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Witness Name: Greg Clark
Statement No.: WITN10900100
Dated: 28 June 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF RT. HON GREG CLARK
I, Greg Clark, formerly Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy,
will say as follows.
INTRODUCTION
1. I welcome this Public Inquiry and the chance to give evidence that I hope will
be of assistance in establishing what acts — of commission and omission — led
to such devastating consequences for so many innocent people who were
among the dedicated and respected members of our communities.
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2. I strongly support the action that Parliament has taken — to the imperfect extent
that it can after the event — to restore the good name of the sub postmasters
and mistresses whose reputations and livelihoods have been devastated.
3. It follows from my support for this legislative action that I wish it had been done
sooner.
4. In preparing this statement I have been supported by lawyers from the
Government Legal Department and by counsel, and have relied on others to
provide me with relevant documents. This statement is true to the best of my
recollection, though of course it deals with events which go back several years
and recollection can be imperfect.
BACKGROUND
5. I read Economics at the University of Cambridge and was awarded my PhD at
the London School of Economics. Before entering Parliament, I worked in
business strategy consulting, as head of commercial policy for the BBC, and as
Director of Policy for the Conservative Party.
6. I was the Member of Parliament for Tunbridge Wells from 2005 to 2024. Before
I was a Minister I served on the Public Accounts Committee of the House of
Commons, and from 2008 I served as Shadow Secretary of State for Energy
and Climate Change.
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7. Before I became Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy in 2016, I served in a number of ministerial positions in government
from 2010. I was Minister of State at the Department of Communities and Local
Government, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Minister of State at the
Cabinet Office, Minister for Universities and Science, and Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government.
8. Following my period of office as Secretary of State for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy I was elected by the whole House of Commons to be Chair
of the Science and Technology Select Committee from 2020 to 2024.
9. I acted as ‘caretaker’ Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and
Communities in the summer of 2022 between Boris Johnson’s resignation and
his departure from office.
CONTEXT OF THE BEIS DEPARTMENT
10.1 was appointed Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
by the incoming Prime Minister, Theresa May, on 14 July 2016. I served in this
role until Mrs May left office on 24 July 2019.
11.The Department (also referred to as BEIS) was a new Department created
when I took office by bringing together two previous Departments - the
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Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, each of which had been headed by a Secretary of State.
12.BEIS was a large department, with among the largest number of discrete
responsibilities of any of the then departments of government. BEIS consisted
of over 40 directorates, each headed by Director (a Senior Civil Service grade)
[WITN10900101], covering areas such as nuclear power, energy security,
advanced manufacturing, life sciences, the national science and research
programme, international climate negotiations, industrial sector sponsorship of
industries such as automotive, steel and aerospace, small businesses,
corporate governance, mergers and takeovers, labour market regulation, and
local growth policy. The directorates were drawn together in the development
of a new national industrial strategy.
413.The Department had had two Permanent Secretaries at its inception — Sir
Martin Donnelly, who had been the Permanent Secretary of the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills, and Alex (later Sir Alex) Chisholm, who had
been the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Climate
Change. Alex Chisholm began sole Permanent Secretary later in 2016.
14.The BEIS Ministerial team generally consisted of six Ministers including the
Secretary of State. Although the people occupying the roles changed as a result
of government reshuffles, one Minister always had specific responsibility for
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Postal Affairs, although this portfolio always included other responsibilities such
as small business and employment policy.
15.The Department was responsible for around £12 billion in annual public
expenditure [p4, WITN10900102]. BEIS consisted of around 3,000 civil
servants (the precise numbers varied a little from year to year) and was directly
responsible for around 50 organisations employing around 30,000 people.
BEIS was the sole shareholder in 40 limited companies such as the British
Business Bank plc, Sellafield Ltd, and Magnox Limited.-In the wider
Departmental Group were a number of major Arm's Length Bodies (often known
as “ALBs’) including the Ordnance Survey, the Met Office, the Green
Investment Bank, British Nuclear Fuels and Post Office Limited.
16.As Secretary of State for a large department I had a sizeable Private Office. It
generally consisted of a Principal Private Secretary, a Senior Private Secretary,
six Private and Assistant Private Secretaries and a Diary Manager. In addition,
I had two Special: Advisers (who also supported the other Ministers), a
correspondence team and Policy Unit of around four people located within the
Private Office.
17. All work involving me came through the Private Office. The Private Office would
filter and manage Cabinet and Cabinet Committee papers, submissions from
civil servants, it would commission briefing papers to inform me about matters
of. interest or concern or impending decision, consider meeting requests
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(internal and external), arrange my meetings and visits, attend all my meetings,
take a note of what was discussed and decided, follow up with instructions to
relevant officials, manage the large. correspondence that I had and prepare
nightly and weekend boxes of work to be done at home.
18.The Private Office was organised with each Private Secretary broadly
shadowing a particular area of the Department - but it was a team with people
covering each other's areas. For example, there was always an early morning,
overnight and weekend rota in which one Private Secretary would deal with J
whatever was necessary. The Private Office functioned as a very hardworking
team. They sat physically together, in a large ‘outer office’ next to my own, and
interacted with me and with each other constantly.
19.It was standard practice across the Department for submissions by officials to
Ministers, and many more internal working documents, to be copied to the
Secretary of State’s Private Office for information. The Private Office would
determine if I needed to see any of these (a small fraction of the total) and either
bring them in to me immediately if they related to urgent matters, convene a
meeting with the relevant officials and ministers, put them in my overnight or
weekend “red boxes” for me to read or write me a short note summarising them.
I did not routinely use an email account in my own name for departmental
business, so everything sent internally or externally to me went to the Private
Office.
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20.As well as leading the Department, as Secretary of State I had responsibilities
as a member of Cabinet. I was also a member of 17 Cabinet Committees
including the National Security Council — this was more than any other
departmental Secretary of State at the time.
2
.My practice as Secretary of State was to try to be inclusive and considered in
making decisions and assessing the way forward. Since there were certain
practices that I established which will be referred to later in this witness
statement, I will briefly describe them.
22. Over and above the daily submissions from officials with briefing and advice, I
instituted a system that towards the end of each week I would receive a briefing
pack which was prepared for me only which would consist of a paper from each
of the eight Directors General (the number varied slightly over the three years).
Their papers would set out the key things that they and their officials had been
working on that week, what they anticipated in the weeks ahead, and a forward
look of submissions that I and other ministers could expect and decisions to be
taken in the foreseeable future.
23.Each of the Director Generals’ weekly briefs would go to the Permanent
Secretary who would submit them all to me accompanied by an overall
commentary of his own. We called this the “Weekly Update from BEIS Directors
General”. I would work on it over the weekend and discuss it with the Permanent
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Secretary and the Director General team in person early the following week. I
would also have a weekly one-to-one meeting with the Permanent Secretary.
24.1 also had other important regular meetings that are relevant to my evidence: a
weekly “Industry Meeting’, a weekly “Energy Meeting” and a fortnightly
“Science Meeting”. At these meetings the specific Minister and officials
responsible for a policy area in which a significant decision was to be taken
would always attend in person, having circulated a relevant submission to
attendees to study over the preceding weekend. We would then discuss J
collectively the proposed way forward at the relevant weekly meeting.
25.All Ministers, regardless of portfolio, were invited and encouraged to attend all
of these meetings, and it was understood to be a requirement for the Minister
whose particular responsibility it was and for their relevant officials to do so.
The relevant Directors General were almost always in attendance, as was
usually the Permanent Secretary.
26.This was not meant to, and in my experience did not, take away individual
Ministers’ decision-making competence. But it was a way to ensure that
individual Ministers’ prospective decisions had benefitted from the experience
and judgement of other colleagues, both official and ministerial. Matters
concerning the Post Office were considered at the Industry Meeting in this way,
since that directorate fell within the broad set of policy areas that fell under the
‘Industry’ heading.
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27.A typical week was filled with many other specific briefings and meetings, but
the regular meetings I have described above were of great importance because
they allowed different perspectives to be brought to areas under discussion and
for decision, and made sure that decisions were not taken in isolation.
28.1 would like to say that I regard myself as having been well served by my
ministers and officials, and that we gave careful and serious consideration to
decisions that were taken. Former ministerial colleagues have commented
elsewhere (such I as in the Institute for Government's Ministers Reflect
interviews) that they found the way I ran the Department to be an effective and
empowering system.
MY TIME AS SECRETARY OF STATE
29. In relation to Post Office Limited and Horizon, I think it is helpful to divide my
tenure as Secretary of State at BEIS into two periods:
0) the period from the creation of the Department and my appointment to
lead it in July 2016 to the first High Court Judgment (“Common Issues”)
of March 2019, and
(ii) the period from the Judgment in March 2019 until I left the Department
in July 2019.
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The first phase: From July 2016 to the High Court “Common Issues”
Judgment of March 2019
30.When I was appointed Secretary of State I knew from my work as a
constituency MP supporting an individual constituent, who was a victim of the
scandal, that she and some other sub postmasters were contesting in the High
Court the accuracy of the Post Office’s systems and, through the Criminal
Cases Review Commission, the safety of their convictions. This support was
with the process of appeal and I had no specific knowledge of the Horizon IT
system, the prosecuting role of the Royal Mail Group or the Post Office, who
had been responsible for investigations or prosecutions, nor the existence or
substance of any of the reports listed in paragraph 15.5 of the Rule 9 request.
These are listed as: Simon Clarke's advice of 15 July 2013 (see
[POL00006357]); Deloitte’s Project Zebra reports (see [POL00028069]); the
Swift Review (see [POL00006355]); and Deloitte’s Bramble reports (see
[POL00029984], [POL00030009] and [POL00031502)).
3
.The period from July 2016 to March 2019 was between two times. This is in the
sense that prosecutions of sub postmasters by Post Office Limited had stopped
~ (they had taken place between 1999 and 2015, with most between 1999 and
2012), and challenges to previous convictions and actions by the Post Office
by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (from 2015) and by the High Court
(from April 2016) were underway but had not concluded.
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32. During my time in office from 14 July 2016 until the time of the first High Court
Judgment in March 2019 most of the matters that I was engaged in as Secretary
of State concerning Post Office Limited were relatively broad, long term
questions - such as the viability of the branch network, the Post Office’s long
term funding requirements from the Government, and the role of the Post Office
in providing banking services to communities in the context of closing bank
branches.
33. When I took office in July 2016 I was provided with, as an incoming Secretary
of State, an Introductory Brief from each of the 40 or so directorates in the
Department. This is a standard and longstanding civil service practice and
summarises, for an incoming Minister, the salient matters in each of the areas
of policy and flags areas in which a decision will be required.
34.One of these Introductory Briefs was for the Post Office [WITN10900103]. It
consisted of 5 pages containing briefing on a number of live issues including its
ownership, Post Office Limited’s long-term strategy, the future of its branch
network, its pensions position, its role in supplying cash to external clients, and
the industrial relations outlook.
35. The Horizon dispute was mentioned in a paragraph subtitled “Other Issues”.
This contained a reference which noted that “affected sub postmasters continue
to put pressure on Post Office Limited, the Criminal Cases Review Commission
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are considering some cases where individuals have received criminal
convictions, and group civil litigation is being launched against POL in the High
Court’.
36. To prepare this witness statement I asked the Department for sight of all of the
4150 or so “Weekly Updates from BEIS Directors General” from July 2016 to July
2019, totalling some 2,700 pages, which I have re-read. The Post Office
features in most of the Weekly Updates, but almost exclusively about matters
such as the funding settlement from HM Treasury, the future of the branch
network (which Government policy required it to maintain) and the provision of
banking services. Before the High Court's initial Common Issues Judgment was
expected in early 2019, I could find only eight references to the group litigation,
which were either noting that it was ongoing or that it was approaching its end.
37.More generally, through the weekly pattern of briefings, meetings with the
Minister, Permanent Secretary, senior BEIS officials and UKGI officials I was
kept informed of matters related to the Post Office that were relevant to the
Department's role and regularly questioned and discussed its strategy and
future requirements, especially given the need to agree with HM Treasury a
future funding settlement for POL.
38.1 discern two components of the longstanding Departmental view that the
matters concerning the Horizon system were for the Board of Post Office
Limited during the period before the Common Issues Judgment.
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39.The first was that these matters were essentially sub judice. The Criminal
Cases Review Commission was investigating the safety of criminal convictions
of sub postmasters and it would not be proper for the Executive publicly to
contest the verdict of properly constituted Courts. Only a Court could overturn
the verdict of another Court and that was the function of the Criminal Cases
Review Commission and the Court of Appeal. Concerning the Group Litigation,
I would characterise the Departmental view as being that it was for the High
Court to establish the truth of the relationship between the sub postmasters and
Post Office Limited and.the questions surrounding the Horizon system.
40.1 myself regarded the High Court trial of the Group Litigation as being of great
importance. It provided a means to take the dispute out of the hands of Post
Office Limited (who, for example, in 2015 had unilaterally refused to allow my
constituent to take part in the mediation scheme). It brought the independence
and authority of the High Court, with its powers to require disclosure and
evidence under oath, sitting under a senior Judge to get to the bottom of what
had happened. And the High Court’s Judgement would be authoritative,
‘compared to any other means of resolving the dispute, and this was important
for the challenges to the criminal convictions. I believe that the Judgments of
Mr Justice Fraser justify that view of the High Court's ability to get to the truth,
41.1 recall my view and the Department's view as being that the two judicial
processes were linked, in the sense that the High Court case was thought to
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have an important bearing on the Criminal Cases Review Commission’s
determination of the safety of convictions. Indeed, an update for UKGI by POL
dated 8 August 2018 [UKGI00008345 PO Group Litigation: Litigation
Update for UKGI following POL Board Meeting on 31 July 2018] states at
paragraph 7 “The CCRC has advised POL that it is nearing completion of its
reviews (commenced in 2015) into 33 Post Office prosecutions of former
postmasters (31 of whom are claimants in the Group Litigation). However, given
that the CCRC’s reviews touch on issues similar to those in the Postmaster
litigation (in particular with respect to Horizon), delivery of the CCRC’s findings
could be delayed by the litigation.”
42. The second component of the Department's view was the belief the relationship
between the Government and Post Office Limited was required to be what has
been referred to as “arm’s length”. The Government had a ‘special share’ in
Post Office Limited. This required permission to be given for certain specified
functions - such as appointments to the Board and agreement of a strategic
plan - but gave no right to direct operational matters, which were reserved for
the Board. The Post Office’s IT system and its contracts with sub postmasters
were considered to be operational matters and so, a fortiori, legal disputes
concerning them were also for the Board.
43.In the evidence that has been disclosed to me there are several examples of
this view being reflected in submissions or advice:
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(i) The Introductory Brief provided on the day I was appointed Secretary of
State [WITN10900103 — as at para 33] described it as follows: “POL is
a public corporation with a fiduciary Board, chaired by Tim Parker (an
experienced commercial Chair appointed in October 2015). Operational
decisions are made by the CEO, Paula Vennells, and her executive
team, supported by the Board’.
My understanding was that a fiduciary Board is one in which each
director legally has an undivided responsibility to pursue the interest of
the company itself, rather than act as a delegate for an external person
or group.
(ii) It was always clear that the Department was not a party.to the litigation
in the High Court. For example, the advice to Ministers regarding a
request for early sight of the Common Issues Judgement
[UKG100009076 UKGI advice to Minister regarding Common Issues
trial, including advice not to seek permission to have early sight of
the judgment, 1 March 2019] said:
“While POL is 100% owned by HMG, it operates as an independent,
commercial business. As such the relationship between sub postmasters
and the management of its IT systems are operational matters for Post
Office Ltd. The legal defence costs involved are being handled by them”
(para 11)
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(iii)
(iv)
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“The Secretary of State as a shareholder is in the same position as any
other shareholder of a private company, namely a separate legal entity.
We have not been able to find any similar precedents where
shareholders of companies have successfully applied for advance sight
of a Judgment involving a company of which they are a shareholder ...
particularly in a case which does not raise any public law issues but is a
private law matter between POL and its claimants” (para 14)
Consistent with not being a party to the litigation, POL supplied only
factual updates, following board meetings, to UKGI to share with BEIS
on the course of the litigation. This was done with some reluctance on
the part of POL. An email train of between 23 February 2018 and 11 May
2018 between lawyers of UKGI and POL [POL00041270 Email Patrick
Bourke to Rodric Williams, Jane MacLeod and Andrew Parsons Re:
Litigation and Appointment, dated 11 May 2018] shows ongoing
resistance by POL to provide written updates that could be shared with
the Department on the progress of the litigation, citing legal privilege.
The email shows that the BEIS Permanent Secretary had to insist on
these factual updates being provided.
Regular warnings would be given that there was a legal requirement for
Ministers and officials to be separate from the Company’s decision-
making lest they risk being deemed to be ‘shadow directors’.
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For example a submission co-authored by the Government Legal
Department when Ministers were dissatisfied with POL’s approach to the
litigation said [BEIS0000075 BEIS advice Re: POL Litigation, 11 June
2019] that:
“care needs to be taken that Ministers do not risk being regarded as
shadow directors. A shadow director is someone in accordance with
whose directions or instructions the board are accustomed to act. A
shadow director has the same legal duties as a normal director and can
potentially incur person liability for their actions”.
There was some anxiety about the propriety of the Government being
involved in matters that are reserved for the Courts. For example, when
the then Post Office Minister, Kelly Tolhurst, was concerned about the
POL Board's intention to apply for the recusal of the Judge in the Civil
litigation she was advised [UKG100009307 Email from Tom Cooper to
Clark MPST, Tolhurst MPST, Tom Aldred and others - Re: Post Office
Litigation Update, 20 March 2019]:
“The advice from BEIS Legal and UKG/ Legal is that BEIS
officials/ministers and the shareholder NED should not be involved in
POL's formal decision-making on the recusal application”.
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This was reinforced in a further email in that document “The strong legal
advice is that the minister should not be involved in this decision”.
When I had expressed dissatisfaction with POL’s conduct of the litigation
and had asked for advice on how we could change it, including the
Department stepping in “to play an active role in development and
delivery of the litigation strategy, working directly with POL’s legal
advisors, in consultation with POL” [BEIS0000076 Annex A to
BEIS0000075 Re: Options for Minister to consider] officials’ advice
was that there were:
“Serious questions over the feasibility/legality of this option. It would
require POL’s agreement and ongoing co-operation as POL would have
full access to all the information on the cases including the involvement
of their employees. POL would have limited incentive to co-operate and
might ask BEIS to fund any settlement in exchange for handing over
conduct of the case. External legal support would be required as
BEIS/UKGI Legal would not have the necessary litigation expertise or
capacity.”
44,The propriety of the conduct between the Department and its arm's length
bodies - including Post Office Limited, but also other bodies such as the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority and the Ordnance Survey - was always considered
to be an important concern in BEIS. This was because the Department was
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itself responsible for policy and enforcement of Company Law and directors’
duties. Indeed, the disqualification and sanctioning of directors for breaches of
Company Law is carried out in the name of the Secretary of State.
45.In the Expert Report to this Inquiry on “Expected and best practice in respect of
the standards of governance, management and leadership in companies such
as the post office companies” [EXPG0000006 Dame Sandra Dawson and Dr
Steward - Expert Report], Dame Sandra Dawson and Dr Katy Steward
describe it this way: “POL Executives were directly responsible for running the
PO businesses including the sub postmasters’ network and the commissioning
and roll out of Horizon”, (para 1.6.3) and “The Board, as a whole, is accountable
interalia for a) Providing oversight and overarching Governance, Risk and
Compliance frameworks ... d) approving the strategy ... i) oversight of
operational performance” (para 2.2.4).
46. Dame Sandra and Dr Steward observe “Whilst there are differences between
publicly listed and publicly owned companies, it is notable that in matters of
governance during the relevant period, one finds that the requirements and
expectations for all organisations in the UK have tended, and tended to be
encouraged by governments and regulators, to follow the approach adopted in
law and guidance for publicly listed companies’.
47.UKGI’s handbook UK Government Arm’s-Length Bodies [WITN10900104]
states “the board of an Arm’s Length Body (whether fiduciary or advisory) pla ys
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a key role in holding the ALB executive to account on behalf of ministers and
departments ... in the case of boards with fiduciary duties (namely companies
and bodies corporate), the board's decision must legally take priority’.
48. It was clear, as set out above, that the operations of Post Office Limited were
the responsibility of its management, and that oversight of these operations was
the responsibility of the POL Board. The role of the Government - officials and
Ministers - was to appoint the Board, set a framework within which the Board
would operate (such as the funding requirements by government and the
required size of the network of post offices) and to monitor and hold it to account
against that framework.
49.1 set out later in this witness statement my current belief, in the light of the Post
Office Limited experience and my experience of other public bodies, that using
this approach of using a standard Companies Act vehicle is not best suited to
the Government's 100 per cent ownership of a body such as the Post Office
whose public purpose may mean that its operations and strategy are both
matters of public interest. Later in this statement I suggest a different vehicle
could be established for such Government-owned, dual-purpose bodies, and I
also comment on the role of UKGI as the organisation through which
Government shareholdings are managed.
50.But.1 do not doubt the sincerity of the long-held view of the Department that
Company Law required separation of Ministers and officials from the operating
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decisions of Post Office Limited. It was a separation that was consistent across
all administrations that I am aware of.
The second phase: from the High Court Judgment of March 2019 to July 2019
51.0n 15 March 2019 the High Court issued its first Judgment on the Group
Litigation — the “Common Issues” Judgment. As far as I understood it was the
first time that a Court had opined on sub postmasters’ case against the Post
Office since the criminal convictions in individual courts. For this reason, as
well as its content, I regarded the Judgment as seminal. It not only gave the
Court's view on the technical questions of contract interpretation with which it
was narrowly concerned, but also gave a first verdict on the merits of the Post
Office’s case and conduct with respect to the sub postmasters. The Court had,
in effect, established that Post Office Ltd had behaved disreputably and had
acted to the detriment of sub postmasters.
52. The Postal Affairs Minister and I received a submission [UKGI00009076 — see
para 42] on 1%t March 2019 from the Director General of UKGI, Mark Russell,
informing us that the Judgment was expected to be shared with the parties to
the litigation the following week, and published the week after. The submission
gave an overview of the case and the ongoing legal process and advised that
Ministers should not apply to the Court for early sight of the Judgment, because
the Government was not a party to the litigation and so it was “highly unlikely
to succeed”.
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53.The submission said that “there are a very wide range of possible outcomes
with 23 common issues at stake, some of which are broad” (para 9), but also
advised us that “the Post Office expect the Judge to continue to be critical of
some aspects of the PO’s handling of the case and its treatment of claimants.
We expect that these largely relate to historic behaviour and do not believe POL
currently has problems with its operational culture” (para 10).
54.1n my weekly “bilateral” meeting with the Permanent Secretary on 5 March 2019
I asked him for his own, personal assessment of the best way ahead for the
Post Office in the context of the imminent Common Issues judgement. Alex
Chisholm responded the next day, 6 March 2019, with a personal minute to me
[UKGI00009137 Email from Alex Chisholm to Greg Clark CC Kelly Tothurst
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Re Post Office
litigation trial and leadership succession, dated 5 March 2019] in which he
said (the underlining is in the original minute):
“You asked me yesterday to look into some of the issues relating to the Post
Office and to advise both you and Kelly on the way ahead. The two most
pressing issues relate to the court case and the appointment of an interim chief
executive...
“I agree with the legal and policy advice that we should not seek permission to
see the Judgment in advance of it being made public and not comment when it
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is published ... Ministers will want to keep an appropriate distance from the trial
and not comment directly while it is sub judice ... Personally I would not be
surprised if the proceedings uncovered some faults on both sides in the
litigation. Hence it would be especially advisable to stay above the fray for now,
leaving you free to speak and act as necessary and in the public interest once
the matter is decided.”
“POL is a big and complex business and needs an acting CEO now that Paula
has stood down ... Having spoken with Tim and Tom C I am satisfied that Al
Cameron is the right person — indeed the only real. candidate — to be appointed
as interim CEO ... I recommend that you give your assent to his appointment
this week.”
55.The Judgment was made public - including to the Department - during the
afternoon of Friday 15!" March. I had engagements in my constituency that
afternoon and I had to attend and speak at the Annual General Meeting of my
Conservative Association that evening, so I asked for a telephone conference
call to be briefed on the Judgment at the earliest opportunity the next morning.
56.1 took this at home on the early morning of Saturday 16" March with the Postal
Affairs Minister and senior officials. The call was taken by Gavin Lambert, the
relevant BEIS Director General, and Tom Cooper, UKGI’s Director on the POL
Board. A short ‘readout (i.e. an informal minute) was taken by one of my Private
Secretaries who was on the call [UKG100009213 Email from Gavin Lambert
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to MPST Clark, MPSST Tolhurst, Tom Cooper and others Re: POL
Discussion with SOS and Kelly Tolhurst, 16 March 2019] and circulated at
0947 on Saturday.
“Kelly brought SoS up to date on the judgement against POL, indicating that
the judgement was close to the worst case scenario”.
57. It was immediately clear to me that the Judgment was of great significance.
Although it was only the first of several judgments expected, it had already
established that sub postmasters had been unjustly treated by POL, and that
significant harm had been done to them. It was my clear view that it should be
rectified as quickly as possible.
58. Officials on the call then briefed me about whether POL were likely to appeal
the Judgment:
“Tom Cooper indicated that there are both legal and tactical reasons for POL to
appeal and that it is most likely that they will do so. Appealing may be helpful in
reaching a settlement.”
59.1 recall being angered by what I interpreted (perhaps unfairly) as a cynical
undertone to this remark - in particular the use of the word ‘tactical’. I do not
suggest that this was Mr Cooper's personal view, but rather that he was
reflecting POL’s position.
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as
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60.A Judgement had been made of great seriousness and needed to be acted
upon conscientiously. I sensed an implication that ‘tactical’ (in conjunction with
an appeal) meant not a well-intentioned need to clarify or even dispute a
genuine matter, but a device or stratagem to disadvantage the sub postmasters
in the litigation. I presumed that this was to cause them to incur more costs,
that they may not be able to withstand.
6
-At this point I interrupted the briefing to try to cut off this line of thinking. This is
recorded in the ‘readout’ as
“SoS made clear his primary objective is to see justice done. Where
postmasters and postmistresses have been treated improperly they should be
treated justly.”
62. Civil service shorthand has certain norms, which are understood by its readers.
‘SoS made clear communicates to readers that I expressed myself forcefully
on this point.
63.The readout is not a verbatim account and my recollection of my demeanour
on that call was that I would have been more likely to have said ‘only objective’
not the rather pedantic ‘primary objective’, but I have no proof of that.
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64.Having heard what I had, I wanted to establish the point very clearly that the
Government was not ‘on the Post Office's side’, as it were, in this — and that
being the sole shareholder would not influence that.
65. The readout also states:
“He (SoS) also asked that the Department put out a statement making the point
that we were aligned with interests of the postmasters but that we are still going
through the legal process.” J
66. The readout says:
“SoS made clear that where POL can fix problems internally before the
conclusion of the legal process it should do so.”
67.In my recollection, that is a slightly opaque encapsulation of another strongly
expressed (“made clear’ again) view that POL should now act without further
delay to compensate postmasters — in other words, make restitution.
68.1 interpret the readout as suggesting that UKGI pushed back against that view
to a certain degree, which was reflected in the concluding line:
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“He (SoS) agreed with Tom Cooper's assertion that caution would be required
to ensure that justice is done for legitimate claimants, but that restitution would
not be appropriate in all cases”.
69.1 cannot remember the exact words used but I believe that was a diplomatic
drafting in the readout to bridge the difference in ambition between my
instinctive view that POL should proceed to comprehensive restitution, and a
more cautious view from UKGI, done to record an agreed way forward.
70.The Minister, Kelly Tolhurst, had had a call with the POL Chair Tim Parker, Al
Cameron and Jane Macleod at 1215 after my call with her and officials
[UKGI00009212 Email chain from Tom Cooper to Craig Watson, cc'ing
MPST Tolhurst, Stephen Clarke and others re: Official Sensitive: POL
Litigation Judgement Master Thread, 16 March 2019] to hear from them and
to share our views (I recall her view as being entirely consistent with mine).
71.As agreed on the Saturday morning conference call, Kelly Tolhurst issued on
Monday morning 18°" March a “Dear Colleague” letter to all 650 MPs
[POL00103458 Letter to (Colleague) Member of the House of Commons
from Kelly Tolhurst, MP-re. Post Office Ltd Litigation, dated 18 March
2019).
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72. The letter points out that “the judge has been highly critical of the Post Office's
handling of the case” and set out directly some of the significant criticisms of
the Post Office made in the Judgment.
73. It notes that the “courts are the right place to hear the issues being raised” and
expressed hope that the case “will assist in the resolution of what are long-
standing issues between some postmasters and the Post Office so that
postmasters with claims can find a remedy if the court finds there is validity to
those claims’.
74. The letter said “having spoken over the weekend with the Chairman of POL, I
am assured they have acknowledged the criticism, are taking it very seriously,
and will be taking appropriate action where necessary ... I will be remaining in
close contact with the Post Office over the coming weeks and months as they
deliver on their commitments to improve”.
75. However, the next development — the attempt to recuse Mr Justice Fraser from
the Group Litigation trials — indicated, in my view, that POL had not made the
same assessment of the consequences of the Common Issues Judgment that
land the Minister had.
76.A submission from Mark Russell of UKGI to the Post Office Minister and me on
Thursday 21 March 2019 [BEIS0000070 BEIS briefing note Re: Update on
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POL Litigation, dated 21 March 2019] informed us that the POL Board had
initiated an action to seek to recuse the Judge.
77.The submission said, of Kelly Tolhurst’s call with POL Chair Tim Parker on the
previous Saturday:
“POL informed you that they were taking independent legal advice on whether
to seek an application for the judge to recuse himself from hearing the rest of
the litigation. At that stage, Tim thought it unlikely that an application would be
taken forward.” (para 6)
78.\t then informed us:
“On 20 March POL’s Board met to hear legal opinion on the recusal application
and to take a decision on whether to proceed. Tom Cooper attended as the
shareholder's representative on the Board, but following advice from UKGI
Legal, he took no part in the decision making ... POL’s Board approved the
seeking of the recusal which will be lodged in the court today.” (para 7)
79. This indicated to me that POL was not accepting the gravity of the Common
Issues Judgment, and was asserting its independence of Ministers whose view
of the Judgment had been conveyed on the Saturday.
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80. Advice to the Minister on an email chain at 1549 on 19" March [UKGI00009307
Email from Tom Cooper to Clark MPST, Tolhurst MPST, Tom Aldred and
others - Re: Post Office Litigation Update, 20 March 2019] said “The advice
from BEIS Legal-and UKGI Legal is that BEIS officials/ministers and the
shareholder NED should not be involved in POL’s formal decision-making on
the recusal application”.
81. This is reinforced in a further email to Kelly Tolhurst’s Private Secretary at 1624:
“The strong legal advice is that the minister should not be involved in this
decision’.
82.As well as the “arm’s length” requirement, referenced above, I understand that
there was also a legal view that it would be improper for anyone associated with
the Government to be involved in any decision about the judiciary. This was a
reason why Tom Cooper, UKGI’s representative on the POL Board, took no part
in the decision taking.
83.A submission of 12" April 2019 from Mark Russell of UKGI to Kelly Tolhurst and
me [BEIS0000071 BEIS briefing note Re: Developments since recusal
application on 21 March, dated 12 April 2019] informed us that on 9" April
the Judge had dismissed the recusal application. That submission claimed that
POL intended to take a new approach to the litigation.
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84.It said “POL has decided to boost the legal team and has provisionally
appointed Herbert Smith Freehills to oversee the litigation with a direct mandate
from the Board rather than reporting through the Company Legal Counsel. Their
mandate will be to revisit the approach to the litigation (both substance and
tone) which jn the short term means looking at the appeal relating to the
Common issues Trial, the currently adjourned Horizon issues trial and the
Strategy for reaching resolution. We have been pressing POL to ensure that
their litigation strategy is considered with a fresh pair of eyes, so this is a good
outcome and we expect it to have a significant bearing on the way the litigation
is conducted.”
85.However, despite this statement that POL would proceed to “revisit the
approach to the litigation (both substance and tone)” the submission also said
“the judge dismissed the [recusal] application on 9 April and refused permission
to appeal, but POL will now seek the Court of Appeal’s permission directly. In
parallel, POL is preparing an appeal of the Common Issues Judgement” (my
emphasis). This reinforced my view that the organisation had not changed its
approach in a meaningful way.
86. The results of the promised short-term review of POL's legal strategy by their
newly appointed legal advisers, Herbert Smith Freehills, was communicated in
a submission dated 10 May 2019 [BEIS0000073 BEIS briefing note on Post
Office Litigation: Briefing on POL’s Appeal Strategy] from Mark Russell of
UKGI to the Minister and the Permanent Secretary (although not to me).
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87.It notes, as a fait accompli, that the POL Board had decided to apply for
permission to appeal the Common Issues Judgment. In effect, nothing had
changed in POL’s approach.
88. The submission to Kelly Tolhurst and the Permanent Secretary said:
“Following the appointment of HSF to oversee the litigation with a direct
mandate from the Board, HSF has reviewed POL’s legal strategy. HSF )
presented their advice on the proposed approach to the Common Issues
appeal. This approach was endorsed by the Board's Group Litigation Sub-
Committee on 9 May.”
89. Immediately the Judgment had been published I had said that the interests of
justice to the postmasters must be the guiding principle, and that POL should
move to restitution without further delay. In my view, the recusal application and
now the intended appeal were inconsistent with that steer.
I 90.Given this frustration, I asked officials to devise ways, within the legal
constraints of the relationship between the Government and POL, to require
POL to give effect to my objective.
91.We discussed this orally with officials at my Industry meeting on 4 June and I
requested a comprehensive written set of actions we could take to bring this
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about. This resulted in a substantial submission, prepared by many officials and
sent by the BEIS Director General Gavin Lambert to Kelly Tolhurst and me on
11 June 2019 [BEIS0000075 BEIS advice on Post Office Limited litigation,
11 June 2019].
92. The first paragraph reads:
“Summary
At the industry meeting on 4 June you (SoS) asked for advice on how the
ongoing Post Office Limited (POL litigation) could be brought to a swift and
satisfactory conclusion, ensuring postmasters who had been treated unfairly
were appropriately compensated.”
93. The recommendations of the submission were as follows (paragraph 3):
“That you note the advice and our recommendations that you choose from the
following options (which are not mutually exclusive):
1. Challenge the POL Chair and Board to review their litigation strategy,
consider opportunities for early settlement and set out an action plan
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2. Commission POL to carry out a project on how to structure and operate a
settlement — including a fund which would subsequently assess claims,
consider effect, and award compensation according to pre-agreed criteria
3. BEIS Ministers to state publicly that they want to see justice resulting from
litigation for claimants with valid claims
4. Challenge Post Office to announce that it is taking on board some of the
legitimate criticisms in the Judgments to date and is taking action to )
address them
5. Put UKGI lead legal counsel (or another legal adviser) on the POL litigation
sub committee as director or observer
6. Invite Nigel Boardman, Chair of BEIS Audit and Risk Committee, to carry
out some independent due diligence on. POL'’s litigation strategy
7. Put in place clear information-sharing arrangements vis the proposed
Framework Agreement for POL.”
94. The submission advised on some of the legal risks of this approach (paragraph
16):
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“While it is perfectly proper for the shareholder to express views and ensure the
Board understand their position, care needs to be taken that Ministers do not
risk being regarded as shadow directors. A shadow director is soméone in
accordance with whose directions or instructions the board are accustomed to
act. A shadow director effectively has the same legal duties as a normal director
and can potentially incur personal liability for their actions.”
95.1 had also asked for more ‘nuclear’ options to deploy in the event that POL
would not willingly comply. These included dismissing the Post Office Limited
Board, the Government denouncing POL's litigation, and assuming
departmental control over the remainder of the litigation. These options were
included at my request, but the submission advised “we recommend that they
are not pursued at this stage”.
96.My belief that POL had not accepted the significance of the Common Issues
Judgment was corroborated by this submission. In providing an update on the
Court's Judgment on POL’s application to appeal the Common Issues
Judgment it revealed that POL was persisting in the very behaviour that had
been criticised. The submission said (at paragraph 6) “The Judge criticised
POL’s conduct again, namely POL’s “veiled or implied threat that mirrors the
approach adopted by Post Office on the recusal application”.
97.On 18! June an email from one of my Private Secretaries to the Permanent
Secretary and other officials [UKGI00010205 Email from MPST Clark to
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MPST Tolhurst, Carl Creswell, cc'ing Craig Watson and others, Re: OFF
SEN COMMERCIAL: Post Office Litigation - advice] said that I wished to
pursue all of the first 7 options.
98. The Minister was to meet the Chair and Interim CEO of POL on 24" June to
discuss their litigation strategy and to inform them of these intended actions at
that meeting. The Minister also planned to attend the POL Board at the end of
July “to raise these issues directly with the Board’ [BEIS0000075 BEIS
Submission on Post Office Limited litigation, 11 June 2019]. )
99.1 agreed with the advice of the submission that the ‘nuclear options’ should not
be pursued “af this stage” - but I regarded them as being still on the table. There
were important downsides to dismissing the Board - or denouncing it in a way
that would be likely to provoke its resignation. The Post Office was a large and
complex organisation, turning over almost £1 billion a year. Many public
services — from the payment of benefits to applying for passports — depended
on its operations. To have the Post Office leaderless was a major tisk. The
submission of 11 June also noted that “a competition is underway to recruit a
permanent CEO and panel interviews are due to take place early this week’. In
fact Nick Read was announced as incoming Chief Executive on 18" July.
100. If these 7 actions were carried out, the consequences and implications
of the Common Issues Judgment would have been respected and a
compensation scheme “including a fund which would subsequently assess
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claims, consider effect, and award compensation according to pre-agreed
criteria” would have been drawn up without waiting for the further Judgments in
the Group Litigation.
101. It is worth recalling that this whole period was an exceptionally turbulent
time in Government and in Parliament. As Secretary of State for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy I was deeply involved in trying to secure a
withdrawal agreement from the EU which would allow the UK to continue to
trade without barriers with other member states. I was also responsible for
preparing for ‘No Deal’ in the Department which had more regulatory
involvement with the EU than any other — from the Euratom Treaty on nuclear
co-operation to Rules of Origin to allow automotive exports to continue to be
made from the UK to the EU.
102. In the days after the Common Issues Judgment of 15 March 2019, the
House of Commons was repeatedly trying to break the deadlock on Brexit with
“indicative votes” on various options being held on 27" March and 18‘ April. The
EU Withdrawal Treaty was rejected by the House on 28" March for the third
time, a Bill to rule out No Deal Brexit was debated on 3” April. The election
campaign for the European Parliament was conducted throughout April and
May with the election on 23" May seeing the governing party fall to fifth place
nationally. Theresa May resigned as Leader of the Conservative Party on 24%"
May 2019, ballots among MPs to elect her successor took place on 13, 18th,
19" and 20" June, before a campaign among the party membership resulted
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in Mrs May's replacement as Prime Minister by Boris Johnson on 24! July. The
Department had other urgent and important issues such as the collapse into
liquidation of British Steel on 22" May. I travelled extensively around the world
during these weeks, including to China, India and Turkey, to seek buyers for the
British Steel business to keep the plants in Scunthorpe and Teesside from
closing. I was responsible for many other important measures at the time,
including in May 2019 acting on the recommendation of the Committee on
Climate Change to require Net Zero emissions and legislating for it on 27 June
2019.
103. I mention these other pressures not to suggest that the response to the
Common Issues Judgment was not a priority but precisely the reverse. Ata time
of almost unprecedented demands on my attention and those of the
Department, I deliberately gave time, thought and priority to directing the
Department, and in turn POL, to act on the Judgment of the High Court. From
the initial conference call on the Saturday morning after the Judgment was
made public to the search for ways to change the course of the Post Office's
response, I was determined to drive change.
104. It was universally understood that I would not be continuing as Secretary
of State after 24'" July, having had a marked difference of view on Brexit during
my tenure as Business Secretary from that of the incoming Prime Minister, Boris
Johnson. Indeed, six weeks later Mr Johnson would expel me from the
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Parliamentary Conservative Party for voting in the House of Commons against
a “No Deal’ Brexit.
105. However, I consider that during my remaining time in office my ministers,
officials and I acted meticulously and firmly to use the Judgment to provide the
incoming administration with a basis for changing the course of the litigation
towards acceptance of fault and proper restitution for sub postmasters — even
though it would be another 5 years for the Post Office (Horizon System)
Offences Act to be passed. I wish that I had had the opportunity myself to see
this to completion in office.
REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
106. There are many lessons that must be drawn from the scandal that ruined
the lives of so many sub postmasters, and I know that the work of the Inquiry is
established in part to identify them.
107. There are three aspects on which I would offer comment from reviewing
the evidence and from experience. They are:
- Post Office Limited’s power to prosecute individuals;
- the process of reviewing patterns of criminal prosecutions and/or
convictions;
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- and the “arm’s length’ relationship with Post Office Limited and other bodies
in which the Government is the sole shareholder.
108. I am conscious that the first two of these are essentially legal matters,
and I am not legally trained. So I offer these observations, with due deference,
as a layman - albeit someone with experience of public policy.
109. On the first, it seems to me that - as the Criminal Cases Review
Commission observed to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee - )
there was a clear potential for conflict of interest in Post Office Limited’s status
as both investigator and prosecutor.
110. My initial instinct was to think that private prosecutions by bodies such
as Post Office Limited should not be permitted and that all criminal prosecutions
should be carried out by the Crown Prosecution Service. But I have read the
House of Commons Justice Select Committee’s report Private prosecutions:
safeguards of 2 October 2020 [WITN10900105]. I now understand that,
following the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, the general right
to bring private prosecutions is important constitutionally, not least as a
safeguard “against the inaction of authorities” and that the conduct of the Post
Office should not be regarded as representative.
1114. I support the Justice Select Committee’s recommendation that every
defendant who is privately prosecuted must be informed of his or her right to a
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review by the CPS. I also agree with the Committee’s recommendation that the
Government should enact a binding code of standards, enforced by a regulator,
that applies to all private prosecutors and investigators.
112. My second observation is that had the pattern of prosecutions and
convictions of sub postmasters been better known — for example, the large
number of people of previously blameless character suddenly being charged
and who were completely independent of each other — alarm bells may well
have rung earlier and prevented the prosecution and unsafe convictions of
many innocent people. There seems to me to be a failure of pattern recognition
in the system which should be addressed.
113. Looking back at evidence supplied to this Inquiry, I am struck by the
repeated vagueness on the part of the Post Office over time as to how many
people had been prosecuted and convicted, and the (false) claims and
insinuations that were made to individual sub postmasters that they were “the
only one”.
114. When criminal convictions have made been by Courts it is — rightly —
difficult, and arguably improper, for Ministers to cast doubt on their safety
outside a Court-driven legal process of appeal.
115. That being the case it is very important, in my view, that the atomisation
of individual prosecutions and convictions — taking place in many discrete
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courts across the country and over time — is overcome, so that concerning
patterns can be discerned and investigated.
116, The required publication of information is one way to achieve this. I agree
with the Justice Select Committee’s recommendation (following the suggestion
of the CCRC) that HM Courts and Tribunal Service should establish and
operate a central register of private prosecutions and their outcomes — making
it clear which body brought them. Clearly this would require the mandatory
notification of all such prosecutions. The live register should be made publicly
accessible. Were it known that POL had massively increased its prosecutions
between 1999 and 2012 for similar offences, this pattern could have been a
matter of public attention and questioning.
117. While the simple disclosure of such information would help, it may not
be sufficient. I believe that a more activist approach should be taken. Whether
it is the CPS or HMCTS in the case of prosecutions, or — in the case of
convictions - the CCRC, it would be beneficial to have a responsibility placed
on a body actively to review notifications for the purpose of discerning patterns
that are unusual and which could trigger further investigation. In this way the
long delay in detecting, establishing and then halting and rectifying the systemic
injustice could have begun earlier and been concluded more quickly. In its
absence it took the extraordinary effort of the sub postmasters themselves —
initiated by Sir Alan Bates — to convert an atomised system to one in which the
devastating pattern was exposed to view.
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118. My third observation refers to matters of Corporate Governance. I have
read carefully Report 1 for this Inquiry of the academic experts Dame Sandra
Dawson and Dr Katy Steward [EXPG0000006].
119. There are two aspects on which I would like to comment: the role of UK
Government. Investments (UKGI) and the use of the vehicle of an ordinary
limited company for the Government's ownership of the Post Office.
120. On the first, as Dame Sandra and Dr Steward observe “in 2016 the
government shareholding responsibilities were transferred to UKGI, itself a
government company wholly owned by HM Treasury and no longer part of the
Civil Service” [para 1.6.10, EXPG0000006].
121. According to its own website “UKG/ is a government company with HM
Treasury as its sole shareholder. UKG/’s activities are governed by its Board
and underpinned by its Articles of Association and framework agreement with
HM Treasury. UKGI/ is accountable via its independent Board to Treasury
ministers and — through the Chancellor — to Parliament.”
122. This means that UKGI officials were not formally accountable to BEIS
ministers and officials, but rather to UKGI’s own independent Board and
ultimately to Treasury Ministers. In governance terms, it was the responsibility
of the independent UKGI Board - outside BEIS - to monitor UKGI’s oversight of
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POL. I think this is unsatisfactory when BEIS was the Department with
shareholding responsibility for the Post Office.
123. In practice, UKGI officials were in frequent contact with BEIS officials
and contributed to briefing for Ministers, including my Weekly Updates from
BEIS Directors’ General. There are formal and informal mechanisms in
government open to the Permanent Secretary and ministers to communicate
challenge and dissatisfaction with the performance of UKGI should it be
necessary such as speaking to the Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury or to
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But there is no doubt that arrangement was
designed to put UKGI at one remove from supervision by BEIS officials and
ministers.
124. My observation is consistent with what Dame Sandra and Dr Steward
assess to have been the case in how the relationship between POL, UKGI and
the Government was conducted. Specifically the “arm's length” model,
exercised via UKGI, was chosen to, in the words of Report 1, “insulate [POL]
from political interference.”
125. This stance of the proper relationship between the Government and
companies in which it was a shareholder was in part shaped by external advice.
Dame Sandra and Dr Steward note that in 2007, the National Audit Office, in a
report into UKGI’s predecessor organisation, the Shareholder Executive (“The
Shareholder Executive and Public Sector Businesses”) recommended that it
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should be expanded “to cover all public sector businesses and be given greater
independence from political influence.” [para 1.4.7, EXPG0000006]
126. Dame Sandra and Dr Steward observe in their report that in the conduct
of UKGI as the representative of the shareholder (ie the Government) the
“corporate finance function dominates”. I agree with their assessment. I think it
is reflected in the background of Tom Cooper, the UKGI NED on the Post Office
Limited Board. This is described as “Global Co-Chair of M&A at Deutsche Bank
where he spent the previous 8 years. Previously at UBS Investment Bank for
21 years. Started his career at KMPG.” [BEIS0000077 Annex B to
BEIS0000075 Re: Personnel changes in POL] I should emphasise that I cite
this not at all to criticise Mr Cooper, but because I believe that it corroborates
Dame Sandra and Dr Steward’s point about the dominance of the corporate
finance approach.
127. I would recommend that if UKGI is to maintain its role in the future it
should have a direct governance relationship with the Departments whose
shareholdings it manages.
128. My second observation on corporate governance concerns the use of
the vehicle of an ordinary limited company to conduct the relationship between
the Government and an external organisation. This is not, in my view,
universally appropriate.
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129. For companies which are fully commercial businesses and in which the
Government has a shareholding — such as the banks which were bailed out in
the financial crisis — the ordinary limited company model may be suitable. The
shareholdings can be properly conceived of as investments (even if made for
the public interest purpose of rescuing a socially important business).
130. But there are organisations - of which the Post Office is one and the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority may be another - in which there is a
genuine public interest in decisions made by employed executives in ‘)
operational not only strategic matters. I think it ought to be possible for
ministers to be involved in such decisions without being deemed to be in breach
of Company Law and potentially to be personally liable. For example, I think it
is an inappropriate constraint that in considering taking over the conduct of
litigation with the sub postmasters I was advised that “/t would require POL's
agreement’ [p7, BEIS0000076 Options for Ministers to consider].
131. In essence, some organisations are home to public interest concerns as
well as concerns of corporate performance. So I think it would be reasonable in
these organisations for decisions to be legitimately co-determined between
Boards and ministers — or at least to give ministers the discretion to involve
themselves.
132. This is not an original point, nor is ita new debate. In the post-war Labour
Government from 1945, a substantial disagreement took place between two
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senior Cabinet ministers — Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin — about how
newly publicly-owned businesses should be governed. Bevin believed that the
Boards should consist of trade unionists to ensure that the companies were
governed in the public interest. Morrison believed that they should be governed
by exclusively independent directors. Morrison prevailed and is, in effect, the
origin of the system we have to this day, including the case of Post Office
Limited.
133. Rather than have to make use of a standard limited company vehicle
that is designed for the overwhelming majority of instances of commercial
businesses, it seems to me desirable to create by legislation a new type of
company — say a ‘Public Interest Company’ — which embodies different rights
for government involvement in decisions relating to the business rather than be
subject to the narrower constraints of being an ordinary Companies Act
company.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
zg Jarre Zo2ty
Dated:
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Index to First Witness Statement of Greg Clark
WITN10900100
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No.
URN
Document Description
Control No.
WITN10900101
BEIS Organogram, 15 April 2019
WITN10900101
WITN10800102
BEIS Departmental Overview, June
2017
WITN10900102
POL00006357
Simon Clarke’s advice of 15 July 2013
POL-0017625
POL00028069
Deloitte Draft Board Briefing
document further to report on Horizon
desktop review of assurance sources
and key control features
POL-0023072
POL00006355
Review on behalf of the Chairman of
Post Office Ltd concerning the steps
taken in response to various
complaints made by sub-postmasters
POL-0017623
POL00029984
POL Sparrow - Interim Report: Draft
for Discussion
POL-0026466
POL00030009
Deloitte Draft "Bramble" - Interim
Report
POL-0026491
POL00031502
‘Bramble’ — Draft Report
POL-0028404
WITN10900103
Post Office - introductory brief, July
2016
WITN10900103
10.
UKGI00008345
PO Group Litigation: Litigation Update
for UKGI following POL Board
Meeting on 31 July 2018
UKGI019157-001
11.
UKGI00009076
UKGI advice to Minister regarding
Common Issues trial, including advice
not to seek permission to have early
sight of the judgment
UKGI019884-001
.I POLO0041270
Email Patrick Bourke to Rodric
Williams, Jane MacLeod and Andrew
Parsons Re: Litigation and
Appointment, dated 11 May 2018
POL-0037752
413.
BEIS0000075
BEIS advice Re: POL Litigation
BEISO000055
14.
UKGI00009307
Email from Tom Cooper to Clark
MPST, Tolhurst MPST, Tom Aldred
and others - Re: Post Office Litigation
Update, 20 March 2019
UKG1020115-001
15.
BEIS0000076
Annex A to BEIS0000075 Re: Options
for Minister to consider
BEISO000056
16.
EXPG0000006
Dame Sandra Dawson and Dr
Steward - Expert Report
EXPG0000006
17.
WITN10900104
UK government arm’s length bodies
guide, January 2020
WITN10900104
18.
UKGI00009137
Email from Alex Chisholm to Greg.
Clark CC Kelly Tolhurst Department
for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy Re Post Office litigation trial
and leadership succession
UKGI019945-001
19.
UKGI00009213
Email from Gavin Lambert to MPST
Clark, MPSST Tolhurst, Tom Cooper
UKGI020021-001
Page 48 of 50
WITN10900100
WITN10900100
and others Re: POL Discussion with
SOS and Kelly Tolhurst
20.
UKGI00009212
Email chain from Tom Cooper to
Craig Watson, cc'ing MPST Tolhurst,
Stephen Clarke and others re: Official
Sensitive: POL Litigation Judgement
Master Thread
UKGI020020-001
21,
POL00103458
Letter to (Colleague) Member of the
House of Commons from Kelly
Tolhurst, MP re. Post Office Ltd
Litigation
POL-0103041
22.
BEIS0000070
BEIS briefing note Re: Update on
POL Litigation
BEISO000050
23.
BEIS0000071
BEIS briefing note Re: Developments
since recusal application on 21 March
BEISO000051
24,
BEIS0000073
BEIS briefing note on Post Office
Litigation: Briefing on POL’s Appeal
Strategy
BEIS0000053
25.
UKGI00010205
Email from MPST Clark to MPST
Tolhurst, Carl Creswell, cc’ing Craig
Watson and others, Re: OFF SEN
COMMERCIAL: Post Office Litigation
- advice
UKGI021013-001
26.
WITN10900105
House of Commons Justice
Committee - Private prosecutions -
safeguards, 29 September 2020
WITN10900105
27.
BEIS0000077
Annex B to BEISO000075 Re:
Personnel changes in POL
BEISO000057
Page 49 of 50
WITN10900100
WITN10900100