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Witness Name: Margot James
Statement No.: WITN10910100
Dated: 26 June 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF MARGOT JAMES
I, Margot James, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, will say as follows.
INTRODUCTION
I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's request for evidence dated 17
May 2024 (“the Rule 9 request’). I have prepared it with the support of the
Government Legal Department and counsel. I have been dependent on others to
provide me with documents to assist with the chronology of events as set out
herein, but any views expressed in this statement are my own. Unfortunately,
some documents which would have been helpful in preparing this statement, such
as the minutes or notes of meetings and my Ministerial Diary, have not been
located or shown to me, but I have done my best to deal with the issues raised by
the Inquiry on the basis of what is available and what I can remember. I will do all
I can to clarify or expand upon the evidence set out in this statement should it
assist the Inquiry.
I wish to express my deepest sympathy for all the subpostmasters and
subpostmistresses (“SPMs”) and their families who have been subject to such a
terrible miscarriage of justice during an ordeal which in most cases lasted many
years and for a large number is not over yet. And to offer my heartfelt condolences
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to the families of those SPMs who were driven to take their own lives as a
consequence of this shocking sequence of events and of those SPMs who died
never having received justice or having their names cleared. I would like to
apologise to the SPM community for allowing myself to be fobbed off for too long,
not challenging what I was being told more forcefully and as a result not pressing
adequately for the acceleration of actions that might have expedited efforts to
uncover the truth and put in place a generous scheme of compensation and
redress more rapidly. It is beholden on everyone who has had any responsibility
for contributing to this torment to account for their actions to this inquiry. In so
doing I intend to help in every way that I can and I hope that my evidence is of
some assistance to the Inquiry. I hope the Inquiry can uncover what went wrong,
hold individuals to account where necessary and ensure that the appropriate
lessons are learned.
3. I have answered the Rule 9 request in sequential order and have endeavoured
where possible to provide my account in chronological order as requested.
Background
4. In 1985 I co-founded and was CEO of a company which worked to provide public
relations and medical education services to pharmaceutical companies and
healthcare providers. In 1999 that company was sold and I managed the change
from it being an independent company to becoming a subsidiary of a large
multinational. I acted as Chair until 2002 before joining the advertising agency
Ogilvy & Mather in 2003 as Vice President, Europe with responsibility for the
integration and growth of its healthcare assets.
5. In 20101 was elected MP for Stourbridge and served until 2019 when I stood down
at the general election.
6. From 13 May 2015 to 17 July 2016, I served as an Assistant Whip. From 17 July
2016 to 9 January 2018, I was appointed to the Department for Business, Energy
and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS” or “the Department”) and served as the
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Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Small Business, Consumers and
Corporate Responsibility. I was also the member of the Department’s Board with
responsibility for diversity and inclusion. It was at this time that I became aware of
some of the issues relevant to this Inquiry.
7. OnQ January 2018, I was appointed to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media
and Sport as Minister of State for Digital and the Creative Industries. I served in
this role until 18 July 2019.
8. After I left Parliament, in April 2020, I took up a position as the Executive Chair of
the Warwick Manufacturing Group at the University of Warwick. I also returned to
the private sector taking up two non-executive board roles in the financial services
and technology sectors.
9. After three to four years, I stepped down from those roles and now pursue
independent consultancy and pro bono work in the areas of decarbonisation and
climate change. I am currently the Chair of the Advisory Board to the West
Midlands Electric Lightweight Vehicle and Battery Storage Cluster and the Chair
of the Climate Change Advisory Board to Coventry City Council. I have held those
roles since 2021 and 2022 respectively. I am an Emeritus Governor of the London
School of Economics and Political Science.
Oversight of POL
10. My portfolio as a junior Minister in BEIS with responsibility for Small Business,
Consumers and Corporate Responsibility was broad and included responsibility
for Postal Services.
11. Some of the work involved with the Small Business area of the portfolio included
liaison with organisations representing small businesses and _ start-ups,
establishing and working with an advisory board on scaling up small businesses,
and working with the Pubs Code Adjudicator to regulate the pub tenant and pub
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company relationship under the Pubs Code. I also worked on the establishment
of the office of the Small Business Commissioner to tackle late payment and to
champion the needs of small and medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”) which
included representing the interests of SMEs in the development of the Industrial
Strategy. I was also involved with the British Business Bank and the Start Up
Loans Company. I travelled round the country whenever I could to listen to the
voices of SMEs from the nations and regions of the UK during the time when the
Secretary of State was developing the industrial strategy and it was my role to
ensure that the concerns of SMEs were incorporated into the industrial strategy
which we launched during 2017.
In respect of the Consumer part of the portfolio, I worked on developing a green
paper on Consumer Rights and tackling the safety of appliances that were causing
fires in residential properties. I established a product safety advisory board and
implemented their recommendations by setting up The Office for Product Safety
and Standards (“OPSS”) on a statutory basis. I worked on addressing the
escalating human and financial cost of fraud and improving initiatives aimed at
encouraging consumer switching in regulated markets.
As for Corporate Responsibility, I supported the Secretary of State Greg Clark in
the development of the Corporate Governance Code, which involved working with
the Financial Reporting Council on the review of their code, liaising with No.10 on
the introduction of a beneficial share ownership/register of people with significant
control, and working with the Hampton-Alexander Review of women on boards to
increase female representation on boards and in senior management. I worked
with the Parker Review of Ethnic Diversity of UK Boards and I was also
responsible for the Overseas Entities Beneficial Share Ownership Register.
In addition to these main parts of my portfolio, I also had responsibility for the
following policy areas and statutory bodies:
a. Labour Markets, which included work on the Taylor Review, minimum wage,
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (“‘ACAS”) and employment
tribunals (a responsibility which was later shared with the Ministry of Justice),
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equal pay legislation and shared parental leave, and liaison with employer and
labour organisations e.g. the Trades Union Congress (“TUC”) and the Low
Pay Commission.
b. Retail Sector, including relationships with major retailers, the British Retail
Consortium and other representative bodies.
c. Retail energy markets, including supporting the Secretary of State on
developing the energy price cap.
d. Postal affairs and the Post Office
e. The Insolvency Service, which involved working with the CEO on a review of
the workings of the Insolvency Act with a view to strengthening its provisions
in light of the British Home Stores (“BHS”) insolvency in April 2016.
f. Companies House
g. HM Land Registry
h. Ordnance Survey
The postal affairs area of my policy portfolio formed one part of this wide-ranging
set of responsibilities and was itself quite broad. The core of the brief was to
ensure that BEIS held the POL Board to account for meeting financial and non-
financial targets and delivery of work that was agreed to be central to the
Government's manifesto commitments. This included securing the future of 3,000
rural branches (WITN10910101 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2015)
and branches in lower income urban neighbourhoods, modernising the network,
meeting access criteria, and expanding services (in particular a digital verification
and identification system, banking services and services to SMEs. Some of the
central work to that brief was to ensure all routine small business and consumer
banking services were available throughout post office branches, and in particular
in rural areas and lower income urban areas.
Apart from this there was significant focus within the postal affairs brief on planning
and securing POL funding. The Government provides funding to POL in the form
of a subsidy (which recognises the wider social purpose of the network that goes
beyond that which would be commercially viable). HM Treasury was a key aspect
of my work on the brief and I supported the Secretary of State on negotiations with
HMT to secure the funding needs of POL as agreed with UKGI and the POL board.
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17. It was also my responsibility to lead the Government response to the public
consultation on Post Office access criteria, which determined the size and
geographical reach of the Post Office, opening hours and the range of services
available across the network.
18. I made efforts to use my influence to help resolve the disputes between the
Communication Workers Union (“CWU”) and POL, which had resulted in the CWU
holding a number of strike days due to the closure of loss-making branches. I held
meetings with the CWU in which I acted as mediator in an effort to improve
communications with POL.
19. I also had oversight of the Royal Mail Group (“RMG’). My role focussed on their
responsibility for delivering the Universal Service Obligation. Towards the end of
2016 I also led on the issue of scam mail (non-online fraud). I hosted a roundtable
meeting with key stakeholders including RMG who agreed to work together to
prevent scam mail where possible. The postal operators agreed a Code of
Conduct to reduce illegal scam mail. I hosted a number of meetings to progress
this policy area.
20. At the time I was appointed as Minister, POL was a public corporation which had
an executive management team and Board. It was the intention of successive
Governments that, although publicly owned, the Post Office should have
commercial freedom to raise funds, invest in new technology, diversify its offering,
and operate as a retail company in a competitive market. It was thought that these
commercial freedoms were crucial to the sustainability of the Post Office. The
legislation underpinning POL (the Postal Services Act 2000 and the Postal Services
Act 2011) therefore separated the functions of ownership and management. The
executives of POL owed their duties to the company, and were accountable to the
POL Board, not directly to the Government of the day.
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21. The Government's role is as sole shareholder. It is responsible for setting the overall
strategy, policy or objectives for the Post Office, as well as for ensuring that POL
works to deliver on those objectives, but not to have any involvement in the day-to-
day running of the operations of the business. It was accepted that POL would
operate at arm’s length from Government, that such freedom was crucial to its ability
to grow and over time reduce its dependence on the public finances. As shareholder
the Government would only get more involved (through UKGI, who undertook the
shareholder function on behalf of Government as I explain below) if the strategic
aims or objectives looked as if they might not be met, such as if a key milestone
had not been achieved.
22. In practice what this meant was that I would answer for all aspects of postal affairs
in Parliament, whether this be answering questions, speaking in debates, or dealing
with correspondence from MPs and their constituents. It was my responsibility as
Minister and the responsibility of the Secretary of State to challenge POL’s Board
about whether it was achieving the strategic objectives set for it. In doing so, I tried
to ensure that I was getting a full and accurate impression of POL operations and
strategy by checking with other relevant stakeholders such as the CWU and NFSP.
to make sure that I accessed other views and experiences within POL’s business
which would assist me in my duty to challenge the Board where appropriate. I would
do this by questioning the Board and CEO at quarterly meetings and by meeting
other stakeholders, for example the leadership of the CWU and the NFSP, without
POL directors and senior management being present. In addition to these meetings
I also heard from and met with Parliamentarians from time to time. Of particular
value to me, in keeping myself informed independently, were parliamentary
debates, which it would be my responsibility to answer on behalf of the Government.
23. The fact that operational or contractual matters were not the responsibility of
Government was a product of legislative design and had been established policy
for some time prior to my appointment as Minister. The legislation assigned the
management functions, including the operations of the company, to POL. This
meant that issues concerning POL’s IT systems, aside from the issue of further
investment in it and budgeting for that investment, were questions of day-to-day
operation of the company. Issues surrounding whether Horizon was functioning as
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it should were matters for POL to resolve as part of its operations. From my
experience in industry, where I had worked for a number of large companies, I
understood that the shareholder should not be interfering with the day-to-day
operation of a business, and I tried to respect those boundaries.
The Government's shareholder function was exercised on behalf of the
Government by UKGI. They were represented on POL’s Board. UKGI was not
based within BEIS; it was a company wholly owned by HM Treasury, because it
performed the shareholder role for a number of Government departments in relation
to various different organisations. It had a ‘dotted line’ to BEIS in relation to POL.
UKGI officials were the conduits of information between BEIS and POL and if I as
Minister needed a briefing on POL issues or wanted to raise questions of POL, it
would be done through UKGI in the first instance. In terms of how UKGI was
monitored, DBT officials took the lead on most matters from UKGI rather than the
other way round, but the Secretary of State would ultimately hold UKGI to account
for their shareholder function in POL. This monitoring came to the fore when finance
and remuneration issues were under discussion.
I had a private office at BEIS and the benefit of a number of officials (civil servants)
who assisted in preparing paperwork for my ministerial box and arranging my diary.
BEIS also had a number of officials who were subject matter experts in the various
policy areas. Those officials would draft the advice/briefings/submissions ahead of
key meetings, debates, Parliamentary Questions and so forth. For the purpose of
the postal affairs brief, those individuals worked within UKGI rather than BEIS. It
was UKGI officials that prepared the relevant advice as experts on postal affairs.
They took the lead in challenging the POL executives and accounting for POL’s
activities to BEIS.
As with the advice I received on all areas of my policy portfolio, I relied on officials
for objective and honest advice. They were bound by the Civil Service Code and so
I expected the advice given to be of this character. Given the breadth of all
ministerial portfolios, it is necessary that Ministers make decisions on the basis of
the advice given (except in those cases where I had good reason to challenge that
advice) and we are reliant on its impartiality and accuracy. I would, for example,
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rely on the officials to review and analyse the information provided to them and
provide me with sensible steers on action and draft responses to correspondence
or Parliamentary Questions which advanced the Government's manifesto
commitments and policy more broadly. After I had been in office for six to nine
months it became clear to me that advice given by officials was often constrained
by expectations on the part of officials of what might and might not be agreeable to
No 10, HM Treasury, or to another department which might be taking the lead ona
particular issue. Officials would require challenge from the Minister in these
circumstances if decisions were to be taken in what the Minister determined to be
the public interest.
Correspondence would be received by my private office and directed to me in a
bundle a few times a week. It would initially be triaged by my private secretaries,
and I trusted them to deal with correspondence on my behalf. Documents which
they referred to officials for analysis or advice would be returned to me with a
submission or note of advice and often with a draft response for my consideration.
I would read the correspondence and documents returned to me, but I relied on
Officials to direct me to the paperwork that required my close attention. There would
be standard responses, based on agreed policy lines, to a large proportion of
correspondence on any brief. Officials worked hard to draft those responses in line
with government policy and they were updated over time and as circumstances
changed. I sometimes edited these responses myself, or added a postscript, when
I had time and when the response drafted for me struck, in my view, the wrong tone.
This began to happen with my replies to SPMs as I became increasingly
uncomfortable with the line we were taking.
I met with the POL Board on a quarterly basis, although I was available to them at
other times should they wish to consult me. I met with UKGI on a more regular
basis, indeed my day-to-day communications in respect of POL were mostly
through UKGI officials. In particular, I remember meeting with UKGI officials to
agree POL’s financial objectives and remuneration policies as part of the work on
POL’s budget and spending review. UKGI monitored POL’s performance monthly
to ensure that Government policy regarding the network was delivered.
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29. I can see a potential distinction between the role and responsibility of the
Department, and myself as responsible Minister responsible, when acting in the
Government's capacity as shareholder and when acting as a Government
department. It might be construed that whilst acting as shareholder the
Department’s responsibilities were narrowly focussed on the setting of POL’s
strategic goals and monitoring performance accordingly. But in the context of the
Department’s wider remit as the department for business, and my broader
Ministerial role, there is a strong argument that we should have delved more closely
into operational matters, especially when they involved the group litigation.
Knowledge
30. I have been asked to comment on my knowledge of various issues relating to the
Horizon system, and whether my knowledge developed at any point., When I was
appointed as Minister with responsibility for postal affairs, I had no knowledge of
any of the issues I have been asked to comment on. Upon my appointment to
that role I was given a Day One briefing pack (UKGI00020328, Post Office Limited
(“POL”) Overview July 2016). The material relating to POL was prepared by
officials from UKGI and was part of a briefing made available to any new Minister
when taking up their post in any Government department. The pack is aimed at
bringing new Ministers up to speed with current issues in the department and likely
early decisions the Minister will have to make.
31. On the “Summary and Key Issues ” slide (page 2) it says as follows: “Horizon
(Slide 14): A small number of mostly former subpostmasters have raised concerns
about POL’s Horizon IT system, which they claim has caused their businesses
losses. Over two years’ worth of independent investigation has found no systemic
faults in Horizon, but campaigning and media interest persists. Civil litigation has
been commenced against POL”.
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Slide 13 (rather than 14) contained further information on “Horizon IT System:
Complaints and Legal Action” (page 14). It said that “there has been over two
years of independent scrutiny of POL’s Horizon IT system and no evidence of
systemic fails has been found”. Providing more detail, it said that “in 2012 POL
commissioned an independent firm, Second Sight, to examine the system for
systemic flaws that could cause accounting discrepancies. Second Sight’s interim
report, published in July 2013, and the final report, published in April 2015, both
make clear that there is no evidence of system-wide problems with Horizon”.
Brief details of the Complaints and Mediation Scheme were provided, and I was
told that the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“CCRC”) was considering
around 20 cases. That review had been underway since early 2015 and I was
informed that POL had “no indication of when the CCRC may reach conclusions
on any of the cases”.
It was recorded that earlier in the year, “group civil litigation on behalf of 91
claimants was commenced at the High Court. This is at an early stage and precise
details of the claim are unclear. As there are legal proceedings underway, our
advice is that this should remain independent of Government: it is a matter of law’.
Looking again now at these documents, and to the best of my recollection, this
was the first time I was made aware of the group litigation (which was still in the
first stages of case management — a group litigation order was not made until
March 2017), and I noted the advice provided by UKGI that the proceedings
“should remain independent of Government: it is a matter of law” (UKGI00020328
page 14). I took this to mean, as I would do in any litigation relating to the
Government, that BEIS should not look to interfere with it or comment on the
process until it was concluded. Perhaps due to this position being taken, not many
details were provided. Whilst the Day One briefing pack did mention the litigation
it did not, for example, contain any details about there being concerns around
remote access to Horizon or the deletion and replacement of files. Whilst it referred
to the Second Sight interim report and final report, it did not refer to any of the
subsequent reports, reviews or actions taken by POL. It did not contain any
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information on the Simon Clarke advice, any of the Deloitte reports or the Swift
Review. With the benefit of hindsight this briefing, even making allowance for the
fact it was a high-level summary, was very selective and omitted several important
developments.
On 29 July 2016, Laura Thompson of UKGI (UKGI00006961, Email from Laura
Thompson to SPADS Clark, SpAD Clark MPST Clark MPST and others re Post
Office: Potential weekend story on litigation) wrote to my private office and the
private office of the Secretary of State providing notification that POL had sent a
letter to the solicitors for the Claimants in the group litigation and that this letter
may be made public. In that email Ms Thompson set out that “the claims relate to
the Post Office’s “Horizon” IT system, and accusations that Post Office has treated
its agents unfairly’. Ms Thompson went on to say that “this is a legal matter and
operational responsibility of Post Office Limited, the company which manages the
Post Office network. As such, our advice would be not to comment and for Press
Office to pass any media enquiries to Post Office directly. This is the approach we
have taken previously on this issue — please let me know if you think SpAds or
Ministers would disagree”.
I did not have any additional knowledge of those accusations aside from what was
contained in the Day One briefing pack. The advice that BEIS should not comment
on the litigation did not surprise me and I accepted that advice. At the start of my
time at BEIS I would have relied on officials to have informed me if a different
approach was appropriate, given my lack of prior awareness and knowledge of
the history of the dispute. However, refraining from any public comment did not
preclude me from challenging the POL Board in private. In retrospect, I wished I
had done that more vigorously than I did.
Ms Thompson concluded that UKGI “will provide a full briefing on this issue to
Ministers — this is flagged in the Day One briefing pack, and we have also included
in our briefing to Margot James”. It is correct that the Horizon IT System issues
were flagged in the Day One briefing pack as explained above. But to the best of
my recollection I never did receive what might be termed a ‘full briefing’. I regret
not asking for one and that my private office did not follow up on this promise.
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39. I received a verbal briefing from UKGI on 4 August 2016 (UKGI00000015 Prep for
Margot James 4 August 2016). To the best of my recollection, helped by looking
now at the documents, it was provided by Richard Callard and Laura Thompson.
I was provided with a note in advance of that meeting which was prepared for me
by UKGI. In respect of the Horizon IT System the note read, “THINGS YOU NEED
TO KNOW. ‘Project Sparrow’. — Alleged problems with IT system seeing
postmasters suffer losses and in some cases imprisonment. — No evidence of
bugs in the system despite three years of investigation. — High court proceedings
have begun. — Suggest we give you a fuller briefing on this as it regularly flares
up”.
40. Idonotremember the detail of that verbal briefing on 4 August. I believe it covered
the topics outlined in the July 2016 Day One briefing pack. My understanding was
that there may be occasional faults in the IT system, but nothing that was a
structural flaw across the system.
41. Ihad very limited knowledge of the nature of the complaints raised by SPMs. I was
told that the complaints were now the subject of legal proceedings. In seeking to
resolve those complaints, such as the Complaints and Mediation Scheme and the
work of Second Sight in connection with that Scheme, the briefing given to me
was that resolution of the complaints was not a matter for Government but instead
for the Court to decide.
42.To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I was not then, nor was I ever,
briefed on the Simon Clarke advice, any of the Deloitte reports, or, most importantly
of all, the Swift Review. I do not believe I ever received copies of any of the
documents the Inquiry has referred me to (POLO0006357, POL00028069,
POL00029984, POL00030009, POL00031502), nor that I knew of their existence
whilst I was Minister. Having now read these reports I have concluded that they
were withheld from me deliberately.
43. I do not now recall the Horizon IT system issues being referred to as “Project
Sparrow’, but I note that this phrase was used in the note of the verbal briefing I
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received from UKGI on 4 August 2016. It may therefore have been mentioned but
I have simply forgotten it in the intervening years.
44. I had no knowledge that it was RMG or POL who had both investigated and
prosecuted SPMs for theft, fraud and/or false accounting. I did not find out about
that until long after I had left office and the information came as a shock to me. All
I was told at the time is that SPMs had been prosecuted and found guilty. I
assumed these prosecutions were brought by the police and CPS in the normal
way; it did not occur to me that these prosecutions were by RMG/POL itself. I did
know that some of those convictions were the subject of a CCRC review, but again
understood that BEIS should let the CCRC process run its course. Had I known at
the time that POL were taking on the investigation and prosecution of the SPMs
themselves, I would have been far less accepting of the argument against further
scrutiny that was regularly made to me; namely that all the SPMs who blamed
Horizon for shortfalls and had been prosecuted for theft or fraud had been found
guilty in a court of law.
The Swift Review and Group Litigation
45. I have been asked to comment on my involvement as Minister in overseeing POL
in relation to Horizon issues. I understand having reviewed the documents
provided to me that on 8 August 2016, Richard Callard of UKGI contacted my
private office to arrange a meeting to include a “Horizon IT session”
(WITN10910102 Email to James MPST from Richard Callard RE: Post Office
meetings). He wrote that “/ think the minister would benefit from a briefing session
on the Horizon IT issue, which tends to flare up at random times. Laura Thompson
can lead the briefing on that (I would like to be there but don’t have to be), but it
would be helpful to get a specific session in the diary for that purpose”. This
echoed the sentiments expressed more briefly at the 4 August 2016 meeting.
46. A meeting with Tim McInnes and Laura Thompson was arranged for 23 August
2016. In the event, the meeting covered a number of topics, and the Horizon
issues were “tacked on” the agenda (WITN10910102). I do not recall being briefed
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on Horizon in any more detail than the verbal briefing I had received on 4 August.
In particular, the Swift Review (and the Deloitte Bramble and Zebra reports) were
withheld from me; it was not mentioned to the best of my recollection. I have been
asked by the Inquiry what I was told about the review by Tim Parker or Jonathan
Swift QC when I became Minister and whether I have any views on further
information POL should have provided on the Swift Review. To the best of my
recollection I have never met Jonathan Swift QC and Tim Parker, whom I did
meet, never mentioned the Swift Review to me. Having had no awareness of the
Swift Review I obviously could not have any view on the matter of whether POL
should have provided further information on the Swift Review.
My private secretary emailed UKGI following the meeting with some action points
(UKGI00006991 Email from Laura Thompson to James MPST and Tim Mcinnes
cc Richard Callard and others re Finance and Horizon Meeting - Follow-up
Actions). He asked for a copy of the group civil litigation letter and POL’s response.
I do not recall asking him to request those documents. I think he was probably
being proactive and ensuring that I had all the necessary information available to
me.
Laura Thompson replied saying that the Government had “not been party to either
the letter of claim from the claimants or POL’s response — POL’s response in
particular is subject to legal privilege. I recommend we maintain that distance,
certainly at this stage in the proceedings”.
On 1 September 2016 I met Paula Vennells, POL’s CEO. I was briefed in advance
of that meeting by Michael Dollin of UKGI (UKGI00032873 Official - Meeting with
Paula Vennells, Chief Executive of Post Office Ltd. - Briefing note). This was a
routine introductory meeting to help me understand the current issues facing POL.
I do not recall the Horizon IT system issues, the SPM complaints or the group
litigation being discussed in that meeting. I certainly was not briefed specifically
on those issues and matters relating to Horizon were not included in the meeting
agenda. Later in my time as Minister (it is hard to remember exactly when) I formed
an impression that Horizon was the last thing that the POL Board or CEO ever
wanted to discuss, that they would never bring it up pro-actively and, if I asked
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questions about it, they were reluctant to speak about it in detail. To begin with, I
simply put this down to it being a difficult issue which was subject to ongoing
litigation, but as time went on and as I started to get a number of letters from MPs
raising complaints from SPMs in their constituencies, and some letters from SPMs
themselves which contained accounts of their personal experience of Horizon
which was at odds with the minimal details disclosed to me by the CEO of the
POL. I started to feel that there might be more to the Horizon issues than I was
being told.
The Inquiry has referred me to document UKGI00016322, which is a draft letter
dated 20 September 2016 from me to David Warburton MP in response to his
letter of 16 September 2016 which enclosed correspondence from his constituent,
John Bowman. The letter is not properly headed or signed and so I do not know if
this is the final version. In any event, this letter would have been drafted by UKGI
Officials and the source of the information contained within it would have been
POL. I relied on UKGI officials providing accurate and reliable information in this
draft letter, as with all correspondence. The reply states that “Mr Bowman
mentions the legal action taking place on complaints about the Horizon IT system.
As I’m sure you will appreciate, as civil proceedings have been issued against the
Post Office on this matter, I am unable to comment further at this present time.
This is a matter for the courts’. I do not recall the content of Mr Bowman's letter
as it pertained to the litigation. It is highly likely that his letter deserved a more
empathetic response, but as I stated above, I accepted the advice that I should
not be commenting on these proceedings as they progressed through the court
system.
On 10 November 2016 UKGI sent my private office a briefing pack
(UKGI00007416 Email from Jessica Williams to James MPST, Michael Dollin and
James Baugh and others re: 161110 Debate Briefing - WHD Future of the Post
Office first cut for James R) ahead of the Westminster Hall Debate on 17
November 2016 (UKGI00007417 Killer Facts on Post Office Limited,
UKGI00007409, Briefing Pack Westminster Hall Debate: Kelvin Hopkins MP,
Labour, Luton North, Tuesday 17 November 3pm-4:30pm). The motion of the
Debate was ‘That this House has considered the future of the Post Office’ and it
Page 16 of 32
52.
53.
54.
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focussed on the closure of post offices. The pack contained a page on the “Top
Lines” and “Background” in relation to the Horizon IT Issues. In terms of “Top
Lines” \t said at the first bullet point that “civil proceedings have been issued
against the Post Office on the matter of the Horizon IT system. This is a matter for
the courts and I am unable to comment further’. In respect of background, the first
bullet point notes that “following complaints from a small number of sub-
postmasters regarding the POL’s Horizon IT (point of sale) system, an
investigation was undertaken by an independent firm, Second Sight, over two
years. Whilst this received relatively high profile press attention, no systemic issue
with Horizon has been found”. The third and final bullet point under “Background”
was that “the Court system represents the best place for this sort of dispute to be
resolved”.
Those documents were drafted by UKGI and repeated the information and advice
received previously.
A record of what was said in the debate is available on Hansard (RLIT0000222
Hansard Westminster Hall Volume 617: debated on Thursday 17 November 2016
Download text). The contributions of the various MPs related to the Post Office
financial position, branch closures, and the availability of services in rural areas.
There was no mention of Horizon, the complaints of SPMs, the prosecutions or
anything related to these issues.
On 22 November 2016, Ranil Jayawardena MP tabled a Parliamentary Question
in respect of the Post Office. He asked, “how much the Post Office has paid in
compensation to sub post masters as part of the Initial Complaint Review and
Mediation scheme”. The draft answer which was provided by Laura Thompson of
UKGI was that “The Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme was
independent of Government, and an operational matter for Post Office Limited. I
have asked Paula Vennells, the Chief Executive of Post Office Limited, to write to
the Hon member on this matter to provide the information requested. A copy of
her reply will be placed in the libraries of the House” (UKGI00016351 House of
Commons Parliamentary Question: PQW2016/31850).
Page 17 of 32
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55. A response that this question would be answered by way of a letter from Paula
Vennells accorded with Government's policy that it was an operational matter for
POL, as the Scheme was run and managed by POL.
56. On 20 January 2017, Laura Thompson of UKGI provided my private office
with an update on the group litigation (UKGI00020453 Email from Laura
Thompson to James MPST, French Claire (Communications), Russell Philippa
(Communications)). She wrote that:
“AS you are aware, a group of (mostly) former postmasters are seeking to bring
a group legal action against Post Office Limited, regarding claims that alleged
faults in the Horizon IT system (used in all branches) have caused postmasters
to be wrongly dismissed or prosecuted. This story has been covered quite
extensively in the press in the past. Note that there remains no evidence that
anyone has been wrongfully convicted, or that there are any systemic flaws in
the IT system. Next Thursday (26 January) there will be a hearing at the High
Court, which is the first part of this group action process. The purpose of the
hearing is largely administrative — it will define the scope of the group action,
and other procedural points. Nevertheless, the campaign group (“Justice for
Subpostmasters Alliance”) bringing the legal action has been very vocal in the
past, and there is the chance that they might seek to create interest in this
hearing: “Post Office in the dock”, etc. The hearing will be in public, although is
unlikely to cover any specific details of any of the claims. So I wanted you to
be aware that this is coming up. If there is any media interest, I would suggest
our usual approach of referring any enquiries to Post Office. I would not suggest
we comment on legal action — but welcome thoughts from press office”.
57. I would have taken this email as an update only and not a request for action
or decision of any sort. I decided to accept this advice after consultation with
the BEIS press office.
58. I am aware that there was some media coverage arising from this hearing
(WITN10910104 Email from Claire French to James RE: BEIS Forecast for
Tuesday 31 January 2017, UKGI00007542 Email from Claire French to Callard
Richard (UKGI), Thompson Laura (UKGI), Dollin Michael (UKGI)) and that Laura
Thompson confirmed UKGI’s advice that “we’re content with the suggested
lines — pass to Post Office in the first instance, ‘operational matter / legal
proceedings’ if needed” (UKGI00020455 Email from Claire French to James
MPST FW: Post Office Litigation).
Page 18 of 32
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59. The Inquiry has provided me with a copy of some text messages I exchanged
with Paula Vennells on 5 March 2017, regarding a meeting on 15 March
(PVEN00000392 Message chain between Margot James and Paula Vennelles
dated 5 March 2017). I am afraid that I have absolutely no recollection
whatsoever of whether this meeting went ahead or what we discussed if it
did take place. It is possible that, given the timing, it was about the funding
settlement for POL that was the subject of considerable discussion between
BEIS and HM Treasury during March 2017. The fact that the meeting was
requested by Paula Vennells means I am fully confident that it would not
have been about Horizon, because as noted above neither she nor anyone
on the POL Board ever proactively raised matters relating to Horizon with
me.
60. On 7 March 2017, my private secretary sent me an email setting out the current
live issues in my policy areas and the key contacts in each of those areas
(WITN10910105 Email from James MPST Final Handover ). In respect of the
Horizon IT issues, my private secretary said that “this is the name of the computer
system used in Post Offices. There is currently a group action at the High Court
regarding issues that have led to dismissals and criminal convictions — they have
been accused (and some proven in court or even provided a guilty plea) of theft.
A group of ex-subpostmasters believe they were sacked/convicted due to an issue
with the system, rather than theft. The High Court agreed they could bring about
a group action suit, and gave them 6 months (from the 26 Jan) to conclude
applications of who could be included within the ‘group’. It will be worth asking for
an update from Laura Thompson in around June-time’”.
61. On 29 March 2017, Jessica Williams of UKGI copied my private office to an email
(WITN10910106 Email from Jessica William to Twinley Leann Re-worked briefing
pack for HoL debate on Post Office tomorrow ) enclosing a briefing pack on the
Post Office ahead of a debate listed by Lord Hain on the future of local post offices
(UKGI00007551 Questions for Short Debate Thursday 30" March 2017). That
briefing pack contained a page on the “Top Lines” and “Background? in relation to
the Horizon IT Issues. The content replicated that contained in the briefing pack
for the 17 November 2016 Westminster Hall Debate.
Page 19 of 32
62.
63.
64.
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On 13 April 2017, my private secretary sent an email to my private office with
updates on policy areas following her meetings with various officials that week
(WITN10910117 Email from James MPST to Rehman Sahar re [OFFICIAL-
SENSITIVE] Policy Update — An Overview dated 14 April 2017). In respect of POL
she wrote that “Horizon court case on going: Grievance between subpostmasters
(represented by the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance) re the IT system.
Concern that the court verdict could force a change in the subpostmaster’s
contract as issued by POL, however this is a POL operation issue”. That
information would have come from POL via UKGI.
On 31 July 2017, Richard Callard of UKGI sent my private secretary an email
updating her on the live issues in respect of POL (WITN10910107 Email from
Richard Callard to James MPST RE: Post Office catch up). Neither Horizon nor
the group litigation were mentioned as a live issue.
I received a further update on the current live issues in my policy portfolio
from my private secretary on 2 August 2017 (WITN10910108 Email from
Sophia Nikolaou to James [OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE] Sophia's Handover). This did
contain a further reference to the litigation as follows: “Horizon. This is the
name of the computer system used in Post Offices. There is currently a group
action at the High Court regarding issues that have led to dismissals and criminal
convictions — they have been accused (and some proven in court or even provided
a guilty plea) of theft. A group of ex-subpostmasters believe they were
sacked/convicted due to an issue with the system, rather than theft. The High
Court agreed they could bring about a class action (group) suit, and gave them 6
months (from the 26 Jan) to conclude applications of who could be included
within the ‘group’. Next Steps — Post recess: there has been no further movement
on this since March 2017. It is worth asking Richard Callard for an update on the
issue after recess as this is when the High court has finished accepting
applications to the class action law suit’.
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65. I have also seen a document entitled “Post Office facts (for MP Drop In Session,
18” October 2017)” (UKGI00016304). This appears to be a briefing pack for an
event in Parliament which I would be expected to attend and answer questions
from MPs. It notes on the second page “Attack: Allegations about the Post Office’s
Horizon IT system. — This is an operational matter for Post Office Limited. As legal
proceedings are underway, I am unable to comment further’. I have no recollection
of this particular event; events such as these were a fairly regular occurrence on
various different subjects or policy areas that I would always try to attend if relevant
to my policy areas.
66. On 24 November 2017, I received from my private office “Crib Sheets” in respect
of POL (WITN10910109 Email to James MPST dated 15 March 2017, POL Crib
Sheet UKGI00007701 Post Office Network Crib Sheet). I would receive “Crib
Sheets” on reasonably frequent occasions which provided the top line policy
positions in a number of areas. For example, I received “Crib Sheets” on the issues
of employment tribunals, EU Exit and Consumers, corporate transparency
and beneficial ownership, and the Retail Energy Price Cap Bill. The
November 2017 “Crib Sheet” and indeed the December 2017 version
(UKGI00007701) both stated, “Allegations about the Post Office Horizon IT
system. — This is an operational matter for Post Office Limited. As legal
proceedings are underway, we are unable to comment further’. The “Crib Sheets”
on the Post Office Network would be drafted by UKGI (WITN10910110 Policy
areas for ‘Crib Sheet’ with authors assigned).
67. I would also frequently receive a document entitled “BEIS Hot Topics Pack”.
As the write around for submissions in March 2017 makes clear, “the pack
will be used by Ministers for Parliamentary business. As such, the lines need
to be short and to the point’ (WITN10910111 Email from Andrew Singleton
BEIS Hot Topics Pack- Deadline: COP Friday 17 March dated 15 March 2017).
UKGI were responsible for the Post Office content in this Pack
(WITN10910112). The March/April 2017 version of this document stated on
page 9, “Allegations about the Post Office Horizon IT system. — This is an
operational matter for Post office Limited. As legal proceedings have been
announced, we are unable to comment further’( WITN10910112). The
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January 2017 (WITN10910113), May 2017 (WITN10910114 BEIS Hot Topics
Pack: May 2017), and November 2017 (WITN10910115 BEIS Hot Topics Pack:
November 2017) Hot Topics documents contained a version of these same
lines.
68. On 20 December 2017 I sent a letter to Tim Parker, the then Chair of POL
(UKG100016342 Letter from Margot James MP to Tim Parker re: provision of
clarity about the Government's expectations for the businesses it owns ). This was
a standard letter drafted by UKGI which reminded him of the Government's
strategic priorities for POL and confirmed the level of subsidy and investment
which would be forthcoming in the next financial year. There was no mention of
Horizon issues.
69. On 31 January 2017, my private secretary emailed me with a further update on
the legal proceedings (WITN10910116 Email from James MPST RE: Update for
Margot James). He wrote, “you may remember there were a number of ex-
Subpostmasters involved in group-action litigation regarding the computer system
‘Horizon’ used in post offices. The group claim they were wrongly dismissed by
POL or prosecuted due to a glitch in the system which indicated they had made
mistakes or stolen money. Last week the group attended the High Court for an
order request to sue the Post Office. The Financial Times will be running a story
tomorrow to confirm the group has been granted permission by the High Court to
pursue a collective action. The group has been given 6 months to add any
additional affected members before the court proceeds. This is not expected to
cause any parliamentary business (UQs etc.) as this is a matter for POL and, as
it is a legal case, we would be unable to say anything anyway.” He goes on to
advise in respect of media handling that, “as this is an operational matter, the
Department are not providing any comment - ‘This is a matter for Post Office Ltd.
Please call their press office”. It goes on to say, “If pushed: ‘As this legal case is
open, it is not appropriate for us to comment.
Other conversations, meetings, correspondence or briefings about Horizon
issues
Page 22 of 32
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70. I have set out in the above narrative what I recall about all my interactions
and engagement with the Horizon issues. The Horizon IT system issues
were raised very little with me and I was not informed at any time of the
existence of the reports and the investigations that the Inquiry has referred
me to. In consequence I did not spend much time at all on these issues and
my role was for the most part reactive. After I became concerned that there
was more to Horizon than had been communicated to me I asked more
questions of the POL Board and I questioned other stakeholders about their
understanding of the issue. I decided to meet the outgoing leader of the
National Federation of Sub-Postmasters (“NFSP”) and took the opportunity
of questioning him about the alleged impact of Horizon on some SPMs.
Somewhat to my surprise I was reassured by the representative of the NFSP,
who concurred with the line taken by the POL in response to my questions.
This had the effect of allaying my concerns which had been growing prior to
the meeting. This state of reassurance was reinforced by Horizon never
coming up during my meetings with the leadership of the CWU.
71. My overall impression of POL around this time was favourable but with
growing doubts on the issue of Horizon. I was impressed by the strategy of
rolling out the counter services via concessions in other retailers and people
in my constituency reported that this arrangement was going well. When I
was a candidate for election in 2010 the Post Office was busy closing
branches and by the time I became Minister for postal services our record
was one of preserving branches in rural parts of the country and areas of
social deprivation (apart from loss making Crown post offices), opening new
counter services, growing services, improving access and investing in the
infrastructure. I saw that POL’s banking operations were evolving, with
particular benefits to SMEs. The network transformation plan was
proceeding as intended and these achievements were all the more
impressive for being delivered in the context of a reducing dependence on
the public purse.
Against this generally positive impression, it would have taken a red flag for
me to have become proactive in relation to the Horizon IT system issues.
Page 23 of 32
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Red flags might have involved exposure to James Arbuthnot MP’s campaign
and reading the Swift Review report. Had either or both of these things
occurred, I think I would have pursued the issue much more vigorously. Had
there been a parliamentary debate on Horizon (similar to the one called by
James Arbuthnot on 17 December 2014) whilst I was in office I would most
certainly have taken action. The development that impacted most on my
awareness of the damage being done by problems with Horizon were the
letters I received from SPMs. These were occasional but they were very
concerning. After I had received a few of these letters my confidence in what
I was being told by POL started to be undermined. This did result in one
action I took in response to a submission by POL around budgetary matters.
Approval was being sought for a budget that included an amount of money
set aside as a provision against claims. POL proposed to cap this amount
at what I regarded to be potentially too small a figure. I recommended to my
Secretary of State, and he agreed, that the cap be removed as by then I was
concerned that SPMs had been treated unjustly and might well be deserving
of substantial compensation and redress.
72. I have been asked by the Inquiry specifically to address the sentence in
UKGI00007417 at page 34 that reads “the Court system represents the best
place for this sort of dispute to be resolved”. I have explained above what I
can remember of this document. I cannot comment on what the author of the
document meant by “this sort of dispute”. Whilst of course I would have hoped and
wished that the issues suffered by SPMs could have been resolved satisfactorily
through other means and in a much timelier fashion, the mechanisms put in place
to try and achieve that, for example the Complaints and Mediation Scheme, came
before my time as Minister. Others are in a better position to provide commentary
on those mechanisms.
General reflections
Page 24 of 32
73.
74.
75.
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Whilst accepting the advice not to comment publicly on legal proceedings I should
have questioned the POL Board more assertively than I did. I should have
requested more information concerning the group litigation being taken by SPMs
against POL and then I might have understood better the details behind the
allegations and this would have led me to challenge the advice I was getting that
Horizon issues were operational matters and as such the preserve of POL and not
the Government. A painful irony of the situation lay in the responsibility I had for
corporate governance and labour markets. We were engaged in an overhaul of
corporate governance and working on a review of employment protections, mostly
pertaining to the gig economy but nonetheless trying to level the playing field
between employers and employees. I did not realise at the time that one of the
most egregious examples of appalling standards of governance and abuse of
agents by a vastly more powerful corporate entity was happening right in front of
us at a company actually owned by the Government.
I should have been briefed on the scope and purpose of Tim Parker's review and
especially the conclusions as set out in the report of 8 February 2016 by Jonathan
Swift QC. I should have been provided with a copy of that report and if there was
any reason why it could not be provided to me then that should have been
explained. I should certainly have been told of its existence. The same goes for
the contents of the Project Zebra report of June 2014 which fed into Mr Swift QC’s
report. I understand now that further work was undertaken by Deloitte under the
banner “Project Bramble”. If I! had known about these reports we might have been
able to put pressure on POL to implement the recommendations of the Swift report
rather than just commission yet more reports that served to delay the day of
reckoning for POL. I should also have asked for a copy of the Second Sight
reports. These were held very close by POL but I could probably have had access
to them and I should have read them rather than taken as read the only message
POL wanted the reports to convey.
I should have been briefed on the scope of Project Bramble and briefed on the
Sparrow Interim Report dated 8 July 2016, the Bramble draft Interim Report dated
27 July 2016, and the draft for discussion dated 31 October 2016. If for any reason
Page 25 of 32
76.
77.
78.
79.
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WITN10910100
those reports could not be made available to me then that should have been
explained to me. Again, I should certainly have known that these reports existed.
With hindsight I feel that I was not properly or adequately briefed by UKGI on the
scope of the issues pertaining to Horizon. Had I known of these matters in more
detail then I hope I would have been able to follow up the ongoing investigations
to ensure that they were brought to a conclusion and, most importantly, that
UKGI's representative on the POL Board pressed the importance of these reports
upon the executive team so that they did not just fall into abeyance as they seem
to have done.
My suspicions gained ground over time that there was more to the Horizon issue
than was being shared with me, as a result of the correspondence I received from
MPs and the caginess of the POL Board and CEO about the matter, but there was
nothing specific I could put my finger on to push harder about. My biggest regret
in retrospect is relying on what UKGI officials told me as being the full picture and
not carrying out my own research. In particular, I have subsequently read the
record of the debate called by James Arbuthnot MP in Westminster Hall on 17
December 2014 as part of my preparation to respond to the Inquiry’s Rule 9
request. If I had found that debate during my time as Minister I would most
certainly have taken a more robust line and questioned the POL Board and UKGI
closely about the whole Horizon issue. If at that point I had been able to drag the
Swift report out of the POL board I would have pushed POL and UKGI to ensure
that Jonathan Swift QC’s recommendations were implemented promptly.
My suggestions for the future oversight of POL would be either bring it under the
broad control of DBT or to expand the remit of Ofcom’s regulation of postal
services to provide independent and effective regulatory oversight. Currently
Ofcom regulate postal services but only in respect of the Universal Service
Obligation.
The structural problems of the current system of oversight are first that there are
too many players involved: UKGI, HMT and DBT. This gives rise to
communication challenges, creates an opportunity for POL to play one entity off
against the other and risks making it easier for POL to conceal vital information.
Page 26 of 32
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The other problem with the status quo is that UKGI as the representative of
government on the board of POL reports directly to HMT. The power wielded by
HMT across government can be absolute and this power heightens the risk that
UKGI focusses purely on the achievement of financial objectives with the sole goal
of reducing public subsidy. Whilst this is undeniably important, the risks of
pressure being applied solely to meeting financial objectives irrespective of how
such goals are attained, are a direct threat to high standards of corporate
governance.
80.The other issue related to the disproportionate focus on reducing public subsidy
was the system of bonusses within POL. I understand the difficulty of recruitment
into government owned enterprises which operate in a commercial environment
and the need for a system of incentives. But to allow a bonus culture to operate in
which the only performance measures were financial carries a high risk of
rewarding bad behaviours. I suspect that this type of bonus culture, which was set
at board level, but also reached quite deeply down into the organisation played a
significant part in producing the abhorrent behaviour that prevailed.
8
. There is an argument that whilst POL depends on public money for the delivery of
a social purpose beyond what is commercially viable that it should be accountable
to DBT. The influence of HMT would still be there, but it would no longer have direct
representation via UKGI on the POL board. The risk with this model is that the
aims of the original legislation that POL operate with commercial freedom in order
to compete effectively in a competitive market would be compromised. I think it
worth considering, therefore, the option of establishing effective and independent
regulation of POL by expanding the remit of its regulator. Ofcom could be tasked
with a much broader regulatory oversight that could include the establishment of a
statutory code of practice that would require POL to meet high standards of
consumer protection and workforce, agent and supplier engagement.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Page 27 of 32
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WITN10910100
26 June 2024
Dated:
Page 28 of 32
Index to First Witness Statement of Margot James
No I URN Document Description Control Number
1 WITN10910101 Conservative and Unionist I WITN10910101
Party Manifesto 2015
2 UKG1I00020328 Post Office Limited UKG1I029223-001
(“POL”) Overview July
2016
UKGI00006961
Email from Laura
Thompson to SPADS
Clark, SpAD Clark MPST
Clark MPST and others re
Post Office: Potential
weekend story on
litigation
UKGI017775-001
UKGI00000015
Prep for Margot James 4
August 2016
ViIS00000976
POL00006357
Advice on the use of
expert evidence relating
to the integrity of the
Fujitsu Services Ltd
Horizon System
POL-0017625
POL00028069
Deloitte Draft Board
Briefing document further
to report on Horizon
desktop review of
assurance sources and
key control features
POL-0023072
POL00029984
POL Sparrow - Interim
Report: Draft for
Discussion
POL-0026466
POL00030009
Deloitte Draft "Bramble" -
Interim Report
POL-0026491
10
POL00031502
‘Bramble’ — Draft Report
31
POL-0028404
ak
WITN10910102
Email to James MPST
from Richard Callard RE:
Post Office meetings
WITN10910102
12
UKGI00006991
Email from Laura
Thompson to James
MPST and Tim McInnes
cc Richard Callard and
others re Finance and
Horizon Meeting - Follow-
up Actions
UKGI017805-001
13
UKGI00032873
Official - Meeting with
Paula Vennells, Chief
Executive of Post Office
Ltd. - Briefing note
UKGI041768-001
UKGI00016322
Letter to David Warburton
from Margot James dated
20 September 2016
UKG1I027 115-001
Page 29 of 32
WITN10910100
WITN10910100
14
UKGI00007416
Email from Jessica
Williams to James MPST,
Michael Dollin and James
Baugh and others re:
161110 Debate Briefing -
WHD Future of the Post
Office first cut for James
R
UKGI018230-001
15
UKGI00007417
Killer Facts on Post Office
Limited
UKGI018231-001
16
UKGI00007409
Briefing Pack Westminster
Hall Debate: Kelvin
Hopkins MP, Labour,
Luton North, Tuesday 17
November 3pm-4:30pm
UKGI018223-001
16
RLIT0000222
Hansard Westminster Hall
Volume 617: debated on
Thursday 17 November
2016
Download text
RLIT0000222
17
UKGI00016351
House of Commons
Parliamentary Question:
PQW2016/31850
UKGI027 144-001
18
UKG100020453
Email from Laura
Thompson to James
MPST, French Claire
(Communications),
Russell Philippa
(Communications)
UKG1I029348-001
19 I WITN10910104 Email from Claire French =} WITN10910104
to James RE: BEIS
Forecast for Tuesday 31
January 2017
20 I UKGI00007542 Email from Claire French I UKGI018356-001
to Callard Richard (UKGI),
Thompson Laura (UKGI),
Dollin Michael (UKGI)
21
UKGI00020455
Email from Claire French
to James MPST FW: Post
Office Litigaiton
UKGI029350-001
22
PVEN00000392
Message chain between
Margot James and Paula
Vennelles dated 24
September 2017
PVEN00114363
23
WITN10910105
Email from James MPST
Final Handover
WITN10910105
24
WITN10910106
Email from Jessica
Williams to Twinley Leann
Re-worked briefing pack
for HoL debate on Post
Office tomorrow
WITN10910106
25
UKGI00007551
Questions for Short
Debate Thursday 30"
March 2017-4pm-5pm
UKGI018365-001
Page 30 of 32
WITN10910100
WITN10910100
Location: Moses Room
Lord Hain: To her
Majesty's Government
about the future of local
post offices
26
WITN10910117
Email from James MPST
to Rehman Sahar re
[OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE]
Policy Update - An
Overview dated 13 April
2017
WITN10910117
27
WITN10910107
Email from Richard
Callard to James MPST
RE: Post Office catch up
WITN10910107
28
WITN10910108
Email from Sophia
Nikolaou to James
[OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE]
Sophia's Handover
WITN10910108
29
UKGI00016304
Post Office facts (for MP
Drop In Session, 18th
October 2017)
UKGI027097-001
30 I WITN10910109 Email from James MPST I WITN10910109
to James MPST re POL
Crib Sheet attachment
31 I UKGI00007701 Post Office Network Crib UKGI018514-001
Sheet
32
WITN10910110
Policy areas for ‘Crib
Sheet’ with authors
assigned
WITN10910110
33
WITN10910111
Email from Andrew
Singleton to David
Greenway, Cameron
Yorston, Christopher
Thresh and others RE:
BEIS Hot Topics Pack -
Deadline: COP Friday
17th March, dated 15
March 2017
WITN10910111
34
WITN10910112
BEIS Hot Topics Pack:
March 2017
WITN10910112
35
WITN10910113
BEIS Orals Hot Topics
Pack: January 2017
WITN10910113
36
WITN10910114
BEIS Hot Topics Pack:
May 2017
WITN10910114
37
WITN10910115
BEIS Hot Topics Pack:
November 2017
WITN10910115
38
UKGI00016342
Letter from Margot James
MP to Tim Parker re:
provision of clarity about
the Government's
expectations for the
businesses it owns
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Email from James MPST
RE: Update for Margot
James
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