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Witness Name: John Bartlett
Statement No.: WITN11190200
Dated: 22 August 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF JOHN BARTLETT
I, John Bartlett, will say as follows:
1 I am John Bartlett, Director of Assurance and Complex Investigations (A&Cl),
Post Office Limited (“Post Office”).
2 This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with certain matters set out in Rule 9 request number 57 received on
12 June 2024 addressed to Post Office (“R9(57)”) and certain matters set out in
Rule 9 request number 58 received on 2 July 2024 (“R9(58)”). This is my second
witness statement to the Inquiry.
3 The facts in this witness statement are true, complete and accurate to the best
of my knowledge and belief. I have sought to include within this witness
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statement evidence relating to matters or issues detailed in the R9(57) and
R9(58) requests insofar as the relevant facts are within my own knowledge. The
R9(57) and R9(58) requests also seek evidence relating to some matters and
issues that are not within my knowledge. As a result, where my knowledge has
been informed by another person or by documents that I have reviewed for the
purposes of preparing this witness statement, I will specifically acknowledge the
identity of the individual concerned or the nature of the documents. As I started
my role at Post Office in February 2022, in order to provide detail on relevant
events before that date, I have relied on documents and/or discussions with
Post Office staff who were present before that date. Where I refer to specific
documents in this witness statement, copies of those documents have (where
possible) been produced to the Inquiry.
I have been assisted in preparing this witness statement by Burges Salmon LLP
and Fieldfisher LLP (together “BSFf”), who act on behalf of Post Office in the
Inquiry (other external advisors also act for Post Office) and external counsel.
This witness statement is set out in the following sections:
(a) Section A “Investigations Structure” (paragraphs 6 to 46) responds to
question 6 of R9(57) and provides further contextual information;
(b) Section B “Investigations Policies and Guidelines” (paragraphs 47 to 77)
responds to questions 7-8 of R9(57) (and, insofar as it concerns guidance,
question 9 of R9(57);
(c) Section C “Training and Professional Background of Investigators”
(paragraphs 78 to 81) responds to questions 9-10 of R9(57);
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(d) Section D “Investigations Data” (paragraphs 82 to 97) responds to questions
1-3 of R9(57);
(e) Section E “Review of Historic Investigations” (paragraphs 98 to 113)
provides information on the process and progress of Post Office’s review of
the allegations against Post Office staff which emerged during the Human
Impact hearings in respect of its historic investigations; and,
(f) Section F “Speak Up and Complaints” (paragraphs 114 to 148) responds to
question 46 of R9(58) and provides further contextual information in relation
to Post Office’s Speak Up policy.
SECTION A: INVESTIGATIONS STRUCTURE
I am asked to provide organisational charts showing the current structure,
personnel and supervisory roles/responsibilities within POL’s Criminal Law
team and POL's Security team (to cover any Financial Investigators who cover
Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) investigations). I understand from that request
that the Inquiry wishes to understand the position in relation to those currently
employed within Post Office who are involved in criminal and/or POCA
investigations.
Post Office does not have a Criminal Law team and the Security team: no longer
conduct investigations. Whilst I have provided information below in respect of
the ‘Criminal Law team’ (such as it previously existed), the Financial Crime team
and the Security team, the focus of my statement is on the development,
‘On 5 August 2024, the Security team was renamed the ‘Network Crime and Risk Support’ team, to better reflect its role.
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structure, work and performance of the Assurance & Complex Investigations
(A&Cl) team. A&CI, which was initially called the Central Investigations Unit
(CIU), was established in February 2022 as Post Office’s central investigation
function. A&Cl, among other matters, conduct any preliminary investigations
into suspected and alleged theft, fraud and/or false accounting. As Post Office
no longer conducts private prosecutions, where appropriate, A&Cl refers those
cases to police or other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to consider for further
investigation and possible later prosecution. In that way, the investigative
landscape within Post Office does not replicate the activities and structures of
the past.
Criminal Law team / Financial Crime team
8 Post Office has not formally had a Criminal Law team since its separation from
Royal Mail Group. Rather, Post Office used this label to describe responsibility
and function of Jarnail Singh. He was the only in-house criminal lawyer at Post
Office from 1 April 2012 until March 2015, during which period he instructed
Cartwright King to prosecute and manage cases, as well as advise on post-
conviction issues following the cessation of prosecutions based wholly or partly
on data derived from Horizon.
9 Post Office currently employs a criminal lawyer, Mr Stuart Lil, full time to advise
on criminal law matters and receive external legal advice on specific matters.
He predominantly works on Remediation Unit matters and, among other duties,
advises on the application of the Post Office Cooperation with Law Enforcement
Agencies and Addressing Suspected Misconduct Policy, which is described in
more detail from paragraph [46] below.
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10 Post Office has a Financial Crime Team which reports to the Group Compliance
Director [POL00448521]. I understand the Financial Crime Team is responsible
for ensuring Post Office meets its regulatory and legal responsibilities relating
to Anti-Money Laundering, Counter Terrorist Financing and Anti-Bribery and
Corruption, and ensuring Post Office supply chain operations meet industry
regulations. The Financial Crime Team has previously supported law
enforcement by supplying information (via request or court order) in relation to
money laundering cases.
Security team
11 Up until 2019, the Security and Investigations Team were responsible for all
criminal investigations within the Post Office. However, in late 2019, following
the criticisms of Post Office’s investigations in the Common Issues Judgment
and Horizon Issues Judgments (the GLO Judgments), Post Office took
responsibility for the conduct of investigations away from the Security team and
disbanded the fraud team which sat within it. From that time, the Retail team
has supported Postmasters to investigate discrepancies. The remit of the
Security team was refocused on supporting Postmasters to prevent retail
crime.?
12 The current Security Team reports to the Retail arm of the business under the
Head of Security [POL00447931] =
2 ClJ 10_ POL Security Storyboard [POL00447956}
3 Slide 9, Service & Support Overview of Teams and Responsibilities[POL00447931]
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13 I have been asked to provide detail about where the former Security team
investigators sit within the new structure. The Inquiry has linked that request
with recent media reports which suggest those former investigators all continue
to be employed by Post Office to conduct investigations. It is right that some
individuals who previously worked in the Security team within Post Office remain
in the business whilst others have left. However, none of those remaining are
members of the A&CI team, which now has conduct of all criminal investigations
within Post Office.
Assurance & Complex Investigations (formerly Central Investigations Unit_until 1
August 2023)
Development of A&CI
14 The GLO Judgments and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hamilton & Ors
v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577 (Hamilton), were critical of the Post
Office’s approach to investigations, specifically in relation to apparent shortfalls
and discrepancies shown by Horizon. In particular and in summary, those
criticisms included:
(a) That Post Office operated with the presumption of culpability;
(b) That Post Office provided insufficient information to Postmasters who
had _ shortfalls during the investigation and before and during
proceedings;
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(c) That there was poor communication with Postmasters throughout an
investigation with the outcome that Postmasters were unable to examine
the issues themselves;
(d) That there were failures to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry, including
potential alternative explanations provided by Postmasters;
(e) Suspicions of knowingly making false assertions relating to the reliability
of Horizon data; and
(f) That Post Office failed to discharge properly the duties of a prosecutor,
especially in respect of disclosure.
15 There was a clear need for Post Office to build an investigative function which
worked differently. In May 2021, a paper seeking approval to appoint an external
firm to review how Post Office conducts its investigations was put to the Group
Executive for consideration [POL00448006].: The paper stated the Court of
Appeal's judgment that "POL's failures of investigation and disclosure were so
egregious as to make the prosecution of any Horizon cases an affront to the
conscience of the court". The paper further stated that while steps had been
taken to ensure proper investigations, including the development and
implementation of a Group Investigations Policy and Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Policy (discussed below), there was "a need to improve co-
ordination of investigations and assurance of the investigative processes" to
ensure that "when investigations are undertaken today, they do not pre-judge
* Post Office Investigations Review_POL_GE_20210505,
[POL00448006}
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an outcome, are fair and objective, properly planned, resourced and executed,
with recommendations and outcomes actioned and lessons learned" Post
Office also identified that while it would no longer conduct private prosecutions,
it still had a need to perform investigations including into whistleblowing,
suspected criminal conduct and personnel issues, and in doing so, it must
"ensure its investigations are conducted to the appropriate standard by
appropriately qualified individuals and adhere to best practice" *
16 Following approval from the Group Executive on 5 May 2021 [POL00448010],’
Post Office engaged KPMG on 30 June 2021 to undertake a review of its current
investigation processes. KPMG did not review historical investigations but
undertook a review to establish whether the decentralised model of Post Office
investigations of all kinds was effective and to consider the best model for
investigations going forward. The review was not limited to criminal or potential
criminal investigations, and, in the report, KPMG noted that Post Office used
the term ‘investigation’ to cover investigative activities to, for example, "identify
areas where Postmasters require more assistance, help Postmasters deal with
errors or discrepancies or undertake information gathering activities" *
5 Post Office Investigations Review_POL_GE_20210505.
[POL00448006}
© Post Office Investigations Review_POL_GE_20210505,
[POL00448006}
7 GE Tactical Meeting Minutes dated 5 May 2021,
[POL00448010}
® KPMG Project Birch report, page 7, [POL00423697]
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KPMG provided its report on 26 August 2021 (KPMG Review).° Below I set out
KPMG's findings across all investigative activities, though I note that not all
findings will be applicable to criminal investigations, which, at the time, were not
being conducted by Post Office.
(a)
(c)
The term ‘investigation’ was not clearly defined within Post Office and
covered a range of activities.
24 separate teams conducted investigatory activities including across
Service and Support Optimisation, Franchising Partnership, Compliance,
HR, Cyber and Legal, and that while the decentralised model provided
individual teams with independence to develop and deliver their own
framework, there was limited central oversight of the frameworks. This
meant that Post Office did not have overarching consistency over:
(i)
(0)
(iii
(iv)
how investigations were undertaken;
the experience and qualifications of the investigators;
the application of investigation minimum standards especially in
relation to high-risk cases; and
the recording and reporting of investigation data.
In addition, there was no overall central monitoring of the investigations
process and no comprehensive analysis was available over the number
° KPMG Project Birch report, [POLO0423697].
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or type of investigations Post Office undertakes, including those that are
high risk.
Post Office could not demonstrate that there was consideration at the
beginning of an investigation as to whether it could potentially result in
criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings, and there was not always early
engagement with Legal.
Post Office investigations process fell short of market practice in a
number of areas, including:
(i) Lack of consistency of investigations conducted across Post
Office, which resulted in different levels of oversight and
inconsistencies in the level of Board sign off for policies and
processes, and a lack of consistency in terms of use of Legal and
other Subject Matter Experts, with a risk that Legal were not
consulted on cases that could result in litigation.
(ii) Lack of overarching governance and oversight over high-risk
investigations, with the majority of business teams not
differentiating between high-risk and other cases. There was a risk
that high-risk investigations were not being conducted with the
appropriate level of rigour to withstand public scrutiny and that
outcomes may not be in line with Post Office's risk appetite.
(iii) I There was no clear consistent triage process in place across Post
Office, with some teams triaging based on product type and case
age rather than risk profile.
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(iv) Lack of consistent monitoring and reporting over all investigations
with variable availability and reporting of “Management
Information” (‘MI’), which resulted in inconsistencies in the
reporting of MI to senior leadership. Where investigations touch
multiple business teams, there was no formal handover or process
to monitor which business team held the investigation, with a
resulting risk that cases may get delayed or lost.
(v) There was no consistent approach to quality assurance across the
business teams, with no independent quality assurance reviews
undertaken across Post Office to ensure that business teams
were adhering to standards set in the Group Investigations Policy.
(vi) There was limited evidence of ‘lessons learnt’ and continuous
improvement arising from investigations across Post Office, with
no formal processes in place.
(vii) Business teams (including earlier iterations of the Speak Up team)
often used Area Managers and Line Managers to conduct
investigations which created a lack of clarity over roles and
responsibilities and who was accountable for outcomes. It was
also noted that Area Managers and Line Managers would have
limited investigation experience and were not appropriately
qualified to undertake high-risk investigations. Most importantly,
this also had the potential to create a conflict and lack of
independence when a Postmaster sought to make a complaint
and may have been a deterrent to the making of complaints. '>
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(viii) Lack of training in respect of investigations across Post Office.
(ix) No consistent use of an investigations case management tool
across Post Office.
18 One of the key recommendations arising from the KPMG review was to
introduce a Central Investigations Unit (CIU) with a Head of Investigations and
a dedicated investigations team to assist or perform high risk investigations, and
to incorporate the whistleblowing function into this team.
19 On the basis of the KPMG Review, Post Office subsequently decided to form a
CIU and on 15 September 2021 approved the appointment of a Head of CIU,
who was to be identified from external candidates.'° I was appointed as the
Head of CIU on 21 February 2022. Over the course of 2022, CIU was
progressively staffed. The team became properly operational in January 2023,
though, in reality, it has managed a case load since the first day I started at Post
Office.
20 Throughout 2022 and 2023, Post Office discussed and determined the scope,
structure and priorities of the CIU.
21 A Group Executive (GE)" Paper dated 20 April 2022 [POL00447975] stated: “[i]t
is proposed that there are two levels of investigative capability within Post
Office. This approach was also suggested by KPMG." It was proposed the first
level was CIU, a small group of professional investigators who conduct
* See GE Minutes from 15 September 2021 [POL0044801 1].
"The Group Executive is now referred to as the Strategic Executive Group SEG) and throughout this statement I use the
name in place at the time of the relevant paper, minute or event
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investigations into high-risk areas, and the second level was those based in the
business who would continue to conduct lower-risk high volume and routine
investigations, but escalating matters to the CIU as needed.'? The same paper
sought approval for the recruitment of the rest of the CIU "in line with KPMG's
recommendations".°
22 Further, in a GE paper dated 6 July 2022, ‘Post Office Investigations: Next
Steps,’ [POL00448354] it was clarified that the work of CIU was to include
investigations into suspected criminality and for findings to be reported to law
enforcement. While it was noted that "Post Office has no appetite to pursue
private prosecutions" the paper stated that the rationale of conducting
investigations into suspected criminality and reporting as appropriate to law
enforcement was "fo act as a deterrent and to seek financial restitution through
the independent and external criminal justice system." Further, the paper
outlined: "Conceptually, the police and the prosecutors will decide on the
strength of the evidence what they will (or will not) progress through the criminal
justice system, not POL"* with the evidence to be gathered by professional
investigators. The paper outlined the concern that if Post Office did not make
pro-active reports to law enforcement, Post Office was "at risk of not discharging
our duty as an organisation in receipt of public funds to investigate and then
refer suspected criminal conduct."
*? POL_GE_Post Office Investigations Review_20220420 [POL00447975}
*° POL_GE_Post Office Investigations Review_20220420[POL00447975}
4 29052022 GE and Board Paper Remit and Criminal Investigations [POL00447979}
*§ 29052022 GE and Board Paper Remit and Criminal Investigations, [POL00447979],
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23 During a GE meeting held on 3 August 2022 [POL00448321], the GE resolved
to approve for onward forwarding to the Board for noting:
(a) "POL, POL Staff, Postmasters and Postmasters’ staff all being within the
remit of the Post Office Investigation Branch", being the two levels of
investigative capability within Post Office as outlined in the GE paper dated
20 April 2022 [POL00447975];"
(b) CIU to investigate and refer to LEAs suspected criminal conduct in all four
nations of the United Kingdom to act as a deterrent and to seek financial
restitution through the independent and external criminal justice system ;”
and
(c) "The mobilising of a new partnership model with the relevant bodies across
the UK to facilitate the investigation and referral of suspected criminal
misconduct."'®
24 On 27 September 2022, the Post Office Board tabled and noted a paper ‘Post
Office Investigations: Next steps” [POL00448320]'° which set out the decision
of the GE made on 3 August 2022.
*® POL_GE_Post Office Investigations Review_20220420, [POL00447975}
1” GE Tactical Meeting Notes/Actions 3 August 2022 POL00448321]
° GE Tactical Meeting minutes 3 August 2022 [POL004483211]
"8 Board paper ‘Post Office Investigations: Next Steps’ [POLO0448320],
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25 On 28 June 2023, the GE agreed that A&Cl priorities for the financial years
2023/24 and 2024/25 would be, in order of priority [POL00447948]
[POL00448327}2°
(a) Investigating Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998-qualifying Speak Up
reports;
(b) Supporting the investigative needs of the Inquiry team;
(c) Assurance of investigations conducted by Dispute Resolution, Network
Monitoring & Reconciliation, and Contracts teams as part of the execution
and development of ClU’s target operating model;
(d) Preparing for transition of the network to New Branch IT System (NBIT);
(e) The investigation of all substantiated losses in branches over £100k, police
liaison, and seeking compensation from the courts;
(f) Providing evidence packages for civil court hearings;
(g) Systems and process integrity investigations only at an enterprise risk level;
and
(h) Behavioural/conduct/integrity investigations only relating to GE and Board.
26 Since this meeting, the above identified priorities have been the basis of A&Cl's
operations. For completeness, I note that the work envisaged in sub-paragraphs
(d) and (f) above have yet to be substantively undertaken as the NBIT landscape
is not sufficiently developed to require this work and Post Office is not presently
taking civil enforcement action relating to shortfalls.
2° GE Minutes 28 June 2023 [POL00447948] and GE Report 'Prioritisation & Resourcing of CIU Investigations dated 28 June
2023 [POL00448327]
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27 The CIU was renamed the A&CI in August 2023 to better reflect the remit and
priorities that were determined in June 2023.
28 As demonstrated by the above, A&Cl is a relatively new team, which continues
to grow and evolve. For example, in approximately June 2024, I hired an extra
staff member on a fixed-term basis to take over the management of any police
liaison matter for which police require assistance from Post Office. Previously,
a subset of liaison matters had remained with the Security team. They were
predominantly allegations of robbery, burglary or theft directly reported to the
police by Postmasters or their staff. However, since Spring 2024, A&Cl has
taken over responsibility for those matters having rightly become the repository
for all outward provision of evidence.
Current purpose, remit and structure of A&CI
29 A&Cl currently undertakes four different but connected areas of work: Speak Up
(discussed further in paragraphs [113 to 147]), Investigations, Investigative
Assurance and the Historic Investigations Review (discussed further in
paragraphs [97 to 112]). The Investigations sub-teams conduct three types of
investigations: fact-finding, accountability and criminal. A&CI, therefore, has a
wider remit than the previous Security team.
30 In respect of its criminal investigations, the Law Enforcement Engagement
Team investigation sub-team conducts investigations into suspected criminal
matters where Post Office is believed to be the victim. It is the only team within
Post Office authorised to conduct such investigations to an evidential standard
and format (that is, such that the evidence can be relied upon in court).
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However, it does not conduct full (or end-to-end) criminal investigations as used
to be the case when Post Office carried out its own prosecutions. It is for LEAs
to conduct such investigations, as they consider appropriate, after Post Office
has reported a suspected offence. After Post Office’s decision on 22 September
2020 to formally cease private prosecutions (discussed in further detail below
at paragraphs [82-85]), Post Office now uses the term ‘criminal investigation’ to
mean the assessment of a potential criminal offence against Post Office, the
reporting of suspected criminal incidents to LEAs and proactively providing
LEAs with information and evidence and responding to their requests for
information and evidence to support their investigations.2' Post Office does not
carry the same disclosure obligations as an LEA, and it does not have decision-
making authority in respect of whether to formally undertake a criminal
investigation, evidential sufficiency, charging decisions or prosecutions.
31 In that way, A&CI is a corporate in-house investigative function with a portion of
cases that involve suspected criminal matters on which A&CI support LEAs.
The scale of investigative activity connected to potential criminal activity is
significantly smaller than in the past and very different in nature. Criminal-
related matters amount to approximately 25% of A&CI work, but that proportion
depends on caseload at any given time. A&CI non-criminal work is supported
by nominal full-time equivalent staff in external firms assisting Post Office.
32 A&CI conducts investigations which are considered ‘high risk’. Non-criminal
investigations which do not meeta ‘high risk’ threshold continue to be conducted
2! Combined GIP CLEP Draft 2.2 for SEG Board [POL00448353}
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by the relevant business teams. However, they must adhere to minimum
standards agreed with A&CI and are subject to periodic quality assurance by
A&CI.22 'High-risk' is intended to be a dynamic term so that A&CI can flex to
cover more cases where resourcing allows. Currently, ‘high-risk’ captures the
following:
(a) Alleged fraud, theft or other activity amounting to over £200,000 in
potential loss;
(b) Public interest disclosures;
(c) Modern slavery allegations;
(d) Public Inquiry matters;
(e) Significant regulatory impact;
(f) Significant process failures across Post Office; or
(g) Cases which are complex in nature relating to concerns as to the
conduct of the most senior Post Office staff.
33 A sub-set of the A&CI team also assures the investigative activity conducted by
other teams within Post Office which is designated as low-risk and high-volume.
That includes the Contracts Team, the Dispute Resolution Team, the Network
Support and Resolution Team and the Branch Reconciliation Team (Stock
Team). The purpose of conducting assurance is to ensure that those within Post
Office, who are tasked with conducting investigations of any kind, work to
® GE Central Investigations Resourcing Paper 25 January 2023 [POL00448007]
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established standards and requirements and comply with any relevant
legislation. The specific requirements are set out in the Investigator's Manual
[POL00448014],?° which is discussed in further detail below in from paragraph
[68]. The Group Assurance team may also conduct their own reviews of the
business-based teams, and it also performs assurance over the work of A&CI
by dip sampling our investigations. If, during an A&CI assurance review of
another team, we identify areas requiring improvement, an action plan will be
agreed to address the concerns identified and if appropriate, additional training
and guidance will be arranged. To date, we have made over 90
recommendations which have been implemented by the teams we assure.
Oversight and governance of A&CI
34 A&Cl is a part of Legal at Post Office, as indicated by the organogram
[POL00447971]. I am line managed by the Group Legal Director and currently
report to the Interim General Counsel. Both of these positions are currently held
by Sarah Gray. As outlined in my First Witness Statement [WITN11190100],
A&ClI provides monthly MI reporting to the Strategic Executive Group and
provides regular reporting to Audit and Risk Committee of Post Office (ARC).
We, like any other team within Post Office, are subject to policies and
procedures. A&CI are also subject to review by Group Assurance and by
Internal Audit.
Group Assurance and Internal Audit reviews
23 Investigator’s Manual [POL00448014),
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35 At my request, Group Assurance conducted a review of A&Cl (then CIU) and
issued a report in June 2023. This was a few months after A&CI (then CIU)
formally went live as a team in January 2023. I wanted to have a non-A&Cl view
of how the team was operating. The team was also struggling with sufficient
resource to match the then current and future anticipated demand for
investigation services and I felt that a review of the team may independently
demonstrate this. I also requested it as a sense check of the policies and
procedures I had developed and we had begun to embed so that they could be
externally reviewed and to proactively seek feedback about how best to develop
our processes. A&Cl was rated as needing significant improvement which was
an expected outcome. As a result of its stage of development, A&C! wasn't yet
able to demonstrate complete adherence to its own processes and procedures
during the assessment period of April 2023-June 2023.
36 Group Assurance identified key areas for A&C to improve upon and risks for it
to address.
37 After Group Assurance identifies a risk, I (or a relevant member of my team) am
asked to provide a response or solution, to confirm whether the proposed control
sufficiently manages the risk and to provide evidence of our risk management.
Group Assurance will then provide a final comment, which may include agreed
action items or a confirmation that the action has been closed. For example,
Group Assurance identified that there was a risk that recommendations made
by A&CI may not be followed through, as A&C! did not have a mechanism to
24 Group Assurance Final Review of A&CI, June 2023, [POL00447965]
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39
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enforce and track the recommendations made at the conclusion of an A&Cl
investigation. As a result, we established a process with Group Assurance so
that recommendations arising from an investigation are shared with Group
Assurance and together, we would engage with the relevant business teams to
discuss how this is progressed. Group Assurance tracks and pursues
implementation. If the business area is unwilling or unable to adopt the
recommendations, then ultimately Group Assurance can escalate the issue to
ARC for resolution. This process has been incorporated into the Investigator's
Manual so it is known across the relevant business areas.
A&CI has subsequently (throughout the course of 2024) completed the
assurance actions identified in the June 2023 review. Since the actions were
identified, Group Assurance and A&Cl have met on a quarterly basis to review
our ongoing management of the identified risks.
Internal Audit has begun to plan an audit of A&Cl to be conducted by the end
of September 2024. This will be their first audit of A&CI. Internal Audit will be
assisted by a professional services firm with specialism in independent audit.
This will be a full audit of the investigative function within A&Cl, including a
review of policies and procedures and dip-sampling to ensure compliance with
those policies and procedures.
NED Investigation's Champion
5 intemal Audit is a Post Office business unit which aims to provide objective and independent assurance on the effectieness
of risk management, internal controls and governance throughout the business.
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42
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On 26 September 2022, the Board resolved to appoint non-executive director
Ben Tidswell as the NED Investigations Champion. Mr Tidswell was the Senior
Independent Director of the Post Office Limited Board from July 2021 before he
stepped down from the Board on 9 July 2024 at the completion of his three-year
term. Mr Tidswell is a lawyer and formerly worked at Ashurst as a Partner in the
London Disputes team from 2000 and was the Global Chairman from 2013 to
2021.
Mr Darfoor, who joined the Board in June 2023, has been appointed as the NED
Investigations Champion in Mr Tidswell’s place. He is now the Senior
Independent Director, Chair of the Investment Committee and a member of the
ARC. Mr Darfoor is the previous Group CEO of Alexander Forbes, CEO of Sun
Life Financial International and CEO of Old Mutual Bermuda. He has previously
held senior management roles at UBS AG, Credit Suisse AG and EY LLP. Mr
Darfoor has experience of working within highly regulated industries, which
require transparency and good governance.
I held quarterly meetings with Mr Tidswell and will hold quarterly meetings with
Mr Darfoor. In his role as the Senior Independent Director, I am able to have
direct access to him to discuss any matters of concern.
The Investigations Champion Terms of Reference, agreed between myself and
Mr Darfoor in July 2024, state that: "The NED's primary purpose as Champion
is to be a point of assurance for the integrity, objectivity, independence,
effectiveness, and evolution of the investigation function in adherence with
relevant Group Policies and associated procedures" [POL00448013]. Further,
the Terms of Reference state that through me, the NED "will influence, where
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appropriate the high-level policies, processes and approaches of the various
teams within POL that conduct investigative activity so that the interests of
fairness, transparency, and public interest are protected and advanced."
Having direct access to the most senior NED is a visible acknowledgement that
A&Cl can escalate any blocks encountered in our investigations or flag any
concerns as to the operation of Post Office. It also allows the Board to directly
question our activity and to provide feedback on the conduct of significant cases.
It also adds significant value to both the Champion and to me in facilitating
discussions around strategic issues that otherwise we may not have.
Resource of A&C!
44 At times during the development of the A&Cl team there has been a disconnect
between the appetite of the business for investigations to be completed and the
amount of resource available. For example, in May 2023, during a presentation
to Post Office's Improvement Delivery Group ("IDG"),?’ the then Group Legal
Director and I identified that the current case load of A&Cl (then CIU) was
unsustainable with the current team size and that, as I was carrying a case load,
our target operating model development had slowed.?® At the time I identified
that approximately £1 million in identified losses were not being investigated
despite good evidence due to a lack of resource.° This is a figure which
fluctuates regularly depending on the cases A&CI are working on. Currently, all
*6 Investigations NED Terms of Reference [POL00448013}.
27 The IDG was comprised of senior staff members within Post Office.
% [POL00448016}
29 [POL00448016].
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cases are allocated to and actively worked on by A&Cl team members or have
been reported to police. However, we are not sufficiently staffed to investigate
any new cases which may be brought to our attention. We regularly request
more resource within the A&CI team to ensure that we have sufficient resource
capacity.
Case Management System
45 A designed-for-purpose case management system has been something I have
sought to source and implement from very early on in joining Post Office in line
with KPMG’s recommendation. This system will assist us in overseeing cases,
compiling material for disclosure (for criminal and non-criminal cases alike),
providing management information, facilitating trend analysis, and issuing
directions. In early August, A&CI began to embed a new case management
system, Insight, supplied by Altia. Altia is a global provider of intelligence and
investigations software and Insight is a comprehensive investigation and case
management system, considered to be one of the market leading systems and
used by many UK law enforcement agencies, particularly for financial
investigations. Insight will allow A&CI to monitor and oversee our active cases
more effectively.
Culture of A&CI
46 The A&Cl team is predominantly made up of professionals who specialise in the
conduct of investigations and who bring significant real-world investigative
expertise and experience from a variety of sectors including the police and other
LEAs, regulated industries and the private sector. The qualifications, expertise
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and experience of A&CI staff involved in criminal investigations are outlined in
detail in paragraph [77] of this statement. We consider ourselves to be focused
on discovering the truth, doing the right thing, and not primarily existing to
protect Post Office. We investigate an event or set of circumstances, not an
individual, and are well set to provide law enforcement with objective, properly
collected evidence. Assisting the police with their disclosure obligations is at the
forefront of our minds.
SECTION B: Investigations Policies and Guidelines
47 I am asked to address the key policies and guidelines applicable (in any of the
four nations of the United Kingdom) to those within Post Office carrying out
investigations into alleged fraud, theft and false accounting based on Horizon
data which are currently in force, and to explain which departments hold
responsibility for those policies and guidelines and who holds responsibility for
the management and oversight of those departments. As explained above, Post
Office no longer prosecutes suspected criminal conduct against it. However, in
order to safeguard public funds and in the interests of justice, Post Office will
seek to identify possible criminal conduct and report it appropriately to LEAs for
them to consider further investigation. To ensure that the reports made to LEAs
are proportionate and considered, Post Office (now through A&Cl) will
investigate to the degree necessary in the first instance to assure itself that it
has reasonable grounds to suspect that a criminal act may have occurred, and
that harm to Post Office may have resulted. This activity is known in shorthand
as a Post Office “criminal investigation" but this is not an end-to-end
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48
49
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investigation which is the role of the police once Post Office has reported a
matter to them. The key “criminal investigation” policies and guidance have
been developed against that background.
As set out in the Post Office Investigations Branch Assurance Control
Framework [POL00447941],°° the two key “criminal investigation” policies
which are technically still in force are: (i) the Group Investigations Policy (“GIP”)
dated 15 March 2021 [POL00448352],*' and (ii) the Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Agencies and Addressing Suspected Criminal Misconduct Policy
(“CLEP”) dated 28 September 2021 [POL00447936].** These are both owned
by the Group Legal Director and sponsored by the Group General Counsel. As
is evident from the dates of the policies, they were introduced before I joined
Post Office in February 2022 so I cannot speak directly to their development. I,
therefore, rely on information I have ascertained from the relevant documents
and from discussions with staff who have been at Post Office for some time
before I joined. I am aware that the policies were intended to address the
criticisms made about POL’s investigations in the GLO Judgments and to give
structure and consistency as to how investigations across Post Office were
conducted and as to how information would be shared with LEAs.°°
However, these policies were developed (or largely developed) prior to the
decision in Hamilton in April 2021, KPMG’s subsequent review of POL’s
*° 1B Control Framework [POL00447941]
3 _POL_ARC_InvestigationsPolicy_v1.2_DRAFT [POL00448352]
® Law enforcement policy v1.0 Sept 21[POL00447936}
88 POL ARC Minutes 26 January 2021 [POL00447929}; IDG Pillar Strategy WB and Investigations [POL00448326),
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investigation process dated 26 August 2021 and the subsequent establishment
of A&CI in February 2022. They have since been subject to ongoing
reconsideration to reflect Post Office’s changed approach to investigations,
particularly in respect of the introduction and evolution of A&CI (then CIU). I
have been closely involved with that process as Head and then Director of
A&Cl.*4 As a consequence, A&C! have drafted and consulted upon a new
combined Group Investigation and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy
(“GICLEP”) for which I will be the owner. Subject to review by an external NGO
with expertise in ethical investigations* and consideration by the Risk and
Compliance Committee of Post Office ("RCC") and ARC and the Board, the aim
is that the GICLEP come into force later in 2024. Accordingly, I address this
draft policy below in addition to the two polices which are technically in force.
50 Alongside the development of the draft GICLEP, A&Cl developed the
Investigator’s Manual which it introduced in June 2023. It is the key guidance
document on the conduct of investigations for all those conducting
investigations throughout the business to ensure consistency and that a
balanced and fair approach is undertaken. I summarise its contents below from
paragraph [68].
Key Policies
Group Investigations Policy
% POL_GE_Post Office Investigations Review_20220420- [POL00448006] and GE Investigations ~ Next Steps paper 6 July
2022 [POL00448354}
85 Post Office intends that the NGO ETICA will review the GICLEP.
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51 As stated, the GIP is owned by the Group Legal Director, Sarah Gray, and
sponsored by Group General Counsel, Ben Foat. Accordingly, responsibility for
it sits within Legal. RCC and ARC are responsible for its oversight and approval.
Following the GLO Judgments, the GIP, which had not been reviewed since
September 2016, was substantially overhauled. On 12 January 2021, RCC
approved a revised version of the GIP dated 22 November 2020. On 26 January
2021, the revised GIP was presented to ARC [POL00448352].°° The
accompanying paper for ARC noted that “major amendments” had been made
to the previous GIP which had been “out of use for some time”
[POL00447925].°’ It stated: “this is a master Investigations Policy that brings
back the principles of investigations for all other Group Policies that relate to it."
52 The minutes of ARC meeting on 26 January 2021 recorded the following
discussion points in respect of the revised GIP [POL00447929]:°°
- The Chair noted that an issue that was made clear from the Group Litigation
Order (GLO) was the attitude of the investigator. Whilst issues like the duty of
good faith would only apply in the Post Office/Postmaster relationship (not
commercial relationships), it was agreed that the attitude of the investigator
should be addressed in the policy.
- It was also noted that matters such as the independence of the investigator and
the level of expertise needed should also be clear in the policy...
°° ARC Investigations Policy v 1.2 Clean— 21 January 2021 [POL00448352]
* [POL00447925}
88 POL ARC Minutes 26 January 2021 [POL00447929]
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- Tom Cooper requested that the policy also be externally reviewed..
53 Subject to those matters being resolved, ARC approved the policy.
54 Further, as stated at paragraph 71 of my previous statement, in January 2021,
General Counsel, Ben Foat, in his capacity as Whistleblowing Officer,
established a Whistleblowing Working Group in order to review the
whistleblowing policies and procedures and make any necessary changes. One
of the key actions of the Working Group was to ensure that there was alignment
between the Whistleblowing Policy, Postmaster Complaints Policy and GIP
[POL00423689].*°
55 Accordingly, a further version of the GIP dated 15 March 2021 was produced to
address the matters raised by ARC and to ensure alignment with the
Whistleblowing and Postmaster Complaints Policies. While I am not aware that
that policy itself was subsequently subject to external review as had been
requested by ARC on 26 January 2021, as stated above, following the judgment
in Hamilton, Post Office commissioned KPMG in June 2021 to conduct a review
of Post Office’s investigation function.“° The work on the GIP, including
embedding it, was paused while KPMG conducted the review.*' The findings
and recommendations from that review meant that there was a need to
%° [POL00423689]
4° Minutes of GE Tactical Meeting of 5 May 2021
{POL00448010}
4! POL00039936 ~ Project Birch, p.10; Investigations Current State and TOM v0.3 [POL00447976]
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significantly update the GIP. That has led to development of the draft combined
GICLEP, which I discuss below.*®
56 However, until the combined draft GICLEP is formally approved, the GIP dated
15 March 2021 technically remains in force, though it has not been subject to
further formal consideration by ARC. I therefore, note the key content of that
policy as follows:
(a) It sets the minimum operating standards for the management of internal
investigations throughout the Group to ensure that internal investigations,
regardless of the scope, are prompt, effective and professionally managed,
and findings are responsibly addressed (paras 1.2-1.3 and 3.4). This applies
to the full range of investigations, not just those that are criminal in nature.
(b) It states that Post Office does not conduct private prosecutions and that any
reference to criminal proceedings is to those brought by LEAs (paras 1.3
and 2.10).
(c) It states, in essence, that it applies to all cases, except those in the employee
relations space. However, it says that even those investigations should
always have regard to the overarching principles of the GIP (para 1.5 and
1.2). In that way, it is designed to ensure consistency of investigation across
POL.
(d) It details the process for managing an investigation, including reporting or
capturing issues, triaging reported issues, determining whether formal
“ POL00039936 ~ Project Birch, pp.14-17; GE Minutes 15 September 2021 [POL00447934]
4° POL00039936 ~ Project Birch, pp.14-17; GE Minutes 15 September 2021 [POL00447934]
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investigation is required, nominating a Commissioning Manager with
responsibility for an investigation, nominating an independent investigator
within the business or externally, preserving and collecting documentation
and conducting witness interviews (section 2). It specifically provides that:
“Investigation should be proportionate and fair. Investigators should seek to
gather facts and evidence around the issues, as necessary. This will often
include witness evidence. Proportionality should also be considered. The
more serious the issue or its consequences and impact, the more extensive
and complete the investigation should be.“
(e) It also provides that Group Policy Owners are responsible for establishing
systems to record and report MI about the number and nature of issues that
are triaged and/or investigated in their specific areas on a ‘need to know’
basis to the Group Legal Director on a “[monthly basis]”. The Group Legal
Director is responsible for reporting MI to ARC also on a ‘need to know’ basis
ona “[quarterly basis]”. That provision is aimed at ensuring that reporting of
investigations and trends occurs to ensure transparency, consistency and
opportunity for improvement (para 3.4). It also states that, in terms of
remediation, consideration should be given to how to address “lessons
learnt’ raised in investigation reports (para 2.14).
(f) In the ‘minimum control standards’ section, it identifies a risk as those
“Conducting investigation without regard to the correct internal policy,
applicable laws or regulation, resulting in unlawful, unreasonable,
incomplete or ineffective investigation. Specific concern should be given to
investigations into postmaster theft...” One of the controls is to ensure
“Employees involved in teams associated with investigating suspected agent
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theft/false accounting... should receive training on the approach to be taken
in, and Policies applicable to, those specific cases.” This control has
effectively now been met by the introduction of the A&Cl team, who are
experienced and professional investigators, who conduct any internal
investigations into suspected theft, fraud and/or false accounting before
referring to the police (or other LEA) when appropriate.
(g) It also includes an appendix entitled “Whistleblowing Considerations” which
contains high level guidance on factors which need to be considered in
whistleblowing investigations.
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy
57 From March 2020, Post Office developed the CLEP and an accompanying
‘Legal Playbook’, with advice and input from Peters & Peters LLP. That occurred
following the Horizon Issues Judgment to address the issues it raised about the
accuracy and reliability of Horizon data and in recognition of the fact that Post
Office had by then stopped conducting its own private prosecutions.
58 Like the GIP, the owner of the CLEP is the Group Legal Director, Sarah Gray,
and the sponsor is the Group General Counsel, Ben Foat, so responsibility for
it sits within Legal. The GE, RCC, ARC and Board hold responsibility for
oversight and approval of the policy. The RCC, ARC and GE considered earlier
drafts of the CLEP on 6 May 2020,* 19 May 2020* and 15 July 2020
“RCC minutes 6 May 2020 [POL00423512}.
45 ARC minutes 19 May 2020 [POL00448008}
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respectively.** On 12 August 2020, the GE considered and approved the draft
CLEP for submission to the Board. On 22 September 2020, the draft CLEP was
presented to the Board [POL00447923].*’ The accompanying paper stated:
“Post Office needs to cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies in order to
prevent and deter criminal activity within its business, and to promote the proper
administration of justice. The Draft Policy sets the operating standards for that
cooperation.
POL receives a large number of requests to assist Law Enforcement Agencies
prevent, detect, investigate and potentially prosecute alleged offences. POL
may be legally obliged to respond to these requests (e.g. through suspicious
activity reports). POL may also wish voluntarily to notify Law Enforcement
Agencies of suspected crime in its operations.
The Draft Policy establishes the minimum operating standards relating to
cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies so as to ensure that any
information provided to a Law Enforcement Agency is properly considered and
managed. The Draft Policy also prohibits POL from conducting private
prosecutions unless POL’s shareholder has been consulted and approval
obtained from the Board.”
“© 15 July 2020 GE Minutes [POL00448009].
47 10.3b_Law enforcement policy (Tracked changes)_POL_Board_20200922~ [POL00447923]
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59 On 22 September 2020, the Board approved the CLEP [POL00447924].** This
is therefore the date when Post Office formally stopped conducting private
prosecutions.
60 On 24 February 2021, there was a company-wide communication which
introduced the CLEP and provided a link to it on the intranet (‘The Hub’) 4°
61 Between 8 March 2021 and 7 May 2021, Peters & Peters delivered four training
sessions on the CLEP to Security, Legal, IT, Compliance, Data Protection and
Postmaster Experience.*° These sessions, which were recorded to facilitate
continued awareness and training, included a high-level overview of the CLEP
(i.e. it purpose, content and application) and modules on:
(a) _ Providing data as intelligence or evidence;
(b) Monitoring of criminal cases;
(c) Flagging potential reliability issues with data;
(d) Disclosure;
(e) Making a victim crime report; and,
(f) Retention of records.
*® POL Board Minutes 22 September 2020- [POL00447924],
*° See ARC Committee Report "Cooperation with Law Enforcmenet Agencies and Addressign Suspected Criminal Misconduct-
Annual Review/Implementation Update"dated 28 September 2021 [POL00447932]
© See ARC Committee Report "Cooperation with Law Enforcmenet Agencies and Addressign Suspected Criminal Misconduct-
Annual Review/Implementation Update"dated 28 September 2021 [POL00447932).
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62
63
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On 28 September 2021, following its annual review, ARC approved a revised
version of the CLEP [POL00447933] [POL00447: 935].*' While the revised
version post-dated KPMG’s review into POL’s investigation process, it did not
incorporate its findings which were reported only the month before. Accordingly,
as with the GIP, there was a need to update the CLEP. That has led to
development of the draft combined GICLEP, which I discuss below.
Until the combined draft GICLEP is formally ratified, the CLEP dated 28
September 2021 [POL00447936] technically remains in force. I note, therefore,
the key contents of the CLEP as follows:
(a) It states that it has been established to set the minimum operating standards
relating to cooperation with LEAs and the manner in which Post Office will
address suspected misconduct (para 1.2).
(b) It states that POL’s approach to cooperating with LEAs is based upon the
following core principles (para 1.3):
“~ Post Office is committed to supporting Law Enforcement Agencies in the
prevention, detection, investigation and potential prosecution of alleged
offences;
- Post Office will as far as possible cooperate with Law Enforcement
Agencies and voluntarily provide information and evidence in response to a
5! Agenda for ARC meeting 28 September 2021 [POL00447933] and written resolution dated 28 September 2021
[POL00447935),
® See, for example, POL_GE_Post Office Investigations Review_20220420_FINAL~ [POL00448006]
and POL_GE_Post Office Investigations - Next Steps_20220706 paper [POL00448354]
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request or proactively in order to assist an investigation following a report by
Post Office;
- Post Office is committed to ensuring that prosecutions are fair and that
Prosecution Teams are made aware of, and provided with, Disclosable
Material in Post Office’s possession;
- Post Office will manage the risks associated with providing such
cooperation, by ensuring that appropriate controls are in place in relation to
the provision of information.”
(c) It provides that, in accordance with those principles, and subject to specified
controls, Post Office (para 1.3):
“. will make a Victim Crime Report to the police where suspected criminal
misconduct is identified in its business operations and will provide such
further information and assistance as appropriate;
- will not conduct private prosecutions (Post Office’s shareholder must be
consulted and approval obtained from the Post Office Board if any deviation
from this is contemplated);
- will provide information to Law Enforcement Agencies to assist the
prevention, detection, investigation and potential prosecution of crime:
- voluntarily for intelligence purposes, accompanied by an Advisory
Notice if required to describe any known issue/s which might affect the
reliability of the information;
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- voluntarily for use as evidence, where it is classified by Legal and
Compliance as ‘low risk data’ for the purpose of this Policy (see Appendix
1);
- voluntarily for use as evidence, if approved by Post Office Legal or any
Nominated Criminal Law Advisors acting for Post Office; or
- as required by a Mandatory Order or otherwise approved by the Post
Office Board.”
(d) It states that compliance with the policy will ensure that (i) suspect criminal
misconduct is subject to proper review before it is reported to a LEA, (ii)
proper consideration is given to the information to be provided to assist LEAs
and Prosecution Teams to comply with their disclosure duties, (iii) issues
with reliability of information provided are identified and dealt with
appropriately, and (iv) Post Office can identify and verify any information it
has provided to LEAs at a later date (para 1.5).
(e) In the minimum control standards, among other matters:
i. It identifies the risk of Post Office not dealing appropriately with issues
concerning the reliability of information it has provided to LEAs which
could result in improper reliance on that information and/or unsafe
convictions. It requires Post Office employees to refer requests for
information from LEAs to Legal, Compliance or Security. Where the
requests relate to the provision of information for intelligence
purposes, Legal, Compliance or Security must follow the ‘Provision of
Data to Law Enforcement Agencies Flowchart for Intelligence
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Purposes’ (Tool 1) to determine their response. Where Post Office or
its employees are asked or compelled to provide witness statements
for relating to any information that is not classified as low risk, the
request must be escalated to Legal, who will assess the risk in
providing the information and determine whether the evidence can be
provided on a voluntary basis, whether a Mandatory Order or Board
approval is required, whether any information so provided should be
accompanied by an Advisory Notice (see below), and/or whether any
other risk mitigation action is appropriate. It requires Post Office
employees to notify Legal if they become aware of any issues which
may undermine the reliability of the information being provided.
ii. It identifies the risk of Post Office not monitoring investigations and
prosecutions by LEAs, not being aware of issues arising in such
cases and/or failing to identify material in its possession which
satisfies the Disclosure Test. It requires Post Office to maintain a list
of known ongoing criminal investigations involving it and to be
updated with developments, in part by making regular contact with
the prosecutors to identify any further disclosable material.
(f) It explains that the Flowchart, Tool 1, has been designed to determine the
level of risk exposure and escalation required when providing data to
external LEAs for intelligence purposes (para 3.1). The Flowchart provides
that the low-risk data, as listed in Appendix 1, can straightforwardly be
provided. However, it provides that the data listed in Appendix 2, which is
“data deriving from Legacy Horizon or HNG-X", while it can also be provided,
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must be accompanied by an Advisory Notice. The Advisory Notice, in
essence, warns that the accuracy and reliability of the data deriving from
these versions of Horizon was the subject of the HIJ and that 39 convictions
based upon evidence derived from historical versions of Horizon were
quashed by the Court of Appeal in Hamilton.
64 The latest version of the ‘Legal Playbook’, which was not required to go through
the same approval process as the CLEP as it is a guide rather than policy, is
dated 24 June 2020 [POL00448313].° It provides five tools which have been
designed to assist Legal when advising the business on issues relating to
cooperation with LEAs and should address suspected criminal misconduct. The
first is the flowchart on the provision of data to LEAs for intelligence purposes
as appended to the CLEP and described above. The other four are:
(a) Tool 2: Flowchart: Provision of Evidence to Law Enforcement Agencies. This
flowchart is designed to assist Legal with assessing the risk associated with
providing data. The flowchart categorises data derived from Legacy Horizon
or HNG-X as “Special Category Data”. It explains that “Post Office must
advise the [LEA] of the risks associated with relying upon the data before
providing it, by providing the Advisory Notice” including in the CLEP.
(b) Tool 3: Monitoring of Ongoing Criminal Cases Checklist. This tool provides
a list of information which Post Office should liaise with the Prosecution
Team* to obtain once it has become aware that a suspect is under
§ [POL00448313]
Prosecution Team is not defined in the Legal Playbook but I understand this to mean the relevant prosecution authority Post
Office is assisting or providing with information.
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investigation for a criminal offence relating to the Post Office. Where Post
Office become aware of any challenge to any data it has provided, it requires
Legal to consider steps to mitigate the risks arising from such challenge.
(c) Tool 4: Disclosure Checklist. This tool provides guidance on how Post Office
should proactively assist the Prosecution Team and draw disclosable
material to its attention. It requires the person conducting the disclosure
review in Post Office to contact the Officer in Charge of the investigation,
and to request a summary of the prosecution and defence so that they can
determine whether Post Office has any material which meets the disclosure
test. It provides specific detailed guidance on the category of materials the
person conducting the disclosure review should consider in “cases in which
evidence is used to prove a loss” and “cases in which evidence is not used
to prove a loss”. In the former, it requires that if Post Office become aware
of any issues raised by the Defendant in respect of the accuracy or reliability
of data which has been provided, the person conducting the disclosure
review should investigate to either satisfy themselves that the data is
reliable/accurate or that the issue raised does not impact the evidence
provided or consider whether they need to disclose anything relating to the
reliability / accuracy of the data.
(d) Tool 5: Factors _to Consider When Determining Whether to Report
Suspected Criminal Misconduct to the Police. This tool is a non-exhaustive
list of factors which Post Office must have regard to when determining
whether it shall report suspected criminal misconduct to the police or other
LEA.
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Draft Combined Group Investigation and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Policy
(‘GICLEP”)
65 As stated above, as A&CI has evolved and its purpose has settled, A&CI have
drafted and consulted upon a new combined GICLEP to reflect the current
investigative function of A&Cl and changed governance approach to
investigations. It is intended that it will replace and simplify the current GIP,
CLEP and Legal Playbook. It will also require the Investigator’s Manual to be
updated, which A&Cl are in the process of doing. I am responsible for the draft
GICLEP, as the Director of A&CI. The Group General Counsel, Ben Foat, will
sponsor it and has overall accountability to the Board in relation to internal
investigations and sharing information with LEAs.
66 When I first joined Post Office in February 2022, I recognised the need to revise
the investigation and cooperation with law enforcement policy framework for the
reasons set out above. As recorded in the draft GICLEP, I produced a first draft
on 7 March 2022 and a further draft on 29 November 2022. It has since not yet
come into force. On 26 June 2024, SEG discussed a revised version, which
reflected the “enhanced capabilities of A&CI and the improved governance
approach to investigations generally”. \n particular, the revised version
proposed a change in the governance of passing material to law enforcement
in that it would be subject to agreement by me and Post Office’s in-house
criminal lawyer rather than the Board [POL00448313].5° SEG, however, noted
55 20240626 SEG Paper Info Sharing Inv Policy [POL00448345]
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further work was required in relation to data assurance [POL00448310].°°
Subject to that work, and a review of the policy by an external NGO and
consideration by RCC, ARC and the Board, it is intended that draft GICLEP will
in due course come into force.
67 Plainly, it has taken, and is taking, too long for the draft GICLEP to come into
force. That has been the result of a number of key factors. First, as a new
investigative function, the perceived purpose of A&C has inevitably evolved and
changed since its establishment in February 2022. The draft GICLEP has,
therefore, had to be continuously reconsidered to reflect that evolution and
change, as illustrated by the recent discussion at SEG. It has, therefore, taken
time for A&Cl’s purpose to settle such that a draft GICLEP could be presented
to RCC, ARC and the Board for consideration. Second, A&C! was not fully
resourced until around November 2022, and it has had to deal with significant
investigative demand. That has diverted attention from taking the necessary
steps to ensure that an up-to-date and approved policy framework which reflects
the current operational requirements is in place. The effect of caseload was
noted by Group Assurance in their review of June 2023.
68 As it stands, therefore, the provisions and requirements of the existing GIP,
CLEP and Legal Playbook continue to be adopted in practice. However, where
the current GIP does not offer necessary prescription or direction, the provisions
of the draft GICLEP are followed in so far as they relate to investigations (as
opposed to the provisions which relate to cooperation with law enforcement).
5© 20240626_POL_SEG_MIN_FINAL [POL00448310].
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69 The latest draft of the GICLEP is dated 25 June 2024 [POL00448353].°’ The
key aspects are as follows:
(a) It states that it has been established to formalise POL’s approach to: (i) the
conduct of internal investigations throughout the Group, (ii) reporting
suspected criminal incidents to LEAs and proactively providing them with
evidence, and (iii) responding to requests for information and evidence from
LEA (section 1.2).
(b) It sets out core principles, including (section 1.3):
i. Post Office does not conduct private prosecutions, and Post
Office’s shareholder must be consulted and approval obtained
from the Board if any deviation is contemplated. Any reference in
the GICLEP to criminal proceedings is, therefore, to those brought
by LEAs and public prosecutors.
ii. Post Office is committed to undertake “ethically executed,
evidence-led, transparent investigations which can withstand
internal and external scrutiny by applying best practice from peer
organisations, industry best practice, applicable laws, and
guidance produced by government agencies.”
iii. Part of that commitment is that experienced and trained
professional investigators conduct investigations into matters
presenting the most risk to Post Office (such as suspected
57 Combined GIP CLEP - Draft v2.2 for SEG Board
[POL00448353},
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criminality or serious policy or process failings) and for
investigative standards to be set and assured by A&Cl.
(c) It defines an investigation as (section 1.4): “The structured, transparent,
objective, fair, and evidence-based collection and assessment of information
with the intent to understand a chain of events or causation of a chain of
events, that has or could affect Postmasters, Postmasters’ staff, customers ,
POL colleagues, POL’s business partners, or members of the public.”
(d) It states that it applies to all situations and teams within Post Office when
engagement with LEAs is contemplated or entered into which involves the
passing of material in Post Office’s possession as evidence to those LEAs,
and to any fact-finding into staff conduct or evaluation of a process that does
not fall within any other policy, guidance or law but does fall within the
definition of an investigation. The only exception is the conduct of
investigation activities of the People team which is governed by existing
People policies (though they must nevertheless have regard to the
overarching principles of the GICLEP) (section 2).
(e) It defines the roles and responsibilities under the GICLEP, including for the
Board, General Counsel, NED Investigations Champions, Director of A&Cl,
the Triage team and Investigators (section 3).
(f) It states that if staff encounter a situation which falls into the non-exhaustive
list of broad categories provided (which include suspected criminal offences
such as fraud, suspected miscarriages of justice and suspected covering up
of wrongdoing), then they should inform their managers, make a Speak Up
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report, and/or refer the matter to the Triage team for discussion. It further
states that the Post Office encourages reporting of issues where staff have
concerns as doing the right thing, even if those concerns turn out to be
unfounded (section 4).
(g) It adopts a Commissioning Manager model for the initiation and
management of investigations for accountability, consistency and oversight
purposes. The Commissioning Manager should never be connected
evidentially to the matter being investigation (section 4.3).
(h) It requires that the investigator must not be evidentially connected with the
matter being investigated. It states that the ‘independence of the
investigation team is key in all investigations. It may be preferable in some
circumstances to appoint an investigator from a different area of the
business or from A&CI or from an external service provider.” (section 4.4).
(i) It states that “All investigative activity must be transparent, objective, and
fair. It is policy that staff conducting investigative activity must record, retain,
and be prepared to reveal any material relating to the investigative activity
or generated during its course. This does not only apply to criminal
investigations — it is an issue of professionalism, transparency, and fairness
to all parties involved and so disclosure may be required to a Postmaster as
part of a contract discussion or to an internal or external team conducting
assurance or auditing functions.” (section 5).
(j) It provides, among other matters, that “All potentially relevant material
identified in following reasonable lines of enquiry must be collected,
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reviewed and assessed, especially if it may be counter to the working case
theory — this is a matter of fairness, professionalism, and best practice as
well as, in some circumstances, law. An investigation is an objective seeking
of fact, whatever the outcome may be, and will not be steered towards a
preferred outcome.” (section 5.1).
(k) In respect of criminal investigations, it states that, while Post Office no longer
prosecutes suspected criminal acts carried out against Post Office, in order
to safeguard public funds and in the interests of justice, Post Office will seek
to identify and understand suspected harm caused by possible criminal acts
and report them appropriately to LEAs for them to consider further
investigation and potential prosecutions. Further, it states that, to ensure that
the reports made to LEAs are proportionate and considered, Post Office will
carry out investigative activity to assure itself that it has reasonable grounds
to suspect that a criminal act may have occurred, and that harm to Post
Office may have resulted. It explains that that activity is known in shorthand
as a “POL criminal investigation" but this is not an end-to-end investigation.
It is for LEAs to conduct these following Post Office’s report of a suspected
offence. A full investigation and “proof” need not be achieved before
reporting a matter. It provides that only A&Cl staff will lead criminal
investigations within Post Office, though staff in other parts of Post Office
may assist or conduct investigative activity with the agreement and oversight
of A&Cl (section 6).
(I) It further provides that where the Triage team, in consultation with Group
Legal and/or me where appropriate, decide that a criminal investigation by
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Post Office is not appropriate, the Triage team may arrange for the matter to
be reported to local police or other competent authorities based on the
suspected nature of the incident without any assistance provided by A&Cl
investigators at that point. This decision may factor in elements such as
value of loss, the availability of A&CI resource, or prioritisation of other
investigative demands (section 6). To give an idea, as at June 2023, as a
yardstick to account for available resource and the need to prioritise, A&CI
would typically investigate all suspected theft and fraud and proactively
manage the interaction with the police and the submission of evidence for
cases with a value over £100,000. For cases below £100,000, A&CI would
manage the reporting process to the police but would encourage the police
to deal with the relevant business-based team directly to secure evidence
and witness statements as there is insufficient resource in A&CI to gather,
analyse and present evidence in these lower-value cases. It, however, is
subject to the specific circumstances of any particular case and available
resource at any given time which may merit a departure from that approach .
(m) It prohibits Post Office staff from taking part as interviewer in interviews
under caution either conducted solely by Post Office staff or in conjunction
with LEAs where Post Office is the believed victim of the suspected crime
under investigation (section 5.2).
(n) It provides that only A&CI will report suspected criminal offences to LEAs
where Post Office considers itself to be the victim, except for burglaries and
robberies when time is critical to get a response from the police. In those
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circumstances, Post Office or Postmasters should report to the police in
accordance with the Security Team’s policies and procedures (section 8.1).
(0) It specifies how Post Office should pass material to LEAs both proactively
and reactively in response to requests (section 8.4). In respect of the
provision of Horizon data, it states (section 9):
“Proactively and reactively supplied information will have differing profiles
due to historic technology issues. The version of Horizon that was
considered at fault in the Horizon IT Scandal was replaced in October 2019.
In 2020, known errors and bugs identified in the Horizon Issues Judgement
[sic] formed part of a review by KPMG of the system and found to not to be
prevalent in the system. From 2021, a new and collaborative approach was
taken to resolving reported Horizon issues in a dispute resolution process.
Due to the effect of these developments, the following approach to data
sharing with LEAs is:
It is policy that:
Any information originating from Horizon after 18 January 2022 may be
passed as either intelligence or evidence to LEAs only after DA&CI (or their
nominated deputy) and an in-house criminal lawyer both give approval. A
record of both DA&CI’s (or their nominated deputy’s) and the in-house
criminal lawyer's rationale and decision must be recorded on the relevant
case management file.
Where information is requested by LEAs that is Horizon data originating from
pre-1* January 2022, the same process must be followed. In addition, the
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wording included in the relevant section of the Investigator’s Manual
covering the passing of information to LEAs must be included in any witness
statement for evidence or in an accompanying email or letter to the LEA
requesting the information in a non-evidential format.
Where information is intended to be passed to LEAs which is not Horizon
data, the same process of DA&CI (or designated deputy) and in-house
criminal legal counsel must be followed, irrespective of the date the
information was created.
Best-evidence originating from Horizon sits with Fujitsu and so LEAs should
be encouraged to request this material direct from Fujitsu.”
(p) In terms of investigation governance, it provides that Group Assurance will
also include the review of A&Cl’s investigative practices at least twice a year.
Internal Audit will also consider A&CI in their annual audit plans.
Key Guidance
The Investigator's Manual
70 In addition to recognising the need to revise the investigation policy framework
when I joined Post Office, we also recognised the need for, and instigated the
development of, the Investigators Manual in mid-2022 [POL00448014].= The
Manual is designed to shape and control the conduct of investigations both in
A&Cl and in the other business-based teams, act as the foundation stone for
A&Cl's assurance work across the Investigation Branch and provide guidance
5° Investigator’s Manual [POL00448014),
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on how data should be treated and shared with LEAs. Its development and
production has been led by one of the Senior Investigation Managers in A&CI
in consultation with the other members of A&Cl and the other business-based
teams who carry out investigative activity which it impacts on. I, as the Director
of A&Cl, have overall responsibility for it. It was introduced in June 2023.
71 I note the key content as follows:
(a) It includes at the outset the Chief Executive (Nick Read), Investigations
Champion (at the time, Ben Tidswell) and Group General Counsel’s (Ben
Foat) endorsements of the manual and the aim of ensuring fairness,
integrity, consistency and professionalism in all investigations (section
1).
(b) It states that it is intended to support the Group’s Policies. In particular, it
says that it should be read in conjunction with the GICLEP (though
currently the GIP and CLEP until the draft GICLEP comes into force), the
Investigation Branch Control Framework and the Speak Up Policy
(section 2).
(c) It further states that it is intended to provide guidance on the
considerations that must be made when conducting investigations, but it
is not intended to be a training manual. It prescribes the professional
standards which the Group expects of all those that undertake
investigations on its behalf (section 2).
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(d) It sets out the roles and responsibilities of the Triage teams,
Commissioning Manager and Investigation Officer. The latter is required,
among other matters, to:
(i) Produce an investigation strategy/plan;
(ii) Follow all reasonable lines of enquiry which points
towards and/or away from the working case hypothesis;
(iii)Record and retain all material relating to the
investigations;
(iv) Produce and maintain an Action and Decision Log;
(v) Immediately bring to the attention of any relevant
decision maker, their Line Manager and the
Commissioning Manager any material which tends to
undermine the case for Post Office or supports a
contrary view;
(vi) Produce reports and management information.
(e) It sets out the triage process for investigations teams, the purpose of
which is to capture information for the organisation and then consider the
relevant priority, necessity and proportionality of conducting an
investigation. Each team’s triage process is set out in the appendices.
(f) It sets out common guidance for conducting investigations regardless of
type, including in relation to evidence collection, lines of enquiry, analysis
of evidence, document heavy evidence reviews, conduct of interviews,
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taking witness statements, external enquiries and disclosure (section 7-
10).
(g) It sets out the investigation assurance framework, which includes
monthly and quarterly reviews of investigations by relevant line
managers, dip sampling of other team’s investigation files by Senior
Investigation Managers in A&Cl, and dip sampling of A&Cl’s
investigations by Group Assurance (section 11). A&Cl, however,
currently conduct assurance reviews of other teams every two months
due to caseload demands.
(h) It refers to the detailed instructions contained in the GICLEP (currently
the CLEP) on how and when it is permissible to share information with
law enforcement (section 12).
(i) It includes numerous appendices which contain specific processes and
guidance on the triage and conduct of investigations for individual teams,
including A&ClI, the Contracts Team, the Disputes Resolution Team,
Network Support and Resolution and Branch Reconciliation (Appendices
A-E).
(j) It has an appendix on disclosure, which provides guidance on disclosure
considerations in non-criminal case, criminal cases and civil cases
(Appendix F). In respect of criminal cases, while A&CI does not carry the
disclosure obligations of an LEA, it requires that material relevant to an
investigation is provided to police/LEAs using disclosure schedules
which the police use. However, we have never used these forms as
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police/LEAs will re-run the disclosure relevancy test themselves on all
material held by Post Office. Instead, the Post Office provides witness
statements and exhibits to police/LEAs but then simply provide all other
material gathered or created by Post Office and pass it to the police/LEA
for them to assess. The update of the Manual which started in July 2024
will reflect this simpler approach.
72 The Manual has been added to the Post Office Intranet. On 7 June 2023, two
of A&CI Senior Managers gave a full day of investigator training to the Retail
teams, which included a session to introduce the Investigator Manual.** This was
recorded to be used in future by new starters. In addition, A&CI assures the
investigative activity of the Retail teams against the standards set in the Manual
and the sections of the Manual that specifically relate to their individual teams
as well as the bespoke assurance framework agreed with each assured team.
Through this regular assurance work, we ensure that practice is embedded and
checked. If the dip-sampling during any given assurance round shows non-
conformity with the approach described in their section of the Manual, then this
is raised in the resulting investigative assurance report and at the debrief
meeting with the heads of department of the assured teams. Feedback on the
dip-sampled cases is provided by the A&CI person conducting the assurance
review to the assured team’s managers and they should cascade this back to
the individual team member.
®® Disclosure Training (1),pptx [POL00448019},
; 20230306-CIU Investigation Strategy - Presentation. pptx [POL00448016}
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Associated policies
73 There are a number of other associated policies which, in part, cover
investigations which might include alleged, or at least might reveal suspicions
of, fraud, theft and/or false accounting. Save for the Speak Up Policy, which
covers investigations by the A&CI Speak Up team and for which I am the owner,
these policies relate to investigative activity conducted by other teams within the
business and are accordingly owned by the directors of those respective teams.
While they are not the key policies for investigations into alleged or suspected
criminal matters, they are nevertheless an important part of the investigation
policy framework. For completeness, I list and briefly address those associated
policies below.
Speak Up Policy v9 May 2024°°
74 I discuss this policy further below in relation to the effectiveness of the current
Speak Up function. I own the policy and, together with the Group Legal Director
Sarah Gray, I am accountable under it to the Board to ensure that a Speak Up
culture is proactively encouraged throughout Post Office. The policy is
sponsored by Group General Counsel, Ben Foat, so responsibility for it sits
within Legal. It is subject to oversight by RCC and ARC. It sets the minimum
operating standards relating to the management of Speak Up. In so far as
investigations into Speak Up reports are concerned, it explains that procedures
for the Speak Up / A&Cl team who investigate Speak Up reports are set out in
the Investigator’s Manual and that the policy does not govern how Speak Up
© Group Policy Speak Up_May24 [POL00447997}
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matters are investigated, which falls under the GIP (though in practice the draft
GICLEP) in the same way as any other investigation conducted by A&Cl.
Financial Crime Policy v8.0 dated July 2023°'
75 The Financial Crime Policy has been established to set the minimum operating
standards relating to the design and implementation of controls to prevent or
deter financial crime throughout the Group.®? The policy is authored by the Head
of Financial Crime, owned by the Group Compliance Director, Jonathan Hill,
and sponsored by the Group General Counsel, Ben Foat. It is subject to
oversight by RCC and ARC. In so far as investigations into suspected financial
crime are concerned, it lists the GIP as an associated policy which should be
considered and read in conjunction where relevant.® It further states that as a
minimum control to guard against the risk of internal financial crime/fraud, “All
reports received of or instances identified of internal fraud will be fully
investigated and where appropriate, Post Office will prosecute individuals” ®
That is plainly an error which should not have been included in any revised
version of the policy after Post Office's decision to cease private prosecutions
on 22 September 2020. As set out above, the current position is that any
internal report of suspected financial crime will be passed to A&Cl for initial
investigation and, if there are reasonable grounds to suspect a financial crime
has been committed, the matter will be referred to police or other LEA for further
°' Financial Crime Policy v8.0 July 2023 POL00447947}
° Para 1.2
® Para2.2
p14
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investigation and potential prosecution and Post Office will cooperate with the
LEA’s investigation/prosecution in line with the CLEP.
Postmaster Support Policies
76 While A&CI should ultimately conduct any internal investigations which concern
suspicions or allegations of theft, fraud and/or false accounting based on
Horizon data, the Retail Team are the first line of teams involved in the initial
investigation and is where the suspicion of theft, fraud and/or false accounting
is formed before the matter is referred to A&CI. The Retail Team have
developed a suite of twelve Postmaster Support Policies which are designed to
reset Post Office’s relationship with Postmasters and provide guidelines on how
it should provide support to them. They are all owned by the Retail Engagement
Director, Tracey Marshall, and sponsored by the Group Chief Retail Officer.
They are subject to oversight and approval by RCC and ARC. I have been told
that Postmasters receive a 'Postmaster Guide to Policies’ which explains the
policies. A number of those policies are directly relevant to how the Retail Team
initially investigate matters where suspicions of theft, fraud and/or false
accounting may be formed as follows:
(a) Postmaster Accounting Dispute Resolution Policy v3.2 dated 26
September 2022: The policy is designed to clarify the nature of the
accounting dispute(s), set out the standards expected in resolving the
®§ This was previously Martin Roberts, who has since left Post Office. Neil Brocklehurst, the Interim Chief Operating Officer
currently holds the responsibilities of the Group Chief Retail Officer.
® Postmaster Accounting Dispute Resolution Policy V3.2 [POL00447999]
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dispute and the procedures that need to be followed in bringing any
dispute to a conclusion (para 2.2). As a core principle, it states that Post
Office has an obligation to investigate any discrepancy "properly, fully
and fairly”, which includes producing all relevant records to Postmasters,
communicating known problems in or generated by Horizon, *making
reasonable enquires, undertaking reasonable analysis and even-handed
investigation”, and “given fair consideration to the facts and information
available to the possible cause of the appearance of alleged or apparent
shortfalls” (para 2.3). It sets out a three-tier investigation procedure: Tier
1 investigations are intended to provide a quick resolution to Postmasters
on straightforward balancing and transaction correction enquiries; Tier 2
investigations are fuller and have passed through a triage process and
include those cases which have not been resolved at Tier 1; Tier 3
investigations are for those cases which have not been resolved at Tier
2 (section 4) and in practice are in-depth transaction and other data
analysis reports. No interviews are conducted and the reports produced
are designed to be shared with the Postmaster. The policy provides that
A&Cl perform an independent sample check of cases on a monthly basis
and share my findings with the Head of Network Support and Resolution,
which is part of the assurance work that A&CI carry out.
Related to the Postmaster Account Dispute Resolution Policy is the ‘CIU
(now A&Cl) Referral Process’, which sets out the process for referring a
case to A&Cl when Tier 2/3 Advisors conducting these investigations
begin to form a suspicion that a financial crime may have taken been
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committed. The process essentially involves Tier 2/3 Advisors referring
any such case to their Team Manager, who will present the case for
discussion at a weekly case review meeting, and, if there is agreement,
refer the case to A&CI where it will be reviewed by our Triage team where
a decision will be made about whether or not A&Cl will investigate.
(b) I Postmaster_Complaint_Handling Policy v4.0°’ This policy sets the
minimum operating standards for the management of Postmaster
complaints (para 2.2). It sets as core principle that such complaints
should be investigated as appropriate so that root causes can be
surfaced and their recurrence prevented (para 2.5). It provides that a
complaint can be escalated to the relevant policy owner for an
investigation under the GIP if it meets a certain risk threshold and it refers
to the GIP for further information regarding the referrals of complaints for
investigations (para 4.2). It also provides that any complaints that are
found during triage to be Speak Up reports are forwarded to the Speak
Up Investigation team (para 4.3).
(c) Postmaster Contract Performance Policy dated 27 November 2023:°
This policy sets the minimum operating standards relating to the
management of Postmaster contracts, identifies the review/investigation
process where those standards are not being met and outlines the
procedures to be followed to ensure contract performance (para 2.2). It
°’Postmaster Complaint Handling Policy v4.0 POL00447972],
®° Postmaster Contract Performance Policy v5.0 [POL00447950).
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provides that Post Office will review/investigate any potential contractual
performance issue before taking any contractual action and that any
investigation will be "a fair and unbiased method of investigating issues”
so that Post Office can establish the facts. The Investigators Manual
requires the Contracts team to seek early advice from the A&Cl if during
the course of their investigation into a contract performance issue the
investigator becomes concerned or uncovers evidence which indicates
that a criminal offence has been committed (Appendix B.1.3). As a
minimum control standard, A&CI sample contract reviews/investigations
on a monthly basis as part of the Branch Control Assurance Framework
(section 3.5). As part of our investigative assurance work, A&CI has
recommended that the Contracts team do not conduct any form of
investigation. We have suggested a model where the Contracts team are
at the end of the process and receive completed investigation reports so
that they are separate to the investigative activity and so cannot be said
to be conflicted in then determining the contractual impact of the
investigation. This has been accepted by Post Office and a re-designing
of workflow and responsibilities is being designed. I believe that a Case
Manager role will be required in Retail to pull together the various strands
of data, including the Tier 3 transaction analysis reports, and to conduct
fact-finding enquiries including speaking with the Postmaster or other
witnesses in order to complete an investigation report for the Contract
Manager to consider. This embeds the principle that those making
recommendations as to suspension and termination of Postmaster
contracts are not involved in the collection and presentation of evidence.
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(d) Postmaster Contract Suspension Policy dated 27 November 2023 ® This
policy identifies the circumstances in which suspension should be
considered and the criteria which must be met before a decision to
suspend is made (para 2.2). It is complemented by the Investigator’s
Manual which prescribes the investigation process when considering
termination (Appendix B.4). As part of the procedure for determining
whether to suspend, and to ensure that Post Office does not suspend
any Postmaster without reasonable and proper cause, the Postmaster
Suspensions Decisions Governance Committee, on which I sat until June
2024, reviews all new, and ongoing, suspensions on a monthly basis
(para 4.8). Further, as a minimum control standard, A&C! also sample
suspension investigations and decisions on a monthly basis as part of
the Branch Control Assurance Framework (section 3.5). I withdrew from
the Suspensions Decisions Governance Committee as I felt A&CI had
begun to have involvement in cases that were considered by the
Committee and that I was therefore theoretically conflicted.
(e) Postmaster Contract Termination Policy dated 15 December 2023.”° The
policy is to identify the circumstances in which termination should be
considered and the criteria which must be met before a decision to
terminate is made (para 2.2) It requires that termination only occur where
Post Office has reasonable and proper cause (para 2.3). It also provides
that Post Office will carry out a thorough review/investigation before
° Postmaster Contract Suspension Policy v5.0 [POL00447952]
7° Postmaster Contract Termination Policy v5.0 [POL00447951].
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exercising any termination rights and that any review/investigation will be
"a fair and unbiased method of considering issues” so that Post Office
can establish the facts. The policy is complemented by the Investigator’s
Manual which prescribes the investigation process when considering
termination, and which states that, depending on the circumstances of
the termination, the matter, but not the decision, may be escalated to
A&CI for investigation of any suspected criminal activity (Appendix B.3).
Again, as a minimum control standard, A&CI sample termination
investigations and decisions on a monthly basis as part of the Branch
Control Assurance Framework (section 3.5).
SECTION C: TRAINING / PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATORS
77 I am asked to provide details of the experience, expertise and qualifications of
those currently responsible for conducting investigations into alleged fraud, theft
and/or false accounting based on Horizon data (or, any minimum level that is
required, if any) and any key guidance, training or instruction (applicable in any
of the four countries of the United Kingdom) given to those responsible carrying
out such investigations. So far as key formal guidance is concerned, I have
already addressed that issue in Section B above.
A&Cl Team: Expertise, Experience and Qualifications
78 The KPMG Review found that the inconsistent experience and qualifications of
those conducting investigations within Post Office and inconsistent application
of minimum investigation standards especially in high-risk cases contributed to
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investigations falling short of market practice. As a result, A&CI was introduced
to ensure that there was a central investigation team of experienced and
qualified professional investigators within Post Office who were competent to
effectively and consistently conduct in adherence with market practice the
highest risk, most sensitive and most complex investigations within the business
and to quality assure investigations conducted by those elsewhere in the
business. A&CI has been staffed with that purpose in mind. I have set out below
for each member of the A&CI team who conduct or manage investigations (i)
the competence requirements for their role as set in their respective job
descriptions, and (ii) their expertise, experience and qualifications to meet or
exceed those competencies.
(a) Director A&CI: Focusing on fraud, theft or false accounting only, due to
issues with the volume of work, I have conducted a number of crime-
related investigations for Post Office or engaged with the police on Post
Office’s behalf during my time at Post Office. I believe the Inquiry seeks
information on my credentials to carry out this work, as well as that of the
rest of my team. Mine are as follows:
i. I have 13 years police investigation experience, primarily in
countering serious organised transnational crime and in counter
terrorism.
ii. I was a qualified Detective (qualified to a level now comparable to
PIP2),” Intelligence Officer, and Intelligence Manager.
7! PIP means the Professionalising Investigations Programme which was introduced to the Police Service in 2003 and is
currently in use. It is intended to deliver a professional, ethical and effective investigation capacity for policing by proiding
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iii. I have worked operationally and representationally with national
police forces and prosecutorial agencies in a variety of countries.
iv. I have around 17 years’ experience in the regulatory and private
sectors. In the private sector as a Global Head of Investigations I
led a global investigation function focused on counter fraud,
intellectual property protection, and anti-bribery and corruption
covering in excess of 120 countries and ten business lines
including life sciences, automative, extractive industries,
government contracts and consumer testing. As an Investigations
Director, I led corporate investigation teams for a high street bank
in cases that were largely Financial Services and Markets Act
2000 related and involved UK and overseas regulators. I have
worked in senior roles in intelligence and investigation functions
at two UK financial regulators.
v. I represented the UK as a financial crime “expert” at Europol for
the Financial Services Authority (now the Financial Conduct
Authority) and established a function and led _ intelligence
investigations into predominately fraud, money laundering or
other “white collar crimes” with mass victim bases.
vi. I established the Enforcement Investigation function at the UK
Pension Regulator and introduced the Victim’s Code, recognising
that support needed to be given to victims of mass frauds.
robust national benchmarked standards maintained and overseen by the College of Policing. PIP2 refers to the second of
four levels of the programme, and is intended to cover serious and complex investigations.
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vii. I have a Graduate Diploma in Law and have attended refresher
courses or inputs in investigation and disclosure, most recently in
2023.
viii. I Until moving to POL, I was a National Crime Agency-accredited
Senior Appropriate Officer for POCA.
ix. I am the Secretary of the Government National Investigators’
Group, a peer group of heads of profession from non-police
investigative government bodies sharing best practice and
knowledge.
x. I am also part of an advisory Trailblazer Group advising the
Cabinet Office on the structure, level, content, and application of
a new Fraud Control Officer apprenticeship.
(b) Senior Investigation Manager: There are two staff at this grade within
A&CI who are or have been involved in crime-related investigations at
Post Office. The role entails conducting or leading the highest risk, most
complex, or sensitive investigations within POL. The role requires,
among other things, “15+ years investigation experience in one or more
of in-house corporate conduct investigation teams, regulatory bodies, law
enforcement, or other public service body performing similar functions”
and specific “experience of investigating serious misconduct allegations,
dishonesty offences, and process failings to identify root causes and
lessons learned.”””
7 JD Snr Investigator [POL00447937].
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The Senior Investigation Manager leading the Law Enforcement
Engagement Team (LEET) has over 25 years criminal investigative
experience with local government and NHS counter fraud teams and led
the South-West of England team for the latter. He later led complex fraud
investigations at the Pension Regulator. He is an accredited (University
of Portsmouth) Counter Fraud Specialist and Manager. He is a former
National Police Improvement Agency-accredited Financial Investigator
and is currently a NCA-accredited Financial Intelligence Officer.
The Senior Investigation Manager leading the Review of Historic
Investigations has over 30 years’ experience in the Royal Military Police,
primarily in the Special Investigations Branch where he was Deputy Head
of Serious and Complex Investigations when he left and previously
Director of Investigation Operations and, as a secondee, Head of
Training at United States Military Police School. He currently holds a role
as a reserve officer in the Royal Military Police. He is a qualified PIP3
Investigator: and a Case Review Officer. He holds a MSc in Leadership
and Strategic Studies.
Ss
Speak Up & Intelligence Team Manager: The role entails managing the
triage process, managing the Speak Up function including all
investigations deriving from Speak Up reporting, and oversight of the
production of investigative MI and strategic risk assessments to inform
the business, SEG and the Board. It is essential that the manager has,
> As outlined above, PIP is the Professionalising Investigations Programme overseen by the College of Policing. PIP3 is
intended to cover major crime and serious and organised crime investigations.
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among other things, “significant experience (10+ years in either or a
combination of the two) in intelligence analysis or whistleblowing
management’.’* The current holder of this role has over 20 years of
criminal investigation experience in the Royal Military Police Special
Investigations Branch (SIB), where she investigated fraud and deaths of
service personnel on behalf of the UK Coroner. She was Deputy Head of
Crime and Projects in the SIB and acted as Senior Investigations Advisor
in Afghanistan. She worked as a privacy investigator at Meta (social
media company) before joining A&CI. She has a BA(Hons) in Applied
Investigations and has qualified as a Case Review Officer.’
(d) Investigation Manager: The role entails conducting the highest risk, most
complex, or sensitive fact-finding, conduct and criminal investigations
within Post Office with oversight from a Senior Investigations Manager.
The role requires, among other things, “5+ years investigation
experience in one or more of in-house corporate conduct investigation
teams, regulatory bodies, law enforcement, or other public service body
performing similar functions” and “Experience of investigating
misconduct allegations, dishonesty offences, and process failings to
identify root causes and lessons learned”.’© The investigation manager
working as part of the LEET team has 18 years’ police investigation
experience specialising in road death investigations and has some
™ JD Speak Up ete Mgr docx ~ [POL00448355}.
75 This is a College of Policing qualification.A Case Review Officer is a highly experienced investigator who, because of their
expertise and due to their passing a specific Reviewer course, is able to review a pre-existing case and determine the
adequacy and appropriateness of the investigation that has taken place.
78 JD Speak Up ete Mgr [POL00448355).
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experience in the care provision sector as an investigator. He is a
qualified PIP3” Senior Investigations Officer.
(e) Transaction Analysts: The role involves conducting analysis of
transaction data from branches as part of investigations, as tasked by
the Investigation Managers or Senior Investigation Managers. The job
requires, “experience in conducting analysis of multiple streams of
transaction or similar data in settings such as law enforcement, military,
intelligence, regulatory, or corporate environments.”’® There are
currently two Transaction Analysts. One, who joined the team in early
2024, has around ten years’ experience at Post Office as a Postmaster
trainer and working in the Dispute Resolution team at Post Office,
working with Postmasters and Strategic Partners to understand and
explain shortfalls. The other came to Post Office in early 2024 from the
Risk Intelligence Service in HMRC where she was a criminal intelligence
analyst. She has a LLB Law with Management qualification and is an
accredited Counter Fraud Intelligence Specialist. Both these team
members are engaged upon an 18-month Fraud Investigation
Apprenticeship.
(f) Investigative Intelligence and Triage Analyst: The role entails reviewing
all in-coming intelligence and information, triaging potential cases,
recommending the allocation of potential cases, producing monthly MI
and conducting on-demand intelligence assessments. It is essential that
77 As described above.
78 JD Speak Up ete Mgr [POL00448355).
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the candidate has, inter alia, “significant conduct and criminal
investigation experience, including production of evidential files.”’° The
current analyst had over 10 years’ experience with the police as an
intelligence researcher and analyst and experience with a national
retailer in loss prevention analysis.
A&Cl Team: Guidance, Training and Instruction
79 As a relatively new team and due to the investigative workload pressures A&CI
has been placed under, which has prevented myself and the Senior
Investigation Managers from focusing as much time as we would have hoped
on the strategic development of the team, A&CI has not yet produced a formal
training needs assessments and training programme for the A&CI team. This
would set out the one-off and continuous training the team will be required to
undertake to ensure its ongoing competence to conduct effective investigations ,
including into suspected criminal matters. However, we have been engaged in
lengthy dialogue with the College of Policing (CoP), starting with a meeting on
14 February 2024, to identify what training they could provide in respect of
criminal investigations (which in the context of our team will be to assist in
supporting police / LEA investigations). In May 2024 a draft contract for a
training and continuous professional development needs assessment was
drawn up and subsequent meetings have been held with CoP to discuss the
qualifications, expertise and experience of the assessor. We expect them to
produce their training needs analysis later this month. In parallel, we have been
7° JD Inv Intel Analyst [POL00447938].
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engaging with the City of London Police Crime Academy to determine what
training they might be able to provide to meet any training needs identified by
the CoP.
80 That said, while there is not yet a formal training programme for the team, since
A&CI became operational in January 2023, the A&Cl team members who
conduct investigations into suspected criminal matters have received guidance
on the conduct of investigations by virtue of the introduction of Investigator’s
Manual in June 2023 and they have undertaken training / CPD on the conduct
of investigations. For example, as referred to above, our two transaction
analysts who conduct criminal investigative work are progressing through 18-
month Fraud Investigation Apprenticeships which are provided by
Intelligencia.®°
81 One of our Senior Investigation Managers completed a National Investigator
Examination for PIP2" as part of his Royal Military Police Reserve training in
March 2024 and the other gained accreditation as a Financial Intelligence
Officer following the completion of a course with the National Crime Agency in
May 2024. Team members then cascade legal or best practice developments
to the team from training they attend. From my involvement in the Government
National Investigators’ Group, I have access to emerging themes and changes
in legislation and practice. The team separately receive informal guidance and
instruction on the conduct of investigations through weekly case reviews
®°L4 Counter Fraud Investigator Employer & Learner Handbook
{POL00448015); Intelligencia Training June update email[POL00448004}
51 As described above.
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between direct reports and their managers where each case is reviewed, and
weekly team meanings.
SECTION D: Investigations Data
82 I am asked to provide (i) the number of criminal or POCA investigations
conducted by Post Office’s investigation team into alleged fraud, theft and/or
false accounting based on Horizon data (that is, based wholly or partly on data
derived from Horizon) since Post Office ceased carrying out prosecutions due
to concerns with the Horizon system (the “Rule 9 start date”), (ii) the number
of cases based on Horizon data referred by Post Office to the police and/or CPS
(or equivalent prosecuting body) from the Rule 9 start date to date, and (iii) a
detailed breakdown of those cases referred by Post Office to the police and/or
CPS (or equivalent prosecuting body) from the Rule 9 start date to date.
The Rule 9 Start Date
83 As far as I can determine, Post Office did not formally make a policy decision,
as stated above, to cease private prosecutions until 22 September 2020 in
response to the GLO Judgments when the CLEP was approved by the Board
[POL00447924].*2 However, in practical terms, and subject to the qualifications
below, Post Office, to my knowledge, has not pursued a prosecution for alleged
fraud, theft and/or false accounting in respect of a Postmaster or Directly
Managed Branch employee based on Horizon data through to trial since the
publication of Second Sight’s Interim Report on 8 July 2013. I am aware that the
® 20200922_POL_Board_MIN_Signed.pdf— [POL00447924}
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only exceptions to this are two connected prosecutions in 2015 in which guilty
pleas were entered to two joint charges of theft following full admissions at audit
and in interview and which were supported by other substantial documentary
evidence such that the reliability of Horizon was not in issue although the
offences had been discovered through an audit of Horizon data.
84 On 8 July 2013, Simon Clarke advised that Post Office should instruct an
alternative ‘expert’ with appropriate knowledge of Horizon to provide evidence
in respect of Horizon-related criminal cases [POL00006365].®° He set out the
reasons for his concerns about relying on Gareth Jenkins’ evidence in his advice
of 15 July 2013 [POL00040000].** He further advised Post Office on 17
September 2013 that prosecuting cases which involved Horizon data in the
absence of an expert to attest to Horizon’s reliability would not be possible so
Post Office needed to instruct a new independent expert.®° The effect of Simon
Clarke’s advice was that after 8 July 2013 Post Office (and/or its external legal
advisors) reviewed all cases on a case-by-case basis and it either discontinued
or put in the “stack” (i.e. suspended / put on hold) all those cases which were
based on Horizon data and it initiated no new prosecutions pending the
instruction of a new independent expert who might attest to the reliability of
Horizon for the purpose of pursuing criminal prosecutions.®° Post Office did not
subsequently instruct such an expert so it did not ultimately pursue the “stacked”
®° [POL00006365].
®* POL00040000
®5 POLO0040040, para 5
® See, for example, Chris Aujard’s paperof February 2014 on Post Office's Prosecution Policy which stated that‘a number of
cases now date back to summer last year, when a decision was made to suspend all prosecutorial activity {POLO0138 130]
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85
86
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cases. As above, it formally made the decision on 22 September 2020 to cease
private prosecutions.
For all those reasons - and notwithstanding that there were prosecutions
already underway as at 8 July 2013, which were proceeded with on the basis
that they were not based on Horizon data or which were based on Horizon data
but were not discontinued immediately on that date as explained above - Post
Office has taken 8 July 2013 to be the Rule 9 start date for the purposes of
responding to questions 1-5 of the Rule 9 request (of which this statement
responds to questions 1-3).
Number of investigations conducted by Post Office since 8 July 2013 to date
Prior to the establishment of A&Cl in February 2022, information about cases
involving investigations into alleged fraud, theft and/or false accounting was
held by the Security Team. Accordingly, for the purpose of answering the
request as to how many investigations into fraud, theft and/or false accounting
based on Horizon data were conducted by Post Office between 8 July 2013 to
date, the Security Team has provided me with data and analysis for the period
from 8 July 2013 to 21 February 2022 when A&Cl took over the conduct of
investigations. For the period from 21 February 2022 onwards, I have relied on
data and analysis provided by A&CI.
To try to ascertain an accurate figure, I am aware that the Security team have
relied principally on analysis of their casework spreadsheets which record
various details about investigations into individual cases, including but not
limited to the date of the incident in question, the date the case was raised with
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Security for investigation, the branch name, summary details of the case, the
date the case was closed and the case outcome.
88 I understand that the data recorded in these spreadsheets was manually
entered and maintained by members of the Security team rather than exported
from a separate digital case management system. For each case referred to in
the spreadsheets, I understand that Post Office hold a corresponding digital file
on SharePoint which contains the available documentation which underlies the
summary information contained within the spreadsheet. I understand that many
versions of these spreadsheets have been generated by the Security team
between July 2013 and February 2022, as they were adapted over time to meet
the Security team’s needs, so there are multiple different spreadsheets, which
to some extent overlap. I understand that the Security team have cross-checked
between spreadsheets to try to ensure that they provide as comprehensive and
reliable a calculation as possible of the cases over that period for the Inquiry.
However, I further understand that in the course of collating and analysing this
data, the Security team have identified instances where the data in the
spreadsheets is incomplete and/or inconsistent with other sources.§” Further,
as the spreadsheets rely on manual data entry, there is an inherent risk that the
data entered might be incomplete or inaccurate. While I am informed that the
Security team have endeavoured so far as reasonably practicable to verify and
reconcile the data contained in the spreadsheets from the underlying case files
held on SharePoint, It is important to state that the data in the spreadsheets
57 For example, I am told that the total number of cases within the spreadsheets do not reconcile exactly with the total numbenf
individual case files held on Sharepoint.
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89
90
91
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may, as a result, not be completely reliable and, thus, the figures and
information derived from them should be approached with a degree of caution.
From their analysis, the Security team has calculated that the number of
investigations it carried out into suspected or alleged fraud, theft and/or false
accounting based on Horizon data from 8 July 2013 to 21 February 2022 was
301.
From 21 February 2022 to date, A&Cl has held the information about cases
involving investigations into alleged fraud and theft based on Horizon data which
it has conducted. A&CI do not record reports of suspected false accounting as
we judge that to be an ancillary offence to fraud and/or theft and in any event,
teams reporting suspected criminal acts to us do not categorise what they are
reporting as false accounting, rather they use “theft”, “fraud” or “money
laundering”. Pending the recent introduction of the new digital case
management on 2 August 2024, the A&CI team also manually input case
information into a casework spreadsheet, which records various details about
investigations into individual circumstances, including but not limited to a brief
description of the suspected offence and whether it is corroborated by Horizon
data.
From the analysis of its casework spreadsheet, A&CI calculate that the number
of investigations it has carried out or is carrying out (including those for which
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Post Office is not the complainant) into suspected or alleged fraud and/or theft
based on Horizon data from 21 February 2022 to date is 27.
92 Accordingly, the total number of investigations calculated to have been carried
out by Post Office into alleged fraud, theft and/or false accounting based on
Horizon data from 8 July 2013 to date is 328.
Number and breakdown of cases referred to police or prosecuting bodies from 8 July
2013 to date
93 To determine the number of cases based on Horizon data that Post Office has
referred to police and/or CPS (or equivalent prosecuting body) from 8 July 2013
to date, I again rely on data and analysis provided by the Security Team for the
period from 8 July 2013 to 21 February 2022 and A&Cl for the period from 21
February 2022 to 12 August 2024.
94 I understand that the Security team relied on their casework spreadsheets
(which for the reasons set out above should be approached with a degree of
caution) to initially determine which cases based on Horizon data involved the
police and/or CPS (or equivalent prosecuting body). However, I understand that
their casework spreadsheets do not distinguish between those cases referred
by Post Office and those referred by any other person, such as a member of the
public or a Postmaster. As a result, I am informed that the Security team has
checked the underlying casefiles to determine so far as reasonably practicable
which of those cases were referred by Post Office.
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95 From that exercise, the Security team has calculated that the number of cases
based on Horizon data that Post Office referred to police and/or CPS (or
equivalent prosecuting body) from 8 July 2013 to 21 February 2022 was 10.
96 For the period from 21 February 2022 to 12 August 2024, according to its
casework spreadsheet, A&CI has referred 15 cases into alleged or suspected
fraud and/or theft based on Horizon data to the police.
97 Accordingly, the total number of cases referred by Post Office to the police
and/or CPS (or equivalent prosecuting body) into alleged fraud, theft and/or
false accounting based on Horizon data from 8 July 2013 to 12 August 2024 is
25. As an annexure to this statement, from page 105, I provide a detailed
breakdown of those cases as requested.
SECTION E: Review of Historic Investigations
98 The Inquiry has asked for information in respect of any key reviews resulting
from evidence arising in the Inquiry which address the quality of investigations.
It has also sought an explanation as to how Post Office is building and
maintaining trust with Postmasters and changing its culture. In Post Office’s
Opening Statement to the Inquiry dated 4 October 2022, it explained that, for
the commencement of the Human Impact hearings, it had created an Inquiry-
focused team who were responsible for identifying and recording points arising
from the individual testimony that merited further consideration. That team
assigned each action point to the relevant business area with the knowledge
and experts to address those points,
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99 One of the matters which emerged during the Human Impact hearings and
which required further investigation related to the conduct of Post Office’s
investigations. Some 31 Postmasters gave evidence which either alleged
misconduct by Post Office staff or otherwise raised complaints as to the quality
of investigations, such as:
(a) Failure to disclosure relevant material;
(b) Failure to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry;
(c) Conduct of interviews; and/or,
(d) Placing inappropriate pressure on Postmasters.
100 As aconsequence, in June 2022, Post Office wrote to the legal representatives
of those Postmasters who made allegations proposing that its Speak Up team
(which, as described above and in my previous statement, is responsible for
dealing with whistleblowing reports and processes) speak to the Postmasters
directly or that they provide a written outline of all information relevant to their
allegations so that Post Office could investigate them.
101 It was obviously a matter for individual Postmasters whether they engaged with
the Speak Up team so that their allegations could be investigated, and Post
Office recognised that some may have felt it was too little too late or would not
want to engage with Post Office because of their experiences. However, Post
Office genuinely wanted to, and wants, to investigate the allegations.
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102 Post Office initiated a review of the historic investigations mentioned in the
Human Impact session evidence which were treated as complaints (“the
Review’). The aim of the Review is to:
(a) Look into the specific complaints made by each Human Impact session
witness;
(b) Review the quality, standard and effectiveness of the investigations
against national standards, professional practice, and legislative
requirements at the relevant time;
(c) Assess the conduct of the Post Office investigator(s) against law,
legislation, policies, procedures, and nationally recognised best practice
in place at the relevant time; and,
(d) Produce a report from each review including recommendations relating
to each case review to a Merits Assessment Panel.
103 The Review is tasked with reviewing all discoverable material relating to the
cases that is held by Post Office, Peters & Peters LLP, or other third parties
supporting Post Office’s Inquiry Team, to determine if the investigation for each
of the cases was thorough and followed all reasonable lines of enquiry, paying
particular attention to, among other matters:
(a) Qualification and/or experience of the investigators conducting the
investigations or making decisions in relation to them;
(b) Recovery and consideration of all relevant material to accurately
establish the facts of the case;
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(c) Compliance with disclosure obligations;
(d) Conduct of interviews under caution and compliance with the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the associated Codes of Practice
(including the treatment of Postmasters and manner of questioning);
(e) Investigation strategy;
(f) Approach taken with Postmasters and witnesses;
(g) I Oversight and supervision of cases;
(h) Consideration of alternative outcomes and lines of enquiry, including
seeking advice from senior investigators, managers and legal
practitioners; and
(i) Whether the conduct of the investigation was fair, balance, justified,
proportionate, legal, accountable, necessary, ethical and in accordance
with the value and standards expected of a professional investigator.
104 The Review is not, however, considering material produced after charge or
issue of asummons nor looking at the role of prosecutor post-charge/summons.
It is focused on the investigations themselves.
105 In January 2023, the Post Office Inquiry team tasked A&CI with conducting the
Review and instructed it to recruit and form a team of experienced and credible
criminal investigators to do so. As a result, Post Office hired four Reviewers
who started between May and June 2023 to carry out the Review. It was
essential that those conducting the Review were experienced in reviewing
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criminal cases in an independent and objective manner. Their qualifications,
experience and expertise are as follows:
(a) Reviewer 1: PIP 3 in Major Crime & Serious Organised Crime; PIP 4
Strategic Investigator; Major Crime Review Officer; MSc (Cambridge
University) in Criminology & Evidenced-based Policing; Former Head of
Major Crime and Serious & Organised Crime; Former Detective
Superintendent.
(b) Reviewer 2: PIP 4 Senior Investigating Officer; Former Head of
Professional Standards; Former Head of Major Crime and Serious &
Organised Crime; Former Chief Superintendent; Member of the Criminal
Investigation Research Network at University of South Wales.
(c) Reviewer 3: BSc in Policing; Graduate of the FBI Academy and
Executive Leadership Programme; Former Authorising Officer for covert
tactics; Former Superintendent; Former Director of police reform projects
in Afghanistan and Libya; Former senior financial crime investigator at a
global bank.
(d) Reviewer 4: PIP 3 Senior Investigating Officer (SIO); Formerly
accredited for SIO roles in respect of kidnap & extortion and counter
corruption; Former Deputy Head of Counter Corruption Unit; Former
Head of Serious & Organised Crime Unit; former case reviewer of
® I have described above that PIP is the Professionalising Investigations Programme PIP4 is the fourth and final level of PIP
and focuses on strategic management of highly complex investigations.
®° As outlined above.
°° As outlined above.
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collusive sectarian homicides in Northern Ireland; Former Head of CID
and Intelligence in a Crown Dependency; former case reviewer of
sectarian terrorist murders in Northern Ireland; holder of an LLB; MSc in
Countering Fraud & Corruption; Former Detective Chief Inspector.
106 As at July 2023, the Review was considering 32 historic investigations. The
number has since risen and currently stands at 47 with potential for more. The
number of reviews has increased as cases were cited, discussed, or referenced
during the Inquiry’s public hearings and it was felt that they should also be
reviewed. In order to support the Review with that increased caseload, we have
recruited three further investigators, the last of whom started in May 2024.
These additional investigators have extensive investigatory and disclosure
expertise including professional standards and war crimes and genocide
investigation experience.
107 In addition to the above members of the Review team, one of A&Cl’s Senior
Investigation Managers, on a fulltime basis, and I, at a higher level, oversee the
Review.
108 The Review team produces a Merits Assessment of each historic investigation
that was conducted (to be clear, they are not re-investigating the allegations
against the Postmaster) which outlines the following:
(a) The allegation, if applicable, made at the Human Impact hearings and
the factual findings of the team in relation to that allegation;
(b) A description of the investigation that was carried out originally and an
assessment on its effectiveness; and
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(c) I The conduct of the investigator observed by the team during the course
of the review and the team's observations and recommendations.
109 The Merits Assessments are then provided to a specially convened Merits
Assessments Panel (“the Panel”) to consider and make a decision on the
recommendations and further action. The Panel is formed of three voting
members — Chris Brocklesby, the Chief Transformation Officer, Nicola Marriott,
a People Team Director and until recently, the Group Chief Retail Officer, Martin
Robert (who recently left Post Office). Chris Brocklesby is also due to leave
Post Office in September. Post Office will therefore seek to appoint two
replacement members to the Panel. The Panel is advised by the Head of
Human Resources/Industrial Relations Legal, and a Senior Legal Counsel from
the Post Office Inquiry Team. I present the Merits Assessment to the Panel and
answer questions. Inquiry Team. I present the Merits Assessment to the Panel
and answer questions.
110 Asatthe date of this statement, thirteen former Postmasters, Postmaster’s staff
or staff of Directly-Managed (or Crown) Branches — including some who gave
evidence during the Human Impact hearings - have voluntarily met with the
Review team. It will, therefore, be clear to the Inquiry that not all the 31
witnesses who raised allegations and complaints during the Human Impact
hearings have wished to engage in the process to allow the Post Office to fully
enquire into each of the allegations which are subject of the Review. The team
will, however, conduct a review of the available material in respect of those
investigations.
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111
112
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The Review team have considered in excess of 100,000 documents. It is
important to state that this has not been a straightforward file review project.
Post Office’s data landscape has proven to be incredibly difficult to navigate.
There has been a total absence of case files which should have been available
to simply collect, either as hard copies or as digital versions. The entire data
repositories have had to be searched for individual documents, the name and
description of which can only be determined through iterative searches. The
team has also conducted a series of physical searches of the Post Office off-
site storage facility in order to satisfy themselves as to the thoroughness and
effectiveness of the data recovery. This process yielded helpful material such
as audio recordings of interviews after caution, many of which were not in the
digital record.
As a consequence of the challenging data landscape in particular, the increased
caseload and also some of the Review team being diverted by other urgent,
high priority historic issues such as Project May, an investigation into the historic
use of racial codification, the Review has taken longer than we initially
anticipated and would have hoped. That has delayed the formal, final and full
reporting of the lessons identified from the Review as to the historic conduct of
investigations and the experience of Postmasters within them. These learnings
will be reflected upon to ensure they are appropriately considered in the current
A&Cl function, and that any necessary action is taken promptly in respect of any
current Post Office staff who are the subject of adverse allegations as may be
appropriate.
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113 It is not expected that the review of all 47 cases will conclude until December
2024. However, an interim thematic report is expected to be completed by the
end of August 2024 which outlines emerging and consistent themes from the
reviews conducted up until the start of August 2024. Currently, these themes
include the recruitment of inexperienced staff as investigators into the former
Security team, lack of training, lack of apparent oversight of the investigators,
disclosure failure issues, ineffectiveness of investigations, lack of investigative
mind set, and insufficient separation of functions. A&CI continue to reflect
lessons identified from these emerging themes in their current investigative
work. Once all 47 reviews are completed, a final thematic report will be
produced.
SECTION F: SPEAK UP AND COMPLAINTS
114 The Inquiry has asked Post Office to provide the number of complaints received
pursuant to the Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy, common themes
arising from complaints, and POL’s assessment of the policy’s effectiveness.
However, the request is headed ‘Whistleblowing’ and refers to paragraph [71](a)
of my First Witness Statement [WITN11190100] which described the Speak Up
(whistleblowing) arrangements of Post Office until approximately mid-2021.
115 Asaresult, I have assumed that the Inquiry seeks information relating both to
the Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy and the engagement of
Postmasters with the Speak Up policies and practices of Post Office.
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116 The Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy is owned by the Retail
Engagement Director, Tracy Marshall. As I am not the policy owner and am not
involved in its application, I am not in a position to assess its effectiveness and
do not have direct knowledge of the number of complaints received pursuant to
the policy, nor the common themes arising. Accordingly, that information will be
provided in the statement of Melanie Park, Central Operations Director.
117 _ Instead, I outline the mechanisms put in place by Post Office to capture a Speak
Up report made pursuant to the Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy, the
number of Speak Up reports made generally, common themes arising from
those reports, and Post Office’s assessment of the Speak Up policy's
effectiveness.
Capturing Speak Up reports made as complaints
118 The first version of the Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy came into force
on 22 January 2021. The current version (version 4.0) has been effective since
21 May 2024." In relation to Speak Up:
(a) It identifies the distinction between a complaint and a Speak Up report. It
defines a complaint as being "about something that affects the
Postmaster (whether a limited company, a partnership, a limited liability
partnership or an individual) or the branch" whereas "if reporting the
wrongdoing is in the public interest then it could fall under the definition
of Whistleblowing (or Speak Up)" = It clarifies that a Speak Up disclosure
%" POL00447972}
% jPoL00447972
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has protections that complaints do not and states that it is important to
understand which type of report is being made from the outset. The policy
provides examples of both Speak Up reports and complaints to enable
those referring to the policy to understand the distinction.
(b) It includes the following process for when a Postmaster complaint
qualifies as a Speak Up report: "Any Complaints received that are triaged
and found to be Speak Up reports will be forwarded to the Speak Up
Investigation Team immediately in accordance with the Speak Up Policy
and Procedures, and with confidentiality protected subject to any
exceptions set out in the Speak Up Policy."*
119 Post Office also implemented a process from August 2022, ‘Whistleblowing
review of complaint cases’ [POL00447939],* to ensure that all Postmaster
complaints received pursuant to the Postmaster Complaints Handling Policy are
reviewed for Whistleblowing issues by way of monthly review of the Postmaster
Complaints Dashboard and by Coaching Log Performance Monitoring.
120 In May 2023, the Regional and Area Managers received online (via Teams) and
in-person training on the Postmaster Complaint Handling Policy. The training
noted that the minimum control standards include: “Making sure complaint
handlers complete the Speak Up training and are aware of the Whistleblowing
Policy and procedures. We will carry out regular case reviews to check
® [POL00447972]
% (POL00447972}
°5 IRT-WBR-001 Whistleblowing review of complaint cases[POL00447939],
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whistleblowing has been identified, where appropriate, and the correct action
taken” [POL00447955]. Further, it described the responsibility of the Postmaster
complaints handling team to: “/dentify Speak Up concerns and pass to the
Speak Up team, in line with Whistleblowing Policy and procedure”.®° I am aware
that further training of a similar nature was delivered in January 2024.
121 Since February 2024, monthly and ad-hoc meetings are held between the
Speak Up Manager and the Issues Resolution Team Manager to ensure that
Speak Up reports are being adequately captured.
The number of Speak Up reports received
122 The below table indicates the total number of Speak Up cases opened as a
result of any person reporting to the Speak Up service from 2022:
Year No. of reports
2022 137
2023 41
2024” 41
123 Data is provided from 2022 as this is when the Speak Up function moved into
A&CI (then CIU). The start date for 2022 is 1 April 2022.
124 The number of reports made in 2022 is significantly higher than subsequent
years as the Speak Up triage function was not yet implemented. The 2022 figure
includes a number of matters which, if received now, would be closed by the
* PCH Policy Refresher Training 2023 V0.2 [POL00447955).
°7 To 1 July 2024.
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Speak Up team and/or referred to an appropriate business area, such as
Employee Relations, or indeed passed to Royal Mail Group.
125 The below table indicates the total number of Speak Up reports known to be
made to the Speak Up service from within a branch (so by a Postmaster or their
assistants) since April 2022, as well the percentage of reports made within that
year identified as originating from a branch:
Year No. of reports I Percentage
2022 27 29%
2023 23 56%
2024% 14 34%
126 The above figures are based on the information known to Post Office as to who
has made the report. Post Office will not always know who has made the report,
or the role that the person holds as anonymous reports may be submitted. In
the above figures, I have included only those reports which were clearly made
from within a branch due to the context of what was reported but there is nothing
to indicate their position. It is likely that the number of reports made by
Postmasters or from within a branch is higher.
Key themes emerging from the Speak Up reports
127 As outlined in paragraph [97] of my first witness statement to the Inquiry
[WITN11190100], A&CI prepare monthly MI reports which are a standing
° To 1 July 2024.
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agenda item at the SEG meetings for noting each month. These reports contain
information relating to Speak Up reports as well as the other work of A&Cl.
128 In addition, since mid-July 2023, regular Speak Up reports have been made to
ARC which are intended to provide an overview of Speak Up activity, identify
current risks and the actions taken to mitigate the risks.
129 As at July 2023, theft was identified as the most common type of allegation the
Speak Up function receives and fraud and theft remain the highest categories
of reporting.” There were also increased reports involving allegations of non-
compliance with codes of conducts and regulations.
130 During Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 of 2023/2024 (October-December 2023), there
were increased reports relating to the conduct of Post Office senior
management and in Quarter 4, 75% of all reports were made by Post Office
staff. Commonly arising themes included ingrained culture and behaviour of
senior leaders, the use of contractors (in relation to necessity and cost of the
hiring process) and mentions of the Inquiry in Quarter 4, following the ITV drama
‘Mr Bates v The Post Office’, which ranged from resurfacing of historic
experiences to alleged fraudulent compensation claims.
Postmaster specific themes emerging from Speak Up reports
131 As outlined above, it is not always possible to identify whether a report has been
made by a Postmaster or from within a branch. Of the identifiable reports, I note
that the following themes arise:
®Speak Up Strategy, page 4 [POL00447996]
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(a) Allegations against members of staff for theft, SmartID misuse (sharing
of what is meant to be a personally allocated log in code which conceals
the identity of the person conducting the transaction), or use of Post
Office funds to support a retail business (the unauthorised use by the
Postmaster of Post Office-owned cash present in the branch in their other
businesses e.g. to pay for stock to sell in their co-located shops);
(b) Allegations around Post Office processes;
(c) Awarding of Banking Hub contracts; and
(d) Cash pouches being booked out on Horizon.
Assessment of the Speak Up policy's effectiveness
132 On 10 February 2023, Post Office engaged EY to review its Speak Up policies
and processes (EY Review) [POL00448531] [POL00448530] [POL00448531].
At the time, the policy in force was version 7.0 which was approved by ARC in
April 2022. The EY work covered three streams:
(a) Assessment of relevant policy documents against best practice, using
the Financial Conduct Authority SYSC 18 (Whistleblowing) as an
indicative model;
(b) Assessment of a sample of five investigation case files to establish
whether the Post Office policies were operating as designed; and
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(c) Interviews with stakeholders of the Speak Up process to establish their
views on possible areas of future development. 1°
133. The EY Review was completed on 26 April 2023 and found:
(a) Post Office's Speak Up function had "undergone significant change and
investment in recent years, including significant hiring activity, creating a
bespoke Speak Up Team, and writing and refreshing policies and
procedures".
(b) "POL appears to be taking steps to build a culture of speaking up. The
SUT [Speak Up Team] have and continue to hold training roadshows with
different POL stakeholder groups to create further awareness of the
SUF" [Speak Up Function].
(c) There is "a perception that case volumes are lower than expected for an
entity of this size”, but that it was difficult to establish an accurate
expectation for case volume, and if only reports from direct employees
were considered, Post Office was in line with median report levels for
European organisations, being an overage of 0.5 reports per 100
employees.'*
(d) Post Office had "a mature SU Policy which assures support for those who
report concerns, and states that victimisation of anyone who raises a
1° (POL00447944}
1" Page 4, Speak Up Function Review Report, [POL00447944]
1 Page 11, Speak Up Function Review Report, [POL00447944}
16 Page 11, Speak Up Function Review Report, [POL00447944]
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concern will be subject to disciplinary action. It also presents options for
raising concerns outside of line management".
134 The EY Report contained recommendations including:
(a) Wider engagement, which has formed part of the subsequent
engagement and outreach strategy, the sessions of which are detailed in
paragraph 148 below;
(b) Updating internal and external communications, including updating the
Post Office intranet so that Speak Up information can be accessed more
easily, and ensuring accessibility on external web browsers, both of
which were actioned; and
(c) Seeking written feedback from Speak Up reporters at the conclusion of
an investigation, which has been addressed by way of an emailed
feedback assessment form.
135 Post Office has tracked its response to and compliance with the
recommendations made by EY [POL00448021].'=
136 Group Assurance also conducted a review of the Speak Up function during April
and June 2023, with a report finalised in July 2023 [POL00447964].:° The
review comprised an objective assessment of the Speak Up policies and
procedures, as well as levels of compliance. Group Assurance identified six
‘© Page 12, Speak Up Function Review Report, [POL00447944],
1° EY Recommendations [POL0044802 1].
18 Group Assurance Speak Up Report [POL00447964]
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137
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improvement opportunities within Speak Up processes and procedures. Overall,
Group Assurance rated the Speak Up function as ‘Satisfactory’ as “The
framework of governance, risk management and control [was] adequate and
effective’.
The Group Assurance review identified that the Speak Up team "demonstrated
a very high level of compliance with the current Speak Up procedures and
processes" including:
"a) Anonymity and communication between the reporter and the
investigator were maintained throughout the investigations, where
applicable.
b) For cases that were passed to other areas of the business, there was
a clear handover process between the Speak Up team and the relevant
business area.
c) All Speak Up data is managed, stored and accessed via Convercent
and the Speak Up Sharepoint site, and access is managed by the Central
Investigations Unit (CIU). Access is approved and authorised through the
Head of Central Investigations Unit and restricted to purposes such as
assurance and audits.
d) The cases which have been closed were documented consistently and
where there were cases of a high severity nature these had a planned
investigation approach in place, maintained with high anonymity and
closed with recommendations.
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e) All employees including Postmasters are provided with several
channels to raise Speak Up concerns this includes:
e The POL Speak Up mailbox (reviewed only by the Speak Up
team)
e Reporting via the Speak Up web portal operated by Convercent
(a third-party)
¢ The Convercent hotline
e Internal reporting (e.g., a line manager)
f) The triage process flow map for Speak Up is documented in the
investigations manual and this provides a structured approach to
assessing what type of investigation is required and who should the case
be investigated [sic].
g) The Speak Up team have now implemented after the external
assurance work done by EY a process where they send a feedback form
asking the reporter for feedback on how their case was handled, this is
done via the route the report was originally made from.""”
138 Areas for improvement were identified as:
‘©7 Final Assurance Report- Speak Up, page 3 [POLO0447964]
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(a) Regular monitoring of who has access to Convercent and Sharepoint
site/data. This was closed at issuance of the Group Assurance review
and the Triage Analyst conducts regular checks for access .
(b) A separate Speak Up process flow map to be created and included into
the Investigator's Manual. The process flow map was to document the
hand over process for cases referred to other parts of the business and
to clarify when and how the Head of CIU intervenes and the sign off
process. This process flow was developed and was included in the
Investigator’s Manual by the end of 2023.
139 On 3 May 2023, the then Group Legal Director, Sarah Gray, and I presented a
PowerPoint to the IDG [POL00447917] which, among other things, outlined
what 'success' would look like for Speak Up within Post Office. We identified
that markers of success would include:
(a) Feeback from reporters showing trust in the service;
(b) PIDA-qualifying reports increasing as a proportion of reports received
year on year; and
(c) Number of reports increased by a particular percentage each year.
140 The Speak Up team continues to seek feedback from reporters and to track the
number of PIDA-qualifying reports as well as overall number of reports. The
nature of reports received through the Speak Up function is also a sign of its
‘©® Final Assurance Report ~ Speak Up, page 3 [POLO0447964]
‘© IDG Presentation on Whistleblowing and Investigations[POL00447917]
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improvement. For example, reports have alleged wrongdoing or poor
behaviours in relation to the most senior staff. This suggests that the reporters
have confidence that their reports will be taken seriously and they will be
protected in making them.
141 Investigations which are initiated due to information originating from Speak Up
reporting are also now conducted conceptually outside of the Speak Up team.
This is to ensure consistency in approach and to provide enhanced protection
to the reporter. In practice, due to staffing restrictions, the Speak Up Manager
is required to oversee these investigations but the investigator is not aware of
the identity of the reporter unless the reporter is content for this to happen.
Speak Up Policy and Strategy
142 Version 8.0 of the Speak Up policy was approved in April 2023 and captured
updates following the external review by EY, including ensuring consistency of
language throughout the policy, the use of 'Speak Up' instead of whistleblowing
and adapting suggested wording to the effect that concerns will be kept
confidential and disclosed on a need to know basis.
143. The most recent version of the Speak Up Policy was approved by ARC on 21
May 2024 [POL00448017]. The changes to this policy were minor, such as
updating references to 'CIU' so that they instead refer to 'A&CI'.
144 In July 2024, Post Office finalised a Speak Up Strategy for 2023-2025 (SU
Strategy) [POL00447996]. The purpose of the SU Strategy “is to deliver
increased awareness, listening up and use of the Speak Up function as part of
POL's [Post Office's] determination to restore trust in POL amongst our staff and
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post office network". The SU Strategy outlines three focus areas: awareness;
confidence in Speaking Up including that concerns are heard and promptly and
thoroughly investigated with feedback and outcomes provided; and training and
support.
145 The Speak Up Strategy is dated 2023-2025 but was only approved in July 2024
due to delays in receiving formal approval. The Speak Up Strategy will shortly
be updated to incorporate a mechanism to review the strategy in December
2024 to evaluate progress and provide revised or new priorities for 2025. The
planned updated otherwise will not affect the relevant consumers of the policy,
being staff and Postmasters.
Speak Up Training and Outreach
146 Compulsory Speak Up training for all employees and Postmasters is delivered
at induction and thereafter on an annual basis."°
147 In addition, the Speak Up function has been promoted by the team internally
and externally, and specific training has been provided to key managers across
the business to ensure they can identify Speak Up reports when made.
148 They key outreach activities conducted by the Team since late 2022 are set out
below:
Date Audience Location
0 Page 5,- Final Assurance Report, Speak Up [POL00447964]
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October 2022 Retail Network I Online
Business Team Meeting
November 2022 NFSP Online
Historic Matters Legal I Finsbury Dials
Team (now
Remediation Unit)
Financial Team Study I Chesterfield
Day
December 2022 Branch Assurance Audit I Chesterfield
Team
January 2023 NFSP Online
February 2023 BEIS Finsbury Dials
April 2023 Contracts Advisor Team I Finsbury Dials
May 2023 NFSP Conference Stratford on Avon
June 2023 Network Monitoring and I Chesterfield and online
Network Reconciliation
Teams
July 2023 Customer Complaints I Chesterfield
Team
January 2024 Banking Hubs Manager I Online
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February 2024 Swinson Stock Centre I Swindon
Manager
May 2024 Postmaster Conference I Warwick
Branch Assurance Audit I Chesterfield
Team
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Date: 22 August 2024
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Index to the Second Witness Statement of John Bartlett
No. I URN Document Description Control Number
1. I POL00447956 POL Security Storyboard v1.0 POL-BSFF-107-
0000040
2. POL00447931 Service and Support Overview of POL-BSFF-107-
Teams and Responsibilities 0000015
3. POL00448521 Financial Crime organogram POL-BSFF-124-
0000001
4. POL00448006 Post Office Investigations Review POL-BSFF-107-
POL GE 20210505 0000090
5. I POL00448010 GE Tactical Meeting Minutes 5 May I POL-BSFF-107-
2021 0000094
6. I POL00423697 KPMG Project Birch Report POL-BSFF-0238515
POL00448011 GE Meeting Minutes 15 September I POL-BSFF-107-
2021 0000095
8. I POL00447975 POL GE Post Office Investigations I POL-BSFF-107-
Review 20220420 0000059
9. POL00448354 Post Office Investigations Next POL-BSFF-117-
Steps 20220706 0000005
10. I POL00447979 29052022 GE and Board Paper POL-BSFF-107-
Remit and Criminal Investigations 0000063
11. I POL00448321 GE Meeting Minutes 3 August 2022 I POL-BSFF-117-
0000002
12. I POL00448320 POL Board Post Office I POL-BSFF-117-
Investigations - Next Steps I 0000001
20220927
13. I POL00447948 GE Meeting Minutes 28 June 2023 I POL-BSFF-107-
0000032
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14. I POL00448327 POL GE CIU Resourcing 20230628 I POL-BSFF-117-
0000004
15. I POL00448353 Combined CIP CLEP — Draft v2.2 POL-BSFF-115-
0000007
16. I POL00448007 POL GE Central Investigations Unit — I POL-BSFF-107-
Resourcing 20230125 0000091
17. I POL00448014 Investigator's Manual POL-BSFF-107-
0000098
18. I POL00447971 Legal Team organogram POL-BSFF-107-
0000055
19. I POL00447965 Group Assurance Review of CIU POL-BSFF-107-
0000049
20. I POL00448013 Investigations NED Terms _ of I POL-BSFF-107-
Reference 0000097
21. I POLO0447917 IDG Speak Up and Investigations I POL-BSFF-107-
presentation 0000001
22. I POL00447941 IB Control Framework POL-BSFF-107-
0000025
23. I POL00448352 POL ARC Investigations Policy v1.2 I POL-BSFF-115-
20210126 0000006
24. I POL00447936 Law Enforcement Policy v1.0 I POL-BSFF-107-
September 2021 0000020
25. I POL00447929 POL ARC Minute 26 January 2021 I POL-BSFF-107-
0000013
26. I POL00448326 IDG Pillar Strategy WB and I POL-BSFF-117-
Investigations 0000003
27. I POL00447925 POL ARC PDF Agenda and Papers I POL-BSFF-107-
— 20210126 0000009
28. I POL00423689 Whistleblowing Working Group I POL-BSFF-0238507
Actions and Updates
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29. I POLO0447976 Investigations Current State and I POL-BSFF-107-
TOM 0.3 210813 0000060
30. I POL00447934 GE Minute Final 15 September 2021 I POL-BSFF-107-
0000018
31. I POL00423512 RCC Minutes 6 May 2020 POL-BSFF-0238327
32. I POL00448008 ARC Minutes 19 May 2020 POL-BSFF-107-
0000092
33. I POLO0448009 GE Minutes 15 July 2020 POL-BSFF-107-
0000093
34. I POL00447923 Law Enforcement Policy POL Board I POL-BSFF-107-
20200922 0000007
35. I POL00447924 POL Board Minutes 22 September I POL-BSFF-107-
2020 0000008
36. I POL00447932 ARC Paper Cooperation with Law I POL-BSFF-107-
Enforcement Agencies and I 0000016
Addressing Suspected Criminal
Misconduct - Annual
Review/Implementation Update
37. I POL00447933 ARC Minutes 28 September 2021 POL-BSFF-107-
0000017
38. IPOL00447°935 IARC Written Resolution 28 I POL-BSFF-107-
September 2021 0000019
39. I POL00448313 Legal Playbook POL-BSFF-115-
0000004
40. I POL00448345 20240626 SEG Paper Info Sharing I POL-BSFF-115-
Inv Policy 0000005
41. I POL00448310 20240626_POL_SEG_MIN_FINAL I POL-BSFF-115-
0000001
42. I POL00448019 Disclosure Training POL-BSFF-107-
0000103
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43. I POL00448016 Clu Investigation Strategy I POL-BSFF-107-
Presentation 6 March 2023 0000100
44. I POL00447997 Group Speak Up Policy May 2024 POL-BSFF-107-
0000081
45. I POL00447947 Financial Crime Policy v8.0 July I POL-BSFF-107-
2023 0000031
46. I POL00447999 Postmaster Accounting Dispute I POL-BSFF-107-
Resolution Policy v3.2 0000083
47. I POL00447972 Postmaster Complaint Handling I POL-BSFF-107-
Policy v4.0 0000056
48. I POL00447950 Postmaster Contract Performance I POL-BSFF-107-
Policy v5.0 0000034
49. I POL00447952 Postmaster Contract Suspension I POL-BSFF-107-
Policy v5.0 0000036
50. I POL00447951 Postmaster Contract Termination I POL-BSFF-107-
Policy v 5.0 0000035
51. I POL00447937 JD Senior Investigator POL-BSFF-107-
0000021
52. I POL00448355 JD Speak Up Manager POL-BSFF-115-
0000008
53. I POL00447938 JD Investigation Intelligence Analyst I POL-BSFF-107-
0000022
54. I POL00448015 L4 Counter Fraud Investigator I POL-BSFF-107-
Employer & Learner Handbook 0000099
55. I POL00448004 Intelligencia Training June update POL-BSFF-107-
0000088
56. I POL00006365 CK Advice on FJ expert and criminal I POL-0017633
case review
57. I POL00040000 Simon Clarke advice regarding use I POL-0036482
of the expert evidence relating to the
integrity of the FJ Services Ltd
Horizon System
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58. I POL00138130 Post Office ARC Prosecutions I POL-BSFF-0000362
Policy, Chris Aujard
59. I POL00447939 IRT-WBR-001 Whistleblowing I POL-BSFF-107-
review of complaint cases 0000023
60. I POL00447955 PCH Policy Refresher Training 2023 I POL-BSFF-107-
v0.2 0000039
61. I POL00447996 POL Speak Up Strategy 2023-2025 I POL-BSFF-107-
0000080
62. I POL00448522 Email from John Spencer to Claire I POL-BSFF-124-
Hamilton and John Bartlett regarding I 0000002
EY Review
63. I POL00448531 EY Proposal to conduct Review of I POL-BSFF-124-
Whistleblowing 0000004
64. I POL00448530 EY Proposal — Appendices CV and I POL-BSFF-124-
Credentials 0000003
65. I POL00447944 Speak Up Function Review Report — I POL-BSFF-107-
EY 0000028
66. I POL00448021 EY Recommendations POL-BSFF-107-
0000105
67. I POL00447964 Group Assurance Final Assurance I POL-BSFF-107-
Report — Speak Up 0000048
68. I POL00448017 ARC Minutes 21 May 2024 POL-BSFF-107-
0000101
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Response to Question 3 of R9(57)
Relevant body I Date of I Likely Actual charge I Brief factual I Quantum of I Outcome Closure
referral relevant or offence summary alleged date or
potential loss current
charge or status
offence
assessed by
POL
GMP 14 August I Theft Theft This __ investigation I £4,000 Sentenced at] 16
2013 relates to a cash Oldham October
shortage of £4000 at Magistrates 2013
Oldham Crown Post Court on 27
Office Branch. This September
investigation was 2013 to 18
initiated by the months
Branch Manager of custodial
the branch = and suspended for
raised to the Security 12 months
Team due to the loss and 100 hours
in one of the Horizon unpaid work.
Stock Units. The
CCTV footage
showed the counter
clerk leaned over the
open plan counter,
placed her own
banking card in the
chip and pin
machine, and
performed the
deposit transaction
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on Horizon. Horizon
Data was used to
show the value of the
banking deposit
transaction was for
£4000 and detailed
the PAN number of
the card used. The
Post Office Security
Team reviewed the
Horizon transaction
data (including
banking deposit) and
CCTV footage and
reported this to the
Greater Manchester
Police.
PSNI
15 October
2013
Theft
N/A
This investigation
relates to a cash
shortage at Derrylin
Post Office Branch.
The cheque team in
the Financial Service
Centre Chesterfield
identified
£21,837.20 in
cheques that had
been remitted from
the branch to the
processing _ centre
N/A
PSNI
informed POL
that the
Prosecution
Service has
returned the
investigation
file as they
deem there is
not enough
evidence to
proceed.
20
2017
April
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but did not arrive.
This was escalated
to the Post Office
Security Team who
undertook an
investigation.
Analysis of Horizon
Transactional data
was used to identify
whether the
Cheques were from
genuine transactions
and identified it was
the Postmaster who
had made the
remittance. This was
reported by the
Security Team to the
Police Service
Northern Ireland as a
theft.
PSNI 4 August I Theft Theft This investigation I £2,700 This case was I5 March
2014 relates to duplicate heard at I 2015
withdrawals being Newry
made from three Magistrates
customers’ Post Court (first
Office Card Account appearance)
(POCA) while using on the 26th
Bessbrook Post January 2015
Office. This was when the
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initially raised as a Postmaster
complaint by a pleaded guilty
customer who to 8 counts of
reported to the bank theft and was
(JP Morgan Chase) sentenced to
that money had been 4 months
taken from her imprisonment,
account. JP Morgan suspended for
Chase raised this one and a half
with the Post Office years, for
Security Team to each count.
investigate. Along There was no
with the customers compensation
bank statements, order sought
Horizon as offenders
Transactional Data financial
was used to identify circumstances
the duplicate POCA would not
withdrawals. Horizon have
Transaction data warranted
was used to identify same.
a DANSK bank
account which was
used to deposit
money after each
duplicate
withdrawal. The
Transactional data
identified it was the
Postmaster who
processed these
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transactions. This
was referred by the
Security Team to
Police Service
Northern Ireland as a
theft.
PF
10
September
2014
Embezzlement
(Theft)
Embezzlement
(Theft)
This investigation
relates to a cash
shortage at Lerwick
Crown Post Office
Branch. — Following
concerns raised by
the branch manager
relating to an
excessive number of
reversals being
processed by a
counter clerk an
audit was arranged.
During this Audit the
physical cash and
stock on hand were
verified against the
Horizon System and
a cash shortage of
£13,746.16 was
identified. The bulk
of this cash shortage
was found in the
Stock Unit_of the
£13,525.80
The clerk
appeared at
court on 29
April 2015.
The clerk was
sentenced to
160 hours
Community
Payback and
given a 12
month
supervision
order to be
carried out in
the area in
which the
clerk resided.
15
2015
May
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clerk who was
processing
reversals. This was
escalated to the
Security Team who
undertook an
investigation.
Following the
investigation by the
Security Team,
using Horizon
Transaction data
and the Audit report
(the loss from the
Audit report is
derived from The
Horizon System), the
case was reported to
the PF by the
Security Team.
4 Embezzlement I N/A This investigation I £179,116.00 I Crown 24
December I (Theft) and relates to a cash Counsel February
2014 Money shortage at Troyglen instructed no I 2017
Laundering Post Office Branch. further
An audit was carried proceedings
out at the branch in relation to
during which the the case.
physical cash and
stock were verified
against the figures
onthe Horizon
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System. This Audit
identified a loss of
£179,116.00. This
loss was escalated
to the Security Team
who undertook an
investigation. The
Audit report (the loss
amount on the Audit
report was derived
from the horizon
System) and
transaction data was
used during the
investigation. The
Postmaster was
suspected of
Embezzlement and
the case was
referred by the
Security Team to the
PF.
PF
16
2015
July
Embezzlement
(Theft)
N/A
This _ investigation
relates to a cash
shortage at
Winchburgh Post
Office Branch. An
audit was carried out
at the branch during
which the physical
£44,300.54
Following a
full review by
the PF, they
have marked
the case NFA
due to the
case being
timed barred.
24
2017
April
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cash and stock were
verified against the
figures on the
Horizon System.
This Audit identified
a loss of £45,000.00.
This loss was
escalated to the
Security Team who
undertook an
investigation. The
Audit report (the loss
amount was derived
from the horizon
System) and Horizon
transaction data was
used during the
investigation. The
Postmaster admitted
removing the money
from the Post Office
and lending it to the
previous
Postmaster. The
Postmaster was
suspected of
Embezzlement and
the case was
referred to the PF.
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GMP. 25 Theft Handling This investigation I £52,100.00 I On 18 August I 3 January
February Counterfeit relates to 2017 the I 2021
2016 Notes £23,800.00 of counter clerk
counterfeit notes was given a
being found in the 12 month
safe at Salford City Conditional
Crown Post Office Discharge for
Branch by the handling £3k
Branch Manager. in counterfeit
Following the finding currency.
of the counterfeit
notes the Counter
Clerk who oversaw
the Main Safe that
day went home sick.
It was identified that
there was a further
loss of £28,300.00
hidden in transfers
between unused
Stock Units. Later
that evening the
Clerk brought into
the branch a further
£26,000 of
counterfeit notes
claiming she had
taken them home to
take them to the
Police station. This
was escalated to the
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Security Team for
investigation. It is
alleged that the
counter clerk stole
genuine notes from
the branch = and
replace them with
counterfeit notes.
Horizon Transaction
Data was used to
identify transfers
between different
Stock units where
the loss was hidden
and identify the
counter clerk who
was doing this. The
Security Team
reported this to
Greater Manchester
Police as a theft.
31 May I Embezzlement I Embezzlement I This _ investigation I £6,967.28 Pled guilty at I 24
2017 (Theft) (Theft) relates to Glasgow December
unauthorised Sheriff Court I 2018
withdrawals being on 22
made from five November
elderly customers 2018 and on
Post Office Card 20 December
Account (POCA) 2018,
while using Craigton received
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Post Office. This was sentence of 3
initially raised as a year
complaint by a supervision
customer who order, 250
reported to the bank hours
(JP Morgan Chase) community
that money had been pay back
taken from her order to be
account. JP Morgan completed in 6
Chase raised this months.
with the Post Office Electronic
Security Team to monitoring for
investigate. By using 10 months.
Horizon Transaction
Data (along with
customer bank
statements) it was
identified that the
Postmaster of the
branch was the
person who served
the customers when
unauthorised
withdrawals — were
made. The
investigation case
was referred by the
Security Team to the
PF.
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Dorset
27
September
2017
Fraud
Postmaster —
fraud by abuse
of position
Customer —-
unknown
This investigation
relates to Banking
Deposits processed
at Newtown Post
Office Branch. The
Post Office Banking
Team identified that
a customer was
making high value
cheque deposits at
the branch where the
cheques were being
returned by the bank
unpaid (bounced).
The branch was
processing these
cheque deposits
incorrectly as cash
deposits on the
Horizon System
meaning the money
was credited to the
customer's account
immediately. The
Banking Team
raised this issue with
the Post Office
Security Team.
Following the
Security Team
investigation and
Postmaster
pleaded guilty
to fraud by
abuse of
position.
Customer was
found — guilty
and
sentenced to
52 weeks
suspended for
2 years.
30
2021
June
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review of Horizon
transaction data
(including deposit
transactions and
Cheque
Adjustments made
by the branch) the
Postmaster and
Customer (who were
known to each other)
were both reported
by the Security
Team to Dorset
police.
West Mercia 31 Theft N/A This investigation I £338,000 West Mercia I 3 January
February relates to a cash Police advised I 2021
2019 shortage at that the Police
Wellington Post investigation
Office Branch. An has been
audit was carried out reviewed and
at the branch during will now be
which the physical filed as NFA
cash and stock were due to lack of
verified against the evidence to
figures on the pursue
Horizon System. The further.
Audit identified that
13 cash remittance
pouches each
containing £26,000
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had been remitted
out but not received
at the cash centre.
This resulted in a
cash shortage of
£338,000.00. This
was escalated to the
Post Office Security
Team who
undertook an
investigation using
Horizon Transaction
data, the Audit
Report and Horizon
Remittance data.
Following this
investigation a
Counter Clerk was
suspected of theft
and the case was
reported to West
Mercia Police for
them to investigate.
Lancashire
Police
14
September
2022
Money
Laundering
and Theft
Advice file to
CPS re charge
The branch which
was run by a an
Officer In Charge,
not the Postmaster,
was initially flagged
by the cash centre
due to an increase in
£398,000
Police
requested
statement
regarding
robustness of
Horizon - POL
producing a
Still live
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cash remittance statement and
return amounts to also referred
the cash centre. It police to
was also highlighted Fujitsu
by the MoneyGram
compliance team
that they wanted to
complete a
compliance call with
the branch to a large
number of high value
transactions being
completed to the
same destination. At
this point the
Financial Crime
team was involved
and highlighted circa
£3,300,000.00 worth
of MoneyGram
Mobile send
transactions
processed at the
branch. The
Financial Crime
team contacted the
branch on
requesting more
information
regarding these
transactions. On the
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same day, the
Financial Crime
team was contacted
by the Area Manager
who advised that the
Postmaster was in
touch with them and
advised of a possible
shortfall of
£400,000.00 which
was related to the
MoneyGram
transactions. The
CIU was advised of
the situation and
tasked with
completing an
investigation into this
matter. Police have
interviewed the OIC
and restrained
c£500k. Enquiries
indicated by Horizon
was a shortage of
c£398k which __ if
proved would be a
loss to POL. Police
working on basis that
the OIC "creamed
off" this amount from
the cash transferred
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through
MoneyGram.
Customer is
considered money
laundering suspect
and OIC suspected
for potential
conspiracy re money
laundering and theft
of c£398k from POL.
CoLP
27 October
2022
Theft
Branch failed to
correctly account
and register stock
(Postage stamps)
from the Swindon
Distribution Centre
on the Horizon
system over an
extended period of
time. As a result, the
Branch was
highlighted by Retail
on the Summary
Markers report due
to registering on
Horizon that stock
was being returned
to the Swindon Stock
Centre and
subsequently not
Reduced
due to
narrowing of
relevant
period to
£493,952.57
Police
requested
statement
regarding
robustness of
Horizon -
POL
producing a
statement and
also referred
police to
Fujitsu
Still live
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being received. A
subsequent branch
visit revealed a
significant
discrepancy was
indicated. Enquiries
commenced by
Contracts team and
the Postmaster
suggested that an
illegal entrant
working illegally
whom he employed,
and who has
subsequently left the
country, was
responsible. Despite
this claim further loss
was identified
subsequent to the
worker's departure.
The Postmaster was
suspended with
matter being referred
to the Metropolitan
Police for
investigation. The
City of London
Police are now
running this
investigation and
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have engaged with
Fujitsu to obtain
evidence.
Transaction analysis
indicates links to the
Postmaster to this
sort of activity prior
to becoming the
Postmaster, that the
suspected _ activity
occurred whilst
Postmaster and
when the reported
worker was present,
and then continued
after this worker was
reported to have left.
The relevant period
has been narrowed
to seek to rely on the
most recent data but
this is flexible
depending on
CoLP's views.
Scotland 16 Theft Multiple transactions I £247,539 A&Cl provided I Still live
February ‘reversed’ on transaction
2023 Horizon without report as intel
introducing and continue
corresponding cash to gather
value, by information.
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postmaster.
Additionally, a cash
pouch containing
29,000 Euros was
despatched to
branch but not
booked into Horizon,
causing overall
discrepancy shortfall
of over £97k.
Identified by Retail.
matter referred to
A&Cl and = was
reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
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Met Police
26 March
2023
Theft
Branch staff state
they sent 7 cash
pouches which were
booked out on
Horizon to CViT.
Paperwork & CViT
driver say 4 were
sent. Reported by
A&Cl_ to police.
Matter referred to
A&Cl and = was
reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
£350,000
Awaiting
evidence
request from
police
Still live
Gloucestershire
26 May
2023
Theft
Suspected staged
robbery during cash
£309,000
Police
requested
Still live
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collection from statement
branch. This was regarding
referred to A&CI by robustness of
Security team. Horizon - POL
Suspicious banking producing a
deposits also statement and
identified. Police also referred
conducted extensive police to
enquiries and are Fujitsu
looking to put advice
file to CPS following
interview of
suspects, including
the Postmaster.
West Yorkshire I 10 October I Theft This initially was I £820,000 Police Still live
2023 raised to A&CI as the requested
branch was statement
processing bank regarding
deposits and settling robustness of
to cheque, with no Horizon - POL
cheques being
submitted. When
training and branch
visit staff attended
the branch
unannounced, the
officer in charge of
the branch ran from
branch mid-
customer. Significant
producing a
statement and
also referred
police to
Fujitsu
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volume of suspicious
cash transactions
identified with
c£800k in shortfalls
identified as
accruing in around a
week. Horizon
transaction data
required. Reported
by A&CI to police.
West Midlands I 8 August I Theft/money Linked to another Police Still live
2024 laundering branch where a requested
staged robbery was statement
believed to have regarding
taken place - robustness of
suspicious banking Horizon - POL
deposits performed producing a
using same cards statement and
used at the other also referred
branch. Admission police to
made to the police Fujitsu
by the Postmaster.
Horizon data
required to
demonstrate
transactions.
Sussex 3 January I Theft Absentee £205,797 Police to I Still live
2024 Postmaster's branch conduct
run by their son who interviews
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stated to POL staff
(not A&Cl) that he
had inflated cash
holdings to cover a
discrepancy from
November 2022.
Branch had
previously been
contacted to return
excess cash which
was not forthcoming.
Horizon data
required to show
transactions.
Referred to police by
A&Cl. Police
progressing.
Norfolk
3 January
2024
Theft
Postmaster reported
that ex-husband was
abusive and
controlling towards
her and was taking
money from Post
Office to fund retail
business. Horizon
data would be
required to test this.
Postmaster has not
been into the branch
for over 5 years and
£70,635
Police
investigating
role of ex-
husband
among other
suspected
offences
unrelated to
Post Office
Still live
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husband has _ told
staff members not to
contact her.
Referred as a
fraud/theft with ex-
husband as suspect
to Police. A&Cl
ensured Postmaster
was not held
accountable for the
potential loss. NFSP
involved.
GMP
3 January
2024
Theft
Stock pouches
processed via
Horizon to Stock
centres where there
is no evidence that
they have been
physically
transferred from
branch by) CVIT
(Cash and Valuables
in Transit). This is
known as “phantom
REM out”. The
branch had pouches
to be remmed out
that were never
handed to CVIT or
received instock
£475,000
Police
awaiting
evidence from
A&Cl
Still live
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centre. matter
referred to A&CI and
was reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
Lancashire
3 January
2024
Theft
Stock received in
branch from
Swindon Stock
Centre but not
remmed in on
Horizon. Believed
that Phantom Rems
- Stock pouches
remmed out (stated
on Horizon that it
was_sent_back to
£242,740
Awaiting
police request
for information
Still live
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Swindon stock
centre) but no
evidence that
pouches were
transferred from
branch to CViT and
not received at
Swindon. matter
referred to A&CI and
was reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
MET
3 January
2024
Theft
A Stock & Mails
team review of
remittances
identified that__ten
£247,539
A&Cl provided
transaction
report as intel
with police
Still live
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pouches of stock and continue
had been processed to gather
in branch for information.
despatch to Swindon
Stock Centre but
were never received
resulting in a
shortfall discrepancy
of £247,759.04
matter referred to
A&Cl and = was
reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
Derbyshire 26 March I Theft Husband of I £105,543 Police Still live
2024 postmistress alleged requested
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to be using
somebody else's
SmartID to process
deposits into bank
account without
introducing cash.
SmartID and
transaction data is
accessed via
Horizon. Reported
by A&CI to police.
information
which A&Cl is
gathering
GMP
27 March
2024
Theft
Stock pouches were
Remmed out of the
branch but never
collected by Cash &
Valuables in Transit
(CVIT). This is
believed to have
been done by not
organising CVIT to
collect the pouch, so
they were not aware
there was a stock
pouch to collect. This
would decrease the
branch's stock levels
allowing the removal
of stock out of
branch, adjustment
of the stock up, or
£210,000
Police
awaiting
evidence from
A&Cl
Still live
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processing sales
reversals, while still
having their stock
levels balance in
branch. Identified by
Retail. matter
referred to A&CI and
was reported to the
police. Horizon data
is required to show
what is remmed
in/out. and what
transactions took
place. If a criminal
offence, then
suspects include
individuals with
access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
Warks 27 = March I Theft Stock was sent to I £87,665 Awaiting Still live
2024 the branch but evidence
remmed in by request from
incorrect amounts police
which caused a cash
discrepancy on
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Horizon. _ Identified
by Retail, passed to
A&Cl and reported to
the police. If a
criminal offence,
then suspects
include _ individuals
with access to the
Horizon system in
branch, including the
Postmaster. Police
enquiries will need to
identify any principal
suspect.
Page 135 of 135