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Witness Name: Kevin Hollinrake
Statement No.: WITN11460100
Dated: 7October 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF KEVIN HOLLINRAKE
I, Kevin Hollinrake, will say as follows.
Introduction
1. lam the Conservative Member of Parliament for Thirsk and Malton, having first
been elected in 7 May 2015, and the Shadow Secretary of State for Business and
Trade. From October 2022 to July 2024, I served as a Minister at the Department
for Business and Trade (“DBT” or “the Department”) and was responsible for the
Post Office, including redress and transformation.
2. I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's request for evidence dated 26
July 2024 (the Rule 9 request”). I have prepared it with the support of the
Government Legal Department and counsel. I have been reliant on others putting
documents before me to help me in its preparation.
3. As requested by the Inquiry, I have focused on answering the questions posed in
the Rule 9 request. I would of course be happy to provide additional relevant
evidence should it be helpful.
Background
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4. After a career in business which began in 1992, I was elected as the MP for Thirsk
and Malton at the General Election in May 2015. I sat on the backbenches until my
first ministerial appointment, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in DBT on
27 October 2022. On 26 March 2024, I was promoted to Minister of State (Minister
for Enterprise, Markets and Small Business) in DBT. I remained in that post until
the General Election in July 2024, following which I was appointed Shadow
Secretary of State for Business and Trade.
The importance of redress and Post Office transformation
5. As Minister of State, my portfolio of responsibilities [List of Ministerial
Responsibilities- webpage, RLIT0000374] included:
e Small business and enterprise
e Scale Up Strategy
e Access to finance
e Retained EU Law (Repeal and Reform)
e Labour market and employment rights (including National Minimum Wage)
e Postal services (including Royal Mail)
¢ Consumer and Competition policy (including Subsidy Control)
e Mutual recognition of professional qualifications
e Office for Product Safety and Standards
e Levelling Up and Regional Growth
e Corporate governance and transparency
e Audit and insolvency
e Hospitality
e Retail
e Consumer goods
e Personal Care
e Post Office Limited
e British Business Bank
e Low Pay Commission
e ACAS
e Small Business Commissioner
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e Companies House
e Competition & Markets Authority
e Competition Service
e Insolvency Service
© Competition Appeal Tribunal Central Arbitration Committee
e Certification Officer
© Office of Manpower Economics
© Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies
e Groceries Code Adjudicator
e Pub Code Adjudicator
e British Hallmarking Council
e Financial Reporting Council
e Regulatory Policy Committee
. During my entire time as Minister from 27 October 2022 to the General Election in
July 2024, the Post Office fell under my ministerial remit, and as part of this I was
responsible for leading the Government's action on redress for sub-postmasters
and Post Office reform.
. This was my number one priority as Minister, no question about it. It was of key
importance to the Department and it was also an issue which I cared about
personally from my time as a backbencher.
. My appointment was manna from heaven to me, because it meant I could actually
help to fix something important. There wasn't a day, night or weekend that went by
when I wasn't doing something on the Post Office redress schemes and
transformation. I would say at least 25% of my overall time and during many
periods a much higher percentage was focused on this.
- To give an indication, during my 20 months as minister I gave 22 oral statements
to Parliament on relevant Post Office issues, a far higher number than for any other
policy area for which I was responsible:
* 23° March 2023: Post Office: Horizon Compensation (RLIT0000375 )
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* 10' May 2023: Post Office Executives: Bonuses (RLITO000376 )
* 23° May 2023: Sub-postmasters and Sub-postmistresses: Remuneration
(RLIT0000377 )
+ 13" July 2023: Post Office Ltd: Management Culture (RLIT0000378 )
* 18 September 2023: Post Office Compensation (RLIT0000379 )
« 25" October 2023: Rural Postal Services: Sustainability (RLIT0000380 )
+ 19" December 2023: Post Office (Horizon System) Compensation Bill
(RLITO000381 )
* 8" January 2024: Horizon: Compensation and Convictions (RLITO000382 )
« 10" January 2024: Post Office Horizon Scandal (RLITO000383 )
« 25 January 2024: Post Office Horizon System: Exoneration of Sub-
postmasters (RLIT0000384 )
+ 29! January 2024: Post Office Ltd (RLIT0000385 )
+ 8" February 2024: Post Office Management Culture (RLITO000386 )
* 22" February 2024: Post Office Horizon Scandal (RLIT0000387)
* 26!" February 2024: Post Office Horizon: Compensation and Legislation
(RLIT0000388)
* 28" February 2024: Post Office Board and Governance (RLITO000389)
¢ 13th March 2024: Post Office Legislation (RLITO000390)
+ 20" March 2024: Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill (RLIT0000391)
* 17" April 2024: Draft Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment)
Order 2024 (RLITO000392)
* 29 April 2024: Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill (RLIT0000393 )
¢ 23% May 2024: Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill (RLIT0000394 )
« 18" July 2024: Post Office Horizon Scandal (RLITO000395 )
* 30" July 2024: Post Office Horizon (RLITO000396 )
Knowledge of relevant issues upon my appointment
10. The Inquiry has asked me about the briefings I received on relevant matters before
or at the time of my appointment as Minister on 27 October 2022.
11.As I have briefly explained, before I took on responsibility for Post Office issues as
a Minister I already had an active interest in the Horizon scandal as a backbencher.
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I entered Parliament after a career in business, and it was always important to me
to support small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”). As co-Chair of the All-
Party Parliamentary Group on Fair Business Banking (“APPG’), I was involved in
examining the HBOS Reading, RBS GRG, IRHP and other banking scandals, and
subsequently in getting justice — including proper compensation — for the victims,
and this was something that was important to me.
12. It was as a result of this that the barrister Paul Marshall first got in contact with me
to draw my attention to the commonalities between the Post Office scandal and
these banking scandals (WITN11460101, WITN11460102),
13. Soon after this, on 19 March 2020 I spoke in a debate in the House of Commons
on the Horizon scandal and called for proper compensation for subpostmasters
(including the GLO claimants), and also called for an investigation into the role
played by lawyers in the scandal (RLIT0000397 ) I raised the role of lawyers again
in a further Commons debate on 10 June 2020 (RLITO000398).
14.On 21 July 2020, Mr Marshall followed up his earlier letter by copying me into a
letter to Darren Jones MP, then Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy Select Committee (UKGI00031453). The letter set out Mr Marshall's belief
that the Post Office's conduct in relation to subpostmasters was not error or
oversight, but intentional wrongdoing, and explained the issues in some detail. I
continued to speak and correspond with Mr Marshall as a backbencher and as
Minister.
15.1 made further contributions as a backbencher on 5 October 2020 (RLITO000399
), where I pressed the Government to confirm that it was committed to making sure
fair compensation was paid; and on 24 February 2022 (RLIT0000400 ) I asked the
Government to deliver compensation quickly, and to make interim payments, and
I again questioned the role of the law firm Herbert Smith Freehills in advising POL
on compensation arrangements.
16.On the day of my appointment as Minister on 27 October 2022, I asked my private
Office to arrange a briefing on Horizon issues, and on 2 November 2022 I was given
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a ‘teach in’ briefing by officials on Post Office issues including the Horizon system,
compensations schemes and the Inquiry. In advance of that meeting, officials
provided me with an 11-page briefing document (BEISO000993 ). The document
provided a timeline, briefly described progress in each of the 3 compensation
schemes that existed at the time (the OCRS came later), briefly headlined officials’
perceptions of the “areas of pressure” for each of the scheme, and identified the
key stakeholders. The briefing was useful and accurate, though very little of it came
as a surprise.
17.\ was also provided with a briefing dated 2 November 2022: ‘Post Office Horizon:
GLO Compensation’ (BEIS0000994 ) advising that DBT should establish a scheme
based on alternative dispute resolution to deliver the additional compensation
which had been promised to SPMs involved in the group litigation in the High Court.
I agreed with the advice (BEIS0000995 ).
48. Following the ‘teach in’ meeting, I was provided with a further (very short) briefing
from officials dated 4 November 2022, addressing “Post Office Horizon: Inquiry and
Compensation” (BEIS0000996 ). The document adds a small amount of additional
detail on top of the information contained in the 2 November ‘teach in’ briefing
document.
49.1 continued to be briefed on issues throughout my time as a Minister. I had regular
meetings with the lead departmental officials — David Bickerton (Director General),
Carl Creswell (Director) and Rob Brightwell (Deputy Director) — and in those
meetings I would often make requests for more information on particular topics and
raise and discuss ideas for change.
20.It was also important to me that I should receive unfiltered information from
stakeholders, and right from the start I asked my private office to arrange calls with
Nick Read, Alan Bates and Lord Arbuthnot (BEIS0000997 ).
21.1 had an introductory meeting with Alan Bates on 21 November 2022
(BEIS0001057 ), and met with Lord Arbuthnot, Kevan Jones and several other MPs
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on 23 November 2022 (BEIS0000998 ), focussing on the GLO scheme which we
were finalising.
22.1 also had an introductory meeting with Nick Read, the POL CEO, on the same day.
Our discussion included Mr Read’s 3-year plan for POL, compensation for SPMs
and how POL was going to make savings (BEIS0000611 ).
23.1 had a meeting with Alan Bates and other SPMs involved in the GLO on 7
December 2022, where I told them I wanted to get compensation out as soon as
possible, would be announcing a scheme to do so (the GLO scheme) that day, and
reassured them that I had consulted with Lord Arbuthnot and Kevan Jones MP
among others on the scheme's design (BEIS0001000 ).
24.The briefings I was given by officials were good and accurate. They didn't
specifically cover open questions such as “How do we improve things?”. That was
left to me to provide challenge based on the cases I had dealt with as a
backbencher and what I was hearing from cases via MPs and direct contact via
email, Twitter, newspapers etc.
25.\ do think my interest in these issues as a backbencher was really key in performing
my role as Minister. It was this general intelligence gathering and the obvious
frustration from many of the victims regarding the delays in compensation and the
need for more transparency that led to the setting up of the cross-party HCAB, the
introduction of Fixed Sum Awards across all 3 schemes, the appeal mechanism for
the HSS and the quashing of c700 convictions. We were working on all these
changes prior to the airing of the ITV series, although there is no doubt that this
was very helpful in securing some of the changes.
26. It was obvious to me that I needed to hit the ground running as Minister. For
example, in my first week, I was advised about the need to make sure that
compensation would be disregarded when calculating benefits for subpostmasters
(BEIS0001001 ). I agreed, and engaged in correspondence with Guy Opperman,
Minister for Employment at the Department for Work and Pensions, making
(BEIS0001002 ).
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27.And right from the outset, I realised we needed to do what we could to identify
problems or gaps in the compensation schemes and do what we could to fix them.
For example, I asked any subpostmasters who had not received interim payments
to get in touch with me directly (BEISO001003 ; BEIS0001004 ) and followed many
of the cases closely to ensure progress was made.
Post Office board and culture
28.1 think cultural change within an organisation must always come from the top.
Whilst I realise that the Post Office is a big and complex organisation, and that
cultural change can take time to take root, nobody at the Post Office has managed
so far to really get hold of this issue and bring change to the extent required. I am
very hopeful that the new Chair, Nigel Railton, and the new CEO will help to do so.
29.No doubt there have been some improvements. For example, the appointment of
400 regional managers, the Postmaster NEDs, the attendance of the CEO at
postmaster conferences, and regular meetings and dialogue with the NFSP and
senior managers have conducted restorative justice sessions with victims.
30.But there are also signs that the Post Office remains too inward looking and
dysfunctional. Good examples are the failures to disclose information to the
Inquiry, the slow pace of disclosure for compensation cases, the reluctance to
reduce central costs to allow a consequential increase of revenue to postmasters
remuneration, the Henry Staunton saga, the failure to deal with long-standing
issues with senior executives, such as Alisdair Cameron, the Remuneration
Committee's decision and processes around the sign off of bonuses for complying
with the Inquiry’s disclosure requests, and the persistent and aggressive lobbying
by the CEO to significantly increase his remuneration. I address some of these
below.
Henry Staunton
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31,On 23 January 2024, a submission was sent to me and to the Secretary of State,
explaining that the Senior Independent Director and the Chair of POL’s RemCo
were expressing serious concerns about Henry Staunton’s conduct and judgement
and asking us to remove him as Chair (BEISO000868 ). The specific concerns
identified in the submission were:
a. That he had repeatedly attempted to shut down a whistleblowing
investigation into his conduct.
b. That he had engaged in aggressive, intimidating and disrespectful
behaviour to other board members and members of the POL executive
team.
c. That he showed continued poor understanding of the public sector aspect
of POL’s work and poor judgement.
d. That he had disregarded proper governance processes as POL’s Chair,
most recently by announcing the appointment of a new Senior Independent
Director for POL without following formal consultation with the Board,
following Board processes or seeking shareholder approval as required.
e. That he had failed to provide constructive support to POL’s CEO.
32.The submission explained that the officials at UKGI and DBT shared these
concerns. We were advised to terminate his appointment, something that the
Secretary of State has the power to do under Article 42(a) of POL's Articles of
Association. We were advised that we could either offer Mr Staunton the
opportunity to resign, or not — and were recommended not to due to the
seriousness of the allegations against him. I agreed with this recommendation
(BEIS0000870 ).
33. The submission was forwarded to my private office by email (BEIS0000869). The
email stated that “The submission reflects the Permanent Secretary's view, as well
as that of GLD and UKGI lawyers.”
34, Whilst I did not have regular contact with Henry Staunton, as Nick Read was my
principle point of contact at POL, my own view of Mr Staunton was that he was
incapable of chairing this organisation. I first started to doubt his judgement only a
few days into my ministerial role when he strongly advocated a very large
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percentage increase of the CEO’s remuneration. I was very aware from my
meetings with senior officials at UKGI— Tom Cooper then Laura Gratton — that they
did not rate him very highly and felt he was a Chair from a previous generation.
35.The Secretary of State decided to terminate Mr Staunton’s appointment without
offering him the opportunity to resign, and he was informed of this by the Secretary
of State by telephone on 27 January 2024. This was confirmed by letter the same
day (BEIS0000867 ).
36.1 am aware of Mr Staunton’s allegations, in which he claimed that a senior DBT
official had told him to go slow on compensation for SPMs and also about the
reasons he was given for his departure. So far as I am concerned, this was
nonsense.
37. But there are some bigger points to be made. We had done a lot of work to help
improve the way in which subpostmaster victims were receiving redress, and this
sort of self-serving outburst from the former Chair inevitably damaged trust in that
process. This also reinforced the view that Mr Staunton was not fit to lead the Post
Office, putting his own interests above those of the subpostmasters.
38.Mr Staunton’s evidence to the Select Committee (RLITO000401 ) reinforced my
concerns. For example, in answer to question 644, Mr Staunton said “I do not think
that compensation for HSS and so on could be considered slow” and that the
scheme was not in need of a “chairman intervention”. He stated in answer to Q642
from Antony Higginbotham MP “Did you fail in getting compensation out to as
chairman?” “No.”
39.And of course the allegations against Mr Staunton were really serious. Regardless
of where the truth lies — I am aware that many of the allegations against Mr
Staunton were subsequently upheld, but I also [now] know that he and the SPM
NEDs had serious concerns about other board members (BEISO001008 ) — the
fact that the POL Board was in open conflict is not a sign of a positive culture. And,
as I indicate above, there is still much work to be done to restore trust between
postmasters and POL.
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Executive bonuses
40, Another concerning instance is the POL Remuneration Committee’s decision to
agree to an ‘Inquiry Metric’, where bonus payments would be paid to POL
executives where “All required evidence and information supplied on time, with
confirmation from Sir Wyn Williams and team that Post Office's performance
supported and enabled the Inquiry to finish in line with expectations’, and to agree
that this metric had been satisfied. This resulted in an incorrect statement in POL’s
annual report and accounts.
41.Clearly this metric had not been satisfied, as the Post Office accepted when the
Inquiry challenged it (BEIS0001009 ). The Post Office produced a report on how it
was that the Inquiry Metric had wrongly been said to have been met (RLITO000342
), but I agreed with DBT officials that it left obvious and important questions
unanswered. It was also very concerning from a governance perspective that such
an obvious error could have been allowed to pass unchecked, and indeed found
its way into the annual accounts. On 26 May 2023, Henry Staunton wrote to me
apologising for the both the inappropriate metric and the decision that it had been
met (BEISO001011 ). On 31 May 2023 I wrote back to Mr Staunton, asking for
further clarification of these issues (BEIS0001012 ). Mr Staunton replied on 2 June
2023 (BEIS0001013 ).
42.Having received that letter, in June 2023 I decided to commission the law firm
Simmons and Simmons to conduct a review of RemCo governance, and the way
in which the Post Office set and awarded performance bonuses (BEIS0001014 ).
Simmons and Simmons completed their review in August 2023, and made a
number of recommendations (POL00363154 ). On 28 August 2023, Henry
Staunton wrote to me setting out the Post Office’s plan for implementing the
recommendations (BEIS0001016 ).
43.\t was clear to me that this fiasco was the result of ongoing weaknesses in POL's
governance, and another example of a poorly led, dysfunctional organisation. It
was also disappointing to me that UKGI had not proactively spotted and highlighted
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this, a point I made when making a statement to Parliament on this issue on 10
May 2023 (RLITO000402 ). My impression, generally, was that the Shareholder
NED, Tom Cooper, acted with the best intentions but was not always robust
enough, and things improved after Lorna Gratton replaced him in May 2023.
Nick Read
44.As time went on, I formed the view that Nick Read was unable to lead the
organisation as it needed to be led. A particular example of this is his inability or
unwillingness to reduce central costs. I repeatedly asked for basic information
about management headcount in various salary bands, and a plan to reduce the
Post Office’s central office senior management headcount and cost (as I think there
were 200 people earning over £100,000 per year) and allow more revenue to flow
to subpostmasters. It was like drawing teeth (see e.g. BEIS0001017 ). I was
extremely frustrated by the Post Office's inability to provide this basic information
(as I noted at the time: BEIS0001018 ). I would expect any proper company to be
able to provide this sort of information in days, but it seemed that we as the
shareholder were resisted at all turns.
45. Nick Read's pay as CEO was always a running theme. It was one of the first things
Henry Staunton raised after he became Chair on 1 December 2022 (he suggested
a very big increase) (BEIS0000919 ), and it was generally thought Nick Read was
always on flight watch, even before this.
46.\ worked constructively with Nick Read. We would meet and talk, and spoke for
example about restructuring the centre of the Post Office, which I always saw as
essential to drive revenue to SPMs. I thought it right to give him a decent chance
to see through the reform of POL's culture. But my view was that the guy was being
paid lots whilst not doing a very good job. On the other hand, subpostmasters —
the bread and butter of the Post Office —- were struggling to break even at best. I
did not think it was right to give him a big increase. Plus the Post Office did not truly
operate in a commercial environment, comparable to other large corporations — it
had no direct competition, relied on Government subsidies, and was Government-
owned. I see the POL CEO's role as a public service job — and one which is very
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well paid when seen in that light. My view was that we should not be moved by his
threats to leave, and that if he wanted to leave he should leave.
47.His departure will present an opportunity to replace him with a truly exceptional
leader, and one who recognises that this is a public service role.
What is the solution?
48.The solution is good leadership. Nothing can replace that.
49.1 am very confident that Nigel Railton, the interim Chair, is the right man for the job,
a view I believe is shared by the SPM NEDs (BEIS0001020 ). It took us time to
persuade him to take the job on an interim basis, and I hope he can be persuaded
to remain for the long haul.
50.As I have stated above, Nick Read’s departure as CEO should be treated as an
opportunity to recruit an exceptional leader with a vision to reshape the
organisation, able to articulate the case for change and implement it.
51.In order to build and maintain trust with subpostmasters, the Post Office has to put
their interests front and centre. It must work creatively and energetically to find
opportunities for new and enhanced revenue streams and to make sure that money
is not retained by the centre to pay a bloated management, but allowed to flow to
the subpostmasters. There are plenty of opportunities out there: renegotiating local
banking services contracts, rolling out parcel hubs, and enhancing the ‘front office
of government’ operation are a few of the more obvious possibilities.
52. Of course, there are serious questions to be asked and answered about the right
structure for the Post Office in the future. When recruiting Nigel Railton, he and I
were both keen for him to conduct a review of the future structure of the Post Office,
and that was a condition of the agreement when he decided to join. That work is
ongoing now.
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53, Mutualisation is an option that appeals to me, though it would still involve a long-
term subsidy from central government, and an agreement to underwrite various
liabilities (such as the compensation schemes and Horizon replacement). But even
mutuals need a centre — and mutualisation wouldn't mitigate the chances of this
being run badly. So, whatever the corporate structure, it all starts with the right
leadership, the right people and the right culture.
Redress and compensation
54.1 believe that the Government and the Post Office have approached compensation
with the best of intentions, but there have obviously been a number of problems,
especially in relation to the pace at which subpostmasters have received
compensation (or not).
55. There were, as I understand it, a number of reasons for this during my time as
Minister, including:
a. slow and flawed disclosure by the Post Office;
b. the fact that large claims were being held up by demands for detailed
information on trivial issues (such as mileage travelled);
c. the requirement that each claim had to be supported by medical evidence
of trauma and physical impacts and forensic accountancy evidence for
financial loss, when these experts had limited capacity;
d. the involvement of lawyers on all sides leading to protracted, lawyer to
lawyer exchanges, rather than having things resolved by an impartial
intermediary who could sense check disputes and expedite their resolution;
e. alack of confidence from affected subpostmasters and their representatives
that offers would be quick and fair.
56. It is important to note that whilst the Post Office — and the Department — were
sometimes (perhaps often) too slow, this is common in large bureaucratic
organisations and I never encountered deliberate delays or obstruction from
anyone in the Post Office, or anyone in government or the civil service. So far as I
could see, everyone was attempting to resolve cases as well as they were able.
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57.1 have also always thought it important to have independent oversight of
compensation from people who can hold our feet to the fire and are not afraid to
criticise the Government. This is why, for example, despite nervousness amongst
officials I pushed strongly for Labour MP Kevan Jones and Professor Richard
Moorhead to be appointed to the Horizon Compensation Advisory Board, despite
(or perhaps because of) their recent criticism of DBT (BEISO001021 ). I felt this
was important to have genuinely cross-party advice and independent oversight and
to win the confidence of SPMs in the compensation schemes.
58.Something to mention more broadly on compensation is that the government
always starts from scratch every time. There needs to be a basic framework,
embedding lessons from past experiences.
59.1 was therefore pleased that the recent National Audit Office report on Government
Compensation Schemes (RLITO000366) recommended establishing a centre of
expertise, recognised that compensation should be delivered independently of the
body responsible for the detriment, recognised the need to avoid adversarial legal
process and stringent evidential requirements and noted the importance of early
clarity on the tax treatment of awards.
60. However, I am surprised by some omissions from the report:
a. lessons should be learned not only from previous Government-administered
schemes, but also from those in the private sector, such as the RBS GRG
and Lloyds / HBOS Reading schemes;
b. the role of fixed sum awards;
c. the value of appointing a respected independent person to provide oversight
and guidance.
61.A good example where we needed to reinvent the wheel is fixed sum payments.
One thing the APPG learned through the HBOS compensation scheme was that
claims are always complex because lives are always complex, meaning it always
takes longer than anyone would like. We came up with the idea of fixed sum
payments, as a way of resolving claims and freeing up resources to consider the
remaining claims. That was agreed and it worked really well in the HBOS scheme.
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About a couple of months into the job as Minister, I brought this up in a meeting
with the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary as something that might help
break the Horizon compensation logjam. Everyone immediately agreed that this
was a good idea, though understandably it did receive pushback on Value For
Money grounds. Eventually we were able to persuade the Treasury that this was
value for money. The Secretary of State was, at all times, fully supportive of our
efforts to pay full, fair and final compensation as quickly as possible and was very
helpful in discussions with Treasury and others.
62. The fixed sum offers in OC and HCRS schemes and the GLO and HSS schemes
have enabled many claims to be settled more quickly than would otherwise have
been the case, minimising the need for evidence gathering and experts. I
understand that at the time of writing, fixed sum offers have been accepted by 52
OC SPMs and 150 GLO SPMs. In the HCRS, fixed offers were announced in March
2024, and as of September 2024 have been accepted by 3 SPMs.
63. Aside from this, throughout my time as Minister I regularly met with those involved
to try to find ways of speeding up the delivery of compensation across the various
schemes (e.g. with many of the victims, with MPs, with officials, with the Lord
Chancellor and Chief Secretary to the Treasury in January 2024 (BEIS0001022 )
and with the Horizon Compensation Advisory Board on many occasions
(BEIS0001023 ).
64.1 constantly asked officials to look into ways that the pace of compensation could
be improved eg Feb 2024 (BEIS0001024 ).
65. It is also clear that the fact that there are now 4 different schemes, some run by
POL and some by DBT, is not ideal. I think this is in large part a hindsight point,
and having started in the way we did it was right to carry on.
66. Generally what I would see when I got into the weeds was that compensation was
being assessed reasonably, but I completely understand why subpostmasters
would not trust the Post Office to run a scheme. So whilst I don’t think POL's
ownership of the schemes made much difference in substance, a lesson to be
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learned (and one of the recommendations of the NAO report) is that confidence
that a scheme is genuinely fair and independent is an important consideration.
67.I mention in passing that ownership of the overturned convictions scheme was one
of the things that crossed my desk as Minister, and that I favoured the idea it should
be administered by the Department (BEIS0000995 ). And when the HCRS came
into being, I decided that it should be administered by the Department
(BE1S0001025 ).
68. The process is too legally adversarial which inevitably leads to delay as the two
sides clock up correspondence hours. This has led to too much focus on the need
for subpostmasters seeking compensation to prove small matters of detail, which
amount to rounding errors in the overall context of the compensation they are due.
Not only are the amounts at stake generally small, but the very fact that applicants
are asked to prove can be offensive. I was keen to bring in an individual to oversee
all four schemes who could ‘knock heads together’ and to ‘take a view’ on cases to
ensure that they didn’t drag on unnecessarily. Sir Gary Hickinbottom, scheme
reviewer for the Overturned Convictions Scheme, was the person we identified to
perform this role. I hope he is given the appropriate powers and remit to do so.
Conclusions
69. The Post Office has a bright future if we improve and accelerate the operation of
the compensation schemes, the right business model that remunerates
postmasters fairly so that they can run profitable businesses and it has the right
senior leadership team in place.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Page 17 of 25
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Dated: P* Ccbbhen 20 a
Index to First Witness Statement of Kevin Hollinrake
I” URN Document Description Control Number I
I
41. RLITO000374 List of Ministerial Responsibilities, Cabinet I RLITOO00374
Office, April 2024
2 RLITO0000375 23rd March 2023: Post Office: Horizon RLITO000375
Compensation I
3. I RLITOO00376 40th May 2023: Post Office Executives: RLITO000376
Bonuses
4. RLITOO00377 23rd May 2023: Sub-postmasters and RLITO000377
Sub-postmistresses: Remuneration
5. I RLITOO00378 43th July 2023: Post Office Ltd: RLITO000378
Management Culture
6. I RLITO000379 48th September 2023: Post Office RLITO000379
Compensation
7. I RLITOO00380 25th October 2023: Rural Postal Services: RLITO000380 ~I
Sustainability
I a)
Page 18 of 25
WITN11460100
WITN11460100
8. I RLITOO00381 49th December 2023: Post Office (Horizon ] RLITO000381 “I
System) Compensation Bill
9. RLITO000382 8th January 2024: Horizon: Compensation RLITOO00382
and Convictions
40. I RLITOO00383 40" January 2024: Post Office Horizon RLITO000383
Scandal
41. I RLITOO00384 25" January 2024: Post Office Horizon RLITO000384
System: Exoneration of Sub-postmasters
42. I RLITOO00385 29" January 2024: Post Office Ltd RLITO000385
43. I RLITOO00386 8" February 2024: Post Office RLITOO00386
Management Culture
44. I RLITO000387 22" February 2024: Post Office Horizon RLITO000387 :
Scandal
415. I RLITOO00388 26" February 2024: Post Office Horizon: RLITO000388
Compensation and
416. I RLITOO00389 28" February 2024: Post Office Board and RLITO000389 I
Governance
17. I RLITOO00390 13" March 2024: Post Office Legislation RLITOO000390
48. I RLITO000391 20" March 2024: Post Office (Horizon RLITO000391
System) Offences Bill
19. I RLITOO00392 17" April 2024: Draft Post Office Network RLITO000392
Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order
2024
20. I RLITOO00393 29% April 2024: Post Office (Horizon RLITO000393
System) Offences Bill
Page 19 of 25
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WITN11460100
[21.
RLITO000394
23 May 2024: Post Office (Horizon
System) Offences Bill
RLITO000394
22.
RLITOO00395
18" July 2024: Post Office Horizon
Scandal
RLITO000395
RLITO000396
30° July 2024: Post Office Horizon
RLITOO00396
24.
WITN11460101
Note for Kevin Hollinrake MP 17 March
2020
WITN11460101
.
25.
WITN11460102
DENIALISM: THE LATEST ENTRANTS
Lloyds Bank the Post Office, Clausewitz
and the tinkling teacups of the English
judiciary
WITN11460102
26.
RLITO000397
Horizon Settlement: Future Governance of
Post Office Ltd
Volume 673: debated on Thursday 19
March 2020
RLITO000397
27.
RLITO000398
Horizon: Sub-Postmaster Convictions
Volume 677: debated on Wednesday 10
June 2020
RLITO000398
28.
UKGI00031453
Letter from Paul Marshall to Mr Jones -
Re: The Post Office - Flawed and Corrupt
Corporation
UKGI040348-001
29.
RLITO000399
CCRC Decision on 44 Post Office
Prosecutions
Volume 681: debated on Monday 5
October 2020
RLITO000399
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30.
. I RLITO000400
Post Office: Horizon Compensation
Arrangements Volume 709: debated on
Thursday 24 February 2022
RLITO000400
31.
BEISO000993
Post Office Teach In - November 2022
BEISO000993
32.
BEISO0000994
GLO Compensation - outline of preferred
scheme - Brightwell to Hollinrake
BEIS0000994
33.
BEISO000995
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Secretary
of State and SpAds Office RE: Post Office
Horizon - GLO compensation
BEIS0000995
34,
BEISOO00996
20221103_Horizon Inquiry and
Compensation Briefing
BEISOO00996
35.
BEISO000997
Email from Carl Crewswell to Minister
Hollinrake re Post Office: slides for
Minister Hollinrake teach-in
BEISO000997
36.
BEIS0001057
Meeting Brief to Minister Russell for
Introductory meeting with Alan Bates
BE!IS0001057
37.
BEISO000998
Email from Minister Hollinrake to
Brightwell, Rob (Business Sectors -
Services Directorate), Lovesey, James
(Business Sectors - Services Directorate),
Brooks-White (Jobshare), Mitchell, Katie
(BEIS) re Readout - Minister Hollinrake
Post Office Compensation Parliamentarian
stakeholder group 23.11.2022
BEIS0000998
38.
BEISO000611
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Brooks-
White (Jobshare), Post Office
VIS00014226
Page 21 of 25
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WITN11460100
Team, Creswell, Carl (Business Sectors -
Services Directorate), Bickerton, David
(Business Sectors DG Office), Permanent
Secretaries re Readout: Minister Hollinrake
meeting with Nick Read 21/11/2022
39.
BEIS0001000
221207 SoS meeting with Alan Bates and
GLO members
BEIS0001000
40.
BEIS0001001
20221104 - Submission on Post Office
Horizon Scandal - Applying a Benefits
Disregard For all Post Office
Compensation Schemes - Final
BEIS0001001
41.
BEIS0001002
20221104 - Letter to Minister for
Employment - Benefits Disregard - Final
BEIS0001002
42.
BEIS0001003
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Michael,
Elena (Business Sectors - Services
Directorate), Lovesey, James (Business
Sectors - Services Directorate), Brightwell,
Rob (Business Sectors - Services
Directorate re GLO interim payments
BEIS0001003
43.
BEISO001004
Email from Lee Castleton to Minister
Hollinrake re Stalled cases
BEIS0001004
BEIS0000868
POL chair sub final 23012024
BEISO000868
45.
BEISO000870
Box note - 22.01.24
BEIS0000870
46.
BEISO0000869
Email from Lorna Gratton to Minister
Hollinrake and Kemi Badenoch re: Post
Office Chair - urgent advice
BEISO000869
47.
BEISO000867
Letter to Henry Staunton - 27 January
2024
BEISO000867
48.
RLITO0000401
Business and Trade Committee
Oral evidence: Post Office and Horizon
Compensation: follow-up, HC 477
Tuesday 27 February 2024
RLITO000401
49.
BEIS0001008
Email from Brooks-White Jobshare to Jon
TUNNEY (DBT), Harriet CLARKE (DBT),
Minister HOLLINRAKE (DBT), Secretary
Of State BUSINESS AND TRADE (DBT)
dated 23 February 2024 RE: Project
Pineapple
BEISO001008
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50.
BEIS0001009
230505 - Nick Read Letter to Sir Wyn
Williams
BEISO001009
51.
RLITO0000342
TIS Review Final 2623
RLIT0000342
52.
BEIS0001011
230526 - Henry Staunton to Kevin
Hollinrake re Amanda Burton final draft
report into ARA 2021-22
BEIS0001011
53.
BEISO001012
Minister Hollinrake letter to POL Chair
31.05.23
BEIS0001012
BEISO001013
230602 - Henry Staunton reply to Kevin
Hollinrake re ARA FINAL
BEIS0001013
55.
BEISO001014
Email from Brooks-White to Minister
Hollinrake re ToR for the POL Bonus
Review
BEIS0001014
56.
POL00363154
POL Report - FINAL - Private &
Confidential[106140894v1]
POL-BSFF-
0191157
57.
BEISO001016
280923 - Chairman to KH - SS Recs and
TIS
BEIS0001016
58.
RLITO000402
May 2023: Post Office Executives:
Bonuses
RLITOO00402
59.
BEISO001017
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Secretary
Of State INTERNATIONAL TRADE (DBT),
Perm SEC (DBT), Sonia ZVEDENIUK
(DBT), Daniel EL-GAMRY (DBT), Spad
SOS (DBT) re: OS PERSONAL [FOR
DECISION] FY22/23 and FY 23/24 Annual
Bonus Schemes for POL CEO/CFO
BEIS0001017
60.
BEIS0001018
Email from Rebecca STOCKBRIDGE
(DBT) to Carl CRESWELL (DBT), Minister
HOLLINRAKE (DBT), Enifome
EKREGBESI! (DBT) RE: Briefing Note:
Minister Hollinrake Monthly meeting with
Nick Read (rescheduled 28th Mar)
BEISO001018
61.
BEISO0000919
Email from Kevin Hollinrake to Secretary
Of State (Grant Shapps), Permanent
Secretaries re FW: OFF SEN PERSONAL:
FOR APPROVAL: POL CEO pay sub
follow up advice
BEIS0000919
62.
BEISO001020
Email from Minister Hollinrake dated 28
March 2024 re Postmaster NEDs
BEIS0001020
63.
BEIS0001021
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Secretary
of State (Grant Shapps) RE: Post Office
Horizon - GLO compensation
BEISO001021
RLITOO00366
National Audit Office report on
Government Compensation Schemes
RLITO000366
65.
BEIS0001022
Minister Hollinrake weekly note 15012024
BEISO001022
66.
BEIS0001023
Email from Minister Hollinrake to Rob
Brightwell re: Speeding up Horizon
compensation
BEIS0001023
67.
BEIS0001024
20240130 Advisory Board paper on
speeding compensation version 2
BEIS0001024
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I
[= I BEISO001025 Letter to CST - Horizon Compensation BEIS0001025 ‘I
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