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Witness Name: Jane Smith
Statement No.: WITN05690100
Dated: OS November 2024
THE POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
First Witness Statement of Jane Smith in the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
I, JANE SMITH, of 1 Future Walk, West Bars, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, S49 1PF, SAY
AS FOLLOWS:
1. My name is Jane Smith. I was employed by Post Office Limited ("POL") (or its
predecessors) between 10 February 1986 and 31 March 2024. I am now
retired.
2. Except where I indicate to the contrary, the facts and matters contained in this
witness statement are within my own knowledge. Where any information is not
within my personal knowledge, I have identified the source of my information or
the basis for my belief. The facts in this witness statement are true to the best
of my knowledge and belief.
3. In this statement! use the term "Postmaster" broadly to refer to those people
or entities that are responsible for operating post offices (but excluding those
individuals employed by POL), rather than with any formal definition in mind. I
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use the terms "Postmaster" and "Subpostmaster" interchangeably given their
common usage. Nothing in this statement is intended to detract or differ from
any definition adopted by POL.
4. This witness statement has been prepared in response to the request made by
the Horizon IT Inquiry (the "Inquiry") pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules
2006, dated 24 August 2022 (the "Rule 9 Request").
5: In this witness statement, I address each of the questions set out in Appendix
1 to the Rule 9 Request regarding my career background at POL and my
knowledge of and involvement with the following areas within POL:
a. Advice and assistance;
b. Training;
c. Errors or issues with Horizon system; and
d. Resolution of disputes.
6. I originally submitted my statement in draft to the Inquiry, in accordance with
the Inquiry's Protocol on Witness Statements, on 8 November 2022. I was not
asked to finalise it until 25 July 2024. Given the passage of time, I have updated
my original draft to reflect any changes since it was submitted.
t Where I refer to specific documents in this statement, copies of those
documents are exhibited to this statement in a series of exhibits identified by
the Inquiry's unique reference number for that document.
DEFINED TERMS
8. In this statement, I have used a number of acronyms and defined terms. I have
set out a definition of each, as I have introduced them. However, for
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convenience, I also set out the definitions of these acronyms and definitions
below:
AP Automated Payments
BSC Branch Support Centre
BVT Business Validation Testing
CAB Change Authorisation Board
ECCO Electronic Cash Registers on Counter
E2E End to End
FSC Financial Service Centre
Horizon The Horizon IT System
HSD Horizon Service Desk
Inquiry The Horizon IT Inquiry
ITIL IT Infrastructure Library
KBA Knowledge base article
NBIT New Branch IT system
NBSC Network Business Support Centre (which later
became the Branch Support Centre)
OBCS Order Book Control Service I
P&BA Product & Branch Accounting
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POca Post Office card account
POEx helpline Post Office External helpline for branch customers
POL Post Office Limited
POLFS Post Office Limited Finance System
SME Subject Matter Expert
UAT User Acceptance Testing
Rule 9 Request The Inquiry's request pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry
Rules 2006, dated 24 August 2022
BACKGROUND
1. Please set out an overview of your role(s) within the Post Office
9. My most recent role at POL, which I held from May 2022 until I retired in March
2024, was Product and Support Consultant for the New Branch IT system
("NBIT") which is replacing the Horizon IT System ("Horizon"). In this role, my
primary responsibilities included:
a. Introducing and executing Business Validation Testing ("BVT"), from
early 2023 onwards. BVT ran alongside End to End ("E2E") testing,
which was carried out by a separate team within the project. E2E testing
was conducted to validate the NBIT system build against system and
branch requirements and to ensure that data entered into the system
was recorded in each relevant part of the system. I set up BVT to ensure
the system had been built to meet the expectations of a branch user.
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The BVT team were all hand-picked by myself due to their knowledge
and experience of working in a Post Office branch and/or the Branch
Support Centre ("BSC"). My tasks included:
i. creating test scripts;
ji. executing testing;
iii. identifying defects, applying a prioritisation status of 1-4 (with 1
being the most severe and 4 being a minor or cosmetic issue);
iv. representing the team on daily defect calls where each defect
was discussed with other stakeholders and a final priority
agreed;
v. _retesting fixes;
vi. full regression testing following a fix release (which was a run
through of the entire suite of tests and not just the area where a
fix had been applied); and
vii. providing test scripts and support to branch users during User
Acceptance Testing ("UAT"). Test scripts should have been
produced by a third-party company brought in to manage UAT.
However, after I reviewed their test scripts, it was evident their
lack of branch knowledge had rendered the scripts unusable. I
escalated my findings to the programme’s head of Release
Management (Andy McCallister) and it was agreed BVT test
scripts would also be used for UAT purposes.
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b. Representing the Branch Support Centre (the "BSC") on the NBIT
project and providing input on the Service and Support workstream,
which concerns the transition of support services from Horizon to NBIT;
c. Supporting the development of acceptance criteria in relation to the
Service and Support workstream;
d. Analysing and reviewing proposed screen layouts for NBIT, and
providing feedback from a business support perspective to improve the
quality of the presentation to branch users and minimise ‘how do I?’ type
calls to support centres;
e. Reviewing (in conjunction with the knowledge manager) support articles
relating to NBIT created and updated for use by BSC staff and
postmasters for accuracy, ease of understanding and suitability for use
in support environments;
f. Contributing to the selection criteria for a replacement knowledge
management system; and
g. Developing the support capabilities needed for the initial counter pilot of
NBIT.
2. Please describe any qualifications you had
10. I obtained an IT Infrastructure Library ("ITIL") Practitioner (Managers)
Certificate in 2003, which concerned IT service management and service
delivery. I then gained an accounting qualification (AAT Technician NVQ Level
4 Diploma) in 2010 from Chesterfield College and a management business
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leadership qualification (NCFE Level 5 NVQ Diploma in Management and
Leadership) in 2019. All of these qualifications were funded by POL.
11. — Prior to joining POL, I obtained O-Levels and an A-Level in maths.
3. Please set out any training you received
12. When I began work as a counter clerk, I attended a 7-week training course at
Sheffield Crown Office. This was prior to the implementation of Horizon. Since
then, most of the training I received during my time at POL has been "on the
job" training, though I have also received training on specific systems relevant
to my role, such as training on the POL Finance System ("POLFS").
4, Please describe any career progression within the Post Office
13. I have held many different roles during my time at POL.
14. I first joined Post Office in February 1986 as a counter clerk in Chesterfield at
the Crown Office branch. I did this for 11 years. In addition, I provided maternity
cover as branch manager. During my time there, Chesterfield Crown Office was
one of the pilot branches for Electronic Cash Registers on Counter ("ECCO"),
an electronic point of sales system that could be described as the predecessor
to (but a separate system from) Horizon. As a result, I developed a good
working knowledge of ECCO and the way in which the system worked. I was
then seconded for six months to the automation project in or around 1996,
which was the project to introduce ECCO to the branch network. My role
involved implementing ECCO in other branches, and providing them with onsite
support in using the system once installed. I believe ECCO was installed in all
Crown offices at the time but not in many other branches (perhaps around 100)
as they would have had to pay to have it installed.
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15.
16.
17.
18.
In October 1997, I moved to the Product & Branch Accounting ("P&BA")
division and began working in the Transaction Accounting Procedures team.
My work there related to Royal Mail and Automated Payment products and
involved preparing feasibility studies for new products, developing existing
products and preparing accounting instructions for those products.
During my time in the Transaction Accounting Procedures team, in or around
early 1999, I was seconded to work on the benefits encashment system that
later became Horizon (after the Benefits Agency pulled out of the project). My
role involved checking balancing receipts and other paperwork from test rigs to
ensure that products and accounts had been mapped correctly and that
transactions were accounted for as intended. I was not working on the test rigs
themselves and was sat in a separate room in Fujitsu's office in Feltham
checking the balancing paperwork.
Service Delivery
In July 1999, I moved into the Service Delivery division and began working as
a change implementation manager. This role involved conducting an impact
assessment on changes to products (including the introduction of new
products) and preparing and reviewing communications to branches on such
changes (explained further at paragraph 35 below). Horizon was rolled out to
branches during my time in this role.
In April 2001, I joined the Operations Control team and became a business
analyst working on the Network Banking project, which introduced the Post
Office card account ("POca") and online banking. In this role I supported the
Post Office External ("POEx") helpline (which provides support to branch
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19.
20.
21,
customers) and the Network Business Support Centre ("NBSC") helpline
(which provides support to those working in branches) to deal with any
questions arising from branches and customers relating to network banking
products during their pilot and go-live phases.
In July 2003, I became a problem manager. I primarily managed the resolution
of POca-related problems (for example, customers unable to access their card
account), liaising internally and externally to implement a solution and monitor
whether the solution was successful. I also ensured there was 24/7 cover for
the Post Office Service Continuity team, which involved logging calls related to
system failures from all suppliers within the IT infrastructure domain, identifying
the domain responsible for fixing problems and managing the problem until it
was resolved, and liaising with all parties (both internal and external) to provide
updates relating to the system failure.
In April 2005, I became a change readiness manager. This role involved
reviewing documents (such as incident and escalation processes for the
Service Delivery team) prepared in connection with system changes (for
example, minor software releases and updates to Horizon) and carrying out
impact assessments for the NBSC and the Service Continuity team before
changes were implemented. I was also involved with pro-active problem
prevention, highlighting any potential problems that might inadvertently be
caused by a system change and ensuring these were resolved before the
change was implemented.
From March 2006 to June 2006, I was briefly a Contact Centre service
improvement analyst. This involved managing and monitoring Ingenico's
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22.
23.
24.
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provision and performance on the Paystation helpline against Service Level
Agreements, through which Ingenico answered queries from branches about
Paystation terminals (which Ingenico supplied to POL).
Product & Branch Accounting / Financial Service Centre
In June 2006, I moved back into the P&BA division in Chesterfield to become a
POLFS and contro! manager. POLFS was POL's accounting system at the time
(now known as the Core Finance System). This role involved investigating
instances where Horizon data was missing from POLFS and identifying and
resolving the cause(s). For context, at this time, Horizon data remained on
individual terminals until it was collected through telephony lines at the end of
each day, in a process known as “polling”. If the telephony lines were down for
any reason, the Horizon data would not be collected and would be missing until
the cause(s) was resolved. The data was needed to reconcile the general
ledgers on POLFS so we would work to resolve the Cause(s) as quickly as
possible. I also helped other staff in the P&BA division to understand how data
passed from Horizon to POLFS (based on my prior experience of Horizon),
which reports to check and why data might be missing from POLFS.
In August 2008, I became a business analyst in the Branch Reconciliation team.
My primary responsibilities involved preparing the P&BA division for new
systems and products (including POLSAP, Horizon Online, and Paystation+).
This involved providing training to the whole division on double entry accounting
on Horizon, and recovery procedures on Horizon Online.
In September 2011, I became a senior team leader in the Automated Payments
team. By this time, the P&BA division was known as the Financial Service
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25.
Centre ("FSC"). In this role I was responsible for training and coaching a team
of 8. The team was responsible for investigating queries and/or errors with bill
payments raised by a customer or a branch, or investigating under- or over-
payment enquiries received via the NBSC from a branch, and liaising with the
client through to resolution. For instance, a branch might say a bill had been
paid, even though the system said it had not been paid, so we had to investigate
the transaction with the bill provider.
Strategy and Change
I became a business analyst for the Front Office project in May 2014. The Front
Office project involved POL procuring a replacement for Horizon from IBM
(though this was later shelved). I was involved in the procurement and design
phases and was responsible for consulting different stakeholders on perceived
deficiencies with Horizon and potential improvements that could be made.
These suggested improvements were then compiled in a log and sent to IBM
(POL00105420). I also produced low-level requirements for accounting and bill
payment products and attended product design sprint meetings, in which IBM
would show us what they had designed and ask what improvements we wanted
to see. There was an initial meeting with IBM for us to ask questions and raise
these suggested improvements, followed by a second meeting in which IBM
came back with any proposed changes to the design. During these sprint
meetings I acted as a subject matter expert ("SME") for the FSC, product
managers and Post Office branches, explaining how current processes worked
and discussing improvement opportunities to be included in the new system.
Contact Centres
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26.
27.
28.
wi
In May 2016, I became operations manager at the Customer Support Centre
(formerly the POEx helpline). I led a team of 9 team leaders, each of whom led
teams of support service advisors who dealt directly with customer calls and
complaints. My role was to ensure that quality, productivity, utilisation,
employee and customer service targets were met in line with business goals.
I then became operations manager at the IT Service Desk in July 2018, where
I was tasked with bringing the IT service desk fully in-house (it had previously
been outsourced to ATOS). I led two team leaders, each of whom led a team
of support service advisors who provided technical support to POL and the
branches. I also provided support on the rollout of Branch Hub.
After that, I became the BSC operations manager in July 2021. I led a team of
5 team leaders, each of whom led teams of support service advisors who dealt
directly with calls from branches through the BSC helpline. As with my previous
operations manager roles, I was responsible for the performance of the helpline
and meeting business targets. I remained in this role until May 2022, when I
moved into the role on the NBIT project before retiring in March 2024.
ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE
5. Please provide an overview of what contact you had with subpostmasters or
managers and assistants working in Post Offices, if any
29.
The first direct contact with postmasters that I recall having was during a pilot
of Horizon in 1999, when I was helping out with the Horizon Service Desk
("HSD") during weekly balancing. This was during my time in the Transaction
Accounting Procedures team. This involved travelling down to Fujitsu's office in
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30.
31.
32.
Stevenage on Wednesday afternoons, answering queries from postmasters
and giving advice to them through the HSD on Wednesday evening and
Thursday morning, and then returning home on Thursday afternoon. I was
asked to assist as I had a lot of experience with ECCO (as explained at
paragraph 14 above), and the balancing processes on ECCO and Horizon were
very similar. I had also gained some knowledge of Horizon through my time on
secondment at Fujitsu (see paragraph 16 above).
As a senior team leader in the Automated Payments team, I would not typically
have had direct contact with branches, but my team would have been in contact
with them. The initial query would generally come via the NBSC, POEX or client
helplines, and then my team would investigate the issue with a bill payment.
This would require direct contact with the branches, both as part of the
investigation and in communicating the outcome.
Part of my role as a business analyst on the Front Office project was collating
suggested improvements from stakeholders, including branches. In order to
obtain postmaster feedback, I attended Branch User Forums. These were
meetings between POL and around half a dozen postmasters, who would pass
on feedback from other branches.
As an operations manager in the various contact centres, I was generally two
steps removed from direct contact with branches, as this was handled by
support advisors who reported into team leaders, who in turn, reported into me.
At the customer support centre, the support advisors may have needed to
contact branches in some scenarios, for example to investigate a serious
complaint from a customer about a particular branch. At the IT service desk,
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33.
the support advisors would receive calls directly from branches in relation to
technical issues, while at the BSC the support advisors would receive calls
directly from branches in relation to operational issues.
In my most recent role as Product and Support Consultant for NBIT, my main
contact with branches was with the two directly managed branches involved in
the NBIT pilot. The pilot related only to Drop & Collect transactions, so no cash
was being taken. I spent two days in branch when the pilot was launched to
provide onsite support, and later took calls from the branches if they had any
issues to report, or queries on how to use the system.
6. Please describe whether you were responsible for providing subpostmasters
or Post Office branches with advice or assistance
34.
35.
36.
In addition to advice and assistance provided through direct contact with
postmasters (as set out above), I have been involved in preparing written
materials for the benefit of those working in branches in a number of my roles.
During my time in the Transaction Accounting Procedures team, I was involved
in writing accounting instructions for branches on Royal Mail and automated
payments products. Those instructions were typically included in
communications to branches, such as Counter News articles.
As a change implementation manager, I reviewed and amended Counter News
articles informing branches of changes that were being made to new and
existing products, adding instructions on how the change would be reflected on
Horizon to the articles. The team was also responsible for the creation and
release of memoviews, which were instant messages sent directly to Horizon
terminals. I also assisted Fujitsu with preparing knowledge base articles
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37.
38.
("KBAs") for use by the HSD when answering queries during the rollout of
Horizon.
As a business analyst in the Banking Project team, I was responsible for
preparing KBAs relating to Post Office card account, banking and debit card
acceptance for use by the NBSC helpline staff. Similarly, as a change readiness
manager, I helped to prepare KBAs for the NBSC on upcoming changes, such
as minor software releases.
As the operations manager at the IT Service Desk and then the BSC, one of
my responsibilities was making sure that the support advisors were well
equipped to provide branches with the advice and assistance they needed. Ifa
change was particularly significant, we would generally arrange face-to-face
training for the support advisors, whereas more minor changes (such as a new
issue of stamps) might be communicated by email and by arranging for the
relevant KBAs to be updated. On occasion, particularly obscure or difficult
queries from branches might be escalated to me and I would make suggestions
to the team leader or advisor on how to approach the issue, and, if appropriate,
make the rest of the BSC aware of the issue in case it arose again.
7. When issues were raised, how did you escalate these difficulties?
39.
In all of the teams to which I belonged, I would have followed the escalation
process in place for that team at the time. This would typically involve escalating
the issue to my line manager if senior involvement was needed, and then it
would be up to the line manager to decide whether to escalate it further. Or it
might involve escalating the issue to a different team or an external supplier if
their assistance was needed to resolve the issue.
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40.
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For example, when I was a problem manager, I might be informed that the card
account service was not working. This would initially have been reported to the
NBSC and then passed onto me. I would then escalate the issue to Fujitsu and
the provider of the card account. I would arrange a call with the relevant
suppliers and work to get the issue fixed as soon as possible to minimise its
impact on branches and customers. If it was a really serious issue, such as the
entire card account system going down, the Business Protection team would
be convened, comprising representatives from different areas of POL's
business. We had around 3 big card account outages in a 12-month period
while I was a problem manager, though these typically affected customers more
than branches.
8. Please specify, if you have not already done so, how often any difficulties
involved the Horizon system
A.
The card account outages that I mention at paragraph 40 above were largely
unrelated to Horizon. At paragraph 45 below, I explain how connection failures
affecting Horizon were more frequent during the Horizon Online pilot than
initially anticipated, and how this was addressed. There were also some
localised outages during my time as an operations manager at the IT Service
Desk and at the BSC, and the major incident process was followed on each
occasion. However, I cannot recall every difficulty that arose, and so I cannot
say how often they involved the Horizon system.
9. Were there any steps that you thought should have been taken in response
to any concerns that you raised that were not?
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42.
43.
44.
There was one occasion that I recall where I raised concerns when working on
the introduction of Horizon Online in or around 2010. Although steps were not
taken immediately to address my concerns, they were taken subsequently,
once the scale of the issue became apparent.
As explained at paragraph 22 above, prior to the introduction of Horizon Online,
Horizon data was collected from branches through overnight polling. On
Horizon Online, data was collected from branches through telephony lines in
real-time. Certain transactions, such as a banking withdrawal, required third-
party authorisation before the transaction could be continued. But if there was
a subsequent connection failure with the datacentre, the transaction could not
be completed, causing confusion in branch as to whether or not to pay out funds
to the customer. POL did not initially train postmasters on what to do in the
event of such a failure, and though I did raise concerns with the project
managers about this, it was considered that connection failures would not be
frequent enough to make training on it worthwhile. I recall this information on
the frequency of connection failures came from lan Trundell, who worked as a
solutions architect on the project. I cannot be sure where lan got this information
from, but I believe it may have been Fujitsu.
I cannot recall which of the project managers specifically I spoke to about my
concerns regarding the lack of postmaster training on connection failures,
however I can recall that Claire Hurrell, Debbie Johnson and Will Russell all
worked on the project management team for this project. I believe I would have
raised the concerns with one or more of these individuals. I do not recall what
their exact job titles were. I think that Debbie Johnson may have used a different
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45.
46.
surname at that time, but I cannot recall what that was. NBSC helpline and
P&BA staff had already been trained on what to do in the event of a connection
failure; I was involved in delivering this training together with Alina Lingard.
Once the Horizon Online pilot began, it became apparent that connection
failures were happening more frequently than expected (with one or more
branches affected on a daily basis), and I believe the pilot was paused as a
result. I recall that the effect of this pause was that Horizon Online was not
rolled out to any new branches, however those branches which had already
migrated to Horizon Online continued to use it rather than reverting to legacy
Horizon. Alina Lingard (who I believe was a training manager at the time) and I
then worked on preparing materials for branches to explain what to do in the
event of the connection failure, which were sent out to branches shortly
thereafter. Further, I recall that any branches that had already been migrated
to Horizon Online were visited to receive additional training on what to do during
a system outage or when the system went offline.
The pilot was then resumed once the issues with connectivity had been
resolved — I believe this was several months after it was paused. My recollection
is that whilst it was not possible for the issue to be resolved completely, the
frequency of connectivity failures had reduced compared to before the pilot was
paused. I believe that the initial decision to resume the pilot would have been
taken by Will Russell. It would then have received sign-off from the Change
Authorisation Board ("CAB"), which would have consisted of more senior
stakeholders from all areas of the business. However, I do not recall which
particular individuals were part of the CAB at that time.
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10. Was there anyone who you felt could have done more to assist or make
things better for subpostmasters
47.
48.
One way in which I think advice and assistance may have been improved is if
support staff in the NBSC and the P&BA/FSC had been given Horizon training.
Typically, the focus for support staff in the P&BA/FSC was on accounting
systems such as POLSAP, so their language and understanding were
grounded in those systems, whereas postmasters used the language of
Horizon: item IDs and balancing processes. If support staff were given Horizon
training, it may have made it easier for them to understand the difficulties that
postmasters were having.
Another way in which I think advice and assistance may have been improved
was in the processing of pension payments. Before POca was introduced in or
around 2001, the Order Book Control Service (the "OBCS") was used to
process pension dockets by scanning a barcode on the dockets. If the OBCS
was down, branches were expected to pay out to the customer, and then put
the pension dockets to one side until the OBCS was up and running again and
the dockets could be scanned. However, a branch might forget to scan the
dockets once the OBCS was back online, leaving the branch with a loss. The
branch would then send the dockets to a POL location in Lisahally together with
a Pension and Allowance report. POL conducted routine checks to see if any
dockets had not been accounted for in the Pension and Allowance report, but
did not carry out checks on every occasion, which may have helped to identify
losses suffered by branches.
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49.
50.
I also think there was room for improvement with Horizon Online Help, the Help
system available through Horizon. While preparing this statement, I was shown
(by Herbert Smith Freehills) a Business Solution Design document for
Enhanced Help and User Support (POL00105419), that I had put together in
2016 while working on the Front Office Project. It looks like I prepared this
document shortly after a decision was taken to retain Horizon, though
consideration was still being given to replacing Horizon Online Help. I was only
briefly involved with looking at Enhanced Help and User Support, as a
colleague had been responsible for looking at Horizon Online Help for most of
the Front Office Project (before they moved on), and I moved to the Customer
Support Centre shortly after. The document is incomplete but its contents would
have mostly been taken from other documents (such as the improvements log
mentioned at paragraph 25 above), and collated into a single document
specifically about replacing Horizon Online Help.
I think the Business Solution Design document is an accurate description of the
shortcomings of Horizon Online Help, as it was quite clunky and not particularly
user friendly, so branches would ring the NBSC instead. There were quite a few
areas for improvement. However, the introduction of Branch Hub has enabled
branches to obtain relevant information more quickly, as a lot of similar
information is available on Branch Hub, which can be accessed on the internet
rather than through Horizon. At the time that I left POL, I believe POL was also
looking to replace Horizon Online Help as part of the NBIT Project, though work
on the NBIT Help function was still in its early stages.
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TRAINING
11. If you were responsible for managing the contracts of subpostmasters, set
out what steps you took to ensure that individuals felt confident with using
Horizon
51.
I was not responsible for managing the contracts of postmasters.
12. If someone said that he or she did not feel wholly confident with using
Horizon, what steps did you take to assist them?
52.
53.
At the BSC there is a process in place for support advisors to request additional
training for a branch, either at the branch's request or where the support advisor
considers it necessary based on their conversation with the branch.
If a colleague (such as a support advisor or a colleague from a different team
at POL) said to me that they were not confident or did not understand how
something on Horizon worked, I would sit them down and try to explain it to
them, using either the training kit or the live Horizon kit at 1 Future Walk (the
POL office in which I was based) to demonstrate where appropriate.
13. Please explain whether you thought that any improvements could have been
made to the training received by subpostmasters
54.
Postmaster training is not my area, but I have generally felt that more training
could be given to postmasters on what to do when things go wrong, and how
to investigate and resolve issues themselves. I think training tends to focus on
how the system works and the processes to follow, rather than on rectification.
I also think that it is important to understand the "double entry" nature of
accounting on Horizon (i.e. that every accounting entry has a debit and a credit
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which balances to zero), which is why I delivered training on this topic to the
whole P&BA division back in 2008. I think more training could also be given to
postmasters' employees and assistants. However, I also recognise that training
is constrained by both time and funding, and that budget cuts may impact what
can be delivered.
ERRORS OR ISSUES WITH HORIZON SYSTEM
14, Please explain whether you were aware of any issues or problems with the
Horizon system
55.
56.
57.
During my time at POL I was aware of some issues or problems with Horizon
as with any IT system, but none that I thought were particularly significant or
recurring, nor do I remember many details of them. However there are two
issues which I recall being involved in resolving.
The first was when I was POLFS and control manager. Following a software
release, there was an issue with local suspense accounts affecting some
branches. The local suspense account records losses and gains each time you
balance a stock unit, and holds the net loss/gain once all stock units have been
balanced. I do not recall the details of the issue, but my understanding was that
the issue was preventing negative numbers (i.e. losses) from being properly
recorded in the local suspense account. I recall that this resulted in shortfalls
for some branches and surpluses for others.
The branches affected by this issue were identified by Fujitsu, and I believe a
list of the branches affected was shared with Andy Winn. I am not aware of how
Fujitsu was able to identify these branches, nor who it was at Fujitsu that shared
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58.
the list. My recollection is that Fujitsu then rectified the issue at the back end,
however I do not know how they did this. Because of the nature of the issue,
transaction corrections could not be issued to remedy the losses and gains, so
instead any branch that suffered a loss was sent a cheque, and any that had a
gain was sent a letter confirming that the issue had been resolved and that they
could keep the gain. I recall that it took around 2 weeks to resolve the issue.
My recollection is that Andy Winn was managing the impact of the issue on
branches, and I helped Andy by explaining to him how the error had manifested
itself.
The second was when I was a senior team leader in the Automated Payments
team. One of the members of the team issued a transaction correction using
the affected branch's Paystation ID, rather than their Horizon ID, by mistake.
This meant that the branch could neither accept the transaction correction nor
complete the balancing process. Fujitsu were able to rectify the issue, which to
my recollection took around a week to resolve. My understanding was that the
issue did not prevent the branch from trading.
15. If so, please set out who you received this information from or how you came
to be aware of these issues and how widely known you consider them to have
been
59.
In respect of the local suspense account issue, I believe this information came
to Andy Winn however I am not aware of whether he learnt of it from branches
or if it was identified by Fujitsu. I became aware of the issue from Andy Winn. I
believe the Problem Management team would have been managing this with
Fujitsu from a system resolution point of view and I think Gary Blackburn was
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in charge of that team at the time. I believe Andy Winn would have alerted more
senior people in P&BA of the issue, including Rod Ismay and Alison Bolsover.
I do not know whether the issue would have been more widely known within
POL beyond that.
In respect of the Paystation transaction correction issue, the affected branch
would have called the team member who issued the transaction correction, who
would have then escalated the issue to me. Other than involving Fujitsu, I do
not think I escalated the issue as it only affected one branch and was resolved
quickly.
16. How did this knowledge impact upon how you dealt with subpostmasters or
Post Office managers or assistants working in Post Office branches
61.
In all my dealings, I always tried to have the postmaster's best interests at heart
and tried to make sure they got the best resolution as quickly as possible. In
respect of the local suspense account issue, I tried to ensure that it was rectified
and that no branch suffered a loss. In respect of the Paystation transaction
correction issue, I made the team aware not to use Paystation IDs when issuing
transaction corrections, and to be careful when issuing transaction corrections
in general.
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
17. Please explain whether you were involved in or party to any disputes
between the Post Office and subpostmasters regarding any alleged shortfalls of
money
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62.
63.
64.
When I was senior team leader in the Automated Payments team, the team
was responsible for issuing transaction corrections in relation to automated
payments. If any transaction corrections were disputed, the team would then
have to investigate. I do not recall any incidents where we were unable to
explain to the branch why a transaction correction was issued.
In terms of shortfalls, a common issue with bill payments was where the branch
had made a mistake and recorded the customer as having paid, say £50, when
in fact the customer had only given them £5. The BSC would then fill in an
automated payment mis-key form, and then my team would contact the bill
provider to ask for the money back. The bill provider would then contact the
customer, but if the customer had been given a receipt by the branch stating
that they had paid £50, the customer could rely on that receipt, and the branch's
loss could not be recovered.
I have been asked by the Inquiry to consider POLO0090779. I do not recall the
letter from the postmaster, nor the emails between myself and Andy Winn in
relation to the same. My impression based on my reading of the document now
is that the issue described by the postmaster would have arisen from a mis-key
on Horizon when processing a gift card. It appears from my emails with Andy
Winn that the postmaster was incorrectly advised by an NBSC advisor to
contact the gift card company, when in fact they should have advised the
Postmaster to file an Automated Payments ("AP") mis-key form. The AP mis-
key form was typically used by the NBSC when a bill payment or top-up had
been under- or over-stated by a branch in error.
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65.
66.
67.
The reason the NBSC advisor gave the postmaster the incorrect advice may
have been due to an omission in the options available to the NBSC advisor on
Remedy, when they were seeking to categorise the issue raised by the
postmaster. If that was the case, the NBSC advisor would not have been able
to identify the relevant knowledge base article which would have contained the
correct solution to be passed on to the postmaster. As noted above, I do not
recall the letter from the postmaster or the emails between myself and Andy
Winn, but my impression now on reading the document is that in saying, "the
advisors are just making it up", I was assuming that the advisor's proposed
solution (i.e. to call the gift card company) was given spontaneously rather than
following guidance contained in any knowledge base article.
I recall that around this time I tasked Tracy Middleton (who worked in an advisor
role and was junior to me) with a review of the guidance to NBSC advisors on
the AP mis-key process and incorporated the solutions for all the different
products into one knowledge base article. We also updated the categorisation
options available to the NBSC advisors when searching for knowledge base
articles to help them to find to the correct article.
A particular issue arose with a supplier of a pre-loadable debit card. Customers
were able to deposit money onto these debit cards at POL branches, but could
not withdraw money, although sometimes a customer would still try to withdraw
money in-branch. A postmaster might try to process it as a withdrawal, but it
would in fact be a top-up transaction, resulting in a double loss for the branch.
My team would then seek to recover that loss from the card supplier, however
there were a few occasions where the supplier took the funds from the customer
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account without seeking their approval first. If the customer later raised a
complaint with the supplier, the supplier then asked POL for the money back.
In those instances, POL wrote off the loss, rather than ask the branch for the
money. We also sent communications to all branches to remind them that POL
did not offer withdrawals on that debit card to try to avoid the issue reoccurring.
18. If so, please describe the process by which any disputes were raised and
resolved. Please specify any individuals you know to have been involved
68. _I have set out the process by which those disputes were raised and resolved in
response to question 17.
19. Please describe whether you are aware of any contact or input from Fujitsu
in the resolution of any disputes. If so, please provide details including the
names of relevant individuals from Fujitsu
69. I do not recall any contact with Fujitsu in respect of the disputes described in
response to question 17 above.
20. Please give your view on whether there could have been any improvement
in this process. Please identify who would have been responsible for
implementing any improvement you suggest
70. Historically, when a branch reported that losses were due to system issue(s),
POL expected the branch to prove this and provide evidence. However, I think
POL could have been more proactive and helped the branch with the
investigation. I am not sure who at POL would have been responsible for
implementing such an approach. However, POL had access to different tools
and teams which would have given us an advantage over the branch in
gathering data about the issue(s). For example, HORice gave some individuals
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at POL access to branch data going back 90 days, whereas branches could
only look at their transaction data going back 42 days. HORice was a licensed
software and there were only a limited number of licences available for
individuals within POL. If I needed specific branch data, I typically requested it
from someone who had access to HORice. I cannot recall which teams or
individuals had access to HORice; I believe a couple of people in P&BA may
have had access. I believe I may have had access at some stage, but given the
limited number of licences I would have given it up to a more frequent user.
21. Are there any other matters that you consider the Chair of the Inquiry should
be aware of?
71,
Having seen some of the evidence which has come to light in the Inquiry, I wish
to make the Chair aware that during my time as a problem manager (July 2003
— April 2005), I became aware that Fujitsu had the capability to access and
make amendments to branch data in the Messagestore. My understanding was
that Fujitsu only used this capability as part of the routine problem management
process by which problems with Horizon were fixed and with written
authorisation from POL. One example of an issue which I understood would be
resolved as part of the routine problem management process is the Paystation
issue mentioned in paragraph 58 above. I was not aware of Fujitsu using this
capability for other purposes, or without the authorisation of POL or the relevant
postmaster. I am not aware of anyone within POL having been able to amend
branch data on the Messagestore.
Communications to NBSC helpline
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72.
73.
I recall that in or around 2011, after the rollout of Horizon Online, when I was
working as a team leader in the Automated Payments team, there was a
communication to NBSC helpline and P&BA staff which said that when a
postmaster called the NBSC helpline to raise an issue with Horizon, staff should
not use the phrase "system issue" when speaking about Horizon. Due to the
passage of time, I cannot recall who specifically sent this communication.
However, my recollection is that the message from senior individuals within
POL at the time was that Horizon was robust and there were no issues with it.
NBI
As noted in paragraph 9 above, my most recent role at POL prior to retiring in
March 2024 was Product and Support Consultant for NBIT. Whilst I was in this
role, I became aware of various issues which I wish to bring to the Chair's
attention.
74.As an overarching comment, in my experience, the project and technical
development teams on NBIT were typically more focussed on meeting target
deadlines for getting the system live in branches, rather than on the quality of
the system and the end-user (i.e. branch) experience. My impression was that
the technical development teams, who were responsible for building the
technical requirements of NBIT, had limited knowledge of how branches
operate in practice. I was concerned about this and wanted to ensure that the
system was fit for use in branches. Otherwise, it appeared to me that there was
a risk of history repeating itself —i.e. that the issues arising out of Horizon would
be repeated with NBIT.
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75.In Summer 2022, I began to raise concerns with my Service and Support Pillar
Lead, Nick Ravenscroft, who in turn escalated them to the NBIT Programme
Director, Gareth Clark. I recall raising concerns with Nick and others on a more
or less daily basis thereafter, in relation to the quality and design of the system
and its readiness for use in branches. I refer to specific examples of these
discussions below.
Release plan
76.In Summer 2022, Nick Ravenscroft asked me to review the release plan for
NBIT. The plan was for NBIT to be rolled out to pilot branches incrementally,
with new functionalities being introduced over the course of five releases
(together, the "Release[s]"). Once all Releases had been deployed, and all
functionalities were live, rollout of the system to the remainder of the branch
estate would commence. On reviewing the release plan, I noticed that
functionalities which needed to be introduced together from an end-user (i.e.
branch) perspective had been separated into different Releases. For example,
cheque acceptances (i.e. the functionality for a branch to accept a cheque for
payment of goods/services) were planned for Release 3, but cheque dispatch
(when cheques received by a branch are sent to the bank's clearing house to
be paid) was planned for Release 5. My recollection is that there could have
been up to 12 months between the scheduled rollout of Release 3 and Release
5, whereas ordinarily cheques should be sent for clearing on the same or next
working day after acceptance. On the basis that cheques are typically valid for
6 months from when they are dated, they may have become invalid by the time
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the branch received the functionality to send them for clearing. In any event,
delaying the clearing of cheques would have caused delays in POL's cash flow.
77.1 reviewed multiple iterations of the release plan during my time in the NBIT
team.
Release 1 testing
78.Around the same time, in Summer 2022, I asked Nick Ravenscroft if I could be
involved in UAT for Release 1 of NBIT. UAT involves testing for ease of use,
accuracy and suitability from an end-user perspective. I recall Nick telling me
that at the time, UAT was not part of the NBIT release plan.
79.There was an E2E test team (see paragraph 9(a) above) for NBIT. However,
the E2E team was responsible for ensuring that data flowed through the NBIT
system properly, for example, ensuring that a completed counter transaction
flowed into POL's Management Information and Accounting systems, and that
the correct data was included in the relevant client files. The E2E team would
not be focussed on testing for issues that could arise in-branch. Additionally,
the individuals in the E2E team did not appear to have experience of how
processes worked in a branch in practice - they had been hired externally and
specifically for NBIT, and they were based offshore.
80. In light of these concerns, Emma Hibberd (who was in my team at the time) and
I obtained access to the NBIT test environment and created test scripts to carry
out testing from an end-user perspective, seeking to identify any aspects of the
system which may have caused confusion or errors when operated in-branch.
81.Emma Hibberd and I identified multiple defects, inconsistencies and potential
issues from an end-user perspective. By way of example, I asked a product
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owner (I cannot recall who this was specifically) at what point during a
transaction a certificate of posting would be produced on the NBIT system. On
discussing this with David Gemmel, Technical Manager, I was told that the
NBIT system mirrored Horizon in this regard, and that as such the certificate of
posting was printed at the same time as the mails label. It would, however, have
made more sense for the certificate of posting to be produced later in the
transaction, after payment was taken from a customer and the basket was
settled. Otherwise, there is a risk of the certificate being printed and then the
basket being cleared without payment having been taken from the customer,
which in turn presents a risk of the customer making a fraudulent lost mail claim
to Royal Mail. Whilst it is true that this is how the transaction operates on
Horizon, it appeared to me that the introduction of the NBIT system was an
opportunity for improvement on Horizon, rather than Horizon simply being
replaced like-for-like.
82.In September 2022, I asked Nick Ravenscroft to invite the NBIT Programme
Director, Gareth Clark and David Gemmel to Chesterfield for a demonstration
of how the system scheduled for rollout in Release 1 was operating in practice.
I recall that Nick Beal also attended this meeting. It was agreed within 20 to 30
minutes of me commencing the demonstration that Release 1 should be
postponed until the high priority defects had been resolved and re-tested. The
BVT team was established following this meeting, in February 2023.
The BVT team
83.The BVT team was established partly due to the concerns that I had been
raising in relation to NBIT. The team was set up to be responsible for testing
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from an end-user perspective. We were given the same level of access as the
E2E test team and processes were put in place for us to provide feedback on
the system to the E2E test manager, Steve McFarlane. We created test scripts
or amended and enhanced test scripts created by business analysts, covering
numerous ways in which the system could create issues for branches — we
looked at how the system should behave normally, as well as how it should
behave if an error arises.
84.In my time in the BVT team, I attended daily defect calls. These calls were
attended by representatives from the other pillars in the project, including David
Gemmel. The purpose of the calls was to discuss any defects with the system
that had been identified during testing, and to discuss any fixes which had been
identified. All defects were recorded on Confluence, the agile project
management tool used by all areas of the project, with a video recording to
demonstrate the error. Once fixed, a recording was also added to the defect
record by way of proof it had been tested, prior to the closure of the defect.
85.My experience when working in the BVT team was that I frequently saw the
same or similar kinds of issues recurring across the code that was shared with
us for testing. Some of the issues that I encountered included:
a. The sale of stamps was scheduled to be released on NBIT without any
stock management functionality. This meant that branches would not
have the capability to rem in, rem out or reverse a sale on the NBIT
system if an error was made. This meant that all stamps reconciliation
would need to be done manually by the branch by completing a
spreadsheet, leaving room for human error and meaning that stock
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would have to be managed manually rather than on the system. I raised
concerns about this and had many discussions with the product owner,
Nik Gill, and a Business Analyst in the Mails pillar, Busayo Sonuga. It
was then decided that the workaround solution would be that branches
should not make a mistake in the first place. I do not recall who made
this decision, but I recall that it was captured and disseminated by
Busayo.
b. I challenged the length of time it took to navigate between screens on
NBIT, which on some occasions took up to five minutes. I was told by
David Gemmel that the system had been built in this way and to update
it would cost millions of pounds. Horizon moves between screens in
seconds and I would have expected NBIT to do the same — not be a
degradation.
c. When cash was introduced as a payment method on NBIT, there was
no way for the test branches to record cash movement in order to cross-
check it against the figures being produced by NBIT and verify if the
figures were adding up correctly. The BVT team therefore produced a
spreadsheet for the test branches to record cash movement within each
of their cash drawers. No other team in the project had realised this
needed to be done - they were trusting the figures produced by NBIT. I
wanted to be absolutely certain NBIT could at least make accurate
calculations.
Release 2 testing
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86.During Release 2 testing in early 2023, I recall that the programme team
brought in a third-party supplier, Qualitest, to manage UAT. Given that this was
an external company with no experience of working in-branch, and no prior
knowledge of NBIT, I spent weeks assisting the Qualitest representative, Peter
Donohoe, to prepare a plan for how UAT should be conducted. I was then given
early access to review Qualitest's test scripts and found them to be inaccurate
and of poor quality. Following this, Gary Saddler (who was the Service and
Support Pillar Lead for BVT at that time) had a meeting with the Release 2
manager, Andy McAlister, to share our observations and to recommend that
the BVT team's test scripts be used for UAT testing in Release 2 instead of
Qualitest's, as they were more accurate and user-friendly.
87. Overall, during my time working on the NBIT project, in particular as part of the
BVT team, I experienced regular pushback from the people responsible for
managing the technical development of the system when I raised concerns or
issues. However, I would say that by the time I retired in March 2024, things
were starting to improve. There was more engagement with the BVT team at I
an early stage, the BVT team's recommendations were being taken on board,
and there was less pushback when defects were raised — it felt like there was
no longer a fight in order for the BVT team to be heard. I believe that this was,
at least in part, due to the dedication of the BVT team, which was determined
to vocalise the importance of the NBIT system working for postmasters.
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Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
pated: —~7 0%. H-FOIVLL ,
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Index to the exhibits to the First Witness Statement of Jane Smith
No.
Document Description
URN
Control Number
Front Office Project
Improvements Log
POL00105420
POL-0091326
BTTP / Enhanced Help and
User Support — Business
Solution Design dated 15 April
2016
POL00105419
POL-0091325
Communications regarding
Allesley Gift Card
POL00090779
POL-0090300
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Witness Name: Jane Smith
Statement No.: WITN05690100
16
Dated: 0% November 2024
THE POST OFFICE
HORIZON IT INQUIRY
WITNESS STATEMENT OF JANE SMITH
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP
Exchange House
Primrose Street
London
EC2A 2EG
Ref: 2066/31048180
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