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Witness Name: Jarmail Singh
Statement No: WITN04750200
Dated: 4 April 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF JARNAIL SINGH
I, Jarnail Singh, will say as follows:
1. I am providing this statement in response to a request for information dated
16 February 2024, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 — Request
number 2, regarding matters falling within Phases 5 and 6 of the Inquiry. This
is the second request that has been made to me under the Inquiry Rules 2006
and is written further to my first statement dated 6 October 2023
(WITN04750100).
2. In writing this statement, I can confirm that I have considered the documents
previously sent to me by the Inquiry, my first witness statement
(WITN04750100) and the transcripts of my oral evidence (INQ00001101 and
1INQ00001102).
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3. I can confirm that I am represented and have had legal assistance in writing
this statement from Ashfords LLP.
RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS MADE BY SPMs AND OTHERS REGARDING THE
HORIZON IT SYSTEM
4. The below deals the nature and extent of my involvement with POL’s
response to complaints made by Sub-Postmasters (SPMs), Justice For Sub-
Postmasters Alliance (JFSA), MPs or journalists as to the integrity of the
Horizon IT System or POL’s prosecution of SPMs based on data generated
by that system.
5. In answering the Inquiry’s questions, I can confirm that I have reviewed the
following documents:
vi.
POL00141359 (email chain with David Pardoe and others in April
2012);
POL00141386 (email chain with Dave Pardoe and others in June
2012);
POL00143308 (email from Helen Dickinson to me and others on 3 July
2012);
POL00141389 (email chain with Andy Cash in July 2012);
POL00141393 (letter from McKeag & Co Solicitors to Cartwright King
Solicitors dated 6 July 2012);
POL00143375 (email chain between me, Hugh Flemington and others
in July 2012);
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vii.
viii.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
XV.
xvi.
xvii.
xviii.
xix.
XX.
xxi.
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POL00143374 (my email exchange with Susan Crichton and others in
July 2012);
POL00026567 (Harry Bowyer’s advice in R v. Wylie dated 11 July
2012;
POL00143379 (email exchange between me and Hugh Flemington on
16 July 2012);
POL00143453 (my email to Chris Darvill on 24 July 2012);
POL00141406 (my email exchange with Helen Rose on 25/26 July
2012);
POL00058155 (my email exchange with Hugh Flemington and others
on 31 July 2012);
POL00141416 (my email exchange with Harry Bowyer in August
2012);
POL00175144 (my email to Helen Rose on 7 August 2012);
POL00141478 (my email to Martin Smith on 10 December 2012);
POL00143339 (email chain with Susan Crichton on 9 July 2012);
POL00089436 (email exchange regarding Horizon cases in February
2013);
POL00124770 (email chain between me, Rachael Panter and others in
February 2013);
POL00325434 (my email to Rachael Panter on 21 February 2013);
POL00186039 (my email to Hugh Flemington on 26 March 2013); and
POL00062588 (my email to Belinda Crowe on 5 January 2015).
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6.
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I had no formal role in POL’s response to complaints made by SPMs, JFSA,
MPs or journalists as to the integrity of the Horizon IT System. Nor did I have
any formal role in POL’s response to complaints made by SPMs, JFSA, MPs
or journalists as to POL’s prosecution of SPMs based on data generated by
that system. As far as I am aware, POL’s senior legal team (General Counsel
and Head of Legal) were sometimes involved in these matters and I was
sometimes asked to provide input or comment on specific matters.
Cartwright King (CK) were involved in a large number of prosecutions prior to
the separation of POL from RMG and following separation, all prosecutions
were outsourced to CK and I worked in liaison with them, including their
solicitors, in-house and external counsel. Prosecution advice on
charges/charging decisions was provided directly by CK to the
Investigation/Security team. On some occasions, particularly in 2012 when
the process at POL was bedding in, the charging advice was sent by CK to
me and I forwarded it on to the decision maker in the Investigation/Security
team.
. Charging decisions and decisions on discontinuing cases, remained with the
Investigation/Security team, as it had prior to the separation of POL from
RMG. Given the interplay between these individuals/parties and in light of
issues being raised in relation to Horizon, I would always involve the more
senior in-house lawyers at POL and CK in relation to requests for
information/instructions and handling decisions relating to cases which fell
under CK’s care and conduct.
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9.
wi
As an example, I was asked by Dave Pardoe, Senior Security Manager, who
was the decision maker in the case involving Mrs Merritt relating to the
Yetminster branch, to draft some wording in relation to the decision not to
continue with her case. I recall that Susan Crichton has already asked me to
obtain CK’s papers and to summarise the case for her and she had input on
the wording of the letter to Mrs Merritt. As my email dated 26" June 2012
(POL00141386) then confirms, the final wording of the letter followed a
discussion which I had with the Company Secretary, Alwen Lyons, who
approved it in Susan’s absence. The drafting was in accordance with the
company’s position and drafted on the instructions of General Counsel and
Company Secretary. I had the assurances that I believed that everyone else
had and had no reason at this time to have any reason to doubt the
truthfulness of the statement.
10.In the same matter, I was asked by Susan Crichton, General Counsel,
11.
(POL00143339) on 9 July 2012 whether I agreed with some proposed
wording and I advised on removing a sentence from a press release where
the sentence could be criticised for implying how the court would have dealt
with the case had it proceeded. I felt that that was not appropriate and
suggested it be removed.
I was not involved in the decision to instruct Second Sight (SS) and became
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aware of their appointment after the decision had been made to appoint them.
As far as I can recall, I had no contact with them at all and nor would I have
expected to have. I may have been involved in ad hoc requests for
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information but even then I recall that it was another person who would have
actually located the information and provided it to SS.
12.Once I became aware of their involvement I was asked to draft some wording
(POL00058155) for what I understood to be a general explanatory statement
regarding their role and remit. This was all based on information given to me
as I had no involvement in determining the scope of their role and it was
drafted at the request of Hugh Flemington, Head of Legal. The wording was
then picked up by Head of PR and Media and approved by the Company
Secretary. Once it was approved, I provided the wording to CK and Counsel
for use as required in ongoing cases because it was anticipated that the
involvement of Second Sight was going to give rise to queries/challenges by
Defendant's legal teams in ongoing matters. I had no role in any wider public
communications strategy concerning the SS review.
13.My view on the instruction of SS, at this stage in mid-2012, was that it was a
positive move from POL in wanting to address concerns that were raised in
some specific cases. I had no view on the choice of SS.
14.1 was not involved in the drafting of SS’s terms of reference and/or the
decision-making process regarding the ambit of its investigations. Based on
an email dated 11" July 2012 (POL00143374) from Susan Crichton
explaining SS’s role, my understanding is that SS were forensic accountants.
Given that expertise, it was my understanding that they were not looking into
technical IT matters nor the legal process. Susan said that “at the present
there is no intention to undertake a full forensic review of the Horizon system
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My understanding initially was that they were going to be reporting back within
a few weeks.
15.1 felt that I needed to understand their role and remit so that I could provide an
explanation regarding their involvement to CK, who were continuing to handle
criminal matters for POL where the involvement of SS was bound to be raised
by defence lawyers and possibly by the Courts.
16.I am aware that CK notified me when the defence solicitors in the R v Wylie
prosecution contacted them about SS's investigation into Horizon. In an email
dated 9" July 2012 (POL00143374) Andy Cash asked me to provide “a clear
steer from the centre” and I therefore forwarded the request for instructions to
Hugh Flemington and Susan Crichton. I also discussed the involvement of
SS with Hugh Flemington in person but I do not recall that discussion in any
detail. I recall that I was concerned that Susan and Hugh understood that
once proceedings were issued in criminal matters, the courts were not likely to
agree to lengthy stays of proceedings to allow SS to produce their report. The
risk to POL were applications by the defence on the grounds of abuse of
process. I therefore asked what POL’s position ought to be in relation to
ongoing proceedings but also in pending and future investigations.
17. Susan Crichton responded to me on 11" July 2012 confirming the scope and
reiterated that “POL has no reason to believe that there is any issue with the
integrity of the Horizon System and the current investigation is limited in
Scope and number of cases”. She confirmed they had not at that stage been
formally appointed and she attached a copy of the draft proposed terms of
reference for their instruction.
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18.1 was not asked to review those terms of reference but I did so because I
thought it would be helpful for CK to have them to enable them to respond to
the defence solicitors on the Wylie case and so that they better understood
the position generally. When I reviewed the draft terms I noted that the
wording included an instruction for SS to study relevant evidence with regard
to the Horizon system and I queried with Susan whether this could be deleted.
To the best of my recollection, the reason I think I took issue with this was
because SS were not looking at the legal process and I felt the word
‘evidence’ was potentially confusing. I recognised that SS’s primary focus
was to look into the accounting processes in respect of the cases in question
and completely understood that in order to do so they would need
documentation/information, and I was not seeking to propose anything
different in terms of overall scope. With the benefit of hindsight I was not
being invited to comment and probably should not have done so. I do not
know if my comments were taken on board or how SS's initial terms of
reference were progressed.
19.1 believe that responsibility for the ambit of SS’s investigation ultimately was a
decision for the Board, supported by General Counsel and Head of Legal. I
believe that Belinda Crowe and her team may also have worked with SS, as
well as external lawyers Bond Dickinson (BD). At some point, Brian Altman
KC was also instructed to advise and suggested that a criminal lawyer have
some involvement in working with SS and so CK became involved, although I
do not recall when this was.
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20.1 believe BD and CK fielded requests for documents. Sometimes I was asked
21.
if I could provide information and I believe most of the requests for documents
I received were from BD. I recall identifying for them where papers were held.
I believe some may have been retained in RMG archives for matters
concluded before the separation of POL in which case I made some enquiries
where papers were held and where they could be obtained
Generally I do not feel that I was sufficiently close to the work that SS were
doing to comment on whether they were given sufficient information by POL
to carry out its instructions over the course of its engagement.
22.1 recall that following the involvement of SS being discussed in the context of
the R v Wylie case, Harry Bowyer, in-house Counsel at CK, advised on the
way forward in ongoing criminal cases (POL00026567). Harry advised that
POL should carry out a review of cases where Horizon challenges were
raised and appoint a disclosure officer to deal with disclosure of Horizon
challenge related information. Helen Rose was a member of the Security
Team and was given that role.
23.1 have been asked about a database which I refer to as having been kept by
the criminal law team in an email dated 24" July 2012 (POL00143453). This
email was in response to an information request by Mr Bates for information
as to how many years RMG/POL held details of prosecutions. In my response
to Chris Darvill in the POL Legal team, I referred to a database of
prosecutions being kept by RMG since 2009, which Rob Wilson, RMG Head
of Criminal Law, had informed was kept by RMG. I had no knowledge of this
database and do not remember adding any case details to any database
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when I was with RMG. I spoke to my former colleague Rob Wilson who told
me about this database before I replied to Chris. I do not know what
information it held and/or whether any information was recorded on the
database in respect of Horizon failures.
24.At this stage in 2012, CK had care and conduct of all POL criminal
prosecutions. I retained no records specifically in relation to Horizon
challenges but I believe that such information would have been available from
CK and the Investigation/Security Team. As I mentioned above, on Harry
Bowyer’s advice, Helen Rose from the Security Team was tasked to look into
in which cases Horizon had been challenged and organising disclosure.
25.I have been asked about an email to Rachel Panter of CK dated 215 February
2013 (POL00325434) and the basis on which I considered it appropriate to
accept a plea to false accounting on the proviso that the defendant wrote that
they did not challenge the integrity of the Horizon IT System. It had always
been the position during RMG days and then at POL that Horizon was robust
and consequently the business would not accept a plea on the basis that
Horizon was at fault. I do not know what the letter from the defence solicitors
says as it has not been provided — it is possible that my email is a response to
something stated in that letter — but generally, the Court needs to be able to
understand on what basis the plea is made and accepted so that it can
sentence accordingly and if this is not clear, then there is a risk that the Court
might order a Newton hearing. Having the defendant put the basis of plea in
writing was usually of assistance to the defence in mitigation and provided
clarity to the Court and Rob Wilson had always encouraged us to having it
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clearly set out in writing. In this instance, I do not know why I have provided
these instructions as they would usually have been provided by the
investigator, who in this case was Stephen Bradshaw. I do not believe that
the ongoing SS investigation had any bearing on this decision or the basis
upon which the plea was agreeable — the reasoning for the decision was
consistent with the RMG/POL position prior to SS.
26.1 have also been asked about an email from Helen Rose dated 3 August
2012 (POL00175144) where she says “In our previous phone call you
mentioned where sometimes there would be bargaining and some cases
would be charged with false accounting rather than theft and false accounting
on the proviso that the horizon system is not brought into question”. I cannot
now recall the specifics of any call with Helen Rose in August 2012. I believe
the purpose of the call was me reminding her that she needed to cast the net
wide when looking for any previous cases of Horizon being challenged,
including cases where theft, false accounting and theft and false accounting
had been charged.
27.All cases/charging decisions were assessed on the evidence and having
regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors. This is evidenced by the memos
from the Legal Team to the Security/Investigation Team and in the advice
from external lawyers where involved. I do not believe that charges were
selected on the proviso that the Horizon IT System is not brought into
question. POL wouldn’t know whether a defendant was going to raise a
Horizon issue as part of a defence and wouldn’t therefore select charges on
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this basis. I believe the reference to plea bargaining is a reference to where
the defence would occasionally approach POL with an offer to plead to either
a lesser offence or to plead guilty on a limited basis. This is action which
would be instigated by the defence and which POL would consider and
respond to, rather than being instigated by POL.
28.I am not aware that POL’s position on the acceptance of pleas in prosecutions
brought by SPMs changed following the announcement of the SS review.
The main change for me in 2012 was that CK took over the care and conduct
of all prosecution cases from 1% April 2012.
29.I have been asked about the nature and extent of my involvement in the
decision to discontinue the proposed prosecutions against Ms Merrit, Ms
Wylie and Uppal. Decisions of this nature were usually for the investigator in
the Security Team, but as set out above, at this time due to the involvement of
SS, I did have some discussions with the Company Secretary, Head of Legal
and General Counsel. In all 3 cases CK were instructed.
30.1 do not know to what extent POL was concerned to ensure that others did not
attribute decisions to discontinue prosecutions to concerns as to the reliability
of the Horizon IT System. I don’t recall prosecutions being routinely
discontinued, hence Harry Bowyer’s input on how cases should be case
managed from a disclosure perspective if Horizon was challenged.
31.1 have been asked about the decision to discontinue the Merrit case and the
extent to which I considered this to be consistent with POL’s public position on
the reason for dropping the case. My recollection is that the decision not to
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proceed was down to the intervention of Oliver Letwin MP. I note that the case
closure report at POL00143308 cites “Prosecution case dropped as this case
will now form part of the external review for Horizon Integrity challenges”. I
accept there is some inconsistency here but I do not feel able to comment
further as I was not involved in the decision to discontinue this case. Any
involvement I had in the decision letter to Mrs Merrit was on the instructions of
the Company Secretary and I do not recall being informed about the nature of
the Horizon issue being alleged or of the decision for the case to be reviewed
by SS.
32.1 was primarily interested in Harry Bowyer’s advice (POL00026567) in terms
of his views on how best to manage the disclosure issues which were
envisaged. In particular I remember thinking about some of the previous
issues where we had needed to go to Fujitsu for data. I do not particularly
remember having a view on his comment “/ assume that we still contend that
the system is fool proof in which case we should defend it aggressively”. I felt
it was for POL to determine its position. In any event, it was on the same day
that Susan Crichton set out in an email to me POL’s position that it had no
reason to believe that there was any issue with the integrity of Horizon
33.As far as I can recall, POL’s approach to bringing or maintaining prosecutions
did not change upon the appointment of Second Sight. Each case was still
considered on a case by case basis and having regard to the Code for Crown
Prosecutors. I do not recall there being any policy shift as a result of the
appointment of SS.
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34.In relation to applications by SPMs for stays of prosecutions on the basis of
the SS review, I wanted CK to advise as they were handling all prosecutions.
I felt that blanket stays would be problematic as the criminal courts would not
be happy to defer indefinitely matters where individuals were facing trial. I
wanted CK to advise on it and they proposed a route forward whereby POL
might agree on a case by case basis not to oppose stays sought by
defendants (POL00186039).
SECOND SIGHT INTERIM REPORT
35. The below deals with the nature and extent of any involvement that I had in
POL’s response to SS’s Interim Report. In answering the Inquiry’s questions
on this subject, I can confirm that I have reviewed the following documents:
POL00144855 (email from Rodric Wiliams to Rod Ismay and others
dated 27 June 2013, in which I am copied) and POL00144856
(attachment);
POL00029622 (email from Rod Ismay, in which I am copied, on 28
June 2013) and POL00029623 (attachment);
POL00062368 (email from me to Hugh Flemington and others on 1
July 2013);
POL00144948 (email from Hugh Flemington, copied to me, on 1 July
2013);
POL00190855 (email from Hugh Flemington to me and others) and
POL00190856
(attachment); and
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vi. I POL00099063 (Second Sight Interim Report).
36.1 do not recall having any communications or meetings with SS in the run up
to the provision of the Interim Report.
37.1 do not recall exactly when I received the SS Interim Report but upon reading
it I remember being concerned, both in relation to its findings around bugs but
also the comments around issues with training and support to SPMs. I
recognised that this was something that needed immediate expert advice from
POL’s external lawyers, CK. I do not recall exactly when this happened but
because I had been involved in previous prosecution cases I recall it was
decided that I should not be centrally involved in any review or any follow up
action.
38.1 recall that CK advised POL on next steps and Brian Altman KC was
instructed to review processes, including CK’s processes. Martin Smith and
Simon Clark of CK were primarily providing their advice to Head of Legal and
General Counsel. I do not recall the detail of any conversations with the POL
legal team around this issue.
39.1 have been asked what I knew of Project Sparrow and my involvement with it.
This was, I think, a senior management or Board level project. I do not know
anything about it. I recall the name but I don’t think I had any involvement in
it.
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THE HELEN ROSE REPORT
40.1 can confirm that I have reviewed the following documents in respect of the
Helen Rose report:
i. POL00022598 (“the Helen Rose report”);
ii. I POL00323841 (email chain between Rodric Williams, Martin Smith and
others in July 2013); and
iii. I POLO0129392 (email exchange between me and Andrew Parsons on
17 June 2013).
41.1 cannot recall when I first read the Helen Rose report but I assume that it was
in June or July 2013, and I assume before 10" July, when CK advised Hugh
Flemington on disclosure of the report in the Ishaq prosecution case
(POL00323841).
42.As set out above, Helen Rose came to be involved in looking at matters
following Harry Bowyer’s advice in the Wylie case but I do not recall if her
report stemmed directly from that involvement or if she was provided any
other instructions. If she was, I believe they must have come from Hugh
Flemington or Susan Crichton. For the avoidance of doubt, I did not request
or commission it.
43. My initial response on reading Helen’s report was one of concern and I recall
that I wanted CK’s advice on what to do. Specifically, I recall thinking that if it
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was correct that Gareth Jenkins knew of Horizon integrity issues that was a
real concern.
44.I have been asked to what extent, if at all, did I think that points raised within
the Helen Rose report cast doubt on the safety of the convictions of SPMs
whose prosecutions was based wholly or partly on Horizon data. I had no
expertise in considering whether Helen’s report gave rise to safety of
conviction issues. I do not recall whether safety of convictions was
immediately addressed by CK following receipt of Helen’s report but I believe
that this was something which Simon Clarke was quickly advising POL in
relation to, and it certainly forms part of his written advice on 8" July 2013
(POL00006365).
45.1 do not recall being involved in the response to the report. From the
information at this time provided by the Inquiry I can see that matters were
being handled by Hugh Flemington and Rodric Williams, who was a litigation
lawyer, and I was kept in copy.
46.In terms of whether the Helen Rose Report was disclosable, whilst I always
deferred to CK on such matters, my view was that if it met the test for
disclosure it should be disclosed. For the avoidance of doubt, I agreed with
CK’s advice that it should be disclosed.
47.I have been asked about my email to Andrew Parsons of BD dated 17" June
2014 (POL00129392), written approximately 1 year after Helen Rose’s Report
was provided.
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48.The approach and advice by Andrew Parsons which I responded to is in
relation to the Mediation Scheme. I had no involvement in, authority over, or
any opinion on how those matters should be conducted. The reason I did
respond was because the email referred to discussions between BD and CK,
and CK were continuing to deal with POL criminal cases. Martin Smith and
Simon Clarke from CK were copied into the email and by responding, I
wanted to give affirmation to CK. My reference to agreeing to deal with issues
on a case by case basis is affirmation in relation to the penultimate para
relating to the suggestion that CK support with any queries the Investigation
Team have with how to deal with the Helen Rose Report.
49.1 reiterate that I was in support of disclosure of any evidence where it was
relevant and met the test for disclosure and I in no way intended to support
any suggestion of how to deal with the Helen Rose Report in CQRs which
were part of the Mediation Scheme process. As everyone knew my role
related to criminal matters only and I had no authority to give instructions
regarding the conduct of the Mediation Scheme, I do not believe that anyone
would have taken my email as an instruction to minimalize or entirely ignore
the Helen Rose Report when responding to applications to the Mediation
Scheme.
THE WEEKLY HORIZON CALL.
50. The below deals with my involvement in the Horizon regular call set up after
the Interim Report. In answering the Inquiry’s questions around this subject
matter, I can confirm that I have reviewed the following documents:
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vi.
vii.
viii.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
5
=
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POL00083932 (record of Horizon regular call on 19 July 2013);
POL00139731 (record of Horizon regular call on 24 July 2013);
POL00139732 (record of Horizon regular call on 31 July 2013);
POL00139745 (Martin Smith’s attendance note made on 1 August
2013);
POL00325474 (my email to Martin Smith on 1 August 2013);
POL00006799 (advice from Simon Clarke dated 2 August 2013);
POL00083930 (record of Horizon regular call on 14 August 2013);
POL00139748 (Martin Smith’s attendance note from 14 August 2013);
POL00129005 (Rob King’s email to me on 19 August 2013);
POL00325492 (my email on 20 August 2013);
POL00089720 (record of Horizon regular call on 21 August 2013);
POL00139728 (record of Horizon regular call on 28 August 2013); and
POL00323677 (my email to Susan Crichton on 20 September 2013).
.I believe the weekly Horizon call followed the advice of CK around having a
central place where Horizon issues could be dealt with in one place, making
the disclosure process easier. To the best of my recollection, I think Susan
Crichton tasked the Investigation/ Security Team with this following CK’s
advice.
52.1 was not involved in setting up the weekly call and was not in attendance at
the first meeting on 19" July 2013 and do not recall if I was briefed on it but I
did attend on 24" July 2013 and thereafter. I do not recall the discussions
held on the weekly calls over and above what is set out in the call records.
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53.On reviewing the record of the call on 24" July 2013 (POL00139731) I do not
fully understand the comment “No minutes circulated, but we will all be taking
notes.” Clearly a record was taken, so I don’t know if it was being suggested
that minutes/notes shouldn’t be taken and I don’t recall any discussion on this
issue.
54.On reviewing the record of the call on 31% July 2013 (POL00139732), I can’t
recall what was discussed in respect of the Helen Rose Report. Further, I
can’t see any reference to the creation of minutes or notes so I can’t recall if
there was any discussion around this on that call.
55.1 recall that after the weekly meeting on 31% July 2013, which I believe took
place in the morning, Dave Posnett came to see me. Dave was seeking my
guidance because he said that John Scott had instructed him that typed
minutes of the weekly calls should be scrapped and / or shredded. I
immediately felt very uncomfortable and I told Dave Posnett very clearly that
he must not do that and that he should tell John Scott the same. I recognised
that this was a serious issue and I called Martin Smith at CK. I think I might
have even done this when Dave Posnett was present so that he could talk to
Martin Smith if needed, but I am not certain of this. In any event I relayed
word for word what Dave Posnett had told me and I believe Martin Smith’s
record is an accurate note. I believe I also spoke with Hugh Flemington about
this but this might not have been on the same day.
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56. The reason for calling Martin Smith was to seek his assistance given POL’s
criminal litigation disclosure obligations. Martin told me to leave it with him —
he said he would speak with Simon Clarke and they would deal with it and
respond. Martin told me that Simon was in the process of providing advice for
POL on disclosure and if I emailed him he could incorporate any points I
wished to be covered in that note. I therefore emailed Martin the next
morning setting out my request (POL00325474).
57.Reviewing matters now, I can see that I have copied and pasted wording
attributed to Andrew Parsons of BD from the 19" July 2013 weekly Horizon
call, which I did not attend — “If its produced its available for disclosure — if not
minuted then technically its not’ I therefore assume that I was provided with a
copy of the record of that call.
58.What I wanted Simon Clarke to cover in his advice was an explanation that
disclosure obligations extended not simply to what was recorded, but what
was known. Simon included this within his advice note (POL00006799) dated
24 August 2013 under a section entitled ‘The Duty to Record and Retain’.
59.1 agreed with the advice and I think the position was very clearly set out.
60.In terms of the advice note at paragraphs 5i. to Siv. I cannot recall precisely
whether my conversation with Dave Posnett covered all of these matters
and/or whether I relayed all of this to Martin Smith, but I do recall Dave using
the word “shredded” which is referred to at 5i. I note that Martin Smith was on
all of the weekly Horizon calls and if anything relating to the retention of
information was discussed on the 19 July 2013 call, then Martin might have
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direct knowledge/recollection of that and this might have fed into the advice
note.
61.1 cannot recall who the advice from Simon Clarke was provided to but I do
recall seeing it. I believe it was agreed that BD would minute the weekly
Horizon call moving forwards.
62. I have been asked to set out my recollection of a phone call with Martin Smith
on 14" August 2013. I recall that I called Martin Smith when I learned that
John Scott had been asked to chair the weekly Horizon call which was taking
place that day. Given the issues which Dave Posnett informed me of on 31%
July 2013 I was concerned with John Scott being on the call. I believe Susan
Crichton asked John Scott to chair the call. I recall that Martin Smith shared
my concern which is why his attendance note refers to it being “not
appropriate” (POL00139748).
63.1 do not recall the weekly Horizon call which took place on 14" August 2013
but having reviewed the record of this call (POL00083930) I believe that there
was some discussion around concerns from the network team about not
prosecuting where the allegation related to theft by a member of staff of a
SPM. I believe this was because the SPM would remain liable for the
shortfall/debt. There is then a reference to the network team raising “comms
issues” and needing “a line of communication”. Rodric Williams then appears
to pick this up and one of the actions from the meeting is for Rodric to
circulate a process for comms to Security and Legal. I cannot recall anything
further in relation to this call.
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64.1 have been asked about an email sent to me on 19" August 2013 from Rob
King (POL00129005). As set out above, I had concerns about the record
keeping in relation to the Horizon weekly call but I do not know what prompted
Rob to email me. It may be that we bumped into each other as we worked in
the same building. I do not know who briefed him on the creation, storage
and distribution of minutes and/or notes. I believe Rob King was ex-Police
and on review of his email, he is setting out to me his views and governance
concerns in relation to the process established. I can see that he is
expressing the view that the Security team was not the best place to be
resolving issues with Horizon but don’t completely understand his email in
terms of the establishment of a working group placing the weekly calls
superfluous and reference to Susan’s concerns.
65. I have been asked to explain the views expressed in my email to Susan
Crichton on 20 September 2013 (POL00323677) regarding not inviting Fujitsu
to a meeting. For the avoidance of doubt, this was not concerning the weekly
Horizon call which took place on Wednesday mornings. This was a separate
meeting between POL lawyers only and the reason for me expressing this
view was purely down to issues of legal privilege. My email was in response
to and in agreement with, the advice provided to Susan Crichton by Martin
Smith of CK.
66.1 do not know why Susan Crichton left POL. I believe I knew a few weeks
before that she was leaving. I had limited one to one contact with Susan as I
reported to Hugh Flemington, Head of Legal.
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PROSECUTIONS AND REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CASES
67. The Inquiry have asked me to set out the nature and extent of any
involvement I had in POL’s review of past convictions of SPMs based on data
generated by the Horizon IT System following the Interim Report, including
the consideration of whether to disclose the Interim Report of the Helen Rose
report. I can confirm that I have reviewed the following documents:
i. _POL00145130 (email from Rodric Williams to Simon Clarke on 3 July
2013);
ii. POL00145142 (email from Rodric Williams to Simon Clarke on 4 July
2013);
iii. I POL00145145 (Simon Clarke's email to Rodric Williams on 4 July
2013);
iv. POL00006365 (Simon Clarke’s 8 July 2013 advice regarding
alternative Fujitsu expert, Royal Mail and review);
v. POL00039994 (letter from CCRC to Paula Vennells dated 15 July
2013);
vi. I POL00040000 (Simon Clarke's 15 July 2013 advice regarding Gareth
Jenkins);
vii. I POL00006800 (Simon Clarke’s 19 July 2013 advice regarding
Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice);
viii. I POL00297952 (email from Gavin Matthews to me and others on 25
July 2013) and the attachment at POL00297953;
ix. _POL00006583 (Brian Altman KC’s Interim Review of Cartwright King’s
Current Process dated 2 August 2013);
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xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
XV.
xvi.
xvii.
xviii.
xix.
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POL00021980 (email from Gavin Matthews dated 9 August 2013),
POL00021981 and POL00021982 (attachments);
POL00006485 and POL00139866 (notes of conference on 9
September 2013);
POL00006581 (Review of prosecutions by Brian Altman KC dated 15
October 2013);
POL00038592 (Draft Review of Post Office Ltd Prosecution Role by
Brian Altman QC dated 21 October 2013);
POL00146861 (email from me to Chris Aujard on 19 November 2013);
POL00146859 (my email to Chris Aujard on 19 November 2013);
POL00112937 (Review of POL’s Prosecution Role dated 19 December
2013);
POL00123147 (your email to David Oliver on 27 January 2014);
POL00148260 (email from me to Chris Aujard on 8 May 2014); and
POL00133638 (Simon Clarke’s advice on R v. Hosi).
68.1 do not recall being involved in POL’s review of past convictions following the
SS Interim Report. As I mentioned above, I recall that because I had been
involved in previous prosecution cases I believe it was decided that I should
not be involved in any review or any follow up action.
69.1 do not think that I attended the conference on 3" July 2013 at POL Head
Office concerning issues in relation to Horizon and the prosecution of criminal
offences by POL.
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70.I have been asked to set out whether I or others in the POL legal department
71.
considered whether it was necessary or appropriate to search for further
documentation or information relevant to the integrity, or lack thereof, of the
Horizon IT System to consider disclosing it to SPMs convicted of theft, fraud
or false accounting. All I can say is that I believe that CK advised and POL
understood its ongoing disclosure duties and this formed part of CK’s
consideration and advice to POL on the actions required in past cases.
I am aware that at this time Simon Clarke at CK was advising POL on a
number of matters, including disclosure and expert evidence issues. I believe
that I agreed with Simon Clarke’s advice on these matters. I note from my
review of the documents Simon Clarke advised on 8" July 2013
(POL00006365) that 1st January 2010 be the start date of the review process.
I can’t recall whether I received that advice but if I did, I believe I would have
agreed that that was an appropriate starting point, based on what was known
at that time around the Horizon issues. I noted this was to be kept under
review. I note that Simon Clarke advised on 19" July 2013 (POL00006800) in
relation to compensation for miscarriages of justice. Again, I do not recall
whether I received that advice but for the avoidance of doubt I had no
experience in relation to that issue and wouldn’t have been in a position to
agree or disagree with his advice.
72.On 24' July 2013 Brian Altman KC attended POL’s offices and I recall that
Susan Crichton asked me to attend a meeting with him where he was
introduced to me and others. I do not recall details of the meeting but having
reviewed the draft terms of reference for his appointment (POL00297953), I
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believe the meeting was an introductory meeting for CK and I was to provide
him with some initial information about the past and current prosecution
process.
73.1 had no involvement in setting Brian Altman KC’s terms of reference. In
particular, I was not involved in any discussion regarding whether he should
be instructed to review the “efficacy” or “safety” of past prosecutions. I do not
know why POL decided that Brian would advise on the efficacy of CK’s role
rather than the safety of the convictions but I note that Gavin Matthews of BD
expressed the view in an email dated 9» August 2013 (POL00021980) that
Brian shouldn't advise on safety and it may be that POL were content to follow
his advice for the reasons he set out.
74.I have been asked to describe my view on Brian Altman KC’s Interim Review
of CK’s Current Process dated 2 August 2013 (POL00006583). I cannot
recall when or even if I received this advice and therefore what my views on it
were. I assume that the advice was provided to BD and they would have
shared it with CK. As this was an interim review, I am not sure if it resulted in
changes to the approach to reviewing criminal cases.
75.On 9 September 2013 I together with colleagues from POL legal, CK and BD
attended a conference with Brian Altman KC. I have reviewed BD’s note of
the conference (POL00006485) and another note of the conference
(POL00139866) which I think might have been taken by Rodric Williams or
one of the CK team. I do not precisely recall the conference but I am not
aware of any material omissions from the notes. I note that the notes refer to
a response from Harry Bowyer of CK to Brian Altman KC’s interim review. I
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do not believe that I received Harry’s response, or if I did I cannot now recall
the contents of it, and I haven’t received a copy of it from the Inquiry.
76.1 don’t recall whether there was any discussion in relation to failing to record
minutes or the destruction of any minutes/notes. I don’t understand the
reference to cultural issues attributed to Simon Clarke of CK in the notes. Nor
do I recall the comment attributed to Susan Crichton that “people then dump”.
I believe it was Susan who also mentioned that there had been a “cash audit”
and I do not have any further information in relation to any such cash audit. I
don’t recall whether there was any discussion of the ‘Callendar Square bug’.
77.I have been asked to consider the note, “/t was widely agreed there was likely
to be a “band wagon” approach in relation to defendant challenging the
previous convictions”. I believe that Brian Altman KC might have used this
term — it also appears at paragraph 55 of his General Review
(POL00006581). AllI took from this was that there was an acknowledgement
of the likely volume of challenges and experienced counsel seems to be
highlighting this likely result based on his experience. With the benefit of
hindsight, the terms shouldn’t have been used but I do not think that it was in
any way intended as a derogatory comment nor was it I believe, intended to
describe SPMs in a negative manner.
78.I have been asked about the advice given by Brian Altman KC regarding the
mediation scheme where he advised caution in relation to mediating with
individuals previously convicted. I had no experience in mediation cases or
the interplay between a mediation scheme and criminal procedure and so I
was in no position to agree or disagree with Brian’s advice on this issue. I do
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not know what was being referred to in terms of information which a convicted
SPM would “not normally be entitled to” but which “lawyers acting for those
individuals” may be seeking “in order to pursue an appeal”. I recall that my
primary concern was in relation to POL’s ongoing duty of disclosure in
criminal cases including in relation to completed matters, and I knew the CK
review was going on for that reason.
79.I have been asked about the General Review advice note dated 15" October
2013 of Brian Altman KC (POL00006581). I don’t know when I first read it
and I don’t specifically recall it. Brian refers to the cash audit at paragraph 64
of the advice. As above, I have no knowledge of this. In relation to my
understanding of any discussion of the “Callendar Square / Falkirk Bug’, all I
can recall now is that I think that it was mentioned by the defence expert in
the Misra case but this was explained by Gareth Jenkins. I had no technical
knowledge relating to Horizon or IT systems more generally and so would not
have known whether it was accurate to refer to the “Callendar Square / Falkirk
Bug” as an isolated instance. My understanding of the advice was that the
cases falling for review should be those from 1 January 2010 onward but that
if during mediation any earlier issues were raised, including for example other
instances of the “Callendar Square / Falkirk Bug” having been reported, then
those events would likely be disclosable. If I received and reviewed this
advice at the time I believe I would have agreed with that approach.
80.I have been asked to consider the advice at paragraphs 129-132 and CK’s
desire to control the dissemination of information and material during the
mediation process. I do not understand what position CK are suggesting is
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taken here. I had always taken the view that in criminal procedure the duty of
disclosure was wide ranging. CK had supported this view previously on a
number of occasions, in particular when I sought their advice in relation to the
retention of records of the weekly Horizon calls, as set out above, and so I am
not sure what sort of control they wanted to exercise in relation to the
mediation process.
81.1 believe the advice was primarily for the benefit of others in more senior roles,
including Susan Crichton and Hugh Flemington. I do not know what actions
were taken by POL upon receipt of this advice.
82.1 have been asked to set out my recollection of the meeting between me,
Brian Altman KC, Gavin Matthews, Andrew Parsons and Rodric Williams on
18 November 2013. My note of this discussion (POL00146859) is not a very
clear note but from what I recall of the discussion, I believe Anthony Hooper
had suggested all convicted SPMs only had a route of challenge to the Court
of Appeal, but Simon Clarke of CK had taken the view that they could be
considered for mediation. I believe that Brian Altman KC agreed with Simon
Clarke. I believe that he also wanted to review minutes of a meeting held
between SS and BD. BD were on the call and I am not sure whether they
provided Brian with the minutes from that meeting. I provided my notes of the
call to Chris Aujard, who was the General Counsel who had been appointed
after Susan Crichton left.
83. Brian Altman KC provided his advice on his review of POL’s prosecution role
on 19" December 2013 (POL00112937). In the executive summary part of
this advice he described the Horizon data integrity issue as “an exceptional
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instance of POL prosecutorial failure of serial non-disclosure in breach of
POL’s disclosure obligations”. Whilst I cannot see that he further explains this
in the body of his advice, I understood this to be a reference to the failure of
Fujitsu to provide full disclosure in cases, but for which RMG/POL as the
prosecuting authority must accept responsibility.
84.I have been asked to set out my views on the conclusion that there was no
need for POL to divest its role as a prosecutor. I understood the conclusion
and did not disagree with the view provided. Overall, what I can recall at this
time was all I could see were problems in proceeding with cases, given the
disclosure issues and the lack of any expert witness. I recall not really seeing
a way through this and I think by this stage I thought it would probably be
better to stop prosecutions, but instead they were being held in the hope that
we would find a new expert and a way to proceed.
85.1 do not recall any other conferences with Brian Altman KC or Cartwright King
concerning the integrity of Horizon or past or present prosecutions based on
data generated by the Horizon IT System.
86.1 don’t believe that I had any real involvement in POL’s response to the CCRC
investigation. I recall that following Susan Crichton’s departure, Sally Berlin,
Director of Casework Operations at the CCRC, emailed Amanda Brown, PA
to General Counsel, seeking an update. This correspondence was forwarded
to me and I sent it on to BD who prepared the response for new General
Counsel, Chris Aujard, to send back to the CCRC (POL00123515).
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87.I have been asked to consider the case review advice dated 15 May 2014
provided by Simon Clarke of CK in the case of Hosi (POL00133638). I do not
know whether I would have received and reviewed this advice. Because CK
were instructed on the reviews and because I had been involved in some of
the previous cases I was not centrally involved in the reviews. I believe the
case was one of Juliet MacFarlane’s dealt with at RMG. I believe that Chris
Aujard would have provided instructions to CK on the recommendations within
the advice. I believe that on instructions CK would have provided disclosure.
88.I have been asked to set out the nature and extent of any involvement I had in
POL’s dealings with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal and / or the
Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland following the SS report. I recall
that BTO were POL’s Scottish agents and POL’s cases were mainly handled
by Laura Irvine. I do recall, and the notes of the conference with Brian Altman
KC confirm, that I went to Scotland to discuss the ongoing Scottish cases with
Laura Irvine. Martin Smith and Simon Clarke were also in attendance. I recall
part of the discussion was whether all cases should be discontinued in
Scotland or whether decisions should be taken on a case by case basis. I
believe the view reached was to deal with each case on its merits. I do not
recall having any wider involvement. I do not recall any involvement in
Northern Ireland cases or what position was taken by POL in relation to
Northern Ireland cases.
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THE MEDIATION SCHEME
89.I have been asked to detail the nature and extent of my involvement in the
Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme. I had no role in the scheme.
I recall that I responded to requests for information as and when requested.
90.1 do not therefore know whether the Mediation Scheme impacted POL’s
conduct of prosecution or its review of past convictions. I know that CK and
BD were more closely involved in the Mediation Scheme than I was and CK
also held the role of reviewing past convictions and would have care and
conduct of any ongoing matters. However, I recall that ongoing matters
remained held up due to disclosure issues and the lack of an expert witness.
9
=
.I have been asked to consider my email to Andrew Parsons on 17 April 2014
(POL00169318) and an email chain between me, Belinda Crowe and others
(POL00325950) and to set out the nature and extent of my involvement in: (a)
deciding what documents should be provided to Second Sight during the
Mediation Scheme and; (b) advising on legal professional privilege in respect
of prosecution documents.
92.1 recall that I was occasionally asked to comment on disclosure of certain
documentation but overall my understanding was that there was an
established process in place which ordinarily didn’t involve me. As the above
emails and my email dated 5" January 2015 confirm (POL00062588), I have
responded to specific requests. On each occasion, I do not know what the
ultimate decision on the provision of documents to SS was.
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93.1 don’t recall providing any advice in respect of discussing the causes of
losses at mediation with SPMs who had been convicted of false accounting.
APPOINTMENT OF A REPLACEMENT HORIZON EXPERT
94. The below deals the nature and extent of my involvement in POL seeking a
new expert to opine on the integrity of the Horizon IT System in civil and
criminal cases. I can confirm that! have reviewed the following documents:
vi.
vii.
POL00146675 (my email to Alwen Lyons on 22 October 2013) and
POL00146676 (attachment);
POL00146919 (email chain regarding a meeting with Fujitsu);
iii, POLO0125568 (email from me to Chris Aujard on 4 July 2014) and
POL00125569 (attachment);
- POL00148714 (email chain regarding the instruction of Imperial
College London);
. POL00148749 (Simon Clarke’s advice of 23 July 2014); and
POL00149562 (email chain on “Top 5 cases”); and
POL00325918 email from Andrew Pheasant to me on 1 October 2014),
POL00325919 and POL00325920 (attachments).
95.1 recall that I had some involvement in seeking a new expert to opine on the
integrity of the Horizon IT System. I did not draft the paper (POL00146676)
but I recall that I was asked by Susan Crichton or Hugh Flemington to seek
Board approval. That was something I hadn’t done before and I remember
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asking Susan how to do that and she advised that I needed to send the paper
to Alwen Lyons, Company Secretary.
96.Within the papers provided to me by the Inquiry I can see there is reference to
arrangements for a meeting with Fujitsu on 29'" November 2013
(POL00146919). I do not have any recollection of this meeting. I can recall
that it took a long time to progress the instruction of new experts. I can see
that I was involved in seeking approval from Chris Aujard, General Counsel,
and others to the initial review proposal of Professor Kramer and Dr Dulay
some 8 months later in July 2014 (POL00125568).
97.1 have been asked to what extent, if at all, did I agree with Martin Smith of
Ck’s advice not to investigate Legacy Horizon cases due to concerns that
“disclosure issues could arise in historic cases”. I recall that I was primarily
concerned that the experts would have access to the information they felt they
needed and there was to be no attempt to curtail what they were provided
with. That was the reason for my email dated 9" July 2014 in response to
Martin Smith’s (POL00148714). I believe that once the need to ensure expert
independence was explained I believe this was accepted and the discussion
moved on.
98.My recollection was that the experts were being instructed in respect of the
integrity of the current system. Separately, I felt that disclosure obligations in
respect of past cases was by this stage well understood and the review
process by CK was well underway, the terms of which were subject to the
review by Brian Altman KC. On that basis I believe I would have agreed with
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Martin’s view that the experts were not required to investigate the old Horizon
system.
99.1 have been asked what I meant in my email dated 14" July 2014
(POL00148714) by saying ‘to instruct the expert to prepare the report in
accordance with the scope but with the proviso that they immediately notify
Cartwright King of anything which may cause POL concern”. What I believe
section 2 of my email relates to is a direct response to the cost and scope
concerns set out by Andy Holt, who worked in IT, in his email of 10" July
2014. Andy was concerned that the experts hadn’t appreciated the scale of
the task and was therefore concerned about the cost implications. In
responding, I had in mind that the experts were due to provide monthly
updates and monthly invoices to CK, and I wanted to explain to Andy that
through this CK could keep control of the process from a scope and cost
perspective. We wanted CK to interface with the experts to keep a degree of
separation from POL to preserve their independence.
100. I have been asked to set out my views on Simon Clarke’s Advice dated
23 July 2014 (POL00148749). I requested this advice to provide all persons
involved in the discussion regarding the instruction of the new experts with
clarity on the approach to the provision of information to the experts and
completely agreed with this advice. I believe that I shared this with all of the
persons involved in that discussion.
101. I do not recall any significant further involvement in the instruction if the
experts. I can see from the documentation provided by the Inquiry that I had
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some involvement in obtaining confidentiality agreements in September 2014
(POL00325918) at the request of my line manager Jessica Madron. I do not
recall having any involvement in the actual instructions to the experts, which I
believe were drafted by BD and reviewed by CK.
SIGNIFICANT LITIGATION REPORTS
102. I can confirm that I have considered the following documents:
i. POL00148973 (email chain including myself and Rodric Williams on 9
September 2014; and
ii. UKGI00018250 (Significant Litigation report dated November 2014).
103. To the best of my recollection, the significant litigation report included
sections dealing with civil litigation and criminal litigation. I believe that CK
drafted the criminal litigation update and I reviewed and inputted as necessary
and then passed it to Rodric Williams. Rodric then reviewed and amended as
before it was submitted to the Board.
104. I note in the November 2014 report (UKGI00018250) there is reference
to there being a “number of cases which could have been prosecuted (e.g.
those with full and frank admission to theft / fraud, but prosecutions were not
commenced to avoid adverse judicial comment”. I do not recall which cases
are being referred to here and I believe CK would be able to provide further
information. My recollection is that there was a concern that even where “full
and frank admissions” had been made there was still a concern that with
Horizon issues being so widely publicised, Defendants would plead not guilty
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and POL would then face potential disclosure issues and have no expert
witness. I believe that at this time the Head of Security, John Scott, was still
the decision maker for cases. Chris Aujard may have been involved in
reviewing which cases should proceed, but I am not sure.
SECOND SIGHT BRIEFING REPORT
105. I can confirm that I have considered the following documents:
i. POL00004439 (Briefing Report Part 1 dated 25 July 2014);
ii. POL00021816 (email from Andrew Parsons to me dated 20 August
2014) and POL00021817, POL00021818 and POL00021819
(attachments);
iii, POL00029849 (Second Sight Part 2 Report dated 9 April 2015); and
iv. UKGI00000018 (POL’s response to Second Sight’s Part 2 report).
106. I have been asked to set out the nature and extent of my involvement
in POL’s response to SS's Briefing Reports. Whilst the first briefing report
dated 25" July 2014 arrived whilst I was with POL (POL000044339), the
second report was dated 9" April 2015 by which time I had left POL and I did
not see it (POL00029849).
107. I do not recall whether I was provided with the Briefing Report Part 1. I
believe SS provided their reports to BD. Rodric Williams was the main POL
lawyer involved and Martin Smith of CK and his colleagues at CK were
involved in the mediation scheme.
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108. I have been asked about who would have considered and advised POL
whether the Briefing Reports needed to be disclosed to SPMs convicted of
theft, fraud or false accounting on the basis of data generated by the Horizon
IT System.
109. I can see from the documents provided to me by the Inquiry that I was
provided with a draft copy of the Briefing Report Part 2 (POL00021819) by
Andrew Parsons of BD on 20" August 2014 (POL00021816). Andrew asked
me or CK to review it to advise whether the report gave rise to criminal law /
disclosure issues. I can see that I provided a holding response on 21° August
2014 explaining that I was discussing it with CK and on 224 August 2014 I
provided a further response explaining that “Martin [Smith] and Simon
[Clarke]...advise that they would not propose any amendments to Rodric
[Williams] letter”. In relation to disclosure I went on to say “We [meaning
Martin, Simon and I] cannot comment at this stage. We would wish to see
final version of the report containing details of the enquiries being carried out
and reasoned evidence conclusions, to enable use to make disclosure
decisions”. (POL00040239).
110. I had no involvement in the termination of SS’s involvement.
RESPONSE TO THE BBC INSIDE OUT
111. I have been asked to set out the nature and extent of my involvement
in POL’s response to journalists investigating allegations that the Horizon IT
system lacked integrity. I recall having very limited involvement. Based on
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information provided to me by the Inquiry I can see that I was copied into an
email chain (POL00169392) where POL was considering in early 2015
whether to agree to an invitation to be interviewed for the BBC’s Inside Out
programme. Based on my review of this document I can see that I was asked
on 8h January 2015 to input on one specific point relating to criminal appeals /
criminal case reviews. In my response I can see that I am still referring to the
SS Interim Report which does reinforce in my mind that I might not have seen
the later 2014 SS Briefing Report Part 1. On review of my email I believe that I
might have copied and pasted advice given by CK or possibly Brian Altman
KC as the wording and language and grammar looks a little different to my
usual email style. I may have spoken with CK before responding but I am not
sure now whether I did. I believe that I was primarily concerned that POL
needed to very carefully consider the content of public statements/interviews
because, as above, I was continually concerned to ensure that POL met its
disclosure obligations and I felt that CK as POL’s external criminal lawyers
should be involved in the discussion in relation to whether to give an interview
and / or how it should respond to the BBC’s interview questions. I copied my
response to Jessica Madron as I recall that she became my line manager
after Hugh Flemington left POL.
RESIGNATIONS
112. I have asked why I think Chris Aujard left POL. To the best of my
recollection he left after I did and I therefore do not know why he left.
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GENERAL
113. At the time there was a clear belief that the Horizon system was robust
which was a message reiterated through my time at RMG and POL, by the
Head of Criminal Law (pre 2012) and subsequently by General Counsel (post
2012). I do not believe that any individuals at RMG and / or POL knowingly
withheld information from the legal team, but it may be that in some parts of
the wider organisation there may have been information which was not known
to us and which may have been relevant to criminal prosecution work. On
reflection, I feel that the governance structures may not have been designed
well enough to challenge assertions by individuals in senior positions
regarding the robustness of Horizon.
114. When I first began working on POL prosecution cases in around 2007
there was a clearly established process led by the Head of Criminal Law and
two principal lawyers. On reflection, I do not feel that the prosecution process
was designed well. I reflect on whether I should have realised or been aware
of this, but I was the most junior of the qualified solicitors and don’t believe I
would have been in a position to challenge. The head of criminal law team
put the prosecution process in place, made the key decisions, for example in
relation to criteria for acceptance of basis of pleas, and also held responsibility
for reviewing the effectiveness of the overall process. What is clear to me now
is that we needed independent review and challenge.
115. I do not feel that I was particularly close to POL’s response to SPMs,
Members of Parliament, journalists and members of the public regarding
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challenges to the integrity of the Horizon IT System and therefore I do not feel
in a position to reflect on the overall organisation’s response.
116. In my role I leaned very heavily on CK as POL’s external criminal
lawyers, and to a much lesser extent on BD, once I began to have some
interaction with them. I felt that the lawyers and counsel I dealt with at CK
acted with integrity at all times in what became very challenging
circumstances.
117. I believe that advice was requested and given promptly and well-
intentioned actions were put in place, in particular once the instruction of SS
was known to those dealing with criminal cases in 2012 and Helen Rose
became involved, and then again in 2013 in response to the Helen Rose
Report and the SS Interim Report. I do not feel that I was sufficiently senior to
have a true sense of whether the advice of the Legal Department was
effectively provided to the business.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: 4 April 2024
Page 42 of 53
INDEX TO SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF JARNAIL SINGH
No
URN
Document Description
Control Number
WITN04750100
First Witness Statement
of
Jarnail Singh dated 6
October 2023 -
WITN04750100
WITN04750100
INQ00001101
Transcript (30/11/2023):
Post Office Horizon IT
Inquiry - Jarnail Singh
[WITNO475]
INQ00001101
INQ00001102
Transcript (01/12/2023):
Post Office Horizon IT
Inquiry - Jarnail Singh
[WITNO0475]
INQ00001102
POL00141359
Email thread from
Dave Pardoe to Jarnail A
Singh RE: Uppal
POL-0142745
POL00141386
Email chain from Jarnail
A
Singh to Dave Pardoe
and
Susan Critchton re
Yetminster
POL-0142771
POL00143308
Email chain from Lin
Norbury to Angela Van
Den Bogerd re case
closure-
POLTD/1112/0163
Yetminster Miss T Merritt
POL-BSFF-
0002473
POL00141389
Email chain from Jarnail
A
Singh to Andy Cash re:
Christopher Bramwell
POL-0142774
POL00141393
Letter from Cartwright
King
Solicitors to Denise
Jackman re Newcastle
magistrates courts and
Horizon examination
POL-0142778
POL00143375
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Hugh Flemington RE:
Wylie - Def sols raising
POL-BSFF-
0002540
Page 43 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
Horizon Investigation
10.
POL00143374
Email chain from Jarnail
Singh to Susan Crichton,
Hugh Flemington and
cc'ing Alwen Lyons re:
Wylie- Def sols raising
Horizon investigation
POL-BSFF-
0002539
A.
POL00026567
Advice on Evidence by
H.M.M Bowyer
POL-0023046
12.
POL00143379
Email chain from jarnail
singh to hugh flemington
and susan crichton re
Case no. 21392
Prosecution v K Wylie
POL-BSFF-
0002544
13.
POL00143453
Email from P Johnson to
J
Singh -RE Draft response
FOI Alan Bates
POL-BSFF-
0002618
14,
POL00141406
Email from Helen Rose to
Jarnail A Singh re
Disclosure Officer for
Horizon
POL-0142791
15.
POL00058155
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Hugh Flemington,
Susan Crichton and
Alwen
Lyon re: 2nd Sight
Review
draft
POL-0054634
16.
POL00141416
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Andy Cash re Horizon
integrity project
POL-0142801
17.
POL00175144
Email from Keith Gilchrist
to Joanne Hancock re:
Horizon integrity project
POL-0170428
18.
POL00141478
Email chain from Jarnail
A
Singh to Martin Smith,
cc'd
Sharron L Jennings and
Helen Dickinson re Mr
Nemesh Patel
POL-0142863
19.
POL00143339
Email chain from susan
critchon re jernail singh,
ronan kelleher with mark
davies and alana Renner
POL-BSFF-
0002504
20.
POL00089436
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
POL-0086411
Page 44 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
Hugh Flemington re:
Horizon cases
Zi,
POL00124770
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
Rachel Panter, Steve
Bradshaw and Martin
Smith regarding Horizon
cases
POL-0131604
22.
23.
POL00325434
POL00186039
Jarnail Singh’s email to
Rachael Panter on 21
February 2013
Email from Hugh
Flemington to Susan
Crichton RE: FW: Horizon
Issues URGENT
POL-0172652
POL-BSFF-
0024102
24.
POL00062588
Seema Misra Case Study
Email Chain from, Jarnail
Singh to Belinda Crowe,
Angela Van Den Bogerd
Re M012 - further
Disclosure
POL-0059067
25.
POL00144855
Email from Rodric
Williams
(POL) to Lesley J Sewell
(POL); Alwen Lyons
(POL),
Rod Ismay (POL) &
others
RE: Anomaly in 14
branches
POL-BSFF-
0003982
26.
POL00144856
Draft Letter to J Mistry
from Andy Winn
POL-BSFF-
0003983
20
POL00029622
Email from Rod Ismay to
Rodric Williams, Andrew
Winn, Simon Baker and
Lesley Sewell and others,
re: Anomaly in 14
Branches - Strictly Private
& Confidential - Subject
to
Privilege - Do Not
Forward
POL-0026104
28.
POL00029623
Undated report re:
Branch
Accounting Incidents.
POL-0026105
29.
POL00062368
Email from Simon Baker
to
Gareth Jenkins, Alwen
Lyons and others re:
POL-0058847
Page 45 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
Discuss of defect in
horizon in court
30.
POL00144948
Email from Hugh
Flemington to Alwen
Lyons
and others re: Legally
privileged and
confidential
POL-BSFF-
0004075
31.
POL00190855
Email from Hugh
Flemington To: Susan
Crichton, Rodric Williams,
Jarnail A Singh re legally
privileged and
confidential
- do not forward
POL-BSFF-
0028918
32.
POL00190856
Confidential V18a -
Interim
Report into alleged
problems with the
Horizon
system
POL-BSFF-
0028919
33.
POLO00099063
Signed Interim Report
into
alleged problems with the
Horizon system
POL-0098646
POL00022598
The Helen Rose Report
POL-0019077
POL00323841
Email from Martin Smith
to
Rodric Williams, Simon
Clarke and others re the
report of Helen Rose
POL-0172299
36.
POL00129392
Email from Allison Drake
to
Shirley Hailstones and
others re Helen Rose
Report and CQRs
POL-0134995
37.
POL00083932
Meeting Minutes for
Regular Call RE: Horizon
Issues on 19/07/2013
POL-0080863
38.
POL00139731
Meeting: Regular Call re
Horizon Issues
POL-0141432
39.
POL00139732
Regular Call Minutes re
Horizon Issues including
action points dated
31/07/13
POL-0141433
40.
POL00139745
Note Entry for Case -
37142 - POL Cases Rev
time recording re
discussing disclosure
issues
POL-0141446
Page 46 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
41.
POL00325474
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
To: Martin Smith and CC:
Rodric Williams re
Disclosure in Criminal
cases
POL-0172680
42.
POL00006799
Advice on Disclosure and
the Duty to Record and
Retain Material
POL-0017591
43.
POL00083930
Meeting Minutes for
Regular Call re Horizon
Issues
POL-0080861
POL00139748
Note Entry for Case
37142
Summary - TC from JS.
John Scott will be in conf
call > MJS said not ap
POL-0141449
45.
POL00129005
Email from Rob King to
Jarnail A Singh, RE
Regular Call re Horizon
Issues
POL-0134246
46.
POL00325492
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Andrew Parsons, John
M Scott CC'd Rob King
and others RE; Regular
Wednesday Call re
Horizon Issue
POL-0172690
47.
POL00089720
Meeting Minutes for
Regular Call re Horizon
Issues
POL-0086695
48.
POL00139728
Bond Dickinson Regular
Call re Horizon Issues.
Attendees Rodric
Williams,
Martin Smith, Andrew
Parsons and others
POL-0141429
49.
POL00323677
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Susan Crichton, Rodric
Williams, Simon Clarke
RE: Fujitsu Lawyers and
the Friday COnference
CAIl
POL-0172015
50.
POL00145130
Email between POL staff
members regarding
issues
from the conference:
letters to be sent to
branches and B14 timing
POL-BSFF-
0004257
Page 47 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
51.
POL00145142
Email regarding letters to
branches and B14 timing
POL-BSFF-
0004269
52.
POL00145145
Email between Cartwright
King and Post Office
regarding the
discrepancies found in
the
14 branches.
POL-BSFF-
0004272
53.
POL00006365
CK advice on FJ expert
and criminal case review
POL-0017633
POL00039994
Letter from Sally Berlin to
Paula Vennells, RE:
Horizon Computer
System
POL-0036476
55.
POL00040000
RE: Post Office Ltd-
Prosecutions- Expert
Evidence- Advice on the
Use of the Expert
Evidence Relating to the
Integrity of the FJ
Services
Ltd Horizon System -
Simon Clarke, Barrister
POL-0036482
56.
POL00006800
Clarke Advice on
Compensation for
Miscarriages of Justice
POL-0017592
57.
POL00297952
Email from Matthews
Gavin to Susan Crichton,
Simon Richardson,
Jarnail
A Singh and others
RE;PRIVILEGED &
CONFIDENTIAL - Terms
of
reference for the
appointment of Brian
Altman QC
POL-BSFF-
0136002
58.
POL00297953
Bond Dickinson - Terms
of
Reference for the
Appointment of Brian
Altman QC
POL-BSFF-
0136003
59.
POL00006583
Interim Review of CK
Processes by Brian
Altman
Qc
POL-0017668
60.
POL00021980
Email from Gavin
Matthews to Susan
Crichton, Rodric Williams,
Hugh Flemington and
POL-0018459
Page 48 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
others re: Brian Altman
Qc
- terms of Reference
61.
POL00021981
Terms of Reference for
the
Appointment of Brian
Altman QC, Observations
POL-0018460
62.
POL00021982
Draft Terms of Reference
for the Appointment of
Brian Altman QC
POL-0018461
63.
POL00006485
Note of Conference with
Brian Altman QC
POL-0017790
POL00139866
Notes of Meeting with
BAQC 9/9/13
POL-0141042
65.
POL00006581
Review of PO
prosecutions by Brian
Altman QC
POL-0017666
66.
POL00038592
Draft Review of Post
Office
Ltd Prosecution Role by
Brian Altman QC
POL-0027903
67.
POL00146861
Email form Jarnail Singh
to
Chris Aujard re: Meeting
with Brian Altman QC
POL-BSFF-
0005988
68.
POL00146859
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Chris Aujard RE: FW:
Telephone Conference
with BAQC 18/11/2013
POL-BSFF-
0005986
69.
POL00112937
Post Office Ltd Review of
Post Office Ltd
Prosecution Role - Brian
Altman QC
POL-0110333
70.
POL00123147
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
David Oliver cc Rodric
Williams RE: briefing on
Cartwright King review
work
POL-0129352
TT.
POL00148260
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
Chris Aujard, cc'd Jessica
Madron, and Amanda A
Brown. RE: Decision
taker
in POL prosecution.
POL-BSFF-
0007383
72.
POL00133638
POST OFFICE LTD —
CASE REVIEW R. v.
JERRY KWAME HOSI
POL-0138091
Page 49 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
Snaresbrook Crown
Court
73.
POL00123515
Email chain from Chris
Aujard to Amanda Brown
re: Horizon Computer
System — draft letter to
CCRC drafted and
approved by Gavin
Matthews of BD —
10/12/2014
POL-0127412
74.
POL00169318
Email chain from Jarnail
Singh to Andrew
Parsons,
Angela Van-Den-Bogerd,
Rodric Williams and
others
RE: Officer's report
POL-0167540
75.
POL00325950
Email from Belinda
Crowe
To: Jarnail Singh CC ing
Belinda Crowe, Martin
Smith,. RE: M052 -
further
disclosure
POL-0173076
76.
POL00146675
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
To: Alwen Lyons CC:
Rodric Williams, Hugh
Flemington re request
approval for Appointment
of Horizon experts
POL-BSFF-
0005802
we
POL00146676
Letter on expert
witnesses
for civil recovery and
criminal prosecution
proceedings.
POL-BSFF-
0005803
78.
POL00146919
Email from Jarnail A
Singh
to Rodric Williams,
Harvey
Michael cc'd James
Davidson and others re:
Expert on the Horizon
System - Subject to
Common Interest
Privilege
POL-BSFF-
0006046
79.
POL00125568
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
Chris Aujard, Jessica
Madron, Rodric Williams
POL-0130686
Page 50 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
and others re: Expert -
Initial Review -Proposal
for
investigation into the
integrity of the Post Office
Horizon Online
accounting
system
80.
POL00125569
Initial Review: Proposal
for
investigation into the
integrity of the Post Office
Horizon Online
accounting
system
POL-0130687
81.
POL00148714
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
Chris Aujard re: Expert
POL-BSFF-
0007835
82.
POL00148749
Advice from Cartwright
King Solicitors re matters
of concern arising out of
the instruction of Imperial
Consultants Limited
POL-BSFF-
0007870
83.
POL00149562
Email from Jessica
Madron to Chris Aujard
FW: Top 5 cases
POL-BSFF-
0008682
POL00325918
Email from Andrew
Pheasant to Jarnail
Singh,
Martin Smith, Andrew
Parsons and others Re;
CK Draft Instructions to
Expert
POL-0173053
85.
POL00325919
Letter from IC
Consultants,
Elena Martynenko to
Martin Smith Re:
Quotation for professor
Kramer and Dr Dulay
consultancy to PO
POL-0173054
86.
POL00325920
Post Office - Draft
Instructions to Expert
Witness
POL-0173055
87.
POL00148973
Email chain including
Jarnail Singh (POL);
Rodric Williams (POL);
Nisha Marwaha & others
Re: Significant Litigation
Report
POL-BSFF-
0008093
88.
UKGI00018250
Post Office Limited
VIS00011649
Page 51 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
Matters
- Dispute Resolution,
Claims over £500K or
those of a sensitive
nature
table.
89.
POL00004439
Initial Complaint Review
and Mediation Scheme -
Briefing Report - Part
One
- Prepared by Second
Sight
VIS00005507
90.
POL00021816
Email from Andrew
Parsons (Womble Bond
Dickinson) to Jarnail
Singh
re: RW Letter to SS.
POL-0018295
91.
POL00021817
Letter from Rodric
Williams
to Ron Warmington & lan
Henderson RE: Second
Sight's Draft Part Two
Mediation Briefing Report
(the "Draft Report")
POL-0018296
92.
POL00021818
Second Sight’s Draft Part
Two Mediation Briefing
Report (the “Draft
Report”)
Appendix to Post Office
letter dated 14 August
2014
POL-0018297
93.
POL00021819
Draft Initial Complaint
Review and Mediation
Scheme - MEDIATION
BRIEFING REPORT
PART
Two
POL-0018298
94,
POL00029849
Initial Complaint Review
Mediation Scheme:
Second Sight Briefing
Report - Part Two
POL-0026331
95.
UKGI00000018
POL response to Second
Sight briefing report - Part
Two as part of the
Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme
VIS00000979
96.
POL00040239
Email from Andrew
Parsons to Jarnail Singh,
RE: Part 2 Report -
22/08/2014
POL-0036721
Page 52 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200
97.
POL00169392
Email from Jarnail Singh
to
Jessica Madron re: BBC
Inside Out Request for
Interview
POL-0167550
Page 53 of 53
WITNO04750200
WITNO04750200