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Witness Name: Anthony Richard Utting
Statement No.: WITN08200100
Dated: 23 October 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF Anthony Richard Utting
I, Anthony Richard Utting, will say as follows...
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
(the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 22
September 2023 (the “Request’).
2. Iama former employee of Post Office Limited and joined the Post Office on 16"
January 1986 as a Postal Officer on the Post Office Counter. In 1989 I moved to
Royal Mail where I worked as a Postal Officer in the Personnel team, covering Staff
superannuation, Annual leave and Sick Absence. In 1990 I was asked to join the
Royal Mail Investigations team, initially as a Postal officer and later as acting
Investigation Manager. In 1992, I joined the Post Office Investigation Department
(POID) as an Assistant Investigation Officer, Primarily Investigating Crimes against
the Postal side of the business. In 1995 or 1996 POID was disbanded and I joined
Royal Mail Security as a Security and Investigations Manager. In 1999, I moved to
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Post Office Ltd as an Investigation Manager and after a restructure was appointed
as Investigation Team leader in 2001. Whilst employed in this role, I spent around 1
year working as the business Security Lead on the Post Office Card Account
Project and had only a small amount of oversight of my Investigation Team
members. On my return from the Project, I applied for and was appointed to the
role of Policy and Standards Manager. I stayed in this role until I was appointed the
National Internal Crime and Investigations Manager in 2004, which was renamed
National Investigation Manager in 2006. In early 2007 the National Investigation
Manager role was split and I took charge of the Commercial Security and Mails
Integrity portion of the role. I left Post Office Security in November 2007 to
commence a role in Royal Mail Marketing, where I remained until I left under
voluntary redundancy in 2017.
. [joined the post office as an Investigation Manager on promotion in 1999, from my
Security Manager role in Royal Mail Security. I was trained as an investigator whilst
working in POID (Post Office Investigation Department) in 1992 and by the time I
joined Post Office Limited, I had six years of experience in the investigation of
various types of crime against the Post Office/Royal Mail. I had an initial six weeks
residential training when I joined POID followed by 12 weeks of working under
supervision of an experienced colleague. In total my trial period should have been
12 months but my appointment was confirmed after 9 months. I attended various in
house and external training courses in a variety of subjects including, Cognitive
interview techniques, Search awareness, conflict avoidance, PACE, Human Rights
Act, surveillance and advanced driving. I was also an NVQ level 3 assessor in
Investigations. My role in Post Office Ltd was to investigate allegations of criminal
offences perpetrated against the Post Office, gather evidence, interview witnesses
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and suspects, prepare case files for court and give evidence when required. When I
first joined the team, I reported to Mike Devanney. Soon afterwards a restructure of
the Security Community was commenced and Mike was moved to lead this. I then
reported to Phil Gerrish for a time and to Ray Pratt when Phil was moved upwards
for a period. I found all of those I worked with in this role to be experienced, very
competent and professional.
. I became an Investigation Team Manager after the restructure of Security in 2001.
This role was similar to my previous role, save that in this role I was also the line
manager of a team of investigators. Whilst employed in this role I was seconded to
the Post Office Card Account project and so my role was back filled. I managed the
team from a distance. My line manager during this period was Phil Gerrish. My
colleagues and manager were in my view very competent and professional.
. On my retum form The Card Account Project I was appointed to the role of Policy
and Standards Manager. The purpose of this role was to have oversight of
investigation Policy and to ensure that policies were developed and maintained to
the desired standard, In this role I reported to Phil Gerrish. I found all of my
colleagues to be very competent and professional.
. When Phil Gerrish Moved to Corporate Security in 2004, I applied for and was
appointed to the role of National Internal Crime and Investigations Manager. The
name of the role was changed after an internal reorganisation in 2006, to National
Investigations Manager. In this role, I oversaw the Investigation team, as well as the
Casework Team and Commercial Security At some point I was also asked to
oversee Information Security Incident Management and when they were
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introduced, I also managed the Financial Investigations Managers. As well as my
management responsibilities, I continued to undertake investigations where my
experience and seniority were required. I also became a member of the Royal Mail
Group Security Committee, which comprised the most senior and experienced
Security Managers within Royal Mail. Early into my time in this role, we introduced
Financial Investigations and I was trained as Senior Authorising Officer under
POCA.I was also the business authority for surveillance under RIPA. I initially
reported to Tony Marsh. Then after a reorganisation, my team moved under Rod
Ismay and then after a subsequent reorganisation we returned to Tony Marsh's
Security Team. I had no concerns about the members of my team or managers
during this time and felt that all were very competent and professional.
. In early 2007 my role was split and I lost responsibility for all aspects of the criminal
investigation function. I was responsible for Commercial Security, which entailed
myself and my team of three Commercial Security Managers examining Business
processes and products and identifying potential risks. My role in the lead team of
Security was considerably diminished and I was removed from the Security Council
during this period. My Line Manager at this time was John Scott. I felt that I had
more to offer than was being asked of me. I left Post Office Security in November
2007.
. In each of the Operational investigation roles above, I would be responsible for
providing a disciplinary report relating to cases I investigated, where a suspect was
identified investigated and for ensuring these were completed where required by
investigators within my direct supervision. I would also be responsible for
disciplinary matters within my own management area. I would also be required to
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undertake interviews under caution with suspected offenders, produce case files,
including disclosure of evidence for criminal cases and on occasion liaison with
other departments including Line Managers, Senior Managers and in major cases,
Corporate Security and the Post Office board. Between around 2005 and early
2007, I produced a monthly report for the Post Office Executive.
The Security team’s role in relation to criminal investigations, prosecutions and
debt recovery
9.
I have been asked to set out my involvement in the development and
management of a number of policies: POL00104747, POL00104777,
POL00104754, POL00030687, POL00104762, POL00121521,
POL00121496, POL00039960, POL00030552, POL00121518,
POL00121517, POL00072288, POL00121550, NFSP00000043 and
POL00131782.
10.1 have no recollection of being involved in the development or management of
these documents. Having said this, where the document is owned by
Corporate Security, as an investigator I would be expected to abide by it and
as Policy and Standards Manager, I would have been responsible to liaise
with Corporate Security with a view to maintaining its currency. With Regard
any POL Investigation Policies, I may have been responsible for managing
these within POL whilst I was Policy and Standards Manager. Possibly
alongside the Casework Manager.
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11.I have also been asked to set out my involvement in the development or
management of the following documents: POL00104812 and the later
versions POL00031003 and POL00031004, POL00104806, POL00104828,
POL00084977, POL00084983 and POL00084989. These documents appear
to have been produced during or after 2007 and I had no involvement with
any of these.
12.I have been asked to consider POLO00021416 and to describe the role of the
Risk and Control Committee. I have no recollection of the role of this
committee. I believe I may have attended the committee twice for my line
manager, Rod Ismay
13.1 have been asked to consider POL00104812 and to describe the role of the
Investigation Policy Review Group. I have no recollection of this Group.
14.1 had no involvement in the development of investigation policies post
separation. I have no knowledge of any impacts separation may have had as I
had left the Security Community in 2007.
15.Whilst I worked in the Security Community, our investigations were conducted
in accordance to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, Criminal Procedures
and Investigations Act, Human Rights Act, Regulation of investigatory Powers
Act, Proceeds of Crime Act (2004 onwards) and any other legislation that
affected criminal investigations and prosecutions. Royal Mail Corporate
Security produced and communicated a number of policies relating to the
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conduct of Investigations, preparation of case files, management of case work
etc.
16.To my recollection there was no distinction between Crown Office staff and
agents with regards to investigation and prosecution policy.
17.I have been asked to describe what the process was for dealing with
complaints regarding the conduct of an investigation by the security Team. I
have no recollection of any formal process, but can say that all Security Team
managers and staff were subject to the same disciplinary procedures as other
members of Post Office Staff, save that where any serious allegations were
made, these could be referred to the Corporate Security Team who would
undertake an independent Investigation of what went on “outside of the line”.
These investigations would normally be undertaken where there was an
allegation of serious misconduct, or a suspicion of criminality. There was also
a team of Harassment Investigators who would investigate allegations of
bullying and harassment from across the Royal Mail Group and Investigators
could also be investigated via that route.
18.1 cannot recall any exact details of how investigations were supervised, but all
investigators were trained to follow Royal Mail Group investigation policies
and procedures and they were also aware of the necessary timescales for
undertaking and reporting their work. Casefiles would be checked on
submission by the casework team and any documents prepared for
prosecution cases would be checked by Legal Services prior to being
disclosed. Investigators were under the management line of the team leaders
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who would hold monthly 121s with them to ensure they were completing their
work to time and standard and to ensure they were getting whatever support,
guidance and assistance they required.
19.1 have been asked to consider document HOCO0000001, which includes a
letter from the Post Office to the Law Commission about the repeal of section
69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. I can say that I have never
seen this document before and other than Mike Heath I have no knowledge of
anybody involved in this matter.
Audit and Investigation
20.1 have been asked to consider the document “Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance” (version 2, October 2008) (POL00104821). I have no recollection
of this document, or its purpose. Investigators would normally only attend a
branch audit, if it had been requested by them, as part of an ongoing
investigation. They would also be requested to attend should an audit take
place and a shortage be found that met the threshold for a criminal
investigation to commence.
21.When a shortage occurred at a branch during an audit, there was a trigger
point of value of loss that would mean that the Investigations Team would
need to be called and an Investigation commenced. I believe this may have
been business policy. I do not recall the exact details, but I do remember that
the level of loss that would trigger an investigation was raised during the time
that I worked in the Team. If the branch concerned was a sub post office, then
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I think the Area Manager would be contacted and made aware of the
situation. They would be responsible for the decision to suspend a
subpostmaster. I don’t think this changed whilst I was in the team. I do not
recall the trigger values for instigating an investigation, but they were based
on loss and not any potential criminal charges that might be necessary at a
later date. This did not change during my time in the Team.
The process followed by Security team investigators when conducting a
criminal investigation following the identification of a shortfall at an audit
22. Once an investigation was commenced, an investigator would take steps to
secure all necessary documentation and other evidence at the Branch. They
would then gather any further evidence they required, interview suspects and
witnesses and analyse the documentation and reports from Horizon in order
to establish the cause of the loss. Once they had completed this task they
would summarise any tape recorded interviews and write a report, which
would be submitted to casework for checking that all aspects had been dealt
with correctly. They were all aware of the requirements in this area and had
been provided with all necessary instructions and guidelines to enable them to
conduct a proper investigation.
The IMPACT Release 3 Branch Trading Project
23.1 do not recall why I was involved in the IMPACT project, but I think it may
have been to ensure that the evidence gathering ability of the Investigation
Team was not compromised by changes to the system and to ensure we
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understood any changes to the balancing process, in order that we could still
undertake meaningful investigations. I do not recall the outcome of the project
having any effect on the way investigations were conducted. In coming to this
conclusion, I was asked to consider the following documents: FUJ00126052,
FUJ00126053, FUJ00126057, FUJ00126058, POL00038878, FUJ00126064,
FUJ00126062 and POL00104589. None of these documents provide me with
any further insight as to my involvement.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
24. If an investigation was reported and a suspect offender was identified, the
case would be forwarded to Royal Mail legal service for consideration of
whether a prosecution could be brought. The Legal Services Team would
then provide an advice that would say whether there was a realistic probability
of success should a prosecution be brought. If the advice suggested a
prosecution would be successful, then prosecution authority would be sought.
25.1 believe that when I joined POL, the prosecution decision was made within
the management line, possibly by the Head of Retail Network for the area
concerned. At some point the decision authority was moved into the
Investigations Team. I am not sure when that was.
26.1 believe that it was business policy to prosecute, if the evidence suggested
that it would be successful and it was in the public interest to do so.
Consideration of these matters was given by Legal Services who I believe
used the same formula as the CPS when considering prosecution. When I
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was the prosecution authority, I would authorise prosecutions if Legal
Services advised that we might be successful. I believe that it was important
to have a consistent approach in these matters.
27.The Legal Services advice would inform us as to what charges to use. It
would also include any further evidence requirements that they thought would
be required.
28. Financial Investigators were introduced to the team in 2004, or 2005. The
Proceeds of Crime Act and the training they received gave details of the
circumstances under which a confiscation order could be sought and this was
used to guide their actions. After this length of time, I have no recollection of
how the process worked. I was the Senior Authorising Officer and would make
the decision to pursue any action under the Proceeds of Crime Act. The court
would make the enforcement decisions.
29.When I joined the Investigation team, Investigation recoveries were sought at
court during prosecution proceedings. If there was no recovery achieved at
court, then the case would be referred to the Legal Services Civil Litigation
Team for conduct of a civil case. There was no further activity from the
Investigation team in the cases. When we introduced Financial Investigators,
the recoveries from criminal were handled by the Financial Investigators. I had
no involvement in any non Investigation Team cases, with regards to
recoveries.
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Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security team
30.All of the investigators that were in the Team that I took over in 2004 had
been trained by the Post Office Security and investigation Services Training
Dept, save those who were ex Post Office Investigation Department officers,
who had been trained when they joined that team. The training consisted of
instruction on the relevant Acts appertaining to offences and investigation of
them, conducting interviews with suspects and witnesses; including interviews
under caution, conducting searches, evidence gathering, how to identify when
further evidence is required and how to obtain it, including obtaining evidence
from third parties like Fujitsu, disclosure of evidence and report writing. Most
training was conducted by in house training officers, but there was also some
external training, such as search training, witness training, in some cases
driving courses and evidence gathering In addition to their initial training, all
were supervised by more experienced investigators during their trial period, in
order that they could be monitored for their performance and guided through
the complexities of POL investigations. There were regular Security
Communications distributed that would inform investigators of any changes to
process or legislation that affected how they were to perform their roles.
3
.I have been asked to consider documents POL00104747 and POL00104777
(Casework Management documents version 1.0 and version 4.0 respectively).
I have no memory of these specific documents, but I recognise what they are
and I believe these would have been circulated to all investigators as part of a
Security Circular when I was an investigator. Bullet 2 of page 2 of that
documents appears to be an instruction to ensure that the instructions are
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complied with. Bullet 3 of page 2 suggests that Legal Services are the
decision maker with regards what items are disclosable in a prosecution case.
Bullet 4 of page 2 is an instruction as to what to include on an operational or
procedural failures report and where to put this on the disclosure forms. I
believe this would have applied to any Bugs errors or defects in the Horizon
system that could have had an impact on a prosecution. Compliance checks
were undertaken in all cases to ensure that content requirements were met,
reports were set out correctly and contained the necessary sections and case
files and appendices were set out correctly. They were carried out by the
casework team. I have no knowledge of the document entitled “Identification
Codes” (POL00118104) being in existence during my time in the Investigation
team. I do not consider the description of the codes to be appropriate. The
assignation of identity codes to offenders was a requirement throughout my
time as an investigator and I think it was to do with reporting offenders to
PNC.
Analysing Horizon data, requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu and relationship
with Fujitsu
32.1 am asked what analysis would be undertaken of Horizon data by
investigators when a shortfall was claimed to have been caused by Horizon. I
have no recollection of what analysis would have been undertaken, as this
would depend on the individual case. The cases I dealt with were
predominantly about suppressing of transactions or fraudulent transactions
such as double counting or encashing stolen benefit books. In these cases we
would want to have evidence of what transactions took place, when they took
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place and who undertook them. We would match these up with the associated
documentation to show that the system had been used fraudulently. In an
audit shortage case, I am not sure what Horizon would be able to tell us.
Though it has been a long time since I looked at one.
I am asked about the arrangements for obtaining data from Fujitsu relating to
investigations, and I have been referred to documents POL00029169,
FUJ00152176, FUJ00002033 and FUJ00080107. I have no specific memory
of how the process worked, other than to say that we had an arrangement
whereby data could be obtained for analysis as part of an investigation, that
there were limits on how many requests were allowed per year and that the
data received was to include all transactions and events that took place at the
branch concerned for the period requested. I know that we exceeded the
request numbers one year, but am not sure how we managed the situation. I
don’t know who provided the data from Fujitsu, but I believe that requests
were managed by the casework team. I believe that the data was provided on
CDs in the form of .csv files. It is my understanding that the Fujitsu contract
included the requirement to provide witness statements relating to the
performance of the system and the accuracy of the data we received.
By reference to document POL001 14566, I have been asked to explain my
involvement in the discussions that took place in 2003-4 relating to increasing
the number of audit request that POL could make of Fujitsu. I believe I was
drawn into discussions due to the number of requests we were using and the
restrictions on data that were placed upon us. My role was to try to persuade
the business leaders that we needed better access to data in order to carry
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out our investigation activity. I am not clear on why the number of requests
was reduced in 2003, as I was not involved in these discussions. From the
emails submitted it looks like the business wanted to cut costs, by removing
the need to pay for requests that we were not making each year. The
decrease meant that investigators had to be more mindful of how much data
they requested and it meant that with the investigations we had ongoing, that
we struggled to get access to sufficient data in a timely fashion. It also meant
that without an increase in data requests we would need to cease activities for
a time, until the access was “unlocked” in the next year. In 2004, we laid out
the circumstances of our predicament and made it clear to the business that
data was important and was becoming more so, with the changes that were
taking place across the operation. This meant that in order to facilitate
investigations we would need to improve access to Horizon data. I cannot
recall the attempts to gain access directly to Horizon data exactly, but I think
we felt that if we had access to the data to check what had happened at a
particular branch, we could do our analysis on any branch we were looking at
and then only use ARQ requests where we needed the base data and a
witness statement as to its originality and completeness from Fujitsu. I do not
believe we ever achieved any direct access to the data, but we may have
made some use of POLMIS (Post Office Management Information System) for
this purpose when it was introduced. I may be wrong on this point. My view
was not necessarily that POL should have direct access to the Horizon data.
Simply because we would not be in a position to provide any expert testimony
as to its accuracy, completeness etc. I think what we were aiming for was the
ability to undertake our work without the need to be mindful of limits on the
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availability of important evidence and data was becoming more and more
important. If we had been given direct access to the data, it would have
greatly assisted the initial stage of any investigation where data was required
as we would not have had to go to Fujitsu to acquire it. Conversely, having
access would have required finding the necessary trained resource to access
it and provide it in a useable form to investigators. This would have been
difficult in the prevailing circumstances.
35.1 am unable to remember any specific cases, though in audit shortage cases
where any comment was made about the accuracy of Horizon, I believe that
audit data would have been requested, in order that it could be examined for
any indication of spurious transactions. I have no recollection as to whether
ARQ data was disclosed in prosecution cases.
36.1 have been asked to explain the contents of document FUJ00171998. It looks
to me like there was a discussion about the destruction of data relating to an
office that DWP were conducting a prosecution in relation to. DWP were
demanding that data destruction cease and Fujitsu seem to be saying that
they have no contract with DWP and thought they can cease temporarily, they
are a commercial organisation and can act in accordance with their contract.
37. During my time with POL Investigations, I had little contact with Fujitsu and I
do not recall meeting Gareth Jenkins or Penny Thomas. I did meet with Bill
Mitchell and some other Fujitsu colleagues and I visited Fujitsu for meetings
on occasion. I also undertook a joint presentation with Fujitsu at the Stock
Exchange, where I gave a description of how we used Horizon data in
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Pension and allowance fraud cases. To prove when stolen benefit books had
been cashed and by whom.
38.1 do not recall Gareth Jenkins’ role in prosecutions, though I do remember that
for every case where Horizon data was used, we needed to have a witness
from Horizon to attest to the security and proper functioning of the system and
the accuracy of the data. Gareth Jenkins may have been this person, but I do
not remember.
POL -v- Lee Castleton (Marine Drive Post Office)
39.1 have been asked to describe my participation in the case of POL v Lee
Castleton, and I have been referred to the following documents:
POL00070492, POL00107426, POL00070457, POLO0070769,
POL00083161_005, POL00070736, POL00070978, POL00070962,
POL00071249, POL00070864, POL00120837, POL00070854,
POL00070851, POL00070850, POL00070839, POL00070840,
POL00113488, and POL00090437.
40.1 have no recollection of this case or my involvement, but can see from
documents provided to me that I had some dealings with the solicitors for the
Post Office who were pursuing the case. It would seem that they were having
some difficulty in finding the right contacts within Fujitsu and myself and
Graham Ward tried to assist in this area. I was asked to look at some Horizon
data, but without sufficient detail to allow me to do very much with it.
Apparently I produced a witness statement in this matter, but I have no
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recollection of this and it has not been provided to me. From the emails, I
believe it was to cover how the Horizon system would work at the counter, but
I can’t be sure. I believe I may have attended meetings in relation to the case,
but have no recollection of them. At the time of my involvement in this case, I
knew of very few cases where Horizon was being called into question. I think
those I heard about here were the total at that time but I may be wrong. I had
no role in disclosure in this case. I have read a lot of emails relating to this
case and my understanding is that POL had difficulty in getting Fujitsu to
provide the necessary statements and this was proving a difficulty in the case.
I had no input into the tactical approach taken in this case and I was never
involved in civil litigation and so can’t comment on how it works.
Involvement in the criminal case studies being considered by the Inquiry
Prosecution of Carl Page
41.1 have been asked about my involvement in the prosecution of Carl Page, and
I have been referred to the following documents: POL00093908,
POL00093702, POL00093701, POL00093760, POL00093759,
POL00093758, POL00045921, POL00065034, POL00047775,
POL00053309 and POL00066519.
42.I have a vague recollection of this case, simply because it was a large value
case and was unusual in the way the crime was perpetrated. I have no
recollection of being involved in the case in any way, but document
POL00093908 provided to me suggests that I prepared a schedule of
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transactions at some point. I am not sure what this schedule was and have no
recollection of preparing it. I am not sure if I was the prosecution authority in
this case or not and have not been provided with any details that would assist
me. In the financial investigation, I was the Senior Authorising Officer and so
would have authorised the requests for information. I had no involvement in
the enforcement proceedings. I had no further involvement in the case.
Prosecution of Oyeteju Adedayo
43.1 have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution of Oyeteju
Adedayo, and I have been referred to the following documents:
POL00068926, POL00044360, POL00066742, POL00066745,
POL00044363, POL00044364, POL00044367, POL00044365,
POL00047897, POL00030561, POL00044370, POL00052589, and
POL00052902.
44.1 do not recall having any involvement in the case at the Investigation stage,
but documents provided to me suggest that I was the Prosecution Authority.
In order to authorise the prosecution I would have been sent the casefile and
the Legal Services Advice and if there was a prospect of a conviction, I would
authorise the prosecution. At the time that the case was prosecuted Mrs
Adedayo had made a full confession with regards what had happened to the
money relating to the shortfall and there was no allegation about the Horizon
system. I was also the Senior Authorising Officer with regards the Financial
Investigation. From my reading of the documents sent to me I believe that the
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investigation and prosecution were conducted in a fair and professional
manner.
Prosecution of Tahir Mahmood
45.1 have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution of Tahir
Mahmood, and I have been referred to the following documents:
POL00052884, POL00044850, POL00066040, POL00066746,
POL00044884, POL00047765, POL00052892, POL00047766,
POL00044860, and POL00044859.
46.1 have no recollection of this investigation or the subsequent prosecution.
From documents that have been sent to me I believe that I would have been
the prosecution authority for this case. Having read the documents sent to me
including the second part of the tape-recorded interview and the investigators
report, I am unaware of any allegations about the functioning of the Horizon
system made by Mr Mahmood during the investigation. It is also not clear
what investigation took place regarding the losses and how they occurred. I
was also the senior authorising officer in respect of POCA for POL and would
have authorised the financial investigators activities. As POCA was relatively
new to us at that time, I believe I may have attended Croydon Crown Court
along with the Financial Investigator to get the disclosure orders approved by
the Judge in chambers. As part of review of this case I was asked to look at
documents amongst these was POLO0066746. This document is said to be a
transcript of Mr Mahmood’s interview, but appears to be incomplete, as it
starts with a statement that the interview is being resumed.
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Prosecution of Hughie Thomas
47.
48.
I have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution of Hughie
Thomas, and I have been referred to the following documents: POL00044861,
POL00044862, POL00044864, POL00044881, POL00047748,
FUJ00155181, POL00047780, POL00044883, POL00044873, and
POL00048361.
I have no recollection of this case, but by reading the documents sent to me I
can say that I was not involved in the initial investigation and had no
involvement in the case until I was asked to approve the prosecution, as the
Prosecution authority. In order to approve the prosecution, I would have read
the case file and the advice from legal Services. As all appeared to be in order
I authorised the prosecution. I can see that Mr Thomas made some reference
to Horizon at interview, but when taken in context, considering his responses
to questioning and by looking at the subsequent view of the “nil transactions”
he was talking about, I would have been comfortable that there was no issue
with Horizon and that he had some other reason for making those comments.
I was the Senior Authorising Officer for POL in POCA cases and so would
have overall responsibility for authorising any actions that required my
authority. In this case I would have needed to authorise the restraint order
before it was taken before a judge. I was also responsible for closing down
the further enquiries that were suggested to me.
Page 21 of 33
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Prosecution of Suzanne Palmer
49.1 have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution relating to
Suzanne Palmer, and I have been referred to the following documents:
POL00052984, POL00053009, POL00053007, POL00068280,
POL00053005, POL00053006, POL00052990, POL00053011,
POL00052994, POL00053003, POL00053008, POL00052986, and
POL00052993.
50.1 have no recollection of this case, or having any involvement with it. In the
Investigation Report POL00068280, I named as the Prosecution Authority,
however in the casework event log, it appears that the authority was sent to
Dave Pardoe, so it may be that he authorised the prosecution in this case. At
that time, it would have been because I was away on leave or otherwise not
available. I was not aware that Suzanne Palmer had made any allegations
about the functioning of the Horizon system and none of the documents
disclosed to me suggest that she did. I have not been provided with any
documents relating to the financial investigation and so am unable to say
whether I had any involvement. However, if there was one prior to March
2007, there is all likelihood that I would have had some oversight. As part of
my evidence in this matter I was asked to review document POL00053008. I
have no recollection of ever having seen this document before and given that
it is an advice from Counsel, I would not expect to see this in my role, which
was quite detached from that of the investigator in the case.
Page 22 of 33
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Prosecution of Janet Skinner
51.1 have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution of Janet
Skinner, and I have been referred to the following documents: POL00048199,
POL00044630, POL00044624, POL00044639, POL00044632,
POL00044633, POL00044656, POL00066726, POL00066725,
POL00066739, POL00066728, POL00048013, POL00048167,
POL00048397, POL00048415, and POLO0044669.
52.1 have no recollection of this matter, but papers disclosed to me suggest that I
was the prosecution authority and in that capacity, I would have authorised
the prosecution based on the content of the investigators report and the
advice form legal services. I do not recall the plea bargaining aspect, but the
email I have seen POL00048397, suggests that a conversation took place
with legal services and I agreed to accept a plea to a false accounting charge.
I have no recollection of any further involvement in the case, but as the senior
authorising officer under POCA, I would probably have authorised the initial
financial investigation. From the timeline involved it is possible that I was not
involved in this case after this point.
Prosecution of Josephine Hamilton
53.1 have been asked to review the investigation and prosecution of Josephine
Hamilton, and I have been referred to the following documents:
POL00047955, POL00118877, POL00048207, POL00052618, POL00118990
and POL00049071.
Page 23 of 33
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54.1 have no recollection of this investigation, but can see from an email
disclosed to me POL00048207, that I authorised the prosecution. I would
have agreed this having read the investigators report and legal advice. I was
not aware that Josephine Hamilton made any allegations about the Horizon
system at the time and it would appear to me that the investigator reviewed
the data and could find no evidence of any failures in the system. I do not
recall any discussion about accepting any pleas in this case and I am not sure
from the documents disclosed to me when this took place. The Casework tick
list POL00052618 suggests that this was after March 2007, in which case, I
had left my role in investigations and would not have been involved. I do not
recall if I had any role in the Financial Investigation of this case.
Prosecution of David Blakey
55.1 have been asked to consider the investigation and prosecution of David
Blakey, and I have been referred to the following documents: POL00044818,
POL00044830, POL00044831, POL00044829, POL00044818, POL00044821
and POL00044822.
56.1 have no recollection of this investigation or the prosecution that followed. I
am named in the preamble to the investigators report as the prosecution
authority (the formatting of the preamble seems to have been corrupted at
some point) and as such I believe I would have been responsible for giving
authority to prosecute having read the case file and the advice from legal
services. From the documents I have seen, I can see no record of David
Blakey making allegations about the Horizon system. I do not recall the
Page 24 of 33
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financial investigation in this case, but as the senior authorising officer for
POL, if the case was undertaken by one of my team, then I may have been
required to authorise any restraint or other orders as part of the case before
they went to a Judge. I do not believe that I would have had any further
involvement in this case.
General
57. Throughout my time within the investigation team, I believe that myself and
my team acted in an impartial and professional manner in the cases we dealt
with and at no time did we suspect that there were fundamental issues with
Horizon. Our investigations were based on years of training and experience
and our prosecutions were guided at all times by legal professionals. Where it
was believed necessary, or where we were instructed by our legal experts, we
examined Horizon data and/or obtained statements from Fujitsu in order to
show that the Horizon system was working as it should at all material times.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Signed: A R Utting G RO
Dated: ...... 23 October 2023..............eeeeeeeeeeeeeeees
Page 25 of 33
Index to First Witness Statement of Anthony Richard Utting
WITNO08200100
WITN08200100
No. I URN Document description Control number
1 POL00104747 Investigation Policy: Casework Management I POL-0080387
(England & Wales) v1.0
2 POL00104777 Investigation Policy: Casework Management I POL-0080417
(England & Wales) v4.0
3 POL00104754 Investigation Policy: Rules & Standards v2.0 I POL-0080394
4 POL00030687 Investigation Policy - Investigation POL-0027169
Procedures v2 January 2001
5 POL00104762 "Investigation Policy: Disclosure of Unused POL-0080402
Material, Criminal Procedures and
Investigations Act 1996 Codes of Practice"
v0.1
6 POL00121521 Post Office Ltd - SECURITY GUIDELINES I POL-0127784
Version 2 - Criminal Asset Recovery by M F
Matthews, Tony Utting
7 I POLO00121496 Post Office Limited Investigation POL-0127759
Circular 2002/08 - Submission of Cases to
Legal Services and Tape Summary
Preparation
8 I POLO0039960 Investigation Policy Appendix 16: POL-0036442
Investigation and Prosecution Policy v5
9 POL00030552 Appendix 1 to Investigation Policy: POL-0027034
Interviews under PACE (England and Wales
Only) v4.0
10 I POL00121518 Investigation Policy - Appendix 6: Offender POL-0127781
Reports (Version 5.0)
11 I POLO0121517 Reporting of Criminal Offences to Police - POL-0127780
Appendix 15 Investigation Policy
12 I POL00072288 Casework Management Initial Tick List POL-0068851
13 I POLO0121550 ROYAL MAIL CORPORATE SECURITY POL-0127813
INVESTIGATION COMMUNICATION
14 I NFSP00000043 Negotiating Committee for Horizon debt VIS00007491
recovery
15 I POL00131782 Post Office Ltd Losses Policy - Overarching I POL-0124469
(Branches)
16 I POL00104812 "Royal Mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation I POL-0080444
and Prosecution Policy"
17 I POL00031003 Royal Mail Group Crime and Investigation POL-0027485
Policy v1.1 October 2009
18 I POLO0031004 RMG Policy - Crime and Investigation (S2) - I POL-0027486
version 3.0
Page 26 of 33
19
POL00104806
Royal Mail Group Security — Procedures and
Standards: Standards of behaviour and
complaints procedure No.10-X v2
WITNO08200100
WITN08200100
POL-0080438
20
POL00104828
Royal Mail Group Security Procedures &
Standards: Searching No. 7-X v5
POL-0080460
21
POL00084977
Post Office, Former SPM End to End Debt
Review v.0.5
POL-0082035
22
POL00084983
Casework Investigation - Business process
documentation - describes a 33 step
process from audit to prosecution
POL-0082041
23
POL00084989
POL Financial Investigation Unit Business
Process Documentation - Security &
Investigation Debt Process text
POL-0082047
24
POL00021416
Risk and Compliance Committee Minutes of
05/01/2005
POL-0018046
25
HOCO0000001
Letter relating to Post Office Ltd’s
submissions to the Law Commission of 31
July 1995 supporting the repeal of section
69 of PACE 1984.
HOCoO0000001
26
POL00104821
Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance v2
POL-0080453
27
FUJ00126052
Email from Bob Gurney to David Parnell,
Clive Read, Graeme Seedall and Others re
Updated IMPACT R3 Branch Trading Issues
List
POINQ0132265F
28
FUJ00126053
Fujitsu, Impact R3 Branch Trading Issues
list, version 9.0
POINQ0132266F
29
FUJ00126057
Email from Bob Gurney to David Parnell,
Clive Read, Graeme Seedall and others re:
Updated IMPACT R3 Branch Trading Issues
List (V10)
POINQ0132270F
30
FUJ00126058
IMPACT R3 Branch trading issues
POINQ0132271F
31
POL00038878
Branch Trading Reporting, Management and
Control and Transaction Management,
Conceptual Design (version 1.0)
POL-0035360
32
FUJ00126064
Email chain from Clive Read to Phil
Boardman, John Dutton, Tony Utting and
others RE: Reporting Requirements
POINQ0132277F
33
FUJ00126062
Email from Bob Gurney to Tony Utting Re:
Reporting Requirements
POINQ0132275F
34
POL00104589
Letter from Julia Bowes to David Miller re
ICL Pathway Management Care Visit
Programme Enclosing report of 1997
Management Care Visit Programme
POL-0104172
35
POL00118104
Appendix 6 - Identification codes (undated -
date taken from parent email)
VIS00012693
Page 27 of 33
36
POL00029169
ICL Pathway Conducting Audit Data
Extractions at CSR Process (v1)
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WITN08200100
POL-0025651
37
FUJ00152176
Conducting Audit Data Extractions at Live -
ICL Pathway Ltd - v2.0
POINQ0158370F
38
FUJ00002033
Fujitsu Services Security Management
Service: Service Description. Version 1.0
POINQ0008204F
39
FUJ00080107
Fujitsu's Guidance on Security management
service: Service Description (v.2)
POINQ0086278F
40
POL00114566
Audit Record Requests (Increase In Limits)
POL-0113672
41
FUJ00171998
Email chain from Jan Holmes to Colin
Smith-Lenton RE: FW: Borehamwood -
discussing disclosure for prosecution
POINQ0178179F
42
POL00070492
Email from Mandy Talbot to Tom Beezer
and Stephen Dilley re: Lee Castleton papers
and next steps
POL-0067055
43
POL00107426
Email from Mandy Talbot to Cheryl
Woodward, Re: Challenge to Horizon
POL-0105734
44
POL00070457
Email from Stephen Dilley to Mandy Talbot
regarding draft witness statement of John
Jones (Post Office Limited v Lee Castleton
POL-0067020
45
POL00070769
Lee Castleton Case Study - Email from John
Jones to Stephen Dilley, RE: The Post
Office v Lee Castleton (Marine Drive PO,
Bridlington)
POL-0067332
46
POL00083161_005
Extract from Bundle: Castleton
correspondence by Stephen Dilley
POL-
0079724_005
a7
POL00070736
Email from Stephen Dilley to Vicky Harrison
and Cath Oglesby re: The Post Office -v-
Lee Castleton (Marine Drive Post Office,
Birdlington)
POL-0067299
48
POL00070978
Email from R.Morgan to Stephen Dilley re:
Post Office Limited -v- Lee Castleton re
Castleton's experts reports.
POL-0067541
49
POL00070962
Email from Stephen Dilley to Mandy Talbot
re: Post Office Limited -v- Mr L Castleton
POL-0067525
50
POL00071249
Lee Castleton case study: bundle of
documents including handwritten note from
Cheryl at PO to Laura at Bond Pearce re call
logs, and email chain with Mandy Talbot,
Tom Beezer, Stephen Dilley and others re:
Horizon issues raised in civil claim
POL-0067812
51
POL00070864
Email from Tom Beezer to Stephen Dilley re:
Post Office v Castleton: IT info required
POL-0067427
Page 28 of 33
52
POL00120837
Email chain involving Mary Talbot, Stephen
Dilley, lan Herbert and others Discussions
between PO and legal counsel. Also
contains some internal discussions. RE:
Bajaj and Castleton Discusses strategy to
be used against Lee Castleton. Also
documents POL's attempts to get further
information from Fujitsu about possible
errors with Horizon.
WITNO08200100
WITN08200100
POL-0127200
53
POL00070854
Email from Mandy Talbot to Tony Rutting,
lan Herbert, Stephen Dilley and others re:
Castleton/ bajaj/ bikhu - Conference call
POL-0067417
54
POL00070851
Email from Mandy Talbot to Tom Beezer,
Stephen Dilley, lan Herbert and others in re
Lee Castleton
POL-0067414
55
POL00070850
Memo of Telephone attendance, from
Stephen Dilley to Royal Mail Group PLC
Sub postmaster litigation
POL-0067413
56
POL00070839
Email from Stephen Dilley to Graham Ward,
copied to others RE: PO v Mr L Castleton
POL-0067402
57
POL00070840
Email from Tony R Utting to Stephen Dilley,
RE: Post Office Ltd v Mr L Castleton
POL-0067403
58
POL00113488
Email from Marie Cockett to Paul Dann re:
Castleton
POL-0112639
59
POL00090437
Series of documents and emails following
Post Office Limited v Castleton
POL-0087406
60
POL00068926
Audit report of Rainham Road Post Office
(FAD098941X) by Deepak Valani
POL-0065405
61
POL00044360
Theft/False Accounting report - Oyeteju
Adedayo
POL-0040839
62
POL00066742
Transcribed note on Oyeteju Adedayo
Interview
POL-0063221
63
POL00066745
Transcript of Oyeteju Adedayo Interview -
Tape 2
POL-0063224
64
POL00044363
Notification of proceedings to police -
Oyeteju Adedayo - False accounting
POL-0040842
65
POL00044364
Notification of proceedings to Police -
Oyeteju Adedayo - False accounting
POL-0040843
66
POL00044367
Schedule of charges for Oyeteju Adedayo in
Post Office Ltd v Oyeteju Adedayo
POL-0040846
67
POL00044365
Form NPA 03 1/97 - Notification of disposal
to police - Oyeteju Adedayo
POL-0040844
68
POL00047897
Oyeteju Adedayo Case Study - Financial
Investigation Events Log, Case Number: FI
0506 0336
POL-0044376
Page 29 of 33
69
POL00030561
Financial Investigation Policy Log dated
07/03/06, Case No. 0506/0336
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WITN08200100
POL-0027043
70
POL00044370
Statement of information relevant in
accordance with section 16 (6) of the
proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Regina v
Oyeteju Adedayo
POL-0040849
71
POL00052589
POL-0049068
72
POL00052902
Antecedents form for Oyeteju Adedayo
POL-0049381
73
POL00044861
Investigation Discipline Report by Diane
Matthews - Hughie Noel Thomas
POL-0041340
74
POL00044862
Investigation Offender Report by Diane
Matthews — Hughie Thomas
POL-0041341
75
POL00044864
Summary of tape- recorded interview of
Hughie Thomas - conducted by Diane
Matthews and Stephen Bradshaw.
POL-0041343
76
POL00044881
Hughie Thomas - POL Investigation Capture
Details Form
POL-0041360
7
POL00047748
Post Office Limited Internal Investigation
Team - Terms of Reference: Criminal
Investigation - Gaerwen Post Office FAD
CODE: 160604.
POL-0044227
78
FUJ00155181
Criminal case study of Hughie Thomas:
Audit Record Query 0506/401 Re: Gaerwen
PO requesting an analysis of all helpdesk
calls from 14/09/05-13/10/05 and Relevant
Documents
POINQ0161376F
79
POL00047780
Memo from J A McFarlane to Investigation
Team Post Office Limited re: Royal Mail
Group plc v Hughie Noel Thomas Bailed to
Holyhead Police Station - 10th January 2006
Case No: POLTD/0405/0401
POL-0044259
80
POL00044883
Financial Investigation policy log case
number: POLTD 0506/0401
POL-0041362
81
POL00044873
Witness statement of Michael Matthews
(Financial Investigator) - Application for a
Restraint Order s41 POCA - Case Study -
Hughie Noel Thomas
POL-0041352
82
POL00048361
Confidential, Investigation Team Report
Period 9 December 2006, from Tony Utting
to POL ET.
POL-0044840
83
POL00052984
Suzanne Palmer Case Study: Casework
Management Initial Tick List
POL-0049463
84
POL00053009
Record of Tape/Recorded Interview with
Suzanne Palmer
POL-0049488
Page 30 of 33
85
POL00053007
Suzanne Palmer cases study: PO
Investigation report into Suzanne Palmer re:
offence of false accounting
WITNO08200100
WITN08200100
POL-0049486
86
POL00068280
Post Office Ltd Investigation Personnel
Report on False Accounting Offence for
Suzanne Palmer of The Grange Post Office
POL-0064759
87
POL00053005
Notification of Proceedings to Police Form
POL-0049484
88
POL00053006
Notification of Proceedings to Police in
relation to Miss Suzanne Lesley Palmer -
False accounting
POL-0049485
89
POL00052990
Memo from Mr Jarnail A Singh to the Post
Office Limited (Investigation Team) re: Post
Office Limited v Suzanne Lesley Palmer.
POL-0049469
90
POL00053011
Schedule of charges re: Post Office Limited
v Suzanne Lesley Palmer
POL-0049490
91
POL00052994
Memo from Jarnail Singh to Investigation
team re: POL v Suzanne Lesley Palmer -
Southend Magistrates Court - Committal 3rd
July 2006 - Case No: POLTD/0506/0619 -
outcome of Magistrates hearing (declined
jurisdiction)
POL-0049473
92
POL00053003
Memo from Miss J S Andrews to Post Office
Limited (Investigation Team) re: Rv
Suzanne Lesley Palmer (Basildon Crown
Court - Plea & Case Management Hearing)
POL-0049482
93
POL00053008
Counsel Advice on Evidence - R v. Suzanne
Palmer
POL-0049487
94
POL00052986
Indictment Sheet re: R v Suzanne Lesley
Palmer
POL-0049465
95
POL00052993
Memo from Miss J S Andrews to the Post
Office Ltd (Investigation Team) re: R v
Suzanne Lesley Palmer
POL-0049472
96
POL00048199
Casework Management Initial Tick List
(England and Wales) - POLTD/0607/0108 -
Janet Skinner - CRM/254194/JMcF - Formal
caution
POL-0044678
97
POL00044630
Offender reporting - Janet Louise Skinner
POL-0041109
98
POL00044624
Post Office Ltd Interim Report for Janet
Skinner (North Bransholme branch)
POL-0041103
99
POL00044639
Janet Skinner case study: Post Office Ltd
Investigation report for Janet Skinner
(POLTD/0607/0108)
POL-0041118
100
POL00044632
Interview Transcript - Janet Louise Skinner
POL-0041111
101
POL00044633
Summary of tape recorded interview - Janet
Louise Skinner
POL-0041112
Page 31 of 33
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102 I POL00044656 Summary of tape recorded interview - Janet I POL-0041135
Louise Skinner
103 I POL00066726 Note of interview of Janet Skinner POL-0063205
104 I POL00066725 Interview of Janet Skinner re audit shortage I POL-0063204
at Branzone post Office
105 I POL00066739 Transcript of Janet Skinner Interview POL-0063218
106 I POL00066728 Transcript on Janet Louise Skinner Interview I POL-0063207
- Tape 5
107 I POL00048013 Antecedents re Janet Louise Skinner (North I POL-0044492
Bransholme Post Office branch).
108 I POL00048167 Email from Terry Crowther to Juliet POL-0044646
McFarlane re: Prosecution of Janet Skinner
case
109 I POL00048397 Memorandum re Janet Louise Skinner, POL-0044876
Court 2 Hull Crown Court.
110 I POL00048415 Memo from J A McFarlane to Investigations I POL-0044894
Team Post Office, re Post Office Limited v
Janet Louise Skinner, Hull Magistrates
Court.
111 I POL00044669 Financial investigation log (Janet Skinner, POL-0041148
North Bransholme PO) from 15/11/2006 to
25/01/2007
112 I POLO00047955 Josephine Hamilton Offences Report POL-0044434
113 I POLO0118877 Antecedents of Josephine Hamilton - Officer I POL-0118796
in Case Graham Brander, Supervising
Officer Dave Posnett
114 I POL00048207 Email from Tony Utting to Investigation POL-0044686
Team Post Office Ltd re: DAM Authority -
Josephine Hamilton - POLTD/0506/0685
115 I POL00052618 Josephine Hamilton Case Study- Casework I POL-0049097
Management Initial Tick List - Prosecution J
Hamilton 18/05/2006 To 14/07/2008
116 I POLO0118990 Josephine Hamilton criminal case study - POL-0118909
Suspect offender reporting form to be
emailed to Casework team, case file no.
POLTD 0506/068, Josephine Hamilton
117 I POL00049071 Josephine Hamilton Case Study: Financial POL-0045550
Investigation Policy Log - Josephine
Hamilton. POLTD/0506/0685.
118 I POL00044818 Offence sheet - Theft and false accounting - I POL-0041297
David Charles Blakey
119 I POL00044830 David Blakey - Record of Tape Recorded POL-0041309
Interview 13 May 2004
120 I POL00044831 Record of tape - recorded interview - David I POL-0041310
Charles Blakey (Part 2)
Page 32 of 33
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121 I POL00044829 Interview with Gillian Blakey, Summary of POL-0041308
points
122 I POL00044821 Notification of proceedings to police - David I POL-0041300
Charles Blakey
123 I POL00044822 Form NPA 02 1/97 - Notification of POL-0041301
proceedings to police - David Charles
Blakey
Page 33 of 33