Bond
Dickinson's
Report
regarding the
Postmaster
Group Action
13/07/2016
Page 105 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
97.
POL00024650
IPOL-0021129
Email from
Mark
Underwood,
Jane
MacLeod,
Angela Van-
Den-Bogerd,
and others re:
PLSG meeting
on Wednesday
24 May 2017
@15:00pm in
Tonbridge
(1.11)
19/05/2017
98.
POL00003414
\VIS00004428
Letter from
James Hartley
to Andrew
Parsons RE:
Bates &
Others v Post
Office Limited -
Group Action,
Claim Number:
HQ16X01238 ,
Inspection of
Known Error
Logs
13/09/2017
99.
POL00023013
IPOL-0019492
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane Macleod,
Angela Van-
Den Bogerd,
Mark R.
Davies and
others, ccing
Aimee
Daughters Re;
Postmaster
Litigation
Steering
Group call
Tomorrow@
14:30.
25/09/2018
100.
POL00254487
POL-BSFF-0092550
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane
MacLeod,
Thomas P
Moran, and
Rodric
11/04/2018
Page 106 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Williams - Re:
100 Technical
Horizon
Documents
101.
POL00254556
POL-BSFF-0092619
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Jane
MacLeod,
Thomas P
Moran, Rodric
Williams — Re:
100 Technical
Horizon
Documents
17/04/2018
102.
POL00253439
POL-BSFF-0091502
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Stuart Nesbit
cc'd Angela
Van-Den-
Bogerd re:
Group
Litigation
OSOP
‘Exposure’:
Private &
Confidential -
Subject to
Legal Privilege
16/02/2018
103.
POL00023285
POL-0019764
Womble Bond
Dickinson
Report on
Decision:
Should Post
office apply to
strike out
inadmissible
parts of the
Claimants’
evidence?
05/09/2018
104.
POL00023209
IPOL-0019688
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Rodric
Williams,
Andrew
Parsons and
Jane Macleod
ccing Dave Pa
naech, Victoria
15/10/2018
Page 107 of 109
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Brooks and
Amy Prime re:
Strike out
application
105.
POL00158363
IPOL-0146593
Email chain
from Mark
Underwood to
Paula Vermeils
and Mark R
Davies cc'd
Avene Regan
re: RE: GLO
update
05/11/2018
106.
POL00257368
IPOL-BSFF-0095431
Post Office
Group
Litigation -
Update: First
Round of
Evidence for
the Horizon
Trial
25/09/2018
107.
POL00155129
IPOL-BSFF-0014226
Horizon Issues
Response
Plan
Powepoint—
GE
Walkthrough
by Angela Van
Den Bogerd
and Mark
Underwood
29/08/2019
108.
POL00155397
POL-BSFF-
0014494
Email chain
from Mark
Underwood to
others “re:
GLO Post
Settlement GE
Paper”
10/01/2020
109.
POL00460651
POL-BSFF-WITN-
068-0000009
Email chain
between Mark
Underwood
and Julie
Bruce RE:
Remediation
Programme
11/08/2021
110.
POL00460652
POL-BSFF-WITN-
068-0000010
Email from
Mark
Underwood to
Simon
06/01/2022
Page 108 of 109
WITNO0990100
WITNO0990100
Docusign Envelope ID: 1D7A86D9-66F5-4642-BE93-83757BOF82C7
Recaldin RE:
Remediation
Programme
Page 109 of 109