REPORT TO THE POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
PHASE 4
INVESTIGATION, DISCLOSURE AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS BY THE POST OFFICE 2000-2013
DUNCAN ATKINSON KC
VOLUME 2A
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Janet Skinner
a.
b.
The Investigation
Charging decision
Investigation of another employee at the branch
Confiscation
Disclosure
Assessment
3. Julian Wilson
The Investigation
Charging decision
Court proceedings
Disclosure
Assessment
§1
§5
§8
§24
§27
§34
§37
§41
§46
§50
§60
864
§69
§73
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
INTRODUCTION
1. This is the addendum to my second report prepared for phase 4 of the Post Office
Horizon IT Inquiry, a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, which focuses on
“action against Sub-Postmasters and others: policy making, audits and investigations,
civil and criminal proceedings, knowledge and responsibility for failures in
investigations and disclosure”. In short, so far as is presently relevant, the Inquiry
seeks to consider investigations undertaken by and prosecutions brought by the Post
Office against Sub-Postmasters, managers and assistants where shortfalls and
discrepancies in branch accounts had been identified through the use of the Horizon
computer system.
2. The analysis in my second report related to the actual application in a series of cases
of the Post Office policies I have seen, and more significantly the application of the
wider framework for investigation and prosecution with which the Post Office
accepted that it was expected to comply and which I analysed in my first report. I was
asked to assess this actual application through a detailed analysis of 22 actual cases
investigated and prosecuted by the Post Office in the period of the Inquiry’s focus,
namely between 2000 and 2013. In each case, I considered, with the assistance of
Catherine Brown and Sebastian Walker, the papers that have been provided to us by
the Inquiry relating to those cases, to identify, where possible, the progress of and
decisions taken in the course of the Post Office investigations, the charging decisions,
and prosecutorial decisions taken thereafter and the process of disclosure. As I
explained in the introduction to my second report, I had only been provided with
material relating to 20 of the intended 22 cases at the time of its completion. This
addendum addresses the final 2 cases.
3. I will throughout this report refer to the Post Office, so as to encapsulate a number of
legal entities that have existed in the period with which I am concerned. The materials
that have been provided to me for this purpose are addressed in the appendix to this
report. The required declarations that are set out in appendix 1 to my second report
apply equally to this addendum.
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
4. I set out my conclusions at length, based on the 20 cases I had then considered, in my
second report. Those conclusions are not altered by the consideration of these 2 further
cases. In summary, there were issues with the scope of the investigation in each case,
in relation to many of the same reasonable lines of enquiry. These areas included, but
were not limited to, the investigation of whether there may have been errors in the
operation of Horizon to explain the losses with which those cases were concerned. The
charging decisions that I have seen in these cases were very limited, without analysis
of the evidence against the elements of the offences charged, or any reference to or
analysis of the public interest. Decisions were made to charge theft with very little
analysis of how that offence was made out. Disclosure was undermined from the
outset by the limitations to the reasonable lines of enquiry pursued by the
investigations, and by a failure to identify or disclose material relating to the operation
of Horizon that was both capable of undermining the prosecution case and assisting
that of the defendant.
JANET SKINNER
5. Janet Skinner was 35 years old at the time that she was investigated, and was the Sub-
post mistress at North Bransholme Post Office in Humberside. She had worked for the
Post Office since 1995.
6. On 5% January 2007, in the Crown Court at Kingston upon Hull before His Honor
Judge Thorn, Janet Skinner pleaded guilty to one count of false accounting. A further
count of theft was ordered to lie on the file. The alleged shortfall was £59,175.39. On
24 February 2007, she was sentenced by His Honour Judge Barber to nine months’
imprisonment. On 29th August 2007, she was ordered to pay a confiscation order in the
sum of £11,000 and to pay compensation to the Post Office in the same amount, out of
the proceeds of the confiscation order.
7. In the proceeding before the Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton v Post Office’, Mrs
Skinner was one of those in category B, “in respect of whom POL accepted that this court
may properly find that the prosecutions were an abuse of process within category 1, but resisted
the appeals insofar as they are based on category 2 abuse.”
1 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §75
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
Investigation
8. As in other cases, there is an investigation summary?, prepared for the investigator
and intended for the contract manager and others, which provided some help as to the
lines of enquiry that were pursued. The paperwork here does not identify specifically
who performed the roles of senior investigator, investigator or disclosure officer for
the purposes of the CPIA. It is therefore difficult to assess the performance of these
roles by reference to the person who was actually expected to undertake them, and to
identify whether the need for someone to do so was properly appreciated.
9. On 30* May 20063, the Rural Support Officer attended the sub-post office to verify cash
on hand in the light of an increase in overnight cash holdings. She identified a loss.
Mrs Skinner had volunteered to her that there would be a £40,000 shortage of cash.
She said she could not explain the loss, but suspected a member of staff, Kathryn
Ayres.
10. An audit was undertaken on 31st May, and a shortage of £59,175.39 was identified in
the cash on hand. Post Office Investigators Dianne Matthews and Steven Bradshaw
attended the branch. It appears from her questionnaire response for Second Sight in
March 2014! that Mrs Skinner had reported the losses to her regional managers, and
told them that she could not explain their cause, and that the audit followed this.
11. Mrs Skinner was interviewed on 1* June 2006%. The interview should have occurred at
the post office, but in fact happened at Bransholme police station because the tape
recorder was not working. Mrs Skinner declined the assistance of a solicitor, and also
did not have a friend with her, although the transcript is silent as to whether she was
offered one until the third interview®. In her questionnaire response for Second Sight
in March 20147, Mrs Skinner said that the investigators assumed that she had stolen
the money “automatically”, because Horizon recorded a loss.
2 POL00044639
3 Chronology in Progression Notes POL00044629
4 POL00046925, para.11
5 POL00044632, POL00044633, POL00044656
® POL00044656
7 POL00046925, para.12
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
12. In her interview under caution, Mrs Skinner said that she was very experienced in the
use of Horizon, having been the first manager in the Hull area to migrate to it, and she
had acted as a contact point for others who had issues with it. She stated that the losses
had begun in January 2006 when the completion of the balance revealed a shortage of
£7500. She considered this too high to be an error. She said that she did not declare
them as she could not afford “to put it right’, and had sought to conceal it. She had
spread the loss around the denominations in the cash on hand. She had not called
when the losses appeared because she knew that she would be required to pay them
back. The losses had gone up and up for 5 months.
13. She had told her staff that there were losses and that they should be careful what they
were doing, but she had not shared the extent of the losses. She believed that one of
her members of staff, Kathryn Ayres, had stolen the money, a suspicion in part
predicated on the belief that such a large amount of money “just doesn’t go missing” .
She also pointed to the fact that Ms Ayres had keys to the post office and its safe
because she lived closest, and that a number of customers had complained that Ms
Ayres had shortchanged them. She had confronted Ms Ayres who had denied it. She
accepted that she had not taken action to stop Ms Ayres from taking money. She
further accepted that she had not taken control of the situation as she should.
14. In terms of investigative steps, the investigators obtained Mrs Skinner's consent
during interview for her home to be searched and for her financial position to be
investigated. The Report suggests that no search was undertaken, but some financial
checks were undertaken (which are addressed below).
15. The investigators also spoke to Mrs Skinner’s employees. A statement was taken from
each. None, including Ms Ayres, was interviewed on tape or under caution, despite
the suspicion that Mrs Skinner had cast on her. This at least suggests that the
investigators had rejected Mrs Skinner's suspicions of theft by one of her staff before
they had spoken to them. This accords with the assessment in the Investigation
Report®: “although Mrs Skinner states she has not stolen the money, I do not suspect the staff
of having any involvement in this case. I have no reason to doubt the honest (sic), integrity and
reliability of these witnesses”. That said, there is some suggestion in the case Progression
8 POL00044639
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
Notes?, and the schedule of non-sensitive unused material" that they were going to be
interviewed, and it is not clear at what stage that decision was changed.
16. Insummary:
(a) Colleen Kates"! said that Mrs Skinner completed the balances for the branch. She
told staff not to declare the cash on hand as it would not be accurate until the
balance at the end of the month. Mrs Skinner was “quite fiery” about losses, and
she recalled Ms Ayres having to repay a loss of £1400.
(b) Theresa Holmes? was aware that there had been losses, but was not told of a loss
exceeding £100. She also recalled Mrs Skinner saying not to declare the cash on
hand as it would not be accurate until the balance at the end of the month. She did
not recall seeing a discrepancy for cash on hand on the system.
(c) Wendy Lyell! said that Mrs Skinner always did the cash declarations, and said
there were several times when the branch ran out of cash. She received calls
regularly from the cash centre as to why the amounts required for the branch had
been increased. She said she was aware that Mrs Skinner had a number of financial
issues.
(d) Katherine Ayres said she noticed a number of procedural changes when she
returned from being off work for a period of 6 months. She confirmed a loss of
£1000, which she had to pay.
17. In this regard, the Court of Appeal observed'> that “the prosecution relied on the evidence
of three of the four other members of staff but we are not persuaded that their evidence was
capable of materially advancing the prosecution case.” The evidence of these witnesses,
taken at face value, was that they had not stolen the money. In that respect they were
in no different position to Mrs Skinner who similarly denied taking it. There was no
evidence that they had benefited, but there was equally no evidence that Mrs Skinner
had done so.
° POL00044629
10 POL00048259
11 POL00044685
12 POL00045343
13 POL00045342
14 POL00047402
15 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §191
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
18. The Second Sight review of the case in 2015!° observed that “it is unclear whether or not
the investigators made any further enquiries regarding the staff members in question”. There
was evidence, as noted in the Investigation Report!’, that transactions had been
undertaken using the terminals of Ms Ayres and Ms Holmes that each denied
responsibility for and asserted had been undertaken by Mrs Skinner. That is, however,
consistent with Mrs Skinner’s account of covering up unexplained losses. It is also of
note that in their response to Mrs Skinner's questionnaire in 2014'8, the Post Office
recorded that there was no record that two of the employees had been registered or
vetted for the Horizon system (as was required at the time). There is no reference to
that in the investigation, or in disclosure arising from it.
19. It appears that financial enquiries were made in relation to Mrs Skinner. The
Investigation Report noted that Mrs Skinner’s sole source of income was her
employment and that her partner was unemployed. She had £2000 of direct debits on
her account. The report goes on “from statements taken and also information received via
Inland Revenue and credit checks, it appears that Mrs Skinner has severe financial problems”.
It is clear that enquiries had been made in relation to County Court judgments and
Inland Revenue records. It is also clear from the Report that the majority of the
information about Mrs Skinner's finances came from others at the branch. There was
no acknowledgment that they might have had reason to emphasise the financial
difficulties of another suspect.
20. That assessment accords with the extent of financial enquiries that had to be
undertaken for the purposes of the post-conviction confiscation proceedings’. An
email from the financial investigator in May 2007” suggests that the detailed
assessment of where the money in Mrs Skinner’s bank account had come from
occurred for confiscation rather than as part of the pre-charge investigation. Whilst it
is perhaps inevitable that greater focus on a suspect's assets will occur when the focus
is on securing those assets, the enquiries here do suggest that pre-charge enquires had
been superficial. This is concerning where the primary source of information about
16 POL00063484, para.4.5
17 POL00044639
18 POL00061997
19 Financial investigation event log, POL00064031
20 POL00048655
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
Mrs Skinner's finances was an employee who was herself subsequently investigated
for theft from the Post Office2!.
21. It appears that there was some interrogation of Horizon data. The Investigation Report
noted that “the Horizon data has been requested”, and various activities and transactions
were addressed, for example use of the terminals of two employees which they denied.
The Case Progression Notes” refer to “Horizon disc received” on 14 June 2006. As
the Court of Appeal observed”: “...it is not now known what it contained or whether it was
disclosed to the defence”. It is not clear from the Report the extent to which data was
either obtained or analysed, but there is nothing in the Report to suggest any check
was made as to the reliability of the system as it operated at the branch. That accords
with Mrs Skinner's questionnaire response for Second Sight in March 201424, in which
she asserted that “at no stage was the Horizon system investigated”, and with the
assessment of the Second Sight review? that no one had given active consideration to
the possibility of errors in the operation of Horizon.
22. It is of note that the Post Office response to Mrs Skinner's questionnaire” asserted
“Post Office has not seen or found any evidence to suggest that there were any issues with the
branch's Horizon system, or that this was raised as a concern by the Applicant during her
tenure or interview as she claims”. It is not clear the basis for the assertion that no
evidence was “found” of issues, as no examination for such issues appears to have
been undertaken. The response also asserted that “because the Applicant had inflated the
cash figures, the investigation would have been unable to identify when or where the shortfalls
arose”. It is not clear how this squares with the failure to investigate the reliability of
the Horizon system, or whether faults may have led to losses being asserted
incorrectly.
23. The Investigator’s Report also noted that “Mrs Skinner did not contact the Network
Business Support Centre or seek guidance from the retail line concerning the level of losses”.
This information appears to derive from Mrs Skinner’s account in interview, there
21 POL00064031
22 POL00044629
23 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §192
4 POL00046925, para.12
25 POL00046010
26 POL00061997
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
being no reference to any independent enquiries being made in this regard. It is at
odds with material before the Court of Appeal, which noted”’ : “Between 1 January 2004
and 31 January 2005, Mrs Skinner made 116 calls to the National Business Support Centre.
Some of those calls concerned Horizon faults and balancing.” The latter accords with the
Post Office response to Mrs Skinner's questionnaire in 20148, and the detail there
suggests that evidence of contact with helplines was available at the time of the
investigation but not sought, evaluated or disclosed. Moreover, the 2014 response does
substantiate some “minimal” losses arising in transaction corrections. Whilst, as the
Post Office pointed out, these were not in the “region of the level of losses that the
Applicant described”, there is no evidence that these were identified, investigated or
disclosed at the time of the prosecution.
Charging decision
24. A charging advice was provided by J. McFarlane, Principal Lawyer in the Criminal
Law Division on 4' September 2006”. She states “the evidence is sufficient to afford a
realistic prosect of conviction” on the charge of theft of £59,175.39%°. There is no analysis
of the evidence in the advice. In particular, there is no consideration of the lack of
evidence that Mrs Skinner did obtain the monies, or evidence of dishonesty. In keeping
with her advice in the case of Hughie Thomas earlier in 2006*!, the advice also includes
a second test “there is a medium prospect of success”. As I observed in the case of Mr
Thomas: “It is not clear how this “Medium prospect” is reconciled to the evidential test in
the Code for Crown Prosecutors.”
25. The advice identifies a list of evidence that is required. This includes “copy statement
dealing with the accounts and explaining how the loss arose’ and a statement “explaining
the Horizon system”. Neither of these appears to be a request for, or to recognise the
need for, an analysis of the reliability of the Horizon data that showed there to have
been a loss. There was no request for any further financial investigation as to where, if
2 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §191
28 POL00061997
29 POL00048161
39 Charge POL00048165,
31 POL00047780
2 Volume 2, para.201
10
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
Mrs Skinner had taken it, the money had gone, and no question was raised as to the
reliability of the Horizon data that revealed the loss charged as theft. There was no
reference at all to the public interest component of the test in the Code for Crown
Prosecutors. Given that this case concerned a 35 year old woman of good character
who had worked for the Post Office in one role or another since 1995, the total absence
of any public interest consideration is stark.
26. The case Progression Notes® record that an application was made for a summons on
12th September 2006. There is no information as to what information was provided at
the time that this was done.
Investigation of another employee at the branch
27. It appears™ that after Mrs Skinner was charged, an investigation was undertaken into
the conduct of Wendy Lyell, whose statement about Mrs Skinner had received
considerable prominence in the Investigation Report*, especially as to Mrs Skinner's
financial difficulties. In short, it appears that Ms Lyell had moved £2000 between stock
units, and told a colleague that she had done so because she was concerned “over
running out of cash before the remittance into the branch was received”. Mrs Skinner's
successor as postmistress reported that “£2000 was a loss which occurred prior to this week
and was being hidden in the accounts”. There are, therefore, clear parallels with the
position of Mrs Skinner in terms of losses arising and the movements of cash to conceal
them. There is also at least a suggestion of further unexplained losses in a period after
Mrs Skinner had left the branch.
28. This issue was communicated by the investigator to the lawyer on 24tt November 2006,
before Mrs Skinner’s first appearance, which was scheduled for 12‘ December®. It was
further reported on 48 December* that Ms Lyell had been dismissed. She had accepted
responsibility for a loss of £560 as a result of a cash error but not of £2000.
33 POL00044629
4 POL00064031, POL00048272
35 POL00044639
36 POL00048272
37 POL00047902
11
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
29. On 6‘ December the lawyer communicated with the agents instructed to act at Mrs
Skinner's first appearance at the Magistrates’ Court. She observed: “whilst clearly the
new information does not bear well with the prosecution case particularly as Miss Lyell is the
witness, this does not necessarily mean that Miss Lyell is the only thief at the office. The papers
in any event do reveal avery sophisticated method of false accounting on behalf of Miss Skinner
in order to conceal a loss for which she raised little concern with her staff’. Ms McFarlane
then raises the possibility of a review after the case has been sent to the Crown Court
or a delay to the sending of the case. She did not advocate one over the other. The
initial case summary** for the proceedings continued to include reference to, and
apparent reliance on, Ms Lyell.
30. What is concerning is that J.McFarlane’s letter recognised that the Post Office could no
longer rely on Ms Lyell’s account, without any apparent consideration of the effect
that the loss of her evidence had for the prosecution case. In particular, this related to
evidence of Mrs Skinner's financial position, which derived in large part from Ms
Lyell. But beyond that, the allegation relating to Ms Lyell raised the possibility, put at
its lowest, that losses were occurring that could not be attributed to Mrs Skinner of a
similar kind to those which had led to her prosecution. Moreover, Ms McFarlane
appeared to recognise that the evidence against Mrs Skinner was more consistent with
false accounting with theft, and yet theft remained the offence with which Mrs Skinner
was charged at that stage.
31. Theft remained the charge at the stage that counsel was instructed in anticipation of
the Plea and Case Management Hearing, which was fixed for 8 January 2007.
Instructions to counsel*? flagged up the issue re Ms Lyell in the same terms as quoted
above. Those instructions, which thereby observed that there was a case of false
accounting rather than theft, also asked for counsel to settle the indictment.
32. When the case was listed on 5‘ January 2007" it is clear that a charge of false
accounting had been added‘!, There is no material that addresses whether this charge
was added because it was considered that it better reflected the indictment, and if so
38 POL00128952
39 POL00044673
40 POL00048420
41 Indictment POL00045387
12
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
why it appeared together with the charge of theft which the reviewing lawyer had
identified did not reflect the evidence. It is further clear that at that hearing Mrs
Skinner pleaded guilty to that charge, and that plea was accepted.
33. There is no material that I have seen, other than the observations of the lawyer about
the issues raised by the allegation of theft against Ms Lyell, as to the basis on which
that charge was considered acceptable. The fact that the lawyer had identified that
“the papers in any event do reveal a very sophisticated method of false accounting on behalf of
Miss Skinner in order to conceal a loss for which she raised little concern with her staff”,
suggests that the false accounting charge was added to reflect what the evidence
amounted to, rather than as a device to secure a plea in a case that was being
undermined by the investigation into Ms Lyell. However, the absence of any other
material makes it difficult to identify the evidential analysis that revealed dishonesty
or a view to gain, beyond avoiding repayment of a loss that she could not explain, as
against Mrs Skinner.
Confiscation
34. In her interview, Mrs Skinner accepted falsifying the records to conceal losses, but
denied that she had received any monies. She repeated that when she spoke to the
author of the pre-sentence report*2. Despite this, and the apparent acceptance by the
reviewing lawyer that this was “a very sophisticated method of false accounting on behalf of
Miss Skinner in order to conceal a loss” (as the only basis I have seen for the acceptance
of the plea to false accounting), the prosecution sought confiscation with a view to
obtaining recovery of the amount identified as stolen in the theft charge.
35. Those acting for Mrs Skinner argued that this represented an abuse of the court's
process*’, More particularly, it was submitted that the setting of a timetable for
confiscation after they had accepted a plea to false accounting demonstrated that the
prosecution was seeking to recover monies that they accepted that they could not
prove that Mrs Skinner had stolen. The prosecution in their response “strenuously
denied” taking advantage of a technicality in taking a plea to false accounting and then
#2 POL00048447
43 POL00048808
44 POL00048806
13
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
seeking recovery via confiscation. It was asserted that Mrs Skinner was contractually
liable to recoup losses, and that they did not need to prove that the monies were stolen
to recover them.
36. The application for a stay was refused“, and it was agreed between the parties that
£11,000 of the £59,175.39 was recoverable, and an order made in those terms. The Court
record states that Mrs Skinner was ordered to pay the Post Office £11,000 in
compensation, “in default of any or all the balance of confiscation order”. The confiscation
order carried with it a term of 12 months’ imprisonment in default.
Disclosure
37. A schedule of non-sensitive unused material (equivalent to an MG6C) was prepared
by the investigator, who was clearly also acting as the disclosure officer, and dated 16
November 2006%, It includes material relating to the process by which statements were
obtained from the employees at the branch, but no material that suggests any financial
enquiries, beyond those touched on in the investigation report, no reference to
enquiries with helplines or any enquiries as to the operation of Horizon. There is, on
the material I have seen, no evidence that the disclosure officer drew the prosecutor's
attention to any material the disclosure of which was uncertain‘, or that the prosecutor
had inspected the material*’. The schedule is not signed or otherwise endorsed by the
prosecutor to show that any such review was undertaken.
38. There is a schedule of sensitive unused material (equivalent to an MG6D)*, which is
similarly signed by the investigator/disclosure officer, but it does not include any
material.
45 POL00049016
46 POL00045358
* POL00048259
48 As required by para.7.1, CPIA Code
* By reference to pra.7.4, CPIA Code and par.24, AG’s Guidelines 2000, or para.35, AG’s Guidelines
2005, which would only just have come into effect
50 POL.00048262
14
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
39. There is no material listed in the MG6C, or obviously the MG6D, that refers to the theft
allegation against Ms Lyell. The lack of disclosure as to that is confirmed by the fact
that the defence requested such disclosure in the context of the abuse of process
application relating to confiscation after Mrs Skinner had pleaded guilty,
40. The Court of Appeal’s assessment of disclosure was as follows”: “POL accepts that this
was an unexplained shortfall case and that evidence from Horizon was essential to Mrs
Skinner’
se. Although there is reference to a ‘Horizon data disk’ in the exhibits, it is not now
known what it contained or whether it was disclosed to the defence. It appears there was no
evidence to corroborate the Horizon evidence. There was no proof of an actual loss as opposed
to a Horizon-generated shortage. There was no investigation into the various Helpline calls
made by Mrs Skinner. We are struck by the fact that POL failed to take these steps despite Mrs
Skinner's long service to POL and her professional progress (doubtless reflecting her
trustworthiness) from counter clerk to permanent SPM of North Bransholme Post Office.”
Assessment
41, There were a number of areas of concern in relation to the ambit of the investigation
that led to Mrs Skinner being prosecuted initially for theft and ultimately for false
accounting. In particular, these related to her financial position, the possible roles of
others and the operation of Horizon. In relation to the first of these, as the extent of
enquiries that were necessary at the confiscation stage illustrates, there appears to have
been greater reliance on the observations of Mrs Skinner’s colleagues than
independent financial enquiry as to the state of her finances. This is of concern not
least because those others themselves ought to have been considered as potential
suspects, rather than just as witnesses. That approach in turn is of concern where one
was named asa possible suspect by Mrs Skinner and another came under investigation
for similar conduct during the currency of proceedings against Mrs Skinner.
42, It is unclear what Horizon data was obtained during the investigation, although
clearly some was. As with, for example the case of Hughie Thomas, some steps were
taken to obtain material that would allow for a review of the operation of Horizon
were looked into, but there were important limitations to that investigation which
51 POL00048738
52 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §192
15
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
undermined its effectiveness. It is unclear whether the limited material that was
obtained was disclosed, to allow the defence to make their own investigations, and
further unclear whether any actual investigation was made of the material obtained or
more broadly as to the operation of the system.
43. The charging decision was in September 2006, and thus before the first explicit
reference to the Code for Crown Prosecutors being the test to be applied®’. The test
that was actually applied does not appear to have been that contained in the Code.
Whilst the prosecutor stated there was a realistic prospect of conviction, she then
identified there being a “medium prospect of success”. This, therefore, appears to be
same test as had been applied by Mr Singh in the case of David Blakey and by this
lawyer, J. McFarlane in the case of Hughie Thomas. As in that case, it is difficult to
understand how a medium prospect of success and a realistic prospect of conviction
are to be equated, such that a decision was reached to prosecute. The charging decision
does not contain an analysis of the evidence relied on for that decision, and is silent as
to how, on the evidence, it was determined that dishonesty and appropriation were
established for the purposes of the offence of theft, and dishonesty and a view to gain
were made out for the offence of false accounting. The public interest was not
addressed at all.
44, The limitations of that analysis are further illuminated by the approach to the
investigation of losses attributed to Ms Lyell during the currency of the prosecution of
her manager, Mrs Skinner. It was recognised at that stage that it undermined the case,
and that it in particular called the theft charge into question, but it neither resulted in
a review of the case or the change of charge at that time.
45, The limitations to the investigation, as in other cases, fed directly into the limitations
of the disclosure process. The extent to which material relating to the operation of
Horizon was obtained, or contact between the branch and the helplines was
investigated, fed into the failings of disclosure of material relating to such important
topics. The review of disclosure did not identify outstanding lines of enquiry any more
than it did outstanding disclosure.
58 POL00044803,
16
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
JULIAN WILSON
46. The late Julian Wilson was Sub-postmaster at Astwood Bank, near Redditch in the
West Midlands. He was 59 years old at the time that he was investigated.
47. On 15 June 2009, in the Crown Court at Worcester, Mr Wilson pleaded guilty to two
counts of fraud. It appears that three counts of false accounting did not proceed. On
34 August 2009, he received a community sentence order with 200 hours of unpaid
work. He was ordered to pay prosecution costs in the sum of £3,500.
48. In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal in Josephine Hamilton v Post Office, Mr
Wilson was one of those in category B, “in respect of whom POL accepted that this court
may properly find that the prosecutions were an abuse of process within category 1, but resisted
the appeals insofar as they are based on category 2 abuse.”
49, Although in some respects the material in relation to this case is quite extensive, the
majority relate to an action brought by Mr Wilson in 2011 in connection with the
termination of his contract as a sub-postmaster®, and the Second Sight Review in 2014,
rather than the investigation or prosecution that led to his conviction. Given the
limited material available in this case relating to the actual prosecution, it is difficult
to be categorical about all of the areas that the Inquiry has asked me to consider.
The investigation
50. As in other cases, there is an investigation summary*, prepared for the investigator
and intended for the contract manager and others, which provided some help as to the
lines of enquiry that were pursued. The paperwork here does not identify specifically
who performed the roles of senior investigator, investigator or disclosure officer for
the purposes of the CPIA.
54 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §75
55 POL00046944
56 POL00044639
17
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
51. The investigation was started after an audit on 11 September 2008 uncovered a
shortage of £27,811.98°7. Mr Wilson told the auditors®* at the outset that there would
be a cash shortage of around £27,000, which represented an accumulation of shortages
over 5 years. He said that he had been inflating the cash on hand figures to achieve a
balance on the weekly and then monthly trading period. The investigators attended
the branch, obtained a signed statement from Mr Wilson to reflect the admissions he
had made, and advised him of his rights in relation to interview. He requested both a
solicitor and a friend. This was in accordance with what a proper application of the
Post Office Interviewing Policy® required.
52. Before the interview was held, a voluntary search had been undertaken at Mr Wilson’s
home address. According to the Investigation Report, a record was made of the
search in accordance with the Post Office Searches policy*.
53. At his interview under caution®, Mr Wilson was accompanied by both his solicitor
and a Federation representative. Mr Wilson said that he had encountered problems
with balancing the trading statements for some time. He had raised problems with
Horizon with his line manager and was told “ there was nothing wrong with the system” .
He had otherwise not raised the issues that he was encountering as he had expected
them to be spotted and there to be intervention, as he was declaring discrepancies but
not their scale. He accepted that he had not told his line manager of losses that he could
not reconcile. He had maintained his own running total of the discrepancies over 5
years, and had provided information about the discrepancies to the Federation when
they had asked for instances of issues with Horizon 2 years earlier. Mr Wilson was
asked about the matters the investigators had identified in his financial statements, for
example the scale of his overdraft and other financial difficulties. He denied that he
had taken any monies from the Post Office.
57 Investigation summary, POL00044639, Summary of facts POL00044767, report from auditor
POL00044806
58 Statement of David Patrick, POL00064118
59 POL00104758
6 POLO0044803
6 POL00104752
& POL00044804; POL00050138
18
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
54. Mr Wilson did not just raise the issues with Horizon in his interview. In his resignation
letter to his contract manager, he stated that he had raised the problem of misbalances
on three occasions and received no adequate response. In an undated letter from the
Contract Manager in response®, he replied “I can assure you thar in terms of the integrity
of the Horizon accounting system Post Office Ltd has been using this system now for the past
nine years. During that time it has been tested in both the criminal and civil courts and has not
found to be wanting” .
55. In terms of investigative steps, statements were taken from the auditor, contract
manager and investigator®. The interview record® shows that a number of enquires
had been made in relation to Mr Wilson’s finances. The investigation report does not
suggest any more, and thus no evidence of financial benefit to Mr Wilson through the
taking of monies. This accords with the statement? provided by the financial
investigator, which only refers to bank accounts that were alluded to at the time of
interview, or related to the issues raised during that interview.
56. Similarly, there is no evidence that enquires were made as to whether Mr Wilson had
reported any issues with the operation of the system, for example reporting any such
issues to regional managers or contacting helplines. Mr Wilson reported that he had
spoken to his line manager in interview, and in the context of both his 2011 civil
action® and his 2014 questionnaire for the Second Sight Review®, he alleged both that
he had contacted the helpline on a number of occasions, and had reported issues to his
manager. There is no evidence that any contact was made by the investigation with
Mr Wilson’s line manager despite his raising such contact, in connection with the
operation of Horizon, in interview. This was clearly a reasonable line of enquiry. When
it responded to Mr Wilson’s Second Sight questionnaire in 2014”, the Post Office
expressed scepticism about such contact, and when it spoke to others who similarly
could have had issues raised with them their memory was limited. This underlines the
importance of checks having been made at the time of the investigation.
POL00044758
4 Auditor POL00064118, contract manager POL00044777, investigators POL00045659, POL00044778
6 POL00044804
& POL00044803,
7 POL00050498
8 POL00046944
©? POL00060981,
70 POL00046970
19
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
57. Similarly, contact with helplines, in particular, was a regularly identified line of
enquiry, and one that arguably ought to have been pursued whether or not raised by
the defendant in interview. In his 2014 questionnaire for the Second Sight Review7!,
Mr Wilson referred to contact with the helpline, which underlines why, even if not
mentioned in interview, it would have been reasonable for the investigation to have
checked whether there was contact. Approaching it from a different perspective,
evidence of a lack of contact would have been relevant to whether there had been
problems with Horizon (a point made in a number of the cases that I have reviewed),
and logically therefore a check on whether the helpline had been contacted was a
reasonable line potentially implicating or exonerating the suspect depending on the
result. The fact that the Post Office was able to access records relating to helpline
contact when it responded to Mr Wilson’s Second Sight questionnaire in 20147,
underlines that such records were available at the time of the investigation.
58. Counsel instructed, Anthony Vines of Civitas Law, Cardiff, provided advice, dated
224 May 200973. In this he requested the production of the material underlying the
asserted losses, and the errors in the records produced by Mr Wilson. He also
requested certificates to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule, in
section 117, Criminal Justice Act 2003, and a statement from the investigator “that at
all material times the computer was working appropriately and that there is no reason to doubt
the accuracy of the information received” and “whether in his experience there are any issues
as to the accuracy of the information provided from the Horizon software package”. Mr Vines
makes clear in his advice that he was not aware of any cases where Horizon had been
called into question, but he did recognise the need to prove its reliability. The list of
exhibits” for the case shows that no Horizon material beyond various branch trading
statements were adduced as part of the case against Mr Wilson.
59. There is no evidence that this did cause any investigation in this regard. That accords
with the assessment of the Court of Appeal”: “POL accepts that this was an unexplained
shortfall case and that evidence from Horizon was essential to Mr Wilson's case. Based on the
71 POL00060981
72 POL00046970
73 POL00044807
74 POL00045675
75 [2021] EWCA Crim 577, at §177
20
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
papers available from the criminal proceedings, there is nothing to suggest any ARQ data was
obtained. POL did not investigate any of the criticisms of Horizon made by Mr Wilson
historically and during his detailed interview. There was no evidence to corroborate the Horizon
evidence. There was no proof of an actual loss as opposed to a Horizon-generated shortage.”
That such material was required is demonstrated by the fact that it was recognised
both that such material was required, and that it would be necessary to apply to Fujitsu
to get it, in the context of the civil action brought by Mr Wilson in 201176.
Charging decision
60. The nearest I have seen to a charging decision in this case is a Memorandum to the
investigator, dated 6 January 2009, from Jarnail Singh, senior lawyer in the Criminal
Law Division”. He advises “the evidence is sufficient to afford a realistic prospect of
conviction” . He refers to a list of charges, which charged theft of the total shortage over
a5 year period, together with “specimen” charges of false accounting relating to a
series of branch trading statements. Mr Singh indicates that the remaining loss can be
addressed by a schedule of offences to be taken into consideration, and such a schedule
was prepared’,
61. The memorandum contains no analysis of the elements of either theft or false
accounting, and thus no identification of the evidential basis for dishonesty, or the
basis on which it could be said that Mr Wilson had taken money. The lack of evidence
of theft in these respects may have underlined Mr Singh’s observation that pleas to
false accounting should be accepted “in view of his admissions to false accounting in
interview under caution and denial of theft”. That does not, however, make clear why a
theft charge was considered appropriate save as a means of encouraging a plea to the
alternative charge. Although Mr Singh asked for a statement to be obtained to explain
the operation of the Horizon system, he did not ask for any enquiries to be made as to
its reliability or the accuracy of the data. There was no reference to the public interest
test.
76 POL00057156
77 POL00044806
78 UKG100012570
21
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
62. Counsel, Anthony Vines of Civitas Law, Cardiff, was instructed, and provided advice,
dated 224 May 2009”. He drafted a five count indictment® in which Mr Wilson was
charged with 3 counts of false accounting, relating to 2 weekly cash accounts and the
final business trading statement, and thus differing from the charges authorised by Mr
Singh, and 2 counts of fraud by abuse of position, contrary to section 4, Fraud Act 2006.
As his accompanying case summary*! explained, the false accounting charges sought
to “cover 3 of the 4 years of admitted false accounting prior to the coming into force of the
Fraud Act 2006”, and the fraud charges “represent the 2 periods covered by the trading
statement”.
63. Mr Vines’ advice’? makes clear that he had drafted this indictment in the light of the
fact that “this is not a straightforward case because of the difficulties in establishing theft and
the fact that the charges of false accounting do not necessarily result in the claim to the full
loss”. He made clear that the indictment was designed to enable “a proper claim to be
made for the full sum of £27,811” and to satisfy “the criminal lifestyle condition set out in
s.75(2)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for the purposes of pursuing confiscation” .
Court proceedings
64. Mr Wilson’s case was listed for plea and case management (‘PCMH’) on 15t June
20098, and was covered by Richard Coles, Civitas Law in the stead of Anthony Vines.
As he reported to those instructing him™, “in this case, the defendant was convinced that
there was a systematic problem with Horizon as was raised in interview.” That is reflected
in his agreed basis of plea**, in which Mr Wilson stated that the losses occurred because
of “staff or systemic errors” and not because the money had been stolen. He admitted
inflating the cash on hand figures over five years to ensure that the accounts balanced
but believed that the alleged shortfall - £28,551.98 - was due to problems with
Horizon. Mr Coles, in his note from the PCMH, said that Mr Wilson had sought to
plead to the fraud charges on the basis of the period from May 2007, and thus a loss of
79 POL00044807
80 POL00044690,
81 UKG100018911
82 POL00044807
83 POL00051936, POL00051943
84 POL00051928
85 POL00051917
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
£15,000, but that he had rejected this and ultimately the plea addressed the full
shortfall. He indicated that he had not informed the judge that confiscation would be
pursued, because that judge had previously indicated that compensation was “ more
suitable”.
65. In his 2014 questionnaire for the Second Sight Review®, Mr Wilson explained that he
was advised to plead guilty to false accounting on the basis that he was likely to be
convicted, and that his wife and father-in-law’s health concerns at that time led him to
feel he had no choice. The hope of a lighter sentence for false accounting than for theft
was also an identified factor.
66. In fact, when Mr Wilson was sentenced a timetable for confiscation was fixed. It was
observed by the Post Office’s agent, John Dove, at the time” that this “is likely to be pre-
empted by the full reimbursement of the stolen monies” from the sale of the post office
branch. It is not without relevance that the solicitor acting for the Post Officer referred
to the monies as “stolen”, even though neither the charges brought, nor Mr Wilson’s
basis of plea, reflected the theft by him of those monies. In fact, contrary to Mr Dove's
prediction, there was a confiscation hearing® at which an order was made for the full
benefit figure of £28,434.95, comprising the full loss and RPI increase, together with
prosecution costs. As was observed by the financial investigator, the Post Office
therefore secured “a 102% recovery”.
67. This stance was justified by the Post Office at the time of the Second Sight Review” on
the basis that Mr Wilson’s admitted false accounting had made it difficult to know if
cash was missing, when it went missing, or which transactions had led to loss. As it
observed “because the accounts in this case have been falsified it is not possible to distinguish
between genuine errors and intentionally false claims”. The Post Office further observed
that a sub-postmaster is contractually liable to make good losses “hidden or caused by
his inaccurate record keeping” . This is a position which is, or should clearly be informed
by other material that demonstrated errors in the Horizon system, as opposed to
86 POL00060981,
87 POL00052174
88 POL00044810
89 POL00065147
23
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
human errors. The Post Office in its response to the Second Sight inquiry observed that
the loss was likely to have been caused by “human action (for example poor controls in
branch and/or user error” . The difficulty with this is that material showing an alternative
explanation was relevant both to the decision to charge and decision to pursue
confiscation just as it was the decision to decline mediation in the case of Mr Wilson in
2014. That required that alternative explanation to be identified and considered. There
is no evidence that such consideration occurred, and it will be for the Inquiry to
determine whether at that time the alternative had been identified.
68. Those acting for Mr Wilson had to seek an extension to the period in which the
confiscation order was to be met because of difficulties encountered in selling the
branch”.
Disclosure
69. In relation to disclosure, there is no evidence in the material I have seen of the actions
of a disclosure officer beyond a schedule of unused material (equivalent to an MG6C),
which he signed on 18 March 2009. The content of this accords with the limited
financial investigation that had been undertaken at the time that Mr Wilson was
interviewed, and documents relating to that interview. It includes no material showing
investigation of his training, contact with helplines or the operation of the Horizon
system and, it follows, no evidence of disclosure in relation to such topics. The last of
these was an issue raised by Mr Wilson’s interview, and therefore a matter in relation
to which the disclosure of material undermining of the prosecution case or of
assistance to his ought to have occurred at the primary disclosure stage. In fact, it is
not clear if it was reviewed by the Reviewing Lawyer and in fact disclosed to the
defence. I have also very belatedly seen a schedule of sensitive unused (MG6D)” and
a disclosure officer's report (MG6E)%, both of which are blank/identify no material
and thus add nothing either to the disclosure position or evidence of review.
% POL00054846
%t POL00051194
* POL00119096
°§ POLO0119097
24
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
70. The advice from counsel, Anthony Vines of Civitas Law, dated 22.4 May 2009, raised
the question of whether issues had arisen in other cases in relation to the operation or
reliability of Horizon. This appears to have resulted from a request to that effect being
made on behalf of the defendant®. He advised that “I personally am not aware that
Horizon has been found to be faulty in any respects but I would be grateful to have this point
clarified. It is conceivable that other cases may have sought to take this point but in am not
aware of this. If there are no issues about the system then of course a fair line can be taken. If
there is material which is potentially disclosable then I am of course happy to advise”. On the
same topic, Richard Coles, Civitas Law, who prosecuted the PCMH® advised that
“consideration should be given to looking at the issue [of Horizon reliability] generally and a
suitable employee from the organisation preparing a statement (for use in cases) that says that
Horizon works perfectly well”.
71. Despite this issue having been raised both before and at the time of Mr Wilson’s plea,
there is no evidence of evidence of cross-disclosure of other cases where complaints
about Horizon, even though the reviewing lawyers had personal knowledge of a
number, at least by reference to those cases I have considered above.
72. The relevance of such cross-case issues was highlighted in Mr Wilson’s case by a letter
his then MP, the Rt. Hon. Jacqui Smith MP. In her letter, sent to the CEO of the Post
office in December 2009, she referred to issues with the operation of Horizon that had
arisen in the case of Mr Wilson, and similar issues that had arisen in other cases
including those of Hughie Thomas, Seema Misra and also referring to the Falkirk post
office, which had arisen as an issue between experts in the Misra case. It is pertinent
to observe that if such cross-case issues were obvious to Mr Wilson’s MP, they should
have been all the more obvious to those concerned in those cases who also played a
role in that of Mr Wilson. Despite this, there is no evidence that cross-case disclosure
was considered.
4 POL00044807
5 POL00051920
% POL00051928
25
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
Assessment
73. There are many features in common between the investigation undertaken in the case
of Mr Wilson and that of Mrs Skinner. As in her case, there were very real limitations
as to the extent to which reasonable lines of enquiry were identified or pursued
relating to the financial position of the suspect, their contact with helplines and the
reliability of the Horizon system. In relation to financial enquiries, as with the case of
Mrs Skinner, the extent of investigations at the confiscation stage underlines the
limitations to investigative enquiries. These are of concern where the question of
whether the suspect took money from the Post Office is at the core of the investigation
and enquiring after evidence of that money, or the lack of it, is therefore central.
Similarly, where the case is predicated on Horizon data, the lack of investigation of the
accuracy of that data and whether complaints were made as to the operation of the
system at an earlier stage are also central.
74. What makes the lack of investigation of such matters all the more concerning in the
case of Mr Wilson is that his account in interview made each very clearly a reasonable
line of enquiry. He denied taking the money, and asserted that there were issues with
Horizon, and yet the obvious methods of testing that account, and of obtaining
material that might either support or contradict it, were not pursued by the
investigators. The failure to follow lines of enquiry identified by the interview is
brought into sharp focus by the fact that Mr Wilson recounted exchanges with his
managers about Horizon, and yet no enquiry was made of those managers to
determine if they accepted his account. Equally concerning is the fact that they were
not identified by the reviewing lawyer, whose role included the identification of lines
of enquiry that ought to have been pursued. In Mr Wilson’s case, it is right to note that
counsel instructed identified the need to address the reliability of the Horizon
material. However, his focus was as to meeting the requirements of the business
records hearsay exception, and section 117, Criminal Justice Act 2003, rather than
requiring the obtaining of the ARQ data to allow for the reliability of this material to
be tested.
75. The charging decision was again very limited in length and in scope. The charge of
theft was identified as appropriate without any consideration of the elements of the
26
76.
77.
78.
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
offence, in particular as to evidence of appropriation or dishonesty. On one view, the
fact that the reviewing lawyer advised that theft be pursued at the same time that he
identified that a plea to false accounting would be sufficient accords with the view that
theft was charged to encourage such a plea to false accounting. It is to counsel's credit
that they identified that theft was untenable and advised that charges under the Fraud
Act be brought instead. The fact that this advice was accepted with alacrity also
supports the view that the theft charge should never have been there.
What is concerning is that the focus at the stage that counsel advised as to the
indictment was on the recovery of the loss. This concern also guided the prosecution's
approach to the basis of plea that was advanced by the defendant and the decision to
pursue confiscation to recover a loss of which the plea did not involve Mr Wilson
accepting responsibility. The approach taken in this case, and indeed that of Mrs
Skinner suggested that prosecution was viewed primarily as a mean to recover the loss
identified by the system. In reaching the decision to seek confiscation, the prosecution
was required to consider whether such a course was warranted, by reference to what
was known about the financial position of the individual, and by reference to that of
which the individual had been convicted. I have not seen evidence of such a thought
process at work here.
Once again, the limitations of the investigation led to the inadequacies of the disclosure
process. Given the issues raised by Mr Wilson in interview, it was appropriate to
obtain the underlying Horizon data both to test its reliability and to allow the defence
to do so once it had been disclosed. It was appropriate to investigate whether Mr
Wilson had sought to call helplines, and to speak to his managers, to test whether or
not he had been reporting problems at the time, and to at least disclose the results
where they supported his account. It was appropriate to investigate Mr Wilson’s
finances to determine if there was any evidence of financial benefit to him, and if not,
to at least disclose the results.
Another important limitation so far as disclosure is concerned is that cross-disclosure
between cases was raised as an issue on Mr Wilson's behalf by counsel, and identified
by prosecution counsel as a relevant area of disclosure if similar issues as to the
reliability and operation of Horizon had arisen elsewhere. There is no evidence that
such disclosure occurred. Those making and reviewing prosecutorial decisions in this
27
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
case would have been aware of the issues that had arisen elsewhere, and the potential
at least for those issues to be relevant for disclosure here. There is no evidence that the
acted on that, or that proper disclosure of issues from earlier cases were either
identified or addressed.
28
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
REPORT TO THE POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
PHASE 4
INVESTIGATION, DISCLOSURE AND CRIMINAL PROSCECTION
IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS BY THE POST OFFICE 2000-2013
VOLUME 2A - APPENDIX
Documents referred to in Volume 2A
Case law
No. Citation Footnote
1 Josephine Hamilton & Ors v Post Office Limited [2021] 1, 15, 23, 27, 52,
EWCA Crim 577 54,75
Publicly Available Documents
No. Document Footnote
1 CPIA Code 48, 49
AG's Guidelines 2000 49
3 AG's Guidelines 2005 49
29
Inquiry Documents
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
No. I URN Document Description Footnotes
1 POL00044639 I Janet Skinner case study: Post Office Ltd 2, 8, 17, 35,
Investigation report for Janet Skinner 56, 57
(POLTD/0607/0108)
2 POL00044629 I Case progression report - Janet Skinner (North 3, 9, 22, 33
Bransholme PO)
3 POL00046925__I Email from Rom Warmington to Scheme 4,7, 24
Enquiries re: FW: Completed Case
Questionnaire Ms Janet Skinner M097 enclosing
case questionnaire
4 POL00044632 I Interview Transcript - Janet Louise Skinner 5
5 POL00044633 I Summary of tape recorded interview - Janet 5
Louise Skinner
6 POL00044656 I Summary of tape recorded interview - Janet 5,6
Louise Skinner
7 POL00048259 I Schedule of non-sensitive unused materials by 10, 47
Diane Matthews. R v Janet Skinner.
8 POL00044685__I Post Office Witness Statement - Colleen Jean 11
Kates
9 POL00045343 I Post office witness statement of Theresa Joan 12
Holmes dated 17/07/2006.
10 I POL00045342 I Witness statement of Wendy Lyell 13
11 POL00047402 I Janet Skinner case study - Unsigned witness 14
statement of Katherine Margaret Ayres dated
the 17th July 2006.
12 I POL00063484 I Janet Skinner Case study: Mediation Scheme- 16
Second Sight Case Review Report RE: Case
Reference: M097 Applicant: Janet Skinner
13 POL00061997 I Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme I 18, 26, 28
of Janet Skinner - North Bransholme
14 POL00064031 I Financial Investigation Events Log 19, 21, 34
15 POL00048655 I Email from Mick Matthews to Juliet McFarlane I 20
re Janet Louise Skinner.
16 I POL00046010 I Janet Skinner case study: Draft POIR SS CRR - 25
Janet Skinner, by Graham Cade
17 POL00048161 I Memo re Post Office Limited v Janet Louise 29
Skinner, by Juliet McFarlane.
POLTD/0607/0108.
18 POL00048165 I Post Office Limited v Janet Louise Skinner re 30
Schedule of Charges.
30
19
POL00047780
Memo from J A McFarlane to Investigation
Team Post Office Limited re: Royal Mail Group
ple v Hughie Noel Thomas Bailed to Holyhead
Police Station - 10th January 2006 Case No:
POLTD/0405/0401
31
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
20
POL00048272
Letter from Diane Matthews to Juliette
McFarlane re Janet Louise Skinner.
POLTD/0607/0108. North Bransholme branch.
34, 36
21
POL00047902
Email from Diane Matthews to Julie McFarlane
re: Post Office Limited v Janet Louise Skinner -
CRM/254194/JMcF Hull Magistrates Court
Committal - 12th December 2006 at 10am Case
No: POLTD/0607/0108
37
22
POL00128952
Janet Louise Skinner Case Study-Summary of
Facts prepared in accordance with rule 21.3
(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005. -
Post Office Limited v Janet Louise Skinner
38
23
POL00044673
The Queen v Janet Louise Skinner - Instructions
to counsel to settle indictment and advise on
evidence and brief for the prosecution
39
24
POL00048420
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to Investigation
Team Post Office Limited, Diane Matthews,
Mick Matthews and others, RE: Case
Management Hearing on 05/01/07 (Janet
Skinner)
40
25
POL00045387
Indictment in The Queen v Janet Louise Skinner
at Hull Crown Court
41
26
POL00048447
Pre-Sentence Report of Janet Louise Skinner, by
Emma Sutton.
42
27
POL00048808
Letter from The Max Gold Partnership to Post
Office Legal Services re Regina v Janet Skinner.
CRM/254194/JMcF.
43
28
POL00048806
Regina v Janet Louise Skinner - Confiscation
Proceedings, Prosecution Response to Skeleton
Argument on Abuse of Process of the Court.
44
29
POL00049016
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to Investigation
Team Post Office Limited, Mick Matthews and
Diane Matthews re Regina v Janet Louise
Skinner. POLTD/0607/0108. Confiscation
hearing outcome.
45
30
POL00045358
Record Sheet: Trial - Janet Skinner - Hull Crown
Court
46
31
POL00048262
Post Office; R v Janet Skinner.
50
32
POL00048738
Email to Patrizia Doherty enclosing Defendant
Skeleton Argument on Abuse of Process -
Confiscation proceedings (R v. Skinner)
51
31
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
33 POL00044803 I Julian Wilson case study - OFFENCE: Audit 53, 60, 66
Shortage - Cash Loss £27,811.98 Corporate
Security Criminal Law Team report from Gary
Thomas
34 I POL00046944 I Letter from Shoosmiths to The Post Office re: 55, 68
Julian Wilson
35 I POL00044767 I Summary of facts re: Royal Mail Group Ltd v 57
Julian Wilson.
36 POL00044806 I Julian Wilson case study: Memo from Jarnail 57,77
Singh to the Fraud Team Post Office Ltd re: POL
v Julian Wilson (Astwood Bank)
37 POL00064118 I Karen Wilson (wife of Julian Wilson, deceased) 58, 64
case study: Witness Statement of David Patrick
38 POL00104758 _ I Investigation Policy: Interviewing v2.0 59
39 I POL00104752 I Investigation Policy: Searching v3.0 61
40 POL00050138 I Julian Wilson Case Study: Royal Mail Group 62
"Record of Tape Recorded Interview" of Julian
Wilson transcript.
41 POL00044804 I) Royal Mail Record of Tape Recorded Interview I 62, 65
with Julian Wilson
42 POL00044758 I Draft letter from Glenn Chester regarding an 63
audit at Astwood Bank Post Office on the 11
September 2008
43 POL00044777 I Witness Statement of Glen Chester 64
44 POL00044778 I Witness statement of Gary Thomas - 64
Investigation Manager (electronically signed) -
Julian Wilson case study
45 POL00045659 I Witness Statement of Graham Brander 64
46 POL00050498 I WITNESS STATEMENT OF Graham Ward 67
dated 17th Dec 2008 in support of an application
for a restraint order in respect of Mr Julian
WILSON 's assets
47 POL00060981 I Letter from Robert Holland to Second Sight 69, 71, 86
Support Service Ltd re: Julian Wilson
48 POL00046970 I Initial complaint review and mediation scheme: I 70
Post Office investigation report - Julian Wilson
49 POL00044807 I Advice from counsel Anthony Vines, Civitas 73, 79, 82, 94
Law to Jarnail Singh - R v Julian Wilson
50 POL00045675 I List of exhibits in The Queen v Julian Wilson 74
51 POL00057156 I Email John Longman to Helen Watson re: 76
Wilson - Astwood Bank
52 UKGI00012570 I Julian Wilson case study: Draft Indictment - 78
False accounting
53 POL00044690 I The Queen v Julian Wilson - Indictment 80.
32
54
UKGI00018911
In the Crown Court at Worcester - Case
Summary for Julian Wilson - Astwood Bank PO
branch by Anthony Vines.
81
EXPG0000005
EXPG0000005
55
POL00051936
Letter from John H. Dove. to Mr. J. Singh re:
Regina - v - Julian Wilson - Worcester Crown,
Court
83
56
POL00051943
Letter from Miss J S Andrews to Gary R Thomas
cc: Fraud Team, POL, Graham Ward re:
REGINA -v- JULIAN WILSON,
83
57
POL00051928
Email from Richard Cole to Rob G Wilson,
Jarnail A Singh cc: Anthony Vines re: R v Julian
Lewis - Worcester Crown
84, 96
58
POL00051917
In the crown court at Worcester Regina v Julian
Wilson Basis of Plea
85
59
POL00052174
Letter from John H. Dove. to Mr. J. Singh re:
Regina - v - Julian Wilson - Worcester Crown
Court.
87
60
POL00044810
Internal memo from Graham Ward Financial
Investigator to Andy Hayward Senior Security
Manager regarding financial investigation case
closure.
88
61
POL00065147
Letter from Angela Van Den Bogerd to Second
Sight Re Post Office's response to Second Sight's
Draft Case review on case M039.
89
62
POL00054846
Letter to Worcester Crown Court from Amy
Cheunviratsakul re.Julian Wilson - Confiscation
Proceedings at Worcester Crown Court
90
63
POL00051194
Royal Mail Group, Schedule of Non-Sensitive
Unused Material re: Julian WILSON
91
64
POL00119096
Schedule of Sensitive Material- RvJulian
WILSON
92
65
POL00119097
Disclosure Officer’s Report - R v Julian Wilson
93
66
POL00051920
Julian Wilson case study: Letter from J. Canlin to
Mr J Singh RE: Julian Wilson - Worcester Crown
Court. 15th June 2009 - PCIVIH,
95
33