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Witness Name: Joanne Swinson
Statement No.: WITN10190100
Dated: 19 June 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF JOANNE SWINSON
I, Joanne Swinson, formerly Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment
Relations, Consumer and Postal Affairs, will say as follows.
INTRODUCTION
1. I am currently Director of Partners for a New Economy, an international
philanthropic fund. I was a Liberal Democrat MP between 2005 and 2015, and
again between 2017 and 2019. I was deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats
between 2017 and 2019, and leader for the latter half of 2019. My background is
set out in greater detail in response to the Inquiry’s questions below.
2. I served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment Relations,
Consumer and Postal Affairs, and also as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Women and Equalities, from 6 September 2012 to 8 May 2015. These were
my first Ministerial roles, and it is events during this time which are relevant to the
Inquiry. I was on maternity leave between 18 December 2013 and 30 June 2014;
during this period my Ministerial roles were covered by Jenny Willott MP.
3. I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's request for evidence dated 14
May 2024 (‘the Rule 9 request”). I have prepared it with the support of the
Government Legal Department and counsel. I have depended on others putting
documents before me to assist with the chronology of events set out below, which
goes back almost 12 years. Unfortunately, some documents which would have
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been helpful in preparing this statement, such as the minutes of many meetings,
briefings notes as annotated with my handwritten comments, covering notes from
my private office and my Ministerial Diary, have not been located by the
Department for Business and Trade, but I have done my best to deal with the
issues raised by the Inquiry on the basis of what is available.
4. Before going into my detailed recollections of that time, I would like to express my
heartfelt sympathy for everyone who has been impacted by this horrendous
miscarriage of justice: all the subpostmasters affected, as well as their loved ones
on whom it also took a toll. I realise this Inquiry and the legal redress comes too
late for some of them, and that it will never be able to undo the damage done. I do
hope, however, that this Inquiry process will help in some ways, by determining
the truth of what happened, holding people to account, and crucially ensuring that
lessons are learned so this kind of scandal can never happen again. I am glad to
be able to play my part in contributing to this process and hope that my evidence
can be of assistance to the Inquiry.
5. My statement contains two sections. The first section is a chronological account,
based on a combination of the documents I have been provided with and my own
recollections and observations. In the second section, I respond to the specific
questions set out in the Rule 9 request in sequential order, adopting the same
numbering. At the end of that second section I set out some reflections about
what went wrong and some suggested lessons to be learned.
SECTION 1: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
Ministerial role and portfolio
6. On 6 September 2012, I was appointed to two Ministerial roles: Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Employment Relations, Consumer and Postal Affairs
in the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) and Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Women and Equalities in the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport (“DCMS”). As is evident from the titles of these roles, they
spanned a wide range of policy areas. Like all Ministers, I therefore relied a great
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deal on the civil servants in both BIS and DCMS, and particularly my private office,
to direct my attention to which issues needed my focus at any given time and to
give me a clear steer as to where a decision from me was needed.
My Ministerial briefs from September 2012 (covering Employment Relations,
Consumer and Postal Affairs as well as Women and Equalities) covered a very
wide range of issues. The demands on my time were many and varied: when I
started as Minister, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill was in Report
Stage, which was a time-consuming process for me as the sponsoring Minister,
requiring attention to detail on technical, legal matters in which I had no
background. I had to hit the ground running.
The issues on which I was focussed at the start of my time as a Minister were
primarily employment rights, which were a constant battle between the two parties
in the Government, consumer protection and the forthcoming equal marriage
legislation. I had about four days each week to spend on all these issues and
everything else in my portfolio, as the other three were spent in my constituency
in Scotland dealing with constituency matters.
Postal affairs were a small part of my overall responsibilities, and within postal
affairs, even once it became an issue I was aware of and to which my attention
was drawn, Horizon and subpostmaster complaints were only one part of a
number of pressing issues under the umbrella of postal affairs, including the
network transformation project to stabilise the post office network after years of
closures, increasing post office revenue through government services contracts,
and working towards the longer-term mutualisation of the post office. Issues
relating to Royal Mail, which included the significant work around its privatisation
and the initial public offering, were deal with by Michael Fallon MP, who was a
Minister of State in BIS.
. It may be helpful to provide some context as to how my Ministerial role worked in
practice. During any given day I would be at a wide range of meetings, events or
Parliamentary debates. Every evening, I would then receive a large set of formal
submissions, several written parliamentary questions (“PQs”), a stack of
correspondence and a diary pack with briefings for meetings and events the
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following day. Typically, I would receive 10 to 20 submissions which would say
whether they were ‘to note’ (i.e. for my information) or ‘to approve’ or ‘for decision’
(ie. requiring an action, decision or judgement from me). They would come with a
handwritten cover note from my private office directing me to particular parts of
the submission and on different coloured paper based on a ‘traffic light’ system
with the colours indicating whether something needed urgent attention (pink),
consideration within normal timescales (yellow) or to get to it as and when I could
(green). Usually there would also be some draft answers to approve in response
to written PQs from MPs.
11. The stack of correspondence received by BIS for my attention would be split into
two categories. The yellow folders contained ‘standard lines’. These were letters
on issues that were similar or identical to previous correspondence and I would
sign the letters based on pre-agreed wording. The orange folders contained
‘bespoke correspondence’. These draft replies would usually be clipped to the
front of the original letter for me to scan, potentially amend, and then sign.
Occasionally these would also contain a short briefing note to give background on
the issue. The vast majority of the correspondence I received was from MPs, as
the volume of general correspondence to the Department meant most of this
would receive a reply from a civil servant, rather than a Minister. Certain
organisations or individuals would also receive Ministerial replies, such as key
Departmental stakeholders. I would typically sign about 2,000 items of
correspondence in a year (WITN10190101, Written Statements, Cabinet Office,
Handling Member's Correspondence dated 13 May 2014).' Shortly after I became
a Minister I highlighted a problem with the quality of correspondence replies, as I
was routinely finding multiple typos or incomplete sentences within the letters. A
senior civil service official from the Permanent Secretary's office offered to review
the correspondence passed to me for signing for a week to assess the situation,
and after that agreed that the quality was not acceptable. I recall her explaining
that what I should be able to expect as a Minister was a letter that I could briefly
scan and then sign, not have to spend lots of time over reading every word.
‘This estimate is based on the figures available.
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12. My diary and paperwork were organised by my private office, which consisted of
a small number of BIS and DCMS officials. BIS and DCMS also had officials who
were subject matter experts in the various policy areas and who would draft the
advice/briefings/submissions ahead of key meetings, debates, Parliamentary
Questions and so on. For the purposes of the POL part of my postal affairs brief,
the relevant policy officials worked within the Shareholder Executive (“ShEx’”,
which subsequently became UK Government Investments, “UKGI”).
13. My private office would put important information in my Ministerial box. My practice
was to annotate submissions or correspondence by hand, indicating where I
needed more information or disagreed with something. Unfortunately, I have not
been able to access the marked-up submissions in preparing this witness
statement, which makes it harder to recall what my thinking was at the time I
received them.
14. Traditionally the Ministerial box is literally a large red box with a briefcase handle,
but I tended to carry my folders of ‘box’ papers in a canvas tote bag as a red box
would have been rather unwieldy and ostentatious on the bus. I would usually
receive a ‘box’ each night from Monday to Thursday, and occasionally also on a
Friday, when I was the ‘Duty Minister’ on the rota on a Friday when the House of
Commons was sitting. On other Fridays, when I was back home in my
constituency, I would not usually receive a box as the default delivery method was
sending it with a Government Car Service driver, which only really worked for
constituencies within easy reach of London. During the summer recess a
mechanism was eventually found to courier box papers to me at my constituency
office in the west of Scotland, using a secure bag with padlocks.
Relevant events to the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference
15. In relation to the Post Office, the first relevant document I have been shown is from
17 September 2012, and is a submission I received from Mike Whitehead, a civil
servant in the ShEx (UKGI00041975 Meeting with the Chair and CEO of Post
Office LTD (Tuesday 18th September 2012, 10:20-11:00). The submission of 17
September 2012 was ahead of what I believe was my first meeting relating to the
part of my Ministerial brief which covered Post Office Limited (“POL”). This was a
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meeting with George Thomson of the National Federation of Subpostmasters
(‘NFSP”). I do not recall this meeting and I have not been provided with any note
of it, but I can see the submission raised a number of matters which I might wish
to discuss with Mr Thomson, under the heading of “current issues”, but there was
nothing about Horizon or the prosecution or investigation of subpostmasters for
theft or fraud.
On the same day, I received a submission from ShEx generally briefing me for my
first meeting with Alice Perkins and Paula Vennells, Chair and CEO of POL
respectively (UKGI00041975). Again, this briefing focussed on network
transformation, Government services which could be provided through POL,
financial services and mutualisation. I understood these to be the central issues
affecting the POL part of the postal affairs brief. There was no mention of any
issues with Horizon or with the prosecution or investigation of subpostmasters. My
memory of this meeting is of a brief general introductory conversation, but I do not
have a detailed recollection of it, nor have I been provided with any note of it (this
is the case for all other meetings below, except where I state otherwise).
On 23 October 2012, I received a submission from Mike Whitehead relating to a
freedom of information request which had been sent to BIS seeking information
about the integrity of Horizon (UKGI00018248 Draft Email from Mike Whitehead
to Jo Swinson re Freedom of information request 12/1362: proposed Section 36
exemption regarding Ministerial briefing). I was advised that the intention was to
release most of the information requested but to hold some specific items back.
To do so, because of the way the Freedom of Information Act 2000 works, my
approval as the relevant Minister was required. The reasoning given was that:
“We consider that disclosure of this information may alter the nature and
substance of future advice given by Post Office Ltd if they feel that candid
advice provided about the Horizon system for the purposes of briefing
Ministers or developing strategy more broadly may in future be publicly
disclosed. Our oversight of Post Office Ltd as shareholder relies on us
being able to get access to information from that company.”
While I think the Freedom of Information Act is a vital and powerful tool, I also
recognise the exemption for candid advice to Ministers has an important function
in preserving space for good decision-making, so this struck me as a reasonable
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approach to take and I approved Mike Whitehead’s suggested approach. The
focus of the submission was the freedom of information exemptions and whether
they applied to the documents in scope. Paragraphs 4-5 provided some
background information about the Horizon issues, but there was little detail and
no mention of prosecutions:
“The request covers the Department's engagement with Post Office Ltd with
regards to concerns and criticism from a number of former subpostmasters
who believe Post Office Ltd's accounting system (Horizon) is responsible
for their contracts being terminated by Post Office Ltd. The Department has
always supported Post Office Ltd's assertion that the system is robust.
In June, the company, with agreement from the Department, appointed an
external forensic accountancy firm to conduct an independent review of a
selection of cases where former subpostmasters believed the system was
at fault. This review has been championed by James Arbuthnot MP on
behalf of a former subpostmaster in his constituency. Post Office Ltd is
confident that the independent review will support their view that the system
is robust and fit for purpose. However, the review has sparked some
interest, including this Fol.”
I recall receiving this submission and thinking about the decision on withholding or
releasing documents, rather than the specific content, which was unfamiliar to me
so early on in my role.
Between October 2012 and April 2013, I did not deal with anything of relevance to
the Inquiry, except that I believe I received a letter from Yasmin Qureshi MP (as
far as I know a copy of this has not been found) because among the documents
provided to me by DBT in preparing to draft this statement is a draft reply to that
letter (UKGI00013747 Letter from Yasmin Qureshi MP dated November 2012).
That letter would have been drafted by a civil servant in ShEx and given to me in
my nightly stack of correspondence to approve. I set out below in section 2 more
detail on how correspondence was dealt with during my time as Minister. This draft
reply stated that “Neither I, nor the Department are able to comment on, or
intervene in individual cases concerning operational and contractual matters” and
directed Ms Qureshi to James Arbuthnot MP.
On 17 April 2013, Alan Bates wrote to me setting out concerns he had about
Second Sight’s work in the mediation scheme and offering to meet with me
(POL00144511 Letter from Alan Bates to Jo Swinson MP RE: Second Sight
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presentation at Portcullis House). I do not have the letter that was sent in
response, but I have been provided with a draft response by BIS in which it was
set out that Second Sight were independent of Government and of POL, but that
James Arbuthnot MP had taken on a “co-ordinating and liaison role in overseeing
the conduct of the review’. I am afraid I do not have any recollection of this
particular piece of correspondence; as the response was straightforward and
positive I can imagine I would have signed that without any cause for concern
(UKGI00013902 Letter to Alan Bates dated April 2013).
My clear memory of first realising the possible importance of the Horizon issues
was a meeting with Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins in which I was told about the
impending publication of the Second Sight interim report. I cannot be certain about
the timing as I do not have access to my Ministerial Diary but it would most likely
have been in June 2013. I recall the genesis of the meeting being slightly
mysterious. It was not in the usual cycle of my regular catch ups, and unusually, I
did not have a briefing note for the meeting in my diary pack for that day. I would
not typically meet Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins together. I cannot recall many
details of the conversation, but do have a recollection that their tone was quiet and
serious as they explained the background to the report. I felt that they were very
keen to reassure me that they were taking it very seriously but everything was
under control, and I would receive a further update from them shortly
I also recall that James Arbuthnot was identified as a key MP co-ordinating
Parliamentarians on the issue, and I spoke with him about the issue on 3 July
2013. Following that call I asked one of my officials, Will Gibson, to follow up on
various issues James had raised, one of which was the suggestion that they
should speak with Second Sight on my behalf.
Between Friday 5 and Monday 8 July 2013 various briefing notes and information
was sent to my private office. While I cannot be certain without access to my
Ministerial or Parliamentary calendars from that time, it is likely that I saw these
updates collectively on Monday 8 July, as I would likely have been in Scotland
from Friday 5 to Sunday 7 July. I do recall the run up to the Ministerial Statement
on Tuesday 9 July feeling very rushed and information being available only very
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late in the day, which was stressful as I also had to prepare for and respond to two
debates in Parliament on 9 July, in addition to making the Statement. The relevant
documents were as follows:
a. On 5 July 2013, my private office was sent an email by Will Gibson of ShEx
with an attachment that set out, as he put it, “the key narrative and findings
of the draft Second Sight report, POL's proposed next steps and handling
for its release on Monday, and suggested lines to take” (UKGI00001693
Email from Peter Batten to Swinson MPST cc Will Gibson, Mike Whitehead
and others RE Draft Second sight report into POL Horizons system)as well
as a copy of the report itself (UKGI00001695 Narrative and summary of the
Second Sight report).
b. The attached note set out that Second Sight “appears to have further
widened its remit to act as an arbitrator for aggrieved ex-SPMs” but stressed
the small numbers of branches affected by the “anomalies” found, and that
POL had “voluntarily admitted” to these anomalies’ existence. It stated that
(emphasis original)
“On the question of the core Horizon function, SS finds that the system
achieves its intended purpose and concludes that they have “so far
found no evidence of system wide (systemic) problems with the Horizon
software”.
It went on to say that Paula Vennells and Alan Bates were in discussion,
that it was likely a joint statement on the report would be signed up to which
welcomed the Second Sight interim report, and that “POL has
commissioned external lawyers to review all cases where legal action
against an SPM has been initiated by POL since separation or may be
pending in light of the interim report findings”. It was not explained what part
of the report made it necessary to review past prosecutions, and I do not
think I asked, though it seemed a proactive and responsible step for POL to
take. Overall, the note was reassuring. The underlined conclusion was that
there were no system-wide (systemic) problems with the Horizon software.
From the contents of the note and my call with James Arbuthnot it seemed
there were agreed next steps and apparent goodwill between POL, JFSA
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and the MPs which suggested to me at the time that, while there was clearly
some concern within Parliament that I would have to respond to on POL’s
behalf given that they could not speak in the House of Commons, this was
not an issue that was likely to require significant further attention from me
afterwards. The reference to ‘no systemic problems’ I understood, given the
context in the surrounding paragraphs of the note, to mean that there were
no fundamental problems with the Horizon system that could affect or were
affecting subpostmasters very widely, but that some small issues had been
identified and resolved, and there were some ongoing training and support
issues for POL to address in the way they engaged with subpostmasters.
. The language used to describe the two matters now known as the ‘Receipt
and Payments Mismatch Bug’ and ‘Suspense Account Bug’ in the note was
‘anomaly’, which at the time I thought sounded reasonable. I was not an IT
expert and would not have thought anything of this word being used rather
than ‘bug’ or ‘error’. I did at one point in the 9 July House of Commons
Ministerial Statement refer to the issues as bugs. The important thing for me
in this context was that they were issues that had been proactively identified
and resolved, rather than ongoing problems. The summary also referred to
the commissioning of external lawyers by POL to review past convictions. I
do not recall this standing out to me; it seemed a reassuring, obvious step
to take and I was pleased to see it being referred to. I cannot recall any
detailed briefings about the nature of this review, nor seeing any further
documents on the matter.
. On6 July 2013, my private office received an update from Will Gibson about
the latest meeting on the subject of the Interim Report between POL and
James Arbuthnot MP (UKGI00001712 Email chain from Will Gibson to
Swinson MPST, cc'ing Mike Whitehead and Peter Batten re: James
Arbuthnot - POL/JFSA Statement for Media Appearance). The meeting was
described as positive. It was suggested that I speak to Mr Arbuthnot again.
My private office then asked Will Gibson by reply whether there was any
prospect of an Urgent Question in Parliament from Mr Arbuthnot and noted
that the whips may need to be kept updated. Will Gibson’s response was
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that a reactive position should be taken, and that a Question was unlikely
as it was an operational matter so not related directly to Government policy.
I do not believe I saw this on the day it was sent, but may have been kept
informed by a phone call with my private office.
e. On 8 July 2013, the whips would have been preparing for the Parliamentary
week ahead and anticipating potential urgent questions. Accordingly, my
private office was sent an email by Mike Whitehead containing the
information to be incorporated into a briefing for the whips’ office on the
interim report (UKGI00001748 Email from Mike Whitehead to MPST
Swinson, cc Will Gibson, Peter Batten and others re: FW: Horizon: James
Arbuthnot MP). He stated, among other things, that “The report confirms
that no systemic problems with the Horizon system were found” and
summarises that:
“we would suggest that there is a strong case against tabling an Urgent
Question on the basis that a Government statement could not achieve
the objectives [James Arbuthnot] seeks because:
+ the issues are not related to any Government action or policy decision
but are wholly operational matters for Post Office Ltd in which
Government has no role.
* no systemic problems with the Horizon system have been identified by
the review.
+ the number of subpostmasters who have experienced problems are a
minute proportion of the tens of thousands of people successfully using
the system across the network of over 11,500 branches on a daily basis
+ Post Office Ltd has proposed measures to address some of the points
about subpostmaster support and training raised in the Report
+ Government cannot intervene in the legal process to review or appeal
past convictions.”
f. The outcome of this was the production of a draft briefing to the whips’ office
(UKGI00001749 Memo re: Update to 4 July 2013 Note on the independent
review of Post Office Limited’s (POL’s) computer system). I can see from
this document that I had a conversation on the morning of 8 July 2013 with
James Arbuthnot in which he “agreed that the report was better than
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expected and acknowledged that it did not point to any wide-scale problems
with the Horizon system.” The briefing goes on to explain that:
“[James Arbuthnot] believes that the Report provides evidence that
some of the convictions of sub-postmasters who plead guilty to false
accounting were unsafe and he would like the Government to intervene
to offer some form of redress or to reopen these verdicts.
We would strongly reject the suggestion that it is the role of either POL
or Government to intervene to reopen the cases of individual sub-
postmasters as Mr Arbuthonot [sic.] appeared to suggest.”
24. It is unlikely that I read Second Sight's interim report itself ahead of the statement
in the House of Commons, though quite possible that I gave it a quick scan after
reading the briefing cover note, which I relied upon as an accurate summary. By
way of context, on the day I made the statement in the House of Commons, 9 July
2013, I was in Westminster Hall at 11am for a debate on consumer protection
issues relating to gift cards. I made the Horizon statement at 1:38pm then from
2:30pm - 4:00pm I was listening and responding to another debate in Westminster
Hall, this time on zero-hours contracts. As such there would have been three
debate packs in my Ministerial box the night before (Monday), and because of
difficulties I had getting Ministerial boxes delivered to my constituency in Scotland,
this was likely the first time I saw the written briefing material on the Second Sight
report that had been sent on the Friday and over the weekend.
25. The Inquiry has shown me an email chain between Paula Vennells and other POL
executives dated 6-8 July, in which Paula Vennells comments that: “/ have also
spoken to Jo Swinson again today [8 July], who remains supportive about our
actions and relatively relaxed about the situation”. I cannot recall details of the
specific conversation on this date and confidently distinguish it from others I had
with Ms Vennells on these issues. I think it was a telephone call. On another
occasion I recall Ms Vennells explaining to me in a tone of taking me into her
confidence, with something of a pained expression, that while it was a sad
situation, the reality was that some subpostmasters ‘had their fingers in the till’ or
something to that effect. From the context of the concerns being raised by James
Arbuthnot and other MPs I did recognise that there was a real need for POL to
deal with and resolve the issues especially around training and support for
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subpostmasters, but my thought process would have been ‘do I have the
information I need to go into the House of Commons and make the statement I
have to make, and do I feel like Post Office are genuinely doing what they can to
address the matter?’. I thought that I did. That does not mean that I was happy
about it, but it was my job as the Government Minister speaking to the Post Office
issues in Parliament. I had questions and they had been answered, there was a
comprehensive brief and what seemed like a robust plan to work alongside the
JFSA and MP stakeholders to explore the issues in good faith. James Arbuthnot
was relatively positive about how it was being addressed, and he seemed to be
the MP most engaged on the issue so that gave some reassurance too.
Events can be fluid and move quickly in Parliament, and often the Departmental
civil servants did not have a good handle on Parliamentary procedures or
management. Here the Departmental brief to the whips was making the case
against the tabling of an Urgent Question, which was not in the control of the whips
as James Arbuthnot would decide whether he would table a Question and then
the Speaker would decide whether it would be accepted and heard in the House
of Commons. The whips would advise on the best Parliamentary handling. One
alternative option often deployed, if it was felt an Urgent Question were likely,
would be to make a Ministerial Statement instead. The key difference is that the
Government can decide that a Ministerial Statement will be made. Often it would
be difficult to get agreement from the whips to make a Ministerial Statement, as
there were limited slots available to make them, but sometimes it would be seen
as better to be proactive than risk an Urgent Question being granted, which would
be more disruptive for the scheduling of Parliamentary business as it would only
be confirmed to be going ahead a couple of hours beforehand, and it would have
knock on effects by delaying all debates in the House of Commons that day.
I recall several phone call briefings in preparation for the potential Urgent Question
(Ministerial Statement as it became), partly to get up to speed on the content,
partly to understand the concerns of James Arbuthnot and understand his appetite
for tabling an Urgent Question, and partly to think through the Parliamentary
logistics on a day where I had to be in three different debates and therefore ensure
they would all be at different times. I do not have a detailed recollection of my call
with James Arbuthnot, but I do recall there being both clear genuine concern and
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also willingness to engage constructively with what appeared to be a positive plan
to move the issue forward through the Working Group. The actions of POL in
advertising the Second Sight review widely to subpostmasters to put forward their
concerns also gave me some confidence that they were engaging in an open,
positive manner and that a resolution could be reached.
On 9 July 2013, there was an exchange between my private office and the
Parliamentary Unit ahead of my statement which was to be made in the House of
Commons following the Interim Report’s publication, agreeing the final text of that
statement and confirming that No. 10 has seen and agreed it as well
(UKGI00041996 Email from Emily Cloke (Secretary to Jo Swinson MP) to Parly
Unit - Others cc Will Gibson, Mike Whitehead and others RE: Post Office - Oral
Statement). This is all standard Parliamentary procedure.
On the same day, I made that Statement (POL00206822 Hansard, Post Office -
Horizon System, Volume 566: debated on Tuesday 9 July 2013) in the House of
Commons at 1:38pm. I have seen the evidence of Lord Arbuthnot (as he now is)
to the Inquiry, where he expressed some frustration that I emphasised the arms-
length nature of the Government relationship with POL in this Statement but
acknowledged that this was the policy of successive Governments (INQ00001127
10 April Hearing pages 10-12) I remember feeling the need to be careful in my
remarks in Parliament to respect the independence of the judicial system. I
recognised that while it was appropriate and indeed desirable for MPs to advocate
for their constituents, as a Minister I should be mindful not to speculate about
individual cases where courts had reached a judgment. My answers to MPs at the
time of the Statement showed that, on the basis of what I had been told, I
understood Second Sight had found evidence of bugs in Horizon, but that these
had been fixed and were not a widespread or ongoing problem:
“The hon. Gentleman is right that it is imperative that these cases be looked at
speedily, although I think he would also agree that that needs to be done
comprehensively, and clearly when forensic accountancy work is going on,
things can take time. We need to be clear about what the report says about the
Horizon system. It did not find evidence of systemic failures; that is not to say
there has never been a bug in the system, but I defy anyone to find an IT system
that has never had a bug. What is important is that when bugs are found, they
are dealt with and the problems are rectified. What has not been found,
however, is any systemic problem leading to the issues faced by sub-
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postmasters, although there have been issues with the support and training
provided alongside Horizon.”
And
“The report mentions a couple of bugs in the Horizon system, which the Post
Office proactively found and rectified, but basically what it has found to be
lacking in Horizon is not the software, but the support and other issues around
the software.”
30. That evening, Alan Bates sent me an email, which I saw and replied to on 11 July
(POL00145667 Letter from Jo Swinson MP to Alan Bates - Re: 2nd sight interim
report on the post office horizon computer system). He thanked me for my
statement in the House and expressed disappointment with the interim report,
stating that he was particularly concerned that it did not address, as he put it, “the
failure of Post Office Investigators to look at any other possible causes of the
subpostmaster’s problem, and just go straight to prosecution”. He did not ask for
a specific response but stated that he thought it “important to raise” this issue with
me. My reply noted the issue raised and recommended that Mr Bates raise the
issue in the Working Party. I also stated that I would seek “regular progress
reports” on this issue. As this draft reply had been prepared for me by the same
people who would also be updating me, I took this to mean that the officials would
be keeping an eye on the progress of the scheme and briefing me accordingly at
relevant points. Over the subsequent months I received several submissions
which mentioned the scheme, unfortunately of course detailing the breakdown of
trust between the parties, which I tried to better understand from Sir Anthony
Hooper, and find ways to address such as by enabling MP involvement in cases
(UKGI00001867 Letter from Jo Swinson MP to Alan Bates re: Second Sight
Interim Report).
31. In the midst of this on 10 July 2013, I received (jointly with Vince Cable, the
Secretary of State at BIS at the time) a submission from Tim McInnes of ShEx
containing a briefing for a meeting with POL on its Strategic Plan. (UKGI00001835
Meeting Agenda with Post Office Ltd from Tim McInnes to Vince Cable and Jo
Swinson re: POL's Strategic Plan) The briefing was five pages long, and covered
a range of issues but did not address Horizon, the mediation scheme or
subpostmaster prosecution or investigation.
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32. The Inquiry has provided me with a copy of a letter from Stephen Mosley MP dated
30 September 2013 (POL00196410 Letter from Stephen Mosley MP to Jo
Swinson MP Re: Correspondence received from Mr Alan Bates from JFSA
regarding his concerns relating to the suicide attempt of Mr Martin Griffiths). This
letter encloses a very moving email. I am afraid I do not remember seeing it, but I
would not want to say that I never saw it at the time. It may have been dealt with
by my private office or correspondence unit.
33. I have seen the evidence given by Alice Perkins to the Inquiry about efforts made
by POL and ShEx in the lead up to the privatisation of Royal Mail in October 2013
to get the Royal Mail prospectus altered in order to remove or tone down negative
references to POL, including the Horizon issues (INQ00001157 6 June 2024
hearing, pages 153-167). It appears that there was discussion about asking me
as Minister to get involved, but I have no recollection of any such request by POL
crossing my desk or being communicated to me and I am fairly confident I would
have recalled it if it had. This does not surprise me, because there was a strict
‘Chinese wall’/information barrier in place between me and Michael Fallon MP (the
then Minister of State for Business and Enterprise) within BIS at the time whereby
he dealt with RMG issues and I dealt with POL issues. I assumed there was the
same information barrier in place at official level, but it is not clear from the ShEx
emails shown to Ms Perkins whether that was in fact the case.
34. The next document I been shown by the Inquiry is an email exchange between
Joe Moor (who appears to have worked for a firm called Grayling providing public
affairs services to Fujitsu), my private office, and members of ShEx
(UKGI00002168 Email chain from Paul Hadley to Jonathan Preece, Darrell
Midgley, cc'd Richard Callard, David Francis, Maureen Wathen and others, re:
"Ria - meeting request — Fujitsu). These emails were exchanged between 18 and
27 November 2013. I was not aware of this exchange at the time but I note that
my private office observed that I “may want to ask [Fujitsu] to reassure [me] of the
systemic integrity of the Horizon network given the recent Parliamentary and news
interest on that.” I was not consulted on whether this meeting should go ahead (it
did not (UKGI00002181 Email from MPST Swinson to David Francis, Jonathan
Preece, Midgley Darrell and others re: Meeting request for Jo Swinson - Fujitsu).
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35. On 11 December 2013, I received a submission form ShEx briefing me on a
meeting with Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins (WITN10190102 Briefing of
meeting with Alice Perkins and Paula Vennells dated 11 December 2013). It did
not address Horizon or the prosecution or investigation of subpostmasters. I
cannot recall the detail of our discussions on that date, but as the Working Group
was still only relatively created, I would not have expected a significant progress
report. It is possible I raised it, though if so it would have been briefly, given the
number of other issues to cover.
36. I was on maternity leave between December 2013 and June 2014. I therefore was
not carrying out any of my Ministerial duties at this time; Jenny Willott provided
cover for me. I have set out in the paragraphs below what the relevant documents
recently brought to my attention show about events in that period of time, but I
cannot provide any further insight beyond them. I spent several “Keeping in Touch”
days in the department towards the end of my leave, being briefed on various
issues. The specific documents referred to below were not shared with me on
those visits, with the exception of the 28 May 2014 briefing pack which was created
to bring me back up to speed with my portfolio (see paragraph 41 below).
37. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to the minutes of a meeting of POL’s ‘Project
Sparrow’ Board Sub-Committee on 9 April 2014 (during my maternity leave)
(POL00294186 Minutes of a meeting of the Proiect Sparrow Sub- Committee of
the Board held on Wednesday 9 April 2014. Present: Alice Perkins, Alasdair
Marnoch, Richard Gallard and others). I did not see these minutes at the time. I
was first made aware of some of the content of this meeting by BBC Panorama in
2022, but had not seen this document in full until my preparations for the Inquiry.
I note that Richard Callard of ShEx was present and that at §3! the minutes state:
“A paper should be produced for the next Sub-Committee meeting on the role of
Second Sight and options to support them or reduce their role” Also at §3m they
state that: “it was agreed that effort should be made to try and accelerate cases
that were not thematic and might be useful to show the Minister’.
38. Alan Bates sent a letter to addressed to me dated 16 April 2014 (during my
maternity leave) (POL00304194 Letter from Alan Bates for the JFSA to Jo
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39.
40.
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Swinson MP re Initial Case Review and Mediation). I did not see this letter at the
time. The letter raised concerns about delays and other problems with the
operation of the Case Review and Mediation Scheme. It concluded, with words
which have proved to be prescient:
“I fear you are reliant upon POL for information that we believe is based upon
reports and assurances given from the lower and medium ranks of POL who
for whatever reason are telling the upper management what they want to hear
rather than the truth. But one way or another the truth will come out, far too
many people have seen it now, the only one refusing to accept it is POL.
! would like to believe I am wrong, but from what I can see, I doubt POL will
ever change its stance on this issue until it has had to answer to a select
committee or a full independent inquiry is held. However, if there is anything
you or your department can do to head off the impasse I believe we are now
heading towards, there are many people who would be very grateful.”
It seems that officials (1 would expect from ShEx) forwarded on Alan Bates’ letter
to Paula Vennells and Sir Anthony Hooper later in April 2014 and asked Sir
Anthony Hooper for a meeting to discuss the Working Group and operation of the
Mediation Scheme. Jenny Willott replied to Mr Bates, noting that the Government
did not play a role in the Working Group and that Sir Anthony Hooper must be
allowed to perform his duties independently, and that “it would be inappropriate to
respond to the operational concerns that you have raised”, but informing him that
she intended to pass on a copy of his letter (POL00100583 Letters from Jenny
Willott MP (on behalf of BIS) to Alan Bates, Sir Anthony Hooper and Paula
Vennells re Initial Case Review and Mediation Scheme). I did not see this
correspondence at the time.
The Inquiry has drawn my attention to the minutes of a POL Board meeting dated
30 April 2014 (during my maternity leave). I would not have seen these at the time;
and, generally, I did not get provided with copies of POL Board minutes or those
of its sub-committees, but relied upon the ShEx representative, Richard Callard,
to advise me. I note that there appears to have been a discussion about a Deloitte
report relating to Horizon issues (POL00021524 Meeting Minutes: minutes for
Board meeting held on 30" April 2014). I have also been shown a further set of
‘Project Sparrow’ Board Sub-Committee dated 30 April 2014 (also during my
maternity leave) (POL00148201 Post Office Ltd, Project Sparrow Sub-Committee
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Minutes of 30/04/2014). Richard Callard of ShEx was again present. I note that
none of the subsequent briefings I received about the closing of the Working
Group and acceleration of the mediation process was explained in the terms, used
in these minutes, of “bringing [investigation] within the control of Post Office”. As
will be seen below, the briefings I later received on this issue did not clearly frame
it in this way, but rather as a way of ensuring the cases were resolved more
quickly.
On 28 May 2014, ShEx provided me with a briefing on POL as part of my
preparations for returning from maternity leave (UKGI00002333 Agenda for Post
Office Shareholder team update). It contained a section on “Key on-going risks”
The sole entry concerning Horizon states only that (emphasis added) “The
Working Group established to consider complaints raised by current and former
spms with respect of the Horizon accounting system has an independent Chair
and is beginning to consider cases, but progress has been slow and POL is
seeking assurance on its position.” With hindsight I assume this is an oblique
reference to the Deloitte report or various pieces of legal advice, but I would not
have realised this nor did the phrase sound controversial at the time. The main
takeaway for me from this as regards Horizon was that the Working Group was up
and running but speed of progress was an issue.
The Inquiry has drawn my attention to an email chain from Alwen Lyons, POL
Company Secretary, to various other POL executives and POL Board members
on 4 June 2014 summarising a briefing from Deloitte and attaching the full briefing
(POL00029733 Email from Alwen Lyons to Rodric Williams Re: FWD - Deloitte
Briefing - Message from Chris Aujard and Lesley Sewell - Strictly Private &
Confidential - Subject to Legal Privilege, POL00130618 Deloitte Draft Board
Briefing document further to report on Horizon desktop review of assurance
sources and key control features.) Obviously I did not see these documents at the
time, but I also have no recollection of being informed at a later date about the
contents of this Deloitte briefing. It is possible that a Deloitte report was mentioned
to me by ShEx after my return from maternity leave, maybe not by name or in
general terms such as ‘POL has had lawyers and independent auditors review or
re-investigate’. What I do recall is that what I was told was always reassuring.
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43. The Inquiry has also shown me the minutes of another Project Sparrow Sub-
Committee meeting on 6 June 2014, which appears to have discussed the
Mediation Scheme and options for taking it forward. There is a reference to the
group recommending ‘Option 3’, and the ‘Chairman’ (which I think must be a
reference to Alice Perkins) exploring with the Minister “the extent to which she
would be prepared to support Option 3” (POL00006571, Project Sparrow Sub-
Committee Minutes 6 June 2014). What is meant by Options 2 or 3 is difficult to
understand from this document without more context or detail (although the Board
Minutes of 10 June 2014 which the Inquiry has shown me (POL00021526 Post
Office Limited: Minutes of a Board meeting held on June 2014) says the Board
“agreed Option 2 (continuing with the Scheme but seeking to refine its work, within
the existing Terms of Reference) was the preferred option.”) As I explain below, I
was wholly unaware of these discussions at the time, and as events unfolded later
in 2014-2015 I was not actually asked to decide what would happen to the
Mediation Scheme but instead presented with a decision from POL. With
hindsight, it looks like the June decision to “refine” the work of the scheme in
practice meant a change in posture from POL on the Mediation Scheme at this
time to become obstructive, which explains the unravelling of trust in the Scheme
by the JFSA and MPs later that year. I note that I was not briefed or told that POL
was changing its position in how it approached the Scheme or interpreted the
Terms of Reference. Instead, I was briefed that others in the Working Group were
being unrealistic in expectations or misunderstood the purpose of the Scheme.
44. I have been shown a letter to the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, dated 1
July 2014, from Mrs Jennifer O’Dell, which was apparently copied to me, as well
as Sir Anthony Hooper and Paula Vennells, amongst others (POL00116649 Letter
to David Cameron PM from Mrs Jennifer O Dell Re: Mrs O'Dell's Second Sight
case). The letter expresses significant frustration about the delays in the Mediation
Scheme, and refers to the suicide of Martin Griffiths. I am afraid I do not recall
seeing this letter and I have not been shown any documentation that suggests I
responded to it or an official responded on my behalf. It is not clear whether it was
sent to my Parliamentary email address or to BIS. If it was received at my
Parliamentary email address my constituency staff would have forwarded it to the
correspondence unit in BIS as with any emails relating to my Ministerial role. It
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46.
47.
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may then have been responded to either by the Prime Minister, if the
correspondent was his constituent, or by an official in No 10.
I have been shown by the Inquiry an undated briefing note (UKGI00002440
Preparation document for the press prepared by Richard Callard). It seems to
have been attached to an email on 20 August 2014 sent to my private office
(UKGI00002439 Email from Richard Callard to Swinson MPST RE Confidential
Prep for Friday). I understand, seeing it now, that this appears to have been written
by Richard Callard as points or prompts for Alice Perkins in advance of a call
scheduled between her and me, to help her try to convince me to ask the Treasury
for permission to recruit a new CFO, Alisdair Cameron, on a very high salary, to
replace Chris Day (WITN10190103 Agenda for Meeting dated 10 July 2014: Post
Office Limited Appointment and Remuneration of New Chief Finance Officer
(CFO)). In light of Government finances at the time and the austerity measures in
place, any appointment using public money to a role above a certain level of
remuneration required Treasury approval. I did not see this document at the time,
indeed it was not something ever designed for me to see, as the covering email
and the contents of the note make clear (e.g. the fact that the note is structured as
a series of responses to questions I might ask). It seems that Richard Callard was
asking my private office for advice on how Alice Perkins could make the points in
the note to me in the way that would be most persuasive, and he anticipated that
I would not be happy (“/ would be grateful if you could flag any potential ‘red rags’
in here”).
I was shocked to read this note. It seems to show Mr Callard, a ShEx official who
was one of the key officials who was supposed to support me in my Ministerial
role with regard to Post Office matters, instead using his Departmental position,
access and contacts to work on behalf of POL to seek to persuade me to do what
POL wanted, contrary to wider Government policy on pay restraint. It also makes
clear that he had deliberately kept me in the dark about the concerns ShEx had
about Paula Vennells’ performance.
I was even more shocked to see the evidence of Alice Perkins on 6 June 2024 to
the Inquiry, and the PowerPoint presentation entitled ‘Post Office Ltd Senior
Management’ dated February 2014 (UKGI00042677, Post Office Ltd Senior
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Management Risk and Assurance Committee February 2014) which was shown
to her (and which I had previously never seen) referring to significant concerns
about Paula Vennells’ performance and with specific reference to her not having
a good working relationship with me. I had not expressed doubts about Ms
Vennells’ performance to ShEx, nor do not recall Alice Perkins or Richard Callard
at any of our meetings expressing serious concerns about her performance. I The
note itself confirms (see the question ‘Why haven't you told me about the CEO
before?’) that nobody had mentioned anything about concerns about Ms Vennells
before this date nor had they raised concerns about the CFO in any detail. Richard
Callard did not ever give me the impression that he or the Board generally had
concerns about her suitability as CEO. Indeed, only three months before the date
of this presentation I was given a submission on POL Directors’ remuneration in
November 2013 which stated that “We wish to retain both Directors [i.e. Paula
Vennells and Chris Day] who are more than half way through the transformation
programme and do not believe that it would be appropriate to seek further
downward pressure on executive pay for this year’ (WITN10190104 Agenda for
Post Office Limited- Director's Renumeration Post Office Limited- Director's
Remuneration dated 12 November 2013). In that context, I am very surprised to
discover that there were concerns about performance being expressed in
February 2014, as this would clearly be a strategic matter on which I would have
expected to be briefed about and have an opportunity to discuss in depth, and
indeed for the Secretary of State also to have been included in such briefings.
. The briefing note in August 2014 was during the Parliamentary recess, less than
a month before the Scottish independence referendum so I would have been in
my constituency working to keep Scotland in the UK at the time this call with Alice
Perkins was scheduled to take place, and it would have been fitted in around public
meetings and campaign activities. I do not recall whether or not the call happened.
I think it may have done, but as no meeting notes or diary records have been
located by DBT I cannot be sure. I am confident that Ms Perkins did not mention
concerns about Ms Vennells. If she had, I would have remembered this and it
would have been a prism through which I interpreted Ms Vennells’ subsequent
assurances. I have not seen any documents to suggest this was followed up in
any way, and Ms Vennells stayed in post for a further five years, all of which
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50.
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suggests the concerns were never raised or taken forward. In the end I was not
willing to approve a higher pay award for the new CFO recruit, but I think the
Secretary of State Vince Cable was ultimately willing to do so.
On 29 August 2014, Alan Bates sent me a letter informing me that Second Sight’s
next report had been completed, but that he could not supply me a copy, and
providing the JFSA’s summary of it (UKGI00013791 Letter from Alan Bates to Jo
Swinson dated 29 August 2015 re Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance). This was
the draft ‘thematic report’ by Second Sight, which was later leaked.
On 9 September 2014, following the leak of the thematic report (although I do not
think the report was published anywhere in full at that stage) and some media
attention, my private office asked Richard Callard for a briefing update on the
Horizon mediation scheme (UKGI00002472 Briefing for Jo Swinson regarding
recent reports on Horizon System - 10th September 2014). This briefing was sent
to my private office on 10 September, and set out, among other things:
a. that POL “consider that independent investigators Second Sight have “gone
native” and are unduly taking the side of JFSA. This is supported by the
fact that SS have admitted privately that they find it emotionally difficult to
opine against SPMs, regardless of the circumstances of the case.”;
b. that “Claims in the thematic report (and the individual reports on each case
prepared by SS) have generally been unsubstantiated” which resulted in the
fact that “A number of the reports written by SS in relation to individual cases
have been rejected by Tony Hooper’;
c. that “Second Sight has continued to widen the scope of the investigation
rather than focus on the Horizon system, prolonging the investigations and
increasing costs (most of which fall on POL)”;
d. that Sir Anthony Hooper “would not be prepared to support the removal of
SS or back POL in pulling out of the scheme.” (I do not think I noticed at the
time that this implicitly meant there must have been a suggestion from
someone, presumably POL, that Second Sight should be removed); and
e. around ‘a dozen’ cases had been settled outside of the mediation process
and three had been mediated - two straightforward and uncontroversial
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examples were given to show that “in those cases that have been mediated
or settled, POL considers it should have conducted itself better
operationally, but it is important to stress that these are not system related.”
(what is not mentioned here, notably, is that POL had intentionally
accelerated cases which did not raise ‘thematic’ issues, apparently for the
very purpose of reassuring me - see paragraph 37 above and
POL00294186).
51. I believe I reviewed the document within a couple of days of receiving it in Scotland
around 11 September, then couriered the box back to London, with my private
office receiving my annotations on 15 September. I wish my handwritten notes had
been preserved on documents like this in particular, as the strongly worded email
from my private office to ShEx on 15 September seeking clarifications suggests I
was punchy in my comments. They noted that I “found it difficult to just accept
POL’s analysis of the report without any evidence”. I picked up on the fact that Sir
Anthony Hooper had been willing to challenge previous Second Sight reports but
had not done so in this case, and asked whether this meant he found the report
credible. I also asked if we could approach him for more details as I was seeking
an independent source to either reinforce or challenge what I was being told. I
think I was beginning to get frustrated by this point that I was not being kept
sufficiently up-to-date by ShEx on the Horizon issues and how they were being
dealt with; a sense of this is captured in the email from my private office where it
says “For the future, please keep private office copied in on any newsworthy
developments....It is really important that we are aware of these kinds of events
so that Jo feels prepared and sighted on issues within her portfolio.” With
hindsight, it now is clear that there was much, much more I was not being told.
52. The answer from Peter Batten of ShEx explained at some length that “the fact that
[Sir Anthony Hooper] didn’t ask for the thematic report to be re-written does not
suggest he found it credible.” He also told me it would be inappropriate to ask Sir
Anthony Hooper for more details about his views (UKGI00007352 Email chain
from Peter Batten to Jo Swinson, Richard Callard cc Alexander Hamilton and
others Re: POL and reports on IT).
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53. I have been shown an email chain between my private office and Tim Mclnnes of
ShEx between 24 October 2014 and 12 November 2014 (UKGI00002521 Email
from Swinson MPST to Tim Mclnnes, CC Richard Callard and Peter Batten re
Second Sight Report). This shows that at this time my private office were pursuing
various lines of enquiry about the progress of the Mediation Scheme on my behalf,
including further details on what kinds of settlements had been reached. The
context was that I was shown a letter from Paula Vennells (POL00116720 Letter
to Jo Swinson from Chris Aujard and Paula Vennells Re: Initial Complaint Review
and Mediation Scheme) which prompted me to ask my private office to seek more
information on Second Sight, media coverage and the Mediation Scheme. It is not
clear whether I ever got an answer to my questions; had details been provided
about the cases being settled it might have alerted me to the fact that the Horizon
issues were more of a problem that I was being told. I also did not know at this
time that as early as April 2014 (see POL00294186 and paragraph 37 above) POL
with ShEx input had decided to push cases that were ‘not thematic’ through the
Mediation Scheme first expressly for the purpose of showing me, i.e. those which
did not raise wider concerns about Horizon. It strikes me now that this was
important information to have withheld from me. Indeed to present simple
examples as if they were representative to back up an argument that problems
were not systemic, when they had in fact been handpicked for swift resolution for
the purpose of making that case to me, is misleading at best.
54. I received a submission from ShEx on 25 November 2014 for a meeting with Paula
Vennells (UKGI00042620 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills - Meeting
with Paula Vennells, Chief Executive of Post Office Ltd (“POL”). We had regular
meetings every few months to touch base on the various Post Office issues. This
meeting was not specifically about Horizon, and, in common with so many of the
Post Office briefing notes prepared for me by ShEx, the briefing from civil servants
does not address it. Officials recommended key issues to discuss in these
meetings, but this would not stop me raising other things. I do recall probing Paula
Vennells on matters relating to Horizon on several occasions in person, though
without access to my diary records or any meeting notes I cannot recall the specific
dates. I think it is likely that I will have asked about the Horizon issues at this point
given my earlier frustrations, though as the note demonstrates, there were a broad
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56.
57.
58.
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range of difficult matters to cover in a short period of time. The Working Group
was breaking down so that could have been a prompt for me to ask for more
information, but with hindsight I was really only being given information by ShEx
when something emerged into the open like a media leak or MP’s press release.
In early December 2014 I recall being asked by the BIS press office about a
request for me to speak on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme about MPs losing
faith in POL’s handling of the Horizon issue. I remember the advice being that I
should decline the request. I accepted that advice and suggested that POL should
do the interview. On 9 December 2014 Mark Davies from POL was interviewed on
the programme.
I have been shown an email that was sent by Peter Batten of ShEx to my private
office on 8 December 2014 (UKGI00002585 Email dated 8 December 2014 RE:
Horizon Working Group update). It contains a general update and briefing on
Horizon and the mediation scheme, ahead of one of the regular catchup meetings
I had with the Post Office team at BIS. I note that it states:
“This is an operational matter for the Post Office, the Government must not
be involved, and hitherto Jo Swinson has been insulated. It is crucially
important to maintain this independence as to involve Ministers in a quasi-
legal, confidential scheme risks undermining the entire scheme and the
progress made to date.”
I was keen to push to speed up progress in the scheme, as I was frustrated by
reports of delays and obstruction. I asked questions about what was causing
delays and whether these issues could be resolved; I did recognise that one
delaying factor was the investigation capacity and the complexity of some cases,
and that it would have been counterproductive if targets were put in that meant
rush investigations or compromised the quality of the scrutiny. I did accept that it
was neither practical nor desirable for me as a Minister to be involved in the details
of individual cases, and that the independence of the mediation process should
be respected.
Subsequent emails on 9 and 10 December 2014, between my private office and
Officials including Richard Callard, show that our meeting covered issues relating
to Network Transformation and that I probed the reasons for POL refusing to
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60.
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mediate cases in the Scheme (UKGI00002610 Email from Richard Callard to
MPST Swinso , Tim Mcinnes, James Baugh and Peter Batten re Catch up this
morning - Horizon mediation scheme). I note that it was confirmed in this email
that POL would not mediate with a subpostmaster who had admitted theft.
I have been provided by the Inquiry with the debate pack of briefing materials for
the Westminster Hall Debate on the Horizon Case Review and Mediation Scheme
secured by James Arbuthnot MP, both in draft form from Peter Batten
(UKGI00002633 Draft Note with annex to Jo Swinson from Peter Batten re:
Westminster Hall Debate: Horizon Case Review and Mediation Scheme), as can
be seen at §9 and §10, and also the final submission (dated 15 December 2014
and with authorship attributed to Richard Callard, not Peter Batten), and refer to
that submission dated below (UKGI00000024 Agenda for Westminster Hall
Debate: Horizon Case Review and Mediation Scheme dated 15 December 2014).
On 15 December 2014, my private office was sent an email by Richard Callard
containing the briefing pack for the Westminster Hall debate (UKGI00002762
Email from Richard Callard to Swinson MPST cc Cable MPST, Hancock MPST
and others RE: Westminster Hall Debate on Post Office & Horizon). This
comprised, attached to the email, the following:
a. Submissions from Richard Callard (to which the remainder of the items
listed below were annexed) (UKGI00002763 Letter from Richard Callard to
Jo Swinson re Westminster Hall Debate: Horizon Case Review and
Mediation Scheme);
b. draft speaking notes for the debate (UKGI00002765 Westminster Hall
Debate: Subpostmaster Mediation Scheme);
c. adocument entitled “Horizon Q&A” (UKGI00002764 Horizon Questions for
Parliamentary Debate 17th December 2014);
d. apress release from a group of MPs which accompanied James Arbuthnot’s
letter to Paula Vennells dated 8 December 2014 (UKG100002767 Report on
"MPs lost faith in Post Office Mediation Scheme");
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e. James Arbuthnot's letter to Paula Vennells dated 8 December 2014
(UKGI00002766 Letter from Lord Arbuthnot to Paula Vennells re Scope of
the Mediation Scheme);
f. Paula Vennells’ letter to James Arbuthnot dated 28 November 2014
(UKGI00002769 Letter from Paula Vennells to Lord Arbuthnot re Complaint
and Mediation Scheme);
g. Sir Anthony Hooper's letter to me (UKGI00002768 Letter from Sir Anthony
Hooper to Jo Swinson re Initial Compliant and Mediation Scheme);
h. an attachment from CEDR to the letter at (e) (UKGI00002771 Letter from
John Munton to The Secretariat of Post Office Mediation Complaint Review
Working Group);
i. a further annex on regulation and postal competition not relevant here.
61. This kind of multi-part debate pack was standard for a 90-minute Westminster Hall
debate, and I would typically review it in advance to flag any questions ahead of
an in-person briefing with officials in advance of the debate. I note that in the
‘Horizon Q&A’ document, the following is stated (emphases added):
“investigations so far have not revealed any suggestion that a subpostmaster’s
conviction is unsafe. Many of the convictions were based on the admissions of
the sub-postmaster in interview or his/her guilty plea”.
Suggested line on past convictions is “Post Office_is, however, under_an
absolute duty to immediately disclose any information which might undermine
the Prosecution’s case or support the case of the defendant and Post Office
has done so where appropriate. There is no doubt in my mind that it is being
particularly vigilant in this regard as it carries out its investigations... The fact
remains, uncomfortable as it may be for some, that nothing has to date surfaced
which suggests that any of the convictions are unsafe”
62. I reviewed these submissions on the evening of 15 December 2014 and as _ usual
this led me to flag several issues for exploration at the briefing meeting with
officials, as set out in the email from my private office to Richard Callard dated 16
December 2014. I was pressing for details about the progress of cases, why POL
were refusing to mediate some cases, the complaint POL referred to about
attempts to widen the remit, and in particular I wanted to probe the line in the
briefing that said “There is no doubt in my mind that [POL] is being particularly
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vigilant [in complying with its disclosure duty]” (UKGI00000916 Email from
Swinson MPST to Richard Callard cc MPST Cable, MPST Hancock and others re:
Jo's comments on Westminster Hall Debate on Post Office & Horizon). These
issues would all have been discussed in the briefing meeting, and while I cannot
remember the precise wording of reassurances given on the disclosure duty, I
know that these were given, probably with reference to the multiple reviews by
external professional advisers that had taken place.
On 16 December 2014, I also spoke to James Arbuthnot who set out what he
wanted from BIS and/or POL, and through my private office I followed up on these
points. I can see I was asking questions about:
e Whether POL were destroying documents - I was categorically told they
were not (see page 9 of the ‘Q&A Document’) (UKGI00002764 Horizon
Questions for Parliamentary Debate 17th December 2014). I know now that
it was not correct to give such a categoric answer, as the Clarke shredding
advice which had been provided to POL in 2013 raised concerns about
exactly this point, but I was not told anything about it.
e Whether POL would stop acting as prosecutor.
e Whether we could ask the CCRC to review Horizon cases. While I did think
POL could be more responsive to the concerns that MPs were putting
forward, one area where I consistently and strongly concurred with the
advice was that criminal convictions could not be overturned by a mediation
process, that it was not the place of Government to intervene in court
processes, and therefore that the judicial route such as the CCRC would be
the right way to resolve any of those types of cases, one way or another.
This was also in the context of the repeated and firm assertions made to me
about the disclosure duty being taken seriously, which I probed and was
reassured on (UKGI00002837 Email from Richard Callard to MPST
Swinson cc: Tim McInnes, James Bough and others Re: Jo's conversations
with James Arbuthnot-actions coming out).
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64. Richard Callard replied on the same day, the substantive points of which were
most likely communicated to me verbally by private office or as notes added to my
briefing pack for the debate (UKGI00002837). Looking now at his email, I note in
particular his comment that Second Sight have “gone native’, his deferral to
Belinda Crowe and Patrick Bourke of POL on whether it would be appropriate to
write to the Criminal Cases Review Commissioner to set up an independent review
of cases, and his advice that I should be more “front footie” to close down some
of these issues, because “being conciliatory got us to where we are currently’. I
do not remember hearing about these comments at the time (generally private
office did not simply put emails into my box but would include what they considered
to be key points in their cover notes to submissions or other documents), and I do
not think my private office would have passed them on to me, as they knew me
well and realised I would not like it.
65. The Westminster Hall debate took place for 90 minutes in the afternoon of 17
December 2014. In my winding up speech I had 12 minutes to respond to as many
points raised in the debate as I could, including taking direct questions from MPs
during my remarks. It was not a comfortable debate given the distressing
situations of MPs’ constituents that prompted it, but I did my best to engage
constructively both during and after the debate with the points MPs had raised,
including on decisions to mediate and the pace of the mediation scheme, and as
briefed I reiterated that POL understood its legal duty to disclose. I declined the
suggestions from officials in my briefing pack to “fire back at James Arbuthnot’,
suggest that JFSA took the view that some subpostmasters were “trying it on’, or
criticise JFSA for engaging a legal firm. I felt these lines were too aggressive and
inappropriate when MPs were doing their job genuinely representing their
constituents. It also seemed strange to criticise JFSA for engaging lawyers when
POL themselves were arguing that mediation was not possible in many cases
where there were criminal convictions. Again, I did feel strongly that it was
important for me as a Minister speaking in Parliament not to undermine judicial
processes (POL00030457 Hansard, Post Office Mediation Scheme, Volume
589: debated on Wednesday 17 December 2014).
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66. On 22 December 2014, I received a letter from Alan Bates offering to meet with
me “you to discuss the issues involved with this matter from the perspective of
those it has affected, rather than from those who seem to be so desperately trying
to keep the truth from you.”(UKGI00002896 Letter from JFSA Alan Bates to Jo
Swinson MP. Re: following adjournment debate at Westminster Hall / initial case
review & mediation scheme) With hindsight, I absolutely wish I had met with Alan
Bates and it was a mistake not to do so. At the time I was strongly advised not to
on the grounds of the importance of the scheme’s independence from
Government. I did not challenge this and I should have done so. My reply, sent in
January 2015, is set out further below; the language in it that “the Government
feels strongly that it is paramount that both the scheme and the individual cases
remain both independent and confidential” reflects the clear advice I was given not
to meet Mr Bates or get further involved.
67. Following the Westminster Hall debate I was determined to address MPs’
concerns. Immediately after the debate I had an oral debrief with officials, and I
asked my private office to follow up with ShEx on next steps. In particular I
proposed that MPs should be invited in to the discussions about their constituents’
cases, going through the details of the investigations, obviously subject to the
consent of the affected subpostmaster constituent. I recognised that as Minister I
could not possibly be the arbiter of cases, but sought a way to bridge the gap
between the hugely contradictory accounts I was receiving from MPs on the one
hand and POL on the other. I thought that if MPs could go through the details of
the cases then either they would be convinced by POL’s evidence, or have a
stronger foundation of information with which to challenge POL’s behaviour, and
that either way this would help everyone to untangle where the truth lay. POL were
initially resistant, but I felt empowered to press on this point as it related to
Parliamentary accountability. An email was sent by my private office to Richard
Callard chasing him about this on 7 January 2015 (UKGI00002920 Email dated 7
January 2015 RE: next steps on Horizon debate). He replied on 13 January 2015
which said that a letter would be written ‘this week’ to MPs. In relation to Alan
Bates’ letter a draft response was provided by ShEx which took a “robust position”
because Mr Callard was of the view that much of Mr Bates’ letter was a “fishing
expedition”. Reviewing this email now, Mr Callard was clearly not very open-
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68.
69.
70.
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minded about whether the issues raised in the debate on behalf of SPMs were
valid.
Around this time, I think it must have been after I was told about Richard Callard’s
email of 13 January 2015, I have a vivid memory of standing in the corridor close
to my office, having a conversation with my private office expressing my
exasperation and fury that the debate had still not properly been followed up,
nearly a week after I chased for an update. My understanding had been that POL
would promptly write to MPs who spoke in the debate to address the points they
raised, and no one had come back to me with a reason why POL could not, as I
had proposed, offer to meet with MPs directly to discuss their constituent’s case
details. I assumed this would have been done by the first working days of January
at the very latest. When I realised that this still had not been actioned by 13
January, some four weeks after the debate, I was very angry. I recall the
suggestion that the Christmas holidays had got in the way, to which I gave short
shrift having myself worked during the break, and in the context of the previous
tensions about very high pay packages for senior POL staff. I am not sure when
the correspondence from POL to MPs was eventually sent.
On 15 January 2015, my private office received an email from Mark Davies of POL
attaching the Post Office’s response to the Westminster Hall Debate
(UKGI00003007 Email from Mark Davis to Swinson MPST cc Richard Callard re:
Post Office Response to Westminster Hall debate; UKGI00003008 Post Office
Response to Westminster Hall Debate). I note that it provided various
reassurances, including denying that there were any Horizon errors, re-stating
POL’s understanding of its disclosure duties and that no evidence of unsafe
convictions had been found, and denying there was any remote access capability
in Horizon. It did seem to be a comprehensive document and, in particular, the
repeated and emphatic statements about complying with their disclosure duty did
give me reassurance.
On 28 January 2015, my reply to Alan Bates’ letter of 22 December 2014 was
sent. The delay I think stemmed largely from the fact that I wanted to be able to
report the actions taken following on from the debate, which as described above
took much longer than I anticipated to happen (UKGIO0003111 Letter from Jo
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Swinson MP to Alan Bates re Response to letter dated 22 December about the
mediation scheme). The letter reiterated various assurances provided by POL
about its cooperation with the mediation Scheme, and made the following points:
a. “I said in the debate itself, in these situations ‘what I would normally propose
doing is to get a team of forensic accountants to go through every scenario
and to have the report looked at by someone independent, such as a former
Court of Appeal judge.’ Given that that is what is happening, I think that the
Scheme should therefore be allowed to run its course and I am glad that
you say you will continue to participate in the scheme for the time being,
and it would be inappropriate for me to intervene in what are essentially
private disputes between each applicant and the Post Office.”
71. “Following my encouragement, I understand that Post Office has written to each
MP that spoke during the debate to offer them the opportunity, with the relevant
applicant’s permission, to run through the facts of each confidential case. Whilst
this would not be a substitute for mediation, this approach would offer a way to
ensure that your members’ respective cases are fully understood by Members of
Parliament.”
72. On 3 February 2015 the BIS Select Committee held an evidence session about
Horizon and the Mediation Scheme. I was told about this in advance and provided
a copy of a letter from Sir Anthony Hooper to the Committee. As Minister I would
only attend a Select Committee session when giving evidence myself, but BIS or
ShEx officials would typically be in the room to be able to report back. I did ask
how it had gone and was given a short high-level verbal briefing which said there
was nothing unexpected. I was not, for example, told that lan Henderson from
Second Sight had said that they thought some of the prosecutions by POL were
unsafe (UKGI00013818 3 February 2015 - Post Office mediation - Oral evidence).
In hindsight, I am very surprised that key points like this were not flagged to me.
73. On 19 February 2015, I received a submission from Tim Mcinnes briefing for me
my upcoming meeting with George Thomson (UKGI00017945 Meeting Brief from
Tim McInnes to Jo Swinson - Re: Meeting with NFSP - Horizon Mediation Scheme
and Network Transformation). Relevantly to the inquiry, it stated: “Horizon
Mediation Scheme: Further advice on this matter will follow shortly, but it is worth
noting that George Thomson was very supportive of POL during the recent BIS
Select Committee hearing and does not consider there to be faults with the
Horizon system. He is however privately critical of POL for not having closed this
issue down sooner. While the mediation scheme is independent of Government,
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you may wish to seek George’s views on the issue.” NFSP was a key stakeholder
for the postal affairs part of my portfolio, and influential due to their large network
of members right across the country. I met them regularly, and as they were the
main representative voice for subpostmasters their position on this was an
additional reassurance to me. I cannot recall if I did ask about Horizon at this
particular meeting with Mr Thomson but I do recall discussing the issue briefly on
at least one occasion, and not hearing any particular concern expressed about
POL’s approach.
. I recall that at some point around this time, in late February or early March, Richard
Callard briefed me verbally - in strict confidence and with an indication that he was
telling me things he should not be - on POL’s decision to close the Working Group
and mediate all non-criminal cases, while referring the criminal cases to the
CCRC. Without access to my diary records or meeting notes, I do not know the
precise date of this briefing, but I believe it was shortly before I received the written
submission of 4 March (see below). I recall he showed me a sheet of paper which
had a table on it outlining options with various factors, but would not let me take it
away to study or keep it, as he said it was a confidential POL Board paper (I
accepted this at face value and did not question it at the time, as I was engaging
more with the content than the reason for confidentiality). It is not one of the
documents I have been shown by the Inquiry so far, nor by DBT when I visited in
2022 to look over relevant documents from my time in office. He was outlining to
me POL’s proposed next steps with the mediation process, to sense check
whether it sounded reasonable, but not asking me to make any kind of decision. I
recall feeling somewhat uncomfortable about the nature of the briefing and the
steps POL were taking, because the Working Group had seemed a positive and
constructive solution to find a way through the competing concerns. However I did
recognise that the Working Group process seemed to have lost the faith of
everyone involved by this stage. James Arbuthnot MP had called for all cases to
be mediated, and so I believed that this would help expedite the process in a
positive way. I realised there would be disappointment that the criminal cases were
to be excluded, but I did think it was a reasonable argument that these needed to
be dealt with by the CCRC rather than mediation. Ongoing support from POL for
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Second Sight’s involvement was emphasised so I did not anticipate that they
would be removed from the process.
75. On 5 March 2015, I then received a submission from Laura Thompson of ShEx
titled “Post Office mediation scheme: revised approach” (UKGI00000032 Email
from Laura Thompson to Jo Swinson Re Post Office mediation scheme: revised
approach). The submission sets out criticism of Second Sight, and states that
“From POL’s point of view, the investigation scheme has demonstrated that there
is no evidence of systemic flaws in Horizon and no evidence that any of the
convictions are unsafe.” On page 2 it then sets out the plan to accelerate mediation
and therefore for the closure of the Working Group in the following terms:
“5. POL’s Board have agreed that, effective from next week, they will
announce that POL will adopt a presumption of mediating all non-criminal
cases remaining in the scheme (except in some very exceptional
circumstances). This will render redundant the role of the Working Group so
it will be closed. POL will terminate their engagement with Second Sight, but
provide funding for any applicants who wish to have Second Sight or other
forensic accountants produce a report on their case before mediation.”
76. The most important part of the submission, from my perspective, would have been
the “purpose” and “recommendation” sections at the top of the first page. These
set out what it is that is needed from me and the key context. These parts read as
follows:
“Purpose: Post Office intend to change their approach to the mediation
scheme dealing with complaints about Horizon, on the basis that the
scheme is not working in the way it was intended. This submission is to
inform you of POL’s planned changes, and seek your views on how we
should engage stakeholders, particularly Parliament.
Recommendation:
That you note the changes POL intends to make to the scheme, the timing
and handling of these, and likely stakeholder reaction
That you agree that on balance Government does not notify Parliament by
Written Ministerial Statement on the day of the announcement, noting that
this is a finely balanced decision and there is the risk of an Urgent Question
being tabled (which we will take steps to mitigate)”
77. Being asked to ‘note’ and to ‘agree’ things are common in submissions. Attention
is drawn, and priority given, to things that need to be agreed, because they require
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78.
79.
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a specific decision to be taken. In this case, the description of the decision about
tabling a written statement as “finely balanced” further directed my attention to this
particular issue as the part that I needed to spend most time thinking about.
I have been shown a document dated 25 February 2015, which is a working draft
of this submission. (UKGI00003390 Post Office Mediation Scheme Update )
It was, as far as I understand, sent by Laura Thompson to Richard Callard
for comment. Richard Callard’s comments (and one comment from Laura
Thompson) are included on the document. In this early draft, the purpose and
recommendation sections are quite different, reading:
“Purpose: To update you on the current state of the Post Office’s mediation
scheme dealing with complaints about the Horizon system, and seek your
agreement to POL’s proposed approach in light of likely next steps.
Recommendation: That you:
a) Note the current state of the scheme and the cases within it;
b) Note the possible events of the next month or so; and
c) Agree to POL’s proposed approach, recognising that they will need to
adapt it to react to specific circumstances. (and they are still working
through specifics)”
In the comments on the draft, Laura Thompson writes “CHECK: are we seeking
her [i.e. my] agreement?” to which Richard Callard replies “Probably not at this
stage. Think this is more of a sighting submission, and if she objects she would
no doubt say. And it’s not her scheme.” The draft contains a detailed section titled
“POL’s proposed approach” which contains, among other things, the following:
a. “The advantages of this approach are that it renders the role of the working
group redundant (which is helpful as JFSA increasingly refuse to take part),
and it reduces the scope for Second Sight or JFSA to continue to broaden
the scope of the scheme. However, it will need careful handling with both
participants and the media to avoid the implication that POL are seeking to
“hide the truth” or “gag” Second Sight.”
b. “We therefore recommend supporting POL’s proposed approach but it might
get choppy.”
c. “Whether leaked or not, the Second Sight final report will give POL a hook
to determine that it is time to amend the terms of Second Sight’s
engagement and limit their involvement to reviewing the specific individual
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cases remaining in the scheme. POL are considering optimal timing
(including a pre-emptive strike ?).”
80. This is substantially different from the submission I eventually received. It seems
to me that it was appreciated when the draft submission was written that the likely
impression from POL’s planned approach was that Second Sight would be seen
to have been sacked or gagged, and this was something which needed Ministerial
consideration. It was an issue that might, in Laura Thompson’s words, “get
choppy’. In the final submission I was given on 5 March, there is no hint of this
potential risk with the approach, and I was asked only to note it, not to approve it.
The final submission does not draw attention to the possible risks of removing
Second Sight, but paints it (at paragraph 5) as an apparently natural (and not
notably controversial) consequence of POL’s approach to “ensure that the
remaining cases in the scheme can be heard as swiftly as practicable’.
81. The earlier draft of the submission contained exactly the kind of advice that
Ministers should be able to expect from civil service briefings, namely identifying
and succinctly highlighting risks and consequences of proposed actions, so that
the Minister can quickly be appraised of a situation and consider their response.
The final version skated over the risks and did not suggest any opportunity to
question POL’s approach.
82. I recall my surprise following PMQs the next week at hearing the suggestion that
Second Sight had been sacked. I considered this at the time not to be true, given
what I had been told. Looking back at it now, within the context of Project Sparrow
discussions over the preceding months (some of which I am now aware of, but
was not at the time) and the knowledge I have now that Second Sight were bound
by confidentiality and told to destroy their documents by POL, it is clear that they
were sacked and prevented from speaking out about their concerns. It raises
serious questions about how Ministers can discharge their responsibilities, if civil
service briefings cannot be relied upon to provide an objective assessment, as
appears to have happened here.
83. I am also suspicious about the timing of this submission. Documents I have now
seen for the purposes of the Inquiry show that discussions about reducing the role
of Second Sight were taking place in the Project Sparrow Sub-committee as early
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84.
85.
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as April 2014. Yet in the months that followed Richard Callard, who was on that
Sub-committee, did not brief me on what POL was planning. My support for
Second Sight’s role in the process was clear from the Westminster Hall debate in
December 2014, and I think Mr Callard was well aware that the way that the 25
February 2015 version of the submission was framed would have raised alarm
bells for me and I would have objected. I do not think it is a coincidence that POL
made this move during the busy final few weeks of the Parliamentary session,
when my time was even more limited than usual, because I still had two Bills to
shepherd through their final stages in Parliament (the Consumer Rights Act and
the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act), and because I would shortly
be out of office and therefore had less power (this change was considered to be a
certainty regardless of the election result, to the extent that I took my private office
for a farewell lunch in the third week of March). It also meant there would be a
period with no Parliamentary accountability during the General Election campaign,
and then a new Minister getting to grips with the issues from scratch.
On review of the submission, as always I probed and sought clarification on a
number of matters, as outlined in the email from my private office (UKGI00000923
Email from Richard Callard to Swinson MPST, Laura Thompson, Cable MPST and
others re: Submission on Post Office Horizon mediation scheme). In particular, I
asked about how many cases would not be mediated because they involved
criminal convictions and whether POL would mediate any cases involving criminal
convictions, and if so in what circumstances. The answer in reply was that criminal
cases would only be mediated “in exceptional circumstances e.g. when say a
relative of the subpostmaster, and not the subpostmaster themselves, was
convicted of fraud or theft, or where the matter for mediation relates does not relate
[sic] to the conviction directly’ and that 37 cases involved a criminal conviction.
As I explained at the start of this statement, given the breadth of my portfolio and
demands on my time, I relied upon my officials to draw my attention to the key
points and matter for decision in any submission rather than leave me to second-
guess what was important. As I considered this submission my attention focused
on whether and in what form to give a Written Ministerial Statement, which was
what I was asked to decide by the submission. Contrary to the advice from Richard
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86.
87.
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Callard, I wanted to make a Written Ministerial Statement that referred to a letter
from Paula Vennells on behalf of POL explaining the situation and giving clear
assurances about the various concerns that had been raised about Horizon and
the safety of prosecutions. Ultimately No 10 refused permission to make a Written
Ministerial Statement and instead I simply placed the letter in the House of
Commons Library, a standard procedure to make the information available to MPs.
This is dealt with in emails between ShEx and my private office (UKGI00000923;
UKGI00019687; UKGI00019687 Email dated 9 March 2015 Re: submission on
Post Office Horizon mediation scheme; UKGI00003543 Email dated 9 March 2015
POL Horizon WMS materials).
On 9 March 2015 letter I received the letter I had requested from Paula Vennells
(POL00132580 Letter to Jo Swinson from Paula Vennells Chief executive of the
Post Office). This was a key document for me at the time, and still stands out to
me now, because at this important point in the unfolding events, even in the midst
of clearly messy and unhappy circumstances of trust having broken down and the
Working Group ending, it set out very clear assurances that POL had thoroughly
investigated the subpostmasters' complaints and the possibility of unsafe
convictions and found nothing of concern. This letter set out the decision to close
the Working Group and end the contract with Second Sight, though in terms which
stressed the continued role they would play and did not draw attention to the work
they would no longer be completing. It also set out that “as prosecutor Post Office
has a continuing duty after a prosecution has concluded to disclose immediately
any information that subsequently comes to light which might undermine its
prosecution case or support the case of the defendant. Having now completed its
reinvestigation of each of the cases, Post Office has found no reason to conclude
that any original prosecution was unsafe”.
My dealings with POL on this issue were starting to frustrate me, and the
documents show I repeatedly asked questions and probed the various assurances
I was given. The fact that the courts had considered the available evidence and
repeatedly reached judgments in POL’s favour or convicted subpostmasters also
weighed significantly in my mind. There also appeared to be a strong commitment
to the legal (and moral) duty to disclose anything that would undermine the
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88.
89.
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convictions, as emphasised by Paula Vennells both in the letter and face to face,
in earnest, who spoke not only with the standing of a CEO of a major institution,
but also with the moral authority of an ordained vicar. It followed a number of
different investigations, reviews and professional advice which, I was told, had not
led to any concerns about the safety of any prosecutions. Finally, the judicial route
for review was being pursued through the CCRC. I was reassured by the
combination of all these factors.
On 10 March 2015, Alan Bates sent an email to BIS for my attention
(UKGI00003684 Email from trail from Swinson mpst to Laura Thompson and Alan
Bates re FW: Post Office Press Release today). This was passed on to my private
office, who in turn passed it to ShEx for reply. In this email, Alan Bates set out his
understanding of what had happened with Second Sight, saying that they have
been gagged and that POL has failed to provide them with documentation. He
asked if I was aware of and approved POL’s actions in this regard.
On 11 March 2015 I received a submission from Laura Thompson which was
addressed jointly to me and to Vince Cable, the Secretary of State
(UKGI00000053 Briefing from Laura Thompson to Secretary of State and Jo
Swinson MP re. Post Office Mediation Scheme: Letters). Attached to the
submission was Mr Bates’ email and a draft response (UKGI00003891 Email from
Alan Bates and draft response dated March 2015). I was not happy with the draft
response and made some comments. In particular, I recall challenging the line
about the Second Sight thematic report: “The Government cannot compel its
publication and nor would we do so”. I wanted to change the wording because I
would have preferred to have the report published had we been in a position to
compel its publication. In the end this wording remained, as I reluctantly accepted
there was a confidentiality argument, which was reflected in the wording “given
the confidential nature of details within it.” The Secretary of State was also
included because the Prime Minster had, in response to a question in Prime
Minister's Questions from James Arbuthnot MP, said that he would write to Mr
Arbuthnot. The question had stated that “the Post Office has just sacked the
independent investigators Second Sight and told them to destroy all their papers’.
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90.
91.
92.
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The submission, in respect of this allegation, straightforwardly said “This is
untrue.” It then set out what was, effectively, POL’s explanation of what happened.
I have been shown by the Inquiry an exchange between ShEx, the BIS Ministerial
Advice Team and my private office dated 11 March 2015 regarding the possibility
that James Arbuthnot would ask a question at PMQs and an attached draft
response (UKGI00003721 Email chain from Ministerial Advice Team to Laura
Thompson cc'ing Richard Callard and Ministerial Advice Team Re: No10 PMQ
urgent Query - Post Office UKGI00003722 Possible Question: Post Office
Computer System - complaints lead by James Arbuthnot over mediation scheme
about Horizon).
I have also been shown an exchange between Laura Thompson and Vince
Cable’s private office regarding his draft response to James Arbuthnot
(UKGI00003733 Email thread from Cable MPST to Laura Thompson, Swinson
MPST, cc Hannah Franklin-Wallis and others RE: PMQs today.) and a letter from
James Arbuthnot to Vince Cable (UKGI00003781 Letter from James Arbuthnot to
Vince Cable MP, re Post Office Mediation Scheme UKGI00003780 Email from
Cable MPST (Claire) to Laura Thompson, Swinson MPST RE: Letter from Rt Hon
James Arbuthnot MP - PMQs/Post Office), both dated 11 March 2015.
On 16 March 2015, Laura Thompson sent my private office an amended draft
response to Alan Bates (UKGI00003913 Email dated 18 March 2015 RE: Post
Office: reply to Alan Bates). In the same email, she attempted to clarify the
relationship between Second Sight and POL in answer to a question I had asked
stating:
“A bit of additional comment on the point about whether Second Sight were
“employed” by POL. Technically, Second Sight were not employed by POL,
they were engaged under contract by POL. This contract was to provide a
number of services to the Working Group - and now that the Working Group
has closed, it makes sense that POL are bringing to an end that
arrangement which is now outdated (given how the role of the WG has
moved since the scheme began).
I appreciate that “engaged by” rather than “employed by” could sound a bit
like semantics. As such, I haven't proposed a rebuttal of Mr Bates’ point, but
just set out the position instead (using similar language to that used by POL
in their press responses and correspondence - although slightly more
placatory than their line). It’s also important, I think, to note that a lot of the
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arguments being waged around this issue rely a lot on_ wilful
misinterpretation of language or statement - such as the accusation that
Second Sight “have been sacked and forced to destroy documents”, for
example.”
93. On reviewing this second draft, I was concerned that it still did not fully address
Alan Bates’ point about the relationship between POL and Second Sight. My
concerns were relayed to Laura Thompson by my private office in these terms
(UKGI00003913):
“Jo has seen this revised version of the letter but unfortunately she still has
some concerns that we have not directly addressed JFSA’s point around
the nature of the relationship between Second Sight and POL.
JFSA assert that Jo’s letter of 22"4 September 2013 gave them assurance
that Second Sight’s independence should not be questioned because they
were not employed by POL. The Minister acknowledges that it is a
contractual, rather than an employment relationship but what the current
letter does not address is why we believed that Second Sight’s
independence was not in question but that it is also right that the decision
to end the current contractual relationship was a decision for POL and not
the working group.”
94. On 19 March 2015, the reply was sent to Alan Bates (POL00102385 Letter to Alan
Bates dated 19 March 2015).
95. On 20 March 2015, Alan Bates replied asking that I be thanked for my response
but seeking clarification on whether I was aware of and approved the decision to
close the Working Group (UKGI00004010 Email dated 25 March 2015: eCase
MCB2015-06376- Alan Bates). As described below, Laura Thompson replied to
this on 2 April 2015.
96. On 24 March 2015, my private office was given a draft of a letter to be sent to
Adrian Bailey MP, chair of the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee
by Vince Cable (UKGI00004006 Email dated 24 March 2015: FW: Post Office
mediation: response to letter from BIS Select Committee; UKGI00003918 Post
Office Mediation Scheme letter dated March 2015). This was sent to my private
office because the letter, concerning issues around the Mediation Scheme, was
within my Ministerial remit. I reviewed the letter, and was unhappy with the position
taken by ShEx that the Government should not receive a copy of Second Sight’s
final report, which was contrary to the BIS Select Committee’s recommendation.
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97. The response from Laura Thompson was that their advice remained that
Government should not have the report, because it was not necessary (as a copy
was retained by POL and they would not destroy documents) and because the
report dealt with “operational matters” and “It is Government policy that we do not
intervene in operational matters for POL, and as such, we do not think it would be
appropriate for HMG to request a copy”. She went on:
“We strongly advise the Minister that Government should maintain its
independence here. This is important because, if Government were to
request (and receive) a copy of the report, it becomes implicit that
Government could be called upon to respond to the report, and potentially
to become more involved in the mediation scheme. Moreover, our wider
policy on Post Office is that we set the parameters for POL to operate and
we then allow POL the freedom to operate - blurring that line here could lead
to pressure to do so again in the future”.
98. I was not satisfied with this reasoning. Firstly, I took the view that we should follow
the Select Committee recommendation unless there was a compelling reason not
to do so. Secondly, while I had reluctantly accepted the confidentiality argument
about not making the report publicly available as set out above at paragraph 82
(though with hindsight this concern could have been addressed in other ways such
as through redaction of specific case details), I considered that this argument
could not possibly apply to whether Government should be provided with a private
copy, This was relayed to Laura Thompson, who accepted that the Government
would receive a copy and as I understand it arranged with POL for this to be done.
The letter to Adrian Bailey MP was sent on 26 March 2015 (POL00039281 Post
Office Mediation Scheme letter dated 26 March 2015).
99. On 26 March 2015, the parliamentary session came to an end and Parliament was
prorogued, then dissolved for the election on 30 March 2015 (WITN10190105 End
of the 2014-15 Parliamentary session 27 March 2015). From this point, while I was
still the Minister formally, in reality no significant decisions could be made due to
pre-election purdah and I was required to seek re-election in my constituency.
100. On31 March 2015, the Criminal Cases Review Commission sent a letter to me
instructing BIS to retain documents in cases relating to Horizon/POL. This was
dealt with by my private office (UKGI00004093 Letter from Criminal Cases Review
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Commission (CCRC) to Ms J Swinson MP requesting evidence from BIS under
Criminal Appeal Act 1995).
101. On 2 April 2015, my private office was copied into Laura Thompson's reply to
Alan Bates’ email dated 20 March 2015. She stated that on 9 March 2015, I had
been informed by Paula Vennells of the details relating to the closure of the
Working Group. In fact, as explained above, this was not the full picture. Richard
Callard had an informal conversation with me in around late February/early March
and I was then informed of POL’s decision on 5 March 2015 in Laura Thompson's
submission. I was not asked to approve the plan, nor did officials clearly present
to me all the risks they had identified.
SECTION 2: ANSWERS TO THE INQUIRY’S QUESTIONS
Background
102. Iwas first elected to the House of Commons in 2005 as a Liberal Democrat MP.
At 25, I was the youngest MP at the time; the ‘Baby of the House’. Before
becoming an MP, I had worked in a variety of marketing roles including for a radio
station, a media company and a public health association.
103. After the 2010 election, the Liberal Democrats formed the Coalition
Government with the Conservatives. In November 2010, I was appointed as
Parliamentary Private Secretary (“PPS”) to Vince Cable (the Business Secretary
at the time) and I served in that role until February 2012, when I became
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Nick Clegg, then the leader of the Liberal
Democrats and the Deputy Prime Minister. The Post Office did not feature at all in
any of these roles with the exception of being PPS to Vince Cable. In that role I
supported Vince in his relationships with MPs, including organising meetings in
the House of Commons during evenings when there were late votes. On occasion
these would involve an MP discussing their local post office, but to my knowledge
Horizon did not come up.
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104. Between 2015 and 2017 I worked as a self-employed consultant in the area of
gender equality and wrote a book. In 2017, I ran for Parliament and was again
elected. I served as deputy leader, then leader, of the Liberal Democrats and as
an MP until 2019. I am currently the Director of Partners for a New Economy.
Knowledge of the Horizon IT System
105. I did not know about the Horizon system or the complaints which
subpostmasters were making about it at the time I was first appointed as Minister
in September 2012. As set out above, it was not mentioned in my early briefings
for meetings relating to postal affairs and POL. There was reference to Horizon
issues in the submission about a freedom of information request which was
provided to me in October 2012, but this contained little detail. The first time I
became aware of the Horizon situation to any significant extent (that is, the first
time I was informed it was an issue that required my attention) was around June
2013, as the chronology above sets out.
106. Whilst! would have known by June 2013 (I cannot say exactly when, as I might
have registered this from the Alan Bates correspondence) that some
subpostmasters had been convicted and gone to prison, I did not know initially
that they were prosecuted by POL. My assumption would have been that they
were investigated and prosecuted in the normal way by the police and CPS.
Because I was not aware that RMG/POL were responsible for prosecutions, I did
not know or think about who in those organisations might be responsible for those
prosecutions. By the time of making the statement to the House of Commons in
July 2013 I had been briefed that POL were a prosecuting authority, though I do
not believe I ever understood how unusual their investigations and prosecutions
were, nor did I receive consistent advice on this when I later asked questions about
their particular powers. I note, for example, that after the Westminster Hall debate
in December 2014 the response document I received from POL said that their
approach to prosecutions “is the same as for any other individual or organisation
and Post Office is not unique in bringing its own prosecutions”, which did not really
reflect the reality on the ground (UKGI00003008 Post Office Response to
Westminster Hall Debate, paragraph 49).
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107. After the initial flurry of Parliamentary activity around the interim Second Sight
report, the focus was the Working Group, the case investigations and mediation
process. At first this all seemed to progress well. It was only in the autumn of 2014
when I had returned from maternity leave that I became aware, through
submissions, media reports, correspondence and MP concerns that the issue
seemed increasingly problematic. The Westminster Hall debate in December 2014
reinforced this, and it became increasingly clear that there was a breakdown in
trust between the parties on the Working Group, culminating in Post Office's
decision to close it.
Oversight of POL
108. I have set out my Ministerial portfolio and responsibilities above. I considered
that I had a role in oversight of POL from a strategic and political perspective, on
matters such as the future sustainability of the network or securing sufficient
government support through subsidy and contracts for government services. I had
the support of teams of civil servants both within BIS and DCMS; my private office
and various officials with specialist knowledge of all the policy areas. In relation to
postal affairs, the relevant officials were part of ShEx. At the time, I did not see
them as being different from or separate to BIS generally and its civil servants, but
they specialised in POL and were who I relied on for matters relating to it. I also
had the support of my private office, as with all matters, who I rated highly, but in
terms of expertise on POL they would defer to ShEx.
109. The issues relating to Horizon were among a number of important issues in the
postal services part of my brief, alongside getting the health of the post office
network onto a secure footing, increasing government services contracts and
taking steps towards mutualisation. As outlined above, postal services themselves
were only one part of a busy Ministerial portfolio which included taking 5 Bills
through Parliament. Obviously for the 6 months or so before I had been briefed on
the issues they were not a priority because I was unaware of them. In the early
months of the working group there seemed to be constructive engagement and
goodwill and therefore less need for Ministerial attention. In my final six months as
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Minister it was definitely more of a priority, though as explained above, this was
also a hectic time approaching the dissolution of Parliament.
110. I thought of POL more as a much-loved national institution than a company. I
was well aware of how post offices were one of the few issues to unite MPs in
support, no matter what political viewpoint they represented. Everyone
appreciates the role post offices play in their community, and as such it felt very
important to ensure that the network could thrive and grow instead of be
diminished by closure programmes as had happened in previous years.
111. Iam and was familiar with arms-length bodies, and there were others which fell
under my ministerial remit such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission,
the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and
ACAS. I thought of POL as one among these ALBs, an institution which the
Department had an interest in and in relation to which I had a responsibility to deal
with Parliamentary matters when they arose. I did not differentiate between BIS’s
role as a shareholder and as the relevant Government Department in this respect.
It made sense to me that if there were substantial issues it was right for MPs to
raise them with me as the Minister and, for something really significant, with the
Secretary of State.
112. However, I do find the accountability placed on Ministers for POL was not
matched with the levers available to Ministers to affect or influence what POL was
doing. It was always made clear to me that it was not for me as Minister to interfere
with operational matters, and it was only feasible to engage with the most serious
and strategically important objective and aims of the Post Office. I did not ask
many questions at the time about the precise nature and limits of the
Government's role as Shareholder and the extent to which I could get involved in
POL governance. I wish with hindsight that I had asked more questions or
intervened more. Like many aspects of Ministerial life, it was unfamiliar to me and
so I relied heavily on my officials to help me navigate the boundaries of Ministerial
responsibility as opposed to decisions that were properly the responsibility of the
POL executives or Board.
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113. As with other similar bodies over which Government has oversight, the role of
overseeing POL was in practice delegated to officials. I expected officials from
ShEx to keep me briefed and draw my attention to any problems or issues that
needed my input or decision. It would then be up to me as the Minister to decide
what to do with that briefing, and how hard to push or challenge the advice I was
being given.
114. I had regular meetings with and written submissions from ShEx officials and
regular but not frequent meetings with POL itself, including with the CEO Paula
Vennells approximately four times per year and, less frequently, with the Chair
Alice Perkins. When I felt that I needed more information on specific issues, I could
and did ask for additional information. For example, at one stage I think in 2013 I
became concerned about progress on the network transformation programme so
requested data from POL on completed conversions of branches to be provided
on a regular basis, I think fortnightly, to create an accountability mechanism for
this strategic government priority.
115. With POL I thought we had more visibility of what was happening had than for
other organisations because we had a non-executive director (“NED”) from ShEx
on the Board. I relied on them to pass on important information, and many of the
briefings I received were from Richard Callard, the NED during part of my time as
the Minister, or others under his supervision. It never occurred to me at the time
that information from ShEx might be anything other than fully accurate. Indeed,
my experience of the civil service was one of extreme caution in terms of
establishing facts. To illustrate, even when making a political speech as a Minister
that the Department had no role in drafting, for example at party conference, I
would have to submit the text in advance to allow the departmental officials to
check it for accuracy. In hindsight, I now question whether the ShEx officials were
acting as the Government's representative on the POL Board or the POL Board’s
representative in Government. It seems it may have been they who had ‘gone
native’, not Second Sight.
116. The permanent secretary, Director General and Deputy Directors would all
have engaged in some form of oversight. My understanding was that Richard
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Callard was a senior official who would have reported to Mark Russell, and more
junior people in ShEx working on POL would have reported to Richard Callard.
But the whole point of ShEx was that they were the experts on managing the
Government's interest in companies it owned, so I do not know exactly how, or at
what levels, the more generalist civil servants at BIS monitored ShEx’s oversight
of POL. I personally was never informed that it was my responsibility to monitor or
oversee ShEx, nor understood that to be any part of my role. I now understand
that ShEx had its own CEO and a separate line of institutional accountability.
117. The distinction between operational and strategic matters was always asserted
in my written and oral briefings by ShEx and BIS officials and understood to be
how things worked. I think I presumed that the basis lay in the legislative
underpinning of POL and typical practice, but I knew little about how Government
worked before becoming a minister and this was my first Ministerial role. It felt
reasonable, as I did not have the expertise or capacity to involve myself in the day-
to-day operational aspects of running a major company like POL.
118. I had regular meetings with POL officials, and separate monthly catchups with
a team of civil servants from ShEx/BIS on post office matters. Additional meetings
would be scheduled as necessary as and when matters arose. Very occasionally
I would meet with Mark Russell, but typically my meetings with ShEx officials would
be with Richard Callard and at more junior levels. I would have regular catch ups
with Secretary of State, though post office issues would typically be one in a long
list of issues to cover, so there would be limited time to discuss each. From time
to time I would also engage with Ministers in other departments about POL,
particularly on the issue of POL being a ‘front office for government’ with services
such as the Post Office Card Account, DVLA and passport applications.
The Second Sight Investigation and Interim Report
119. I was not briefed on the Second Sight investigation when I was first appointed
as Minister. As explained above, I was not briefed on Horizon or any of the issues
associated with it either. The first time I recall learning about the Second Sight
investigation was at a meeting with Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins shortly
before the publication of the interim report, as described above.
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120. As set out above, I cannot be sure whether I actually read the full interim report
at the time or relied upon the summary with which I was provided and gave the
report a quick scan. To the best of my recollection, my overall impression of it was
that it was a bit impenetrable and technical, but there was no ‘smoking gun’ about
Horizon.
The launch of the Mediation Scheme
121. Iwasnot consulted about the Mediation Scheme at all as far as I can remember.
The briefings for the 9 July Statement set out a proposed process that seems to
have evolved into the Mediation Scheme so it wasn’t a surprise, but it made sense
that the details would be worked out. Paula Vennells did tell me about it once it
was up and running, and I think I also had a call with James Arbuthnot at some
point where he described what it entailed.
122. On financial compensation, I was told about this later (POL00116720 Letter to
Jo Swinson from Chris Aujard and Paula Vennells Re: Initial Complaint Review
and Mediation Scheme), but in the context of it being about training errors and
lack of support in using Horizon, not a massive miscarriage of justice. Indeed, I
was repeatedly reassured that there was no evidence of any miscarriage of justice
and if anything came to light it would be disclosed. Because I understood the
compensation to be for poor training and the like, I did not expect the scale of
financial compensation to be large.
The Helen Rose report and Simon Clarke advice:
123. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to POL00022598, POL00006357 and
POL00129453. I had never seen any of these documents until they were shown
to me in the course of preparing for the Inquiry. I first became aware of the
existence of the Clarke advice via reporting of the court case in 2021. I note that
Simon Clarke’s 15 July 2013 advice was prepared only a few days after I made
the Statement to the House of Commons on Horizon issues. In hindsight it is truly
astonishing to me that I was given the information by POL for the purposes of that
Statement that there was no evidence of any conviction being unsafe, and that
very shortly afterwards POL was in receipt of advice that their key witness in
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several Horizon prosecutions was in breach of his duties as an expert, yet I was
never informed of this and the POL line never changed over the following 20
months when I was subsequently briefed or updated on Horizon issues.
Concerns about risk of unsafe convictions
124. I did start to become concerned and uncomfortable about the briefings I was
receiving on the issue through late 2014 and early 2015, particularly after the
Westminster Hall debate where so many MPs strongly expressed concerns about
POL’s behaviour and approach, which is why I sought further detail, information
and assurances. I would not go so far as to say I was believed there was a
significant risk that convictions were unsafe, as I found it hard to imagine that
multiple investigations and courts had examined the facts and separately all
reached erroneous convictions. Yet it was strange that it seemed so hard to prove
it either way whether POL’s position was right or wrong. I found it extremely difficult
to determine where the truth lay. I accept that I may perhaps have put too much
weight on the fact that there had been multiple convictions in the criminal courts;
that this was not one decision but many decisions on different facts.
125. Whilst I did think ‘is there something here?’, I was ultimately reassured towards
the end of my time as Minister by the letter from Paula Vennells on 9 March 2015
(POL00132580 Letter to Jo Swinson from Paula Vennells Chief executive of the
post office) which stated explicitly and clearly that POL was aware it had an
ongoing duty of disclosure, that each case was re-investigated, and that there was
no evidence that convictions were unsafe. I now know this was not accurate, but
then it seemed I had no basis to conclude that what the CEO of POL had told me
straightforwardly in writing was false.
Oversight of Mediation Scheme
126. I understood from ShEx that Government was to remain ‘hands-off’ about the
Mediation Scheme, as it was a confidential process conducted according to
specific mediation principles. Until the leak of the Second Sight thematic issues
report I therefore had no involvement beyond receiving brief updates from the
team such as one sentence in a briefing on my return from maternity leave
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(UKGI00002333 Agenda for Post Office shareholder team update). When that
media interest happened I asked for a briefing. I tried to push harder and I thought
that Sir Anthony Hooper's view would be a useful objective perspective to seek,
since despite having apparently been critical of some of Second Sight’s work he
did not criticise this report. However the ShEx response to my questions told me
it was inappropriate to contact Sir Anthony Hooper to ask him for more detail. I
think that I was getting a bit frustrated at this point, because I was obviously aware
of the earlier complaints and criticisms from Alan Bates and others, and felt I was
trying to ask but getting push back.
127. To try to resolve the contradictory accounts I was receiving from POL and the
MPs / JFSA, I again sought input from Sir Anthony Hooper in advance of the
Westminster Hall debate, but he declined to meet with me. His decision on
grounds of propriety also had the impact of reinforcing the message I was
receiving about the importance of Government staying separate from the scheme.
128. I do wish I had asked to meet with Second Sight, though I am pretty certain if I
had that ShEx would have told me this was not possible due to operational
independence. I feel let down by a failure of briefing from ShEx. Richard Callard
was on the Board and knew what was going on for months with steps towards
sacking Second Sight and the closure of the Working Group, but he did not tell
me. I was repeatedly advised in briefings that it was an operational matter, so not
one for me to be involved in, but looking back it was not clear that the POL Board
or anyone else was conducting an adequate oversight function.
129. As explained above at paragraph 74 Richard Callard briefed me in person
shortly before the submission was provided about the closure of the Working
Group. He gave the impression of being particularly helpful, in sharing some
information on a piece of paper that he should apparently not have shown to me,
as it was supposed to be confidential to the POL Board. That led me to believe
that I was being given a full picture, though in reality it was a very partial one,
which misrepresented the future role for Second Sight and the motivation for
making the change.
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130. While I did see the merits of expediting most cases to mediation, and referring
criminal cases into the CCRC process that would actually have the powers to
resolve them, if I had been told Second Sight were to be sacked and bound by
confidentiality, and documents were to be destroyed, I would have certainly
expressed a strong objection. Indeed, I remember challenging the point about
Second Sight having to destroy documents when learning about this in later
correspondence.
131. I feel that instead of being provided with the important information on POL’s
motivations and plans in a timely way, I was kept at arms’ length and was being
‘managed’, especially given the timing around the election. When asked to ‘note’
something, a Minister is receiving information about things that have been done
or decided by others, as opposed to being asked to make a decision themselves.
Inevitably matters for decision demand greater consideration.
34, Knowledge of Deloitte's Project Zebra work
132. As set out above at paragraphs 41-42 I cannot recall specific reference to
Deloitte’s work. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to the document at
POL00130618. I do not recall having any knowledge of the existence, content or
gist of this report.
Concerns about Paula Vennells or Chris Day
133. Ihave dealt with this extensively above. I was never shown UKGI00002440 and
do not recall being made aware of the concerns expressed within it. In July 2014,
when I returned from maternity leave, I was aware that there was a general issue
that POL wanted a new CFO who wanted a high salary. This could not happen,
due to measures put in place as part of the Government's austerity programme,
without special approval. For this to happen, BIS would have needed to approach
HM Treasury. I do recall seeing a submission about this and speaking to Jenny
Willott about it to check whether it had been discussed with her as it was soon
after my return from maternity leave. I cannot remember our precise conversation
but the impression I got was that she had certainly not given the green light for
hiring an expensive new CFO.
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134. As noted above in the chronology section, I do not recall Alice Perkins ever
mentioning that she was considering removing Paula Vennells. I also never got an
impression from Richard Callard, who I understand wrote UKGI00002440, that he
or the Board were concerned about Paula Vennells. As the CEO of POL is an
appointment made by the Secretary of State for BIS this was clearly strategic, not
operational, and I am surprised that I was not made aware of these concerns.
APPG meeting on 24 February 2015
135. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to a note of a meeting of the All-Party
Parliamentary Group for Post Offices on 24 February 2015 (NFSP00001177). I do
not specifically recall this APPG meeting but have no reason to doubt that Paula
Vennells’ comment is accurately recorded as: “Regarding the Horizon enquiry, Ms
Vennells said that POL had now completed investigating all applicants to the
mediation scheme. The investigation had demonstrated that the Horizon system
works, and has been proved to be robust and reliable.” This was POL’s consistent
line on Horizon issues in all my briefings, and at the time it would have seemed
uncontroversial and unsurprising to me.
NFSP
136. 1Ido not recall that Horizon issues came up substantially in my dealings with the
NFSP, beyond a brief conversation which left the impression that they were not
concerned. I do remember discussing many other issues with the NFSP, who were
considered a key stakeholder in POL matters. They represented thousands of
subpostmasters and if they were to run a campaign against POL or the
Government, it would be a mass campaign which would get significant traction
and put unwelcome pressure on Government MPs, so this was to be avoided if at
all possible. But on Horizon, I understood they were on side with POL, which was
reassuring, as they seemed more than willing to criticise POL on other matters.
Fujitsu
137. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to email chains in November and December
2013 regarding a meeting with Fujitsu (UKG100002168 and UKGI00002181). This
would not have been something I saw, and I do not recall seeing it. I would only
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have been aware of the outcome, which in this case was the advice that I should
not meet with the representative from Fujitsu. My diary was always under pressure
and I could not accommodate all of the meeting requests and events that I was
advised to accept, therefore I would almost always accept advice that said a
meeting was unnecessary. I did have some dealings with Fujitsu but this was only
in the context of work on corporate transparency and women on boards. I do not
know what the BIS view of Fujitsu was.
General
138. This affair has clearly been a horrendous miscarriage of justice, compounded
by obstruction and delay. As the full details have emerged through the court
judgments and this Inquiry, naturally I have been reflecting on my role and what
more I might have done. I do believe I did challenge POL and ShEx officials, asking
many of the right questions, but I am deeply sorry that my efforts were ultimately
not enough to expedite justice. Looking back now there are various moments
where I wish I had done something differently.
139. At one point I was told that the Post Office was going to stop prosecutions of
subpostmasters except in a small category of cases. I am not sure exactly when
this was, though it would likely have been in late 2013 or when I returned from
maternity leave in summer 2014, and I don’t think this change of policy was the
subject of a written briefing note to me. I recall it being mentioned verbally and me
saying something like ‘About bloody time!’. It seemed to me from MPs’
descriptions of their constituents’ experiences that the previous approach had
been rather heavy-handed rather than focused on support, and that prosecution
ought to be more of a last resort in extreme cases only. At this point I wish I had
not just accepted it as a positive step, but had explored the reasoning for this in
detail. Perhaps if I had asked for a briefing outlining the analysis and case for
changing policy it would have uncovered something. Though I doubt they would
have disclosed that they had received legal advice that indicated their key
prosecution witness could no longer be used.
140. I regret not meeting Alan Bates and JFSA. His correspondence has proved
prescient on so many of the issues, and it is clear to me now that his judgement
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of what was happening was spot on. Jenny Willott had recently met him and a
JFSA group while covering my maternity leave so from the Department's
perspective that meeting had been ‘done’, but of course that meant I personally
had not had the benefit of hearing directly from Mr Bates and his colleagues.
141. Another group I ought to have met is Second Sight, rather than just asking them
to meet MPs and asking my officials to be in touch with them on my behalf. If I had
been made aware of their evidence to the BIS Select Committee, I think it is likely
I would have asked to see them.
142. I tried to get input from Sir Anthony Hooper both in September and December
2014 to help me form a more rounded view of the mediation process to check what
I was being told. It may be that this was always going to be impossible in terms of
his role in the working group, but having seen in the course of the Inquiry that he
did meet informally with POL, I do wonder what would have happened had we
been able to have a conversation.
143. In February and March of 2015, I wish I had spotted the underlying agenda. I
did ask questions and give scrutiny, but while I was getting frustrated with POL I
was not second guessing my own officials, including those in ShEx. I trusted that
they were giving me accurate briefing and with the benefit of a place on the POL
Board I believed that they would be upfront and flag to me if there was something
important POL were not telling me. If I had been looking with the scepticism of
someone who thought they were being lied to, I may have pushed back and asked
many more questions when I received the 4 March submission.
144. Technically I was still the Minister in March-April 2015, though Parliament had
dissolved and we were in the pre-election ‘purdah’ period. This means that most
Ministerial work effectively ceases and boxes are not sent. I had a couple of
conversations with my private office, such as about the CCRC request on data
retention outlined earlier. The Second Sight report was leaked in April, and I asked
my private office to read it and tell me if there was anything significant in it that I
should know. In the heat of a general election campaign, I did not read it myself. I
regret this. If I had, I think it would have raised alarm bells for me, in particular the
section outlining concerns that some decisions to prosecute may have been
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contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors. I think it likely, however, that had I
asked I would have received a reply citing confidence in all convictions given the
extensive investigations undertaken by POL, and legal assurance they had to back
it up. I do not know why the final Second Sight report did not raise red flags within
BIS, whether in April 2015 when it was leaked, or when a formal copy was sent to
BIS, or in subsequent years.
145. I did probe and push, but I have asked myself why did I not push harder? For
me, the separation between the Government and judicial processes weighed
significantly on my mind. I was conscious in my actions and my public remarks of
not undermining the courts or suggesting that decisions they had reached were
wrong. I did not believe it was my place as a Minister to do that. The ongoing
disclosure duty also seemed unambiguous, serious and a strong protection
against unsafe convictions continuing to stand. It did not cross my mind that the
cast iron assurances I received about POL’s compliance with such a serious legal
responsibility would turn out to be false.
146. Thinking about recommendations for future oversight and governance of POL,
and indeed other entities where Government is the shareholder, I think there is a
real risk of capture where the same team of civil servants are discharging both
shareholder and policy advice / oversight functions. Separating out into two teams
would provide more opportunity for challenge.
147. Additionally, the distinction between operational and strategic matters should
be made clear. That could include criteria for which areas or for what reasons or
at what level of concern Government would intervene in decision-making, both
through Ministerial oversight and to guide the behaviour of the relevant civil
servant discharging their role as a Non-Executive Director.
148. The contrast between what I was briefed as Minister and what Richard Callard
knew raises questions for me about civil service advice to Ministers. The answer
cannot be for Ministers not to trust the advice they are getting, as Government
would grind to a halt. So there do need to be better mechanisms for oversight
within the civil service to ensure that full and frank advice is provided. The solution
to this may be partly procedural, but I also suggest it is cultural. I know that ShEx
Page 57 of 65
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WITN10190100
did seem to be set apart from the rest of BIS, with a different, more commercial-
leaning culture. I do not know if this continues to be the case for UKGI, but it could
be worth exploring whether this was a contributing factor and how it could be
addressed.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Page 58 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
Index to First Witness Statement of Joanne Swinson
URN
Document Description
Control Number
WITN10190101
Written Statements, Cabinet Office,
Handling Member's Correspondence
dated 13 May 2014
WITN10190101
UKGI00041975
Meeting with the Chair and CEO of
Post Office LTD (Tuesday 18"
September 2012, 10:20-11:00)
UKGI050870-001
UKGI00018248
Draft Email from Mike Whitehead to
Jo Swinson re Freedom of
information request 12/1362:
proposed Section 36 exemption
regarding Ministerial briefing
VISO0011647
UKGI00013747
Letter from Yasmin Qureshi MP
dated November 2012
UKG1024540-001
POL00144511
Letter from Alan Bates to Jo Swinson
MP RE: Second Sight presentation
at Portcullis House
POL-BSFF-
0003646
UKGI00013902
Letter to Alan Bates dated April 2013
UKG1024695-001
UKGI00001693
Email from Peter Batten to Swinson
MPST cc Will Gibson, Mike
Whitehead and others RE Draft
Second sight report into POL
Horizons system
UKGI012507-001
UKGI00001695
Narrative and summary of the
Second Sight report
UKGI012509-001
UKGI00001712
Email chain from Will Gibson to
Swinson MPST, cc'ing Mike
Whitehead and Peter Batten re:
James Arbuthnot - POL/JFSA
Statement for Media Appearance
UKGI012526-001
10
UKGI00001748
Email from Mike Whitehead to MPST
Swinson, cc Will Gibson, Peter
Batten and others re: FW: Horizon:
James Arbuthnot MP
UKGI012562-001
11
UKGI00001749
Memo re: Update to 4 July 2013
Note on the independent review of
Post Office Limited’s (POL’s)
computer system
UKGI012563-001
12
UKGI00041996
Email from Emily Cloke (Secretary to
Jo Swinson MP) to
Parly Unit - Others cc Will Gibson,
Mike Whitehead and
others RE: Post Office - Oral
Statement
UKGI050891-001
13
POL00206822
Hansard, Post Office - Horizon
System, Volume 566: debated on
Tuesday 9 July 2013
POL-BSFF-
0044885
Page 59 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
14
INQ00001127
10 April Hearing pages 10-12
INQ00001127
15
POL00145667
Letter from Jo Swinson MP to Alan
Bates - Re: 2nd sight interim report
on the post office horizon computer
system
POL-BSFF-
0004794
16
UKGI00001867
Letter from Jo Swinson MP to Alan
Bates re: Second Sight Interim
Report
UKGI012681-001
17
UKGI00001835
Meeting Agenda with Post Office Ltd
from Tim Mcinnes to Vince Cable
and Jo Swinson re: POL's Strategic
Plan
UKGI012649-001
18
POL00196410
Letter from Stephen Mosley MP to Jo
Swinson MP Re: Correspondence
received from Mr Alan Bates from
JFSA regarding his concerns relating
to the suicide attempt of Mr Martin
Griffiths
POL-BSFF-
0034473
19
INQ00001157
Hearing dated 6 June 2024, pages
153-167
INQ00001157
20
UKG1I00002168
Email chain from Paul Hadley to
Jonathan Preece, Darrell Midgley,
cc'd Richard Callard, David Francis,
Maureen Wathen and others, re:
"Ria - meeting request - Fujitsu
UKGI012982-001
21
UKG1I00002181
Email from MPST Swinson to David
Francis, Jonathan Preece, Midgley
Darrell and others re: Meeting
request for Jo Swinson - Fujitsu
UKGI012995-001
22
WITN10190102
Briefing of meeting with Alice Perkins
and Paula Vennells dated 11
December 2013
WITN10190102
23
POL00294186
Minutes of a meeting of the Proiect
Sparrow Sub- Committee of the
Board held on Wednesday 9 April
2014. Present: Alice Perkins,
Alasdair Marnoch, Richard Gallard
and others
POL-BSFF-
0132249
24
POL00304194
Letter from Alan Bates for the JFSA
to Jo Swinson MP re Initial Case
Review and Mediation
POL-BSFF-
0142244
25
POL00100583
Letters from Jenny Willott MP (on
behalf of BIS) to Alan Bates, Sir
Anthony Hooper and Paula Vennells
re Initial Case Review and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0100166
26
POL00021524
Meeting Minutes: minutes for Board
meeting held on 30th
April 2014
POL0000057
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WITN10190100
WITN10190100
27
POL00148201
Post Office Ltd, Project Sparrow
Sub-Committee Minutes of
30/04/2014
POL-BSFF-
0007324
28
UKG100002333
Agenda for Post Office Shareholder
team update
UKGI013147-001
29
POL00029733
Email from Alwen Lyons to Rodric
Williams Re: FWD - Deloitte Briefing
- Message from Chris Aujard and
Lesley Sewell - Strictly Private &
Confidential - Subject to Legal
Privilege
POL-0026215
30
POL00130618
Deloitte Draft Board Briefing
document further to report on
Horizon desktop review of assurance
sources and key control features
POL-0120670
31
POL00006571
Project Sparrow Sub-Committee
Minutes 6 June 2014
POL-0017847
32
POL00021526
Post Office Limited: Minutes of a
Board meeting held on
June 2014
POL0000059
33
POL00116649
Letter to David Cameron PM from
Mrs Jennifer O Dell Re: Mrs O'Dell's
Second Sight case
POL-0117522
34
UKGI00002440
Preparation document for the press
prepared by Richard
Callard
UKGI013254-001
35
UKG100002439
Email from Richard Callard to
Swinson MPST RE Confidential Prep
for Friday
UKGI013253-001
36
WITN10190103
Agenda for Meeting dated 10 July
2014: Post Office
Limited - Appointment and
Remuneration of New Chief Finance
Officer (CFO)
WITN10190103
37
UKG1I00042677
Post Office Ltd Senior Management
Risk and Assurance Committee
February 2014
UKGI051572-001
38
WITN10190104
Agenda for Post Office Limited-
Director's Renumeration Post Office
Limited- Director's Remuneration
dated 12 November 2013
WITN10190104
39
UKGI00013791
Letter from Alan Bates to Jo Swinson
dated 29 August 2015 re Justice for
Subpostmasters Alliance
UKG1I024584-001
40
UKG1I00002472
Briefing for Jo Swinson regarding
recent reports on Horizon System -
10th September 2014.
UKGI013286-001
Page 61 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
a4
UKGI00007352
Email chain from Peter Batten to Jo
Swinson, Richard Callard cc
Alexander Hamilton and others Re:
POL and
reports on IT
UKGI018166-001
42
UKG1I00002521
Email from Swinson MPST to Tim
McInnes, CC Richard Callard and
Peter Batten re Second Sight Report
UKGI013335-001
43
POL00116720
Letter to Jo Swinson from Chris
Aujard and Paula Vennells Re: Initial
Complaint Review and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0117590
44
UKGI00042620
Department for Business, Innovation
& Skills - Meeting with Paula
Vennells, Chief Executive of Post
Office Ltd (“POL”)
UKGI051515-001
45
UKG1I00002585
Email dated 8 December 2014 RE:
Horizon Working Group update
UKGI013399-001
46
UKGI00002610
Email from Richard Callard to MPST
Swinson, Tim McInnes, James
Baugh and Peter Batten re Catch up
this morning - Horizon mediation
scheme
UKGI013424-001
47
UKGI00002633
Draft Note with annex to Jo Swinson
from Peter Batten re: Westminster
Hall Debate: Horizon Case Review
and Mediation Scheme
UKGI013447-001
48
UKG1I00000024
Agenda for Westminster Hall Debate:
Horizon Case Review and Mediation
Scheme dated 15 December 2014
VISO0000985
49
UKGI00002762
Email from Richard Callard to
Swinson MPST cc Cable
MPST, Hancock MPST and others
RE: Westminster Hall
Debate on Post Office & Horizon
UKGI013576-001
50
UKG1I00002763
Letter from Richard Callard to Jo
Swinson re Westminster
Hall Debate: Horizon Case Review
and Mediation Scheme
UKGI013577-001
51
UKG1I00002765
Westminster Hall Debate:
Subpostmaster Mediation Scheme
UKGI013579-001
52
UKGI00002764
Horizon Questions for Parliamentary
Debate 17th December 2014.
UKGI013578-001
53
UKG1I00002767
Report on "MPs lost faith in Post
Office Mediation Scheme"
UKGI013581-001
54
UKG1I00002766
Letter from Lord Arbuthnot to Paula
Vennells re Scope of the Mediation
Scheme
UKGI013580-001
Page 62 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
55
UKGI00002769
Letter from Paula Vennells to Lord
Arbuthnot re Complaint and
Mediation Scheme
UKGI013583-001
56
UKGI00002768
Letter from Sir Anthony Hooper to Jo
Swinson re Initial Compliant and
Mediation Scheme
UKGI013582-001
57
UKGI00002771
Letter from John Munton to The
Secretariat of Post Office Mediation
Complaint Review Working Group
UKGI013585-001
58
UKGI00000916
Email from Swinson MPST to
Richard Callard cc MPST Cable,
MPST Hancock and others re: Jo's
comments on Westminster Hall
Debate on Post Office & Horizon
VISO0009054
59
UKG1I00002764
Horizon Questions for Parliamentary
Debate 17th December 2014.
UKGI013578-001
60
UKG1I00002837
Email from Richard Callard to MPST
Swinson cc: Tim McInnes, James
Bough and others Re: Jo's
conversations with James Arbuthnot-
actions coming out
UKGI013651-001
61
POL00030457
Hansard, Post Office Mediation
Scheme, Volume 589: debated on
Wednesday 17 December 2014
POL-0026939
62
UKGI00002896
Letter from JFSA Alan Bates to Jo
Swinson MP. Re: following
adjournment debate at Westminster
Hall / initial case review & mediation
scheme
UKGI013710-001
63
UKGI00002920
Email dated 7 January 2015 RE:
next steps on Horizon debate
UKGI013734-001
64
UKGI00003007
Email from Mark Davis to Swinson
MPST cc Richard Callard re: Post
Office Response to Westminster Hall
debate
UKGI013821-001
65
UKGI00003008
Post Office Response to
Westminster Hall Debate
UKGI013822-001
66
UKGI00003111
Letter from Jo Swinson MP to Alan
Bates re Response to letter dated 22
December about the mediation
scheme
UKGI013925-001
67
UKGI00013818
3 February 2015 - Post Office
mediation - Oral evidence
UKGI024611-001
68
UKGI00017945
Meeting Brief from Tim McInnes to
Jo Swinson - Re:
Meeting with NFSP - Horizon
Mediation Scheme and
Network Transformation
UKGI027952-001
Page 63 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
69
UKGI00000032
Email from Laura Thompson to Jo
Swinson Re Post Office mediation
scheme: revised approach
VIS00000993
70
UKG1I00003390
Post Office Mediation Scheme Update
UKGI014204-001
71
UKGI00000923
Email from Richard Callard to
Swinson MPST, Laura Thompson,
Cable MPST and others re:
Submission on Post Office Horizon
mediation scheme.
VISO0009061
72
UKGI00019687
Email dated 9 March 2015 Re:
submission on Post Office Horizon
mediation scheme
UKGI1028582-
001
73
UKGI00003543
Email dated 9 March 2015 POL
Horizon WMS materials
UKGI014357-001
74
POL00132580
Letter to Jo Swinson from Paula
Vennells Chief executive of the Post
Offiice
POL-0121750
75
UKGI00003684
Email from trail from Swinson mpst
to Laura Thompson and Alan Bates
re FW: Post Office Press Release
today
UKGI014498-001
76
UKGI00000053
Briefing from Laura Thompson to
Secretary of State and Jo Swinson
MP re. Post Office Mediation
Scheme: Letters
VIS00001014
77
UKGI00003891
Email from Alan Bates and draft
response dated March 2015
UKGI04705-001
78
UKGI00003721
Email chain from Ministerial Advice
Team to Laura Thompson cc'ing
Richard Callard and Ministerial oh
Advice Team Re: No10 PMQ urgent
Query - Post Office
UKGI014535-001
79
UKG1I00003722
Possible Question: Post Office
Computer System - complaints lead
by James Arbuthnot over mediation
scheme about Horizon
UKGI014536-001
80
UKGI00003733
Email thread from Cable MPST to
Laura Thompson, Swinson MPST, cc
Hannah Franklin-Wallis and others
RE: PMQs today
UKGI014547-001
81
UKGI00003781
Letter from James Arbuthnot to
Vince Cable MP, re Post Office
Mediation Scheme
UKGI014595-001
82
UKGI00003780
Email from Cable MPST (Claire) to
Laura Thompson, Swinson MPST
RE: Letter from Rt Hon James
Arbuthnot MP - PMQs/Post Office
UKGI014594-001
Page 64 of 65
WITN10190100
WITN10190100
83
UKGI00003913
Email dated 18 March 2015 RE: Post
Office: reply to Alan Bates
UKGI014727-001
84
POL00102385
Letter to Alan Bates dated 19 March
2015
POL-0101968
85
UKGI00004010
Email dated 25 March 2015: eCase
MCB2015-06376- Alan Bates
UKGI014824-001
86
UKGI00004006
Email dated 24 March 2015: FW:
Post Office mediation: response to
letter from BIS Select Committee
UKGI014820-001
87
UKGI00003918
Post Office Mediation Scheme letter
dated March 2015
UKG1I014732-001
88
POL00039281
Post Office Mediation Scheme letter
dated 26 March 2015
POL-0035763
89
WITN10190105
End of the 2014-15 Parliamentary
session 27 March 2015
WITN10190105
90
UKGI00004093
Letter from Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC) to Ms J
Swinson MP requesting evidence
from BIS under Criminal Appeal Act
1995
UKGI014907-001
91
UKGI00003008
Post Office Response to
Westminster Hall Debate
UKGI013822-001
92
POL00116720
Letter to Jo Swinson from Chris
Aujard and Paula Vennells Re: Initial
Complaint Review and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0117590
93
POL00132580
Letter to Jo Swinson from Paula
Vennells Chief executive of the post
offiice
POL-0121750
94
UKG100002333
Agenda for Post Office shareholder
team update
UKGI013147-001
95
POL00297497
Email from Martin Edwards To Paula
Vennells RE: Update on final draft of
Second Sight interim report
POL-BSFF-
0135547
96
POL00022598
Horizon Data Lepton SPSO 191320
by Helen Rose (v.1 draft)
POL-0019077
97
POL00006357
Advice on the use of expert evidence
relating to the integrity of the Fujitsu
Services Ltd Horizon System
POL-0017625
98
POL00129453
Simon Clarke's Advice re: Disclosure
- The Duty to record and retain
material - Post Office LTD
POL-0134937
99
NFSP0000117
7
All Party Parliamentary Group for
Post Offices Meeting
NFSP00001177
Page 65 of 65