WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Witness Name: Jane Elizabeth MacLeod
Statement No. WITN10010100
Dated: 30 April 2024
THE POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF JANE ELIZABETH MACLEOD
I, Jane Elizabeth MacLeod, say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. I am a former employee of the Post Office Limited (“POL”) and held the position
of General Counsel (“GC”) from 19 January 2015 to 31 May 2019.
2. This witness statement has been prepared in response to a request made by
the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) pursuant to Rule 9 of the
Inquiry Rules 2006, dated 19 January 2024 (the “Request’).
SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE REQUEST
3. The Request covers the following topics:
(a) I My background, recruitment, and subsequent career
(b) Overview of roles and responsibilities
Page 1 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(c) POL legal department
(d) I POL corporate governance
(e) I Knowledge of the Horizon IT System
(f) Project Sparrow and the Mediation Scheme
(g) I Review of criminal convictions: initial stages
(h) Project Sparrow after the closure of the Working Group
(i) Response to Panorama
(j) Tim Parker's appointment and the Swift Review
(k) Dalmellington Bug
(I) Brian Altman KC’s 2016 advice
(m) Project Bramble
(n) I The Group Litigation
PREPARATION OF THIS STATEMENT
4. I have been assisted in preparing this statement by BDB Pitmans LLP, who act
for me in a personal capacity.
5. The Inquiry has requested that I address certain questions. I have copied or
paraphrased (where clearer to do so) the relevant questions into the headings
and sub-headings of the sections of this statement that answer the respective
question. I have endeavoured to not phrase this as a “Q&A” and tried to prepare
as clear a narrative and factual account as I can recall, with the assistance of
the documents the Inquiry has provided me.
Page 2 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
I have retained no documents from my employment at POL. I have therefore
been reliant on my memory of events from up to 9 years ago, or as a result of
being prompted by the documents provided to me by the Inquiry. As part of the
Request, I have been provided with 272 documents, running to around 3,500
pages. However, I wish to note that the documents provided to me by the
Inquiry to date do not, of course, comprise the complete correspondence or
documents from the relevant time or relating to the respective issues. I have
therefore done the best I can to address the questions asked of me, based
primarily on the documents provided to me by the Inquiry. To the extent that my
recollection diverges with any contemporaneous documents that are
subsequently produced, this is unintentional and is simply borne by the passage
of time and my review of the documents provided to me.
Those documents which are expressly referred to in this statement are listed in
the index accompanying this statement.
I understand from correspondence BDB Pitmans has had with members of the
legal team for the Inquiry, and the solicitors acting for POL, that POL has waived
legal professional privilege in matters addressed in this statement.
I have at the front of my mind the seriousness of the issues and events being
investigated by the Inquiry and I am acutely aware of the human impact
underpinning the Inquiry’s work. I have had limited contact with POL or its
employees since leaving its employment, but I have read media reports from
time to time as the Inquiry has progressed. I support the Inquiry’s work and am
Page 3 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
keen to assist in its investigation. I am very aware that the decisions in which I
was involved during my time at POL regarding the Group Litigation and the
investigation of Horizon’s performance and robustness have had implications
for many subpostmasters and their families. I regret that this has happened and
apologise to those so affected for the adverse outcomes they have suffered.
MY_BACKGROUND, RECRUITMENT, SUMMARY OF ROLE AT POL, AND
SUBSEQUENT CAREER
My background and qualifications prior to joining POL
10. I obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree (BA) in 1983, and then a Bachelor of Laws
(LLB) in 1985 from the Australian National University. I undertook articles at
Macphillamy Cummins & Gibson, in Canberra, Australia and was subsequently
admitted as a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia in
February 1985. I joined Minter Ellison Solicitors in Sydney in early 1986 initially
in the Intellectual Property team, and later joining the Corporate and
Commercial team. In October 1988 I moved to the United Kingdom and joined
Simpson Curtis in Leeds for 18 months focusing on corporate and mergers and
acquisitions. In 1990 I moved to London and joined Wilde Sapte Solicitors. I
was admitted as a solicitor in England and Wales in September 1993. In
October 1996 I moved back to Australia and from July 1997 I undertook a legal
contract role with AMP Limited, an investment firm, and in July 1998, I then re-
joined Minter Ellison Lawyers in Sydney (where I had previously worked).
Page 4 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
11. In January 2001 I relocated back to the United Kingdom and from June 2001 to
the end of 2005, I held various Senior Legal Counsel roles at AMP (UK) Limited
and its successor Henderson Group Plc. From March 2006 to November 2014,
I held various legal roles at Pearl Group Limited (which in due course became
Phoenix Group Holdings) and was appointed General Counsel in 2009. All of
these roles were based in the United Kingdom.
12. With the exception of some limited personal injury litigation work during my
articles in 1985, I undertook no criminal or civil litigation work in any of the roles
referred to above. I would describe myself as a corporate lawyer, with significant
experience of managing a legal function within the financial services
environment.
My recruitment by POL
13. I was approached in February 2014 via a headhunter, Tungsten Noble, who
had been appointed by POL to conduct a search for candidates for the role of
GC. My recollection is that POL was looking for someone with a financial
services background and the role was positioned as being responsible for
manging the Legal, Company Secretariat, Internal Audit, Risk and Compliance,
and Security Teams. I exhibit the job description I was provided at the time as
WITN10010101.
14. The process was overseen by the POL HR Director and his team and it involved
multiple interviews with POL senior executives, including: Martin George (Chief
Commercial and Marketing Officer), Nick Kennett (Financial Services Director),
Page 5 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Kevin Gilliland (Network and Sales Director), Paula Vennells (Chief Executive
Officer (‘CEO”)), and Virginia Holmes (the then Chair of the Audit and Risk
Committee). The briefing process covered the whole of POL’s business which
at the time included mails, government services, telecoms and financial
services. The Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme (the “Scheme”)
was referenced in discussions but did not have a greater focus than any of the
other areas of the business. The whole recruitment process took around 10
months. I signed my contract on 9 December 2014, and took up my role on 19
January 2015.
The reasons for Mr Aujard’s departure and handover
15. I was aware that Chris Aujard was employed as an Interim GC on a fixed term
contract. Whilst that contract was extended pending my appointment, it came
to an end shortly after I commenced the role, so as to enable a short handover
period. My recollection is that POL had suggested a 3-month handover period.
However, as it was becoming confusing having two people in the role of GC,
Mr Aujard and I agreed, with POL’s support, that after approximately 4 to 6
weeks, he would not be required to work the full 3 months in the office, and was
thereafter available to me from home if required pending expiry of his contract.
I cannot recall whether for that remaining period of his contract I did in fact
speak to him about anything specifically.
16. My handover included briefings from Mr Aujard, as well as from the heads of
each of the functions that reported to me, and other experts on specific topics.
I cannot now recall the nature and extent of those briefings, but I relied on them
Page 6 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
to update me on the current matters they considered appropriate to brief me
on. Those experts also provided me with relevant reading materials. I cannot
recall specific details of the various reading materials provided to me, but I do
recall asking for and receiving the most recent Strategy papers and copies of
recent papers presented at the Group Executive and Board.
17. During my handover I also met with members of the Board, POL’s external audit
partner, and Simon Richardson, Senior Partner at Bond Dickinson. During my
time at POL, Bond Dickinson changed its name to Womble Bond Dickinson but,
for ease, I will refer to them as Bond Dickinson throughout this statement.
Brief summary of the roles I held whilst employed by POL
18. I joined POL as its GC on 19 January 2015. My role was also referred to as
Director of Corporate Services to reflect the fact that my responsibilities were
more extensive than the legal function, encompassing a wide range of
corporate services as set out in more detail in the paragraphs below, which
identify and expand on those additional roles. During my time at POL, my
formal title changed, which I explain below.
19. I was Company Secretary of POL from 31 August 2017 until 31 May 2019.
20. I was never at any point a director of POL.
21. I was a Director of Post Office Management Services Limited (“POMS”) (the
regulated financial services subsidiary of POL which trades as Post Office
Page 7 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Insurance) from 31 August 2015 until 20 March 2018. I was the Company
Secretary of POMS from 31 August 2017 until 31 May 2019.
Professional career since leaving POL
22. Following my role at POL, I returned to Australia in October 2020 and on 1
March 2020 was appointed General Counsel & Chief Risk Officer for the Asia
and Pacific region of FNZ Australia Pty Limited, a Fintech company. From 1
September 2022 to 31 March 2023 I was seconded to the Group holding
company FNZ Limited as Interim Group Chief Risk Officer for the FNZ Group. I
left FNZ on 31 August 2023. I am not currently in paid employment. I continue
to reside in Australia.
OVERVIEW OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
23. In this section I address the roles and responsibilities I had whilst employed at
POL.
24. I considered the role of GC was to ensure that the relevant officers and
employees of the organisation were provided with timely legal advice when
requested, and that they were aware of the legal risks associated with their
decision making. It was not for me to make the decisions on business
operations for them, rather I saw my role as a facilitator and advisor in that
process.
Page 8 of 211
25.
26.
27.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
When I joined POL, the GC role was responsible for managing the Legal,
Company Secretariat, Risk, Internal Audit, and Security Teams. These teams
were collectively known as the ‘Corporate Services’ directorate of POL, and as
such I was also known as the Director of Corporate Services, which was an
executive role. I was not a statutory director of POL, rather the title ‘Director’
was to indicate that I had day-to-day responsibility for managing this area of
POL’s business. I was a member of the Group Executive (originally called the
Executive Committee or ‘ExCo’) which is the senior leadership team
accountable to the CEO for the day-to-day operations of POL (“Group
Executive”).
To assist the Inquiry, I refer to an organogram prepared by BDB Pitmans with
my input, which sets out the committees I sat on, the structure of the teams who
reported to me, and the functional reporting lines at exhibit WITN10010102.
This is just a visual aid to support what I go on to explain in more detail below.
During my time at POL, the teams that reported to me were restructured
meaning that some of the reporting lines changed, and the name of the function
changed from ‘Corporate Services’ to ‘Legal, Risk, and Governance’ (“LRG”)
which ultimately comprised Legal, Company Secretariat, Risk, Compliance, and
Internal Audit. Each of the teams that reported to me was led by a ‘Director’ or
‘Head of who managed their specialist team. When I commenced the role in
January 2015 my direct reports included two Heads of Legal, the Company
Secretary, Head of Risk and Internal Audit, Head of Information Security, and
the Head of Security. Each of these ‘Head of roles had their own direct reports.
Page 9 of 211
28.
29.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
The Legal Team structure is described from paragraph 56 below.
From memory, over the period 2015-2019, the Company Secretariat Team
(‘CoSec”) comprised three to four roles. Whilst the GC was responsible for
managing the CoSec, when I joined POL the Company Secretary (then Alwen
Lyons) continued to report to Ms Vennells as CEO, and it was not until I believe
2016, although I cannot be certain about that date given the passage of time,
that Ms Lyons’ reporting line changed to me directly. When Ms Lyons retired in
2017, I became the Company Secretary. Thereafter, Veronica Branton was
appointed as the Head of Secretariat reporting to me and she fulfilled the day-
to-day responsibilities of the Company Secretary. The responsibilities of the
CoSec team included:
(a) supporting good corporate governance outcomes such that the
Board was able to approve POL’s strategic plans, monitor execution
of those plans, and oversee management of POL’s risks through an
effective risk framework;
(b) I ensuring that good governance practices were applied for all
corporate boards, the Group Executive, the POMS Group Executive
and their respective committees including scheduled meetings with
agreed agendas based on the terms of reference, supporting
executive management to prepare and present good quality Board
papers, and the preparation of accurate minutes of the discussions
Page 10 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and decisions reached at each meeting, together with follow up
actions);
(c) ensuring that all statutory compliance requirements were met for all
POL companies including filing and reporting to Companies House
and the maintenance of corporate registers;
(d) supporting other activities such as the annual audit and preparation
of the Annual Report, and responsibility for drafting the Governance
section of the Annual Report. The CoSec team also undertook an
annual Board evaluation process for both POL and POMS, and every
three years this evaluation was externally facilitated. The CoSec
team were responsible for coordinating completion of any
recommendations coming out of those evaluations; and
(e) supporting POL’s delegated authority approvals and processes and
the document execution framework.
With both Ms Lyons and Ms Branton, I had regular catch ups on Group
Executive and Board processes, including meeting schedules, agendas,
forward planning, relevant actions, Annual Report content and other
requirements such as Board evaluations, as well as looking at improvements in
the operation of the CoSec function. In addition, as Company Secretary, I
reviewed the draft minutes of the Board and its committees, as well as the
Page 11 of 211
31.
32.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
minutes of the Group Executive and Risk and Compliance Committee
meetings.
When I began as GC, the Internal Audit Team reported to the Head of Risk and
Internal Audit and comprised approximately five roles supported by an external
co-source arrangement with an external firm. This function had been run by an
interim manager and in the first half of 2015, I recruited a new Head — Mike
Morley-Fletcher. Unfortunately, Mr Morley-Fletcher left in, I believe, early 2016,
and as a result we restructured the Risk and Internal Audit teams into separate
functions, each of which had its own ‘Head of role, which reported directly to
me.
The Internal Audit Team was responsible for undertaking internal audits in
accordance with a programme approved by the POL Board Audit, Risk and
Compliance Committee (“ARC”), the work of which is further discussed below
in paragraph 83(a), and the POMS Board Audit, Risk and Compliance
Committee. The forward programme of audits was finalised by the end of each
financial year and covered a range of areas based on the risk profile of the
business, best practice audit review cycles and any specific requests raised by
management or the respective ARC. The Internal Audit Team was also
responsible for monitoring and reporting to the respective ARC on completion
of follow up items specified in the audit reports. There was an ARC approved
Internal Audit charter which stressed the independence of the internal audit
function and embedded a reporting line to the Chair of the ARC. I worked with
the Head of Internal Audit to review the proposed audit plan, I reviewed the
Page 12 of 211
33.
34.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
audit reports before they went to management or to the ARC, and I supported
the Head of Internal Audit to improve the overall quality of the team over time
as well as enhancing the audit reporting. During my tenure at POL, both the
external auditors and the internal audit co-source were re-procured and I was
part of the team that reviewed the submissions, interviewed the candidates and
made recommendations to the ARC as to the outcomes of the procurement
process.
The Risk Team comprised about five people. When I joined POL, the risk
framework was in its infancy and was not embedded. During my time, we
developed the risk framework, which included defining POL’s risk universe,
developing a risk appetite, developing policies for each of the key risk areas
owned by me as GC (which were all regulatory risks) and working with business
owners to support them in developing policies regarding the risks they owned,
and developing a quarterly risk reporting framework across POL. To do this, we
worked closely with the Chair of the ARC and with Deloitte as our external risk
advisers. Following Mr Morley-Fraser's departure, I recruited a new Risk
Director and supported her in the development of her team.
At the time of my appointment, the Security Team comprised approximately 40
- 50 people and covered physical security, investigations, and financial crime
(which focussed on external financial crime including money-laundering). In late
2015, the Security Team was restructured and the reporting line for the physical
security and investigations teams were transferred away from the GC and split
between Alisdair Cameron (the then Chief Financial Officer and Chief
Page 13 of 211
35.
36.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Operations Officer (“CFO”)) and Mr Gilliland (Network and Sales Director). As
a result, the Financial Crime team, which focused on financial crime and anti-
money laundering, became part of a wider Compliance team reporting to me.
The Information Security Team comprised around 10 - 15 people and covered
data protection as well information security. Following the appointment of Rob
Houghton as Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) in 2016, this team was also
restructured with the data protection team becoming part of a wider Compliance
team led by a Compliance Director reporting to me, and information security
team and related activity moved into the CIO team.
At the time I joined POL, Compliance was distributed across a number of
functions. During 2016 these were consolidated under a Compliance Director
who reported to me. Following this consolidation the Compliance Team
comprised approximately 20 people and were responsible for advising POL on
compliance requirements, and conducting assurance activity, and reporting on:
(a) financial services compliance which related particularly to the training
and assurance for in-branch sales of travel and general insurance
products in POL’s capacity as Appointed Representative for POMS;
(b) compliance requirements of the Banking Framework under which
POL provided deposit and withdrawal services to more than 20
British banks;
Page 14 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(c) compliance requirements relating to the Telecoms business;
(d) data protection across POL including in branches, and in 2017-18
this included the project to implement GDPR requirements across
POL and POMS and where I chaired the GDPR Project Steering
Committee;
(e) I managing and responding to Data Subject Access Requests, and
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) requests;
(f) anti-money laundering and external fraud compliance;
(g) I managing the externally sourced PCI DSS audits. (PCI DSS refers
to the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, a globally
recognized information security standard designed to safeguard
payment card data, and which applies to businesses that process
credit or debit card transactions); and
(h) I managing POL’s whistleblowing policy and investigating any reports
received under that policy.
Around the same time, I believe in 2016, POL changed the name of the
directorate from ‘Corporate Services’ to ‘Legal, Risk and Governance’. My title
therefore changed from ‘General Counsel and Director of Corporate Services’
to ‘General Counsel and Director of Legal, Risk and Governance’. However, on
Page 15 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
a day-to-day basis I was known as ‘General Counsel’ and my sign offs on
emails and letters used this shorthand up until 2018, when my full title was then
used in sign offs.
38. As I have set out above, the number of my direct reports varied during my
tenure, but following the various restructures, was six (excluding project leads),
being the Director of each of Legal, Risk, Compliance, Head of Internal Audit,
Company Secretary, and the Head of Portfolio, LRG. The total LRG team
exceeded 50 people. In addition, where I was a project sponsor (e.g. GDPR)
the Project Manager reported to me. Although each team within LRG had its
own functional head, I was responsible for setting their objectives and
overseeing progress against those objectives. Although it naturally varied over
time depending upon the work the particular team was dealing with, on average
I estimate that I spent approximately 15% of my time on each team and its
activities. The balance of my time was spent on my role as a member of the
Group Executive.
Committee Attendance and Membership
39. Aspart of my role as GC and as the member of the Group Executive responsible
for legal, governance, risk, compliance and internal audit at POL, I attended a
number of POL and POMS Board and committee meetings. I was also a
member of a number of management committees and attended a variety of
regular management meetings. I set out below a brief summary of those
meetings relevant to the Request. I appreciate the Inquiry will by now be familiar
with the corporate governance structures of POL, but I believe it is helpful when
Page 16 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
considering the various meetings I attended to understand that they can be
distinguished in the following way:
(a) I The POL Board and its three standing committees (Audit, Risk and
Compliance Committee, Remuneration Committee and the
Nominations Committee);
(b) Specialist Board sub-committees which were established by the
Board from time to time such as the Pensions Committee, the
Financial Services Committee and the Sparrow Sub-Committee (all
of which were established before I started) and the Postmaster
Litigation Sub-Committee which was established in 2018;
(c) The Group Executive and its sub-committees which included the
Risk and Compliance Committee and, for a period, the
Transformation Committee.
(d) I Management project steering committee meetings of which there
were many and which met at least monthly, but in some cases more
frequently, and which oversaw the implementation of specific
initiatives.
In respect of each of the Board and committees referred to above (other than
the project meetings), they were supported by the CoSec Team for the
production of agendas and minutes and in the follow up of actions.
Page 17 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL Board and its three standing committees
41. More detail about the composition of the Board and its standing committees is
set out in the Compostion and Operation of the Board section of this witness
statement (see from paragraph 77)81, but in summary I attended:
(a) The Board — prior to my appointment as Company Secretary, I only
attended the Board from time to time in my capacity as GC to present
or report on specific matters. Following my appointment as Company
Secretary, I attended all Board meetings in my capacity as Company
Secretary, and from time to time I presented reports on specific
matters in my capacity as GC or as the executive director responsible
for Internal Audit, Risk and Compliance.
(b) The Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee - ARC - this was a
standing committee of the Board and I generally attended the whole
of the ARC meetings in my capacity as the executive director
responsible for Internal Audit, Risk and Compliance. I also separately
provided regular reports on legal, risk and compliance matters.
(c) The Remuneration Committee (“RemCo’) - this was a standing
committee of the Board and I attended in my role as Company
Secretary.
Page 18 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(d) The Nominations Committee (“NomCo”) - this was a standing
committee of the Board and I attended in my role as Company
Secretary.
Specialist Board Sub-Committees
42. What I describe as ‘specialist board sub-committees’ are committees which
were set up to deal with a specific project or a stream of work and as such had
a narrow focus. During my tenure there were four such committees:
(a) I The Sparrow Sub-Committee — this committee was set up following
a resolution of the Board to make recommendations to the Board and
provide strategic oversight in respect of Project Sparrow. It was
chaired by Alice Perkins (the then Chair of the POL Board). I do not
know when it was established as it was before I joined POL, and I
have not been provided with a copy of its Terms of Reference. I only
recall attending one meeting of the Sparrow Sub-Committee shortly
after I began my role as GC on 18 February 2015 (POL00006574),
and I believe it was disbanded during 2015.
(b) IThe Pensions Committee was established to oversee the strategic
work relating to employee pensions following separation from Royal
Mail. It met two to three times a year and I attended in my capacity
as GC.
Page 19 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(c) The Financial Services Committee was chaired by Virginia Holmes
and was established to oversee the development and
implementation of the strategy for the Financial Services business
and the restructuring of the arrangements with Allied Irish Bank,
which resulted in the establishment of POL’s regulated subsidiary,
Post Office Management Services Limited. The Committee met three
to four times a year. It was disbanded following the stand up of POMS
as a regulated entity. I attended in my capacity as GC.
(d) I The Postmaster Litigation Sub-Committee (the “Litigation Sub-
Committee") - this was established in 2018 to oversee the litigation
commenced by subpostmasters (“SPMs’”) (the “Group Litigation’),
and was chaired by the Chairman, Tim Parker. It met at least four
times per year. I attended in my capacity as GC. I set out more detail
about this sub-committee in the Group Litigation section.
Group Executive and its committees
43.
In respect of the committees connected to the Group Executive, I set out below
a brief explanation of those which took up a reasonable amount of my time
during my tenure:
(a) I The Group Executive — this was also referred to as the “Executive
Committee” or “ExCo” when I first joined, and later changed its name
to the “Group Executive” or “GE”. The Group Executive comprised
the most senior executives generally being the direct reports of the
Page 20 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
CEO, as well as certain others, and the membership changed over
the time I was at POL. However, it did include the Chief Financial
Officer / Chief Operating Officer (when I joined Mr Cameron's title
was ‘Chief Financial Officer’ and then it changed to be ‘Chief Finance
and Operating Officer’), the Commercial Director, the Network and
Sales Director, the Group People Director, the Group Business
Transformation Director, the Financial Services Director, the Director
of Strategy, the GC and the Company Secretary.
(b) I The Group Executive's role and responsibility was to implement the
strategy agreed by the Board. It had decision-making authority within
the Board-approved Delegated Authority Framework. The Group
Executive held weekly and monthly meetings; the weekly meetings
were usually only one hour and were a ‘round the table’ catch up on
new developments. The monthly meetings usually took about half a
day and were supported by papers and presentations from
executives which informed decisions that could be taken by the
CEO/Group Executive, or which were being recommended to the
Board for approval. The papers (which often ran to 100 pages or
more) were circulated in advance and the meetings were minuted.
(c) The Risk and Compliance Committee (“RCC”) — I was initially Chair
of this committee in my Risk and Compliance capacity, which
reported to the Group Executive and its remit was oversight of risk
management. The Chair later switched to the Chief Financial Officer
Page 21 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
/ Chief Operating Officer which aligned better with the objects and
purpose of the committee. From memory, I believe this committee
met bi-monthly. There was a forward-looking rolling agenda, papers
(again usually in excess of 100 pages) were pre-circulated and the
meetings were minuted.
Management project steering committee meetings
44. Inrespect of project steering committees, I sat on a considerable number of such
committees during my tenure, and these changed from time to time as projects
were initiated and then delivered. These meetings had papers (usually prepared
by the project manager) which were pre-circulated, and actions and decisions
were recorded. From memory, the project committees I attended included the
projects related to the acquisition of Payzone Bill Payments Limited ("Payzone’),
the Royal Mails contract negotiation, Transformation Programme, GDPR (which
I chaired), the Health & Safety Committee (which I attended in my Risk capacity
and which met quarterly), and I chaired a committee to oversee the
implementation of ‘joiner/movers/leavers’ controls, the need for which arose from
an adverse audit report. In addition, there was an annual working group set up
to oversee the production of the Annual Report which I also attended. The
committees which took up the majority of my day-to-day calendar were:
(a) The Transformation Steering Committee — this committee was set
up by the Director of Transformation to monitor risks emerging from
the overall Transformation Programme and oversee the
implementation of mitigation actions. The Transformation
Page 22 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Programme covered a number of initiatives across the Retail
Network, HR and IT. I attended the Transformation Steering
Committee in my Risk and Internal Audit/Assurance capacity. The
Transformation Programme was a significant project and took up a
lot of my time in the first 18 months of my time at POL. In addition to
the committee meetings themselves I had regular meetings with the
external assurance team to receive updates on the delivery of their
assurance programme, and to set priorities for future assurance
work. The progress of the Transformation Programme was of
material importance to Post Office and was a periodic agenda item
at Board meetings (for example see POL00030888_0042).
(b) The Subpostmaster Litigation Steering Group (“Litigation
Steering Group”) — this was established in May 2016 in order to
oversee the Group Litigation. I have set out more detail about this
committee in the Group Litigation section.
(c) IThe GDPR Steering Committee which was established to oversee
the implementation of the regulatory GDPR requirements across
Post Office. This was a significant project and we had up to 40
contractors working on the project at different times. I chaired the
GDPR Steering Committee which met monthly. The role of the GDPR
Steering Committee was to approve the work plan, monitor progress
against the work plan, commission and receive assurance reports on
implementation, discuss and give guidance on prioritisation issues,
Page 23 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and oversee resourcing and the project budget. Papers were
prepared by the project manager and pre-circulated, and actions and
decisions were recorded. In addition, I met with the Project Manager
on a regular basis (at least fortnightly) to discuss issues and
progress.
POMS
45. As part of my role as a Director of POMS, I attended the following meetings:
(a) POMS Board which met approximately 8 times per year for
approximately 2-3 hours per meeting. Meeting packs were prepared
and distributed in advance, and the meetings were minuted; and
(b) I POMS Board Audit, Risk and Compliance Sub-Committee which
met quarterly for around 2 hours per meeting. Again, meeting packs
were prepared and distributed in advance, and the meetings were
minuted.
First Rate Exchange Services Limited
46. I also attended the Risk and Compliance Committee of First Rate Exchange
Services Limited — the joint venture between POL and Bank of Ireland relating
to the provisions of foreign exchange to Post Office branches. These meetings
were quarterly for approximately 2 hours, meeting packs were prepared and
distributed in advance and the meetings were minuted. I also attended the
quarterly relationship meetings between POL and Bank of Ireland. Again, there
were meeting packs prepared and distributed in advance, and the meetings
Page 24 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
were minuted. In both cases, my attendance related to my risk and compliance
responsibilities.
My professional responsibilities derived from my position as GC
47. I have been asked to set out my view of my professional responsibilities derived
from my position as a legal professional whilst acting as GC. As a solicitor
admitted to the High Court of England and Wales and holding a practising
certificate, I was under the same obligations and responsibilities as any other
admitted solicitor. I was regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and
followed its Code of Conduct for solicitors, irrespective of whether the function
I was undertaking was purely legal, executive, or a hybrid. As an in-house
solicitor though, I was not subject to certain obligations that apply to solicitors
working in law firms, for example in relation to trust accounts and client money
accounts.
POL LEGAL DEPARTMENT
Management structure of POL Legal
48. At the time I joined POL in 2015, the legal team comprised approximately 10
specialist lawyers covering Procurement, Property, IT, Telecoms, Financial
Services, Litigation, and general Corporate and Commercial expertise. There
were two Heads of Legal who reported directly to me, each of whom had been
at POL for several years. Jessica Madron had been at POL for over 20 years
and headed the team that provided the legal support for all matters relating to
the branch network. POL’s civil litigation lawyer, Rodric Williams, also reported
to Ms Madron, and I believe that Janail Singh, POL’s criminal litigation lawyer,
Page 25 of 211
49.
50.
51.
52.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
had reported to Ms Madron, however he left shortly after I started. Mr Williams
was thereafter responsible for all litigation matters, becoming Head of Litigation,
although there were no criminal matters afoot by that stage.
The other Head of Legal was Piero d’Agostino who had been at POL for I
believe 3 - 4 years and led a small team that provided legal support for financial
services, telecoms, IT and procurement, corporate matters, major commercial
contracts, and mergers and acquisitions (e.g. the acquisition of the joint venture
interest from Bank of Ireland relating to the General Insurance business).
Prior to me joining, it had been decided that a third Head of Legal role should
be created, ‘Head of Financial Services’, to support the Financial Services
business. I undertook the final interviews and appointed Ben Foat to that role.
My recollection is that he started in that position in mid-2015.
In late 2015/early 2016, the leadership of the legal department was restructured
so that there was only one Head of Legal (thereafter called the Legal Director).
Following an internal selection process, Mr Foat was appointed to that role. Ms
Madron and Mr d’Agostino exited the business in the subsequent 6 — 12
months. As Director of Legal, Mr Foat reported directly to me, and had
responsibility across all the areas described above.
In terms of the reporting lines, as GC, I reported directly to the CEO, Ms
Vennells. Ms Vennells and I would agree written annual objectives which
related to the delivery of POL’s strategy and annual plans, as well as objectives
Page 26 of 211
53.
54.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
which related to the management and development of those functions for which
I was responsible. Ms Vennells and I had regular monthly meetings where we
tracked progress against these objectives, as well as discussing other matters
that were material at the time. An agenda was prepared for each of these
meetings, and we would both take notes of actions arising. In addition, we would
have other subject specific meetings on an as needs basis either 1:1 or with
others.
The LRG team and I contributed to the development of Group Executive and
Board papers in relation to the legal, risk and compliance implications of specific
initiatives, as well as producing our own papers and reports in accordance with
agreed reporting cycles. The Board regularly reviewed and approved a
Delegations of Authority matrix which set out the framework for those decisions
that required Board approval, those decisions that were delegated to the CEO,
and those decisions that were delegated to individual members of the Group
Executive.
Across the LRG function, on an annual basis I agreed performance objectives
with each of my direct reports. Performance objectives for each of my direct
reports cascaded down from those that the CEO and I had agreed for me. I had
monthly 1:1s with each of my direct reports where we tracked achievement of
these objectives and discussed other issues relevant to their respective areas
of responsibility, and we had ad hoc meetings as required to discuss material
issues. In addition, I had weekly and monthly team meetings with my direct
reports. At the one-hour weekly meetings we discussed recent developments
Page 27 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and the priorities for that week. At the monthly LRG leadership team meetings
we discussed matters relevant to the performance of the wider LRG function.
We also had an ‘all hands’ monthly team meeting which updated the whole LRG
function on recent developments and upcoming activities. There were also
project meetings at which LRG was represented, some of which I would attend
also in my capacity as a member of the Group Executive, and we also had
meetings which were to brief other parts of the Post Office on new legal or
regulatory developments. I would say that on average these meetings
collectively took up one day a week. There was also associated preparation
and reading for those meetings which took up a similar amount. So each week
I would spend up to two days associated with these meetings.
55. Generally I tried to empower each of my direct reports to manage their teams
and deliver their responsibilities without micro-management from me, and as
such I would not have been briefed on minor day-to-day issues. However, my
direct reports knew that they could discuss issues with me or seek my guidance
whenever required.
The work of POL Legal
56. During my time as GC, there was a wide range of work undertaken by the legal
function, and the legal team were constantly busy with their day-to-day
functions. Whilst I go on to address specific questions regarding roles and
responsibilities in the Group Litigation, I think it would be fair to say that the
issues with which this Inquiry is concerned were only one part of a broader
workload, and represented only a small part of what the internal legal function
Page 28 of 211
57.
58.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
as a whole was managing. While it changed from week to week depending on
what was happening at the time, on average I would spend c.15-20% of my
time on legal matters — including my involvement in the Scheme and the Group
Litigation. That is not to say I did not recognise the importance of those matters,
but I relied on the support and advice of our internal litigation colleagues and
external advisers in respect of this work.
Shortly after I commenced employment, POL moved from offices on Old Street,
London to newly refurbished premises across 3 floors at Finsbury Dials.
Following the move, the majority of the LRG team sat together in an open plan
area on the Ground Floor. The CoSec team sat on the first floor near the Board
Room, the Compliance team was split between the ground floor and the 2™
floor (where the Telecoms and Financial Services teams were located) and
certain members of the team working on the Scheme and the Group Litigation
worked from other offices (e.g. Swansea).
Although at the time POL encouraged hot desking, each team within LRG tried
to sit together. I initially sat with the Legal team in the middle of the Ground
Floor, however after a reorganisation of the space on the Ground Floor, the
Legal team moved to provide greater opportunity for confidentiality given the
nature of their work, and I remained in the middle of the floor. To me this
physical positioning better reflected that my role covered a number of functions,
not just Legal. After I was made Company Secretary, I moved to sit with the
CoSec team on the first floor which worked better as I shared a PA with the
Chairman, whose office was also on the first floor.
Page 29 of 211
59.
60.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Within POL Legal, when I joined, all of the specialist lawyers directly reported
to their respective Head of Legal, and through the Heads of Legal to me.
Following the restructure in 2015/16 all of the Legal team reported directly or
indirectly to Mr Foat. The practical effect of this was that Mr Foat received
regular updates across the whole Legal function, and his briefing to me at our
monthly 1:1 would be based on those updates. I believe that Mr Foat conducted
whole team meetings from time to time and given their physical proximity to
each other I believe that the whole team had an appreciation of the nature of
the work that was underway across the function.
I have set out below some examples of the wide range of key projects that the
legal team were working on during my tenure, and on which I was briefed, and
the progress, details and issues of which I was expected to be aware:
(a) Negotiations regarding the revised contract with the National
Federation of Subpostmasters (‘NFSP");
(b) I Legal work to support the Network Transformation project which
included the legal work relating to the disposal of premises formerly
occupied by Crown branches;
(c) Negotiations with WH Smith to increase the number of post offices
they operated (Project Paddington);
Page 30 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(d) Negotiations with Bank of Ireland about the establishment of POMS
and the transfer from Bank of Ireland to POMS of the 50% JV interest
owned by Bank of Ireland in relation to the insurance business.
POMS also looked at various acquisition opportunities from time to
time;
(e) I Renegotiation of the Mails Distribution Agreement with Royal Mail;
(f) The Scheme, and the subsequent Group Litigation. There was
relatively little other litigation during my tenure;
(g) Legal aspects of various restructurings across POL’s business
including negotiations with the Communications Workers Union;
(h) I Procurement was a major driver of work in the legal team given the
requirements of the Public Contracts Regulations which were
amended in 2015. Material procurement activity which the legal team
supported during my tenure included:
i. Termination of the IBM contract (Project Trinity);
ii. Negotiations with Fujitsu about changes to its contract, and
equivalent negotiations with other IT suppliers under the
‘Towers’ model;
Page 31 of 211
(i)
(0)
(k)
()
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Post Office regularly participated in tender processes for the
provision of government services through the post office
network e.g. for the DVLA in relation to drivers' licences and
MOT renewals, and the BBC for TV licence renewals;
The process to appoint new external and internal auditors. I
was on the committee that oversaw the procurement process,
interviewed candidate firms, and made recommendations as
to the preferred firm for the ARC to consider; and
The establishment of a new legal panel in 2018.
Re-negotiation of the Banking Framework which enabled customers
of over 20 banks to engage in basic banking transactions through
post offices;
Extension of the Post Office Card Account contract with Department
of Work & Pensions relating to the provision of services for in branch
pension payments;
Funding and relationship documents with Government;
The acquisition of Payzone;
Page 32 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(m) Purchase of a small telecoms business and the subsequent
preparation for the sale process relating to the merged telecoms
business;
(n) Legal issues relating to the provision of identity services in branch,
and
(0) A project to consider the optimum legal structure for POL going
forward.
61. As part of the separation from Royal Mail Group, POL had established a panel
of external legal advisers. This was reviewed in 2018. Under Mr Foat's
supervision, a compliant procurement process was undertaken to provide POL
with the additional legal resources it required. Generally, external legal advice
was sought either because additional specialist capability was required which
the POL legal team did not possess (e.g. M&A activity, and material litigation)
or extra capacity was required. Generally, the POL legal team managed the
relationship with the external law firms and worked cooperatively with the
relevant business managers to brief the external law firm.
My knowledge of POL’s role in prosecuting SPMs
62. I have been asked to set out what I knew of POL’s role in prosecuting SPMs for
theft, false accounting and/or offences under the Fraud Act 2006 when I joined
POL. I have reflected hard on this question and I do not now recall what I knew
at the time of joining POL regarding the prosecutions. I do recall that as part of
Page 33 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
my induction once I had joined, I was briefed on the history that led to the
establishment of the Scheme and I believe I was shown some of the
investigation reports that were developed by the POL team under the Scheme,
and the case reports prepared by Second Sight Support Services Limited
(“Second Sight’) (both of which are further explained in paragraph 111) by way
of example of the issues raised. However, I cannot recall which reports I was
given. There were no prosecutions underway at the time I joined, although I
seem to recall that there may have been prosecutions in Scotland and/or
Northern Ireland which were undertaken by the relevant external equivalents to
the CPS, but I had no involvement in those matters. I do not recall being
provided with any of the legacy legal advice at that time. I do recall asking how
many prosecutions there had been and my recollection is that that the answer
was 40-50 per year, which in the context of a network with more than 11,500
branches, I understood was not an unusual number.
My understanding of privilege
63. Later in this statement I address privilege in the context of the Chairman's
Review and within the Group Litigation. With regards to privilege more generally
within POL, I appreciate that privilege is a complicated area, particularly in
litigation. As I was not a litigation lawyer, I would say my understanding of
privilege was at a general level as it was not something, prior to joining POL,
that I had to deal with in practice. When I joined POL, I understood that the term
‘legal professional privilege’ was the umbrella term for legal advice privilege and
litigation privilege. I understood that in general terms, legal advice privilege
attaches to confidential communications between a lawyer and their client
Page 34 of 211
64.
65.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
where the dominant purpose of that communication is seeking or giving legal
advice, and that applies equally to in-house lawyers acting in their capacity as
such. Litigation privilege attaches to confidential communications between the
lawyer and their client and/or a third party, or as between a client and a third
party, where those communications are created for the dominant purpose of
obtaining information or advice in connection with the conduct of existing or
contemplated litigation. Unless expressly stated otherwise, in this witness
statement I collectively refer to these two strands of legal professional privilege
as ‘privilege’.
My view on and approach to privilege at POL was no different to that in any
other organisation that I had worked. It was rarely a matter that arose on a day-
to-day basis given the nature of the majority of legal work undertaken by the
POL legal team. Where a matter was being led by a colleague, I would not
generally be consulted as to whether any particular document or part of a
document would attract privilege or not; this would be dealt with by the relevant
lawyer — usually in conjunction with external legal advisers. In practice, the
question of whether privilege might properly apply mostly arose in relation to
contractual issues which had the potential to become a dispute.
As lawyers, we were clear that where it applied, privilege only attached to legal
advice being given or received or, in the case of litigation privilege, where the
dominant purpose of the communication was litigation. However, generally, this
was not well understood by the business who from time to time, sought to label
documents, including emails, as “privileged”, without appreciating privilege was
Page 35 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
unlikely to apply. As a result, the POL legal team would have to explain to the
business why privilege was unlikely to apply in the situation in which the
business was seeking to use it. If it was determined that in relation to a specific
matter it was possible that one or more documents or parts of documents might
attract privilege, the relevant POL lawyer would circulate an email to the
relevant business teams setting out a high-level procedural approach to
privilege in the specific context. This included statements to the effect that
privilege only attached to legal advice contained within a particular document
or part of a document, and would not apply to all communications on the
subject. I recall conversations with colleagues where we outlined the protocols
to be followed and reminded them that simply marking a document as privileged
would not of itself confer the document with privilege.
In relation to the developing SPM issues such as the Scheme, the POL legal
team discussed privilege with our external lawyers on a number of occasions
on a case-by-case basis. As set out elsewhere in my statement, there were a
number of circumstances where the POL legal team anticipated that certain
documents would attract legal privilege by virtue of their nature, or if litigation
eventuated. Where a specific document was identified as potentially being
subject to privilege, then we would discuss with our external legal advisers
whether privilege applied to that document. I do not now recall whether I made
any decisions as to disclosure, but consider it unlikely that I would have done
so without reliance on external advice given the nuances of the law around
privilege.
Page 36 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Responsi
lities of a board of a company solely owned by HM Government
67. I have been asked to summarise my views on the responsibilities of a board of
directors in the operation of a company owned solely by HM Government, and
in particular, in relation to the oversight of (i) criminal prosecutions, (ii) civil
litigation, (iii) IT, and (iv) accounting systems used to collate individual
transactions, cash and stock declarations etc. used for the purposes of
preparing management and statutory accounts.
68. In my view, ownership, whether by HM Government or indeed any other
shareholder, does not impact the basic duties of a board of directors which are
set out in Chapters 2 and 3 of Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006, and in
particular those duties set out in sections 172-177, as well as in other relevant
legislation relating to specific duties such as health and safety etc. However,
ownership by HM Government may also impose additional duties such as
certain procurement processes that must be followed. While I hope that all
boards believe that they should act with integrity, transparency and fairness,
the boards of companies whose sole shareholder is HM Government should
expect higher public scrutiny than would be the case for a privately owned
company. This would apply not just to the four issues mentioned in (i)-(iv)
above, but to all matters.
69. In addition to the statutory duties set out in the Companies Act, there are various
guides issued by HM Government that apply to (inter alia) wholly owned entities
such as POL. These guides include:
Page 37 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(a) ‘Guidance for Directors of companies fully or partly owned by the
public sector’ published by the Cabinet Office in 2016 (1 am not aware
whether there were previous versions of this document);
(b) ‘Managing Public Money’ issued by HM Treasury — the current
version is dated May 2023, and I am aware there was a version in
2015 when I started at POL; and
(c) ‘Code of Conduct for Board Members of Public Bodies’ issued by the
Cabinet Office. The current draft is dated June 2019 and replaces the
previous version from 2011.
70. While these documents set out in detail the standards that are expected for
government bodies and government owned entities, these are, in the case of a
wholly owned subsidiary such as POL, consistent with the over-arching duties
imposed by the Companies Act. Prior to me joining POL, the Board had
included statements in the Annual Report to the effect that it would seek to
observe the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code, being the
Code that applies to companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange. This was a
very onerous framework, however during my tenure we referenced the Code’s
requirements to determine what good practice looked like for the operation of
the POL Board.
Page 38 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
71. I While a board is ultimately responsible for setting the strategy and overseeing
the management of the company, it delegates responsibility to its executives to
implement the board approved strategy and manage the day-to-day operations
of the company, including in relation to the four issues identified in the question
(paragraph 67 above). The board should ensure that the company has_ the
right management having the appropriate level of expertise to respond to the
needs of the business including in relation to the four issues identified above,
and the right risk management framework to provide assurance to the board
that these (and other issues) are being addressed in accordance with the board
mandated strategy and risk appetite. The board should also ensure that the
company has clear reporting lines and an appropriate internal governance
framework so that, wherever possible, decisions are suitably informed and
taken at the appropriate level, and where appropriate, escalated to the board.
Corporate structure
72. I have been asked to summarise the corporate structure of POL and how the
POL Board operated. During my tenure, the corporate structure was very
simple.
73. I was aware that when POL became a public corporation in 2012, it was owned
directly by the Secretary of State for Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”) which held a special share (for clarity, the
department changed its name in 2016 from Business, Innovation & Skills (“BIS”)
to Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy following a merger between two
departments). Originally, the Shareholder Executive (“ShEX”) managed BEIS’s
Page 39 of 211
74.
75.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
interest in POL. ShEx’s functions - including oversight of POL, were transferred
in 2016 to the newly established UK Government Investments (“UKGI”). In
practice this made no difference to POL's Board, and Richard Callard remained
the Government appointed Non-Executive Director (“Shareholder NED’).
When I joined, POL was a wholly owned subsidiary of Postal Services Holding
Company Limited (the “Holding Company”), which operated purely as a
holding company. In June 2017, the Holding Company entered voluntary
liquidation and the shares in POL were distributed to BEIS. This process was
managed entirely by BEIS with support from Alwen Lyons as Company
Secretary in relation to the actual transfer of shares in POL.
POL operated the mails, government services, financial services, and telecoms
business, employed all staff (other than those in the regulated financial services
business who were employed by POMS) and entered into all key contracts. At
the time I joined POL, it had one wholly owned subsidiary, POMS, which
operated the regulated financial services business (which comprised the
provision of travel and general insurance), and POL also held a 50% interest in
First Rate Exchange Services Holdings Limited (“FRESH”), which was a 50:50
joint venture with Bank of Ireland (UK) Pic. FRESH in turn had a wholly owned
subsidiary, First Rate Exchange Services Limited (“FRES”). FRES supplied
POL with foreign exchange, so that POL could operate foreign exchange
services through its Post Office branches including the provision of foreign
currency.
Page 40 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
76. In October 2018, POL acquired, and became 100% shareholder in Payzone.
Payzone provides bill payment services, and offers terminals for payment of
bills, tickets, lottery, and mobile phone top ups.
Composition and Operation of the Board
77. The POL’s Board comprised of two Executive Directors (the CEO and CFO), a
representative of BEIS through ShEx (and later UKGI), in the form of a
Shareholder NED, and independent Non-Executive Directors (including the
Chair) whose appointment was approved by BEIS.
78. Atthe time of my appointment as GC, POL’s Board comprised of the Chair (Alice
Perkins), four independent Non-Executive Directors (Neil McCausland, Tim
Franklin, Virginia Holmes and Alasdair Marnoch), the Shareholder NED (Richard
Callard), and two Executive Directors (the CEO Ms Vennells, and the newly
appointed CFO, Mr Cameron). During my tenure at POL, the Chair, three of the
independent non-executive directors, the Shareholder NED and the CEO
changed. At the time I left POL, the Board comprised Tim Parker as Chair, Ken
McCall as Senior Independent Director, Carla Stent, Mr Franklin, and Shirine
Khoury-Haq as Non-Executive Directors, Tom Cooper as Shareholder NED, and
Mr Cameron as Acting CEO.
79. In addition to POL Board members and the Company Secretary, there were
attendees at each Board meeting. Usually such attendees (being members of
the Group Executive with responsibility for the particular matter under discussion,
together in some cases with certain of their direct reports) were present only for
Page 41 of 211
80.
81.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
the specific items that they were presenting on. Attendees were recorded in the
minutes of each Board meeting.
Throughout my tenure, the POL Board met approximately eight times per year
(including an annual strategy away day), in accordance with a schedule that was
agreed circa 6 — 12 months in advance. Under Alice Perkins, Board meetings
lasted approximately a full day. Under Tim Parker’s chairmanship, Board
meetings were reduced in length and were usually only circa 3 hours. As a result,
the business of the meeting was more tightly controlled. Nevertheless, all Board
members had the opportunity to speak on matters, and I do not recall the shorter
Board meetings being challenged through the annual Board evaluation process.
The agenda for Board (and sub-committee) meetings was developed by the
Head of Company Secretariat, discussed with me, and then finalised in meetings
between the Company Secretary, the CEO, and the meeting Chair. The inputs
into the agenda planning included an annual forward plan, actions from previous
meetings, decisions required to be made in relation to ongoing business in
accordance with the Board’s or Committee’s Terms of Reference, as well as any
other matters that either the CEO or Chair wanted raised. The agenda for
scheduled Board meetings broadly included:
(a) I Administrative matters, e.g. attendees, conflicts, actions from earlier
meetings, sealings;
Page 42 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(b) CEO report which summarised material developments across the
business since the last meeting, areas of concern for the CEO, and
material upcoming developments. This paper was collated from,
among other sources, the reports from each senior executive
submitted to the Group Executive;
(c) CFO report summarising the financial position of the business
including profit and loss and balance sheet updates, and
performance of each individual operating business;
(d) I Papers for approval — the Board Terms of Reference set out those
matters that required Board approval as well as those matters that
also required Shareholder approval being those above a specified
threshold;
(e) Strategic papers, which varied from meeting to meeting;
(f) Reports from committees;
(g) I Other matters required by the forward agenda; and
(h) I Other ad hoc matters.
82. The level of discussion at each meeting varied depending on the topic. Some
papers were for noting only, as they were not controversial, and were taken as
Page 43 of 211
83.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
read with no discussion. Other papers, even where no decision was required,
would generate significant discussions, and those papers requiring decisions
would generate discussions depending on the complexity and significance of the
subject matter.
In addition to its own deliberations, the Board had established three standing
Board sub-committees, which each had their own Terms of Reference setting
out (inter alia) their responsibilities and delegated authority:
(a) ARC - Audit, Risk and Compliance: this committee approved the
annual audit plans for the internal and external auditors, considered
strategic risks, reviewed the risk management framework, and
reviewed and approved policies. It was chaired by a Non-Executive
Director, and the other members were the Senior Independent
Director, and two Non-Executive Directors. I attended the whole of
the ARC meetings as the Executive having responsibility for Internal
Audit, Risk and Compliance and it was normal for the CFO and the
Head of Internal Audit to also attend. The CEO attended a number,
but not all, of the meetings. The Risk Director and the Compliance
Director were also present during the meetings. There were also
other attendees from time to time who came to present on specific
items, and their attendance was noted in the minutes;
(b) IRemCo - Remuneration Committee: this committee discussed
matters relating to the remuneration of the Executive Directors (CEO
Page 44 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and CFO), as well as for members of the Group Executive. It also
reviewed and approved the structure and terms of POL employee
incentive schemes. It was chaired by the Senior Independent
Director, and the other members were another Non-Executive
Director and CEO. The Group People Director/HR Director was a
standing attendee. I attended in my role as Company Secretary, and
I believe the CFO attended regularly as well; and
(c) NomCo - Nominations Committee: considered the skills and
experience required by the Board for any new appointments to the
POL Board. It also approved appointments of senior executive
officers and agreed changes to the Board composition of POL’s
wholly owned subsidiaries. It was chaired by the Chairman, and the
other members were the Senior Independent Director and the
Shareholder NED. The Group People Director/HR Director was a
standing attendee, and I attended in my role as Company Secretary.
84. In addition to these three standing committees, the Board established four other
sub-committees which were in operation during my tenure. These were the
Pensions, Financial Services, Sparrow and Litigation sub-committees, which I
discuss further below.
85. The Terms of Reference for each committee were made available on POL’s
website, and were summarised in the Governance section of the Annual Report.
Page 45 of 211
86.
87.
88.
89.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Meetings for all the Board sub-committees were held in accordance with a pre-
agreed schedule — usually within 2 weeks prior to the relevant Board meeting.
Under Mr Parker, the ARC frequently met immediately before, and on the same
day as, the Board.
Aside from the scheduled Board and sub-committee meetings, there were also
ad-hoc Board and sub-committee meetings from time to time to discuss specific
issues or developments. The Board meeting held on 18 March 2019 to discuss
the recusal application is an example of such an ad-hoc meeting
(POL00027594).
During my tenure, work was undertaken to improve the quality of Board reporting,
and the agendas at Board meetings were more focussed. My sense was that Mr
Parker had certain matters that he wanted to prioritise for discussion at each
meeting, and while all directors were encouraged to, and did, participate, the
conversation was kept focused.
In my experience, irrespective of ownership, boards are frequently expected to
have detailed oversight of the operations of a company despite the fact that the
board is usually comprised of a majority of non-executive members, each with a
commitment of c.40-60 days a year who, in many cases, earn relatively low levels
of remuneration. The POL Board faced the same challenges. Given the scope
and complexity of POL’s business and the level of its maturity as a standalone
business following the separation from Royal Mail Group in 2012, and the quality
of the reporting provided to it, I think the Board's oversight was generally
Page 46 of 211
90.
91.
92.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
appropriate, although clearly there was more that the business could have done
to support the Board in the way of better quality and more timely briefings, and
that was part of the governance initiatives which the CoSec team and I worked
on.
I have been asked to give my views on whether POL’s corporate structure, as
described above was adequate in order to fulfil a board of directors’
responsibilities in the operation of a company solely owned by HM Government,
and the adequacy of POL’s oversight in respect of (a) criminal prosecutions, (b)
civil litigation, (c) IT, and (d) any accounting system. I have interpreted ‘corporate
structure’ as comprising two factors: the legal entity structure, and the
governance structure.
As described in paragraphs above, POL’s legal entity structure was very simple,
and I do not believe the corporate structure impacted the ability of the Board to
exercise effective governance - either at all or in relation to the four matters
identified above.
However, I think it is relevant to mention more generally that during 2018, Mr
Foat and I set up a project to look at the optimum corporate structure for POL’s
business and to address the various conflicts that were inherent in its structure.
The establishment of the project was approved by the Board. The conflicts that
we had identified included the following: POL was the sole shareholder of POMS
and there were various decisions specified in POMS’ articles of association
which required POL’s approval. At the same time, POL was the Appointed
Page 47 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Representative of POMS for the distribution of regulated financial services
products. This meant that POL was accountable to POMS for financial services
compliance, and POMS exercised oversight over POL’s compliance with various
regulatory and contractual requirements relating to the sale of regulated products
which were set out in the Appointed Representative Agreement. At the same
time, POL provided a range of services to POMS including Finance, HR, and
Legal services under a service level agreement. This raised a concern that if, as
the strategy of POL required, financial services grew materially, then these
conflicts would be of increasing concern to the regulator, the Financial Conduct
Authority, which would want assurance that POL did not, as shareholder,
exercise undue authority over POMS. The project was ultimately stood down I
believe in late 2018/early 2019 as the relative costs of the proposed initiatives
were considered disproportionate at that time.
As set out in the March 2020 “Post Office Limited: Shareholder Relationship
Framework Document” (“Framework Agreement’), an open-source document I
have found online and now exhibit as (WITN10010103), POL is classified as a
Public Non-Financial Corporation. As such the POL Board retains responsibility
for the operations of the Post Office. A Framework Agreement was put in place
during my employment at POL which sets out the relationship between UKGI as
shareholder and POL, and which states that neither BEIS as the Shareholder,
UKGI as the Shareholder’s Representative, nor the Shareholder NED (Mr
Callard at the time of my joining POL, and subsequently Mr Cooper) have any
involvement in the day-to-day operations of POL or in the management of its
network of post offices and staff. The Framework Agreement stipulates that while
Page 48 of 211
94.
95.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
the POL Board retains operational control, it is accountable to BEIS for the
performance of POL and is required to seek shareholder consent for certain
matters, as set out in the Articles. In addition to its responsibilities set out in the
Companies Act, and other relevant legislation, as a government owned entity,
POL was required to comply with certain statutory requirements such as
procurement and FOIA, and certain other guidelines mandated by Government
such as those set out in paragraph 69.
The POL Board was comprised of a majority of independent non-executive
directors. Their role was to not to manage the business of the company directly
but to ensure that it had the right governance structures, policies and risk and
control frameworks in place to ensure that POL could discharge its strategic
purpose in a compliant way. The day-to-day responsibility of running POL was
with the CEO and her direct reports. The Board had an annual strategy review
at which the strategy for the next 3 - 5 years was approved by the Board, and
then submitted to BEIS as shareholder for formal approval. Management then
executed various actions to deliver this strategy. The Board oversaw this
programme of activity and tested whether the strategy was being delivered in
accordance with the approved plan.
As referred to above, POL was a statutory company subject to the Companies
Act, and other relevant legislation which mandated legal responsibilities on the
entity and on its directors, as well as legislation that related to specific aspects
of its business such as financial services. In 2017, the Legal Team developed a
Legislative & Regulatory Framework that identified all the statutory and
Page 49 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
regulatory responsibilities applicable to POL and its operations. This was
presented to the Group Executive to support a discussion on executive
accountability for compliance with specific legislative requirements. This
framework is common in financial services firms but was new to POL and
supported the work of the Legal, Compliance and Risk teams to ensure that
POL'’s operations reflected good practice. I cannot now recall but the production
of the framework may also have been prompted by a request made by the Chair
and recorded in the ARC Minutes of 22 January 2016 (POL00030888_0021).
The review identified that there were more than ten regulators with oversight over
some or all of POL’s activities with a consequential significant number of
legislative requirements that applied to POL. Further details of this are set out in
paragraph 372. The purpose of the work was to ensure that there was an
identified executive accountable for compliance with all relevant legislative and
regulatory requirements in each business area. The accountable executive was
required to provide assurance to the Board each year by way of declaration as
part of the annual accounts process, that within the executive's area of
responsibility POL complied with its regulatory and legislative obligations.
In relation to the Board and its structure and operations, POL broadly followed
the best practice governance recommendations set out in the UK Corporate
Governance Code. At a Board level, I believe that the governance structure was
adequate to fulfil the responsibilities listed in paragraph 90 (a) to (d) above.
However as commented on in paragraph 371, I believe that POL’s internal
management governance framework, contract management framework and risk
management framework were still in development and therefore were not
Page 50 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
sufficiently mature to enable management or the Board to have a reliable and
comprehensive understanding of risk across the business. The improvement of
the risk framework was one of my responsibilities. In order to help my executive
colleagues better understand how a properly developed and implemented risk
framework could assist them to discharge their responsibilities, the
Transformation Team and I developed a RACI matrix. RACI is a business
management tool which uses four key levels of ‘ownership’ (responsibility,
accountability, consultation, and being informed) to map out executive
accountability not just for legislative and regulatory compliance, but also for
ownership of (among other things) systems and processes. This concept is well
developed across the regulated financial services sector but was new to POL. I
was concerned that the different business functions within POL operated in silos,
so that ownership and therefore accountability, was unclear. One example of this
was that IT systems were seen as being owned by, and were therefore the
responsibility of, the IT function, rather than being key business processes on
which the relevant executive was dependant for the operation of his/her business
area. The lack of clear ownership also impacted the Board’s ability to have
effective oversight over key aspects of POL’s business operations. As I discuss
later at paragraph 372, this concept of accountability requires significant cultural
change, and for a number of my colleagues these constructs were unfamiliar and
took time to adopt and embed.
Page 51 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Criminal prosecutions
97. It is difficult for me to comment on whether the corporate and governance
structure of POL was adequate to fulfil the responsibilities of the Board and
whether POL's oversight was adequate in respect of criminal prosecutions, as
the prosecutions of SPMs stopped well before my appointment. Therefore, the
question of the Board’s responsibilities and whether they should have oversight
(or had adequate oversight) of prosecutions did not arise. I am aware that a
prosecutions policy had been in development for some time prior to my arrival
and this was finalised and approved by the Board in March 2016 (see
POL00030888_0008).
Civil litigation
98. In respect of civil litigation, I believe POL’s corporate structure was adequate to
meet the responsibilities of a board of directors and provide POL with adequate
oversight of civil litigation. ARC received quarterly reports on all material civil
litigation, and by way of an example such updates can be seen in the papers
from 27 March 2018 (POL00021445), and 28 June 2018 (POL00021446).
Moreover, as the Group Litigation developed, the Litigation Sub-Committee was
established as a sub-committee of the POL Board following the Board meeting
on 29 January 2018 (POL00021553) which provided the Board with oversight of
the Group Litigation. The members of the Litigation Sub-Committee were senior
members of the Board including Mr Parker, Mr McCall, Mr Cooper, Ms Vennells
and Mr Cameron. I attended the Litigation Sub-Committee meetings in my role
as GC. In addition, the (management based) Litigation Steering Group provided
operational oversight on a day-to-day basis, and each of those steering group
Page 52 of 211
IT
99.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
members in turn reported to their relevant Group Executive member. I believe
the effect of this was that POL as a business had good oversight of the Group
Litigation across its functions.
From memory, only one Non-Executive Director during my tenure was
specifically recruited to bring additional IT experience - Shirine Khoury-Haq, who
I believe was only on the Board for 12 months between July 2018 and July 2019.
I believe that Mr McCall had responsibility for IT in his executive role at Europcar
and brought some expertise. Nevertheless, irrespective of the specific skillset
and expertise of the individual directors, I believe that the Board had adequate
oversight by means of receiving regular updates from the respective executives
in charge of IT, which was usually the CIO, on a range of IT matters including
the relationship with, and oversight of Fujitsu, information security, and strategic
IT developments. Through these updates the Board could raise matters with the
executives, request independent assurance to be carried out, and bring in
specialists in the field to assist and guide the Board. There were three ClOs
during my tenure: Lesley Sewell, Chris Broe (interim) and Rob Houghton. During
Mr Houghton’s tenure, I recall the Board asked for external assurance work to
be commissioned in relation to the strategic approach that Mr Houghton was
recommending in relation to the modernisation of, in particular, the Horizon
network. For example, see the discussion at the POL Board on 23 November
2017 in (POL00021552_0003), though it should be noted that this relates to the
IT strategy assurance review undertaken by Actinista, and is not a review of
Horizon itself. The ARC also received reports on IT developments, for example
Page 53 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
see in the meeting on 27 November 2018 it received reports on the regular
‘ethical hacking’ exercises that were conducted on POL’s IT estate and the
Payment Card Industry certification process (POL00021559), and in the meeting
on 23 November 2017 details on IT related issues and disaster recovery
(POL00021441).
100. There was significant structural and contractual change introduced as a result of
the Towers model (before my appointment) where there were four main
outsourced suppliers (including Fujitsu) across the IT estate, as coordinated by
Atos as integrator. Each Tower supplier then managed a number of subsidiary
suppliers. In my opinion, at the time I joined POL, it did not have a mature
contract management framework to effectively manage significant outsourcing
suppliers, and this should have been an area of concern for the Board. With the
appointment of Mr Houghton in 2016 as the new CIO, steps were implemented
to start to address this, and the Board's level of confidence grew during Mr
Houghton’s tenure.
Accounting systems
101. The Board's oversight of accounting systems relied heavily on advice from the
CFO (Mr Cameron), internal audit reports and the annual statutory audit. In
addition, there were various reports commissioned from independent parties to
review aspects of POL’s accounting systems, e.g. the Deloitte work on suspense
accounts. In addition, there was a major programme during my tenure to update
POL's finance and accounting systems. The Board and in particular ARC
Committee members took these responsibilities seriously and asked challenging
Page 54 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and probing questions of the various Finance executives who brought reports to
them, and of the external auditors who attended all ARC meetings. Additionally,
in accordance with recommended best practice, at least once per year the ARC
met with the audit partner from POL’s external auditors without management
being present.
Government Oversight
102. Oversight of POL by Government, through the Shareholder NED, became more
intense during my tenure. In 2015 Mr Callard was the Shareholder NED, and he
had a small team which I believe comprised three people to support him. He
attended all Board, ARC and NomCo meetings. He was also on the Sparrow
Sub-Committee. Mr Callard stood down from the Board in March 2018 and was
replaced by Mr Cooper.
103. Under the arrangements agreed with BEIS, and which were formalised in the
Framework Agreement and Funding Agreements, POL was required to submit
regular reports (later specified to be quarterly) to BEIS/UKGI covering prescribed
topics. I believe that both the CEO and CFO had regular meetings with
BEIS/UKGI although I did not attend these. I also believe that Mr Parker as Chair
had regular meetings with BEIS/UKGI.
104. Mr Cooper’s team within UKGI was significantly larger, although I believe he also
oversaw other Government entities. Both Mr Cooper and members of his team
were much more visible in the business on a regular basis. They requested and
held meetings with a wide variety of executives at a number of levels and would
Page 55 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
regularly request significant amounts of information to be provided, which in
many cases required the creation of specific information and reports.
105. The Framework Agreement was negotiated following Mr Cooper’s appointment.
Mr Cooper operated in a very executive manner and was an active participant in
Board and committee meetings. I am unable to comment whether his oversight
was adequate from a Government/shareholder perspective, however it was
much more detailed than had been the case under Mr Callard.
ARC
106. I have been asked to review the minutes of the ARC Committee meeting on 25
March 2015 (POL00026719) and the minutes of the RCC meeting on 7
September 2015 (POL00110129) and explain the nature and extent of my
responsibilities in respect of ARC and RCC. As I explain above, ARC was the
Board sub-committee. The RCC was an executive level committee, which had
its own terms of reference. The RCC’s remit was similar to ARC, but it did not
include internal or external audit. It was designed to provide executive
management with an overview of risk and compliance within POL. As an
executive committee it reported through the executive line to the CEO, and it
reviewed those matters that went to the ARC, as well as other matters of lower
materiality.
107. The Risk & Compliance team, who reported to me, prepared the agenda for the
RCC meetings in conjunction with the CoSec team following a similar process to
Page 56 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
that for the ARC. POL had adopted the standard ‘3 lines of defence’ risk
management model where:
(a) _ the first line of defence was the line management responsible for
running the business and therefore for identifying and managing the
risk associated with that business;
(b) the second line was the Risk function which developed and helped
implement the risk management framework and provided assurance
to the RCC and the ARC as to the effectiveness of risk management
within POL; and
(c) the third line of defence was Internal Audit. Under the Board-
approved Internal Audit charter, they had a direct reporting line to the
Chair of the ARC.
108. I chaired the early meetings of the RCC, however, overtime, Mr Cameron took
over the chair role as it was a ‘first line’ committee and therefore properly the
responsibility of those executives who were accountable for managing those
risks. As Mr Cameron was CFO and COO, he had first line accountability for the
management of many of POL’s operational risks.
109. The RCC received copies of the internal audit reports and was able to discuss
these, however given the independence of internal audit in accordance with the
Page 57 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Internal Audit Charter, it was for the ARC to receive and accept the internal audit
reports.
110. I have been asked to expand on the statement: “The Committee asked if he was
aware of the challenges in the Business and the less than mature risk framework.
The GC assured the Committee that he was well aware of the challenges” at
POLARC 15/15 in (POL00026719). The discussion related to my update on the
recruitment of a Head of Risk & Audit to replace the interim role who had recently
resigned. The specific reference relates to the fact that at the time the risk
framework at POL was very immature and there was significant work to be done
to develop and embed a suitable framework. In addition, the risk team was small.
This statement in the minutes referenced the discussions I had had with the
successful candidate as to his responsibilities in developing POL’s risk
management maturity.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM
111. At the time I joined POL, I had only a very limited knowledge of the background to
‘Project Sparrow’ as it was referred to. As part of my induction process following
joining, I was briefed on a range of issues regarding Horizon, the Scheme, and the
issues leading to that (including the fact of prosecutions), and, at a high level, the
work and enquiries that had been undertaken to date in relation to addressing
these issues. The briefings were largely in person, and I believe I was provided
with examples of Post Office Investigation Reports (“POIR”) prepared by POL, and
Case Review Reports (“CRR’”) prepared by Second Sight under the Scheme. My
Page 58 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
recollection is that I had verbal briefings from Mr Aujard, Mr Williams, from
members of the Scheme Secretariat, which was at the time headed by Belinda
Crowe, and from the external legal team at Bond Dickinson.
112. I also recall a discussion of the reasons why POL was no longer undertaking
prosecutions. My recollection is that there was a consistent view that prosecutions
were not being pursued as any evidence that was generated from the Horizon IT
system would be challenged, and the onus would be on POL to prove that Horizon-
based evidence was robust, and at that time there was no expert witness available
who would be able to address these issues. It was felt that for POL to ‘prove a
negative’ that is, establish that there was nothing wrong with Horizon and therefore
the evidence from it was reliable, would be onerous and disproportionate given the
age and complexity of the system. I do not recall receiving any specific training on
Horizon when I started, although from time-to-time training on the Horizon IT
system was provided in the Model Office which was established in the Finsbury
Dials building; for example, prior to providing Christmas support to Crown
branches, which I attended. These training sessions were available to all those
employees who did not use Horizon as part of their day-to-day work, but it was not
designed to enable staff to actually operate Horizon and no user IDs were issued
with it.
113. I also attended briefings in the Model Office which were provided to external parties
such as our external legal team, on an as needs basis. For example, when we
appointed our Counsel for the Group Litigation, we provided them with
demonstrations of Horizon in the Model Office, which I attended.
Page 59 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
114. My knowledge of the Horizon IT system developed over time as I became more
familiar with the issues arising through the Scheme and the Group Litigation, as
well as through other issues that I was involved in such as Project Trinity (the
termination of the IBM contract), and the resulting re-negotiation of the Fujitsu
contract, and the discussions around the IT strategy led by Mr Houghton. My view
was that no IT system was perfect, but that the real challenge was how the
organisation (in this case POL and Fujitsu as the system supplier and operator)
identified bugs, defects and/or errors, understood their impact and then prioritised
and effected remediation.
THE PROJECT SPARROW AND THE MEDIATION SCHEME
115. I have been asked to describe the nature of any briefing received on Second
Sight, and the nature and purpose of the Scheme. When I joined, Mr Aujard and
Mr Williams briefed me on the Scheme, in particular:
(a) the process by which, and the purpose for which, it was established.
My recollection is that I was provided with copies of the Terms of
Reference and minutes of the most recent Steering Committee
meeting;
(b) the steps that had been undertaken to inform potential interested
parties across the postmaster community about the Scheme;
Page 60 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(c) the agreed steps involved in producing the POIR, the CRR and
Second Sight’s role in producing these (in this regard I was provided
with a copy of Second Sight's first Interim Report).
(d) the role of the Working Group and the approach that the Justice for
Subpostmasters Alliance (“JFSA”) had more recently taken; and
(e) the criticisms that had been levied at the Scheme.
116. I no longer have access to the notes that I took during these briefings, and they
have not been provided to me by the Inquiry, and my memory of these briefings
is impacted by what I learned subsequently over time. However, my recollection
of the briefing process generally as part of my induction across all aspects of
POL’s business was that it was initially high level, and that I requested and
received more detailed information as matters developed over time. I do recall
that the focus of my induction was on other parts of POL’s business first, and that
handover on the Scheme came slightly later. My recollection is that we agreed
this based on the work that was underway to prepare for the Parliamentary Select
Committee and I agreed with Mr Aujard that he should continue to lead this work.
In addition, my recollection is that both Mr Aujard and I had separately pre-booked
holidays during this period, and these delayed the hand-over of some matters.
Given the recommendations that were put to the Sparrow Sub-Committee and the
Board during this period relating to the closure of the Scheme, termination of the
Working Group and the termination of Second Sight’s appointment, I sought more
Page 61 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
detailed briefings on these areas so that I was sufficiently prepared to handle
these issues.
117. When I started at POL, the future of the Scheme was the subject of discussion at
both Executive and Board level given the lack of progress with mediations, and
the criticism being directed against the Scheme, which came to a head with the
Select Committee hearing on 3 February 2015. The Select Committee took place
only a few weeks after I started at POL. I did not attend the hearing, but watched
a recording of it, and it was clear that MPs were no longer supportive of the
Scheme. This was summarised to the Sparrow Sub-Committee in an updated
dated 11 February 2015 as “MPs raised concerns about the time the process is
taking, while the business also faced hostile questioning from MPs about the
range and scope of information being shared with Second Sight.”
(POL00040911_0001)
118. Prior to my appointment, Mr Aujard and Mark Davies had developed a draft paper
setting out the options for the Scheme in light of the criticisms that were being
made about its progress and outcomes (see POL00158191) which was discussed
at an internal meeting on 27 January 2015. Following Mr Aujard’s departure, this
paper was converted into a paper dated 11 February 2015 which was prepared
for the Sparrow Sub-Committee (POL00040911). That paper was subsequently
discussed at, the Sparrow Sub-Committee meeting on 18 February 2015
(POL00006574) and I believe that a similar paper dated 2 March 2015
(POL00102254) was also discussed at the Board meeting on 25 March 2015
although the minutes of that meeting (POL00027279) only refer to a verbal
Page 62 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
discussion. The recommendation to close the Working Group and offer to mediate
all cases that were not the subject of a Court decision, was accepted by each of
the Sparrow Sub-Committee and Board. I note that I am listed as a co-author of
this paper, but I do not recall whether I had much input into its drafting. I do recall
that, based on the briefings I had received, the documents I had reviewed, and
my understanding of the criticisms that were being levied at the Scheme, I agreed
with the conclusions and recommendations of the paper, which appeared to
represent the safest option for POL — the conclusions were closest to the
intentions of the Scheme and the way in which the Scheme already worked, and
sought to ensure that POL met its obligations to those who applied to the Scheme.
119. I was made aware that Bond Dickinson had been advising and guiding POL
throughout the course of the Scheme prior to my appointment, and this continued
during my time at POL. Decision-making by POL in relation to the Scheme was
therefore informed by Bond Dickinson's advice.
120. I have been asked to describe the issues raised by Mr Davies in his email on 12
February 2015 (POL00132956), and in particular what I was addressing in my reply
on the same day when I said, “Chris & I are on the case re Patrick and Tom”. POL
provided the Secretariat support for the Working Group and to Sir Anthony Hooper
as Chair of the Working Group. This was led by Belinda Crowe as Programme
Director and supported by others who reported to her including Patrick Bourke and
Tom Wechsler (Programme Manager). By early 2015 Ms Crowe had announced
her intention to retire. Mr Bourke was a contractor and his contract was due to
expire around this time, though I cannot recall the precise date. I don’t recall Mr
Page 63 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Wechsler’s employment status. Taking all of this into account, along with the fact
that no decision had been made as to leadership of the Secretariat team following
Ms Crowe's departure, Mr Davies’ email was to highlight that issue and the
resulting uncertainty that this created, and which was exacerbating the existing
resourcing challenges. From memory, Mr Wechsler was appointed to replace Ms
Crowe, and I subsequently agreed with Mr Bourke that we would extend his
contract. Around mid-2015, Mr Wechsler changed roles internally, and Mr Bourke
was appointed to lead the team that was running the mediations.
121. I have been asked to consider (POL00023833) which is the draft CRR dated 8
February 2015 produced by Second Sight regarding Mr Timothy Burgess, and
consider in particular paragraph 4.21 of that draft CRR, and address why POL took
the stance it did in responding to concerns raised about it bringing charges for both
theft and false accounting. I had only been in post for a couple of weeks when the
draft report regarding Mr Burgess was provided to me. I did not expect to read or
sign off POIRs or CRRs given they were very factual and detailed in nature,
although several had been provided to me as examples as part of my induction. I
believe that Mr Burgess’ CRR was provided to me as an example of Second Sight
providing opinions on matters outside their acknowledged areas of expertise.
122. Second Sight asserted that POL brought charges of theft so as to ‘bully’ Mr Burgess
into accepting a lower charge, such as false accounting, in circumstances where
the grounds for theft were not made out. POL’s position, as explained in its letter
to Second Sight on 24 February 2015 (POL00002503), was that false accounting
was not a lower charge. I was not involved in the instruction of Cartwright King,
Page 64 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL’s criminal legal advisers, to review the POIRs and CRRs and am not aware
whether they reviewed all of them, or only those that involved criminal charges. I
had sight of the advice from Simon Clarke dated 16 February 2015
(POL00023832) which is expressed in more general terms rather than being
limited to any specific CRR prepared by Second Sight. That advice raises
concerns, expressed in strong terms, with the conclusions that Second Sight was
reaching. On that advice, POL believed that Second Sight was acting outside its
sphere of expertise in opining on these matters, and that this did not assist the
overall process given the reliance that the SPMs placed on Second Sight’s work.
123. I supported the decision to close the Working Group as its role had been to
determine which cases should proceed to mediation. Given that POL had
previously stated that it was, except in very limited cases, not prepared to mediate
cases with a criminal conviction, then the decision to offer mediation to all cases
(other than those with a Court decision) obviated the need for the Working Group’s
opinion. CEDR continued to oversee the mediation process in the revised form.
124. Terminating the Working Group then raised the question of Second Sight’s ongoing
role. The internal view, which I supported, was to terminate Second Sight’s
engagement on notice in accordance with the terms of the relevant engagement
letter. POL expected that Second Sight would be able to complete the work that
had already been commissioned, including its Part Two report, during the notice
period, and proposed that Second Sight would continue to have a role in helping
resolve the concerns of applicants to the Scheme. In this regard, POL would
continue to fund Second Sight to review the files and materials and prepare a CRR
Page 65 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
for each remaining applicant, if the applicant so wished and if Second Sight was
willing to assist. This meant that Second Sight would effectively continue to do the
same role (at POL’s cost) and would enable each remaining applicant to have their
files reviewed in the same way that would have applied if the Scheme had
remained on foot. However, any other legacy work that Second Sight had
underway from previous POL engagements would be terminated.
125. POL was genuine in its offer to mediate all remaining cases other than those
involving a Court decision. Under the Scheme, it was for the Working Group to
recommend whether a case should be mediated, however POL did not have to
accept this recommendation, and had made it clear that, save in exceptional
circumstances, it would not mediate criminal cases or cases involving Court
decisions. The JFSA believed that all cases should be able to go to mediation
subject to the Working Group's decision, and we were aware that the JFSA had
called for SPMs to withdraw from mediation, and had abstained from voting at the
Working Group as a result. POL had received advice from CEDR that the
settlement rates from the mediation were lower (45%) than is normal for mediation
(65-75%). POL continued to offer mediation over the next 12 months until the
Group Litigation commenced.
126. POL was aware that none of the various options as originally set out in the draft
options paper prepared in January 2015 (POL00158191) would be seen
positively by any of the stakeholders, and that there would be significant adverse
comment. Even though the option chosen — to offer to mediate all cases other
than those with a court decision — reflected as closely as possible the intention of
Page 66 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
the Scheme, it was heavily criticised. Much was made of the termination of
Second Sight’s role, even though they continued to perform the same role for the
applicants as they had previously, and at POL’s expense. POL was concerned
that Second Sight continued to opine on matters outside their expertise, however
this was not a reason for termination of their engagement.
127. The paper submitted to the Sparrow Sub-Committee and the Board summarised
the various options, and properly set out the proposals and then discussed a
series of issues - of which risk was properly one factor. A key risk was the PR risk
in that we expected an adverse reaction from all stakeholders irrespective of
which option was chosen. However, this prospective PR risk was not the reason
for choosing to close the Working Group. The driver for closing the Working Group
was that no one thought the status quo should continue and the process generally
needed to be accelerated. The Scheme was not working though for a number of
reasons which included the fact that applicants had different and higher
expectations of what mediation could offer (as evidenced by the CEDR feedback);
the thorough investigation and review process by POL and Second Sight meant
that progress was perceived as being too slow so wasn't meeting political
expectations; the JFSA (led by Alan Bates) had refused to engage as they
believed all cases (including those involving criminal convictions and other court
decisions) should be considered for mediation; and the Parliamentary BEIS
Select Committee had been extremely critical. As a result, there was a major loss
of confidence. Hence why we thought the option to continue offering mediation of
all cases other than those involving a Court decision was the option that was most
Page 67 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
aligned with the original intentions, and in that case, the Working Group's role was
redundant.
REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: INITIAL STAGES
128. I have been asked to describe the nature and extent of any involvement with or
oversight I had of POL’s review of past convictions of SPMs using data generated
by the Horizon IT system, including post-conviction disclosure. I had no direct
involvement in POL’s review of past convictions of SPMs. When I joined POL my
understanding was that Cartwright King had undertaken a review some time
previously, and that this had subsequently been reviewed by Brian Altman KC in
2013. I have no recollection of receiving a copy of this review and I do not recall
any formal communication as to whether all recommendations from Mr Altman
had been actioned. However, I was aware that prior to my appointment there had
been a discussion about the duty of disclosure to those who had been previously
convicted should POL become aware of information relevant to those convictions.
This duty was one of the reasons why Cartwright King were involved in the review
of cases in the Scheme - to consider whether a duty of disclosure arose. Bond
Dickinson were also aware of this ongoing disclosure duty, no doubt because of
their longstanding involvement around the Horizon issues and POL’s dealings
with the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”). I referred to this at the
meeting with Second Sight on 4 March 2015 (see paragraph 37 of
POL00063428). I recognised that there was an ongoing duty of disclosure to
convicted SPMs and my expectation was that this duty was being discharged,
largely owing to the regular interaction between the POL team and external legal
advisers on the particular subject matter, and ‘Sparrow’ more generally. An
Page 68 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
example of this arose in relation to the Computer Weekly publicity in November
2015 in relation to the ‘Dalmellington bug’ which demonstrates that POL was alive
to the disclosure obligations raised by new information. As set out in the email
exchange on 10 November 2015 (POL00153527_0001), Mr Williams was noted
to be collating "all the coverage to date on this (Computer Weekly, Shropshire
Star and Tim McCormack's blog) to send to CK for disclosure considerations.”
129. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to five documents:
(a) the Helen Rose Report (POL00022598);
(b) the Second Sight reports:
i. Interim Report dated 8 July 2013 (POL00099063);
ii. Briefing Report - Part One dated 25 July 2014
(POL00004439):
iii. Mediation Briefing Report — Part Two, version two — 30
July 2014 (POL00022150)
(collectively the “Second Sight Reports”); and
(c) the Project Zebra report dated 23 May 2014 (POL00028062).
and asked me to set out the nature and extent of my knowledge of them, and the
extent to which they ought to be disclosed to convicted SPMs. I will take each of
these in turn.
130. I knew that there was a report referred to as the Helen Rose Report
(POL00022598), although I do not now recall the circumstances as to how I
became aware of it as I have no recollection of seeing it prior to the provision of
Page 69 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
these documents to me by the Inquiry. I note from the documents provided to me
by the Inquiry that POL proposed to disclose the report to the CCRC. However,
while the document was marked “legally privileged”, as Mr Williams set out in his
email on 31 March 2015, POL recognised that privilege would not apply
(POL00022597). Following this, POL provided a copy of the Helen Rose Report to
the CCRC on 2 April 2015 (POL00151754). I am not aware whether this Report
was at any time otherwise considered for disclosure to convicted SPMs. Given that
this Report was prepared in 2013, I would have expected that the question of
disclosure had been dealt with in the Cartwright King/Mr Altman review (“2013 Sift
Review’). Nevertheless, looking at the report now, had I seen the report at the
time, I would most likely have asked the following questions: (i) was any work done
to identify whether there were other cases where this, or similar fact patterns had
presented? If so, (ii) was there a discrepancy in those cases between the ARQ
logs and the underlying data?; (iii) if so, were these disclosed at the time to the
SPM, or indeed to any convicted SPM where the prosecution had only relied on
ARQ data and the underlying data told a different or more complete story?; (iv)
were the changes recommended by Ms Rose actually made? Given that the
information provided to me by the Inquiry is not a complete record, I am unable to
answer these questions.
131. With regard to the Second Sight Reports, I believe these were made public at the
time of publication, notwithstanding that they were intended to be provided to the
participants in the Scheme and their advisers, and otherwise were expected to be
treated as confidential. POL was aware that the Second Sight Reports were
circulated more widely, although I do not now recall if this was by Second Sight,
Page 70 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
the JFSA or by one of the recipients. In this regard, I note that, in an email to me
on 16 February 2015 (POL00025781), Gavin Mathews of Bond Dickinson said that
the July 2013 (Interim Report) was published by Second Sight and that the CCRC
would therefore have seen it. I also note that on 2 April 2015, POL provided the
CCRC with the first iteration of Second Sight’s Part Two Report and POL’s
response to that iteration. POL also said in its letter dated 2 April 2015 it would
provide a copy of the final Part Two Report once it received it from Second Sight
(POL00151754). I do not now recall how the early Second Sight Reports were
provided to the CCRC, but I know that the CCRC had them. There is reference in
an email from Mr Williams to me on 5 April 2016 (POL00123890_0002) to a
conversation between Mr Williams and Amanda Pearce of the CCRC which took
place before Easter 2016, in which Ms Pearce makes reference to content in the
Second Sight Reports, so it is clear that the CCRC did receive them.
132. I do not recall how or whether the Second Sight Reports were considered for
disclosure directly to convicted SPMs but as Bond Dickinson was actively involved
with the Scheme and reviewed the Second Sight material, I would have expected
them to consider the possibility of disclosure of the Second Sight Reports to
convicted SPMs. My expectation was that, if Bond Dickinson thought the Second
Sight Reports might need to be disclosed to convicted SPMs, they would advise
POL to seek specialist criminal advice from Cartwright King on the point.
133. Cartwright King did review other documentation prepared for the purpose of the
Scheme. For example, when an applicant became part of the Scheme, POL would
investigate the applicant's complaint and produce a report detailing the result of
Page 71 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
those investigations (the POIR). The POIR was reviewed by both Bond Dickinson
and Cartwright King prior to being provided to Second Sight, who would then
produce their own report (the CRR). With this in mind, if either POL’s or Second
Sight’s Reports required disclosure to the CCRC or to convicted SPMs, I would
have expected Cartwright King to advise POL as such.
134. With regard to the Project Zebra reports, I believe there are two documents related
to this review: the actual Deloitte report dated 23 May 2014, a copy of which has
been provided to me and which I refer to as the Zebra Report (POL00028062), and
a Board Briefing which I believe was dated June 2014 and which is referred to in
Sir Jonathan’s report dated 8 February 2016 (POL00006355_0048), neither of
which I saw during my time at POL. Having been provided with a copy of the Zebra
Report (but not the Board Briefing) by the Inquiry, I am now aware that the Zebra
Report was an assurance review carried out by Deloitte in 2014 which was
undertaken before I started at POL, and it contained recommendations as to how
POL should implement a risk based approach to its oversight of Fujitsu and
Horizon, and flagged that there were risks that should be considered as part of this
framework including in relation to the controls around superuser/privileged user
access, and that POL’s assurance framework did not cover all the identified risks.
135. I recall being made aware of the fact of the Zebra Report relatively shortly after
joining POL, and the fact that it had gone to the Board although, not having seen it
at the time, I don’t know whether it was the Zebra Report or the Board Briefing (or
both) that was referenced. I had asked the team whether there was anything about
the work that I needed to be aware of. The position was presented to me as a
Page 72 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
legacy matter, which had been addressed, and therefore no longer of relevance. I
do not recall being informed of the content.
136. I am not aware whether either the Zebra Report itself or the Board Briefing were
considered at the time they were produced for disclosure to convicted SPMs. I also
cannot recall, and the documents I have seen from the Inquiry do not specify,
whether either of them were disclosed to the CCRC. However, given the scope of
the CCRC’s disclosure request, my current assumption is that they would have
been disclosed. My general position to the CCRC was that POL should take a
cooperative approach to disclosure and I believe this was clear to the wider POL
legal team. I tried to encourage a constructive dialogue between POL and the
CCRC on the question of disclosure and how that was facilitated.
137. I have seen in the papers provided to me by the Inquiry that there is an advice note
from Cartwright King dated 27 March 2015 (POL00315631). I see that Cartwright
King say that the Zebra Report is “potentially disclosable” where there are certain
suggestions raised in the convicted defendant's defence, but it goes on “that is not
to say the material is presently to be disclosed, only that we cannot determine that
issue without further information”, and then sets out a series of questions for POL
in respect of the Zebra Report which need to be answered in order to properly
consider the disclosure point. I appreciate the significance of this advice note, and
I have thought hard about this, but I do not recall seeing it at the time, even though
I received a copy on 29 April 2015 (POL00315630_0001), although the cover email
under which it was sent focuses on the point that the Deloitte report could not be
used as expert evidence, rather than on the recommendations made to undertake
Page 73 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
further enquiries. In the absence of any further information I am unable to assist
the Inquiry any further about this document or what steps were taken upon receipt
of it, although the recommendations are broadly similar to those of Sir Jonathan in
his report in early 2016, and those recommendations were picked up through the
Bramble work. Had the questions asked by Cartwright King been identified and
addressed in early 2015, then decisions about disclosure — both in context of the
Group Litigation and potentially to convicted SPMs — could have been addressed,
and I regret that I did not follow up with this at the time.
138. I have been asked to what extent or others at POL considered searching for other
documentation relevant to the integrity of the Horizon IT system to determine
whether the same ought to be disclosed to convicted SPMs. I am not clear whether
this question is targeted at the periods in which each of the reports referred to in
paragraph 129129 were prepared or completed, or during the whole of my tenure,
but I will attempt to address the question in its broadest sense.
139. When I started in 2015, as per my comments above, the 2014 Deloitte (Zebra) and
2013 Sift Review were presented as legacy matters as they predated my arrival. I
therefore cannot comment on whether a wide search of documentation was
considered as part of the 2013 Sift Review, or at any other time prior to my
appointment. With regard to any new matters relating to Horizon that were brought
to POL’s attention during my tenure, POL would consider whether these suggested
issues could have affected branch transactions, and if so, would undertake further
investigations including requesting relevant information from Fujitsu (as was the
case with the later Project Bramble reports). POL was reliant upon Fujitsu to
Page 74 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
respond to such requests by searching for and identifying relevant information to
address the question being raised. My expectation was that Fujitsu would carry out
reasonable and proportionate searches, and a decision would be made in relation
to the disclosure of any relevant information identified through that process. I recall
being advised in 2015 or 2016 that POL and Fujitsu had, I believe, weekly meetings
to review operational issues in relation to Horizon, and that given the challenges
that had been raised in relation to the integrity of Horizon, these meetings were
attended by Mr Williams, and Bond Dickinson, and I believe that Cartwright King
may also have attended. I did not attend those meetings, but I would have expected
that any newly identified issues would have raised a requirement for further
investigation, including the search for relevant information. If an issue was
identified that upon investigation gave cause for concern as to whether it should
be disclosed, then my expectation was that this would have been reviewed by the
relevant lawyers given their attendance.
Correspondence with the CCRC
140. Although I was aware in early 2015 that the CCRC had been in touch with POL, it
was not until 14 January 2015 that the CCRC requested specific information — in
particular a copy of Mr Altman’s report dated 15 October 2013. I do not have a
copy of that request, however my recollection (aided by subsequent
correspondence provided to me by the Inquiry) was that the CCRC did not provide
any explanation as to the basis of the request. Bond Dickinson noted that the form
of the approach was unusual as there was no ‘case under review’ at that time by
the CCRC, nor was there any case under review for the Court of Appeal, being the
two grounds of reasonableness set out in the CCRC’s own Formal Memorandum
Page 75 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
on its powers (and set out as an attachment to the letter to CCRC dated 11
February 2015 (POL00151181). By that letter dated 11 February 2015, we
therefore asked the CCRC for clarification.
141. Whilst, with hindsight, I appreciate that my first letter could be interpreted as
resisting the CCRC’s request, this was not the intention or purpose. My letter,
prepared on the advice of, and with input from, Bond Dickinson, was seeking
clarification from the CCRC on its request. That conversation with the CCRC
evolved, and its letter of 12 February 2015 (POL00151293) provided POL with a
degree of understanding of what it was seeking. In that letter, the CCRC stated
“Recently, the Commission has been made aware of potential miscarriages of
justice arising out of convictions where information produced by the Horizon
software was used in evidence. Therefore the Commission would be looking to the
information provided by the Post Office to identify the individuals that may be
affected by the Horizon issues and asses the safety of any convictions”. What
flowed from there was discussions regarding how best to provide information and
material to the CCRC.
142. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to my email to Mr Williams on 16 February
2015 (POL00025781). In this email, I note that the CCRC are asking to see Mr
Altman's report and I note that the CCRC state that they expect that this would also
cover the “Horizon system” (see paragraph 6 on page 2 of the CCRC’s letter dated
12 February 2015 (POL00151293_0002)). I have been asked to expand on what I
meant when thereafter stating “In relation to the Horizon system, we should
consider what can be provided around this; would any of Second Sight’s own
Page 76 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
reports assist on this”. The CCRC’s request for documents relating to the “Horizon
system” raised the same question that Second Sight had to address, namely what
“Horizon system” meant and whether this was limited to hardware and software, or
whether it extended to training, branch support and other processes. The
statement I made in POL00025781 was a query in relation to whether provision of
the Second Sight Reports would help the CCRC to clarify the focus of its enquiry
— whether it was considering the hardware and software, or whether it was
considering training and other elements, or both. In the event, I note that Gavin
Matthews of Bond Dickinson then confirmed in his reply on 16 February 2015
(POL00025781) that the CCRC already had a copy of Second Sight’s July 2013
report.
143. POL was aware that the CCRC’s requests as presented to POL would result in a
significant volume of documents being provided to the CCRC, much of which POL
believed would not be relevant to the CCRC’s investigation. POL therefore wrote
to the CCRC on 27 February 2015 (POL00114301), asking them to identify the
findings and recommendations in Mr Altman's report which were pertinent to its
investigations, in order for POL to provide disclosure on those elements. This was
not intended as an attempt to withhold documents, rather to ensure that the
disclosure process was manageable on both sides. Indeed, POL took a proactive
step in setting up an electronic data room at POL’s cost to facilitate CCRC’s access
to a large numbers of documents. My recollection is that this was the first time that
this had been offered to the CCRC and they were appreciative of our efforts in this
regard.
Page 77 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
144. POL engaged actively with the CCRC in correspondence and in person meetings
to ensure that all relevant information falling within the scope of the CCRC
requests was supplied.
145. As the CCRC’s request became clearer, I relied on input from Bond Dickinson
and then Mr Altman (see email of 26 February 2015 POL00151297_0001), as to
what POL’s response should be to the request. Bearing in mind that by this stage
I was only a month into my role, and my lack of familiarity with the CCRC, I
wanted to ensure that I correctly understood their powers and POL’s obligations,
and took advice on this from POL’s external legal advisers. Having then
understood this, my instruction to the team was that we should work
constructively with the CCRC.
146. 1 have no specific memories of any material discussions, meetings, or
conferences, regarding POL’s response to the CCRC. To be clear, I do not deny
there were none, rather with the passage of time, I cannot recall them. The
emails the Inquiry have provided do provide a window into those discussions.
147. As I set out above, my involvement of responding to the CCRC’s letters of 18
March 2015 (POL00063501), (POL00063503), (POL00063513),
(POL00065654), (POL00118556), (POL00118558), I (POL00118559),
(POL00118560), 19 March 2015 (POL00118563), (POL00118570), 20 March
2015 (POL00118550), 23 March 2015 (POL00118569), 24 March 2015
(POL00323854), 26 March 2015 (POL00091220), 8 April 2015 (POL00162706),
10 April 2015 (POL00065652) and 6 May 2015 (POL00066947) was part of a
Page 78 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
wider team’s contribution. The engagement POL had with the CCRC meant that
they alerted us in advance that the requests were coming. While I engaged with
the CCRC formally on more high-level issues in written correspondence and this
was done with the contribution of the legal team and external legal advisers, the
actual delivery of documents was dealt with by the internal and external legal
teams as well as certain others who supported the legal teams from an
operational perspective. I occasionally dealt with issues regarding the timing of
the provision of specific documents (for example where work was ongoing on a
specific report, such as the Chairman’s Review) and I saw the dataroom, but I
do not recall having specific involvement in deciding which documents were
disclosed to the CCRC and nor can I now recall the contents of the dataroom.
Meeting with CCRC - 8 May 2015
148. I have been asked to set out my recollection of the meeting with the CCRC on 8
May 2015 and the steps I took to prepare for it. That meeting came about
following a suggestion from the CCRC on 18 March 2015 that it would be useful
for the CCRC and POL to meet to establish the issues and clarify the level of
CCRC involvement (POL00151662). It was my first meeting with the CCRC, and
my recollection is that both entities saw this as an opportunity to meet and
establish ways of working. POL offered to brief the CCRC on the background to
the issues and what steps had been taken to address this, which was welcomed
by the CCRC, and this was the basis of the speaking note (POL00110243) which
I believe was prepared by myself and Mr Williams. I recall that the meeting, which
I think lasted about 2 hours, was constructive. .
Page 79 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Search for a new expert
149. I have been asked to set out the nature or extent of any involvement I had, or
any oversight of, POL’s search for a new expert to provide evidence in
prosecutions based on data generated by the Horizon IT system. In an email
from Mr Williams to me on 1 March 2015 (POL00125594) he refers to the
potential appointment of Imperial College London (“ICL”) to conduct an
independent assessment of Horizon. I cannot recall how ICL was identified,
although I believe there had been discussions with them prior to the
commencement of my employment. I recall that only limited work was
undertaken by them, which I reference in an email to Jonathan Swift KC on 12
October 2015 (POL00104216). I was not involved in discussions relating to the
selection of, or appointment of any other potential experts, other than Deloitte in
relation to Mr Parker's review (Project Bramble) and Dr Robert Worden as expert
witness in the later civil litigation. In relation to appointing Deloitte, the wider legal
team (which included the POL internal lawyers, Bond Dickinson, and the Counsel
team) concluded that it made sense for them to undertake the work in light of
their familiarity as a result of Project Zebra. I discuss the appointment of Dr
Worden at paragraph 264264 below.
PROJECT SPARROW AND THE CLOSURE OF THE WORKING GROUP
150. I have been asked to describe my recollection of any updates on Project
Sparrow, or the issues arising from the Horizon IT system to POL’s Group
Executive or Board, and set out to what extent I, or others, were encouraged to
provide updates on Project Sparrow orally rather than in writing. I understand by
this question that the Inquiry is seeking to understand any specific recollections
Page 80 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
I have of any updates on Project Sparrow. I recall that regular updates on Project
Sparrow were provided to the Board and the Group Executive, particularly where
there were material developments. From the material I have been provided by
the Inquiry, such updates were provided to the Board on 25 March 2015
(POL00027279), 22 September 2015 (POL00021538), 24 May 2016
(POL00027219), 28 March 2017 (POL00027188) and to the Group Executive on
13 July 2017 (POL00027182). I note I have received a relatively small selection
of Board and Group Executive papers and so the examples above should not be
taken to mean they were the totality of Project Sparrow updates to those
committees. The means by which briefings were conducted varied according to
the topic, some were written and some were oral.
151. From April 2016 when we were informed that Freeths, the Claimants’ solicitors,
had filed a claim in the High Court, I was more sensitive about confidentiality and
privilege issues given the risk that litigation was imminent, and therefore some
updates were verbal only. While POL had implemented a facility for electronic
Board and Group Executive papers, a number of directors and executives still
chose to receive paper copies which posed a higher security and leak risk. We
were also aware that POL Board papers were distributed within BEIS, beyond
the nominated UKGI Board member, and this increased the risk of disclosure
and/or the loss of privilege where it applied to specific documents or parts of
documents (e.g. through FOIA applications).
152. With regard to the nature and extent of my involvement in the release of the final
draft of Second Sight’s Part Two Report and POL’s response to it, I do not have
Page 81 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
any specific recollection of having any involvement in the release of the Part Two
Report. This was released by Second Sight in April 2015 and was contemplated
in the correspondence with Second Sight at the time the Working Group was
closed (for example see the letter on 18 March 2015 (POL00022529)), and when
the Second Sight engagement was terminated on notice. Following receipt of a
draft copy, POL prepared a detailed response, of which we informed Second
Sight in my letter of 18 March 2015 (POL00022529). I have not been provided
with a copy of the detailed response but recall it was prepared by the internal
POL team and I believe, had input from Bond Dickinson. While I read the report
and POL’s response, much of the material related to events that pre-dated me,
and I relied on the POL staff who were managing the preparation of the response
to ensure that the responses were accurate and proportionate.
153. I have been asked to set out my knowledge of Fujitsu’s ability to alter transaction
data or data in branch accounts without the knowledge or consent of SPMs when
POL responded to the Second Sight Part Two Report. The POL IT team in 2015-
16 was relatively small, so all questions regarding Horizon and IT related matters
went directly to the Fujitsu team. POL had specifically relied on Fujitsu to provide
detailed answers in relation to the issue of remote access, and had
correspondence with Fujitsu on this point on a number of occasions during my
employment. For example, the email dated 21 July 2015 (POL00024087) in
which the Head of Information Security, Ms Julie George, informs me and others
as to the outcome of her questions to Fujitsu about a particular application
(Cygwin) that Fujitsu used and whether it could be used by Fujitsu for remote
access. Ms George’s email was to confirm that she had received written
Page 82 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
confirmation from Fujitsu which she summarised as Fujitsu “...cannot/do not
access for amendment or deletion the branches (sic) Horizon front office
business/financial systems”. This use of the language ‘cannot’ was consistent
with what I understood was POL’s previous understanding.
154. The scope of the question also changed over time. Early on, it arose in relation
to Mr Rudkin’s allegations, and the focus of the initial queries was to establish or
disprove those allegations. Later the question became more nuanced: could
either POL or Fujitsu employees remotely access and alter branch data without
leaving an audit trail? It was not until 2016 at the time of the Group Litigation
that we received specific positive information that remote access was in theory
possible. These matters are further dealt with at paragraphs 209 - 225.
155. Within POL there were frequent discussions as to the implications of the remote
access issue. Other than Mr Rudkin’s statements and those of Mr Richard Rolls
in the BBC Panorama programme, no evidence had been presented that remote
access had occurred or that records had been remotely changed other than in
ways that were mandated. There had been no suggestion that POL had
instructed Fujitsu to alter records; and there was no evidence presented that any
one from either Fujitsu or POL had benefitted from changes remotely made. So
while resolving the issue was important, there was a sense within POL that in
the absence of evidence that records had actually been deliberately altered to
the detriment of the SPMs, then this was a lesser issue.
Page 83 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Dealings with the Shareholder Executive (“ShEx”)
156. I have been asked to describe the nature and extent of my dealings with the ShEx
and the Government in relation to the complaints made by SPMs regarding
Horizon. From a POL operational perspective, there wasn'ta significant difference
between the ShEx and the day to day contact we had with BEIS, and there was
frequently overlap. Most of my interaction was with the ShEx team who had a very
wide remit, and they could, and did, ask questions on, and require copies of
documents and reports on a wide range of topics.
157. As I set out above, Mr Callard was the Shareholder NED when I arrived and he
had a small team. Mr Cooper then replaced him and developed a larger team.
Their approach was much more intensive in terms of the frequency of interaction,
the depth of information they sought, and the range of POL employees with whom
they sought to engage.
158. At the time I joined POL, there was no formal arrangement as to briefings in
relation to Scheme matters. We received requests for briefings from time to time
on the progress of the Scheme, and interactions with MPs. Briefings to BEIS/ShEx
usually followed an agreed agenda, and the materials prepared followed the
issues flagged in developing that agenda. Accordingly, the priority was to address
the questions that were raised, and as a secondary goal, give BEIS confidence
that the POL team were managing the situation regarding the complaints from
SPMs. I believe that this was one of the original reasons for the establishment of
the Board Sparrow Sub-Committee (of which Mr Callard was a member) so that
the committee had oversight over progress to address the issues raised in relation
Page 84 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
to Horizon. There were regular interactions with a number of MPs about the
complaints raised by SPMs which was handled mainly by the Communications
team lead by Mr Davies with support from Mr Bourke in my team. There were
several changes of minister during my tenure, and each time there was a request
to brief the new minister on the background to the issues. Other than the briefing
for Baroness Lucy Neville-Rolfe (referred to in internal documents as ‘BLNR’ or
LNR’), who was appointed in 2015, I don’t recall details of specific cases being
requested by, or provided to ShEx or BEIS during my tenure. Regular briefings
were provided to various BEIS officials including Alex Chisolm, the then BEIS
Permanent Secretary who received briefings similar to that which went to
Baroness Neville-Rolfe.
159. Ahead of the meeting with Baroness Neville-Rolfe on 6 August 2015 there were
a series of both internal discussions, and conversations with Laura Thompson (a
member of the BEIS team reporting to Mr Callard) , which I refer to in my email to
Ms Vennells on 2 August 2015 (POL00102431) to agree the scope of the meeting,
as well as to agree within POL the key messages, which were then discussed in
advance with the BEIS team. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to an email I
sent to Mr Cameron on 31 July 2015 (POL00162554_0005) and the comment “no
one is opining on the merits of the case”. In this email I am reporting to Mr
Cameron a conversation I had with Laura Thompson regarding the issues
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (referred to as “L-NR” in the email) was likely to be
considering and on which she would want to be briefed. I believe that reference
to be a statement of BEIS’s position at that time; that is, that BEIS had not formed
their own view of the merits or otherwise of the case. Had it been a question as
Page 85 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
to the merits, then I would have expected it to be phrased as a request for an
opinion.
160. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to an email from Ms Vennells to me on 3
August 2015 (POL00065477) in which she states “As my earlier note, our priority
is to protect the business and the thousands who operated under the same rules
and didn’t get into difficulties; the points and queries are not to reopen anything
but to ensure so we are well briefed for Thursday” and asks me to comment to
what extent was “protecting the business” a priority in dealing with challenges
brought by SPMs regarding the Horizon IT system. The POL approach was
premised on the fact that while there were a number of SPMs (and others) who
had raised concerns, there were a significant number of users both currently and
historically (c.60,000 at any one time, and more than 500,000 since Horizon was
launched) for whom Horizon worked as intended and who had raised no
concerns; there were c.6 million transactions processed every day without
problem; and POL provided reliable services to over 20 Government and third
party customers (such as Royal Mail, Department for Work and Pensions, Bank
of Ireland, banks generally, utility providers etc, WH Smith etc). POL therefore
had to maintain the trust and confidence of these stakeholders at the same time
as investigating and addressing the complaints brought by a group of SPMs.
Therefore it was important to ensure that for those SPMs for whom Horizon was
operating as intended, that we continued to support them, and that they were not
de-stabilised by the ongoing challenges. As part of the Government funding for
POL, it was a condition that certain access criteria were maintained — these
included a minimum of 11,500 branches which had to meet certain requirements
Page 86 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
as to geographic spread. Maintaining this geographic requirement was
challenging, so stability in the network was important. Equally, the fees received
from Government agencies and third parties for providing services underpinned
POL’s financial position, so maintaining their confidence in the system was critical.
The reputational damage arising from the ongoing challenges from the JFSA,
SPMs and the press were unhelpful in the context of retaining the confidence of
SPMs, customers, suppliers and business partners. POL considered it important
that it not only understood whether there were real issues to be addressed, but
also that the reputation of the business would not be enhanced by failing to
address and identify significant IT issues, if such issues did in fact exist. It was
also reputationally important to be seen to be addressing the criticisms.
RESPONSE TO PANORAMA
My involvement with POL’s response to the BBC
161. My recollection of POL’s engagement with the BBC in respect of its broadcast of
Panorama concerning the Horizon IT system is that it was handled largely by
POL’s communications team, with support being provided to the communications
team by internal and external lawyers.
162. I do not recall having direct input into the response to the BBC, as this was largely
led by Mr Williams, with support from external legal advisers at CMS Cameron
McKenna, although I was aware it was taking place and I recall attending
meetings to discuss the engagement with the BBC and was copied into emails
attaching drafts of the proposed correspondence with the BBC. As with other
Page 87 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
matters, I relied on other members of POL’s legal team to have carriage of this
work and would receive high-level briefings and updates from them.
163. The Inquiry has provided me with a copy of an email dated 2 June 2015 from Mr
Williams to Mr Bourke, Mr Underwood, Ms Corfield and others RE: Horizon /
Panorama — Join Up Session-— SUBJECT TO PRIVILEGE —- DO NOT FORWARD
— Panorama Letter (2) (POL00229353) and has asked me to set out whether I
attended a meeting on 3 June 2015 at CMS and what my recollection is. The
email says “Thank you for being available to meet at 3pm tomorrow at CMS’s
London offices”. I note that I am copied to the email rather than being a direct
recipient, however I do not recall whether I attended the meeting at CMS on 3
June 2015, nor do I have access to my diary from that time to check whether I
did. I am afraid I therefore unable to assist the Inquiry on the contents of that
meeting.
164. In light of my recollection that I had little direct involvement with the response to
Panorama, I am unable to comment on how POL satisfied itself that the contents
of the response to Panorama was appropriate, in respect of remote access or
otherwise. However, having considered the documentation provided to me by the
Inquiry, namely the draft letter from POL to the BBC sent to me on 2 June 2015
(POL00229354), the draft letter from POL to Karen Wightman sent to me on 4
August 2015 (POL00230790), the draft statement for Panorama (POL00230791),
and the letter from BBC to POL 19 October 2015 (POL00139193) I note that much
of the content contained in the correspondence with the BBC was common to
equivalent statements made to Second Sight, to the BIS Select Committee, etc.
Page 88 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Based on the information of which I was aware of at the time, I believed that the
content relating to remote access in the aforementioned letters reflected the
advice that POL had received from Fujitsu.
TIM PARKER’S APPOINTMENT AND THE CHAIRMAN’S REVIEW
The purpose and scope of the Chairman’s Review
165. Baroness Neville-Rolfe, the BIS Minister responsible for Post Office at the time of
Mr Parker's appointment, wrote to Mr Parker shortly after his appointment,
requesting that he undertake a review. I understand that the Inquiry refers to the
review as the “Swift Review”, but the review was referred to internally at POL as
the “Chairman’s Review’ or “Tim Parker’s Review” and I will use this terminology
throughout my statement.
166. The Inquiry has not provided a copy of the Minister's letter to me although I have
seen what I understand to be a copy of the letter online (WITN10010104). It is
dated 10 September 2015 and I believe it was received in POL’s offices in hard
copy on Friday 11 September 2015. The Minister does not specify the scope of
the review but merely states “/ am therefore requesting that, on assuming your
role as Chair, you give this matter your earliest attention and, if you determine
that any further action is necessary, will take steps to ensure that happens’. I
emailed a copy of the letter to Mr Parker on 14 September 2015 (POL00102550),
and summarised the request as “the Minister requests you to review personally
the issues relating to the Post Office ‘Horizon’ system and determine whether any
further action should be taken”. I expect that the Minister considered that, in light
Page 89 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
of the criticisms that had been levelled at how POL was handling complaints, a
newly appointed Chair would be able to look at things afresh, take an independent
view, and would then be well placed to drive through any recommendations.
167. The documentation provided to me by the Inquiry reflects my recollection, which
is that there was discussion internally within POL legal (POLO0065606), about
how to address the Minister's request so that an independent review could be
delivered on behalf of Mr Parker, and, if appropriate, actionable findings or
recommendations could be made. I believe that POL legal also discussed the
letter at the time with Bond Dickinson.
168. Mr Parker had only just been appointed to his position as Chair and my
recollection was that he had agreed to dedicate approximately 1 - 1.5 working
days per week to his role at POL. In light of the very limited amount of time Mr
Parker would therefore be able to dedicate to the review, and given the large
amount of material relating to the subject matter of the review, Mr Parker
considered that he would need to seek external professional assistance to
undertake the review. It was clear that Mr Parker, who was unfamiliar with the
detailed history of the subject matter and the relevant materials, would need some
practical assistance from my team in order to facilitate the process and be the
conduit for information to flow to his external adviser. It was understood by me
and my team that we were not acting as Mr Parker's legal advisers — our role was
to provide information and assistance when Mr Parker or his advisers requested
it.
Page 90 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
169. In a meeting on 25 September 2015, Mr Parker asked me for recommendations
as to leading barristers who would be able to advise and assist him with his
enquiry (POL00027126). I recall that Bond Dickinson sourced and recommended
two potential KCs, one of which was Sir Jonathan Swift . Having first checked
their availability, I passed those recommendations on to Mr Parker. Mr Parker
requested that Sir Jonathan be instructed.
170. I have been asked to comment on whether there were any disagreements within
POL as to the purpose of the review. I do not recall that there were any
disagreements as to either the purpose or scope of the review, either from the
Group Executive or from anyone else. Both the members of my team who
ultimately supported the Chairman’s Review and myself were very clear that this
was the Chairman's Review and therefore, ultimately, both the fact and scope of
the review were a matter for Mr Parker.
171. POL’s view was that it was important for the scope to be settled independently of
POL given the significance of the scope — it would clearly have a direct impact on
the content, and likely the conclusions, of the Chairman’s Review.
172. The Inquiry has asked me to describe why I recommended the wording for the
scope of the Chairman's Review in the Instructions to Sir Jonathan to advise in
consultation on 8 October 2015 (POL00156617). I believe the Instructions were
drafted by Bond Dickinson, and reviewed by Mr Williams and myself before they
were sent. As referred to above, when the Minister's letter arrived, Mr Parker had
only just been appointed Chairman and so was unfamiliar with the background
Page 91 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and the issues, which had, of course, been ongoing for some time. As I say, Mr
Parker was also only working part-time and therefore, in order to assist him, I
prepared what I thought was a starting point for Counsel to consider. In those
Instructions, I noted that the Chairman, considered the letter from Baroness
Neville-Rolfe to be a request: “To review the Post Office’s handling of the
complaints made by sub-postmasters regarding the alleged flaws in its Horizon
electronic point of sale and branch accounting systems, and determine whether
the processes designed and implemented by Post Office Limited to understand,
investigate and resolve those complaints (including through the Complaints and
Mediation Scheme), were reasonable and appropriate”. I do not recall why I
chose this specific language to describe the scope, but I do not recall having a
specific ‘agenda’ - the letter from Baroness Neville-Rolfe did not contain a scope,
and so I think I intended this to be simply a succinct description of the issues to
date. One of the challenges prior to the Group Litigation was to define the issues
and challenges which were being made, and which were wider than ‘Horizon’
(hardware and software), it also encompassed POL's processes and procedures
and the approach POL took to resolving complaints. I may have had a call with
BIS to talk about the letter in more detail, but I cannot now remember if this was
the case.
173. The Instructions to Sir Jonathan requested that he provide advice to Mr Parker on
“the scope of the review and how this is framed’, it was therefore clear in my mind
at the time of preparing these instructions that neither myself nor anyone else at
POL was setting the scope. I recall that Mr Parker wanted to complete his review
by Christmas of 2015, so a proportionate scope needed to be considered and
Page 92 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
agreed, taking into account Mr Parker's preference as to timing. My understanding
was that the responsibility of settling the scope lay with Mr Parker, having been
provided with advice and assistance by Sir Jonathan. I therefore did not consider
my role as providing advice to Mr Parker about the scope of the review, or shaping
the review in any way. That was a matter between Mr Parker and Sir Jonathan.
Accordingly, within the instructions Sir Jonathan was provided with a number of
background documents, including the initial letter from Baroness Neville-Rolfe of
10 September 2015, so as to provide transparency as to the request which had
been made by the Minister to the Chairman. The POL team (being mainly Mr
Williams, Mr Bourke and Mr Underwood) and I had discussions with Sir Jonathan
and Christopher Knight (Sir Jonathan’s junior) in early October 2015 in order to
provide more detail in relation to the history of the matter, and also any assistance
Counsel required to enable him to settle the scope of the review, as I refer to in
my email to Mr Parker on 16 October 2015 (POL00102614). The provision of
information to Sir Jonathan and Mr Knight sometimes took the form of direct
discussion with them, and at other times, we provided written information, for
example when I provided background information relating to each proposed term
of reference (POL00130961). In those discussions Sir Jonathan asked a number
of questions which formed the basis of the terms of reference he was considering
with Mr Parker. The POL team and I did our best to answer Sir Jonathan's
questions, and as can be seen from POL00130961, this culminated in a question
and answer document provided to Mr Parker on 16 October 2015. Aside from
what can be seen in the written exchanges leading up to the question and
answers (emails on 13 October 2015 (POL00104216) and 15 October 2015
Page 93 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(POL00162692), and its attachment (POL00162693), I cannot now recall specific
oral discussions with Sir Jonathan or Mr Knight.
174. Throughout my engagement with Sir Jonathan in this process, I kept Mr Parker
updated. He was however reliant on me for the provision of information to Sir
Jonathan, given that he was new to the role — this was in my role as a conduit and
facilitator for information, rather than as a decision maker.
175. Following the initial engagement, there were separate subsequent discussions
between Mr Parker and Sir Jonathan in which the wording of the scope was
discussed and finalised. Based on materials provided to me by the Inquiry, it
appears that the final version of the scope was agreed at a conference between
Mr Parker and Sir Jonathan on 20 October 2015. I attended that conference,
where the scope of the Chairman’s Review was finally agreed, but I now do not
recall the meeting itself. I note, however, that I have been provided with a copy of
an email (POL00102616) which I sent the next day summarising the outcomes of
the meeting.
176. Following the conference on 20 October 2015, the POL team had several
meetings with Sir Jonathan and Mr Knight, where we discussed the practicalities
of the review, including ways of working, the documents to be provided to
Counsel, and the interviews to be arranged between Counsel and third parties.
As mentioned above, Mr Parker made it clear (and I agreed with this approach)
that the role of the POL team was to be a conduit to provide materials and support
to Counsel, but it was Mr Parker’s review. Save as explained above, I did not
Page 94 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
consider it my role to give instructions to Counsel, or make decisions about what
Counsel should, or should not, be provided with, or the trajectory of the review.
Once Counsel had initially been briefed on the historical issues, which included
the provision of a range of documents and a detailed chronology, the role of the
POL team (including me) was to be responsive to Counsel’s requests for
documentation and information and facilitating third party interviews. I personally
had very little involvement during this period. My email to Sir Jonathan on 14
October 2015 indicates that the volume of material the team was collating was
significant and I requested that Sir Jonathan indicate to me what he would
particularly like to see (POL00102604). This was simply an interim provision of
material whilst the team undertook to collate the remaining documents.
Thereafter, I recall that Sir Jonathan and Mr Knight would either request specific
documentation when they saw reference to it or knew it existed and, otherwise,
they would make ‘issue-based’ requests for documentation.
177. The Inquiry has asked me to consider an email from Mr Bourke to Mr Knight,
whereby Mr Bourke summarises a meeting on 27 October 2015 and notes “in
relation to the Horizon system, Jane outlined the very real difficulties involved in
what is, at its heart, an exercise in proving a negative, only made more
complicated by the age of the system” (POL00102638). I believe that Mr Bourke’s
note derives from me explaining to those at the meeting on 27 October 2015 that,
increasingly, POL was being pressured to establish that Horizon did not have any
flaws (i.e. it was required to prove a negative). I considered that proving a negative
was particularly difficult in these circumstances because all systems have issues,
but that does not necessarily mean that they are inherently flawed. Another
Page 95 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
difficulty was that a large number of the complaints arose from issues with the
Horizon system pre-2011. It was therefore very difficult to locate records
(assuming they still existed) in order to determine whether the Horizon system
was or was not the underlying cause of the discrepancies in the branch accounts.
The nature of Sir Jonathan’s advice
178. On 30 October 2015, I emailed Mr Parker to update him on the progress of the
Chairman's Review (POL00102649). I have been asked to consider the following
part of that email: “At this stage we propose that Jonathan will provide you with a
legally privileged report...It is not our intention that this report would be made
public, and we will therefore need to consider the best way for your findings to be
presented in a way that can be made public”. At this point in time, Sir Jonathan
had not provided advice or recommendations to Mr Parker, and I was not sure
what Sir Jonathan’s advice would ultimately look like, but I thought that it was
likely that Sir Jonathan’s recommendations to Mr Parker would constitute legal
advice and thus it would be appropriate for Mr Parker to assert privilege over the
report if he chose to do so. I note from Sir Jonathan’s amendments / comments
to the draft letter prepared for Mr Parker to send to the Minister briefing her on the
outcome of the inquiry in February 2016, he asks Mr Parker to “consider whether
or not [Mr Parker] wish to maintain privilege in the report.” (POL00131715) which
suggests the issue of privilege was raised with Sir Jonathan at some point. My
approach to privilege arose from the fact that this was deemed to be the
Chairman's Review, such review being informed by the legal advice and
assistance of Sir Jonathan.
Page 96 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
179. Nevertheless, it was clear from the outset that Mr Parker would be required to
write to the Minister to inform her of the outcomes from his review, and we
expected that the Minister would want to be able to rely on the detail provided to
her in some way either in Parliament, through discussion with other Ministers and
interested MPs, or to the public. All were considered to be possible outcomes. We
assumed that the Minister might make that detail public or, alternatively, the detail
might be made public by way of a FOIA Request to BIS. Particularly in
circumstances whereby Sir Jonathan’s recommendations and conclusions might
be privileged, we wanted to ensure that we had some control over the information
which was communicated outside of POL. We wanted to ensure that no potential
privilege would be lost, whilst also ensuring that the Minister was properly
informed about Mr Parker's findings. In the event, a letter was sent by Mr Parker
to the Minister on 4 March 2016 as discussed below. I note that (POL00103136)
contains two emails from me to Mr Parker attaching what is effectively an interim
draft of the letter (my email dated 19 February 2016) together with a further email
dated 1 March 2016 which attaches the recommended final draft following receipt
of comments from Sir Jonathan. In the email of 19 February 2016, I refer to my
concerns that providing the Minister with a copy of the report could mean privilege
is lost, and this simply reinforced the previously understood position that the report
attracted privilege. I also noted that BIS officials were also concerned as to the
legal status of the report:
“As discussed last week, we have considered the best way for you to brief the
Minister on the outcome of your enquiry to date. As you will recall, I expressed
concerns that were we to provide the Minister with a copy of the legal advice
Page 97 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
you have received from Jonathan Swift, there was a risk that privilege could be
lost and that the report could become disclosable by BIS through FO! requests
or similar. We have also received a call from the Minister's office in which they
sought to understand how the reporting would be undertaken. During that call
it became apparent that BIS officials are also concerned as to the legal status
and positioning of any report received from you.
Accordingly we have sought to construct a report from you to the Minister which
carries fewer risks should it ultimately (have to) be made public by BIS, and
which therefore balances a description of the scope of work that has been done
and the resulting key findings, with the need to retain privilege. To this end,
please find attached for your consideration a draft letter from you to the Minister.
It describes the questions addressed in the review work, as well as the high
level findings, and it summarises the further work that is being undertaken. We
have discussed this approach with BIS, and believe that it will be acceptable to
the Minister. We have sent the draft letter to Jonathan Swift for him to advise
whether he is satisfied as to how his findings are represented.”
180. I am aware from press reporting and online commentary that there has been a
suggestion that POL and I were seeking to use privilege as a means to avoid
disclosing the Chairman's Review in the Group Litigation. I understand that
sentiment in light of what has happened, however, I wish to be clear that it
certainly was never the intention of POL or myself. It was understood within POL
(which relied on the advice from Counsel and Bond Dickinson) that the
Chairman's Review constituted legal advice to Mr Parker on the basis that it
Page 98 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
provided a series of recommendations borne out of legal advice. The whole
internal, and external, legal team operated on that basis, and indeed at no time
was POL advised that the Chairman’s Review was not a privileged document
either in whole or in part. I regret that I did not turn my mind to this question
explicitly and seek specific advice as to whether the report could have been
released with appropriate redaction to protect any sections that were properly
determined to constitute privileged advice, given that disclosure of the advice in
or even before the Group Litigation may have assisted SPMs.
181. The threat of litigation was not relevant to the way in which the review was
conducted by Mr Parker, although we would have communicated to Sir Jonathan
that POL was aware that Mr Bates and others were keen to bring some kind of
proceedings against POL. POL was informed by a journalist in November 2015
that the JFSA was preparing a class action (POL00153696), however the Claim
Form was not filed until April 2016, and therefore this was no more than a ‘threat’
for the majority of the period his review was underway. Following the conclusion
of Sir Jonathan’s report, the recommendations were implemented and I note that
Mr Altman in his report dated 26 July 2016 comments “The review commissioned
by Mr Parker has subsequently been brought to a close, and POL is actively
defending the civil claim. I have, however, been instructed to continue with the
work requested by Mr Williams for the purpose of assisting POL’ s defence of the
civil proceedings.”(POL00112884_0003).
182. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to Mr Williams’ suggestion on 20 November
2015 that “We should seriously consider suspending Tim Parker's review...we
Page 99 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
should be very careful about generating through the TP review material which is
disclosable in the civil action” (POL00153696). In my view, Mr Williams was right
to flag that potential litigation should be considered even though I don’t believe
that at that point we had visibility of the likely recommendations, let alone the
report itself. Nevertheless, I took the view that the Chairman’s Review needed to
be completed, and it was not at all certain at that point that litigation would
eventuate. Sir Jonathan continued his work and provided his report on 8 February
2016.
Discussions with Mr Parker, other senior managers or board members about Sir
Jonathan’s findings, how to communicate those findings and how to respond
to those findings
183. My recollection is that Sir Jonathan provided a draft version of his findings to Mr
Parker, who shared them with me. I shared them with my team and we provided
some comments (largely typos and some fact-checking) to Sir Jonathan
(POL00103112). Sir Jonathan then finalised his findings, which he and Mr Knight
then discussed directly with Mr Parker ahead of Mr Parker's report back to the
Minister in March 2016. I cannot recall if I was involved in that discussion between
Mr Parker, Sir Jonathan and Mr Knight.
184. I have not been provided with the minutes of any Board meetings or Group
Executive meetings in which the Chairman’s Review or the findings from it, were
discussed, although it is clear that the Board were aware that it had been
commissioned as the CEO informed the Board at its meeting on 22 September
2015 that “the Minister had asked the new Chairman for his independent review
Page 100 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
of Sparrow’. (POL00021538_0001). I do not now recall whether the Group
Executive was briefed. With regards to the Board, I am aware from open-source
material that Mr Parker has said that I had advised him not to brief the Board on
grounds of confidentiality and privilege. I exhibit at (WITN10010105) an email
exchange between Mr Cooper and members of UKGI on 26 — 27 August 2020
and at (WITN10010106) an email exchange between Mr Cooper and members of
UKGI on 16 September 2020, in which it is reported that I advised Mr Parker that
Sir Jonathan's report needed to be kept confidential in light of the Group Litigation
and that I raised issues of privilege. My recollection is different to Mr Parker's,
although I agree that I discussed privilege and confidentiality when I met him. My
recollection is that the Senior Independent Director, Mr McCall asked a question
at a Board meeting as to whether the Board would be briefed on the findings of
the Chairman’s Review, although I do not now recall the exact timing, but it was
after the further work recommended by the Chairman’s Review had commenced.
I believe that, as a result of that question, I provided an oral briefing to the Board
(although I do not recall if this was at the same meeting or subsequently) as to
the scope and findings of the Chairman’s Review as well as a summary of the
further work being undertaken following the Chairman's Review . Although I have
not seen any documents which indicate that the full report was circulated to the
Board, my recollection is that I advised the Board that the full report was available
on request.
185. With regards to communicating the findings to the public, it was agreed that a
summary of the findings should be sent by Mr Parker to Baroness Neville-Rolfe,
and I discuss this in more detail above and below. I do not otherwise recall having
Page 101 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
any specific conversations about the findings being made public, but I note that
Mr Bourke had a discussion with BIS in late January 2016 where the possibility of
preparing some form of public document was discussed (POL00027116). Other
than the letter being sent to the Minister, I do not now recall what happened
thereafter, but I do note that those in the Minister's office had concerns about
inadvertently creating disclosure issues for BIS or the Minister, which I set out in
my email to Mr Parker on 1 March 2015 (POL00103136). Given the way
Departments (e.g. BIS) worked with their Ministers, the provision of the 4 March
2016 letter to the Minister meant that BIS/UKGI were thereby informed, and Mr
Callard is likely to have been at the Board meeting at which I summarised the
findings.
186. Following receipt of Sir Jonathan’s final report, workstreams were set up in
February 2016 to address each of the recommendations. This work involved
reviewing criminal convictions, Horizon controls, suspense accounts and the
postmaster helpdesk. The scope of each workstream was discussed with Sir
Jonathan in advance to ensure that he was comfortable that the scope would
properly address his recommendations. The necessary work was then
commissioned, and the results were reported back to Sir Jonathan. In parallel, I
recall I provided written fortnightly updates to Mr Parker on progress (see my
email dated Friday May 13 2016 as an example at POL00103192_0002) . Where
I was made aware that Mr Parker was due to meet with Government in relation to
the review, my team and I arranged the Government briefings and prepared and
supplied briefing notes.
Page 102 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
The letter of 4 March 2016 from Mr Parker to Baroness Neville-Rolfe
187. I do not now recall who prepared the first draft of the letter to the Minister,
however, based on the materials that have been provided to me by the Inquiry, I
believe the letter would have been initially drafted, and commented on, by the
POL team (including the internal team, Bond Dickinson, and myself) and was then
submitted to Sir Jonathan to ensure he was comfortable with the positioning of
the statements as an accurate summary. I can see that Sir Jonathan provided a
tracked changed version making some suggestions which he said we should “fee/
free to adopt/or not” for consideration on 24 February 2016, which was considered
by myself, Mr Williams, Mr Underwood and Mr Bourke (POL00103134). During
this review process, we (and I cannot remember who, but I believe it would have
been either Mr Bourke or Mr Underwood) had a discussion with the Minister's
office about whether such a letter would create “disclosure issues” for BIS or the
Minister (see POL00103136). What I mean by “disclosure issues” is not in the
context of any litigation, but rather in terms of any FOIA request. The draft letter
was emailed to Mr Parker for final review and sign-off. I cannot now recall whether
I had a discussion with Mr Parker about this draft, and whether any further drafting
amendments were made, but I believe this was left with Mr Parker to finalise as
he considered appropriate.
188. I have been asked to note Sir Jonathan Swift's proposal to remove the following
text from the draft letter from Mr Parker to the Minister: “However nothing in the
materials we reviewed suggested that there is any evidence that the Horizon
system was responsible for those losses which resulted in convictions” and to
explain what, if any, importance I attributed to the deletion. I believe the deletion
Page 103 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
here was due to (a) it no longer being the right place for such a comment given
the changed content of this section, and (b) replacement with the following
language:
“The review report recognised that, in a system of the age, size and complexity
of Horizon, it was unremarkable that occasional bugs, errors or glitches were
uncovered and addressed. A limited number of specific problems with the
potential to affect branch accounts were brought to the attention of Second
Sight during the course of their work, together with details of the way in which
the Post Office had addressed these matters. Based on the review it has
become apparent that these bugs were capable of having a generic impact (i.e.
of affecting all users of the Horizon system and not only those who had raised
complaints about them). However, the review did not disclose any evidence to
suggest that any of these bugs had been the cause of loss to any sub-
postmasters other than those who had raised the problem.”
189. Sir Jonathan then goes on to recommend that further work be undertaken in
relation to this. There are a number of possible reasons as to why Sir Jonathan
may not have felt comfortable with the original language which was very wide.
After all, the Report did state at paragraph 95 that: “We emphasise that none of
the Second Sight reports identify systemic flaws in the Horizon system likely to
have caused the losses incurred at the Scheme Branches" and also at paragraph
146: “We recognise that the existence of the two matters highlighted by Deloitte
are most likely to be wild goose chases. It is improbable that they have been used
beyond the identified instance. However, in the light of the consistent impression
Page 104 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
given that they do not exist at all, we consider that it is now incumbent on POL to
commission work to confirm the position insofar as possible. Accordingly we make
a recommendation to that effect.” I therefore can see that the original wide
language was not appropriate to address the nuances described in these two
paragraphs of the report. That said, I am not in a position to broadly speculate
about what language Sir Jonathan used and why. Fundamentally POL and Mr
Parker were comfortable with the revised wording and the associated
recommendation which formed the basis of work commissioned from Deloitte.
190. The Inquiry has also asked me to consider Sir Jonathan’s inclusion of the
following text (POL00131715):
‘it has become apparent that these bugs were capable of having a
generic impact (i.e. of affecting all users of the Horizon system and not
only those who had raised complaints about them). However, the
review did not disclose any evidence to suggest that any of these bugs had
been the cause of loss to any sub-postmasters other than those _who_ had
raised the problem” i (emphasis added by the Inquiry).
and the following text in Mr Parker's letter to Baroness Neville-Rolfe
(POL00024913) and explain the reasons for the change in wording away from
Sir Jonathan’s suggestion above:
Page 105 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
It_is_ apparent that these bugs were capable of having a generic
impact... However, no evidence has emerged to suggest that a technical fault in
Horizon resulted in a postmaster wrongly being held responsible for a loss”
(emphasis added by the Inquiry).
I have no recollection as to how or why the language was changed although I can see
from my email to Mr Parker of 1 March 2016 (POL00103136) which attaches a revised
draft of the letter (POL00103137) that I had accepted Sir Jonathan’s proposed
amendments in this respect. In the absence of any knowledge as to the reason for the
change, I’m afraid I cannot comment on the significance of these changes.
POL’s approach to the CCRC and POL’s review of criminal convictions
191. Sir Jonathan made a number of recommendations in relation to the criminal
convictions and POL’s engagement with the CCRC (POL00006355 at paragraphs
92-94, 99, 149(6)). Sir Jonathan's recommendations were implemented by POL.
I expand on this below when I discuss Mr Altman’s advice (see paragraphs 199
ff.
192. I do not have any specific recollection of the meeting with the CCRC on 6
November 2015. I have been provided by the Inquiry with a draft of my speaking
notes prepared for that meeting (POL00110246). I do not have a copy of the final
version and therefore cannot comment on whether the draft is an accurate
reflection of the final document.
Page 106 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
193. Nevertheless, the draft speaking notes reference documents in certain categories
(mediation related documents and what seem to be the prosecution related files)
provided to the CCRC to that point, and include the comment ‘Unless it discovers
something new, POL does not expect to be providing any more documents in the
above categories”. Given the beginning of that sentence is ‘Unless it discovers
something new’, I interpret that comment as meaning that POL had disclosed
everything that it had found in relation to the 20 cases, and that there was
therefore nothing more to be disclosed. There are then further notes about other
files which may be relevant, although the note suggests that these points had
been previously raised in correspondence with the CCRC. The draft speaking
note also queries whether we should mention the Chairman's Review with the
notation ‘I think not’. I suspect that this was a timing issue given that the
Chairman’s Review had only commenced in the previous month, and we had little
to say about it at that point. As with the first meeting with the CCRC in May 2015,
the tone of the speaking notes suggests POL was seeking to be helpful and
cooperative. Although I don't specifically recall the meeting, that approach is
consistent with how I would have wanted to position POL with the CRRC.
194. I do not recall the precise nature and extent of information which POL may have
passed to the CCRC in relation to the Chairman’s Review, Project Zebra and/or
any other work by Deloitte. As I mention at paragraph 136136 above, I do not
recall whether the Project Zebra report was passed to the CCRC, but it is my
assumption it would have been. I believe that Mr Parker's briefing letter to the
Minister was disclosed under a s17 request (as per section 17 of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1995) to BIS from the CCRC. I am not aware of any reason why POL
Page 107 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
would not have disclosed the full report produced by Sir Jonathan, although there
would have a been a question around the right time to disclose it given the follow
up work that was recommended. At the time of the November meeting with the
CCRC, Sir Jonathan’s work was still underway and no report had yet been
provided. I note that POL00123890 (an email from Mr Williams to me dated 5
April 2016) refers to the fact that POL had advised the CCRC of the ongoing
Deloitte work under Project Bramble, although the report had not been shared
with them given it was still being developed.
195. I have been asked to consider statements in an email from Mr Williams to me
dated 5 April 2016 in which Mr Williams states (POL00123890):
“This to me raised the question of whether, and if so when, we might want to
disclose Jonathan's report to the CCRC. Providing the report to the CCRC
sooner than later would demonstrate the serious and transparent (to them)
efforts we are making to run down the various issues. It might also avoid the
CCRC embarking on a course of action which could confuse and delay
substantially the conclusion of their investigations._The risk of course is that we
would need to provide to the CCRC the outcome of the further work being done
on Jonathan's recommendations in circumstances where we don't yet know all
of the outcomes.
My gut feeling is that we should disclose the report to the CCRC relatively soon.
The CCRC are likely to hear about it through the Arbuthnot connection, and it
fits within their informal request for any Board level reports (1 am confident we
would get a s.I7 Notice for it if the CCRC knew of its existence).
Page 108 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
I’m reasonably comfortable about where we might get to with Brian's
"sufficiency of evidence" review, but substantially less so with the Deloitte work,
which in turn would feed Brian's advice on whether any disclosure is required
(it would however demonstrate to the CCRC that we are thinking about that!).”
196. I have been asked to consider the underlined words (underlining added by me).
Out of context, these words might suggest that the recommendation was not to
disclose the report. However, Mr Williams’ view was that we should disclose the
report, even though there were (identified) risks of doing so. As stated above, I
do not recall specifically whether the report was in fact disclosed to the CCRC,
however I believe that I would have been supportive of disclosing it. As flagged
by Mr William's email, the real question was one of timing given that, although the
report itself had been completed by that time, the work pursuant to the
recommendations was still underway. Nevertheless, it is clear that POL had
informed the CCRC about the scope of work being commissioned as earlier in
that same email, Mr Williams’ comments:
“I have told Brian that Deloitte is looking further into the balancing transaction
and "sealed basket" issues in order to address Jonathan's Recommendations
4 and 5. It therefore seemed sensible to us to park this issue until Deloitte's
work is further progressed, bearing in mind that we cannot in the meantime be
accused of concealment because voluntary disclosure has been made to the
CCRC.“
197. We subsequently became aware in October 2016, that various documents
relating to Mr Parker's report of 4 March 2016 to Baroness Neville-Rolfe had been
Page 109 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
disclosed by BIS to the CCRC under the terms of a request under s.17 of the
Criminal Appeals Act (which was the source of authority for all the CCRC’s formal
requests). In late September 2017, the CCRC contacted Mr Williams advising that
they had obtained further information from UKGI relating to the Chairman's
Review. It therefore appears that POL had not disclosed the report by this time,
which I can only assume was because of the ongoing work being undertaken on
Project Bramble and the ongoing Group Litigation.
DALMELLINGTON BUG
198. While I have some recollection about this issue having arisen, I don’t recall the
details, or whether I had any conversations with senior managers or board
members regarding the Dalmellington bug. I am afraid the documents provided to
me by the Inquiry do not assist my recollection as to what happened, but I note
two emails in November 2015 (4 November 2015 POL00153483 and 10
November 2015 POL00153527) say that Computer Weekly and the
Communications Workers Union purportedly raised this as a new issue, but that
in fact, the issue had been know about for some time.
MR ALTMAN’S 2016 ADVICE
199. The Chairman's Review recommended that: “Legal advice be sought from
counsel as to whether the decision to charge an SPMR with theft and false
accounting could undermine the safety of any conviction for false accounting
where (a) the conviction was on the basis of a guilty plea, following which and/or
in return for which the theft charge was dropped, and (b) there had not been
Page 110 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
sufficient evidential basis to bring the theft charge.... If such a conviction could be
undermined in those circumstances, that counsel review the prosecution file in
such cases to establish whether, applying the facts and law applicable at the
relevant time, there was a sufficient evidential basis to conclude that a conviction
for theft was a realistic prospect such that the charge was properly brought”
(POL00006355). Mr Altman was instructed to advise POL in relation to these
points.
200. Mr Altman sets out in paragraphs 5 — 7 of his advice (POL00112884) that by
instructions dated 18 February 2016, he had been requested to advise on 2 areas
arising from the recommendations of Sir Jonathan in his report of 8 February
2016. These 2 areas were:
“(1) Legal advice be sought from counsel as to whether the decision to charge
an SPMR with theft and false accounting could undermine the safety of any
conviction for false accounting where (a) the conviction was on the basis of a
guilty plea, following which and/or in return for which the theft charge was
dropped, and (b) there had not been a sufficient evidential basis to bring the
theft charge.
(2) If such a conviction could be undermined in those circumstances, that
counsel review the prosecution file in such cases to establish whether, applying
the facts and law applicable at the relevant time, there was a sufficient
evidential basis to conclude that a conviction was a realistic prospect such that
the charge was properly brought."
Page 111 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
6. As regards the second area of concern, which was dealt with in the review they
recommended:
"POL seek specialist legal advice from external counsel as to whether the
Deloitte reports, or the information within them conceming Balancing
Transactions and Fujitsu's ability to delete and amend data in the audit store,
should be disclosed to defendants of criminal prosecutions brought by POL.
This advice should also address whether disclosure should be made, if it has
not been, to the CCRC.”
201. Mr Altman notes (at paragraph 14) that he had been instructed that in relation to
the second issue (Balancing Transactions), these had already been disclosed to
the CCRC. He went on to note (at paragraph 16) that he had previously advised
by email:
“I advised that there was no point advising on the recommendation set out in
paragraph 149(6) [use of Balancing Transactions and Fujitsu's ability to delete
and amend data in the audit store] unless and until the reviews recommended
in paragraphs 149(4) and (5) were complete, and POL knew whether there was
a real problem, rather than some highly speculative possibility, my view being
that premature wholesale disclosure might lead to unjustifiable, new claims of
third party tampering being made.”
202. Mr Altman saw his review as responding to the Chairman’s Review, rather than
pursuant to any other duty (POL00123890) and as such following agreement with
Sir Jonathan, it was agreed that he should review a selection of files in order to
consider the first area from Sir Jonathan’s recommendations, and that
Page 112 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
consideration of the disclosure points in the second area should wait until the
investigations had been completed (which was the subject of the Deloitte review
known as Project Bramble and which is addressed separately below). The legal
team initially identified 19 cases within the Scheme pool which appeared to meet
the criteria for review of the first area. I do not recall how or why 8 cases were
ultimately chosen for the review, but I note from the papers I have received that
they were “high profile cases within the Group Litigation and/or CCRC cases”
(POL00022754). On further review by Mr Altman, only 3 of the cases squarely fit
the review criteria. Nevertheless, Mr Altman reviewed the 8 prosecution case files
(POL00112884_0051). One file did not contain enough materials for him to draw
a conclusion, however, in the case of each of the other files, he concluded that
(at paragraph 205): “/ have also not discovered any evidence in the cases I have
been invited to review that theft (or fraud for that matter) was charged without any
proper basis to do so and/or in order only to encourage or influence guilty pleas
to offences of false accounting”.
203. In respect of those cases, Mr Altman concluded that (at paragraph 204) “... any
allegation that POL (or Royal Mail pre-separation) operated a deliberate policy to
charge theft when there was no or no sufficient evidential basis to support it, just
to encourage or influence pleas of guilty to charges (said to be lesser charges) of
false accounting, is fundamentally misplaced; not only is there no evidence of
such a policy, there is positive evidence that each case was approached both by
internal and external lawyers professionally and with propriety, and,
unquestionably, case-specifically.” Mr Altman's findings were clearly stated and
Page 113 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
were reassuring and gave me some degree of comfort that there were appropriate
processes that had been followed — at least in these cases.
204. I do not recall any particular action resulting from Mr Altman's findings. POL would
have submitted the review back to Sir Jonathan to ensure that it sufficiently
addressed the recommendations that he had made, however, I cannot recall the
extent to which Sir Jonathan commented on Mr Altman’s findings. As there were
no criminal prosecutions on foot at the time, the findings could not be applied to
any current practices, and at least in the case of the 8 files that Mr Altman did
review, no grounds for disclosure were identified. While only 8 files were reviewed
covering a period 2006 — 2011, in relation to those files, Mr Altman was able to
conclude that:
a) POL adopted a fact specific approach to cases; there was no ‘one size
fits all’ approach (paragraph 203).
b) There was no evidence of a deliberate policy to charge theft where there
was no sufficient evidential basis to support it, and there is positive
evidence that each case was approached ... “professionally and with
propriety, and, unquestionably case —specifically’ (paragraph 204).
c) No evidence that theft or fraud was charged without any proper basis to
do so, and/or in order only to encourage guilty pleas to offences of false
accounting (paragraph 205).
Page 114 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
205. As referred to above, POL and I took comfort from these findings. Given that a
further 20 cases were under review by the CCRC, and that at the time POL
understood that only one criminal case had been appealed, POL took the view
that Mr Altman’s review met the requirements of the Chairman’s Review, and in
light of those findings, that no further action was required.
206. I have been asked to consider the following extract from paragraph 208 of Mr
Altman’s advice (POL00112884_0052): “More substantive criticism, albeit
beyond the remit of this review, involves the risk of challenge, not that POL has
been charging theft where there was no proper basis to do so only to encourage
or influence pleas of guilty to false accounting charges, but that POL has been
using the criminal justice system as a means of enforcing repayment from
offenders by charging and pursuing offences that will result in confiscation and
compensation orders”.
207. The reference to the criticism ‘being beyond the remit of this review’ relates to
the criticism that POL used prosecutions as a means of recovering monies via
confiscation and compensation orders, rather than relying on (if appropriate),
civil debt recovery proceedings. This was not an area identified by Sir Jonathan
as requiring further investigation and hence why Mr Altman stated that it was
‘beyond the remit of this review’. I note that, in relation to this paragraph, Mr
Altman considered whether there was any evidence to support this risk of
challenge, and observed that: “In fact, the Code for Crown Prosecutors (which
POL adopts and applies) stipulates that it is appropriate to consider, among
other things, when selecting charges, the court's sentencing powers and the
Page 115 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
imposition of appropriate post-conviction orders. In the cases I have reviewed,
I am satisfied that where offences were indicted with an eye to the making of
applications for confiscation and/or compensation orders on conviction, there
was, in each case, a proper legal and evidential basis for so doing, which
included consideration of the orders that might follow conviction.”
208. Again in this case, I took comfort from Mr Altman’s comments that in the cases
he reviewed there was ‘a proper legal and evidential basis’ for the selection of
the respective charges. I don’t now recall what discussions took place in
relation to the advice, however given that the CCRC were reviewing a further
20 cases, I did not consider that further investigative work was then required,
particularly as POL had ceased to conduct criminal prosecutions. However as
stated elsewhere in this statement, I would have expected POL’s internal and
external legal team to raise with me any issues that they may have identified.
PROJECT BRAMBLE
209. As noted earlier in relation to the Chairman's Review, Sir Jonathan
recommended to Mr Parker that a number of areas warranted further
investigation (POL00006355_0065). As far as these related to Horizon, the
recommendations were:
“(3) POL consider instructing a suitably qualified party to carry out
an analysis of the relevant transaction logs for branches within
Page 116 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
the Scheme to confirm, insofar as possible, whether any bugs in
the Horizon system are revealed by the dataset which caused
discrepancies in the accounting position of any of those branches.
(4) POL instruct a suitably qualified party to carry out a full review of the use
of Balancing Transactions throughout the lifetime of the Horizon system,
insofar as possible, to independently confirm from Horizon system
records the number and circumstances of their use.
(5) POL instruct a suitably qualified party to carry out a full review of the
controls over and use of the capability of authorised Fujitsu personnel to
create, amend or delete baskets within the sealed audit store throughout
the lifetime of the Horizon system, insofar as Possible;
.and
(8) I POL commission forensic accountants to review the unmatched
balances on POL's general suspense account to explain the
relationship (or lack thereof) with branch discrepancies and the
extent to which those balances can be attributed to and repaid to specific
branches.”
210. Having received Sir Jonathan’s recommendations, the POL team proposed,
and I agreed, that Deloitte should be instructed to undertake the work required
under recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 8 as they were familiar with Horizon from
Page 117 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
their work in 2014 (Project Zebra). However, I was concerned to ensure that Sir
Jonathan’s recommendations were deliverable as drafted, and therefore
suggested that the first step should be for Deloitte to undertake a feasibility
study to ensure that the recommendations could be actioned as recommended,
and if so, what Deloitte would require to undertake the work, the expected
timeframe, and cost. I flagged this approach to Mr Parker on 5 February 2016
(see POL00153884_0001). Following this, POL instructed Deloitte to consider
how these matters could be addressed. I believe I was involved in framing the
draft instructions to Deloitte, which were then discussed by the team involved
in this phase of work, namely Bond Dickinson, alongside Mr Williams, and Mr
Underwood, and Sir Jonathan to ensure the proposed scope to Deloitte met his
recommendations. This new work was referred to as ‘Project Bramble’.
211. Once the external Counsel team were instructed following the commencement
of the Group Litigation process, they were also involved in reviewing the scope
as the project developed.
212. Following Deloitte's confirmation that the work was feasible, albeit with some
challenges relating to earlier versions of Horizon, Deloitte was further instructed
to progress with the project. The day-to-day liaison with Deloitte was handled
by Mr Underwood, who liaised with Fujitsu and POL to arrange access to
documents and the relevant people for interviews. I recall his role was to
facilitate the engagement between Deloitte and Fujitsu, rather than any active
involvement in the lines of enquiry Deloitte were pursuing; that was strictly a
Page 118 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
matter between Deloitte and Fujitsu. I believe Mr Underwood worked with Mr
Williams and Bond Dickinson throughout this process.
213. I ought to clarify that whilst the Interim and Draft Reports I have been provided
with all state that they are “produced for the General Counsel of POL” this
simply reflects how, and to whom, the engagement letter was formally
addressed, rather than a reflection of my involvement. Once Deloitte had
commenced their work, I had little day to day involvement with the project. From
time to time, I asked Mr Underwood how the Deloitte work was progressing,
and received a high-level summary of progress; typically, the fact that work was
ongoing, the need for further investigations, matters of timing, and additional
costs. At no point either during the Deloitte work, or as a result of what I learnt
in those briefings, did I consider it was necessary for me to be more actively
involved in the process to enable Deloitte to undertake or complete their
work. Additionally, as flagged to Mr Parker in my email to him of 13 May 2016,
(POL00103192_0002) I had asked the new CIO Rob Houghton “to review the
process undertaken by Deloitte, to sense check these further decisions’.
214. The Inquiry has provided me with seven drafts of the Deloitte report which were
produced in the period July 2016 to January 2018. The first, dated 8 July 2016,
is marked as the ‘Sparrow Interim Report’ (POL00029984), and then the reports
develop as follows:
(a) Bramble interim report dated 27 July 2016 (POL00030009);
(b) I Bramble draft report dated 31 October 2016 (POL00031502);
(c) Bramble draft report dated 1 September 2017 (POL00041491);
Page 119 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(d) Bramble draft report dated 3 October 2017 (POL00028070);
(e) I Bramble draft report dated 15 December 2017 (POL00029097); and
(f) Bramble draft report dated 19 January 2018 (POL00028928).
215. 1!do not know if this is the complete set of all of Deloitte’s draft reports, nor do I
recall if the report was ever finalised. The reports are iterative and reflect the
outcomes and findings of the further investigations that Deloitte recommended,
and POL agreed should be undertaken, to better understand the design and
effectiveness of Fujitsu’s control framework particularly as regards remote
access by privileged users. As further set out in paragraph 227, in June 2016,
Antony de Garr Robinson KC strongly advised that the subject matter of the
Deloitte work should continue, provided that it was re-scoped and re-instructed
for the purposes of the litigation (POL00168551). This resulted in
recommendation 8 being de-scoped from the Bramble work by October 2016
(as seen by the reduced scope reported at POL00031502_0003), although I
believe this work continued under a separate engagement letter.
216. In terms of which reports I received, and read, I have thought very hard about
this, but I do not recall receiving copies of the draft reports referred to at
paragraph 214214 above, and as a result I do not recall reading them at the
time or forwarding them on to others at POL. I appreciate this may sound
unusual, but it is important to bear in mind that in circumstances where I was
overseeing a large legal and corporate function, and where POL had external
advisers engaged on the day-to-day detail of the project, my expectation was
Page 120 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
that the team and POL’s external advisers would brief me on any material
issues that I should be aware of.
217. My recollection is that the draft reports from Deloitte were issued by them to
Bond Dickinson, who then circulated them to Mr Williams and Mr Underwood.
Other than the email from Mr Parsons on 13 July 2016 (POL00029990), in
which he does not attach a copy of the 8 July 2016 report, I do not have copies
of any of the email correspondence relating to Project Bramble, and so I am
unable to say with certainty who else was on the initial distribution list.
218. I would have relied on our external lawyers to summarise the impact of the
findings of the reports and advise on options. I believe the first time this
happened was when I received the email from Mr Parsons on 13 July 2016
(POL00029990), in which he, as I would expect him to, raised a material matter
for my concern. In that email he advised that Deloitte had identified that a small
number of ‘super users’ at Fujitsu had the ability to delete and edit transactions
from the Branch Database. He went on to say that the access was subject to
strict controls and that Deloitte’s understanding at the time was that it would not
be possible to delete or edit transactions without leaving a footprint in the audit
trail. This to me, was ‘new news’ as it was separate to what POL already knew
about Balancing Transactions. However, what was apparent from what Mr
Parsons said, was that this type of access was not unusual in IT systems of this
scale, and as he said, “the likelihood of someone actually making such changes
is extremely low’. Nevertheless, I took this seriously, particularly considering
Page 121 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL’s historic statements on the question of “remote access” (as Mr Parsons
refers to in his email).
219. Inthe materials I have received from the Inquiry, there is an email dated Sunday
24 July 2016 in which I shared the information received from Mr Parsons with
Ms Vennells in the context of a board meeting the following day
(POL00041258). It is apparent from the materials provided to me that there was
significant internal discussion on the ‘superuser’ issue between 13 July and 24
July. I operated on a ‘no surprises’ basis with Ms Vennells and I believe that I
would have briefed her on this development earlier than 24 July. In the email of
24 July to Ms Vennells I refer to the Board taking place “tomorrow’ i.e. Monday
25 July 2016 and informed her“ ... as a result of the work undertaken by Deloitte
in relation to Horizon, we will be flagging that within Fujitsu there are a limited
number of individuals who have super-user rights which can only be used in
very limited and controlled circumstances. We do not believe that this causes
us any concerns from a legal perspective, however it is a different positioning
to the public statements that we have previously made, and therefore we should
be prepared for adverse comments from the usual commentators. Given the
Board tomorrow, you may wish to advise them that we will be responding to the
Freeths claim towards the end of the week (which we are still finalising), and
that we will issue a briefing to the Board at that point.”. As I say earlier in that
email, my intention was to take Ms Vennells through the approach to POL’s
response to Freeths’ Letter of Claim on 26 July 2016 and issue an update to
the Board on Friday 29 July 2016. I go on to say in that email that “we will be
flagging [in the letter of reply to Freeths] that within Fujitsu there are a limited
Page 122 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
number of individuals who have super-user rights which can only be used in
very limited and controlled circumstances.”.
220. I cannot now recall whether I attended the Board on 25 July 2016 to provide a
briefing and as I have not been provided with the Board agenda, minutes or
papers from that meeting, I am not in a position to verify this. I note in an email
to Ms Vennells on 23 May 2016 (POL00103201) (before the email from Mr
Parsons on 13 July 2016) that “/ propose to provide a brief update to each Board
meeting”. In light of the contents of my email to Ms Vennells on 24 July 2016, I
believe my intention was to provide an update to the Board the next day, as
well as a separate written briefing on the Letter of Claim issues and response
later that same week. I cannot recall the detail of that Board briefing on 29 July
2016 and I have not been provided with any papers to assist me in that regard.
221. As Mr Callard attended Board meetings, he received the same updates as the
Board and I would not have provided a separate briefing to BIS/UKGI outside
of the Board meeting, unless one was specifically requested by them, and in
this instance, I do not believe they did.
222. I also informed the Group Executive after Mr Parsons’ email of 13 July 2016. I
note from the material I have been provided, that in an email dated 26 July 2016
(POL00110482) I advised Mr Parsons that I had briefed the Group Executive
that morning (that is, on 26 July) on, inter alia, the progress of the Group
Litigation and the proposed response to Freeths including the response on the
remote access issues. The email notes the Group Executive response that “As
Page 123 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
expected there was significant concern around the apparent change in
emphasis from previous public statements, the resultant adverse publicity this
may create, and the impact this may have on new ministers etc, who will not
have been briefed”.
223. In terms of to what extent I thought that any of the issues raised in the interim /
draft Deloitte reports ought to be disclosed to convicted SPMs or the claimants
in the Group Litigation, Mr Parsons’ email on 13 July 2016 (POL00029990)
flags that POL would need to consider, “once we have a much clearer picture”
whether to have Mr Altman review the draft Deloitte reports in relation to
criminal law/disclosure perspective, and also whether to disclose it to the
CCRC. I note that there was a Litigation Steering Group meeting the following
day (14 July 2016) which Bond Dickinson attended, in their usual way. I do not
have sight of any minutes from that meeting, however there are subsequent
emails (see POL00023487_003) addressed to the members of the Litigation
Steering Group on 16 July 2016 and relating to the review of the Letter of
Response, which reference the discussion on remote access at the Litigation
Steering Group so it was clearly discussed at that meeting. What I do recall
was that the focus at the time was on general disclosure in the Group Litigation,
especially as POL’s response to the Letter of Claim was in the process of being
finalised when this new information became known, and therefore the remote
access issues would be disclosed in the Letter of Response. As Deloitte’s
findings and understanding developed through the course of the project, this
then fed into the Group Litigation. My expectation was that, as Bond Dickinson
had raised this issue for consideration, this was on their radar. I would have
Page 124 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
expected that, had the Deloitte work moved to a point where we were advised
that either Cartwright King or Mr Altman should review the position, then I would
have followed that advice. I do not recall the issue of disclosure of the reports
being brought to my attention again after the email of 13 July 2016. As stated
in paragraph 278, from my point of view, the issue fell off my radar in light of
the focus on Horizon in the Group Litigation, and I do not recall raising it again.
224. As referred to in (POL00123890), by April 2016, the CCRC had been made
aware that Deloitte was undertaking work to address Sir Jonathan’s
recommendations 4 and 5. However, I cannot now recall whether either the
draft Deloitte reports, or the information from them, was disclosed to the CCRC,
and if it was provided, when that was.
225. AsImention above, disclosure of ‘superuser access’ was made in the Generic
Defence and Counterclaim and in the Reply in the Group Litigation. POL was
not seeking to hide anything from the Group Litigation and took its disclosure
obligations seriously.
THE GROUP LITIGATION
The initial stages and the effect on Mr Parker’s review
226. POL changed its approach to the Chairman’s Review because of clear and
unambiguous advice given by leading Counsel. I relied upon that advice, I
believed then and continue to believe now that I was entitled to do so.
Page 125 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
227. After the claim form was filed, Sir Jonathan suggested in May 2016 that Mr de
Garr Robinson, the barrister being retained to advise POL on its defence to the
Group Litigation, should advise POL whether, in light of the Group Litigation,
the various work streams following on from the Chairman’s Review should be
continued, paused or re-defined (POL00103212). In June 2016, Mr de Garr
Robinson strongly advised that the work being undertaken should not continue,
but that the subject matter of the work should continue, provided that it was re-
scoped and re-instructed for the purposes of the litigation (POL00168551). I do
not now specifically recollect Mr de Garr Robinson’s reasons for this. The
Inquiry has asked me to what extent I agreed with the reasons for POL changing
its response to the Chairman's Review. I do not recall the discussions around
this, however, ultimately, I followed and relied upon the advice of Leading
Counsel.
228. The main piece of work then underway was the Deloitte work (Project Bramble),
and my recollection is that this work was then re-scoped under a new
engagement letter. Around the same time, it became apparent that, in light of
the work Deloitte had done for POL in relation to Horizon, Deloitte would not
qualify as ‘independent’ in circumstances where it was expected that one or
more independent IT experts would be required for the Group Litigation.
Further, it was considered unlikely that it would be possible for the expert
witness to rely on work undertaken by Deloitte because (i) any expert witness
would likely not be able to show that their work was independent if they relied
upon Deloitte, who we thought would not qualify as ‘independent’; and (ii)
Deloitte would likely have required non-reliance assurance if their work was
Page 126 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
going to be shared with a third party, and therefore would not achieve the
objective of the assurance.
229. Deloitte’s work on suspense accounts (in relation to the relationship between
the POL suspense accounts and specific branch accounts) continued under a
separate engagement letter as, at that stage, it did not appear to be in scope
for the Group Litigation.
230. As described above, another workstream which was underway was Mr Altman's
advice in relation to several of Sir Jonathan’s recommendations. That advice
continued and was not re-scoped — Mr Altman was re-instructed for an
alternative purpose (in accordance with Mr de Garr Robinson’s advice) and his
work carried on and he provided his advice in July 2016 (POL00112884).
231. I have been asked to consider Mr Parker's position that “there will soon be
frustration at the time this is taking (indeed I am also beginning to get somewhat
frustrated)” (POL00103192). Given that Mr Parker's original instructions from
Baroness Neville-Rolfe had been in September 2015, and he had initially hoped
to complete the review by the end of 2015, it was understandable that Mr Parker
was concerned by what he saw as ‘delays’, such that the review process was
still not concluded in May 2016. I infer from Mr Parker’s email that he may also
have been under pressure from BIS to produce a final report.
Page 127 of 211
Summary of my role and responsibilities in relation to the Group Litigation
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
232. As the most senior lawyer at POL, I was the executive accountable for the
strategy and conduct of the Group Litigation. As litigation was not my area of
expertise, I relied heavily on advice provided to me throughout the course of
the Group Litigation by POL’s external lawyers (Bond Dickinson and the
external Counsel team), who were all highly experienced litigators and whose
advice I trusted. I do not recall any instances where I went against the legal
advice. Nevertheless, if I felt additional legal advice was required, or if POL
wanted to steer certain practical aspects of the Group Litigation, I instigated
this. For example, following receipt of the Common Issues judgment in March
2019, I felt it was important that POL have access to a ‘second opinion’ in
relation to the appeal and recusal options that were being proposed, and I
sought independent advice both in relation to the proposed strategy (from Lords
Neuberger and Grabiner) and for the Board (from Norton Rose), both of which
are discussed later.
233. Moreover, there were occasions when I directed the legal team to follow a
particular course of action in respect of practical steps to be taken pursuant to
that advice. For example, prior to the commencement of the Common Issues
trial, we discussed ‘tone’. Considering the criticisms received to that point from
Mr Justice Fraser and others, POL needed to act, and to be seen to be acting,
constructively and cooperatively, and the language used in the Courtroom
needed to be consistent with that approach.
Page 128 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
234. I was involved in key meetings and strategic decisions in relation to the Group
Litigation. The POL team comprised:
(a) I From a POL perspective — myself and (initially) one in-house lawyer,
Mr Williams, who had significant litigation experience both in practice
and in house. We were supported internally by a wider (non-legal)
team whose responsibilities included project management, support
on writing papers, and locating, extracting and collating records
relating to the Claimants as well as internal POL policies and
procedural documents. The non-legal team included Mr Davies in his
capacity as Director of Communications, Mr Wechsler (prior to his
appointment as Chief of Staff), Mr Bourke (prior to his appointment
as Government Affairs and Policy Director), Mr Underwood, Angela
van den Bogerd (in parallel with various operational roles which she
held during this period), and a team of 4-5 other long serving POL
staff who were responsible for locating and extracting historic records
and providing them to Bond Dickinson, and who reported to Ms van
den Bogerd. Additionally, Tom Moran chaired the Litigation Steering
Group (see paragraph 240) and members of that Steering Group
came from various functions across the business
(b) External solicitors, Bond Dickinson — the team was led by litigation
partner Andy Parsons and included a number of litigation solicitors
and paralegals. In certain cases, materials and papers were also
reviewed by POL’s criminal law advisers, Cartwright King.
Page 129 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(c) I Counsel — Mr de Garr Robinson KC and David Callendar KC, both
from One Essex Court. At one of the Case Management
Conferences, Mr Justice Fraser had stated that no allowance would
be made for counsel’s diary commitments, and accordingly, Mr
Callendar was brought in when Mr de Garr Robinson had a clash with
another pre-existing matter. My recollection is that they were initially
supported by one junior (Owain Draper), and a second junior,
(Gideon Cohen), was brought onboard to support on the Horizon trial.
235. Mr Williams was committed to the Group Litigation full-time and he, together
with Bond Dickinson and the Counsel team, managed the day-to-day progress
of the Group Litigation. I had regular (I believe fortnightly) catch ups with Mr
Williams and Mr Parsons to discuss issues and progress, and other POL team
members were often also in attendance. Although Mr Williams’ reporting line
was not to me directly (he initially reported to Ms Madron, and subsequently to
Mr Foat once Mr Foat became the Legal Director in mid-2016), Mr Williams and
I worked closely together in relation to both the Scheme matters and
subsequently the Group Litigation. Mr Williams had day-to-day carriage of the
Group Litigation from a POL perspective. Given Mr Williams’ significant level of
experience and his close working relationship with Bond Dickinson, I trusted Mr
Williams to proactively keep me informed as to developments, progress on key
projects, and ensure I was properly briefed on upcoming discussions or where
tactical or strategic decisions needed to be made. Where matters needed
escalation (for example to the Litigation Steering Group, members of the Group
Page 130 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Executive, the Litigation Sub-Committee, or the Board), Mr Williams would brief
me and request my assistance in raising matters with those groups.
236. The Litigation Steering Group had been established to oversee the Group
Litigation from an operational perspective and, in particular, to understand and
provide feedback on any impacts which the Group Litigation could have on
POL’s business. As a result, key decisions were escalated to the Litigation
Steering Group, and/or Litigation Sub-Committee, and/or Board as required,
which I discuss in more detail below.
237. My time requirements varied considerably during the Group Litigation. Some
weeks it took up very little of my time, other weeks were very intensive; for
example, I attended most of the hearings in the Common Issues and Horizon
trials. I would estimate that, during the course of the Group Litigation, I spent
on average between 10-20% of my time on the Group Litigation, with my other
areas of responsibility (as set out in the organogram (WITN10010102))
continuing to take up a significant amount of time.
238. Throughout the course of the Group Litigation, I relied upon advice from
Counsel and external solicitors in relation to the strategy and conduct of the
Group Litigation. Bond Dickinson, in particular, had been and were heavily
involved with all of the ‘Sparrow’ related issues, both prior to and during my time
at POL and so had far better knowledge than me of how the Horizon issues had
evolved over time. Bond Dickinson were in the POL office regularly, spoke with
Mr Williams on a daily basis, and were able to, and did, contact other individuals
Page 131 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
outside of POL Legal whom Bond Dickinson knew were the appropriate
individuals to speak to about particular matters. Given Bond Dickinson's
detailed historic and then-current knowledge of ‘Sparrow’ matters, and their
day-to-day responsibility for the conduct of the Group Litigation, I relied on their
advice on matters relating to the Group Litigation. I also relied on the advice of
Counsel throughout the course of the Group Litigation, which included eminent
KCs
The Board, Litigation Sub-Committee, Litigation Steering Group and
Government — a summary of oversight of the Group Litigation and decision
making
239. Either! or the CEO provided regular updates to the Group Executive and to the
Board at its meetings (see for example the references in the following
documents provided to me by the Inquiry, and which are not a complete set of
records of meetings: POL00027279 (25 March 2015), POL00021538 (22
September 2015), POL00027219 (24 March 2016), POL00030888 (24 May
2016) , POL00027188 (28 March 2017), POL00021550 (26 September 2017),
POL00041486 (26 September 2017), POL00021552 (23 November 2017),
POL00021553 (29 January 2018), POL00021555 (24 May 2018),
POL00021556 (31 July 2018), POL00090612 31 July 2018, POL00021557 (25
September 2018), POL00021559 (27 November 2018), POL00021561 (29
January 2019), POL00021563 (20 March 2019)). These updates were high
level and initially focussed on the procedural developments and timetable,
however as the Group Litigation developed, I ensured that the Board was aware
of key developments and the developing tone of the Group Litigation. Where
Page 132 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
necessary, special meetings of the Board were convened to discuss specific
developments or issues, and the decision whether to make an application for
recusal in March 2019 was an example of an out of cycle Board meeting (see
POL00103473 (20 March 2019), POL00021563 (20 March 2019),
POL00027594 (2 July 2019)).
240. In May 2016, I proposed that, in addition to regular updates from me to the
Group Executive and Board, the Litigation Steering Group should be
established to oversee the Group Litigation from an operational perspective.
The establishment of this Litigation Steering Group was approved by the Group
Executive at its meeting in May 2016 where it was agreed that the Steering
Group would be chaired by Tom Moran, General Manager of the Network and
Sales Team, who had responsibility for Network Operations.
241. I believe the first meeting was held on 7 June 2016 (POL00025508), at which
Terms of Reference were approved (POL00025509). In summary, the purpose
of the Litigation Steering Group was to oversee the Group Litigation and, in
particular, to understand and provide feedback on any impacts which the Group
Litigation could have on POL’s business. As a result, key decisions were
escalated to the Litigation Steering Group. Decisions were also escalated to the
Board and/or Litigation Sub-Committee as required.
242. The Chair of the Litigation Steering Group, Mr Moran, reported to Mr Gilliland
who was the Network & Sales Director for most of my time at POL (and was
then succeeded by Debbie Smith). The other Litigation Steering Group
Page 133 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
attendees were all senior executives from various parts of POL’s business and
had the authority and business experience to make key operational decisions;
all reported directly to members of the Group Executive. Whilst there was not a
formal report that went from the Litigation Steering Group to the Group
Executive, the Group Executive was updated on progress regularly. My
recollection is that Mr Moran was frequently (but not always) requested to
attend Group Executive discussions on the Group Litigation, or discussions with
Ms Vennells as CEO and Mr Cameron as CFO, in relation to the Group
Litigation so that there was a broader management perspective rather than
solely a legal one.
243. Where decisions were required to be made by the Litigation Steering Group, a
paper would be presented (usually by Bond Dickinson who attended all
meetings) setting out the decision to be made, its context, relevant information,
and a summary of risks and issues. While some decisions were relatively
straightforward, some were more complex and required considerable
discussion. I was a standing member of the Litigation Steering Group and Mr
Williams was the representative from the POL legal team. If for any reason I
could not attend, I would provide comments on the relevant proposal in
advance.
244. The Litigation Sub-Committee was established in January 2018 to provide a
forum mandated by the Board to discuss matters relating to the Group Litigation
in greater detail than the Board agenda allowed, and to provide an opportunity
for the members of the Litigation Sub-Committee, on behalf of the Board, to
Page 134 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
exercise a greater degree of oversight over the Group Litigation. The members
of the Litigation Sub-Committee (Ms Vennells, Mr Cameron, Mr Cooper, Mr
McCall and Mr Parker), received more detailed legal advice, briefings and
updates from me, supported by the internal and external legal team. I note that
the Litigation Sub-Committee Terms of Reference (POL00117892) provided
that the Litigation Sub-Committee was established to receive legal advice on
POL’s defence in the Group Litigation as it proceeded to final resolution. Mr
Parsons was a regular attendee at the Litigation Sub-Committee for the
purposes of giving that advice, and as set out elsewhere, members of the
Counsel team also attended certain of the Litigation Sub-Committee meetings.
245. Depending on the nature of the update, I would submit papers to the Litigation
Sub-Committee (or Board as the case may be), or I would provide a verbal
update. In the case of both Board papers and oral updates, I prepared (and
kept a record of) detailed speaking notes, although I have not been provided
with copies of many of my speaking notes. Both the internal and external legal
team contributed to the production of Board/ Litigation Sub-Committee papers,
and to my speaking notes.
246. The Litigation Steering Group and the Litigation Sub-Committee were the only
governance committees set up specifically for the purposes of the Group
Litigation. I have seen reference in the papers provided to me by the Inquiry to
“Postmaster Litigation Advisory Committee” — this is a reference to the Litigation
Sub-Committee. I have also seen reference to “Post Office Group Litigation
Steering Group” - this is a reference to the Litigation Steering Group.
Page 135 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
247. A governance timetable was developed in relation to the expected Group
Litigation timetable and presented to the Group Executive in June 2016
(POL00117704). It was also presented to the Board on 17 May 2016 as an
Appendix to a Board paper (POL00030888_0547). Further iterations of this
were developed as the Group Litigation progressed and were used to ensure
that briefings to both the Litigation Steering Group and Litigation Sub-
Committee/Board were held in advance of key developments. This timetable
was also used subsequently to agree the timing of briefings to UKGI, as set out
in the draft information sharing protocol (UKGI00007924) (the details of which
I refer to in paragraph 315). Where we could predict that decisions would be
required to be taken by either the Litigation Steering Group, Litigation Sub-
Committee, or the Board, then this was also flagged in the timetable.
248. In February 2018, UKGI advised that it also wanted separate briefings
(UKGI00008014). POL’s initial view was that, as Mr Cooper was both a member
of the Litigation Sub-Committee and the Board, it would be duplicative for there
to be further briefings on the same subject to UKGI where he would be one of
the principal attendees. Given that these briefings were usually just ahead of
key stages in the Group Litigation, these additional briefings and the associated
preparation of briefing papers represented an increase in workload at a time
when the legal team was already under pressure. Nevertheless, POL agreed to
UKGI’s requirement for separate briefings, and these were held broadly in
accordance with the agreed schedule. A protocol was developed to allow for
privileged materials to be shared with UKGI through the UKGI General Counsel,
Page 136 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and UKGI briefings were added to the governance timetable. Attendees at
these briefings varied, however my recollection is that I attended the vast
majority, if not all, such meetings. Again, these meetings were scheduled to
take place before key decision points or material developments.
249. Keeping senior management, the Board and UKGI up to date and informed on
key developments in the Group Litigation was one of my responsibilities as GC.
Generally, briefings to the Board, the Litigation Sub-Committee and UKGI were
necessarily high level. They focussed on where the Group Litigation process
was up to and key issues that were emerging. This initially related to timetable
and disclosure matters, any decisions that needed to be made, and risks of
particular strategies. From time to time, the Board would ask for more
information on a particular aspect, and this would be provided. For example, we
took the Board through the work that was underway on contingency planning
ahead of the Common Issues trial. I also arranged for Leading Counsel to
attend Board meetings on several occasions to provide updates on specific
issues, including to present their ‘merits opinion’ which was prepared ahead of
each of the Common Issues and Horizon trials. Each of the merits opinions
were presented to the Board and/or Litigation Sub-Committee by Leading
Counsel to ensure that the Board members had the opportunity to ask questions
as to Counsel's views on likely outcomes (e.g. at the Litigation Sub-Committee
meeting on 15 May 2018 (POL00006754)) The Board was also provided with
briefings from Counsel in relation to the recusal application ahead of being
requested to make a decision whether to proceed with that application. Further
details of these briefings is provided below.
Page 137 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
250. I have been asked whether, in my opinion, the Board had adequate oversight
of the Group Litigation. In my opinion, the Board did have adequate oversight,
in terms of the regular updates provided to them on the emerging issues,
developments, risks and the views of external Counsel on the merits of the
cases. Options for mediation and settlement were also discussed with the
Board (e.g. at the Board meeting on 27 November 2018 (POL00021559)). The
Board also always had the opportunity to request further detail on any particular
area. I believe I had a good relationship with the Board and its members and
from time to time during my period at POL, individual Directors did feel able to
call me requesting more detail on various topics or asking for my opinion. I recall
having such a discussion with Mr Franklin ahead of the Board discussion on 18
March 2019 on the recusal application. Therefore, had the Board or indeed any
Director, wanted more information or more detailed analysis, I believe they
would have felt free to make that request. I am not aware whether there were
any discussions between Board members outside of the Board room, however
I did not receive any feedback from the CEO or the Chairman that indicated that
the Board were unhappy with the level of information or briefings that they
received.
Roles and responsibilities - POL’s general litigation strategy
251. When I started working for POL, it was clear to me that the ‘Sparrow’ related
issues (by which I mean anything related to legacy complaints from the SPMs
relating to Horizon, and which POL had sought to address through the Scheme)
were seen by senior management as essentially legacy legal issues for the
Page 138 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
legal function to manage. I was very aware that, notwithstanding the fact that it
was deemed to be a legal issue, decisions taken by the legal function in relation
to the Scheme and subsequently, the Group Litigation, could have material
operational, financial and reputational impacts on the rest of the business —
particularly with regard to the network of c.11,500 post office branches and the
internal management and operational structures that supported them which had
been headed by Mr Gilliland since, I think, 2012. For example, there were
recommendations which came out of the Second Sight work which needed to
be (and were) considered from an operational perspective, as opposed to from
a purely legal perspective. We needed to ensure that these changes were
appropriately operationalised and embedded in documented processes, such
that there was no risk that they would lapse if key team members left the
business. Close communication between the legal and operational teams was
required to ensure that the impact of developments (both legal and operational)
was fully considered. I co-authored a paper (POL00117704) for a Board
meeting on 16 May 2016 (a short while after POL received the Letter of Claim
on 28 April 2016) which explained that we saw two main objectives in
responding to the claim: (i) proportionately managing POL’s defence and (ii)
protecting the Network going forwards so that POL and its agents had
confidence in POL’s systems.
252. By way of explanation, POL’s over-arching hope was that the outcome of the
Group Litigation would be the resolution of the issues with the SPMs in a way
that would provide a firm and repeatable basis for resolving issues in the future
with those SPMs who had not been part of the Scheme or the Group Litigation.
Page 139 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Settlement prior to the Common Issues or Horizon trials would not resolve the
key questions around Horizon for anyone who was not party to that settlement,
and so POL decided to defend the Claim in the Courts. Clearly this strategy was
premised on the advice received from the external legal team that POL had a
reasonable prospect of successfully defending the Claim.
253. As stated at paragraph 62, relative to the overall size of the branch network and
the number of SPMs who had operated Horizon since its inception, the number
of SPMs involved in the Scheme, and later the Group Litigation, was still small.
It was vitally important that the vast majority of SPMs continued to receive the
support of POL and had confidence in its products, systems and processes.
Therefore, continuity of ‘business as usual’ during the course of the Group
Litigation was critically important. In my opinion, reputational issues did not
affect POL’s litigation strategy, and, from a personal perspective, POL’s
reputation did not impact any of my work or decision-making in the Group
Litigation. POL had been reported as being the UK’s most trusted brand in
various surveys and that trust was valuable to POL, however POL would not
protect its reputation at all costs. What was more important was the c.11,500
SPMs who were not involved in Sparrow-related matters and who were
engaged with POL, using its brand and selling its products on a day-to-day
basis. Equally, POL was always looking for new candidates to run post offices,
as well as managing relationships with a variety of commercial partners.
Maintaining the trust and confidence of all these groups, was important in order
for both POL and the branch network of post offices to continue to operate.
Page 140 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
254. As the Group Litigation covered an extremely wide range of issues, POL and
the Claimants ultimately agreed that the Group Litigation should be phased in
4 separate stages:
(a) I The Common Issues trial, so named as it addressed those issues
(mainly the SPM contract) which were common to all Claimants, and the
decision on which would then underpin later stages of the Group
Litigation. This phase was intended to be mainly one of legal
construction;
(b) Horizon trial, which was to address questions as to Horizon’s reliability
and which would turn largely on factual expert evidence;
(c) A further trial which would address procedural issues such as time-
barring etc; and
(d) _ A final trial in which the issues relating to a small number of test cases
would be litigated in light of the outcomes of the Common Issues and
Horizon decisions.
255. The ‘split trials approach’ was reported to the Litigation Sub-Committee at its
meeting on 15 May 2018 (see draft minutes at POL00006754) and was flagged
to the POL Board at its meeting on 24 May 2018 (POL00021555).
Page 141 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Roles and responsibilities - POL’s approach to disclosure
256. The separation of issues and the sequencing of the proposed trials were also
intended to assist with the process of disclosure — almost all of which had to be
sourced from POL and provided to the Claimants. It included materials across
a 20-year period and ultimately covered a very wide range of policies,
procedures and documentation. The above staged sequence allowed for
disclosure to be made in tranches and we initially expected that this would be
amore pragmatic approach for both sides given disclosure was likely to run into
hundreds of thousands, if not millions of documents. This was why POL
objected to the Claimants’ early request for disclosure of a very wide range of
documents as part of the Common Issues trial, as we believed that many of the
documents requested were in fact relevant to later stages, rather than to the
Common Issues.
257. POL’s responsibilities in respect of disclosure began when it was advised, I
believe by Bond Dickinson several years prior to my employment with POL, to
put ‘litigation hold’ protocols into place in order to preserve potentially relevant
documentation. Further advice from Bond Dickinson included a note on
“Disclosure of documents in litigation” dated December 2014 (POL00025512),
which was circulated to the Litigation Steering Group by Mr Williams on 6 June
2016 ahead of one of the Litigation Steering Group meetings (POL00025507).
Bond Dickinson, supported by Mr Williams, agreed a broad scope of disclosure
with Freeths - this was a high-level scope in accordance with Court procedures
and rules. Once the broad scope of disclosure for the Group Litigation had been
agreed between the parties, I understand that Bond Dickinson and Mr Williams
Page 142 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
discussed and agreed how the disclosure would work in practice. POL,
supported by Bond Dickinson, identified the location of different types of
documents, and then the relevance of these documents was established by
reference to agreed search terms.
258. The day-to-day work on disclosure was done by Bond Dickinson and, as set
out in their advice note of December 2014 (POL00025512), Bond Dickinson
would be responsible for reviewing documents that were identified as potentially
attracting privilege and assessing whether in fact privilege applied. In this
regard, the labelling of documentation as ‘privileged’ when it perhaps was not
so (as mentioned in paragraph 65) had a practical advantage in that Bond
Dickinson would do specific searches for potentially privileged documentation
and those marked ‘privileged’ would be caught by those searches and flagged
for specific review by Bond Dickinson. My understanding was that documents
were not automatically withheld from disclosure/inspection solely because they
were labelled as ‘privileged’ - Bond Dickinson reviewed these documents in
order to ascertain whether they were in fact privileged or not and POL relied on
Bond Dickinson in that regard.
259. My understanding was that all the documentation provided to Bond Dickinson
by POL, whether it had been provided in earlier matters throughout the history
of POL’s instruction of Bond Dickinson, or as a result of the Group Litigation,
would be subject to these disclosure and privilege reviews. As part of the
disclosure review process, I would have expected Bond Dickinson to review
Page 143 of 211
260.
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
documents such as Sir Jonathan’s report for privilege as Bond Dickinson were
aware of its existence.
I do not recall having the final decision on any specific decisions about
disclosure, but I was involved in discussions about disclosure with the Litigation
Steering Group. From time to time, the question as to disclosure of specific
documents or types of documents arose, and was raised with POL by Bond
Dickinson and discussed at Litigation Steering Group meetings, for example in
relation to the PEAK database, which I discuss in more detail below. Usually,
Bond Dickinson would present an issue to the Litigation Steering Group, set out
the available options to address the issue, as well as any risks, and then state
their recommendation. My recollection is that following discussion, the Litigation
Steering Group would usually accept Bond Dickinson's recommendations (as
they had the litigation expertise). My recollection is that, generally, the Litigation
Steering Group would agree to disclosure, although in some cases there were
questions about the timing or method of disclosure of specific documents. It
was my view that decisions about disclosure were operational decisions to be
taken by executives, and that it was not the Board’s role to take operational
decisions.
Roles and responsibilities - POL’s preparation of lay and expert evidence
Lay witness evidence
261.
The identification of potential witnesses and the preparation of witness
statements for the Common Issues trial and the Horizon trial was undertaken
Page 144 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
by the Bond Dickinson team and Mr Williams, in conjunction with the witnesses.
The draft witness statements were also reviewed by the Counsel team.
262. It was a matter for both the witness and the legal team (both internal and
external) working on the statement to be satisfied that the matters within the
witness statement were true (where presented as fact), and in the case of
opinions, reasonably held. I was not involved in the drafting of any witness
statements. The Inquiry has specifically asked me about the witness statement
of Ms Van Den Bogerd, and I address this in paragraph 325 325 below.
263. My recollection is that witness statements were circulated to the wider POL
team (including me) a short time before they were filed for awareness purposes
only. I had no material involvement in the preparation of any witness statement.
I do not recall submitting witness statements to the Litigation Steering Group,
and we did not submit them to the Board or Litigation Sub-Committee.
Expert evidence
264. Bond Dickinson, together with the Counsel team, identified potential candidates
to be POL’s expert witness for the Horizon trial. Factors the legal team
considered included IT experience and track record as an expert witness, and
this included considering the outcomes of cases where the various candidates
had previously acted as an expert witness. I was provided with details of Dr
Worden’s experience. My recollection is that Bond Dickinson, Mr Williams (and
likely some others) prepared a shortlist of candidates, and met with and
interviewed those candidates, including Dr Worden. Thereafter, once Dr
Page 145 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Worden became the interviewers’ preferred candidate, I, together with others,
interviewed Dr Worden. My recollection is that Mr Houghton, the then CIO, was.
also asked to interview Dr Worden as part of the selection process, although I
cannot now remember if Mr Houghton and I met Dr Worden separately or
together. Approval from Mr Houghton and myself were effectively final
approvals of Dr Worden’s instruction, and Dr Worden was thereafter instructed.
Again, I considered this to be an executive decision, rather than one for the
Board.
265. I was not materially involved in briefing Dr Worden, but the wider POL team
were responsible for helping to identify and locate materials that were
considered relevant or that he requested.
POL’s position in Court documents and letters in the Group Litigation
266. Bond Dickinson was responsible for drafting most legal documentation required
to be produced for POL during the course of the Group Litigation. Bond
Dickinson also held a vast repository of hard and soft copies of POL documents
which had been collated over time. Discussions about the drafting of
documentation for the Group Litigation were largely between Bond Dickinson
and Mr Williams.
267. In many cases, the proposed wording in legal documentation repeated
statements that had been made previously in the Second Sight work (or POL’s
responses to it), or were extracted from previous investigations, other reports
etc. Provided that the proposed wording could be referenced back to the original
Page 146 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
wording, and there had been no changes which meant that the wording was no
longer accurate, the original wording was re-used in legal documentation. If
there had been changes, then these would be discussed with relevant POL staff
who were familiar with the issues, and these conversations would be facilitated
by Mr Williams. Mr Underwood was also involved in this work, as was Ms Van
Den Bogerd in certain cases. In some cases, draft documents were circulated
more widely with requests for specific named individuals within POL to review
specified sections and comment on their accuracy.
268. I was not routinely involved in the process of drafting legal documents, although
from time to time specific wording was circulated to me and others for review.
My contribution was not to comment on the factual accuracy of the statements
as generally this was not within my direct knowledge, rather I looked at the
overall argument, whether the context was clear and whether it was being
positioned appropriately. As I explain in paragraph 287 below, I had discussed
with Mr Parsons that I wanted to know that statements of fact in Court
documents could be backed up by underlying sources, and that there was
evidence to support statements of opinion being held on reasonable grounds. I
was acutely conscious that statements made by POL needed to be factually
accurate, as well as adequately answer the question being put to POL from a
legal perspective. This was my, and I believe POL’s, first priority. In the case of
statements about Horizon (which I refer to in more detail below), I was, also
aware that POL’s understanding of Horizon had changed over time and that
there would be publicity attached to any public statements that represented a
change of position. I therefore wanted to ensure that POL’s position in legal
Page 147 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
documentation in respect of remote access was factually accurate and legally
appropriate. POL00117755_0001-2 (an email dated 13 July 2017 from Mr
Parsons to POL) is an example of the process that Bond Dickinson went
through to ensure that relevant statements were reviewed for accuracy by
identified individuals.
POL’s position on remote access in the Group Litigation
269. In relation to statements relating to Horizon (hardware and software) and
remote access, questions were sent to Fujitsu asking them to either answer a
specific question or to comment on draft documents and statements. Those
questions included concerns about remote access capabilities raised by
Second Sight, and subsequently Deloitte as part of Project Bramble. POL then
relied on these responses when drafting the relevant legal documentation. For
example, I note from the papers provided to me by the Inquiry that the wording
regarding remote access in the Letter of Response was checked with both
Deloitte and Fujitsu (as well as being reviewed by Counsel) as I mentioned in
my email to Mr Cameron of 27 July 2016 (POL00022664). Statements made
about remote access in the General Defence and Counterclaim were reviewed
by Deloitte and Fujitsu, as referenced in Mr Parsons’s email of 13 July 2017
(POL00117755_0002).
270. Over time, the questions put to Fujitsu, and their answers, had become more
nuanced. Accordingly, care was taken to ensure that Fujitsu's statements were
carefully considered by POL and Bond Dickinson before being repeated in
Court and other documentation. One example of this in the documentation
Page 148 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
provided to me by the Inquiry is where Fujitsu suggested that, in POL’s Letter
of Response, POL could say that all bugs would be detected due to the design
of the system. Bond Dickinson and POL (I think rightly) decided not to include
this in the Letter of Response in circumstances where we had not seen enough
evidence to say so confidently (see the email from Andy Parsons on 27 July
2016 (POL00041259)). POL also relied on the Deloitte work over the period
2016-18 in relation to POL’s position on remote access. At the time of drafting
the Letter of Response (July 2016) when POL was looking at further disclosure
in relation to remote access, POL and Bond Dickinson collated a chronological
summary of all statements relating to remote access that had been made by
Fujitsu to POL, and which had been used by POL in communications with
others. I do not have a copy of this chronology but the proposal to develop it is
referred to in an email from Andy Parsons on 26 July 2016 (POL00110482) and
I believe that it was in fact produced.
271. I have been asked to describe the “significant concern around the apparent
change in emphasis from previous public statements” of the Group Executive,
referred to in an email from me to Mr Parsons on 26 July 2016
POL00110482_0003. POL’s previous public messaging had set out its
understanding of remote access at the relevant times, which was informed by
Fujitsu. My understanding in 2016 was that POL was already aware that, in
certain limited circumstances, and subject to certain industry standard controls,
Fujitsu could ‘inject’ transactions (“Balancing Transactions”) which would be
visible on the trading statements but would not require acknowledgement or
approval by a SPM. Fujitsu had advised POL that this had only been done once
Page 149 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
with POL’s approval in March 2010 as part of the roll-out of Horizon on-line, and
that there was an auditable log.
272. Shortly after I joined POL, I became aware that Deloitte had been
commissioned to do some work which had resulted in a written report, which I
now know was referred to as Zebra. In fact, as referred to elsewhere in this
statement (paragraph 133134), Deloitte produced two documents — a draft
report dated 23 May 2014 (POL00028062) which I did not see at the time, but
which has been provided to me by the Inquiry (and which I refer to in this
statement as the ‘Zebra Report’), and a Board Briefing which I don't believe I
saw, but is referred to in Sir Jonathan's report (POL00006355_0048). Having
read the Zebra Report for the purpose of this Inquiry, I am now aware that it
contains recommendations as to how POL should implement a risk-based
approach to its oversight of Fujitsu and Horizon, and flags that there are risks
that should be considered as part of this framework including in relation to the
controls around superuser / privileged user access, and that POL’s assurance
framework did not cover all the identified risks. With the benefit of hindsight,
POL should have explored the controls around the “super user” / “privileged
user’ risks as identified by Deloitte at the time. At the time I became aware of
the fact of the 2014 Deloitte report (shortly after joining POL), I had asked the
team whether there was anything about the work that I needed to be aware of.
As I say elsewhere in the statement, the work was presented to me as a legacy
matter, so I was not informed of the content.
Page 150 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
273. The concerns of the Group Executive arose when, subsequently in mid-July
2016, Deloitte identified that a small number of “super users” at Fujitsu having
administrator access had the ability to delete and edit transactions from the
Branch Database, but that (i) this access was subject to strict controls and
would leave an auditable footprint, (ii) this type of access is not unusual in large
computer systems and (iii) the likelihood of someone making the changes was
very low. Deloitte’s findings were communicated to me by Mr Parsons on 13
July 2016 (POL00029990). Having been alerted to Deloitte’s ‘Bramble’ findings
in mid-July 2016, further work with Deloitte and Fujitsu was initiated in order to
understand the extent of the permissions, and the extent to which Fujitsu’s
control framework had been effective to control or prevent such access in
practice. The Group Executive was briefed on the developments in late July
2016, and it was during that meeting (which I believe was on 26 July 2016) that
the Group Executive expressed its concerns in the terms of the above-
mentioned quote.
274. This represented a change from the previous advice provided by Fujitsu (e.g.
POL00110482_0005). The issue was drawn to my attention by Mr Parsons of
Bond Dickinson by email on 13 July 2016 (POL00029990) and we immediately
discussed it with our external legal team.
275. The Letter of Response (a draft of which is at POL00041260) and,
subsequently, a further letter which expanded POL’s understanding of remote
access (a draft of which is at POL00023434), were prepared and in parallel;
further enquiries were undertaken by the internal and external legal teams and
Page 151 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Deloitte to understand whether there were cases where the capability had been
exercised so as to remotely affect branch records without the awareness of the
SPM.
276. The Group Litigation did not affect POL’s approach to disclosure to convicted
SPMs, or POL’s approach to the CCRC. POL was aware that the CCRC review
continued during this time and our assumption was that the CCRC would not
issue its findings until the Group Litigation process had addressed the issues
raised in the Common Issues, and particularly, the Horizon trials. Materials
continued to be provided to the CCRC as and when requested. As I do not have
access to the lists of materials provided to the CCRC I cannot comment on
whether specific documents were disclosed or not, however my recollection is
that the CCRC received copies of the documents (e.g. witness statements) that
were filed in Court. This would have included those documents that referenced
the change in disclosure regarding remote access, and I am aware that the
CCRC had been informed of the Deloitte work (see POL00123890).
277. Ido not believe that the developments relating to remote access (as discussed
in paragraph 273) were disclosed to any convicted SPMs at the time. POL was
aware of the ongoing duty of disclosure as flagged in the email from Mr Parsons
to me and others on 13 July 2016 (POL00029990_0001). My expectation
following that email was that Deloitte's work would be completed and at that
stage their report would be provided to Mr Altman who would advise on
disclosure. I do not believe that happened. I am unable to say why. From my
point of view, the issue fell off my radar in light of the focus on Horizon in the
Group Litigation, and I do not recall raising it. However, the Generic Defence
Page 152 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
and Counterclaim, and Reply, in which the understanding of the extent of
access was disclosed, were public documents.
POL’s Letter of Response and Generic Defence and Counterclaim
278. I was not directly involved in the initial drafting of the Generic Defence and
Counterclaim or the Letter of Response, which was undertaken by the wider
external and internal legal team and settled by Counsel, although I reviewed
certain sections during the process (including the explanation of remote access
and the recent developments about the scope of that access) and I reviewed
both documents once finalised.
279. The decision to bring a counterclaim is best explained by reference to a number
of papers prepared by Bond Dickinson in relation to tactical decisions to be
made, specifically “DECISION 4: Does Post Office lodge counterclaims against
Claimants who have outstanding debts?” (POL00024989). These papers were
sent to the Litigation Steering Group ahead of a meeting on 14 July 2016. I do
not recall the details of any discussions about the counterclaim at the meeting
of 14 July 2016 and I have not seen any minutes of the meeting. However, I
note that the decision to bring a counterclaim was also due to be discussed at
a Litigation Steering Group meeting on 24 May 2017 (POL00154151_0002). I
was supportive of the decision to bring a counterclaim, as I said in my email of
19 May 2017 (POL00154151) - it was consistent with POL’s ‘business as usual’
practice.
Page 153 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
280. I note from POL00024989_0004 that there were 29 claimants who collectively
owed more than £700,000 to POL (after write-offs). The potential advantages
of bringing a counterclaim were deemed to be:
(a) pursuing the counterclaims would be consistent with POL’s legal
position that these amounts were debts due to POL;
(b) it would put POL on the front foot and send a message that POL was
confident in its position;
(c) the counterclaims could be used as a bargaining chip in settlement
discussions; and
(d) I POL might recover some of the debts if the counterclaims were
successful.
281. I note from POL00024989_0004 that the potential disadvantages to bringing a
counterclaim were deemed to be that there was a court fee of £10,000, and that
it might cause an aggressive reaction from Freeths or the Claimants and
allegations that POL was acting oppressively.
282. I further note from POL00024989_0004 that the recommendation of Bond
Dickinson was that the counterclaim should be brought where there were fair
and legal grounds to do so. This approach was discussed and agreed at the
Litigation Steering Group meeting on 14 July 2016.
Page 154 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
283. The Inquiry has referred me to an email from myself to Mr Parsons on 14 July
2017 which I sent to Mr Parsons following a Group Executive Committee
meeting on 13 July 2017. The Inquiry has specifically drawn my attention to my
comment in that email that “/ was kicking myself for talking about the ‘black hat’
work, as that took us down an unnecessary rabbit hole’.
284. I am aware that, by email dated 21 May 2016 (POL00103201), the CEO had
asked Mr Davies and myself to “put on your blackest hats and think through the
worst outcomes: I would like a downside horizon scan e.g. are there any judicial
review or (mis)use of public funds angles at all— costs expended to date, failure
of our own mediation scheme”.
285. I do not now recall the specific details of the Group Executive meeting on 13
July 2017, but the copy of the minutes of the Group Executive meeting on that
day that have been provided to me by the Inquiry (POL00027182) summarise
the discussion and include the following statement: “GE noted the briefing and
requested that a further update be provided to GE and the Board following the
Case Management Conference. This update should include an assessment of
the potential impact on Post Office and its business and operations of the range
of possible outcomes, based on the issues to be considered through the Lead
Cases.”
286. Additionally, I note that in the ‘Review’ section at the end of the minutes (for
Agenda Item 15) it was commented that Sparrow was too long. Therefore, I
Page 155 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
suspect that the ‘black hat’ comment that I made to Mr Parsons referenced a
long discussion at the Group Executive meeting about how to conduct the
assessment of the potential impact on POL of differing outcomes of the Group
Litigation. In that context, I suspect that my reference in my email to Mr Parsons
on 14 July to ‘an unnecessary rabbit hole’ related to the level of detail in this
discussion which, at the time, I probably thought was premature given that the
work still needed to be scoped and fully considered before a meaningful
detailed discussion could be had about it.
Content of Generic Defence and Counterclaim
287. In order to satisfy myself that the content of the Generic Defence and
Counterclaim were true, I relied on the wider legal team including Counsel,
Bond Dickinson and the internal team to accurately summarise statements of
fact, and to ensure that there were reasonable grounds for any expression of
opinion. I recall that around the time the Generic Defence and Counterclaim
was being finalised, I had a conversation with Mr Parsons regarding the
validation of factual statements. I recall commenting that, in previous roles, I
had been through verification processes with boards in relation to public
documents such as prospectuses which required the collation of appropriate
evidence to support or verify each statement of fact or expression of opinion. I
advised Mr Parsons that I expected that there would be appropriate evidence
to support each statement of fact or opinion appearing in POL’s Court
documents, and my recollection is that Mr Parsons acknowledged these
requirements. Whilst I did not see or review any such evidence, I relied on Mr
Page 156 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Parsons’ assurance that there was appropriate evidence in relation to each
statement made in the Generic Defence and Counterclaim.
288. I understood that statements regarding technical matters — whether relating to
POL processes or Horizon (including remote access) — were informed by
conversations with, and documents from, those responsible for those matters,
including Fujitsu. As set out elsewhere in this statement (paragraph 152), the
internal IT team at POL at that time was small and heavily reliant on Fujitsu’s
expertise.
289. In an email from Mr Parsons to POL senior managers on 13 July 2017
(POL00117755), Mr Parsons explained who had reviewed each section of the
draft Generic Defence and Counterclaim. This review was part of the process
to ensure that statements made by POL in this document were checked as
widely as possible for accuracy, and were checked by those with the most
appropriate and relevant experience and knowledge of the facts. I refer to this
email in more detail below.
290. I have been asked by the Inquiry to consider a number of specific paragraphs
in the Generic Defence and Counterclaim and explain the basis on which POL
pleaded certain points relating to the Horizon system. The paragraphs of the
Generic Defence and Counterclaim that the Inquiry has asked me to consider
are highly technical. I had some high-level knowledge of these issues but,
because they were highly technical, I considered that they were matters for
Page 157 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL’s IT team (as well as Fujitsu and Deloitte) and Operational teams to review
and comment upon.
291. The email I refer to above from Mr Parsons on 13 July 2017 (POL00117755)
describes the section of the Defence relating to “Fujitsu, Horizon and remote
access” as being within the “fact heavy section of the defence” and notes that
the section had been reviewed by Fujitsu and Deloitte, being those with the
most technical and historical knowledge of Horizon. Moreover, Mr Parsons’
email notes that the section of the Defence relating to “Branch accounting
contracts” (which is where POL’s pleading about blocked values was made)
was also within the “fact heavy section of the defence” and had been reviewed
by members of POL’s Operational team, including Ms Van Den Bogerd. This
gave me comfort and, when signing the statement of truth, I relied upon the fact
that both sections had been appropriately reviewed by those with relevant
expertise .
292. Notwithstanding the fact that I relied upon those with technical expertise and
factual knowledge (as well as Bond Dickinson and the Counsel team with
regards to the nuanced legal arguments), I will explain my understanding of the
specific paragraphs of the Generic Defence and Counterclaim that the Inquiry
has referred me to. I do not now recall my understanding of POL’s pleadings at
the time they were made, and so I am explaining my current understanding of
them.
Page 158 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
293. I have been asked by the Inquiry to consider paragraphs 43(1) to (3) of the
Generic Defence and Counterclaim and explain the basis on which POL
pleaded that “The blocked value is not (and is not treated as) a debt due to Post
Office”. I think it was POL’s understanding that SPMs could dispute liability for
a shortfall and, until that dispute was resolved, the shortfall was not treated as
a debt. However, I understand that this point was conceded during the trial
process and POL admitted that the sum was treated as being legally owing to
POL. I do not recall the basis on which POL concluded at the time of the
Generic Defence and Counterclaim, that the shortfall was not treated as a debt.
294. I have been asked by the Inquiry to consider paragraphs 48(3)(b) and 48(3)(c)
of the Generic Defence and Counterclaim (POL00003340) and to explain
POL’s pleadings in those paragraphs.
295. Paragraph 21.3 of the Particulars of Claim’ states the Claimants’ understanding
of Fujitsu’s role as included “managing coding errors, bugs and fixes so as to
prevent, manage or seek to correct apparent discrepancies in the data
(including between the said systems) in a manner which would potentially affect
the reliability of accounting balances, statements or other reports produced by
Horizon”.
296. In paragraph 48(3) of the Generic Defence and Counterclaim, POL stated that:
“Paragraph 21.3 bundles together several different concepts and uses
1 A copy of which I obtained from Scribed (https://www.scribd.com/document/397674363/Bates-v-Post-
Office-Generic-Particulars-of-Claim)
Page 159 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
language that is open to different meanings and/or misleading. However... (b)
To the extent that the phrase “correct apparent discrepancies in the data” is
intended to mean that Fujitsu implemented fixes that edited or deleted specific
items of transaction data, that is denied... (c) It is denied that Fujitsu has
implemented fixes that have affected the reliability of accounting balances,
statements or reports.”
297. My recollection is that these statements at paragraph 48(3) of the Generic
Defence and Counterclaim had been discussed with Deloitte and Fujitsu who
confirmed their accuracy. Indeed, Mr Parsons’ email of 13 July 2017 confirms
that the section had been reviewed by Deloitte and Fujitsu
(POL00117755_0002).
298. Even at the time the Generic Defence and Counterclaim was being drafted in
2017, my understanding was that there were a range of different actions which
Fujitsu staff could take in different circumstances, and it was very easy to
conflate these. Balancing Transactions, Transaction Corrections, and
Transaction Acknowledgements were all activities of which POL was aware and
which were undertaken by Fujitsu or POL in specific situations for pre-defined
purposes, that were visible to SPMs, and left an audit trail. The allegation that
Claimants had raised was that POL and/or Fujitsu could either delete or alter
existing records, to the detriment, and without the knowledge, of the SPM, and
without leaving an audit trail. Following advice and review by Deloitte and
Fujitsu, POL was informed that there were sophisticated control measures in
Page 160 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
place to prevent such activity (as referred to in paragraph 57(4) of the Generic
Defence and Counterclaim).
299. In sub-paragraph 48(3)(b) POL denied that Fujitsu implemented fixes that had
affected the reliability of accounting balances, statements or reports. Similarly,
in sub-paragraph 48(3)(c), POL denied that Fujitsu’s fixes had affected the
reliability of accounting balances etc. Whilst POL was aware that “super users”
could in theory edit/delete data, as far as I was aware, POL, having relied on
information from Fujitsu, understood that this theoretical capability had not been
exercised and had not caused loss, and that there were sophisticated control
measures in place to prevent such activity. I note that the issue as to the ability
of Fujitsu staff (being super users / privileged users / those with administrator
access) to make changes was subsequently discussed in the Horizon trial,
however I am not aware that any evidence has ever been provided that suggest
that such super users/administrators did use these theoretical rights to make
such changes, in ways that were not visible to SPMs or that resulted in branch
losses for which a SPM was held accountable.
300. I have been asked by the Inquiry to consider paragraph 57(4) of the Generic
Defence and Counterclaim and explain the basis on which POL pleaded that
“To have abused those rights so as to alter branch transaction data and conceal
that this has happened would be an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, involving
complex steps...which would require months of planning and an exceptional
level of technical expertise. Post Office has never consented to the use of
Page 161 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
privileged user rights to alter branch data and, to the best of its information and
belief, these rights have never been used for this purpose”.
301. Paragraph 57(4) of the Generic Defence and Counterclaim is pleaded in
response to paragraph 25 of the Particulars of Claim, which provides that “the
Defendant was, by itself and/or via its agent Fujitsu, able to alter branch
transaction data directly and carry out changes to Horizon and/or transaction
data which could affect branch accounts.”.
302. I believed that POL’s pleading reflected Deloitte's developing advice at the
relevant time, which was reflected in Deloitte’s draft report dated 1 September
2017 (POL00041491), paragraph 1.4.2.17 in particular. My understanding is
that this section of the pleading was read and approved by Deloitte and Fujitsu.
303. So far as I was aware during the time that I was at POL, POL was not provided
with any evidence that remote access was responsible for any particular loss in
branch. Rather, ‘remote access’ became a catch all claim for unexplained
losses. I note that Sir Jonathan Swift stated in his report that “Second Sight
recognise, largely implicitly, that the themes they see are regular forms of errors
at the counter on the part of SPMRs and their staff. It is notable that nowhere
in their Part Two Report do Second Sight revise or disavow their conclusion in
the Interim Report that they have found no evidence of systemic problems with
the Horizon software.” (POL00006355_0042)
Page 162 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Disclosure of the Known Error Log (“KEL”) and PEAK database
304. In relation to disclosure generally, POL’s general concern (as stated by Bond
Dickinson in correspondence) was that wide and/or non-specific requests for
disclosure would result in a disproportionate number of irrelevant documents
being within the search scope; that it would take a significant time to identify
and extract all documents within such wide requests (where this was in fact
possible); and that the costs were also disproportionate. This was driven by
the period under review (over 20 years in some cases), the number of claimants
(c.550) and the fact that many of the records were not held by POL e.g. pre-
2012 documents which were held by Royal Mail, documents held by Fujitsu or
other outsourced IT suppliers, some of which were very difficult to access or
extract, which I will explain in more detail in relation to KELs and PEAKs.
305. In general, POL sought to ensure that disclosure was relevant to the questions
to be decided at the relevant trial (Common Issues and Horizon) rather than
being a generic request for ‘all documents’, and that disclosure should be a
manageable, reasonable and proportionate process, delivering a satisfactory
outcome for both POL and the Claimants. Bond Dickinson had primary carriage
of these issues, but they reported back to the Litigation Steering Group on the
progress of disclosure and requested instructions in relation to key tactical
issues such as the approach to disclosure of the PEAK database in a Decision
Paper for consideration (POL00023014).
306. Other than for the purposes of the Group Litigation, I had no personal
knowledge or experience of the KELs or PEAK database. Therefore, any
Page 163 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
knowledge that I did acquire was as a result of information that became
apparent during the course of the Group Litigation, which was refreshed in
some cases from reading the materials provided to me by the Inquiry. All
information relating to the KELs and PEAK database was derived from Fujitsu
and was provided to Bond Dickinson. I have seen Mr Parsons’ description in
paragraphs 33 to 41 of his fourth witness statement dated 9 October 2017
(POL00000444) relating to the KELs, and the description of the PEAK database
in a decision paper for a Litigation Steering Group on 28 September 2018
(POL00023014). I believe that my knowledge at the time was limited to what is
set out in those two documents.
307. As referred to in Mr Parsons’ fourth witness statement (POL00000444), there
were very real logistical issues associated with extracting KELs (they were not
a physical document which could be copied; and they could not be easily
downloaded being data stored on a database which was difficult to read without
the necessary database software). POL did not seek to prevent disclosure of
the KELs, rather disclosure required cooperation between all parties to agree
how access would be provided, to whom and where. There was significant
correspondence between Freeths and Bond Dickinson in relation to disclosure.
POL00023014 describes a similar logistical difficulty with disclosure of data in
the PEAK database: there had been no way to extract the entries and it was
not feasible or practical to manually take a screenshot of each entry.
308. Bond Dickinson and Mr Williams facilitated the Claimants’ expert, Jason Coyne,
attending a Fujitsu site in order to physically review both the KELs and PEAKs.
Page 164 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Although I was not involved in this process, I do not believe that POL or its
advisers were seeking to delay or withhold disclosure. Rather, a physical review
of the database was seen as the only way to provide disclosure at the time
(prior to the development by Fujitsu of a programme which enabled extraction
of the relevant information). Mr Coyne had been offered the opportunity for
further inspections of the database, but these had not been taken up and, as
explained above, there were significant logistical issues with extracting data
from the database in a way that could be provided to Mr Coyne and reviewed
in a documentary format.
309. My view was that documents that fell within the agreed scope of disclosure must
be disclosed, however where there were logistical issues associated with
disclosure, then we should be pro-active in offering alternative ways of providing
disclosure options. I believe that is what POL and Bond Dickinson sought to do
at the time. In the event, in relation to PEAKs, Fujitsu managed to develop a
programme which allowed them to extract all PEAK entries. I do not recall when
this happened, but the documents provided to me by the Inquiry show Fujitsu
had developed the programme by about 26 September 2018 (POL00023014).
POL00023014 suggests that, thereafter, the PEAK documents went through
the usual disclosure review process before being disclosed to the Claimants.
Preparation for the Common Issues trial
310. As previously mentioned, the day-to-day work on the preparation of the trial
materials, and preparation for the trial itself, was undertaken by Bond Dickinson
in conjunction with the Counsel team and Mr Williams, as supported by others
Page 165 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
within POL. I received regular high-level updates from Bond Dickinson and Mr
Williams as to progress and issues arising. Key decisions were referred to the
Litigation Steering Group, and regular briefings were provided to the Group
Executive and Board. Whilst that was the general position, and I relied heavily
upon those with carriage of the Group Litigation, the Inquiry has asked me to
explain the nature and extent of my involvement in (i) the assertion of privilege
in redacting documents, (ii) the preparation of witness evidence, (iii) POL’s case
on the effect of the “settle centrally” button, and (iv) the approach of cross-
examination of the Claimants, including making allegations of dishonesty.
311. Redaction of documents in which privilege was asserted was undertaken by
Bond Dickinson. I would have expected that the redaction process would have
been undertaken in accordance with a protocol, once documents had been
properly identified as containing privileged information. However, I have no
recollection of discussing such a protocol. I do recall there were situations
where the approach to identifying privileged documents was discussed. For
example, the options presented to the Litigation Steering Group in reviewing
the KELs as set out in POL00023014_0003. I had no involvement in the actual
process of identifying or redacting privileged material.
312. As explained in more detail in paragraph 261,261 the preparation of witness
evidence was done by the Bond Dickinson team and Mr Williams, in conjunction
with the witnesses, with statements being reviewed by the Counsel team.
Page 166 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
313. I do not recall being involved in the discussions around the “settle centrally”
button, and would not have expected to, given this was in relation to a technical
process point of which I had no personal knowledge. I would have relied on
those with the factual knowledge and technical expertise in relation to POL’s
case on the effect of the “settle centrally” button.
314. I was not involved in determining the approach to cross-examination of the
Claimants, other than a generic discussion where I flagged to the Counsel team
that the Board and CEO were concerned at the level of criticism being directed
at POL by Mr Justice Fraser, and therefore our preference was that, wherever
possible, the Counsel team should avoid creating circumstances that would
provide the Judge with the opportunity for further criticism. POL recognised
however that this would not always be possible.
Information sharing with UKGI
315. Although there was at all times a UKGI-appointed director on the POL Board,
in February 2018, UKGI proposed to POL a process by which information in
relation to the Group Litigation could flow between POL and the Secretary of
State and UKGI in order to ensure that the Secretary of State and UKGI were
kept properly informed about the Group Litigation. Following discussions about
the content and wording of the document, an information sharing protocol was
established between POL and UKGI (“Protocol”).
316. I have been provided with a marked-up copy of the Protocol (UKGI00007924)
and note that this version of the Protocol confirmed the basis upon which Mr
Page 167 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Cooper, UKGI’s Board representative, who was also a member of the Litigation
Sub-Committee, would receive information in relation to the Group Litigation.
The Protocol also confirmed the basis upon which information should be shared
with a nominated legal advisor to the Secretary of State / UKGI.
317. One of the purposes of the Protocol was to protect POL’s privilege, and the
Protocol set out procedures that were designed to do that. This was
implemented against the background that both POL and UKGI could be (and
were) subject to requests under FOIA for the disclosure of documents, and
privileged documents were a (limited) exception to the disclosure obligation.
318. The Protocol was supposed to protect POL against the possibility that a
unilateral decision by UKGI to disclose documents without reference to POL
could adversely affect POL’s ability to (properly) assert privilege over its own
documents. There had been examples where UKGI/BIS had disclosed POL
documents under FOIA, or in response to the CCRC’s requests, without prior
reference to POL.
319. On 10 May 2018, UKGI sent POL a written briefing on the Group Litigation,
having been requested by BEIS Permanent Secretary Alex Chisholm to prepare
the same (POL00006523 and POL00006524). I was concerned that the
production by a non-lawyer of the briefing summary did not comply with the
Protocol and was therefore ‘highly dangerous’ in relation to the protection of
POL’s privilege. Within POL we had discussed the risk that we had no control
over the disclosure by UKGI of documents that it produced, prepared or
Page 168 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
otherwise held (other than in accordance with the Protocol), and that this could
impact not only legally privileged documents in relation to the Group Litigation,
but also commercially sensitive documents relating to POL’s wider business.
The written briefing prepared by UKGI contained information which at the time
was not public (e.g. relating to the Chairman’s Review, and POL’s approach to
litigation v settlement) and this reinforced POL’s concern about UKGI having a
different approach to confidentiality.
Mr Justice Fraser’s decisions and comments on POL’s approach to the Group
Litigation and conduct
320. I note from the minutes of the Board meeting on 23 November 2017
(POL00021552) that I updated the Board about the outcome of the Case
Management Conference held on 19 October 2017 and the fact the Court dates
would not be set by reference to Counsel availability, which posed potential
issues to POL as Leading Counsel may not have been available for the hearing
in November 2018. I have not seen a copy of my speaking notes for the Board
meeting, and I do not recall whether the criticisms of POL’s conduct by Mr
Justice Fraser in Bates & Others v. Post Office Limited [2017] EWHC 2844 (QB)
were discussed. My usual practice would be to give a high-level summary of
the judgment. I believe this would have included my personal observations as
to his approach to POL, including any criticisms he may have made of the
parties.
321. In September 2018, POL made an application for certain parts of the Claimants’
witness statements to be struck out on the basis that they contained matters
Page 169 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
that were not relevant to the Common Issues trial. A hearing took place on 10
October 2018 and, by judgment dated 17 October 2018, Mr Justice Fraser
rejected POL’s application and, while he made a number of critical comments
about both parties, he was particularly critical of POL. My recollection is that
both in this judgment and in the Common Issues judgment itself, Mr Justice
Fraser opined that POL’s historic approach to the Claimants' and POL’s
approach to the Group Litigation was aggressive.
322. I note from an email to me on 18 October 2018 (POL00103355), that Mr Cooper
had confirmed that he had read the judgment in the most recent procedural
hearing (relating to POL’s application to strike out evidence contained in the
Claimants’ witness statements), and he had recommended that the Chairman
should read this judgment also. I separately discussed these criticisms with the
CEO, Ms Vennells, and by email with the Chairman (POL00103355), and
advised that I would discuss with the external legal team (Bond Dickinson and
Counsel) how to moderate the language used in documentation and in Court
given that this appeared to be one of the causes of the Mr Justice Fraser’s
criticisms — and I recall doing so. Later that day, I emailed the Board
(UKGI00008549_0002) to update them on the outcome and the criticism that
had been levelled at POL by the Judge: “the Managing Judge was very critical
of our conduct of the case, intimating that we were not acting cooperatively and
constructively in trying to resolve this litigation (which criticism was levelled
equally between the parties); and that we had impugned the court and its
processes by making the application for improper purposes.”
Page 170 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
323. The Inquiry has provided me with a document whereby the CEO subsequently
had a separate email exchange with the Board (UKGI00008549_0001) advising
that she and I had agreed on various actions to follow up to address ‘tone’ going
forward. This was also discussed at the Board meeting on 30 October 2018
(POL00021558). I did raise the issue with the Counsel team and asked them
to be mindful of the tenor and tone of their language and comments, as POL
did not wish to further aggravate Mr Justice Fraser.
324. The POL legal team (myself, Mr Williams, Bond Dickinson and the Counsel
team) were concerned that in procedural judgments, Mr Justice Fraser was
increasingly critical of POL and its conduct of the Group Litigation, and
appeared to be extrapolating from allegations made by the Claimants about
historic behaviours towards SPMs, and implying that this was consistent with
POL’s current behaviour and management of the Group Litigation. POL felt that
Mr Justic Fraser was seeking to support the Claimants wherever possible. At
the time, POL felt this was consistent with a ‘David v Goliath’ view of the Group
Litigation, and did not at that time consider this was evidence of actual bias,
however we were concerned at the trend, and had discussions with the external
legal team as to what steps could be taken to address Mr Justice Fraser's
criticisms.
Witness statement of Ms Van Den Bogerd
325. Ms Van Den Bogerd was the key witness for POL in the Common Issues trial
on all procedural matters within POL given her length and breadth of service. I
had no direct involvement in the drafting or settling of Ms Van Den Bogerd’s
Page 171 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
witness statement. I note from emails provided to me by the Inquiry (for
example, the email chain between 8 and 20 August 2018 (POL00041955)) that
iterations of the witness statement were passed between Bond Dickinson and
Ms Van Den Bogerd, such emails being copied to Mr Williams. I also note that
Mr Williams provided comments on the draft witness statement (see, for
example in an email on 23 August 2018 POL00041986)). I believe I was
provided with a copy of the witness statement at the time it was filed, and I read
it before Ms Van Den Bogerd gave evidence in Court, however I do not believe
that I provided any comments on it before it was filed. As with other matters in
the Group Litigation, I expected that Mr Williams (or other members of the team)
would advise me of any matters or developments in any of the witness
statements of which they thought I ought to be aware.
326. As I was not involved in the preparation of Mrs Van den Bogerd’s witness
statement, I am unable to comment on Mr Justice Fraser's findings about it in
the Common Issues judgment.
Preparation for Horizon trial
327. As with the preparation for the Common Issues trial, the day-to-day work on the
preparation of the Horizon trial materials was undertaken by Bond Dickinson in
conjunction with the Counsel team and Mr Williams. I received regular high-
level updates from them as to progress and issues arising. As discussed
elsewhere, my recollection is that key decisions were referred to the Litigation
Steering Group (such as the approach to disclosure of documents and systems
to the Claimants’ Expert and POL’s approach to evidence (see, for example,
Page 172 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
POL00023013)) and regular briefings were provided to the Group Executive
and Board. I was not involved in the preparation of witness evidence and did
not meet Steve Parker or Torstein Godeseth prior to the Horizon trial.
328. As the Horizon trial was largely driven by expert evidence, Dr Worden, as POL’s
independent expert, wrote his own report based on the information he had
received from POL and Fujitsu, as did the Claimants’ expert, Mr Coyne. I was
kept informed at a high level by Mr Williams and Bond Dickinson of the
development of the experts’ reports and the approach that each was taking,
and the areas of agreement and disagreement between them as these became
clear. POL’s approach was that we could challenge factual statements in Dr
Worden’s opinion if we believed they were incorrect, however the conclusions
he drew from the facts were his own. I was not involved in discussions with Dr
Worden about technical matters, although I know they took place and I believe
Mr Houghton was involved in some of these discussions.
329. My recollection is that, given the nature of the evidence required for the Horizon
trial (i.e. largely technical evidence from the experts), issues relating to privilege
and the redaction of documents arose infrequently. The Inquiry has provided
me with a copy of the minutes of a Litigation Steering Group meeting on 26
September 2018 (POL00023014_0002), whereby the Litigation Steering Group
was requested to opine on the approach to disclosure of the PEAK system. The
recommendation was to undertake keyword searches across the 220,000
individual entries in the PEAK system which would reduce the manual review
for potentially privileged documents to 3,886 documents. I believe I would have
supported this recommendation as it appeared proportionate from a time and
Page 173 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
cost perspective. I am not aware whether any documents were identified as
privileged through this process.
330. I believed that the scope of factual evidence had been discussed with Fujitsu
given that the software had originally been developed, and continued to be
maintained by Fujitsu. Essentially, Fujitsu had the factual and technical
knowledge of Horizon and the vast majority of POL's historic understanding of
Horizon originated from things it had been told by Fujitsu (and, to a certain
extent, Deloitte).
331. The Inquiry has provided me with a copy of an email from Mr Williams to Simon
Clarke and Martin Smith of Cartwright King on 7 September 2018, which
forwards an email from Mr Parsons (POL00042015). I am not copied to that
email, but I note that a discussion was required in relation to the possibility of
calling Mr Jenkins as a witness in the Group Litigation. I suspect that I was not
copied into that email as the legal team would have wanted to explore the
possibilities before briefing me on the matter and (where relevant) making
recommendations. In the end, it was decided that Mr Jenkins would not be
called as a witness in the Group Litigation. My expectation was that this would
have been decided by the legal team.
332. However, it became apparent to POL during preparation for the Horizon Issues
trial that a number of Fujitsu staff were relying on Mr Jenkins when preparing
their statements given his legacy knowledge of many of the matters, and the
limited number of Fujitsu staff who had detailed knowledge of Horizon prior to
the introduction of Horizon on-line. I don’t believe that POL or its lawyers relied
Page 174 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
on Mr Jenkins directly. Nevertheless, a number of the witness statements
prepared by Fujitsu staff subsequently required amendment, which was of
concern to POL and its legal team.
Expert reports — reliability of Horizon
333. I have been asked to describe my recollection of the Litigation Sub-Committee
Meeting on 21 February 2019 (POL00006753), including the advice given and
questions asked by the committee members on certain issues relating to Dr
Worden’s advice.
334. I do not have a specific separate recollection of the meeting, however I have
been provided with a document (POL00006753) which appears to be a draft of
the minutes of the Litigation Sub-Committee meeting held on 21 February 2019.
I believe that Veronica Branton, the Head of Secretariat, would have taken
notes and written these up as minutes, however the document I have seen is
not signed, contains a number of incomplete points such as ownership of
actions, and reads as a contemporaneous and, somewhat literal, record of the
discussion. I therefore believe that this is a draft version of the minutes.
Nevertheless, it records the details of the briefing provided, that questions were
asked and that there was a Board discussion.
335. The final expert witness reports were not produced until late 2018 when the
differing approach between them became apparent. The experts had been
asked to address 15 questions which had been agreed between POL and the
Page 175 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Claimants. As set out in the draft minutes (POL00006753), Mr de Garr
Robinson advised the Litigation Sub-Committee that the 15 questions covered
three core sets of issues:
(a) whether the Horizon system was robust;
(b) the causes of shortfalls in branches, including whether Fujitsu was
"manipulating" the data behind the scenes; and
(c) miscellaneous issues.
336. I have been asked to comment on whether there was any challenge to Dr
Worden’s view that Horizon was “critically robust”. While the draft minutes do
record that a variety of questions were asked by the Board, they do not record
whether the Board asked questions about the basis of Dr Worden’s view and I
do not now recall any further details. Dr Worden was not present at the meeting,
and therefore the summary of his views was presented by Mr de Garr Robinson
who would not have been the most appropriate person to respond to challenges
as to whether Dr Worden’s conclusions were appropriate and well founded.
However, Mr Houghton, the then CIO, was present and although the draft
minutes do not specifically record it, I believe that the Board would have sought
his views in relation to the reliability of Horizon and on the relative position of
Dr Worden’s and the Claimants’ expert’s views, but I cannot now recall if they
did. I am aware from separate discussions with Mr Houghton that he believed
that, while improvements were desirable, the error rate was low when assessed
against the number of users across Horizon’s lifetime and the significant volume
Page 176 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
of transactions every day, and that this was evidence that the Horizon system
was robust.
337. The Litigation Sub-Committee was advised by Mr de Garr Robinson that POL
would argue that:
(a)
Whilst the system could be improved or did have bugs, it recorded data
accurately in most cases.
No one had found a fundamental flaw in the system.
It had been well designed and managed by Fujitsu throughout. When
there had been system issues, the systems and processes to address
these had worked well in practice.
Several of the bugs identified by the Claimants’ experts were not in fact
system bugs and several would not have affected branch accounts.
Several bugs had been triggered by an unusual combination of events.
Therefore, for the vast majority of the time, Horizon was a very reliable
system.
338. Mr de Garr Robinson reported that Dr Worden’s view was that Horizon was
critically robust. By contrast, he summarised the essence of the Claimants’
expert's view, as being that he had identified system errors, therefore there
Page 177 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
could be thousands of undetected bugs in the Horizon system and therefore he
believed that the system was not ‘robust’.
339. I have been asked to comment whether I (or any other representative of POL)
was concerned as to POL’s prospects of success in showing that Horizon was
robust and unlikely to cause any unexplained losses. The draft minutes record
that Mr de Garr Robinson explained that one of the main risks of the POL case
was that: “...the bar we have set ourselves was very high as we had said that
the Horizon System was robust and very unlikely to cause significant losses.
We had to be able to support this starting position. Not meeting that bar would
have a serious impact on PO Limited's operating procedures and would open
up 18 years of previous decisions. The claimants alleged an of asymmetry of
information.” (POL00006753_0002)
340. I am not an IT expert, and therefore my personal views were informed by Dr
Worden and also the views of the various POL ClOs and in particular Mr
Houghton. I did not find the logic of Mr Coyne’s view that there could be
thousands of undetected bugs, to be convincing, given that the vast majority of
transactions with SPMs, customers and commercial partners over a long period
of time had occurred without issue.
341. I note from the draft minutes of the meeting that the Litigation Sub-Committee
was concerned as to the prospects of success, and this was reflected in the first
question that was posed whether POL should be less optimistic because of the
supplementary evidence and the approach of the Mr Justice Fraser. Mr de Garr
Robinson did say that he “remained reasonably optimistic, but somewhat less
Page 178 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
so than before Christmas” as a result of the line that Mr Coyne was taking and
the challenges with the production of robust evidence given that the questions
as to the robustness and operations of Horizon were being measured over a
20-year period. It was also noted that Mr Coyne had filed a supplementary
statement (larger than his original) very close to the commencement of the
hearings and it was very challenging for the legal team to read and absorb the
material and form a view as to the significance of any new evidence, in the time
available. In addition, and although this discussion was prior to receipt of the
Common Issues judgment, the POL legal team were concerned about how Mr
Justice Fraser would deal with the different approaches in the expert witness
reports, given his approach to evidence in the Common issues trial.
342. I have also been asked to comment on what information was passed to the
Litigation Sub-Committee about remote access. The draft minutes do not record
what (if any) papers were submitted to the Litigation Sub-Committee and I do
not now recall what information was passed to the Sub-Committee regarding
remote access, however I do not believe that the Deloitte reports were provided
as part of the 21 February 2019 briefing. The only reference to remote access
in the minutes is where Mr de Garr Robinson summarises the key risks to POL
as including: “Remote access risk. The claimants had posited the theory that
Fujitsu had interfered with branch data in secret. PO Limited and Fujitsu's case
on remote access had changed over time. Initially Fujitsu had said that remote
access was not possible. The Deloitte audit had found that it was. The
claimants’ expert was arguing that the scope for remote access was even
greater than now stated. The Court was likely to want to test this fully. We
Page 179 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
should be in a position to provide more evidence on each and every remote
access tool by the time the trial began.”
343. The minutes record a question whether an accusation was being made that
POL had been involved in instructing Fujitsu to change transactions. It was
noted that “... only Fujitsu could change data and there was no suggestion that
PO had operated a policy to get Fujitsu to manipulate the branch data. The
claim was that we had lied about Fujitsu's ability to change branch data. It was
noted that it was hard to capture the number of instances in which data had
been changed, especially in the legacy Horizon System because of the way
that data was captured. We could not distinguish easily between maintenance
access and making changes to branch data. However, Fujitsu had been clear
that branch data had only been changed on very rare occasions.”
344. The draft minutes summarise the other risks reported by Mr de Garr Robinson
as including (i) POL being able to verify statements that had been made over
time including as to remote access, (ii) the quality of the witness evidence, (iii)
the age of the system and (iv) the risk that Fujitsu had interfered with data in
secret.
345. I note from the minutes of the meeting that the safety of past convictions using
Horizon data was not discussed at the meeting. The purpose of the Litigation
Sub-Committee as set out in its Terms of Reference was “to receive legal
advice on the Post Office's Defence in the Group Litigation as it proceeds to
final resolution.” (POL00117892_0001), and therefore a discussion relating to
Page 180 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
past convictions would not have been within its authority. However, one of the
reasons for progressing with the Horizon trial before considering mediation
discussions, was that the outcome was expected to give clarity not just for the
Claimants, but also for other SPMs (including convicted SPMs) who may be
observing the Group Litigation.
The recusal application
346. On Friday 8 March 2019, immediately following receipt of the embargoed
judgment for the Common Issues hearing, the wider legal team (myself, Mr
Williams, Bond Dickinson and the Counsel team) read the judgment and had a
call in the afternoon where we discussed our initial reactions. My recollection is
that we were concerned about the emotive language used by Mr Justice Fraser
in the judgment, as well as by certain of his decisions. In particular, we felt that
he had taken the concept of a ‘relational contract’ well beyond the established
cases; that he had taken into account evidence from the period post formation
of the contract which was inconsistent with established precedents on
contractual interpretation, but was also directly contrary to his own statements
at the disclosure hearings. The Counsel team raised the prospect of bias in
that call and advised that an application for recusal would be a necessary step
should POL wish to appeal the judgment.
347. I advised the POL Interim CEO and Board that afternoon of the outcome
(UKGI00009149) with a commitment to provide a more detailed briefing
following a closer review over the weekend. A Board call was set up on Tuesday
Page 181 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
12 March 2019 and the Board was briefed on the judgment and the initial advice
we had received as to possible courses of action — including the possibility that
POL could make an application for Mr Justice Fraser to recuse himself,
together with a high-level summary of the possible consequences. The Board
was advised that (i) an application for recusal and (ii) appeal, were both options
to be considered as a matter of urgency. My recollection is that the terms of the
embargo meant, initially, we could not brief Government more widely, but Mr
Cooper as UKGI shareholder representative, was part of the Board briefings.
348. The outcome of the Common Issues trial was unexpected given the views that
Counsel had previously expressed to the Board as to the merits of the Claim
and POL’s Defence. The decisions and comments made by Mr Justice Fraser
in many instances went well beyond what we thought were possible adverse
outcomes. Given that the Counsel team could be considered to have a vested
interest in recommending appeals (and therefore the recusal option), I wanted
the Board to have a ‘second opinion’ on the available options, and this was the
rationale for instructing Lord Neuberger to advise POL. I do not recall who
suggested Lord Neuberger as a candidate for the second opinion, but I expect
it was the Counsel team, given that they are all from the same set of chambers.
I also believed that Lord Neuberger would bring a helpful perspective informed
by his experience of the Court of Appeal judges’ approach to these types of
issues, and he might therefore be able to provide us with more nuanced
guidance.
Page 182 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
349. The instructions to Lord Neuberger were prepared by the external legal team
(Bond Dickinson and Counsel) and were submitted to Mr Williams and me for
review. I now have no recollection of the discussion about which materials
should be sent to Lord Neuberger with his Brief, but I am aware that the Counsel
team put together a summary of the areas of the judgment with which we were
particularly concerned.
350. The initial advice from the Counsel team was that, should POL wish to appeal
either the Common Issues trial, or potentially the Horizon trial, it would be
difficult to do so successfully unless the issues of procedural unfairness and
apparent bias had been previously raised. This was summarised by Bond
Dickinson in a Recusal Note (POL00022970) as follows: “If Post Office is to
forcefully assert procedural unfairness, it would be inconsistent to not apply for
recusal too as the prejudicial findings of fact and adverse comments of the
Judge are evidence (Post Office says) of both bias and procedural unfairness.
To make one application without the other would be inconsistent and weakens
each position.” Lord Neuberger’s advice note (POL00023228) gave POL
comfort as he supported the logic of the appeal, albeit the note was prepared
over a short period of time and contained a number of qualifications. On the
basis that POL had three concerns about the judgment: (a) interpretation, (b)
procedural unfairness, and (c) bias, Lord Neuberger expressed support for
POL’s case on all three and concluded that “there are reasonable grounds for
PO to bring an application to recuse the Judge in these proceedings.
Furthermore, if it is PO’s intention to bring an appeal on the basis of the
‘unfairness issues’ (as I understand to be the case) - and on that appeal will
Page 183 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
asked the Court of Appeal to return the case to a different judge, then the PO
has little option but to seek to get the Judge to recuse himself at this stage.”
351. Following receipt of Lord Neuberger’s advice, I shared it with the Chairman, Mr
Cooper and Mr Cameron (acting CEO), under cover of an email dated 15 March
2019, summarising the conclusions, timing of next steps and risks, and
requested their guidance on shareholder consultation and Board process
(POL00023898).
352. We were aware that Lord Neuberger, as an ex-Judge, would not be able to
appear in any application for recusal, so POL instructed Lord Grabiner with a
view to him appearing in the recusal application. I had instructed Lord Grabiner
in a matter some years before (prior to joining POL) and believed he would
provide a robust view of the options.
353. On 18 March 2019 a conference took place between Lord Grabiner, Mr
Cavender, Mr Cohen, Tom Beezer of Bond Dickinson and myself (a note of the
conference is at POL00006792). My recollection is that, due to diary clashes,
Lord Grabiner could not attend the Board meeting on 18 March 2019 which
Lord Neuberger dialed in to. Accordingly, a separate conference was arranged
with Lord Grabiner.
354. The Inquiry has provided me with a copy of the note of the conference drafted
by Mr Beezer (a litigation partner at Bond Dickinson) (POL00006792) which
states that Lord Grabiner advised on (i) procedural structure, (ii) urgency, (iii)
Page 184 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
duty to act and (iv) prospects. Lord Grabiner’s advice as set out in the note was
robust and was supportive of Lord Neuberger’s initial advice. Lord Grabiner
went further in so far as the note records: “Recusal is therefore essential and...in
the face of legal advice from Lord Neuberger that recusal should be applied for
and the quantum of damages that Post Office will pay out on a loss, then it was
Lord Grabiner's view that there was a duty on Post Office to seek recusal. Lord
Grabiner stated that in his view the Board of Post Office had no option but to
seek recusal.”
355. I relied upon Lord Grabiner’s advice and his particularly strong view gave me
further comfort that, while recusal applications were not common, they were not
unknown, and therefore in the circumstances, making an application for Mr
Justice Fraser to recuse himself was an appropriate course of action to
recommend to POL’s Board.
356. Mr Breezer and I each took a note of the conference with Lord Grabiner and
subsequently combined our notes into a summary of the advice given, which
Mr Breezer then sent back to Lord Grabiner to have settled. The Inquiry has
asked me about Mr Breezer’s comment in his email on 20 March 2019 that “/
have sought to make the note a more “normal” note of a con but some very
strident comments were made by Lord Grabiner (in your favour)”
(POL00022883). I do not now recall the specific language that Mr Breezer
referred to as ‘strident’, however I recall that Lord Grabiner made a number of
statements that were highly critical of Mr Justice Fraser’s decision and these
statements were expressed in even stronger language than is contained in the
note of the conference. As mentioned above, I had previously instructed Lord
Page 185 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Grabiner in a previous role (not at POL) and was aware that he could give very
robust assessments of a case’s prospects.
357. A Board meeting was held later in the afternoon on 18 March 2019, and was
attended by Lord Neuberger by telephone, dialing in from South America
(POL00027594). I recall that I gave the Board a short summary of (i) the
Common Issues judgment and the criticisms levied by Mr Justice Fraser and
(ii) the immediate consequences of those. I outlined the possible actions which
POL could take (appeal, recusal etc.) and I then handed over to Lord
Neuberger, and he outlined his views which were consistent with the views he
had expressed in his written note. The Board were able to, and did, ask
questions. In due course, Lord Neuberger left the call and the Board discussed
the position and the advice they had received. The Board requested that Mr
Cameron and I set out our views of the best possible scenarios and circulate
those ahead of the Board meeting on 20 March 2019, where the Board would
ideally make a decision about the recusal application.
358. A further Board meeting was held on 20 March 2019, the signed minutes for
which are at POL00021563. Those minutes record that Norton Rose (Glen Hall
and Ruth Cowley) were present at the meeting. POL had recently completed a
procurement process in relation to the legal panel, and Norton Rose had been
selected as a panel member through that process. Given that they had no prior
involvement with the Sparrow or Horizon issues, I requested Norton Rose to
attend the Board meeting so as to be able to provide advice to the Board
independent of the existing legal team, noting that at this point we had views
Page 186 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
from four KCs (Messrs de Garr Robinson and Callendar, and Lords Neuberger
and Grabiner) recommending that we apply to Mr Justice Fraser to recuse
himself on the basis of apparent bias.
359. The minutes record the briefing that was presented to the Board (based on the
paper prepared by Mr Cameron and myself and which is set out at
POL00103473), and a separate paper prepared by Bond Dickinson and the
Counsel team (a draft version of which is set out at POL00022970) which had
been circulated previously. The minutes also demonstrate the lengthy
discussion among the directors.
360. Mr Franklin and Ms Vennells did not attend the Board meeting. Prior to the
meeting, Mr Franklin had provided his views in writing to me and to Mr McCall
— he believed that the application for recusal should be made and leave to
appeal should be sought. Mr Parker (as Chair) attended and took part in the
discussion, although he recused himself from the actual decision on the basis
that he was also the Chair of the Courts & Tribunals Board. Mr Cooper also
attended and took part in the discussion, however he also recused himself from
the actual decision as he was the Government-appointed director.
361. As recorded in the minutes of the meeting, the factors the Board considered as
part of their lengthy consideration, prior to making the decision included:
(a) I POL could not be sure of succeeding with the recusal application, but it
could still manage the narrative on what POL wanted to do with the
business even if it lost the recusal application;
Page 187 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
(b) the strength of the legal advice and possible upsides of success tipped
the balance in favour of recusal;
(c) the Judge’s views and the reputational damage caused by his views
pushed POL towards seeking recusal and leave to appeal;
(d) the Horizon trial could be damaging and pose a risk to the business if it
continued to be heard by the current Judge;
(e) the only argument of force against recusal was the near-term
reputational impact if POL lost and the risk of alienating the Judge, but
the Judge’s views were already pronounced and losing the recusal
application could either embolden him further or make him more alter to
charges of bias;
(f) the case had not gathered significant attention so far; and
(g) POL needed to take action in the long-term best interests of the
business.
362. In my opinion the Directors present took the matter seriously and were very
aware that an application to a judge to recuse himself for apparent bias was
uncommon and must be considered very carefully. Following the discussion,
each Director present and participating in the decision confirmed that they
supported the resolution (i) that an application should be sought for the Judge
to recuse himself and, should he elect not to do so, an application should be
Page 188 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
submitted to the Court of Appeal, and (ii) to seek leave to appeal the Common
Issues judgment.
363. I believe that there was a further call with Lord Grabiner on 20 March 2019
which certain Board members attended. However, other than a passing
reference in the minutes of the Board meeting held later that day
(POL00021563), I have not been provided with any records of this meeting.
364. I have been asked to comment on the extent of UKGI's involvement in the
decision to issue the recusal application. There was a briefing call with the then
Minister, Kelly Tolhurst, on Saturday 16 March 2019. As per the note of the
discussion produced by UKGI officials following the call (UKGI00017593), while
there was a discussion about the recusal application itself, the Minister's
positioning was that she and UKGI wanted to be kept informed, but would not
be providing direction to POL and that it was a matter for the POL Board.
Richard Watson, the General Counsel of UKGI, asked that I keep him informed
on developments. As set out above, Mr Cooper recused himself from the actual
Board decision, although he attended the Board meeting on 20 March 2019 and
participated in the discussion.
My resignation
365. On Monday 15 April 2019 I was advised by Mr Cameron, the acting CEO, that
the Board wished to take a different strategy with regards to the Group Litigation
and that Herbert Smith Freehills (‘HSF”) would be appointed to oversee and
have accountability for the Group Litigation process to replace both me and
Page 189 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Bond Dickinson. On that basis, we agreed that I would leave POL and the terms
of my exit were agreed. I continued to work in the office until the end of April,
and thereafter was available from home until termination of my employment at
the end of May 2019 should my assistance be required for handovers. I assisted
in the handover to HSF in the week following this conversation. The Inquiry has
asked me why I did not attend the Litigation Sub-Committee meeting on 24 April
2019. While I helped prepare the papers that were submitted to the Litigation
Sub-Committee at its meeting on 24 April 2019, I did not feel it was appropriate
for me to attend, given HSF had been appointed and were responsible for the
strategy from that point on.
Reflections and observations
366. At the time I started at POL, the focus was on (a) the Scheme and (b) the
finalisation of the Second Sight work which was nearing completion. While
Second Sight had referenced Horizon in a number of their findings, their
conclusion that they had not found evidence of system wide (systemic)
problems with Horizon software (POL00099063_0008) had not addressed the
concerns of the affected SPMs, and there was clearly concern among the SPM
community (as represented by the JFSA) and stakeholders such as MPs and
Lord Arbuthnot, as to the robustness of Horizon. With the benefit of hindsight, I
think that setting up a jointly instructed independent forensic review of Horizon
in 2015 and ensuring that the recommendations from the Zebra Report, and
Cartwright King’s questions of 27 March 2015, (POL00315631) were
addressed, under the aegis of a steering committee representing the range of
Page 190 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
stakeholders, may have addressed those concerns in relation to the robustness
of Horizon. If that had been done, the focus could then have been on POL’s
operational practices and whether those remained fit for purpose in context of
a modern retail operation. To that end, I should have considered this and
advocated for it at the time, and regret not having done so. Had POL done that
under the aegis of a representative oversight committee, it would have:
(a) provided a better basis for consideration as to the safety of previous
convictions based on Horizon evidence;
(b) provided greater comfort to stakeholders such as MPs, journalists and
SPMs; and
(c) probably avoided a significant part of the ensuing litigation, and resulted
in earlier resolution of the issues currently being considered by the
Inquiry.
367. Sir Jonathan's advice of 8 February 2016 (POL00006355) contained a number
of recommendations and action points. While certain of these were
appropriately addressed at the time, I should have ensured that the Project
Bramble work was completed and reviewed by Mr Altman in a timely manner,
so as to determine whether there were any findings from those reviews that
required disclosure to convicted SPMs, and if so, ensuring that such disclosure
was made promptly. I regret not having ensured this happened given the
ongoing distress of convicted SPMs and their families, and for whom early
resolution of these issues would have been of considerable benefit.
Page 191 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
368. In relation to the conduct of the Group Litigation, as stated above at paragraph
321, POL has been criticised for its ‘aggressive’ defence of the Group Litigation.
The Group Litigation was brought in a judicial framework that is, by definition,
adversarial and as Defendant, POL's role was to respond to allegations made
by the Claimants. While the Claimants clearly wanted financial recompense for
the losses they believe they had suffered, litigation is not necessarily the best
way to get to the truth of what happened in the case of each individual Claimant.
POL saw the Common Issues and Horizon trials as the starting point to (a)
understand the concerns about the contractual construct between POL and
each SPM, and (b) answer the question as to whether Horizon was robust and
if it was the likely cause of losses in branch. However, the Group Litigation
plainly did not answer all the questions that the Claimant community, and
others, were asking, and did not result in the outcomes that the Claimant
community hoped for. Had an enquiry of the type I refer to in paragraph 366
above been commissioned, this may have accelerated the outcomes for those
Claimants, and I regret that POL and my decisions in relation to the Group
Litigation prolonged resolution of these issues and thereby extended the
distress of convicted SPMs.
369. I understand that, following the Group Litigation and partly through the work of
the Inquiry, additional information has been disclosed by POL both to the Inquiry
and in other Court processes, which was not known or provided during the
Group Litigation. I do not know why information that was in existence when I
was at POL was not discovered at the time, and I regret that POL’s disclosure
Page 192 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
in the Group Litigation was incomplete, although I was not aware of this at the
time. At no time did I participate in any discussions to withhold information that
should properly have been disclosed, nor did I see any evidence that anyone
within POL was actively seeking to withhold evidence, or that there was any
conspiracy to do so.
370. POL’s strategy at the time I joined was very focussed on revenue growth and
cost reduction, which was mandated by Government. POL was funded by
Government and I believe made its first operating profit in 2017, although I have
not reviewed POL’s accounts to confirm if this is accurate. POL’s 3-year
strategic plans were approved by BEIS and these operated in parallel with the
3-year funding agreements. These strategic plans reflected the Government's
objective for POL to become profitable, and less dependent on Government
funding. Cost reduction was therefore an important component of the strategic
plan. Government funding at the time was largely (but not wholly) directed to
changing the branch network operating model through the ‘Branch
Transformation’ project, led by Mr Gilliland, while continuing to meet the
Government's requirements as to the minimum number of branches (11,500)
and the associated requirements of geographic spread. Cost reductions, some
of which resulted in the loss of staff members, contributed to a loss of legacy
knowledge within POL, greatly impacting the ‘corporate memory’, which may
have contributed to the issues associated with locating relevant materials.
371. There was a wider issue however about the maturity of POL as a corporate
entity. While the legal entity had been in existence since 1987, there were
Page 193 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
several functions that had been centrally provided by Royal Mail. In fact, POL
was described to me very early on in my tenure as a ‘300 year old start up’ as,
following separation in 2012, a number of functions and associated frameworks
had to be re-created for POL including (but not limited to) governance structures
and risk management frameworks. While a Board governance framework had
been established that referenced accepted good practice, there were many
other areas that still required significant work when I arrived. For example, POL
had not developed any POL-specific risk policies and continued to use those
from Royal Mail.
372. Additionally, there was significant work to be done to define, develop and
embed a Post Office culture. One area where we tried to progress matters as
part of the Transformation project was to look at the accountability frameworks
across POL’s business as described in paragraph 95. This work was used to
frame a discussion with the Group Executive around accountability — a concept
well embedded in Financial Services institutions, but unfamiliar to several POL
executives. This concept was challenging for many executives in part because
POL’s control framework was also immature. Given that cost reduction and
financial stability was the Government mandated priority, the development of a
risk aware culture, and the embedding of risk and control frameworks — together
with the appropriate assurance functions — was not a high priority at this time.
While this was not the cause of prosecutions of SPMs and the associated
behaviours that have been considered by the Inquiry, the lack of clear
accountability and the absence of a ‘top down’ risk culture meant that in many
cases there was no Clear cultural guidance as to what was expected of POL’s
Page 194 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
employees at an operational level in terms of expected behaviours or upwards
reporting. This immature risk framework was identified by Deloitte in the Zebra
Report which I have now read for the purposes of the Inquiry. POL’s oversight
framework in relation to Fujitsu and Horizon was not sufficient, and ownership
of IT systems and the contractual relationship with Fujitsu as supplier and
operator, was seen as an IT function, rather than as a key enabler for the
effective operation of the retail network. While various executives (including
me) were brought in to support the development of a risk framework, the ‘3 lines
of defence’ model was not consistently understood and supported at a ‘line 1’
management level among the executive team. Cost pressures meant that there
was insufficient funding to develop and embed the necessary risk aware culture
and embed appropriate and proportionate risk and control, and assurance
frameworks. Had POL done so, the risks inherent in Horizon may have been
better understood and managed, which again would have addressed a number
of the concerns of the various stakeholders.
373. I am acutely aware of the difficulties and challenges that many former SPMs
have faced over the last 20 years and I hope that the Inquiry’s findings will
provide them with the explanations they deserve. Had there been a wider
enquiry into Horizon from 2015, and greater focus on implementation of the
various recommendations from the Zebra Report, the Cartwright King advice of
March 2015, completion of the Bramble reviews, and the review by Mr Altman
of all the associated findings, the resolution of many of the issues now being
faced by the Inquiry may have been addressed much earlier, which would have
materially benefitted both the Claimants in the Group Litigation and many of the
Page 195 of 211
WITN10010100
WITW10010100_
other SPMs whose issues are being considered by the Inquiry. I am sorry that
the recommendations were not implemented in a timely way and for the
extended uncertainty that this created for SPMs.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: 30 April 2024
Page 196 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
Index to First Witness Statement of Jane Elizabeth MacLeod
No. I URN Document Description Control Number
1. WITN10010101 I Post Office General Counsel role WITN10010101
profile (2015)
2. WITN10010102 I POL Organogram WITN10010102
3. POL00006574 I Sparrow sub-Committee Minutes 18 I POL-0017848
Feb 2015
4. POL00030888 I Post Office Board Agenda, Briefings I POL-0027370
and Policy Reports for the PO Board
to consider 24/05/2016
5. POL00027594 I POLTD Board Meeting - Minutes of a I POL-0024235
call of the Board of Directors of
POLTD 02/07/2019
6. WITN10010103 I Post Office Limited: Shareholder WITN10010103
Relationship Framework Document
dated March 2020
7. POL00021445 Audit, Risk and Compliance POL-0018075
Committee meeting Minutes of
27/03/2018
8. POL00021446 Post Office Limited Audit, Risk and POL-0018076
Compliance Committee Minutes of
28/06/2018
9. POL00021553 Meeting minutes: minutes of board POLO000086
meeting held on 29th January 2018
10. I POL00021552 Meeting Minutes: minutes of Board POL0000085
meeting held on 23rd November 2017
11. I POLO0021559 Meeting minutes: minutes of Board POL0000094
meeting held on 29th January 2019.
12. IPOLO0021441 I Post Office Limited ARC Committee I POL-0018071
Meeting Minutes 29/01/2018
13. I POL00026719 Post Office, Minutes of a meeting of POL-0023360
the Audit, Risk and Compliance
Committee 25/03/2015
Page 197 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
14.
POL00110129
Post Office, Risk and Compliance
Committee Meeting 07/09/2015
POL-0108010
15,
POL00026719
Post Office, Minutes of a meeting of
the Audit, Risk and Compliance
Committee 25/03/2015
POL-0023360
16.
POL00040911
Post Office Ltd - Project Sparrow Sub
Committee Update and options
03/02/2015
POL-0037393
17.
POL00158191
Project Sparrow: Options Paper for
internal discussion 27/01/2015
POL-0146506
18.
POL00102254
Post Office LTD Board Project
Sparrow - Update and Options
Report, 2015
POL-0101837
19.
POL00027279
Post Office Limited - Minutes of board
meeting from 25/03/2015
POL-0023920
20.
POL00132956
Email chain from Chris Aujard to
Mark R Davies and cc'ing Jane
MacLeod re: Urgent - Sparrow -
responsibility for the immediate next
steps 12/02/2015
POL-0136328
21.
POL00023833
Post Office Mediation Scheme -Draft
Second Sight - Case Review for
Timothy John Burgess
Report 08/02/2015
POL-0020312
22.
POL00002503
Letter from Jane MacLeod to lan
Henderson & Ron Warmington re:
Initial Complaint Review
and Mediation Scheme 24/02/2015
VIS00003517
23.
POL00023832
Note on Second Sight
investigations/findings by Simon
Clarke 16/02/2015
POL-0020311
24.
POL00063428
Susan Rudkin case study: File Note
of meeting between POL and Second
Sight 4/3/2015 at 1pm
POL-0059907
25.
POL00153527
Email from Melanie Corfield to Mark
R Davies, Jane MacLeod, Angela
Van Den Bogerd and
others, Re: CWU and alleged Horizon
error 10/11/2015
POL-BSFF-0012639
Page 198 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
26.
POL00022598
Horizon Data Lepton SPSO 191320
by Helen Rose (v.1 draft) 12/06/2013
POL-0019077
27
POL00099063
Signed Interim Report into alleged
problems with the Horizon system
08/07/2013
POL-0098646
28.
POL00004439
Initial Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme - Briefing Report -
Part One - Prepared by
Second Sight 25/07/2014
VISO0005507
29.
POL00022150
Initial Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme - Mediation
Briefing Report: Draft V2 30/07/2014
POL-0018629
30.
POL00028062
Report: Horizon Desktop Review of
Assurance Sources and Key Control
Features - draft for
discussion, Deloitte 23/05/2014
POL-0023065
31.
POL00022597
Email from Rodric Williams to Jane
MacLeod, Gavin Matthews, Harry
Boweyer and others re
CCRC S17 requests for sub-
postmaster applications 31/03/2015
POL-0019076
32.
POL00151754
Letter from Rodric Williams (Post
Office Limited) to Frazer Stuart
(CCRC) RE: Horizon -
Requirement to Produce Materials
POL-BSFF-0010866
33.
POL00025781
Email from Gavin Matthews to Jane
Macleoad cc: Rodric Williams re:
CCRC Letter - Altman
Report 16/02/2015
POL-0022260
34.
POL00123890
Email from Rodric Williams to Jane
MacLeod, Patrick Bourke and Mark
Underwood, RE:
"Sparrow Update - CCRC and Brian
Altman QC" 05/04/2016
POL-0127590
35.
POL00006355
Review on behalf of the Chairman of
Post Office Ltd concerning the steps
taken in response to
various complaints made by sub-
postmasters 08/02/2016
POL-0017623
Page 199 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
36.
POL00315631
Note: Deloitte Report - Question for
POL by Cartwright King Solicitors
27/03/2015
POL-BSFF-0153681
37.
POL00315630
Email from Jessica Madron To: Jane
MacLeod re FW: Deloitte's report -
confidential 29/04/2015
POL-BSFF-0153680
38.
POL00151181
Letter from Jane Macleod to Frazer
Stuart re: Criminal Cases Review
Commission ("Commission") Horizon
Computer System - Requirements to
Produce Materials 11/02/2015
POL-BSFF-0010293
39.
POL00151293
Letter from CCRC to Jane MacLeod
on 12 February 2015
POL-BSFF-0010405
40.
POL00114301
Letter from Jane Howard to Mr Frazer
Stuart re Criminal Cases Review
Commission, Horizon
Computer System - Requirement to
Produce Materials 27/02/2015
POL-0113228
41.
POL00151297
Email from Gavin Matthews to Rodric
Williams - Re: FW: Draft letter to
CCRC 26/02/2015
POL-BSFF-0010409
42.
POL00063501
Hughie Thomas case study: Letter
from Gregg Cooke to Jane MacLeod
RE: Mr Hughie Thomas'
application to the Criminal Cases
Review Commission 18/03/2015
POL-0059980
43.
POL00063503
Julian Wilson Case Study: Letter to
Jane MacLeod RE: Requirement to
produce materials for
case review 18/03/2015
POL-0059982
44.
POL00063513
Letter from Vandana Mehra-Johal to
Jane MacLeod re: Requirement to
Produce Materials - Post
Office/Horizon Computer System
18/03/2015
POL-0059992
45.
POLO0065654
Letter from M Pickering to Jane
Macleod re: Mrs Josephine Hamilton
- Requirement to Produce
Materials 18/03/2015
POL-0062133
Page 200 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
46.
POL00118556
Letter from Vandana Menra-Johal
CCRC to Ms Jane MacLeaod RE:
Mrs Gail Ward - Requirement
to Produce Materials - Post
Office/Horizon Computer System Ref
- 00358/2015 18/03/2015
POL-0118475
47.
POL00118558
Letter from Gregg Cooke to Jane
MacLeod Re Kanagasundaram
Prince - Requirement to
Produce Materials for CCRC
18/03/2015
POL-0118477
48.
POL00118559
Letter from M Pickering to Jane
McLeod Re Tracy Banks
Requirement to Produce Materials for
CCRC 18/03/2015
POL-0118478
49.
POL00118560
Letter from Vandana Mehra-Johal to
Jane MacLeod re: Janet Skinner
Requirement to Produce
Materials for CCRC 18/03/2015
POL-0118479
50.
POL00118563
Letter from Jane MacLeod to Gregg
Cooke Re Stanley Fell Requirement
to Produce Materials for
CCRC 19/03/2015
POL-0118482
51.
POL00118570
Letter from Frazer Stuart to Jane
MacLeod re: CCRC and requirement
to produce and preserve
Materials 19/03/2015
POL-0118489
52.
POL00118550
Letter from M Pickering to Jane
McDonald Re Requirement to
Produce Materials for CCRC
20/03/2015
POL-0118469
53.
POL00118569
Letter from M Pickering to Jane
MacLeod Re: Mrs Alison Henderson,
Requirement to Produce
Materials 23/03/2015
POL-0118488
54.
POL00323854
Letter to Jane MacLeod (POL) from
Gregg Cooke (CCRC) RE: Khayyam
Ishaq Requirement to
produce materials 27/03/2015
POL-0172308
Page 201 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
55.
POL00091220
Letter from Miss Pickering to Ms Jane
MacLeod and Mr Williams re :
Requirement to Produce
Materials 26/03/2015
POL-0090864
56.
POL00162706
Criminal Cases Review Commission -
letter to Ms Macleod/Mr Williams from
M Pickering (Miss) 08/04/2015
POL-0150210
57.
POLO0065652
Seema Misra case study: Letter from
Criminal Cases review Commission
to Jane Macleod/Rodric
Williams for Seema Misra, re:
Requirement to Produce Materials.
Formal notice is addressed to
Paula Vennels as ‘appropriate
person’ 10/04/2015
POL-0062131
58.
POL00066947
CCRC Letter from Gregg Cooke to
Ms MacLeod/Mr Williams, RE: Mrs
Oyeteju Adedayo
Requirement to Produce Materials
06/05/2015
POL-0063426
59.
POL00151662
Email from Rodric Williams (POL) to
Jane MacLeod (POL) cc Jessica
Madron (RMG), Belinda
Crowe and others re Horizon - CCRC
involvement 18/03/2015
POL-BSFF-0010774
60.
POL00110243
Draft Speaking Note For Post Office
Meeting With Criminal Cases Review
Commission 08/05/2015
POL-0108064
61.
POL00125594
Email from Chris Aujard to Jane
MacLeod, cc to Belinda Crowe,
Rodric Williams and others Re:
Sparrow - Independent Horizon
Assessment 02/03/2015
POL-0131264
62.
POL00104216
Email chain Jonathan Swift to Jane
MacLeod re: Draft terms of reference
13/10/2015
POL-0103799
63.
POL00021538
Meeting Minutes: minutes of Board
meeting held on 22nd September
2015 22/09/2015
POLO000071
64.
POL00027219
Post Office Limited minutes of a
board meeting held 24/05/2016
POL-0023860
Page 202 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
65.
POL00027188
Post Office Minutes: Meeting of the
Board held at 12:30pm on 28/3/2017
POL-0023829
66
POL00027 182
Meeting Minutes: Post Office Ltd -
Group Executive Meeting 13th July
2017
POL-0023823
67.
POL00022529
Letter from Jane MacLeod to lan
Henderson re draft of Second Sight's
Brief Report - Part 2 18/03/2015
POL-0019008
68.
POL00024087
Email thread between Julie Geroge,
Jane MacLeod, Lesley J Sewell and
others re: Cygwin
remote access 21/07/2015
POL-0020566
69.
POL00102431
Email from Alisdair Cameron to Jane
MacLeod and Paul Vennells, Re:
Sparrow 03/08/2015
POL-0102014
70.
POL00162554
Email from Jane MacLeod to Mark R
Davies RE: Sparrow 01/08/2015
POL-0150957
71.
POL00065477
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Alisadair Cameron, Paula Vennells
and others re Sparrow and
meeting with BIS 03/08/2015
POL-0061956
72.
POL00229353
Email rom Rodric Williams to Patrick
Bourke, Mark Underwood, Melanie
Corfield and others RE: Horizon /
Panorama - Join Up Session -
SUBJECT TO PRIVILEGE - DO NOT
FORWARD - Panorama
Letter (2) 02/06/2015
POL-BSFF-0067416
73.
POL00229354
Draft letter from POL to BBC re:
Panorama 02/06/2015
POL-BSFF-0067417
74.
POL00230790
Draft letter from POL to Karen
Wightman re: Panorama 04/08/2016
POL-BSFF-0068853
75.
POL00230791
Draft Statement for Panorama
04/04/2015
POL-BSFF-0068854
76.
POL00139193
Letter from BBC to POL re:
Panorama 19/10/2015
POL-BSFF-0001402
Page 203 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
77.
WITN10010104
Letter from Baroness Neville-Rolfe to
Tim Parker dated 10 September 2015
78.
POL00102550
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker, Mark R Davies and Paula
Vennells re: Letter from
Baroness Neville-Rolfe 14/09/2015
POL-0102133
79.
POLO0065606
Email from Patrick Bourke to Rodric
Williams and Jane MacLeod re Draft
Speaking Notes for
meeting with Tim Parker - Complaint
Review 24/09/2015
POL-0062085
80.
POL00027126
Email from Jane Macleod to Paula
Vennells RE FW Project sparrow
01/10/2015
POL-0023767
81.
POL00156617
Instructions to Jonathan Swift QC to
Advise in Consultation on 8 October
2015 06/10/2015
POL-0145682
82.
POL00102614
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker; re: Sparrow - Meeting with
Jonathan Swift QC 16/10/2025
POL-0102197
83.
POL00130961
Answers to the Questions posed in
the Draft ToRs 16/10/2015
POL-0120805
84.
POL00162692
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Jonathan Swift, cc'ing Rodric
Williams, Patrick Bourke and another
re: Post Office - response to
questions 6 & 7 of ToR 15/10/2015
POL-0151082
85.
POL00162693
POL answers to JSQC Questions 6
and 7 15/10/2015
POL-0151083
86.
POL00102616
Email from Jane MacLeod to Patrick
Bourke, Rodric Williams and Mark
Underwood re: Sparrow
- download from my meeting with Tim
Parker and Jonathan Swift
21/10/2015
POL-0102199
87.
POL00102604
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Jonathan Swift, Mark Underwood and
others re: Post Office: note
to accompany the updated and
attached chronology 14/10/2015
POL-0102187
Page 204 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
88.
POL00102638
Email from Patrick Bourke to Melanie
Corfield cc: Mark Underwood re: FW:
Post Office Matter 28/10/2015
POL-0102221
89.
POL00102649
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker re: Post Office - Investigation
update 31/10/2015
POL-0102232
90.
POL00131715
Draft Letter from Tim Parker to
Baroness Neville Rolfe 24/02/2016
POL-0121501
91.
POL00103136
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker; re: Post Office - Chairman's
Enquiry 01/03/2016
POL-0102719
92.
POL00153696
Email chain from Rodric Williams to
Jane MacLeod,Mark R Davies also
cc'ed -Patrick Bourke,
Melanie Corfield, Mark Underwood
and others Re: Group Litigation
20/11/2015
POL-BSFF-0012808
93.
POL00112884
Review of Post Office Limited
Criminal Prosecutions report written
by Brian Altman QC 2016 26/07/2016
POL-0111598
94.
POL00103112
Email from Mark Underwood to
Jonathan Swift, Christopher Knight
and others re: Action points
from the call held on 22 January 2016
04/02/2016
POL-0102695
95.
WITN10010105
Email exchange between Tom
Cooper and members of UKGI on 26
to 27 August 2020
WITN10010105
96.
WITN10010106
Email exchange between Tom
Cooper and members of UKGI on 16
September 2020
WITN10010106
97.
POL00027116
Email from Tom Wechsler to Paula
Vennells re TP/BNR - Phone call with
BIS which included
discussion about Sparrow 26/01/2016
POL-0023757
98.
POL00103192
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker, RE: PO- Chairman's review
Confidential and legally
Privileged 16/05/2016
POL-0102775
Page 205 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
99.
POL00103134
Email from Jonathan Swift to Mark
Underwood, Christopher Knight, Jane
MacLeod and others; re: A letter
drafted for Tim Parker to send to the
Minister, briefing her on the outcome
of your
enquiry to date 24/02/2016
POL-0102717
100.
POL00024913
Letter sent from Tim Parker to
Baroness Neville - Rolfe re :Post
Office Handling of complaints
made by Sub -Postmasters review
04/03/2016
POL-0021392
101.
POL00103137
Draft Letter To BNR — Project
Sparrow V2 29/02/2016
POL-0102720
102.
POL00110246
Speaking Note For Post Office
Meeting With Criminal Cases Review
Commission 06/11/2015
POL-0108066
103.
POL00153483
Email from Jane MacLeod to Patrick
Bourke, Rodric Williams and Mark
Underwood1 Re:
Computer weekly 04/11/2015
POL-BSFF-0012595
104.
POL00022754
Email from Andrew Parsons, Bond
Dickinson, to Rodric Williams, Jane
MacLeod, Patrick Bourke
and others: RE: Report of Brian
Altman QC - subject to litigation
privilege 26/07/2016
POL-0019233
105.
POL00153884
Email chain from Jane MacLeod to
Patrick Bourke, Rodric Williams, Mark
Underwood1 and
others Re: Sparrow 05/02/2016
POL-BSFF-0012994
106.
POL00029984
POL Sparrow - Interim Report: Draft
for Discussion 08/07/2016
POL-0026466
107.
POL00030009
Deloitte Draft "Bramble" - Interim
Report 27/07/2016
POL-0026491
108.
POL00031502
‘Bramble’ — Draft Report 31/10/2016
POL-0028404
109.
POL00041491
Deloitte - Bramble - Draft Report
01/09/2017
POL-0037973
Page 206 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
110.
POL00028070
Deloitte's 'Bramble' Draft Report
03/10/2017
POL-0023073
111.
POL00029097
Deloitte's draft 'Bramble' Report
15/12/2017
POL-0025579
112.
POL00028928
POL00028928 19/01/2018
POL-0025410
113.
POL00168551
Email from Jane MacLeod to Rodric
Williams, Patrick Bourke, Mark
Underwood RE: Chairman's
Review 10/06/2016
POL-0163848
114.
POL00029990
Email from Andrew Parsons to Jane
MacLeod and Rodric Williams and
Patrick Bourke Re:
Deloitte Preliminary Report
13/07/2016
POL-0026472
115.
POL00041258
Email from Jane MacLeod to Paula
Vennells re. Postmaster Litigation -
Confidential and Subject
to Legal Privilege 25/07/2015
POL-0037740
116.
POL00103201
Email from Paula Vennells to Avene
Regan, RE: Fwd: Sparrow Board
Paper- Request for advice
subject to legal professional privilege
23/05/2016
POL-0102784
117.
POLO00110482
Email from Jane MacLeod to Rob
Houghton. CC'd - Rodric Williams RE:
wording of Letter of
Response 26/07/2016
POL-0108217
118.
POL00023487
Email chain from Jane MacLeod to
Andrew Parsons and others re: Draft
Letter of Response 18/07/2016
POL-0019966
119.
POL00103212
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker, RE: Chairman's review
27/05/2016
POL-0102795
120.
POL00027279
Post Office Limited - Minutes of board
meeting from 25/03/2015
POL-0023920
121.
POL00041486
Post Office Board - Postmaster
Litigation: Confidential and Subject to
Legal Professional Privilege
POL-0037968
Page 207 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
122.
POL00021550
Meeting minutes: minutes of Board
meeting held on 26th September
2017 26/09/2017
POLO000083
123.
POL00021555
Meeting Minutes: minutes of meeting
held on 24th May 2018
POLO000088
124.
POL00021556
Meeting minutes: minutes of Board
meeting held on 31st July 2018
POLO000089
125.
POL00090612
Postmaster Litigation Update report
(Executive Summary)
POL-0090133
126.
POL00021557
Meeting minutes: minutes for Board
meeting held on 25th September
2018
POLO000090
127.
POL00021561
Meeting minutes: minutes of Board
meeting held on 29th January 2019
POLO000094
128.
POL00103473
Post Office Limited The Board of
Directors Discussion Paper - The
Background to Recusal and
other issues 20/03/2019
POL-0103056
129.
POL00021563
Post Office Ltd Board Minutes of
20/03/2019
POLO000096
130.
POL00025508
Agenda for Postmaster Litigation
Steering Group Meeting on 7 June
2016
POL-0021987
131.
POL00025509
Draft Postmaster Litigation Steering
Group Meeting Terms of Reference
and Membership 01/06/2016
POL-0021988
132.
POL00117892
POL00117892 29/01/2018
POL-0115392
133.
POL00117704
PO Group Executive - Postmaster
Litigation - Executive Summary (Jane
MacLeod / Rodric
Williams 16/05/2016
POL-0118337
134.
UKGI00007924
Information Sharing Protocol - Group
Litigation
UKGI018737-001
135.
UKGI00008014
Email trail between POL and UKGI
re: info sharing protocol 15/05/2018
UKGI018826-001
Page 208 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
136.
POL00006754
Meeting Minutes of the Postmaster
Litigation Subcommittee of POL
15/05/2018
POL-0018012
137.
POL00025512
Womble Bond Dickinson Disclosure
of Documents in Litigation Report
01/12/2014
POL-0021991
138.
POL00025507
Email from Rodric Williams to POL
employees re Postmaster Litigation
Steering Group Meeting
on 7 June 2016
POL-0021986
139.
POL00117755
Email from Patrick Bourke to Andrew
Parsons, Amy Prime and Rodric
Williams RE: PLSG meeting on
Wednesday 24 May 2017 @ 12 in
Tonbridge (1.11)
POL-0114692
140.
POL00022664
Email from Jane MacLeod to Alisdair
Cameron, Rob Houghton and others
RE: Sparrow update
CONFIDENTIAL AND SUBJECT TO
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
POL-0019143
141.
POL00041259
Email from Andrew Parsons to Jane
MacLeod and others, re Letter of
Response (Final Form)
POL-0037741
142.
POL00041260
Draft Letter of Response to Freeths
LLP from Bond Dickinson LLP re
Bates & Others v Post Office
Limited
POL-0037742
143.
POL00023434
Attached document from Jane
Macleod's email on 21/11/2016
Remote Access wording
POL-0019913
144.
POL00024989
Bond Dickinson's Report regarding
the Postmaster Group Action
POL-0021468
145.
POL00154151
Email from Mark Underwood to Jane
MacLeod re: PLSG Meeting on 24
May 2017 in Tonbridge
POL-BSFF-0013256
146.
POL00003340
Letter from Andrew Parsons to James
Hartley, re: Bates & Others -v- Post
Office Limited -
Generic Defence and Counterclaim
VIS00004354
Page 209 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
147.
POL00023014
Steering Group Paper - Peak
Disclosure
POL-0019493
148.
POL00000444
4th Witness Statement of Andrew
Paul Parsons (Womble Bond
Dickinson), Solicitor to POL
VIS00001458
149.
POL00006523
Email from Jane MacLeod: Subject 'In
strict confidence: briefing to fact-
check’
POL-0017828
150.
POL00006524
Horizon litigation: facts of the case for
BEIS Permanent Secretary
POL-0017829
151.
POL00103355
Email from Jane MacLeod to Tim
Parker, Paula Vennells and Mark R
Davies re: RE: Postmaster
Litigation
POL-0102938
152.
UKGI00008549
Email from Ken McCall to Paula
Vennells, Carla Stent and others, CC
Tim Parker re Postmaster
Litigation
UKGI019357-001
153.
POL00021558
Post Office Ltd Board Minutes dated
30/10/2018
POLO000091
154.
POL00041955
Email from Angela van den Bogerd to
Andrew Parsons and others re
Witness Statement in PO
Group Litigation
POL-0038437
155.
POL00041986
Email from Rodric Williams to Andrew
Parsons re Witness Statements in PO
Group Litigation
POL-0038468
156.
POL00023013
Email from Mark Underwood to Jane
Macleod, Angela Van-Den Bogerd,
Mark R. Davies and others, ccing
Aimee Daughters Re; Postmaster
Litigation Steering Group call
Tomorrow@ 14:30
POL-0019492
Page 210 of 211
WITN10010100
WITN10010100
157.
POL00042015
Email from Rodric Williams to Simon
Clarke, Martin Smith and Andrew
Parsons RE: Post Office
Group Litigation - Horizon Issues Trial
- Monday Con with Counsel - Strictly
Private &
Confidential
POL-0038497
158.
POL00006753
Meeting Minutes of the Group
Litigation Subcommittee of POL
POL-0018011
159.
UKGI00009149
Email chain with Ken McCall to Jane
MacLeod, Tim Parker, Carla Stent
and others - Re
Postmaster Litigation
UKGI019957-001
160.
POL00022970
WBD Bates & others v Post Office
Limited - Recusal Note
POL-0019449
161.
POL00023228
Bates and Others v Post Office
Limited Observations on recusal
application
POL-0019707
162.
POL00023898
Email chain from Jane MacLeod to
Tim Parker, Thomas Cooper, Tom
Beezer, Andrew Parsons
(ce Rodric Williams) RE: Litigation
options
POL-0020377
163.
POL00006792
Bates & Ors v POL: Note of
Conference with Grabiner QC of 18
March 2019
POL-0018039
164.
POL00022883
Email from Tom Beezer to Jane
Macleod ccing Andrew Parsons,
Rodric Williams and others, RE:
Post Office Litigation
POL-0019362
165.
UKGI00017593
Email from Mpst Tolhurst (BEIS) to
Tom Cooper (UKGI), Gavin Lambert
cc William Holloway and
others RE: POL discussion with SoS
and Kelly Tolhurst
UKGI027600-001
Page 211 of 211