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Witness Name: Sir Anthony Blair
Statement no.: WITN0608_01
Exhibits: WITN0608_01/1 to WITN0608_1/7
Dated: 14 November 2022
IN THE POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF SIR ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR
I, SIR ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This witness statement is made in response to a request pursuant to Rule 9 of
the Inquiry Rules 2006, dated 15 September 2022. Along with that request I have
also been provided access to some documents from the period February 1998 to
May 1999, and I have been asked a set of detailed questions in respect of these
documents.
BACKGROUND
2. I was Prime Minister from 1997 until 2007. The Horizon IT Project (“the Project”)
was a significant endeavour which my government inherited from our
predecessors. As one would expect, the Project was led by civil servants and
overseen by relevant ministers. As Prime Minister, I would likely have received
periodic updates on progress. I would also have been approached and asked to
get more involved if there were significant developments such as serious risk to
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project delivery, and indeed the material I have been provided with covers a
period between 1998 and 1999 when this is exactly what happened.
. I have reviewed the documents provided to me by the Inquiry.
. Whilst reviewing the documents has assisted to a very limited extent, I am unable
to recall much of the specific detail sought by way of the Inquiry’s detailed
questions. With a view to assisting the Inquiry as best I can, I have nonetheless
sought to provide what further detail I can as below.
. Whilst I have very limited recollection of the precise events during this period, I do
recall that some concerns were raised in respect of reliability of the end product
being developed. I recall that my overarching concern was that the Project should
deliver a reliable end product, and that I asked questions about this. I recall
making clear that if the problems with the Project related solely to commercial
aspects then I was content to continue to work to try to find a way forward, but if
there were concerns about product reliability then we should not. I recall that I
subsequently received the necessary reassurances as to reliability.
. This recollection appears to be supported by the documents I have been shown.
For example:
a. The written submission to me from Geoffrey Mulgan dated 9 December
1998 [WITN0608_01/1] has a handwritten note from me on the bottom
which says as follows:
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“I would favour Option 1 but for Geoff's statement that the system itself is
flawed. Surely there must be a clear view on this. Speak to me on that: ie
reading the enclosed paper, it all focuses on the financial deal. But there
the risks are pretty even, probably coming down on the side of continuing.
The real of heart of it is the system itself.”
. Peter Mandelson’s letter to Stephen Byers of 10 December 1998, which
was copied to me [WITN0608_01/2] says “There is still some way to go to
complete the Horizon project, but the basic development work has been
thoroughly evaluated by independent experts who have pronounced it
viable, robust and of a design which should accommodate future
technological developments... I believe the only sensible choice is to
proceed with the Horizon project. It is the way forward which offers the
least commercial and technological risk.”
. The letter of 14 December 1998 from lan McCartney to Stephen Byers
[WITN0608_ 01/3] provides reassurance in respect of acceptance testing,
including that this was to encompass live trials in 300 offices.
. The letter of 16 December 1998 from Alistair Darling to Stephen Byers
[WITN0608_01/4] confirms the government's rejection of proposals to
dilute acceptance criteria for the project.
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e. Jeremy Heywood’s letter to Her Majesty's Treasury of 12 April 1999
[contained at p 5 — 6 of WITNO608_01/5] reports that “/my] only concern
was to get a viable system agreed that would actually deliver what the
Government wanted both now and in the future.”
f. Final Report to Ministers dated April 1999 [WITNO608_01/6]. I note that
this refers again to technical reviews having been conducted (paragraph 5)
and user acceptance testing (for example paragraph 7).
7. More broadly, I recall a protracted period during which various alternative options
were developed, discussed within government, and negotiated with International
Computers Limited (“ICL”) and Fujitsu. I also recall that a variety of factors were
at play in our deliberations, including the need for an effective solution to be
delivered timeously, value for money for the taxpayer, the government's
modernisation agenda, the future of the Post Office network, the UK’s
relationship with Fujitsu and other Japanese investors, and the future viability of
International Computers Limited (“ICL”) as a UK company. I note that this is
borne out by the material I have seen.
8. Turning to the specific questions covered by the Rule 9 request itself, I will
attempt to address these as best I can in broad topic areas. They appear to cover
the following:
(a) What I knew about the delay to the project.
(b) The relevance of my constituency.
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(c) My role in the negotiations, including my understanding of the various
options that were developed and reasons for the decisions taken.
(d) My dealings with the Chairman of ICL and the Vice Chairman of Fujitsu,
including matters surrounding the closure of Fujitsu’s manufacturing plant
in Newton Aycliffe.
(e) What I understood about the conclusions of external IT experts and the
volume of known problems.
(f) What I understood at the time to be the key lessons learned.
What I knew about the delay to the project
9. Whilst I recall being alerted to and brought into the discussions about these
issues in 1998 and 1999, I have no detailed recollection of the precise events and
so am unable to usefully comment on or add to what is in the written record.
The relevance of my constituency
10.ICL was closely associated with, and eventually acquired by, Fujitsu. Fujitsu
operated a semi-conductor manufacturing plant in Newton Aycliffe which was
within my constituency. I see that this was flagged to me in some of the briefings.
I do not consider this to be unusual as it is common practice for a Member of
Parliament to be alerted to matters affecting their constituency, especially in any
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briefings. This would not however have materially impacted on my approach to
matters as Prime Minster, and I note that nothing in the material I have seen
suggests that it did.
1
-Furthermore, in September 1998 it was announced that the plant would close in
December with the loss of 600 jobs. The government, and I personally, were
naturally concerned about this and its impact on the local community, especially
the loss of local jobs. I see that this was mentioned in passing in my letter to the
Chairman of Fujitsu [WITNO608_01/7], but the material I have seen does not
suggest that this was relevant to the matters being considered, nor is that my
recollection.
My role in the negotiations, including my understanding of the various options
that were developed and reasons for the decisions taken
12.1 have no detailed recollection of the precise events and so am unable to usefully
comment on or add to what is in the written record, beyond that already covered
above.
My dealings with the Chairman of ICL and the Vice Chairman of Fujitsu,
including matters surrounding the closure of Fujitsu’s manufacturing plant in
Newton Aycliffe
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13.1 have nothing to usefully add here beyond what the material I have seen shows,
which broadly confirms that in an attempt to unblock matters and agree a way
forward, engagement between the Government and Fujitsu (including ICL)
extended to the highest levels. As I have already mentioned, I see that the
closure of Fujitsu's manufacturing plant in Newton Aycliffe was mentioned during
these exchanges but the documents do not suggest that this was relevant to the
matters being considered, nor is that my recollection.
What I understood about the conclusions of external IT experts and the
volume of known problems
14.1 have no further specific recollection of these matters beyond what I have
already explained above in respect of my desire to ensure that the end product
was reliable, and that I was provided with reassurances in this regard.
What I understood at the time to be the key lessons learned
15.1 am unable to recall what I personally understood, at the time, to be the key
lessons learned. However my experience, both from my time in office and
thereafter, is that large technology projects can be highly complex and often
subject to significant disagreement about the best approach. I have learned that it
is crucial to obtain advice from experts with deep experience in the field who can
provide the necessary assurance. As I have explained, I sought and obtained
assurances as to the reliability of the product being developed. It is now clear that
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the Horizon product was seriously flawed, leading to tragic and completely
unacceptable consequences, and I have deep sympathy with those affected.
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
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Index to the First Witness Statement of Sir Anthony Charles Lynton Blair dated
14 November 2022
WITNO608
No. I Exhibit Number
Document
Description
WITNO608_01/4
Control Number
URN
Ltr from G Mulgan to
IPM dated
(09/12/1998
(CBO00100001_072
(CBO00100001_072
WITNO608_01/2
Ltr from P
[Mandelson to S
Byers dated
10/12/1998
1S$00009512
\CBOO0000008
WITNO608_01/3
Ltr from I McCartney
to S Byers dated
14/12/1998
1S$00009514
(CBO00000010
WITNO608_01/4
Ltr from A Darling to
IS Byers dated
16/12/1998
1S00009553
\CBO00000049
TTNO608_01/5
Ltr from J Heywood
to Ros Roughton at
IHMT dated
12/04/1999
(CBO00100002_045
\CBO00100002_045)
WITNO608_01/6
IBA/POCL
Automation Final
Report to Ministers
\dated April 1999
(CBO00100002_041
(CBO00100002_041
WITNO608_01/7
Ltr from PM to Mr
ISekizawa date
lunknown but not
before 19/03/1999
1S00009550
\CBO00000046