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Witness Name: Teresa Williamson
Statement No.: WITN08680100
Dated: 15 August 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF TERESA WILLIAMSON
I, Teresa Williamson, will say as follows:-
INTRODUCTION
1. lama former employee of the Post Office. I was employed by the Post Office
initially as a lawyer in February 1992 then as a senior lawyer from 1995/1996
through to the end of 2005. The Post Office changed its name to Consignia
in 2001 and then to Royal Mail Group plc shortly afterwards.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
(the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 9 June
2023 (the “Request’). The focus of this statement is my position as a
prosecutor within the Criminal Law team at the Post Office and the
prosecution of Lisa Brennan.
3. I have instructed PCB-Byrne LLP to act on my behalf in relation to the
Request. I have been assisted by Michael Potts and Sam Russell, who are
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lawyers at PCB-Byrne, in responding to the Request.
BACKGROUND
4. Prior to joining the Post Office, I had worked as a criminal defence solicitor at
Desmond Wright and Co Solicitors, which was based in Hayes. I joined this
firm in 1987, after leaving law school, and qualified as a solicitor in 1990.
Once I qualified as a solicitor, my case load almost exclusively involved
defending individuals who had been accused of criminal offences across a
spectrum of general crime cases, funded through legal aid. I also worked on
a very small number of private prosecutions, relating to dangerous dogs, but
do not have much recollection about the details of those cases.
5. Part of my role as a criminal defence lawyer involved being a duty solicitor,
which meant that I was often called to the police station at unsociable hours.
After two years in this role, I started to look for other jobs that had more
conventional working hours, which would be better suited to my family life. I
interviewed at the Crown Prosecution Service and the Post Office and I was
offered a position by the Post Office in the Criminal Law team.
6. I joined this team in February 1992 as a lawyer. My role involved prosecuting
cases across the different parts of the business including for the Post Office,
Royal Mail, Parcelforce and other smaller entities from time to time.
7. Around 1995/1996, I was promoted to the position of senior lawyer within the
same Criminal Law team. My role did not change significantly on promotion,
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and I remained responsible for prosecuting cases. The only real difference
was that I would have taken on more supervisory duties and my work would
have been subject to much less supervision. I provide more detail of the
nature of my work as a prosecutor at paragraphs 13 to 24 below.
8. My son was born in 1996 and, after returning from maternity leave, I started
for the remainder of my employment
with the Post Office. This did mean that there would have been occasions
where I may have missed a training session (see paragraph 29 below) or that
other colleagues had to cover my cases whilst I was away.
9. By 2003, I started to consider moving on from my position in the Criminal
Law team. By this point, I did little advocacy as most court work was
outsourced to local agents or junior counsel. There was also less variety of
work, as lawyers were increasingly given the same type of cases, as an
attempt to increase efficiency. The role had become more of a desk job and
I needed a new challenge.
10. Towards the end of 2003, an opportunity arose to join the Employment Team
at the Post Office. I thought this was a fantastic opportunity to learn and
develop skills in a new area of law, which I thought I would find interesting,
so I accepted the offer to move teams. The employment team was divided
into two sub-teams: operational and corporate. I sat in the operational team
with about five other lawyers and mainly dealt with employment tribunal work.
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11.While I was in the Employment team, I had very little interaction with the
Criminal Law team. I did not carry on working on any cases after I made the
move; although I may have responded to internal enquiries from criminal
team members that concerned cases that I had previously worked on.
12.1 left Royal Mail Group plc around Christmas 2005. There was a wave of
redundancies and I was offered a termination package. I decided it was a
good time to leave and pursue other opportunities. Since working for Royal
Mail Group plc, I spent about five academic years working as a tutor at BPP
University. I've also trained as an acupuncturist and currently work as a
coordinator for a charity and I am chair of an advisory board for an
acupuncture college.
PROSECUTORIAL WORK
13. Throughout my time working as a prosecutor at the Post office, I dealt with a
large variety of cases, some of which included theft (including theft of mail),
wilful delay of mail, robbery, fraud and false accounting. Given the passage
of time, I cannot now recall how many cases I would have prosecuted across
my time in the Criminal Law team.
14. Similarly, I cannot recall how many would have specifically related to theft
and/or false accounting that involved data generated by Horizon. Based on
the documents disclosed along with the Request, I can see that I prosecuted
at least one such case, being R v Brennan. I believe there may have been
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other cases, but I am unable to recall any specifics given the passage of time.
I have asked for disclosure of any other cases that I may have prosecuted to
assist my recollection of specific events. At the time of making this statement
I await a response from the Inquiry.
15.When I first joined the Criminal Law team at the Post Office in 1992, the team
was led by Mike Heath and my direct line manager and supervisor was Roger
Williams. I was also supervised by Rob Wilson after Roger’s departure. I
cannot recall the date of Roger’s departure. To start with, the level of my
supervision was relatively high. Most of my work would be checked prior to
being finalised. As I gained more experience prosecuting cases and
demonstrated that I could carry out the work to a high standard to my
supervisors, the level of supervision steadily decreased until it became
minimal as I progressed to a senior lawyer role.
16.When I became a senior lawyer in 1995/1996, I took on some supervisory
duties. My style of supervision was similar to those who supervised me: I
would check work before it was finalised, until I started to become confident
that the lawyer or articled clerk was able to carry out the work to a high
standard themselves. It would probably be fair to say that I was more hands
on than the average supervisor.
17.When I started, there were probably around ten lawyers in the team in total,
along with a few support staff including junior legal executives, who
essentially performed the role of paralegals, and secretaries. There was a
slight reduction in staff numbers over the course of my employment in the
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team, as there was a wave of redundancies in the late 1990s/early 2000s. By
the time I left the team in 2003, it would have included roughly eight lawyers.
18.Each lawyer within the team was given their own caseload and it would have
been normal for each lawyer to be working on several different cases at any
one time. Aside from supervision of the articled clerk and more junior lawyer,
each member of the team tended to work autonomously on their cases and
there was generally very little collaboration. You could, however, seek
assistance from junior legal executives, who normally helped with the
administrative aspects of cases.
19.My role as a prosecutor of a case would have typically involved the ten steps
set out below.
+ Step 1: reviewing the case file, which would have been compiled by
an investigator and included a note of the interview with the suspect,
the antecedents, any evidence relevant to the case and a
memorandum drafted by the investigating officer (such as document
POL00047325). On reviewing the file, my focus would have been on
considering the strength of the evidence in the case in accordance
with the evidential test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors which was
used by the Criminal Team to assess whether a case met the
threshold for prosecution or not.
* Step 2: corresponding with the investigator to clarify certain points
within the evidence or seek further evidence if appropriate. I would
often point out further lines of enquiry that should be considered. The
nature and scale of this correspondence would have been entirely
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dependent on each specific case.
Step 3: drafting a written advice to a regional (or area) manager
providing my opinion on why a prosecution is, or is not, appropriate in
accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors with a particular
focus on whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. If I advised
that there was a realistic prospect of conviction, I would have also
included my opinion on the likelihood of success in this advice, along
with the relevant charges and a summary of facts to be served on the
defence. If I advised that there was not a reasonable prospect of
conviction, the case would have been brought to a close at this stage.
I should make it clear that I was only providing an opinion, I was not
the decision maker. My written advice would be sent tothe regional
manager for an actual decision on charge.
Step 4: attending the first appearance. Once the regional manager
had authorised the decision to charge (if advised), the investigator
would apply for the summons. If the first appearance was in the
greater London or South East area, I may have attended the
magistrates’ court (at least at the start of my career before a decision
was made to outsource most court work). If it had been further afield,
I would have instructed a local agent or junior counsel to attend on
the Post Office’s behalf. I would have also sent the summary of facts
that I had prepared to the defendant or their solicitor.
Step 5: reviewing the committal papers. The investigator in the case
would have provided a file with all the witness statements (which
would have been drafted by the investigator) and exhibits. I would
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have reviewed these documents with the primary focus of ensuring
that there was a case to answer. I would have also wanted to
familiarise myself with the key issues in the case so that I was able to
go on to consider disclosure issues. My reading of the case papers
would assist my assessment of whether any unused material may
undermine the Prosecution case or assist the Defence case.
Step 6: if appropriate, corresponding with the investigator in order to
ensure that any mistakes or omissions in the committal papers were
corrected. This could have been as simple as a quick phone call to
highlight a small problem or might have formed part of a written
advice.
Step 7: reviewing the unused material schedules. The disclosure
officer in the case was always the investigator. They would provide
three schedules relating to disclosure, typically at the same time as
providing the committal papers. These schedules included: a
schedule of non-sensitive unused material, which should have
included a list of all the relevant material (aside from any privileged
material) that did not form part of evidence in the case; a schedule of
sensitive material, which should have included any relevant privileged
material that did not form part of the evidence in the case; and the
disclosure officer’s report, which was an internal document detailing
the disclosure officer's analysis of the material that should be
disclosed to the defence. My role was to check these schedules to
ensure that —_ all relevant material had been included and to assess
whether I agreed with the disclosure officer's view of what should be
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disclosed or made available for inspection. There was a section on
the form where the reviewing lawyer could leave any comments
relating to the disclosure officer’s decisions. I may also have
subsequently corresponded or spoken with the disclosure officer if I
had comments in terms of follow up matters or wished to challenge
any disclosure issues.
+ Step 8: sending the committal papers to the defence solicitor, local
agents and the magistrates’ court for the committal hearing. I would
have sent the primary disclosure to the defence solicitor and agents
with the committal papers.
* Step 9: drafting the indictment, along with preparing the brief to
counsel and instructions to advise on evidence shortly after
committal. Generally, I would ask counsel to draft the indictment on
my behalf, if the case was complex.
+ Step 10: reviewing the defence case statement, if served. As with
primary disclosure, the investigator (and disclosure officer) in the
case would have prepared a further disclosure report, detailing any
further documents that fell to be disclosed. I would have reviewed the
work of the disclosure officer and provided any comments on
secondary disclosure if appropriate.
20.At this point my involvement in the case would have typically ended with any
further administrative preparation for trial carried out by a junior legal
executive, who would liaise directly with the Crown Court, counsel, the local
agents and the investigator. I would have only become involved if any
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substantive legal issues arose, such as a defence statement being served,
or if the junior legal executive had encountered a problem.
2
. That said, when I first joined the Post Office, I would regularly attend court for
magistrates’ hearings and would carry out the advocacy if the case was being
tried locally in London or the South East instead of outsourcing the job to a
local agent or junior counsel. However, this became much less typical after a
few years of working at the Post Office, as management decided that it was
more financially viable to outsource most advocacy. I cannot recall exactly
when this change took place. We would always have instructed barristers on
cases tried at a Crown Court, even when it was more normal for Post Office
lawyers to carry out advocacy. I did not have higher rights of audience in the
Crown Court.
22.In addition to supervision, I would have had some training to assist me in
carrying out my role as a prosecutor. There was some internal training but it
was largely down to the individual lawyer to sign on to external training
sessions in order to ensure they were meeting their continuing professional
development (the “CPD”) requirements. I enjoyed attending training courses
and would regularly attend training sessions that I thought were relevant to
my work. I always met my Solicitors Regulation Authority (the “SRA”) CPD
requirements.
23.There were also templates to assist lawyers in drafting letters or advice.
Lawyers could use these templates and were at complete liberty to change
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them as they thought appropriate. I would alter them quite significantly to fit
with my own style.
24.1 do not recall there being any specific company policies relevant to the
Criminal Law team. However, we adopted the legal guidance and framework
that governed the conduct of a prosecution at any given time. This would
have _ included the Code of Crown Prosecutors, the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act and its protocols and any other contemporaneous
legislation that was applicable to prosecuting cases. The head of the Criminal
Law team was responsible for overseeing the overall conduct of the
prosecution. As stated previously, this would have been Mike Heath when I
first started working at the Post Office, then Rob Wilson, after he took over
the role from Mike.
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM
25.At some point in the late 1990s/early 2000s, I would have become aware that
the Post Office intended to introduce the Horizon IT accounting system. I
probably would have become aware of this development by reading the
weekly news update, which I think was called the Post Office Gazette, that
was circulated to all Post Office staff. I did not give it a lot of thought at the
time. I did not know exactly when the system started to become operational
and was not aware of the reasons for any delays in the rolling out of the
system.
26.Prior to 12 July 2002, my understanding of the Horizon IT system was very
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basic. I knew it was a computerised bookkeeping system designed to assist
subpostmasters with the processing of various payments and also balancing
on a weekly basis. I recall that, at the time the system was being rolled out,
there was a general message within the organisation that it was a
sophisticated and high-quality technology.
27.Consequently, I always assumed it was reliable and was never given any
reason to doubt the accuracy of the technology. This was during a period
when technology was steadily becoming a more important feature of working
life and I think there was a general understanding that, like most technological
advances, it was being introduced to make the work easier and more efficient
but not at the cost of accuracy. If anything, we believed that any
computerisation of systems would have made them more accurate than
manual entry which is always prone to error.
28.1 did not ever think to question the accuracy of the technology while I was
working at the Post Office. I did not have the required expertise in technology
to properly understand the mechanics of the system and, even if I had done,
I was never involved in any conversations or discussions about how the
system operated between the branch post offices and Fujitsu. To the best of
my recollection, I never attended a local post office branch to see the system
in practice.
29.There was some training on the Horizon system around the time it was
implemented into individual branch offices. I don’t think I attended the training;
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I cannot remember why exactly but it is possible that it fell on one of my non-
working days or I was out of the office looking after my son. I believe the
training was specifically for the Criminal Law team, but because I did not
attend, I cannot be certain; it is possible that members of other teams also
attended. I did not have an opportunity to attend another session. I cannot
remember if I asked about attending another session but if there had been
one, I am fairly certain that I would have attended. I think the point of the
training was to show lawyers how to use the system, as if we were working
in the subpostoffice, so we would be able to understand how it could be used
as evidence in any future cases.
30. It is unlikely that I discussed the training with any of my colleagues, or even
spoke about the Horizon system more generally with them. As mentioned, we
tended to work individually on cases and operated in siloes. It was very rare
that we discussed cases as a team. We did regularly go to lunch together,
but this typically involved more social conversation. Between Horizon’s
implementation to when I left the team in 2003, I was never party to, or aware
of, any conversation within the legal team questioning the accuracy of the
Horizon system.
3
. During my time working at the Post Office, I was never aware of any actual
or potential bugs, errors, defects or other problems with Horizon. My first
knowledge of any issues with the system was when I read the Computer
Weekly article in 2009 long after I had left my employment at Royal Mail legal
services. I bought a copy of the magazine from WH Smith when it was
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published. On reading the article, I felt shocked, horrified and physically
nauseous.
Rv BRENNAN
32.1 have been provided with several documents that relate to the prosecution
of Lisa Brennan. I have reviewed these documents thoroughly, which has, to
some extent, assisted my recollection of the details of this prosecution. These
documents include:
+ 25-page Record of Tape Recorded Interview commencing 10:10 on
13 June 2002, POL00047320;
* 12-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded Interview commencing
10:10 on 13 June 2002, POL00047322;
* 6-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded Interview commencing
10:55 on 13 June 2002, POL00047323;
* Correspondence from S Bradshaw to Jan Mullin dated June 2002,
POL00047324;
* Pension and = Allowance Fraud _ Investigation Document,
POL00047325;
+ Antecedents sheet, POL00047326;
* Internal memo from me to Prosecution Support Office, Leeds, dated
12 July 2002, POL00047331;
* interoffice memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to me dated 31 July
2002, POL00047335;
+ Email from Angie Maloney to me dated 9 August 2002,
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POL00047336;
interoffice memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to me dated 7 October
2002, POL00047340;
interoffice memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to me dated 5
November 2002, POL00047475;
The memorandum from Rob Wilson to the Prosecution Support Office
dated 20 November 2002, POL00047480;
Attendance note of S Bradshaw dated 30 December 2002,
POL00047486;
Attendance note of S Bradshaw dated 6 February 2003,
POL00047489;
Disclosure Officer’s Report dated March 2003, POL00047491;
Schedule of Sensitive Material dated March 2003, POL00047492;
The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth Rosenthal dated 11 March 2003,
POL00047501 and POL00047500;
List of exhibits, POL00047502;
List of witnesses, POL00047503;
Witness list, POL00047504;
internal memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to me dated 14 March
2003, POL00047505;
Two pages of the statement of Stephen Bradshaw dated 3 March
2003, POL00047506 and POL00047507;
The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth Rosenthal dated 2 June 2003,
POL00047514;
memorandum from John Steve Bradshaw to John Gibson dated 3
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June 2003, POL00047515;
* memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to Miss Andrew dated 10 June
2003, POL00047516;
* Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material, POL00047517;
* The internal memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to Miss Andrews
dated 16 July 2003, POL00047519;
+ The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth Rosenthal dated 22 July 2003,
POL00047520;
* 10-page Summary of Record of Tape Recorded Interview
commencing 10:10 on 13 June 2002, POL00047521;
+ 4-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded Interview commencing
10:55 on 13 June 2002, POL00047522;
+ The judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v. Brennan [2004] EWCA
Crim 1329, POLO0066602.
+ Transcript of proceedings on 3 and 4 September 2003,
POL00066713;
+ The indictment, listing details and verdicts, POL00066714;
* The Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office
Limited [2021 EWCA Crim 577, POL00113278.
33.However, there are a number of important documents, which I believe would
have been created, that have not been provided. Some of these documents
include:
+ My correspondence with Steve Bradshaw relating to the evidence in
the case;
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+ My memorandum dated 13 November 2002;
+ My advice in response to the disclosure schedules;
+ My communication with the investigator in the case, Steve Bradshaw,
including attendance notes of our calls that are referred to in the
documentation;
* My brief to counsel and any request for advice on the evidence in the
case.
34.1 believe these documents, and possibly others, would set out my opinion on
the strength of the case and any issues with the evidence or disclosure.
Consequently, the provision of these documents would greatly assist my
ability to answer some of the questions asked by the Inquiry in the Request.
I appreciate these documents may not be in the Inquiry’s possession and I
will do my best to assist the Inquiry in providing details of this prosecution
based on the documents provided and my own, albeit vague, recollection of
the documents not provided.
35. It is worth noting at the outset that throughout the prosecution of this case, I
believed that the Horizon system was working properly. I did not have an idea
of even the possibility that the Horizon system was creating inaccurate data.
If I had any sense that there was a problem with the system, I would have:
+ Sought further evidence from the investigators to ensure that I fully
understood the nature of the issues and how they impacted the
evidence in the case;
+ Considered whether any such evidence meant that there was not a
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realistic prospect of conviction in the case; and
+ if I felt the evidence still supported a realistic prospect of conviction,
disclosed any relevant details of the problems with the system to the
defence.
36.Around late June or early July 2002, I would have been allocated the Lisa
Brennan case file by my team leader, Rob Wilson. File allocation was typically
based on the capacity of the lawyers within the team. I would have had
significant experience in prosecuting allegations of this type of pension fraud,
including under the old pre-Horizon paper-based system.
37.On a general level, I did not notice any obvious differences between the
number and nature of these types of cases from those that had been carried
out before Horizon was introduced. The key difference was that the evidence
of discrepancies was provided by the Horizon data, rather than evidenced in
a human audit or paper-based documents.
38. The case file that would have been given to me would have included:
+ Steve Bradshaw’s memorandum to Jan Mullin (POL00047324);
+ Steve Bradshaw's summary of the investigation (POL00047525),
including the schedules to this summary (Appendix B, detailing the
discrepancies identified and Appendix C, the copy tapes) which were
not provided in the disclosure;
* The Antecedents form (POL00047326);
+ Summaries of the interview (POL00047322; POL00047323). It was
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not uncommon for further summaries of the interviews to be created
on the request of either the prosecution or the defence. An
administrator in the Security and Investigations team would typically
listen to the tape and produce a new summary clarifying the point in
question. I cannot recall exactly which version of these documents I
would have reviewed in this file; it could have also been
POL00047521 and POL00047522, which appear to be slightly
different versions of the same summaries. On occasions, either the
defence or prosecution, might have also requested a full transcript of
the interview, which appears to have happened in this case
(POL00047320), but is unlikely to have been provided with the
original case file.
39.Lawyers were typically expected to review the file and provide their initial
opinion on whether charges could be brought against a suspect within 14
days of receiving the file. My initial memorandum to Steve Bradshaw
(POL00047331) is dated 12 July 2002, so assuming I stuck to this deadline,
I would have reviewed this file anytime between 29 June 2002 and 12 July
2002.
40.On review of the file, I would have noticed that the only direct evidence of a
pension fraud was contained in the Horizon data discrepancies. As explained
above, I had no reason to doubt the accuracy of these discrepancies.
However, initially, I did not think there was enough evidence to support the
explanation for these discrepancies being that Ms Brennan had intentionally
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carried out a fraud.
41.1 explained my main concerns with the evidence in my memorandum dated
12 July 2002 (POL00047331). The purpose of this document was to allow
Steve Bradshaw to carry out further investigations to see if it was possible to
address the issues with the evidence that I had identified. In the
memorandum, I did not request any details about whether Horizon was
operating accurately because I assumed it was and Ms Brennan had not
questioned the accuracy of the data in her interview. If she had, or if I had
any reason to doubt the Horizon system, I would have asked for the accuracy
of the data to be checked in addition to the other points raised.
42.In this document, I refer to the “minute from Steve Bradshaw”. I am fairly
certain that this refers to POL00047325. At this point, I would only have seen
the documents included in the case file, so it is highly unlikely that I would
have been referring to anything else.
43.1 would sometimes call the investigator prior to sending the advice, especially
in circumstances where I did not think the evidence was strong enough to
recommend a charging decision. There was no requirement to make any
such call, but I thought it was a polite step that helped maintain good
relationships with investigators.
44.1 may have made a similar call in this instance: if I did, it would more or less
have reiterated the points in the 12 July 2002 advice. It is likely that Steve
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Bradshaw or myself would have created an attendance note of any such call,
which, if it exists, has not been provided to me by the Inquiry.
45. After sending the 12 July memorandum to Steve Bradshaw, it is unlikely that
I had any further involvement with this case until receiving Mr Bradshaw's
response on 31 July 2002 (POL00047335). We may have spoken on the
phone at some point in the intervening period, but it is impossible for me to
confirm this without viewing any copies of attendance notes.
46.1 cannot recall whether, at the time, I thought Mr Bradshaw's response
adequately addressed the questions in my 12 July memorandum. However,
on reviewing the rest of the disclosure, it appears that it did not, as Mr
Bradshaw provided a further memorandum relating to the checks conducted
dated 7 October (POL00047340).
47. It is likely that this further memorandum would have been provided in
response to a further advice written by me about the persisting issues with
the evidence in the case. On reviewing the 31 July 2002 (POL00047335)
memorandun, it is likely that I would have sent the file back to Mr Bradshaw,
along with this further advice. It would then have been up to Mr Bradshaw to
carry out further investigations to address these issues.
48.While I am almost certain that I still did not think there was a realistic prospect
of conviction at this point, I did believe that certain inferences could be drawn
about the case that pointed towards the potential guilt of Ms Brennan. I say
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“almost certain” because I cannot recall my state of mind at the time, but,
having reviewed the documents disclosed, it appears clear to me that this
would have been my state of mind. I recall thinking it was strange that the
discrepancies only appeared in relation to Ms Brennan’s date stamp on the
pension and allowance claims and that Ms Brennan could not recall her
recent holiday when questioned about it at interview. I understood that there
had been no pension and allowance discrepancies while Ms Brennan was on
holiday. Consequently, I would have wanted to give Steve Bradshaw an
opportunity to address deficiencies in the evidence.
49.It appears that a similar interaction between myself and Mr Bradshaw
occurred on receipt of the 7 October 2002 memorandum (POL00047340).
Again, I cannot remember my thoughts at the time of receiving this
memorandum, however, it appears that it still did not adequately address my
concerns with the evidence, as Mr Bradshaw provided a_ further
memorandum, relating to the checks carried out, dated November
(POL00047475). Both the October and November memoranda relate to
checks being carried out to identify any shortfall in stock and so, on this basis,
I believe that my main concerns with the evidence at this point related to the
nature of the discrepancies identified. However, I cannot be sure of this
without having sight of my communications with Mr Bradshaw during this
period.
50.My knowledge of the investigations made into whether shortfalls had been
identified is limited to details provided in the disclosure. It is clear that the
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Department for Social Security at Lishally had initially identified the
discrepancies, which in turn triggered the investigation within the Post Office.
It is also clear that Steve Bradshaw carried out further investigations into the
discrepancies; the results of which are provided in his memorand a of 7
October 2002 (POL00047340) and 5 November 2002 (POL00047475).
Unfortunately, I cannot recall any more detail about this.
5
. Similarly, I cannot recall the details of the telephone conversations that I had
with Steve Bradshaw on either 4 October 2002 or 4 November 2002.
However, I strongly suspect they were about the checks he had been carrying
out to identify the shortfall, detailed in POL00047340 and POL00047475, and
whether these sufficiently addressed my concerns relating to the deficiencies
of the evidence in the case. There should be an attendance note of these
calls and it would assist my recollection if they could be disclosed by the
Inquiry to me.
52. It would appear that in light of receiving the 5 November 2002 memorandum,
I became satisfied that the evidence was strong enough to afford a realistic
prospect of conviction in this case (being more than 50%), as there is no
further back and forth about the evidence between myself and Mr Bradshaw
in the disclosure. Unfortunately, I cannot recall exactly what it was about this
memorandum, and the further checks, that meant I felt satisfied with the
evidence. It is too long ago to recall such detail.
53. At this point, I would have drafted an advice to the regional manager about
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the decision as to whether to bring charges against Ms Brennan. I would need
to see this document to be certain of my thought processes at this point. It
seems highly likely that this advice is the document dated 13 November 2002,
referred to at question 20.3 of the Request.
54. However, to the best of my recollection, I believe that I advised that both the
evidential and public interest tests in the Code for Crown Prosecutors were
satisfied in this case, and charges could be authorised by the regional
manager against Ms Brennan if that decision was going to be made by him.
55.1 would have set out my reasoning for this position, including the strengths
and weaknesses of the evidence. I think I believed that although there was
no direct evidence to suggest that Ms Brennan had stolen the money, the
shortfalls identified by the Horizon data, along with the fact Ms Brennan was
known to be a competent member of staff, was enough for a court to infer
that she had committed theft. A further inference could be drawn on the basis
that all the discrepancies related to her pension and allowance claims and
they only occurred when Ms Brennan was in the office. As stated above, I
also remember thinking it was odd that she had not been upfront about her
holiday. I seem to recall advising that it was not the strongest case, but that
it did pass the evidential test.
56.1 do not recall there being any relevant public interest considerations in this
case. Consequently, it is possible that I did not include a specific analysis of
the public interest test in my advice. I would have also included an advice on
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whether charges could be made and a summary of facts in the case. This
summary would form the advance information to be served on the defendant
or their solicitor prior to the first appearance in the magistrates’ court.
57.As previously mentioned, at the time of drafting this advice I was not aware
of any bugs, errors, defects or problems with the Horizon system. I assumed
the data that formed the key basis for the decision to prosecute Ms Brennan
was entirely accurate. Had I known then, what I know now about the Horizon
system, it is almost certain that this advice would have recommended that no
further action was taken against Ms Brennan.
58.My advice would have also included any further steps that could be carried
out by investigators to improve the likelihood of conviction. For example, it
appears, from question 20.3 of the Request, that I requested a witness
statement confirming the accuracy of the Horizon data. I made this request
not because I doubted the accuracy of the data in any way, but because I
always took a thorough approach to my prosecutorial duties. At the time, had
such a statement been drafted, I fully anticipated that it would have simply
confirmed that the data forming the basis of the prosecution was accurate.
59.Had I thought anything else, I would have been much clearer and vociferous
in conveying the importance of investigating the accuracy of the Horizon data
to Steve Bradshaw. I would not have felt ready to draft my advice on the
charging decision until any such investigations had been completed.
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60.On receiving my advice, the regional manager would have then authorised
the decision to charge Ms Brennan with the recommended offence(s). I had
no relationship with the regional manager and it was typical for them to
approve the recommendation in the advice without asking any further
questions. I do not recall there being any disagreements about the decision
to prosecute Ms Brennan.
6
-After this decision had been made, it is clear from the disclosure that Rob
Wilson instructed agents in Liverpool to attend the magistrates’ court for the
first appearance (POL00047480). I would have normally done this myself but
clearly was not able to do so for one reason or another. It is likely that the
agent in question provided a short update after the first appearance, which
seemingly took place at Liverpool Magistrates’ Court on 6 February 2003.
62.1 would not have had any substantive involvement in the case until the
investigator, Steve Bradshaw, sent me a draft pack of the committal papers,
along with his memorandum dated 14 March 2003 (POL00047505). This
would have included all the witness statements that had been drafted by that
date and the exhibits.
63.At the same time, Steve Bradshaw would have sent me three documents
relating to disclosure: the Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material
(POL00047517); the Disclosure Officer's Report (POL00047491); and a
Schedule of Sensitive Material (POL00047492). Steve Bradshaw was the
disclosure officer in this case. I should say that the documents provided to
me are clearly drafts and I do not know whether they are first drafts or later
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64.
65.
66.
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versions but I have not seen the final signed versions so it is much more
difficult to analyse what I may have or have not commented upon.
While I cannot remember my review of these documents, it is highly likely that
in the first instance, I would have gone through the committal papers to make
sure that there was a case to answer. While doing this, I would have
familiarised myself with the key issues and evidence in the case, so that I was
also in a position to check the disclosure officer's schedules.
I would then have checked that everything in the case file that I had been
provided with was included on either the Non-Sensitive Schedule of Unused
or the Sensitive Schedule of Unused unless the item was a witness statement
or exhibit. I would have also gone through both the Sensitive and Non-
Sensitive unused to check that documents had been correctly categorised as
privileged or not.
The Disclosure Officer's Report (POL00047491) was an internal document
that contained the disclosure officer's position on which documents should be
disclosed. In the draft provided, it appears that Mr Bradshaw did not think any
documents fell to be disclosed. I would have checked the schedules of Non-
Sensitive and Sensitive Unused material to confirm whether I agreed with this
analysis. In the event anything was missing or incorrect, I would have asked
Mr Bradshaw to correct the appropriate schedule or locate the relevant
document. There was also a section on the forms where I could have
entered my comments such as whether an item should be disclosed or made
available for inspection. As I do not have the final signed versions I cannot
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67.
68
69.
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see if there was any disagreement between Mr Bradshaw and me but if there
were I would have expected him to follow my guidance.
It is worth noting that on my initial review of the schedules of unused, I would
have been primarily focused on checking that the disclosure officer had
correctly identified any material that could undermine the prosecution case or
assist any defence made by the defendant at interview. If, at any point, the
defendant served a defence case statement, the disclosure officer would
have conducted a secondary disclosure exercise, which I would have
checked much in the same way, focusing on whether anything else that might
assist the defence case had been correctly identified. I cannot recall if a
defence case statement was served in this case.
.As I have said, the schedules disclosed with the Request (POL00047517;
POL00047491; POL00047492) appear to be in draft form and the disclosure
does not include any document that details my response to Steve Bradshaw's
14 March 2003 memorandum. Consequently, I am not able to say whether I
provided any further advice to Mr Bradshaw on the committal papers or the
disclosure schedules. It was common for there to be a back and forth between
myself and the investigator, until I was happy that the committal bundle was
ready to be served on the defence and the disclosure schedules were correct.
As I have also said, there should be a signed version of the disclosure
schedules, including my signature. I would have been satisfied that those
versions of the schedules were correct and disclosure obligations had been
completed.
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70.In his memorandum dated 14 March 2003 (POL00047505), Steve Bradshaw
says “Concerning point 4 of your memo dated 13 November 2002. I have
spoken to Sonia Cassidy at Lishally in Northern Ireland. She informs me that
this type of statement [is] not normally done and the matter has been
discussed previously with Colin Justice”. I believe he is essentially saying that
it has not been possible to have a witness statement drafted by a
representative of the Department of Social Security at Lisally confirming the
accuracy of the Horizon data, as I requested in my 13 November 2002
memorandum. It is difficult to provide any further detail about this request
without seeing the memorandum in question.
7
.My sense is that I would have been reluctant to accept this answer. However,
I cannot remember my response and there is little point speculating. It
appears that the statement was never drafted so ultimately, I must have
accepted that it could not be done in time for 3 April 2003, which was the
deadline for serving the committal papers.
72.After the committal papers and schedules of unused material had been
finalised, I would have instructed counsel. I can see in this case John Gibson
was instructed. I would have sent the brief to counsel and instructions to
advise on evidence to his chambers that we used in Liverpool rather than
instructing him directly. It is also possible that I drafted the indictment
(POL00066714); although counsel would also often do this and I cannot
remember who drafted it in this case.
73.From this point onwards, my involvement in this case would have been
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minimal. A junior legal executive in the team, being Jenny Andrews in this
case, would have dealt directly with the investigator, agents, counsel and the
Crown Court. I would have only become involved if any issues arose.
74. For example, if there had been any “plea-bargaining”, I would have expected
to be involved in this process with the regional manager making the final
decision on any agreement reached. That said, issues could crop up at the
very last minute in criminal cases and communication was more difficult in
2003, so it is possible that counsel would have dealt with any such issues
directly. I cannot remember any plea-bargaining taking place in this case.
75.1 have been provided with a memorandum sent by Steve Bradshaw to John
Gibson dated 3 June 2003 (POL00047515). John Gibson was the barrister I
instructed in this case and it appears that this correspondence was born out
of a request made by him as he prepared for the trial. I cannot remember if I
saw this document at the time. I am not sure why Mr Bradshaw sent this
document directly to Mr Gibson; any communications with counsel should,
and would typically, have come through myself of the junior legal executive,
Jenny Andrews. It is possible that Mr Bradshaw did copy this memorandum
to Ms Andrews, and it was agreed that he should send it directly to the
barrister, however, I cannot remember for sure.
76.Similarly, it seems that the memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to Jenny
Andrews, dated 10 June 2003 (POL00047516) is also born out of a request
from counsel in his preparation for trial. It is unlikely that I saw this
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memorandum at the time and cannot comment on it further.
77.Any advice that I gave on the collation of evidence would have been included
in the various memoranda that I drafted throughout the case. I have only been
provided with the memorandum dated 12 July 2002 (POL00047331). I believe
I would have drafted further memoranda or pieces of advice to Steve
Bradshaw over the next few months in September/October, a memorandum
to the regional manager dated 13 November 2002 and a memorandum in
response to the submission of the draft committal papers and schedules of
unused material in March or April 2003. I would need to see those documents
to comment further.
78.As stated, I was not aware of any bugs, errors, defects or problems with the
Horizon system at any point throughout my involvement in this prosecution. I
did not become aware of any issues until reading the Computer Weekly article
in 2009. At the time, I believed that this prosecution was carried out fairly in
accordance with the legal framework in place at the time; it was essentially
the same as every other prosecution that I was involved in during my time at
the Post Office.
JOSEPHINE HAMILTON & OTHERS v POST OFFICE LIMITED JUDGEMENT
79.1 have recently reviewed the Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office
Limited [2021 EWCA Crim 577] at POL00113278, which has enhanced my
knowledge of some of the issues with the Horizon system. It is clear that there
were numerous issues with the system that had been identified from an early
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stage. I agree with the findings at paragraphs 286 to 290.
80.1 am frustrated that these issues were not communicated to criminal lawyers
prosecuting cases at the time. As a lawyer, my priority had always been to
apply the law and guidance fairly, whether that pointed me towards advising
on charges or no further action. I trusted that the Post Office had created an
environment where I could do this to the best of my ability; however, it is now
clear that it had not. I personally feel let down by any individuals who failed
to share this information with prosecutors or the Criminal Law team generally.
81. It is also clear that there were more structural problems with the working
culture at the Post Office that prevented the open and transparent sharing of
information. It was very hierarchical and there was limited communication
between the different strata of the organisation. Even the Criminal Law team
adopted a culture in which we typically kept our work to ourselves and did not
communicate openly as a wider team. I think this undoubtedly played a part
in ensuring that the issues with Horizon were obstructed for so long.
82.From my perspective as a lawyer, knowledge of these issues would have
changed my approach to any prosecutions that I conducted involving Horizon
data. My priority would have been to identify and understand the issues with
the system and then assess whether these issues undermined the
prosecution case. I would have wanted statements taken from Fujitsu,
detailing the mechanics of the system. I would not have been scared to push
back on deadlines or ask for significant work and analysis to be carried out
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by investigators to ensure that all the issues were identified and properly
understood.
83.1 always tried to be a meticulous lawyer, who applied the law and guidance
carefully even if it meant giving advice that would have frustrated
investigators. I gained no satisfaction from bringing charges against
individuals, especially given my background as a defence lawyer. I have little
doubt that in the Lisa Brennan case I would have advised that there was not
a realistic prospect of conviction due to issues with the Horizon data had I
known them at the time.
84.1 feel absolutely devastated that Ms Brennan was charged and convicted of
theft. I feel gutted that I was unwittingly part of a horrible miscarriage of justice
and am so sorry for the awful impact it has had on her life. I am incredibly
glad that convictions have been overturned in this judgement and Ms
Brennan has sought compensation for the ordeal that she has been through.
85.With all that said, aside from retrospectively changing the culture of the Post
Office to ensure that issues with Horizon were shared with the Criminal Law
team, I do not think there is anything that we could have reasonably done
differently at the time in relation to the prosecution of Lisa Brennan. Within a
framework of not knowing about the issues with Horizon, the law and
guidance was applied fairly at every stage.
MISCELLANEOUS
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86. There is one further point that I consider relevant to Phase 4 of the Inquiry.
After I left the Criminal Law team in 2003, there was a restructuring of the
reporting lines so that the team no longer reported to the head of legal
services but instead reported to the head of security and investigations. I
remember thinking at the time that this created a potential conflict of interests,
as investigators, by their nature, typically wanted cases to be prosecuted, and
it was the role of prosecutors to apply the tests in the Code for Crown
Prosecutors as fairly and objectively as possible. I thought the reporting lines
should have remained entirely separate to avoid even the possibility of any
internal pressures influencing a decision to prosecute cases.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: I< Angus 2st
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Index to First Witness Statement of Teresa Williamson
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No. URN Document Description Control Number
25-page Record of Tape Recorded Interview
7 POL00047320 commencing 10:10 on 13 June 2002 dhciathaaieihata
12-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded
2s POL00047322 I Interview commencing 10:10 on 13 June POL-0043801
2002
6-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded
3. POL00047323 I Interview commencing 10:55 on 13 June POL-0043802
2002
Correspondence from S Bradshaw to Jan
4. POL00047324 Mullin dated June 2002 POL-0043803
5. POL00047325 Pension and Allowance Fraud Investigation POL-0043804
Document
6. POL00047326 I Antecedents sheet POL-0043805
Internal memo from me to Prosecution
if icieniehiiceds Support Office, Leeds, dated 12 July 2002 ihciatiehitalon
interoffice memorandum from Steve
8. I _POL00047335 I Bradshaw to me dated 31 July 2002 POL-0043814
9. POL00047336 Email from Angie Maloney to me dated 9 POL-0043815
August 2002
interoffice memorandum from Steve
10. I POL00047340 Bradshaw to me dated 7 October 2002 dhiathcchichelia
interoffice memorandum from Steve
14. I POL00047475 Bradshaw to me dated 5 November 2002 BOE e >t
The memorandum from Rob Wilson to the
12. I POL00047480 I Prosecution Support Office dated 20 POL-0043959
November 2002
Attendance note of S Bradshaw dated 30
13. I POL00047486 December 2002 POL-0043965
14. I PoL00047489 Attendance note of S Bradshaw dated 6 POL-0043968
February 2003
15. I PoLo0047491 psclosure Officer's Report dated March POL-0043970
16. I PoL00047492 songuule of Sensitive Material dated March POL-0043971
17 POL00047501; I The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth POL-0043980;
“I POL00047500 I Rosenthal dated 11 March 2003 POL-0043979
18. I POL00047502 I List of exhibits POL-0043981
19. I POL00047503 I List of witnesses POL-0043982
20. I POL00047504 I Witness list POL-0043983
21. I POL00047505 I Internal memorandum from Steve Bradshaw I POL-0043984
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to me dated 14 March 2003
22 POL00047506; I Two pages of the statement of Stephen POL-0043985;
* I POL00047507 I Bradshaw dated 3 March 2003 POL-0043986
The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth
23. I POLO0047514 Rosenthal dated 2 June 2003 POL-0043993
Memorandum from John Steve Bradshaw to
24. I POLO0047515 John Gibson dated 3 June 2003 POL-0043994
Memorandum from Steve Bradshaw to Miss
25. I POLO0047516 Andrew dated 10 June 2003 POL-0043995
26. I POLO00047517 I Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material POL-0043996
The internal memorandum from Steve
27. I POLO00047519 I Bradshaw to Miss Andrews dated 16 July POL-0043998
2003
The statement of Kathryn Elizabeth
28. I POLO0047520 Rosenthal dated 22 July 2003 POL-0043999
10-page Summary of Record of Tape
29. I POL00047521 I Recorded Interview commencing 10:10 on 13} POL-0044000
June 2002
4-page Summary Record of Tape Recorded
30. I POL00047522 I Interview commencing 10:55 on 13 June POL-0044001
2002
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v.
31. I POLOOO66602 Brennan [2004] EWCA Crim 1329 POL-0063081
Transcript of proceedings on 3 and 4
32. I POL00066713 September 2003 POL-0063192
33. I POLO0066714 I The indictment, listing details and verdicts POL-0063193
The Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton &
34. I POLO0113278 I Others v Post Office Limited [2021 EWCA POL-0110657
Crim 577
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