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Witness Name: ALISDAIR CHARLES JOHN CAMERON
Statement No.: WITN09840200
Dated: 8 August 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF ALISDAIR CHARLES JOHN CAMERON
I, ALISDAIR CHARLES JOHN CAMERON, will say as follows...
INTRODUCTION
1. I was an employee of Post Office Limited (“POL”) from January 2015 to 23 June
2024. Throughoutthis period, I was Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). From 2017
to 2019 I was Chief Financial and Operating Officer (“CFOO”). I was Interim Chief
Executive (“Interim CEO”) from April 2019 to September 2019. I was on medical
leave from 7 May 2023 until 23 June 2024, when I retired due to ill-health.
2. During my employment with POL, I undertook other roles and responsibilities at
different times, which I set out in my first witness statement (First Witness
Statement of Alisdair John Charles Cameron, dated 18 April 2024,
WITN09840100).
3. This second witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT
Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the second request made by
the Inquiry pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 (“the Request’), dated
5 July 2024.
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4. Except where I indicate to the contrary, the facts and matters contained in this
witness statement are within my own knowledge. Where any information is not
within my personal knowledge, I have identified the source of the information or
the basis for my belief. The facts in this witness statement are true to the best of
my knowledge and belief.
5. To the extent that documents have assisted my recollection, I set out the URN
of the relevant document. I no longer have access to my POL emails or
calendar.
6. I was assisted in preparing this statement by Bates Wells and Braithwaite LLP,
my recognised legal representative in the Inquiry.
BACKGROUND
Education and Professional Qualifications
7. Ireceived three A-Levels in 1983. I received a degree in 1987.1 qualified as a
Chartered Accountant in December 1993.
Career and appointment to POL
8. My career prior to joining POL is set out in paragraphs 7-15 of my first Witness
Statement (WITN09840100).
9. The circumstances of my appointmentto POL are set outin paragraphs 79-87 of
my first Witness Statement (WITN09840100). I was appointed to the POL Board
at my first Board meeting, on 28 January 2015 (POL00021531).
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EXPERIENCE WITH THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM AND SUBPOSTMASTER
TRAINING
10. I have never operated the Horizon IT system (“Horizon”) in a live branch
environment.
11. I did operate an off-line version of Horizon while attending a Sub-Postmaster
(‘Postmaster’) training course in 2017, which I noted in paragraph 111 of my first
Witness Statement (WITN09840100). I attended this training at my own request,
to helpme understand the business better, as part of my additional accountability
as CFOO.
12. As per paragraph 111 of my first Witness Statement (WITN09840100), following
the Postmaster training course I set outin an email my concern that it was simply
a poor course which, in isolation from the other components of new Postmaster
training, did not provide a strong basis to support Postmasters. I cannot recall to
whom I sent the email. My recollection is that I followed up a couple of times to
check whetherthe course was being updated to make it more relevantand useful
to Postmasters. I also recall supporting plans to enable the course to be delivered
on machines connected to the Internet, enabling the training to be more complete
and realistic. I cannot recall the detailed outcomes of my feedback.
TRAINING AND INDUCTION OF BOARD MEMBERS
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13. Idonotremember having any specific training or being part of a formal induction
programme when I joined the POL Board. However, I no longer have access to
my POL emails or calendar and I may simply have forgotten if such a formal
process did take place.
14. I do not recall any briefing on the issues addressed by the Inquiry, such as
Horizon or the prosecution of Postmasters, when I joined the POL Board.
15. The Group Litigation claim (“GLO”) was notissuedin the High Courtagainst POL
until April 2016, so it did not form part of any briefing I received upon joining the
POL Board in January 2015.
16. AsI set outin paragraph 146 of my first Witness Statement (WITN09840100), the
CEO’s Report of January 2015 (CEO’s Report January 2015, POL00219395) set
out POL’s position that there was no evidence of any faults with Horizon, or
unsafe convictions, nor had any convictions been appealed.
17. An induction programme was developed for new Board members, supported by
the Company Secretary. I recall helping to develop some briefing material on the
commercial business, possibly when Tim Parker became Chairman, laterin 2015.
18. In more recent years, I was not closely involved with the induction of incoming
Board members. My role as CFO was primarily to brief new Directors on the way
in which POL’s finances and financial results worked.
19. My sense, therefore, is that when I stopped working (in May 2023, when I was
signed off work) there was a more effective induction programme than when I
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joined the business. However, I was not involved enough to say whether the
induction programme was adequate at the time I left. I do not recall seeing any
specific induction material on Horizon, Postmaster prosecutions or
compensation.
GOVERNANCE
My view of corporate governance issues in 2023
20. In paragraph 74 of my first Witness Statement (WITN09840100) I exhibited an
exchange, dated 23 March 2023, between Nick Read (CEO), myself and other
executives (including the General Counsel and Strategy Director) which set out
our views of governance issues in the business at that time (Email Subject: The
robustness of our governance 26 March 2023, POL00423699). Nick had asked
us to summarise our concems about the governance of POL over email to be
used to agree a plan balancing between improving governance internally and
arranging an independent review by an extemal party.
21. I have been asked to comment on the progress that hasbeen made following that
email exchange in resolving the corporate governance issues highlighted. I have
set out in paragraph 22 to what extent progress had been made by 7 May 2023,
my last effective working day at POL. I do notknow whatprogress hasbeen made
since May 2023.
22. My most material concerns about the governance of the business in March 2023,
which I put to Nick Read and the other executives, were:
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e The role, purpose and accountability of the Group Executive (“GE”). My
assertion had been that the GE was not operating effectively as the senior,
executive governance of POL. This had, in my view, made it harder for the
business to get the decisions it needed and to provide oversight. Nick’s reply
included his view on why that might be the case, but he also suggested that
more matters should be dealt with by individual executives andnotby the GE.
As of 31 July 2024, according to POL’s website, the GE comprised four
people, including Nick and Owen Woodley (Deputy CEO), whol understand
to be leaving the business. Two further interim appointments have been
announced. This suggests that the lack of robust, consistent executive
governance may still be an issue.
e Retail oversight, including the management of stamps and, most significantly,
of branch shortfalls (see paragraphs 125-140 of my first Witness Statement,
WITN09840100). Both areas are, in my view, critical to treating Postmasters
fairly, to the safe functioning of POL now and to the safe delivery of a future
Horizon replacement. Progress had not been made in these areas when I
stopped working in May 2023.
e The decisions about compensation schemes being made by a non-executive
committee with limited executive input, prioritising the interests of the
Department of Business and Trade (“the DBT” or “the Shareholder’) over the
fair treatment of Postmasters. This included both the speed of compensation
(paragraphs 142-144 of my first Witness Statement, WITN09840100) and
whether amounts taken from Postmasters to repay shortfalls through
deductions from remuneration, without proper investigation, should be
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retumed to them (paragraph 145 of my first Witness Statement,
WITN09840100). Progress had not been made when I stopped working in
May 2023, but new schemes are now being introduced.
e Data. My view was that POL willnotbe able to properly manage its obligations
or support the Horizon replacement without improved access and
interpretation of branch data. Progress had not been made when I stopped
working in May 2023.
e Governance of the Horizon Replacement Programme. My sense is that an
enormous amount of work, led by Nick Read, has gone into fundamentally
restructuring the programme and seeking additional financial support.
THE BOARD
Culture
23. The POL Board hasrecently changed rapidly and materially, with 5 new people
appointed to the Board since March 2023. I therefore have very limited
experience of the culture of the current Board given that! did not attend Board
Meetings after 7 May 2023.
24. Many of the Directors and Executives on the Board were broughtin, as I was,
because of our commercial experience. As a result, my experience of the Board’s
culture was that there was a general enthusiasm to focus on the current
commercial performance of the business even while acknowledging, from 2020
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and the conclusion of the GLO, that driving justice for Postmasters should be
POL’s greatest priority.
25. In 2020 and 2021, the Board accorded considerable time to matters relating to
the Inquiry, the compensation schemes and the legal processes to secure justice
for Postmasters. This time was reduced once the Historical Remediation
Committee (“HRC”) was formed, and the work was largely delegated.
26. More Board time was spent considering the legal processes, such as supporting
the appeals and the compensation structures, than on understanding the ways in
which the findings of Mr Justice Fraser in the GLO trial judgments were being
implemented.
27. From an Executive perspective, in early 2021, Nick Read introduced a focus on
“Putting Postmasters First’, including better listening and more time spent in
branches. At the same time, a programme was developed to ensure that the
business implemented the changes required by Mr Justice Fraser in the GLO trial
judgments, with the results audited by a third party.
28. My sense was that the cultural work introduced to improve relationships with
Postmasters had a limited impact. The ongoing issues of shortfall management
and recoveries through remuneration deductions suggested to me that POL’s
culture had not changed enough.
29. Financially, POL has been unsuccessful in getting Shareholder support to
increase the total amount of remuneration paid to Postmasters. I set out in
paragraph 438 of my first Witness Statement (WITN09840100) the Board’s focus
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on hitting POL’s own targets first. Putting these things together suggested that
the slogan “Putting Postmasters First’ was a largely rhetorical device.
Reflections: ‘What Went Wrong?’
30. I have been asked to consider whether the issues I raised in my paper “What
Went Wrong” (‘What went wrong? A draft for discussion’ 19 November 2020,
POL00175235) had been addressed and changes implemented in relation to the
GLO when I left the business.
31. This document was prepared for Nick Read to help ensure that lessons were
learnt (see paragraphs 385-387 of my first Witness Statement, WITN09840100)
after the conclusion of the GLO.
32. My viewof where POL was in respect of each of these issues atthe time I stopped
working are as follows:
4. “Our culture, self-absorbed and defensive, stopped us from dealing with
Postmasters in a straightforward and acceptable way.” The financial liability
for shortfalls now sits far more with POL, which is a significant change in
approach since the GLO. However, until POL has the data and processes to
investigate shortfalls thoroughly and reach fair and transparent conclusions
as to how they were caused, I do not believe that Postmasters’ issues can be
dealt with appropriately or that a replacement to Horizon can be properly
implemented.
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2. “We did not disclose Horizon issues to the defence when we prosecuted
Postmasters”. Horizon’s numerous issues are now in the public domain since
the Horizon Issues Trial (“HIT”) judgment and, as far as I am aware,
Postmasters are not being prosecuted for losses where the case would rely
on Horizon.
3. “We should never have conducted our own prosecutions. Some of the
behaviours during the Prosecutions were unacceptable”. I believe that this
lesson has been learnt and understand that POL does not and will not
undertake its own prosecutions.
4. “We did not re-assess our behaviour as prosecutors between 2014 and 2020”.
I believe this has since been considered as part of the Court of Appeal process
reviewing convictions. I am unsure whether it has been fully and formally
considered for all prosecutions.
5. “We reliedon anecdotal evidence that Horizon and our surrounding processes
were working properly without fully investigating concerns on a proactive
basis. We did not properly challenge and test what Fujitsu told us. This seems
in part to still be the case”. Considerable work was undertaken, by Simon
Oldnall (Horizon and GLO IT Director at POL) and his team, to try and prove
that the currentversion of the Horizon system was operating as it should. This
was overseen by the Improvement Delivery Group (paragraph 71 of my first
Witness Statement, WITN09840100). This was an improvement in the
scrutiny of the system. There have also been reviews of surrounding
processes which support Horizon and for which compensation is being
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contemplated. This is confirmed on Page 80 of the published 2022/2023
Annual Report and Accounts as “Remediation Matters — Process review”
(Post Office Limited Annual Report & Consolidated Financial Statements
2022/23, UKGI00044323). In May 2023, I was not aware of evidence that the
relationship with Fujitsu involved any more collaborative and open challenging
on the operation of Horizon than previously.
6. “We were and perhaps still are too focused on our tactical battles. Other
priorities took second place”. In the 2022/2023 Annual Report and Accounts,
the Chairman and CEO reports focused on the priorities of commercial
outcomes, re-building trust and branch profitability. It is hard to argue that
systemic progress has been made on any of these priorities. Given the
differentissues focused upon at the Select Committee in 2024, it may be that
tactical battles still hold sway.
7. “We did not sufficiently challenge and test our legal advice until it was too late”.
The only point where I am aware that POL has challenged legal advice was
relating to the HRC’s insistence, up until December 2022, that POL continue
to take monthly deductions from Postmasters relating to shortfalls thathad not
been properly investigated. This decision was changed in December 2022 but
not made retrospective (see paragraph 145 of my first Witness Statement,
WITN09840100).
Composition of the Board
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33. I have been asked to comment on the composition of the Board generally, and
specifically the desirability of appointment of Non-Executive Directors (“NEDs”)
with specialist knowledge in areas such as legal; IT; acting Postmasters.
34. It is helpful to have specialist knowledge on the Board when debating technical
issues so that the Executive can be properly held to account. This is effective on
the financial side; for example, the Audit, Risk & Compliance Committee usually
included two NEDs with relevant financial experience, which enabled
considerable scrutiny and challenge.
35. An expert in, for example, IT should help the Board to challenge issues, for
example relating to Horizon and its replacement. However, the Board should
avoid delegating the role of challenging issues solely to that individual.
36. This approach is less effective when the NED takes on a quasi-executive role, as
has occurred with the HRC and often with the work of the Shareholder
Representative (UK Government Investments, “UKGI”). In my view, maintaining
the proper separation of Executive and Non-executive roles is important and
probably requires a much stronger executive team.
37. I supported the appointment of Postmaster NEDs, to bring the voice of the
Postmaster alive in the Board Room. Since their appointment in 2021, I have
been a supporter of both of the Board’s current Postmaster NEDs, Elliot Jacobs
and Saf Ismail. However, having representative NEDs is never straightforward.
38. Firstly, the impact two NEDscan have at Board levelis limited. For example, Elliot
Jacobs and Saf Ismail’s perfectly proper focus on increasing Postmaster
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remuneration to support the POL branch network (‘the Network”) did not lead to
change. I can understand why they may have therefore felt ignored, although I
had perceived that to be a Government ("HMG”) response more than a POL one.
39. Secondly, being bound by the need for the Board to agree majority decisions in
an atmosphere of confidentiality put Postmaster NEDs in an extremely difficult
position when they and other Postmasters were disappointed by decisions.
40. I had been absent for eight months from duties on the Board when Postmaster
NED disagreements with Post Office became public (The Times article
‘Postmasters on Post Office board “ignored and unwanted”, dated 19 February
2024, RLITO000201).
41. My reflections on this article are that I had not heard Nick Read describe
investigators as ‘untouchables’ and I do not understand why they would be
considered untouchable by POL.
42. However, the underlying issue of whether POL can investigate branch shortfalls
in a way that is fair, transparent, consistent and which would with stand legal
challenge remains acentral challenge to POL. It was clear to me that these issues
were unresolved when I left the business and, in my view, getting this right is
fundamental to Postmasters, to their working relationship with POL, to POL’s
reputation and financial sustainability and to the effective operation of a Horizon
replacement.
43. I do not agree with the NFSP thatthe solution is an Oversight Committee (‘NFSP
Statement on PO Board Postmaster NED role”, dated 19 January 2024,
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RLIT0000245). The last thing POL needs is more introspection and a more
complicated bureaucracy when the underlying, financial conflict of interest
between POL and Postmasters is unresolved.
44. In the end, however hard the journey, I consider that the only feasible solution is
for Postmasters to own the Post Office, whether that is POL or a successor
organisation, with a proven Horizon replacement, a transparent shortfall
investigation process using real time data and new Postmaster contracts (see
paragraphs 437-440 of my first Witness Statement, WITN09840100).
DEPARTURE OF HENRY STAUNTON, CHAIR OF POL
45. I have been asked to comment on The Times article in February 2024
(RLIT0000201) which highlighted the issues surrounding the departure of Henry
Staunton, the former Chair of POL, in January 2024. This happened when I had
not been at work for between seven to eight months.
46. The references in this article to Henry Staunton’s claims that he was asked to
delay compensation reflect, I suspect, a misunderstanding.
47. My knowledge of the financial background was that the last formal funding
decisions (that I was aware of) made by HMG in respect of POL were difficult
(Page 10 of POL’s Annual Report and Accounts, 2020/2021). Even following
amendments, the funding available was not sufficient, and there was no support
for POL to reduceits own costs. The costs of the compensation schemes and of
supporting the Inquiry then proved greater than expected and POL, in addition,
had had to propose funding for the Horizon replacement too early in the
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programme. POL’s funding requesthad been too low andeven that had not been
met.
48. It was therefore clear that increased funding would be required for POL to
maintain the Network. My understanding from conversations with Nick Read is
that HM Treasury had indicated to the DBT that any further funding was
dependent on a strategic review of the policy of HMG towards the Network.
49. I also understood from Nick that, probably in late 2022 or early 2023, the then
Secretary of State for the DBT had said that such a review would notbe started
and asked POL to carry on until after the General Election as best it could.
50. It may have been this conversation that was referred to by Henry Staunton, and
nota requestto delay the compensation for Postmasters. My understanding was
that the compensation was already funded by HMG and there was a shared
anxiety that, for overturned convictions, it was being paid out too slowly and less
generously than originally forecasted.
51. However, my views on this topic only repeat my understanding following informal
conversations with Nick Read. Clearly, he, and others, will have a much greater
knowledge of the events which led to Henry Staunton’s departure.
52. The current Postmasters, who have been working heroically to maintain their
businesses through the scandal and the pandemic would, I imagine, have been
infuriated by the further brand damage.
BOARD RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS
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53. The Board's relationship with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters
(‘NFSP”) was non-existent. I do not recall the NFSP ever attending a Board
meeting.
54. I set outin my first Witness Statement (paragraphs 411-415, WITN09840100)
that I did not consider the NFSP to be independent of POL because it received
the bulk of its funding from POL and not from Postmasters paying membership
subscriptions.
55. My views on whatconstitutes independence are grounded in the assessment of
audit relationships. No audit firm would consider itself independent of a client that
paid such a high proportion of its income. My view, therefore, is that NFSP cannot
consider itself independent until it is funded by Postmasters. This has not
changed.
56. I have said to the NFSP that they need to become more representative of
Postmasters and I understand anecdotally that this has, at times, upset them.
57. I cannot recall the Communications and Workers Union (“CWU”) attending a
Board meeting during my time at POL. The responsibility for that relationship sits
predominantly within the People team and is focused heavily on pay awards.
58. Regarding Fujitsu, I set out more fully in my first Witness Statement my own
relationship with this stakeholder (see paragraphs 420 — 436, WITN09840100).
In my view Fujitsu’s relationship with the Board has never been satisfactory. I
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suspect that both parties would like to end the relationship and have attempted
to do so previously.
59. However, until a Horizon replacement is rolled out with all the supporting data
and processes in place, it cannot be terminated. This still felt some years away
when I left in May 2023 and there was simply no plan to improve the processes
that sit around the system, including the management of shortfalls, the data
needed to support them or for the roll-out of a new IT system. Any roll-out would
inevitably be difficult, expensive and controversial.
60. In my first Witness Statement (paragraphs 26-27, WITN09840100) I said that I
did not believe that the relationship between the Shareholder, the Shareholder
Representative and POL worked properly, although it may have improved since
I left. UKGI was consistently unable to explain POL to the DBT or vice-versa.
Fundamentally, if UKGI is going to act with the authority of being the Shareholder
Representative then it must represent the views of the Shareholder at all times
and thishas not always been the case. In addition, not all commercial experience
is equally useful to the oversight of a franchise retailer.
61. The commercial and other skills and abilities needed to understand and oversee
POL need careful consideration and the team recruited should sit within the DBT,
not separately, creating a unified and consistentperspective, improving the DBT’s
understanding of POL and reducing the likelihood of poor communication.
62. At the time I left the business, the reality was that many decisions were made by
or significantly affected by the views of HM Treasury, and this should have been
more transparent to all parties.
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WHISTLEBLOWING
63. During my time at POL, formal whistleblowing processes were established and
refined. A summary report was produced for a monthly GE review, and I think
was also shared with the Board. I no longer have access to this document.
64. I do not recall issues relevant to the Inquiry being flagged through this process.
The team led by Ben Foat (General Counsel) could give a comprehensive reply
covering the issues raised and the outcomes.
65. My sense was that the process was dealing sensibly with the issues that were
raised, although itis of course difficultto know whetherimportant issues were not
being raised. My view is that the processes were much improved by the time I
stopped working but! do nothave a considered judgement on whether they were
entirely adequate.
LEGAL PRIVILEGE
66. I have been asked to consider whether I properly understand issues of legal
professional privilege. It became clear to me during the development of my first
Witness Statement and attendance to give oral evidence to the Inquiry in May
2024 that! do not. I have generally followed legal advice from General Counsel
on what was privileged, and this was clearly unhelpful in terms of the Chairman’s
Review / Swift report (see paragraph 37 of my first Witness Statement,
WITN09840100).
MY RESIGNATION FROM POL
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67. Asset outin the introduction to this statement, my employment with POL ended
on 23 June 2024. That was the formal date of my departure from the POL Board.
However, I had not been working or attending Board meetings after 7 May 2023.
68. I have been asked to comment on three Daily Telegraph articles dated 5 March
2024 (Telegraph article, ‘Post Office Executive off sick for almost a year after
clash with boss’, RLIT0000242), 25 June 2024 (Telegraph article ‘Post Office
finance boss quits after two months sick leave’, RLIT0000243) and 29 June 2024
(Telegraph article, Post Office exec paid for years after leaving, RLIT0000244)
insofar as they relate to my departure from POL. I have also been asked to
comment on my working relationship with Nick Read.
69. In early 2021 Nick Read told me that I would be leaving the business by the end
of June of that year. He did not give me any reasons for this, but he was clear
that it was not a reflection on my performance and that POL would reach a
financial settlement with me.
70. In my experience, it is not unusual in the commercial world for CEOs to want to
recruit their own teams. Indeed, even within POL, many Executive colleagues
had previously received settlements to leave the business.
71. Following my conversation with Nick, nothing happened for a period. In May 2021
I raised a formal grievance, the fact of which was recently inadvertently disclosed
by the DBT. The grievance covered my general treatment by POL, including the
decision that! must leave the business which had followed no fair or transparent
process. I also raised a concern about the treatment of Executives with protected
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characteristics. These matters were investigated by a POL employee, but not
independently.
72. After a few months, Nick told me that HMG were not prepared to authorise a
financial settlement after all, and he therefore asked me to stay with POL. We
explored the true reasons for him wanting me to leave and he told me that he
thought! wanted his job. Not for the first time, I explained that I had very quickly
and permanently concluded that the decision not to make me CEO was correct.
He acknowledged this, saying that he wished he had talked to me aboutit earlier.
73. We agreed that! had, to date, made a useful contribution by being able to identify
aspects of the business that were not working well, and Nick agreed that it would
be helpful if I continued to share these with him on a 1-2-1 basis.
74. I remained open and supportive of Nick for the remainder of my employment with
POL. He was largely reluctant to share his personal views or opinions, although
he could be very negative about colleagues. He was not negative about me face-
to-face, but I assumed he was when talking to others and it felt like there was an
increasing sub-text of him still wanting me to leave POL, with more and more
people becoming aware of this.
75. In late 2022 and into 2023 the issues I was raising around shortfall management,
deductions from Postmaster remuneration, governance, the lack of cost reduction
programmes and issues with the Horizon replacement were not being tackled. I
felt that we were not fighting hard enough to improve the business and get
adequate support from HMG. Nick did not seem to disagree with many of my
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challenges, butequallyI did not see the CEO’s weight behindresolving them and
colleagues appeared to be getting mixed messages.
76. We were both finding this stressful and, in April 2023, Nick told me that my
position was untenable. Again, he said he would seek a financial settlement for
me to leave.
77. Around this time, Jane Davies asked me whether the situation was making me ill.
I was finding the deterioration in the business, including the issues set out in
paragraph 75 above, and the sense of being unwelcome, very stressful.
78. I had two weeks holiday in late April to early May 2023, at the end of which I felt
unable to return to POL. As soon as I got back home from my holiday, I sought
the view of my GP, who signed me off on grounds of ill-health. She required me
to speak to her every month. I undertook other medical interventions in the
following months.
79. In early 2024, I soughta view from the Occupational Health team funded by POL.
After several months and a number of medical consultations, they advised POL
that I was not fit to work and would not be fit for the foreseeable future. They
concluded that! was eligible for ill-health retirement. At that stage, POL proposed
a settlement which was signed on 23 June 2024, at which point! formally resigned
as a Director and employee of POL.
80. The amounts quoted for my settlement in the Telegraph articles provided to me
by the Inquiry are substantially overstated. The financial settlement will be
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published in POL’s accounts for 2024/2025 in due course. For clarity, my
settlementis for two years’ salary, excluding benefits, of £245,000 per annum.
81. The Telegraph article dated 29 June 2024 (RLIT0000244) provided to me by the
Inquiry also mentions allegations made about Nick Read's behaviour more
generally at POL, including that he oversaw a “culture of misogyny”. It has
seemed to me, and I have raised this with Nick, that he is instinctively more
comfortable with a team of younger, deferential, male colleagues — who are often
also talented, enthusiastic and hard-working. By contrast very few senior and
independent-minded colleagues, especially female colleagues, have thrived at
POL, and a number have been paid off and left the business.
82. I would note, however, that retaining Chief People Officers was an issue at POL
before Nick’s arrival as CEO. In my time at POL there have, from memory, been
seven Chief People Officers. Paula Vennells had three in four years between
2015 and 2019 and Nick has had four in five years between 2019 and 2024.
83. It has seemed to me that Nick Read has felt, understandably, very insecure in his
CEO role at POL anda lotof hisreactions have been led by the need to evidence
reassurance and support from the Shareholder, Board and Executive. The
Shareholder has supported Nick in principle but rarely supported his decisions or
requests.
OTHER MATTERS
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84. The Post Office business is capable of supporting a national network of Post
Offices, providing enormous value to the UK through access to parcel networks,
cash, foreign currency and much more.
85. Its immediate priority, through compensation schemes, legal processes and this
Inquiry is to provide justice for wronged Postmasters. This should include
Postmasters who paid for shortfalls through deductions from their remuneration
without full investigations having been completed.
86. Over the last few years, the business has become less resilient, financially and
operationally.
87. Horizon must be replaced, which may require new contracts for Postmasters.
These are hugely difficult undertakings. POL’s relationship with Fujitsu must be
exited. A whole new shortfall process must be developed, shared, implemented
and made transparent.
88. POL’s costs are at least £100m per annum higher than they should be and must
be reduced to support Postmasters better financially.
89. If HMG wants a sustainable, national set of Post Offices, it will have to finance
this complex, multi-year set of challenges and then arrange for Postmasters to
own the network long-term.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
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08 August 2024 I 15:53 BST
Dated:
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Index to Second Witness Statement of Alisdair Charles John Cameron
No, I URN Document description Control Number
1. I WITN09840100 First Witness Statement of I WITN09840100
Alisdair John Charles
Cameron, dated 18 April
2024
2. I POL00021531 Meeting minutes: minutes of I POLO000064
Board meeting held on 28th
January 2015
3. I POL00219395 CEO's Report January 2015 I POL-BSFF-
(01/01/2015) 0057458
4. I POL00423699 Email Subject: The I POL-BSFF-
robustness of our I 0238490
governance 26 March 2023
5. I POL00175235 What went wrong? A draft I POL-0170332
for discussion’ 19 November
2020
6. I UKGI00044323 Post Office Limited Annual I UKGI00044323
Report & Consolidated
Financial Statements
2022/23
7. I RLIT0000201 The Times article I RLIT0000201
‘Postmasters on Post Office
board “ignored and
unwanted”, dated 19
February 2024
8. I RLITO000245 NFSP article ‘NFSP I RLITO000245
Statement on PO Board
Postmaster NED role’,
dated 19 January 2024
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9. I RLITO000242 Telegraph article, ‘Post I RLIT0000242
Office Executive off sick for
almost a year after clash
with boss’ 6 March 2024
10.I RLITO000243 Telegraph article ‘Post I RLIT0000243
Office finance boss quits
after two months sick leave’
25 June 2024
11.
RLIT0000244 Telegraph article ‘Post I RLIT0000244
Office exec paid for years
after leaving’ 29 June 2024
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