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Witness Name: Jonathan Evans
Statement No.: WITN0346_01
Exhibits: WITN0346_01/01 -
WITNO346_01/18
Dated: 16 September 2022
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF JONATHAN EVANS
I, JONATHAN EVANS will say as follows:
This written witness statement has been drafted in response to the Rule 9 Request
dated 27 May 2022, with supplementary letters dated 17 June 2022 and 5 July
2022, regarding corporate knowledge of technical issues with Horizon prior to rol-
out.
Professional background, relationship with POL, role at POL particularly
between 1999 and 2001
The Inquiry has asked me to set out my professional background and relationship
to POL and to summarise my role at POL between 1997 to 2001. I was employed
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by The Post Office, (from 2001 by Consignia plc, and from 2003 by Royal Mail
Group plc, following company status and name changes), between 1974 and
2010. I joined The Post Office as a graduate trainee having obtained a degree in
mathematics at Durham University. In brief, my Post Office career followed this
path:
1974-1976 Management Trainee, mainly in postal operations
1976-1982 Operations Executive, Midlands Postal Board
1982-1984 Personal Assistant to The Post Office Chairman
1984-1986 Assistant Head Postmaster, Leicester
1986-1989 Subpostmasters Manager, Post Office Counters HQ
1989 — 1992 Deputy Personnel Director, Post Office Counters HQ
1992-1993 Director of Organisation, Post Office Counters HQ
1993-1995 General Manager Midlands Region, Post Office Counters
1995 — 1999 Network Director, Post Office Counters HQ
1999 Director of Shaping for Competitive Success Programme (Post
Office reorganisation)
1999-2001 Secretary to The Post Office
2001-2010 Company Secretary of Consignia plc, then Royal Mail Group plc
Post Office Counters Ltd, a subsidiary company of The Post Office, came into
existence in 1987 as part of the strategy to give dedicated focus to the
management of the UK’s then 20,000 or so post offices. Following the dissolution
of The Post Office in 2001 and the creation of Consignia plc (subsequently
renamed as Royal Mail Group pic) Post Office Counters Ltd (POCL) changed its
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name to Post Office Ltd (POL) on 1 October 2001, marking a further degree of
separation from Royal Mail. 10 years later the complete separation of POL from
Royal Mail took place when the latter was privatised, leaving POL in Government
ownership.
My relationship with POL in the period about which I have been asked to comment
— 1997-2001 - was limited. When POL came into being in October 2001, I was
Company Secretary of the whole Group and of its main subsidiaries — and
therefore also of POL. The main focus of my role as Group Company Secretary
was working on Group-wide matters with the Chairman, Chief Executive and other
directors on the main board. My involvement with POL was mainly in the area of
board governance.
However, as my career history shows, between 1986 and 1999 my work was with
POL’s predecessor company, POCL, predominantly in the areas of general and
personnel management. My role as Subpostmasters Manager was to take the
lead on the contractual relationship between POCL and subpostmasters. This
involved considerable dealings with the National Federation of SubPostmasters
(NFSP) in negotiating remuneration and other contractual issues. From 1989 as
Deputy Personnel Director, I had a wider role in charge of employment relations
with staff and subpostmasters. In 1992 I led a major reorganization of Post Office
Counters, later becoming General Manager of the newly created Midlands Region
with 1500 or so post offices, before returning to London HQ as Network Director,
with responsibility for the operational performance of the whole network of post
offices across the UK.
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Experience of major IT projects
The Inquiry has asked me to summarise my experience in respect of major IT
projects. My experience with major IT projects is and was limited to that of an end-
user.
Automation Transformation Steering Group
The Inquiry has asked me to explain the purpose behind the Automation
Transformation Steering Group and whether the Group considered the technical
robustness of Horizon. The Automation Transformation Steering Group was a
POCL-wide group set up in 1996 to oversee the integration of the many and varied
IT systems and programmes across POCL — covering not just Horizon but also
other areas such as logistics, accounting and the interface with Group-wide IT
systems. There was a large programme of IT activity in POCL, and it required
carefully coordinated implementation and communication. The Steering Group’s
role was not to probe the technical integrity and robustness of Horizon (or of other
IT projects) — that was done by respective project governance groups — but to keep
a close overview of their progress and integration with other POCL IT systems.
The terms of reference of the Group are at Appendix B in POL00031271
[WITNO346_01/1].
The minutes of the meeting on 23 June 1998 (POL00028324 [WITN0346_01/2])
show the type of agenda and discussion at meetings of the Group.
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Early feedback on Horizon implementation
The main Post Office Board received regular progress reports on Horizon, and the
follow-up report on which I have asked to comment (POL00028593
[WITN0346_01/3)) fulfilled a request from the Group Chief Executive, following the
Board meeting in June 1997, for a detailed report on learning points arising from
the Horizon programme thus far. The background to this was slippage in the roll-
out timetable and the need to understand the causes of this.
25 years on, I do not have an exact recall of my understanding at the time of the
causes of slippage, but two points come to mind now. The first was the difficulties
that ICL/Pathway was having in developing its software for handling the full range
of benefit payments (whether this was predominantly an issue to be laid at the
door of Pathway or the Benefits Agency was, I recall, a contentious matter). The
second area, which at the time would have been my main concern as Network
Director, was the array of issues arising from the installation of the Horizon
hardware in subpostmasters’ premises and changed transaction processes —
items such as office layout constraints, power supplies, training, remuneration
arrangements.
The minutes of the joint meeting with ICL/Pathway, POCL and the NFSP held on
28 May 1997 (NFSP00000279 [WITN0346_01/4]) on which I have been asked to
comment, show the type of matters that were concerning subpostmasters in the
trial offices. I do not recall this particular meeting and am not even sure that I was
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present at it, but together with colleagues from other parts of POCL I did have
frequent meetings — formal and informal — with NFSP representatives to try to iron
out practical implementation problems, and for them to give feedback on how the
roll-out — limited at that stage - was progressing. At that time there was limited
functionality on the Horizon system, so the main feedback areas, as mentioned
above, were regarding hardware installation and the length of automated
transaction times.
Horizon testing
The inquiry has asked me about my understanding of the results of Model Office
and End to End testing and POCL and ICL Pathway’s actions to address these
issues. The document to which I have been referred (POL00028421
[WITNO0346_01/5]) is a short briefing note dated 16 November 1998 from POCL’s
leader of Horizon implementation to his colleagues on the Counters Executive
Committee, of which I was one, alerting us to potential problems with the interface
between Horizon and the Transaction Information Processing (TIP) project. 24
years on, I have no recollection of receiving or reading this note and cannot answer
the specific questions asked by the Inquiry. However, I do hazily recall that
problems had been encountered in the preparation for carrying out tests on the
Horizon system. Horizon was being designed to provide streams of information
about client transaction volumes and receipts etc from the cash accounts of post
offices for TIP to produce consolidated information for client settlement and
management information purposes. I think — although others closer to the problem
would know better than me — that these issues would not have affected
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subpostmasters. The Inquiry has asked me whether such issues were brought to
the attention of the Government. The document shows that the problems were
being taken up with ICL/Pathway and that Government officials would have been
aware.
Treasury Review of Horizon
The Inquiry has asked me a number of questions about the role and activities of
the Treasury Working Group of which I was a member during some of its
existence. I believe the first inter-Government Departmental working group to
review the Horizon project was established in early 1998, when the Horizon project
was flashing red on the political radar screen in view of the significant timetable
slippage and growing contractual disputes between the three main parties — ICL,
the Benefits Agency (BA) and POCL. This review concluded that Horizon was still
feasible, but that its continuation would depend on the contract with ICL being
renegotiated. Negotiations then took place between the parties, led by Graham
Corbett, then a senior official in the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, but by
the Autumn of 1998 it was recognised that agreement would not be possible.
To try to make progress, ICL and POCL separately attempted to reach an
agreement on a new contract. While these discussions took place, Ministers
requested work to be carried out on contingency options. The Treasury Working
Group (TWG) was assigned this task, and I joined it as the Post Office
representative. Other members were from the Treasury (HMT), the Department of
Social Security (DSS), BA, and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The
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TWG liaised with other Government departments, including No 10, the Central IT
unit, and law officers, was advised by consultants KPMG and the legal advisers of
the individual member organisations. In my capacity as POCL Network Director,
my role was primarily to provide analysis of and commentary on the consequences
for the post office network of Horizon not going ahead, and the impact of the
contingency options. Document POL00028642 [WITN0346_01/6] shows the type
of input I made.
The documents provided to me by the Inquiry provide a good illustration of the
nature of the work carried out by the TWG, and of the tensions between the various
parties — which had existed for years before. Horizon had been created as a
means of accommodating two competing Government objectives — one being the
modernisation of the old paper-based methods of paying state benefits, which in
the eyes of DSS and BA should be paid via Automated Credit Transfer (ACT)
direct into beneficiaries’ bank accounts thereby saving millions of pounds in
administration and fraud; with the other objective being the maintenance of a
nationwide network of post offices, which would be torpedoed by the loss of
Benefits Agency income as it accounted for over one third of POCL’s total
revenues.
In essence, BA wanted to move to ACT quickly, while POCL wanted to avoid this,
or at best to slow it down. The original design of Horizon, with the Benefits
Payment Card (BPC) at its heart, was the compromise to accommodate these
objectives — a modern, automated means of paying state benefits in post offices,
reducing fraud and administration costs, whilst preserving business and customer
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footfall in post offices. It is important to remember here that there was a further,
potentially vocal, constituency with a vital interest in all this — the 18,000 or so
subpostmasters, whose livelihoods would be threatened by the loss of income
caused by the move to ACT. It was no coincidence that the then Government in
the mid-1990s announced its commitment to Horizon and the BPC at the annual
general meetings of the NFSP.
17 But the Horizon project faltered. In 1998, important milestones had been missed,
and disputes were arising between the parties about the causes of this, in
particular between ICL and BA. As mentioned in paragraph 10 above, I was
unsure at the time of the root causes of this - my memory recalls doubts about
ICL’s ability to deliver its commitments, particularly in respect of software
development, tempered by other doubts about BA’s ability to redesign its systems
and processes to accommodate Horizon’.
18 The TWG set to work on analysing three main options:
1) to continue with Horizon as planned, with a renegotiation of contractual terms
2) to continue with Horizon but reconfigure it to operate without the BPC and
provide an automated platform for post offices, with an early facility for network
banking. Benefit payments would be made via ACT
3) to cancel Horizon entirely.
1 For a full analysis of the issues affecting Horizon at this stage, I would commend to the Inquiry the
National Audit Office’s 2000 report on The Cancellation of the Benefits Payment Card project.
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19 Each option was analysed from financial, legal and political viewpoints. The
documents show the range and extent of the analysis the TWG involved itself in,
and the nature of the debate between its members. The TWG review inevitably
resulted in reopening the Pandora’s box of arguments about the colliding
objectives of the Benefits Agency and POCL — ie ACT v post office network. I draw
the Inquiry’s attention to a few of the documents which give a flavour of the
discussions as per the Inquiry’s questioning:
1) POL00039877 [WITN0346_01/7] and POL00039876 [WITN0346_01/8]: these
throw some light on the respective positions of DSS/BA and DTI/POCL
&
POL00028638 [WITN0346_01/9]: KPMG’s analysis of the three options which
shows, despite the rigour of their analysis, the lack of a clear conclusion on
which was the best option
L
POL00028634 [WITN0346_01/10]: my note to the Post Office Chief Executive
about the presentation the TWG was to make to Ministers in December 1998.
The presentation was designed to inform Ministers of a possible ‘agreed’ way
forward to accommodate the competing objectives — i.e., to follow option 2 by
continuing with Horizon without the BPC, implementing a network banking
facility in post offices, and delaying the introduction of compulsory ACT for a
few years. This was of course all subject to agreeing on new terms with ICL.
The presentation to Ministers (six Ministers were present, including at least
three Cabinet members) was made jointly by TVG members (I was the Post
Office contributor) in order to portray a sense of agreement, but the underlying
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different preferences of the parties - DTI/PO for option 1, DSS/BA for option 3
— nevertheless shone through. I do not recall a clearly stated outcome of the
meeting but work subsequently continued on developing option 2 — although
this was interrupted by a Government reshuffle as outlined in paragraph 25
below.
In response to other questions asked of me by the Inquiry about the workings
of the TWG
20
1) It was not part of the TWG’s role to explore detailed technical issues
concerning the Horizon project (by which I assume is meant, for example, the
reasons why the coding of software development was proving troublesome).
While the risk of Horizon failing was clearly recognised — indeed that was the
catalyst for our work — the TWG was not equipped, nor needed to be equipped,
to investigate technical issues. This level of scrutiny was carried out by other
groups, mainly in the Horizon project team reporting to POCL and BA. One
point to add here: I recall that as Horizon was a Private Finance Initiative (PFl)
project, ICL had shown some reluctance for the contracting parties to probe its
inner workings. Under PFI philosophy, it was for the client to specify
requirements, and for the supplier to deliver them without being interrogated
on its methodology. As slippage continued, this was a source of considerable
tension between the parties.
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2) I am not aware of the extent to which Government Ministers personally were
briefed on the detailed technical aspects of Horizon. Were any briefing called
for, it would have been the responsibility of officials in respective Government
departments to provide it.
L£
I was not directly involved in the negotiations with ICL at any time and have no
recollection of the detail of their proposals for the Horizon project in
November/December 1998, their proposed changes to the acceptance criteria
for the system, or the extent of their acceptability to POCL or the Benefits
Agency.
4) I was aware of contact between the Government and Fujitsu. POL00039932
[WITN0346_01/11] and POL00028692 [WITN0346_01/12] show there was an
approach via the British Ambassador in Tokyo. I also recall that Fujitsu was
seen as an important investor in the UK through its acquisition of ICL in 1998.
I also recall that there had been the closure of a Fujitsu factory in or near
Sedgefield, the then Prime Minister's constituency at about this time. But! am
unable to comment on the extent to which these matters influenced, if at all,
the outcome of discussions with ICL about a renegotiated contract.
2
My involvement with the TWG ceased in early 1999 when I was asked to take
charge of a major reorganisation of the Post Office into separate business
units, known as Shaping for Competitive Success. I continued with this
programme until becoming Group Company Secretary (actually Secretary to
the Post Office until incorporation in 2001) in October 1999.
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Review of POCL deal with ICL Pathway
21 The Inquiry has asked me to consider the review (POL00031230)
[WITN0346_01/13] of the proposed deal with ICL/Pathway, to comment on its
purpose, my involvement with it, and the extent to which I agreed with its
conclusions. The review was carried out by Roger Tabor, the very experienced
and well-respected Finance Director of POCL, who had not been directly involved
with the progress of the intense discussions over the few months prior to his report.
I now have little recollection of his conducting this review or of my involvement
with it, but it would have been, as he states in his opening paragraphs, to give a
more detached view of the emerging ‘deal’ to be done with ICL/Pathway. (While
‘deal’ is mentioned here, this must mean the draft Heads of Agreement which had
been worked up between POCL and ICL, but which had not received approval
from DSS/BA. In fact, as Roger mentions in his report, at the time of writing it the
Heads of Agreement had lapsed).
22 My views at the time would have echoed those of ‘senior managers’ mentioned in
paragraph 2.6 of the review. Given the background of poor delivery to date, there
was every reason to be cautious about a future deal with ICL. But there was no
easy solution out of the Horizon problem at the time: we were all recognising that
we had to face the least bad deal, with open eyes.
23 I would have endorsed the conclusions reached in paragraphs 3.4 - 3.6 of the
review. As mentioned above in paragraph 20(1), the PFI nature of the contract
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was a problem: the resultant lack of transparency with ICL was a major factor in
impeding the joint identification of risks and their effective mitigation.
Cancellation of the Benefits Payment Card
24 The Inquiry has asked me about the position of the Post Office regarding the
options identified by the TWG. As mentioned in paragraph 20(5) my involvement
with the TWG ended in early 1999. My understanding was that the three options
continued to be explored, with most attention given to option 2 (continue with
Horizon with the BPC, and accelerate post office network banking) as this was
seen within Government as the best possible ‘third way’ compromise position. The
Post Office continued to stress that option 1 — to continue with Horizon as planned
but renegotiated —- was its preferred option. DSS continued to press the
advantages of moving quickly to ACT.
25 However, not long after the presentation to Ministers I described in paragraph
19(3) above, there was a reshuffle of Government Ministers following the
resignation of Peter Mandelson, then Secretary of State at the DTI. As a result,
there was a new head at the DTI, and a new Chief Secretary at the Treasury — two
cabinet ministers closely involved with the Horizon issue. My recollection is that
these changes caused, perhaps inevitably, a delay in Government coming to a
consensus as to the way forward as Ministers took over their new portfolios. My
understanding was that in order to make progress No 10 was asked to provide
guidance. I am not sure whether the Prime Minister was personally involved,
although POL00028603 [WITN0346_01/14] suggests that he may have been.
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However, it would seem inconceivable that the decision about Horizon would not
have received Prime Ministerial attention. The decision would have far-reaching
impacts not only on the payment of state benefits to millions of people and the
future of the post office network, but also on the commercial future of ICL, and the
relationship with Fujitsu. The reputation of the Government was at stake.
I mentioned in paragraph 20(4) that there was some direct contact between Fujitsu
and Government in 1998. I am unaware now, and was unaware at the time, of the
existence of any such contact out with the actual negotiations with Fujitsu/ICL in
January-May 1999.
The Inquiry has asked me to detail the circumstances in which the Post Office
signed Heads of Agreement with ICL, and what if any pressure was brought to
bear by the Government in respect of this. Things came to a head in May 1999.
Negotiations had taken place with Fujitsu/ICL, and draft Heads of Agreement had
been produced, based on pursuing a variant of option 2. A big change was the
removal of BA from the contract with ICL, leading to a more conventional non-PFI
contractual arrangement between ICL and POCL. While the proposal included
concessions from DSS/BA to defer the introduction of compulsory ACT for a few
years, it was still financially problematic for the Post Office to accept. In the end
— and I was not directly involved but gleaned this at the time from those who were
— the Post Office Board agreed to the proposal because they believed that if they
didn’t, Ministers may well direct them to do so. In order to avoid that constitutional
imbroglio, the Board reluctantly agreed to the proposal, managing to secure some
concessions in return for their acceptance.
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28 The Inquiry has asked for my understanding of the robustness and technical
issues of Horizon at this time. As mentioned before, analysis of the detailed
technical robustness of Horizon did not feature prominently in TWG discussions
while I was involved (i.e. up to January 1999) — although the risk of ICL continuing
to miss performance targets did. In retrospect, I suppose it was assumed that ICL
would in the end deliver the goods, even if this meant that glitches along the way
would need to be corrected.
29 The Inquiry has asked me to comment on whether the financial implications of
cancelling the project impacted the focus on the technical integrity and robustness
of Horizon is an interesting question. My answer is that I do not know, but I will
comment on a slightly different point. The removal of the BPC from Horizon was
a major change. On the one hand I heard it described as making Horizon easier
to implement as the considerable complexity of paying benefits had been
removed. But on the other hand, as it was analogously described to me, Horizon
had been designed to the equivalent specification of an army tank to handle
securely £billions of public monies, whereas without the BPC only a nimble
armoured car was needed. But the Post Office was left with a tank.
Discussions at certain Board meetings: Sept 1999 — June 2001
30 The Inquiry has asked me to comment on the minutes of four board meetings, in
particular about my understanding at the time of the robustness of Horizon and of
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any technical issues, whether I was aware of any problems experienced by
subpostmasters, and whether I raised any concerns.
Meeting of the Post Office Board on 14 September 1999: I first point out that
although the minutes in document POL00000353 [WITN0346_01/15] were first
sent to me by the Inquiry as “a Post Office Limited Board Member during the period
1999-2001”, they are not minutes of POL (i.e. Post Office Limited, which, as I
pointed out above in paragraph 3, did not come into being until 1 October 2001)
but minutes of the board of The Post Office Corporation — i.e. the main board of
the whole group. I was present at this meeting as an observer: I had been
appointed as Secretary to The Post Office (Corporation) and this was a
familiarisation meeting for me before formally taking up the role the following
month.
Despite re-reading these minutes, I have no recollection of the detail of the
meeting — perhaps understandably as it took place 23 years ago. I am therefore
unable to say what my understanding was at the time of the robustness of Horizon.
I note however that the minutes refer to concerns about the reliability of the
Horizon software. I have no recollection of any technical issues being discussed.
I note that the minutes do not record any such discussion.
I also have no recollection of anything being reported about problems for
subpostmasters. I note from reading the minutes that there were some concerns
about training (presumably of subpostmasters, amongst others). I! have no
recollection of raising any concerns. I was at the meeting as an observer. As
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Secretary from the following month, it would have been my role to ensure that any
concerns raised by board members were followed up. I have no recollection of
doing this, although I see the minutes record one action point about Horizon which
I would have ensured was reported on at the following meeting.
Meeting of the Post Office Board meeting on 26 October 1999: I point out that the
minutes detailed in document POL00000354 [WITN0346_01/16] are not minutes
of the board of Post Office Limited, but of The Post Office Corporation. As before,
despite re-reading these minutes, I have no recollection of the detail of the
meeting. I am therefore unable to say what my understanding was at the time of
the robustness of Horizon. I note from the minutes that Horizon had been
accepted for implementation.
I have no recollection of any technical issues being discussed. I note that the
minutes do not record any such discussion. I have no recollection of anything
being reported about problems for subpostmasters. I note that the minutes do not
record any such discussion. I have no recollection of raising any concerns.
Meeting of the Post Office Board on 11 January 2000: I point out that the minutes
in document POL00000336 [WITN0346_01/17] are not minutes of the board of
Post Office Limited, but of The Post Office Corporation. As before, despite re-
reading these minutes, I have no recollection of the detail of the meeting. I am
therefore unable to say what my understanding was at the time of the robustness
of Horizon. I! note from the minutes that the roll-out of Horizon was due to
recommence following the resolution of certain issues.
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37 I have no recollection of any technical issues being discussed. I note that the
minutes do not record any such discussion. I have no recollection of anything
being reported about problems for subpostmasters. I note that the minutes do not
record any such discussion, although they mention that difficulties with ‘the
provision of support to offices’ (which could imply support to subpostmasters,
amongst others) had been identified, with work undertaken to resolve them. I have
no recollection of raising any concerns.
38 Meeting of the Consignia plc Board on 12 June 2001: I point out that the minutes
detailed in POL00021476 [WITN0346_01/18] are not minutes of the board of Post
Office Limited, but of Consignia pic. As before, despite re-reading these minutes,
I have no recollection of the detail of the meeting. I am therefore unable to say
what my understanding was at the time of the robustness of Horizon. I note from
the minutes that some 40,000 Horizon terminals were reported to have been
successfully installed, and 60,000 people trained.
39 I have no recollection of any technical issues being discussed. I note that the
minutes do not record any such discussion. I have no recollection of anything
being reported about problems for subpostmasters. I note that the minutes do not
record any such discussion. I have no recollection of raising any concerns.
Other significant meetings
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40 My recollection of meetings in respect of the procurement, design, pilot, roll-out
and modifications to Horizon are now very hazy. I was not personally involved in
any of them, although I was generally aware of much activity taking place at the
time. My closest involvement with Horizon was in 1998-99, as mentioned above,
when I was a member of the Treasury Working Group.
Reassurance sought from ICL/Fujitsu
41 Ihave no recollection of any specific requests for reassurance from ICL/Fujitsu as
to the Horizon system other than, of course, compliance with the service standards
to which ICL was contracted to deliver. I do recall, as some of the minutes referred
to above show, that the efficacy of the system was a key focus for the Board.
Political pressure to agree to the ICL/Fujitsu contract
42 Although I was not involved with awarding the contract to ICL/Pathway in 1996,
my recollection is that was done after careful analysis of the three finalist
tenderers’ proposals against specified criteria, in which external consultants and
lawyers were heavily involved to give advice and analysis. I recall that the
recommendation to appoint ICL/Pathway came from an evaluation panel whose
members included Government officials, but I do not recall any direct political
pressure to appoint ICL/Pathway. However as mentioned earlier, the need for the
successful contract to meet PFI criteria was a key point for Government.
Political pressures in respect of the timing of the roll-out
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43 I have no recollection of any such political pressure, other than the general desire,
on the part of all parties to Horizon, for it to be rolled out to the planned timetable.
Board awareness of difficulties with Horizon in 1999-2001
44 I believe that the Board was kept fully informed of progress with the Horizon
project. The minutes in the documents with which I have been provided support
this: the Board papers on which the discussions were based, if they still exist,
would reveal more detail.
IT project governance expertise amongst the Board
45 I donot recall there being a member of the main Board with extensive governance
experience of a project of the size of Horizon — of which there were few, if any.
However, the Board was informed by advice from leading external experts and
consultants at key stages of the project.
The Board’s effectiveness in scrutinising stages of the Horizon project
46 Much of the close detailed scrutiny of the Horizon project took place below main
Board level in project boards and working groups. The Board was given frequent
updates on progress, and substantial time was allocated on board agendas for
interrogation of those leading the project. Even in retrospect, I have no reason to
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doubt the Board’s commitment to ensuring that Horizon was properly scrutinised
in the 1999-2001 period under review.
47 As a general point about these Board meetings, I suspect that the papers and
presentations about which the minuted discussions took place, if still available,
would provide a richer source of information for answering the Inquiry’s questions
than the minutes themselves.
Any matters to assist the Chair
48 I have nothing further to add.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: 16 September 2022
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Index to First Witness Statement of Jonathan Evans
No. I Exhibit Number Document Description I Control URN
Number
1 WITNO346_01/1 Report on Automation POL-0028173 POL00031271
Change Programme and
Control, dated August
1996
2 WITNO346_01/2 I Automation POL-0024806 POL00028324
Transformation
Programme Steering
Group Meeting Minutes,
23 June 1998
3 I WITNO346_01/3 I Correspondence from POL-0025075 =I POL00028593
Paul Rich attaching
Horizon - PO Board
Follow-Up Report (July
1997)
4 WITNO346_01/4 I ICL/NFSP Action List VIS00008727 NFSP00000279
from Meeting on 28/05/97
5 I WITN0346_01/5 I Letter from Dave Miller to I POL-0024903 I POL00028421
a number of colleagues
re Horizon Testing
6 WITNO346_01/6 I Discussion Paper: POL-0025124 POL00028642
‘Discussion on Option 3'
prepared by Jonathan
Evans, POCL, sent to
Harry Bush, HM
Treasury, 27 August
1998
7 WITNO346_01/7_ I Fax from Sarah Graham = I POL-0036141 POL00039877
DSS: Towards an Inter-
ministerial decision
8 WITNO0346_01/8 I Note from Jonathan POL-0036140 POL00039876
Evans to Sarah Mullens
re Inter-Ministerial
decision
9 WITNO346_01/9_ I Letter from Chris POL-0025120 POL00028638
Nicholson, KPMG, to
Horizon Working Group
Members, attaching 'HM
Treasury, BA/POCL
Automation Project:
Analysis of Fall-Back
Recommendations’, 16
Oct 1998 (draft)
10 I WITNO346_01/10 I Letter from Jonathan POL-0025116 POL00028634
Evans to John Roberts re
‘Beyond Horizon’
presentation to Ministers
on 8 December 1998
11 I WITNO346_01/11 I Fax from Sarah Graham I POL-0036196 POL00039932
(DSS) to Sarah Mullen
(HMT) copied to
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WITNO03460100
WITNO3460100
Exhibit Number
Document Description
Control
Number
URN
McCorkell, Sibbick,
Evans, Sandison.
12
WITN0346_01/12
Letter - legal advice on
Government's response
to Fujitsu regarding ICL
Pathway's failure to meet
key milestones ®From:
Jeff Triggs - Slaughter
and May ®To: Dave
Miller - POCL®
POL-0025174
POL00028692
13
WITN0346_01/13
Review of the POCL/ICL
Pathway Deal by Roger
Tabor, Finance Director
POCL (January 1999)
POL00031230
14
WITN0346_01/14
Email from Stuart
Sweetman to Neville
Bain, John Roberts,
Richard Close and Jerry
Cope re Horizon Update
on new agreement, 23
Feb 1999
POL-0025085
POL00028603
15
WITN0346_01/15
Post Office Board
Minutes of 14/09/1999
POL00000353
16
WITN0346_01/16
Post Office Board
Minutes of 26/10/1999
POL00000354
17
WITN0346_01/17
Post Office Board
Minutes, Meeting of
11/01/2000
POL00000336
18
WITN0346_01/18
Consignia Plc Board
Meeting Minutes of
12/06/2001
POL00021476
Page 24 of 24