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Witness Name: Diane Matthews
Statement No: WITN08330100
Dated: 1% November 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DIANE SARAH MATTHEWS
I Diane Matthews state the following:
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry with
the matters set out in the Rule 9 request dated 29"" September 2023.
Background
2. I began my employment with Post Office Limited on 5" March 1986 as a counter
clerk (PO Grade). My roles were in branch offices where I progressed to the role
of Assistant Branch Manager. In 1999 I was seconded onto the Horizon project
where I assisted the offices during the “Live Trial” phase mainly in Northern
Ireland. As the roll out started, I undertook the role of Team Leader, managing a
team of 22 Horizon Field Support Officers (HFSO’s) in ensuring they were
supported in managerial terms for example timetable, accommodation,
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performance. In 2003 I returned to my role as Assistant Branch Manager before
taking up a role as Audit Manager with responsibilities for delivering an audit plan
for the team as well as ad hoc audits where requested. I also undertook a small
number of audits myself. In 2004, I accepted a temporarily move to the Post Office
Limited Investigation team, initially to look at pension docket fraud. Approximately
6 months later, this role was made permanent. In 2007 I was promoted to Security
Manager, managing a small team of investigators. In 2008 I moved to Royal Mail
Group as an investigator, a role I undertook until 2018 when I left the business
under voluntary redundancy terms.
. Upon joining the Investigation team, I completed a 6 week training course
covering all aspects of the role including witness statement taking, analysing data,
interviewing suspects, PACE, Risk Assessments. I also attended Thames Valley
Police Training Centre and undertook a search course.
. My understanding of the role of an Investigator within Post Office Limited was to
obtain the facts and circumstances pertaining to a Post Office Counter loss and
report this to the Legal team for their consideration as to next steps.
. During my 4 years within Post Office Limited Security function I was line managed
by Paul Dawkins and latterly David Pardoe. The Head of Investigations was
initially Tony Utting who was succeeded by John Scott and Head of Security was
Tony Marsh.
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6.
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I found the investigators, Team Leaders, Casework and Prosecution teams and
the leadership of Tony Utting and Tony Marsh to be professional, had integrity and
were committed to the business.
During 2007, I was promoted to Investigation Manager. This involved line
managing approximately 6 investigators with their development and aspirations as
well as day to day administrative duties. I was line managed during this period by
David Pardoe with a level of input by Head of Security John Scott.
In my role as an Investigator/Investigation Manager, I played no part in disciplinary
matters towards Subpostmasters apart from provide a report to the relevant Area
Manager following any activity I attended at a Post Office. I was involved in the
interviewing of accused individuals and subsequent reporting of these interviews.
As part of any investigation following an interview with an accused, a further more
in depth Investigation report compiled, a case file would be compiled and
depending on the advice from the assigned lawyer, a committal bundle would be
prepared which would ensure all evidence was forwarded to the legal team.
Any litigation strategy would be decided by the lawyers. There may have been
some discussions with myself but this would be to tell me what their decision was.
I have no legal training and the decision would be theirs. I would liaise with other
Post Office departments which may include Pensions department (Northern
Ireland) Helpline, Accounts, Audits and area management groups.
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The Security team’s role in relation to criminal investigations and prosecutions
10.1 have been asked to consider 23 documents to assist me in this section of
questions. I wish to state that 16 documents were written after I had left the
business and 1 (POL00104968) “POL — Enforcement & Prosecution Policy” is
undated and I have no recollection of this document. I note Helen Dickinson is
named as the “Reviewer”. Mrs Dickinson assumed a management role after I left
the business so I assume this was written post 2008.
11.1 have reviewed the following 6 documents:
e Casework Management Policy (Version 1.0, March 2000) (POL00104747)
and (Version 4.0, October 2022) (POL00104777)
e Rules and Standards Policy (Version 2.0, October 2000) (POL00104754)
e Investigation Procedures Policy (Version 2.0, January 2001) (POL00030687)
e Disclosure of Unused Material, Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act
1996 Codes of Practice Policy (Version 1.0, May 2001) (POL00104762)
e Royal mail Group Ltd Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Policy (1
December 2007) (POL00030578)
e Royal Mail Group Security — Procedures and Standards — Standards of
Behaviour and Complaints Procedure (Version 2, October 2007)
(POL00104806)
12.From my recollection, the investigators were split into teams across England,
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Each team had a Team leader. I am unclear if
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there was another level of management before the Head of Investigations. During
my 4 years with the department, there were several reorganisations where the
teams were moved into different geographical areas and therefore a restructure of
the reporting lines.
13.1 did not play any part in the development and/or management of the policies
listed in point 11.
14.1 cannot recall the specific policies adhered to but as a Designated Prosecuting
Authority the department was governed by Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(PACE) and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 regarding
disclosure rules. There were also internal documents which were circulated and
adhered to, however, I cannot remember what they were some 15 years
previously. The only noticeable change I can recall was the introduction of
Financial Investigators and the recovery of monies through the Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002 (POCA).
15. I have been asked to consider the email sent to myself from Dave Posnett and
others. (POL00123309). Having viewed the document, I cannot see my name on
the circulation list and I note the date the email was sent, that being 9" July 2014
was some 6 years after I left the company. I have therefore not reviewed the
attachments (POL00123310), (POL00038728), or (POL00123312). I also note the
email chain originated from Mick Matthews, so presume you have mistaken my
name instead of his. I therefore have no comment to make regarding this
question.
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16.1 have been asked what the process was for dealing with complaints about the
conduct of an investigation by the Security team. I do not recall ever being
involved in or consulted over this issue. I have never been the subject of a
complaint made during my 32 year career within the Royal Mail Group.
17.With regards to supervision over criminal investigations, from my recollection, I
had regular interactions with my line managers and peers over the development
and progression of investigations and any areas which need to be addressed.
There was also conversations with the casework management team and direction
from the Legal team.
18.From my recollection, there was no difference in the investigations I undertook
between Crown Office staff and Subpostmasters. I treated each one exactly the
same, evidence based, and reported up to the relevant individuals in exactly the
same manner. I cannot comment on if there was any different strategies adopted
from a higher level than me. My approach did not change over my time with Post
Office Limited with the exception of consideration given to POCA.
Audit and Investigation
19.1 have been asked to consider the document “Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance” (Version 2, October 2008) (POL00104821). I have never seen this
document as it was created after I had left the business. I therefore have no
comment to make with regards to this document
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20.As an investigator, I would attend an audit if the auditors on site, after verifying the
2
cash and stock on hand, reported a large loss or if the Counter
Clerk/Subpostmaster volunteered the cash declared was inflated by a significant
amount. Another reason for attendance would be if the Investigator had requested
the audit due to anomalies in the accounts. This could also be from information
from another department for example Cash Management where an office would
be ordering cash despite having declared in excess of what the office needed.
The investigators role on these occasions would be a watching brief until the audit
was completed with interaction with the staff involved.
.After a shortfall was identified following an audit, I cannot recall who made the
decision on whether the Post Office Investigators would be involved. There were
thresholds on amounts which would trigger involvement but I cannot recall what
they were. The involvement of the Financial Investigators, from my recollection,
was down to the amount of loss, possibly with previous reported incidents being
taken into account. I cannot recall if this changed during my 4 years with the team
from 2004 to 2008.
22. The local Contract Manager would be involved in conversations regarding the
branch but I cannot recall if they could influence any decision re next steps. This
conversation would be undertaken at a higher level than me.
23.1 cannot recall what the triggers were from raising a fraud case following a
shortfall or discrepancy at a branch. I believe several factors would impact on next
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steps taken including the amount of the loss, including any previous losses or
concerns.
24.1 have been asked what process the Security Team Investigators followed in
conducting an investigation. From my recollection, the process was to obtain
accounts/statements from relevant persons, analyse the data available including
transaction logs, log on/log off records, attendance and annual leave records etc.
Follow up any lines of enquiry or possible evidence to prove or disprove the
allegations. This would be done in line with all legal guidelines including but not
limited to Data Protection Act 1998, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and
also the internal Post Office Limited guidelines for dealing with such matters.
25.The decision to prosecute was made by the Post Office Criminal Law Team and
the Head of Post Office Security. I cannot comment if the Local Contract Manager
had any input or influence in legal decisions as I was not involved at that level.
26.1 have been asked what test was applied by those making prosecution and
charging decisions. I cannot answer this as I was not involved in these areas.
Furthermore, I hold no legal qualifications and have no expertise in these areas.
27.In terms of what advice the investigator provided the legal team, this was by way
of a Suspect Offender report which detailed the individual, the alleged offence, the
investigation and any supporting evidential material. On occasions, not always, a
conversation would take place between the investigator and the assigned lawyer
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regarding the case but in my experience this was to discuss any further evidence
required and/or to inform me of the outcome.
28.1 have been asked in what circumstances were steps to restrain a suspect's
assets by criminal enforcement methods such as confiscation proceedings
considered. Post Office Limited employed Financial Investigators to deal with
these types of situations, however, I believe there was a threshold amount of a
shortage which would trigger their involvement. I cannot recall what this amount
was but it was around £15k. The decision to pursue this method of recovery lay
with the Financial Investigators, maybe with involvement with the Head of
Security.
Training, Instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security
Team
29.1 received training with regards to all aspects of interviewing individuals suspected
of accriminal offence, statement taking, searching, the role of an investigator and
obtaining, reviewing and disclosing evidence. This was by way of a 6 week initial
intensive training course at the start of my tenure with the department and
subsequent ad hoc workshops either as a refresher or when there were significant
changes to either legislation or working arrangements within Casework
Management.
30.1 have been asked whether and in what circumstances evidence should be sought
from third parties who might hold relevant evidence and in particular, Fujitsu,
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where shortfalls were identified in branch. In the investigations I undertook I
followed the evidence trail and I would seek information from relevant
departments where needed for example, cash management teams and Helpline
departments. With regards to Fujitsu, I believe there were protocols to follow
should you require their assistance, I cannot recall exactly the process but having
viewed the documentation provided to me, I believe it was via an ARQ request via
the Casework Team.
31.1 have been asked what instructions, guidance and/or training I received regarding
an Investigator’s disclosure obligations. Disclosure of evidence was part of the
initial training on joining the Security function. I also recall attending a workshop
where it was covered.
32. Instructions were given on drafting investigation reports which were subject to
scrutiny by the Casework team prior to being forwarded to the Criminal Law team
for consideration. At the start of my 4 year tenure, in 2004, my work was mainly
checking pension dockets and inflated submissions by counter clerks. I did not
compile many reports whilst undertaking this responsibility as I was mainly doing
the background work for the Lead investigator in the case. I believe my
subsequent reports were scrutinised by my peers and Line Manager prior to
submission to the Casework Team.
33.1 have been asked to consider the document entitled “ The Casework
Management document” (POL00104747) (version 1.0 March 2000) and
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(POL00104777) (version 4.0 October 2002). I cannot recall being provided with
either of these documents when I joined the Security team in 2004. I believe I may
have seen something similar on my training course or from the document
database which I referred to during my time in this role. I cannot state if these
were the exact versions.
34.1 have been asked what I understood by the bullet points on page 2 of the
Casework Management. I have reviewed the October 2002 version
(POL00104777) as it is highly likely the previous version from March 2000 had
been superseded when I joined in 2004. The first 3 bullet points on page 2 are
regarding the documents required to be associated in any casefile and that all
casefiles go in the first instance to the Prosecution Support Office.
35.With regards to bullet point 4 on page 2 concerning failures in operational
procedures and security, my recollections on this are anything you observed or
encountered which played a part in a fraud being committed or loss in an office.
This could be due to a system problem, for example allowing an uncapped
number of deposits into an A&L account, procedural issue for example paper
pension dockets being inflated which less than 5% were subject to random
scrutiny at the processing centre in Lisahally, Northern Ireland, or a security issue
for example a malfunction of a safe or the fact the clerk keeps excess cash in the
draw. These are examples where the business would not want these details to
become common knowledge.
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36.1 do recall compliance checks being undertaken on my files. I cannot remember if
this was in force prior to joining the team or whilst I was there (2004 to 2008). I
believe it was introduced to improve the standard of the files and try and
standardise the submissions across all teams. It did not change anything I did, I
just used it as a guide to ensure I had completed the tasks. My recollection is this
was undertaken by the Casework Team in Croydon however there were several
people in that department and I cannot remember whose responsibility it was. I
played no role in the development of the Casework Management documentation.
37.1 have been asked to consider an email from David Posnett dated 23 May 2011
(POL00118096) and the associated documents (POL00118096) (POL00118109)
(POL00118101) (POL00118102) (POL00118103) (POL00118104) (POL00118105)
(POL00118106) (POL00118107). As I had not been employed by Post Office
Limited for some 3 years and therefore not included on the circulation of this email
or had sight of the associated documents, I cannot comment as to the status of
the suite of compliance documents at the times they were circulated nor the
purpose of the documents.
38.1 cannot make any comment on the document entitled “Guide to the Preparation
and Layout of Investigation Red Label Case Files — Offender reports and
Discipline reports” (POL00118101), the Offender Report Template (POL00118102)
and the Identification Codes (POL00118104) attached to David Posnett’s email
dated 23" May 2011 as I had not been employed by Post Office Limited for 3
years and therefore not included on the circulation of this email or had sight of the
associated document.
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39.1 can state I played no role in the development, management or amendments to
any Post Office Limited Security policies, procedures or guidelines. This includes
any involvement in the document entitled “Identification Codes” (POL00118104)
attached to David Posnett’s email dated 234 May 2011 as I had not been
employed by Post Office Limited for 3 years and therefore not included on the
circulation of this email or had sight of the associated documents.
40.My understanding of why Security Team investigators were instructed to assign
identification codes to suspected offenders was to align with the details required
when completing an antecedents documents and align the details to those
required for input onto the Police National Database should a case reach that
stage.
4
.I have been asked what analysis was done by Security team investigators of
Horizon data when a Subpostmaster/manager/assistant attributed the shortfall to
problems with Horizon. The claim made by Mr Thomas that an intermittent
electrical issue caused problems with the On-Line banking withdrawals on his
Horizon system, was the first time I had heard a claim that a loss was due toa
fault with the system, and when I left in 2008, it remained the only investigation I
led or had involvement with in which similar claims were made. I investigated Mr
Thomas's claims and requested the Horizon data. From my recollection, the data
was in an excel spreadsheet. I then analysed this information to look for
anomalies and patterns. I also asked Fujitsu via the Casework team, to undertake
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checks at their end and I also had the equipment removed to be checked. I cannot
comment what other investigators did or what the Post Office instructed
investigators to do after 2008.
42.1 have been asked to give an explanation of the contractual obligations of Fujitsu
to provide data. I do not know what the contract with Fujitsu was, only that I
requested data for specific times and information and received it. I knew there
were limits on how many requests could be made to Fujitsu each month without
having to pay for it so each application was scrutinised on its own merits. I played
no part in this process apart from make an application. I also do not know who
was responsible from Fujitsu to provide the data or any subsequent support
offered as part of the contract. I did receive data and cannot be 100% sure but
believe it was on CD discs.
43.1 do not know if ARQ data was requested from Fujitsu as a matter of course
regarding shortfalls identified which the Subpostmaster or clerk attributed to the
Horizon system. I was not involved in this process. I do not know if the ARQ data
was provided to Subpostmasters as a matter of course. If obtained, it should form
part of the disclosure package.
44.1 cannot recall the names of Gareth Jenkins or Penny Thomas, however, I do
recall seeking assistance on one occasion with individuals from Fujitsu regarding
obtaining data, checking the integrity of a system and providing statements.
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45.1 do not recall Gareth Jenkins and I do not know if he was an expert witness for
Fujitsu. From the documentation provided, this may well have been the case.
Involvement in Criminal Prosecution Case Studies
Prosecution of Janet Skinner
46.1 have been asked a series of questions regarding the POL v Janet Skinner case
and wish to clarify that I had very little recollection of this case but have been
aided by referring to the documentation provided by this inquiry. My answers will
be from the documents provided as much as my own clear recollections.
47.On Tuesday 30" May 2006, I received information regarding a substantial loss at
North Bransholme Post Office in the Hull area. I am unsure if this communication
was from my Line Manager who I believe was Paul Dawkins or from Mrs Hoyles,
Rural Support Officer. Following this an audit was undertaken which confirmed the
total loss amount which I believe I would have been informed of.
48.On the day of the audit, after confirmation of the outcome, arrangements were
made with Miss Skinner to undertake a tape recorded interview. From the List Of
Exhibits (POL00047368), I refer to SB/1 “Copy of notebook entry of conversation
with Janet Skinner 31/05/2006 at 09:58 hours. I am assuming the telephone call
was made by Investigator Stephen Bradshaw. From the Summary of Tape
Recorded Interview (POL00044632) an entry was made at 11:53 part of which
states “ Notebook entry by SB read out regarding arrangements made for JS to
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attend a voluntary interview. Legal rights explained. JS confirms it is an accurate
account of the conversation”
49. Accompanied by Stephen Bradshaw, on Thursday 1*' June 2006 I travelled to
North Bransholme Post Office and met Miss Skinner. As is standard procedure,
Miss Skinner was cautioned and the offer to seek legal advice if she required,
and/or a union representative or a friend to be present was reiterated and the
relevant forms completed and signed by Miss Skinner. From my recollections,
Miss Skinner declined both. (DM/1 “Copy of Legal rights form signed by J Skinner”
on List Of Exhibits (POL00047368) and “Form CS003 friends at interview form J
Skinner 1/06/2006” on Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material
(POL00048259).
50.1 recall starting the interview in her premises, however, there was a problem with
the tape machine. The tapes were sealed up and I obtained authority from the
local police station to use a room and their facilities to conduct the interview. I
don’t believe Miss Skinner was ever arrested or placed in custody, we were just
using their facilities in an administrative room which had a tape machine in. A
notebook entry detailing the issues with the Tape Machine was made and entered
on the Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material.
5
.My role in this investigation was to investigate the loss in question and obtain any
evidence relating to it. This could mean exploring several avenues of enquiry as
the investigation evolves. When I was in possession of all relevant documentation,
I completed an Investigation report.
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52.Statements were taken from POL employees from cash handling and the
identification of the loss as well as other staff members working at North
Bransholme Post Office.
53.1 do not recall Miss Skinner making any allegations relating to the reliability of the
Horizon system at any stage of the investigation. I have referred to the 3
documents titled “ Summary of Tape Recorded Interview” (POL00044632,
POL00044633 and POL00044656) and cannot find any evidence of Miss Skinner
offering the Horizon system as a potential reason for the losses. Miss Skinner
stated she believed mistakes were being made by her staff and/or one of her staff
members was stealing and on POL00044632 at 33:15 goes into detail regarding
this.
54.Miss Skinner was asked if she would agree to a voluntary search of her home
address which she declined at that time as she had young children who would be
at home. As was procedure at the time, I would relay this to my Line Manager to
check on next steps. I was asked to contact the local Police Station for
assistance. As I was already at the Police Station I spoke to an officer who said
they had manpower issues and they could not help. I did not ask Miss Skinner
again.
55. I have been asked to consider documents POL00048161 and POL00048168 in
relation to my involvement in the decision to charge and prosecute Miss Skinner. I
can state that I had no involvement in this decision. I have no legal training and
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my involvement is to collate and present the facts and pass it to the Legal team
for consideration. The Legal team alongside the Head of Security would make
those decisions.
56.As is the same with all prosecution cases, I would have to present my documents
in the form of a committal bundle and ensure they are placed on the relevant
paperwork with regards to used/unused/sensitive material. Any additional material
required by the assigned lawyer would be obtained or addressed although the
majority of time this was only required should the subject plead not guilty. I would
then forward the paperwork bundle back to the lawyer for them to scrutinise and
do whatever they needed to do with it. Any summonses would be sent to the
investigator to issue however, from the documents provided, I believe I wasn’t
involved in that process in this case.
57.With regards to the witness statements, I spoke to the individuals and drafted an
account of the discussion which took place. This was read and checked by the
person named before signing as accurate. Any handwritten notes made in the
drafting of the statements were included on the Schedule of Non-Sensitive
Unused Material (POL00048259).
58.1 was not the disclosure officer in this case or any cases. The decision on what
was disclosed was a legal matter and dealt with by the Prosecution Support Team.
I submitted all documents to them on the relevant paperwork and I played no
further part in the dissemination of the evidence.
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59.From my recollections, I believe I had a discussion with the assigned lawyer
regarding the theft charge against Miss Skinner. This was due to my belief that the
evidence proved inconclusive as to what had happened to the missing money.
The decision in all cases is made by the lawyers as the experts in this area.
60.I have been asked how the circumstances surrounding the suspension and
61.
dismissal of Mrs Lyell impacted the case strategy against Miss Skinner and also
my views of the merits of the case against her. I cannot answer the question
regarding strategy of the case as I was not part of any discussion, my role was to
forward the information onto the legal team and assigned lawyer. My view of the
merits of the case did not change as I did not conclude who, if anyone had stolen
the money.
I have been asked the details of the discussion which I was party to at the plea
and case management hearing and the reasons why a plea to false accounting
was acceptable. Firstly, I cannot remember any exact details from the hearing,
however, from the document “Letter from Myer Wolf Solicitors dated 8" January
2007 (POL00048407), I note the discussion where I was named was following a
discussion from counsel with Head Office on the morning of the hearing. From my
best recollections and as is normal practise in my experience of court hearings,
discussions took place between the prosecution and defence barristers with the
prosecution barrister having already been in contact with and been given direction
from the instructing lawyer. I would have been informed at this point what was
agreed. These were not discussions where I would have any influence on. I note
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my discussion was with prosecution counsel and instructed solicitors, both legally
trained individuals where as I am not.
62.1 played no part in the confiscation proceedings, this was undertaken by trained
Financial Investigators. Some information provided by Miss Skinner as part of the
antecedents (POL00048013) and featuring in the report would have been passed
to the Financial Investigator although I believe they have their own channels for
obtaining financial information.
63.1 played no further part in this case.
64.1 have been asked what my reflections are now on the way the investigation and
prosecution of Alison Hall was conducted by the Post Office and the outcome of
the case. I was not involved in nor have ever heard or read anything about Alison
Hall's case, I therefore have no comments to make on this.
65. Having read the evidence given to the inquiry by Janet Skinner (INQ00001035) I
wish to make the following comments. It is my recollection that Miss Skinner did
not make any reference to the Horizon system being to blame for her losses.
Having read through all the documents provided to me, especially the Interview
transcripts, I cannot see it ever being offered as a possible explanation by Miss
Skinner.
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66.1 requested and received Horizon data discs ARQ123 and ARQ124 which are
listed on the List of Exhibits (POL00047368). From my recollections, the dates
coincided with losses and I requested the data for look at anomalies, large
transactions or movement of cash and look at each counter clerks transactions in
isolation for anything suspicious.
67.From my best recollections, as in all cases with large losses, I would contact the
Helpline for any calls relating to the office experiencing losses. I did not receive
any call logs back from them. I did not find this unusual as in her interview Miss
Skinner was asked if she called anyone for help with her losses and replied No,
stating her reason for not contacting anyone is because she would then have to
pay it back. Summary of Tape Recorded Interview (POL00044632) at 23:12
refers. If there were any indications from Miss Skinner that she did engage with
the Helpline for this reason or due to Horizon faults then the logs would be more
comprehensive and I would have expected to receive data. A considerable
number of the calls made by this Post Office would have been in relation to the
numerous changes to the cash remittances due.
68. My views in this case have not changed in one respect. I was not convinced Miss
Skinner had stolen the money and there was no evidence to prove she had. I was
therefore unhappy with a Theft charge and conveyed this at the time to the
assisting lawyer. I felt Miss Skinner had lost control of the office and was too
trusting of her staff despite knowing one had a large loss she was repaying and
also with a background of family issues. Miss Skinner was absent for a lot of the
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time and gave her staff keys to the office and safe despite the losses growing.
She didn’t want to upset or offend them.
69. At the time of this investigation, I was not aware of any other complaints or
challenges regarding the integrity of the Horizon system. The losses Miss Skinner
was experiencing were rising at an alarming level, sometimes £7k in a week and it
is unusual for counter clerks to steal at this level as they know repercussions will
occur. On Hindsight, knowing now the problems that have been highlighted, the
Horizon system seems like a feasible cause of the losses Miss Skinner
experienced.
70.With regards to False Accounting, on face value, this appeared a valid charge,
71.
however, if the losses were created by a system whose integrity cannot be relied
upon and which attempts have been made to hide this or minimise the impact,
then both the counter clerks and Investigators were experiencing and
investigating issues that were never going to resolved. To that end, having read
the Judgement of the Court of Appeal (POL00113278) paras 190 to 193, it maybe
that justice has been done for Miss Skinner.
Prosecution of Hughie Noel Thomas
I have been asked to describe the circumstances in which I became involved in
the case involving Mr Thomas. I recall receiving a phone call from Stephen
Bradshaw informing me our Line Manager Paul Dawkins, had contacted him
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stating that an audit team was on site at Gaerwen Post Office in North Wales and
had encountered a large cash shortage. Stephen Bradshaw asked me to attend
with him to investigate the loss and undertake an interview with the
Subpostmaster Mr Thomas.
72.Whilst en route to the office, we received a phone call from Mr Emlyn Hughes,
Contracts Manager, informing us that Gaerwen Post Office had had a previous
loss of around £11,000 which Mr Thomas's daughter was responsible for. Mr
Hughes said he had allowed Mr Thomas to keep the Post Office on the proviso
that the money was repaid and his daughter did not have anything to do with the
Post Office. Mr Hughes said he had suspicions the money had not been repaid
and the situation may have repeated itself and compounded the losses.
Subsequent documents produced in this case make reference to Mr Hughes
comments, the documents are “Post Office Ltd Confidential — Investigation
Personnel report” (POL00044861) and Terms of Reference for the Criminal
Investigation” (POL00047748)
73.My role in the investigation was to confirm the audit shortage, introduce myself to
Mr Thomas and explain why we were there, what we wanted to do and how we
proceed. This was dependant on a number of factors, mainly the Health and
Safety of the auditors and Investigators in what are always difficult and tense
situations. Being in the Subpostmaster’s premises and also his home with his
family and friend present poses risks and the situation has to be dynamically risk
assessed. Always at the forefront of my mind was a situation in the Chester area
Page 23 of 40
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in 1999 where an Investigator was shot and killed and colleagues injured by a
Royal Mail Group employee whilst undertaking a search of his house.
74.1 was also responsible for any follow up actions and the reporting of the case to
Mr Hughes, as he would be considering Mr Thomas's status as a Subpostmaster
and also the Post Office legal team. I note the report which I have been forwarded
titled “Investigation- Personnel” (POL00044861). This was the report purely for Mr
Hughes and prepared soon after the audit and prior to some of the follow up
actions being undertaken. A far more detailed report at the conclusion of the
investigation was prepared and forwarded to the lawyers titled Investigation-
Legal. I have not been provided with the document to assist in this inquiry.
75.I have been asked to consider Mr Thomas's evidence to the enquiry in
INQ00001044 pages 135 to 160 and provide any observations.
76.Page 141 Mr Thomas was asked:
“You said you had an audit in 2004
“Yes”
“if that one went ok”
yes”.
It is my recollection, that this audit in 2004 discovered a loss of £11,000 attributed
to misappropriation by Mr Thomas's daughter, as mentioned by Mr Emlyn Hughes
in point 72 and referred to in documents “Post Office Ltd Confidential —
Investigation Personnel report” (POL00044861) and Terms of Reference for the
Page 24 of 40
77.
78.
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Criminal Investigation” (POL00047748). The October 2005 audit was a planned
one, which had to take place within 12 months of the previous audit, due to a
previous loss being recorded.
Page 142, Mr Thomas stated:
“They hoovered my office, I didn’t have a shred of paper left, even my
council work went. Everything went”.
I was responsible for the evidence gathering of the paperwork. I seized the weekly
envelopes containing the paperwork generated by the Horizon system as well as
Horizon generated paperwork from the auditors on the day. That is all I was
interested in and was quite substantial. No search was ever undertaken of Mr
Thomas's private living areas or retail shop. Only the Post Office area was ever
searched. I did not see or remove anything to do with Mr Thomas’s council work
nor did I come across anything non Post Office related when I went through the
documentation. I can also state that the Investigation team played no part in
clearing his office of any stock or taking the keys off him.
On Page 143 Mr Thomas stated:
“a lady came in, and a gentleman with her. The lady was quite robust.
She wanted to interview me on my own. I refused”
I wish to clarify that I do not recall my behaviour to be robust and I have never
been described in that manner either before or since. I was walking into a very
difficult situation where Mr Thomas was rightly upset and was angry and raising
Page 25 of 40
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his voice. My first priority is to try and calm the situation and explain in a
methodical manner, why I was there and what I needed to do.
79.At no point did I ask Mr Thomas to be interviewed alone, in all situations, I would
prefer to have somebody present to oversee proceedings, this is to help all
parties. Mr Thomas would have been offered a friend to be present and also for
him to seek free and independent legal advice and I would assist him to do this if
he so wished. Mr Thomas asked for Mr Jim Evans to be present at an interview,
however, this was deemed inappropriate at the time as Mr Evans was now the
interim subpostmaster for this office.
80.On page 143, Mr Thomas has stated:
“She said they had to go outside and make a couple of telephone calls
and within half an hour two policemen arrived. She walked through the
door and she said “Cuff him, he’s a thief’.
I find this comment outrageous for many reasons. It is for the Police to decide how
they deal with suspect offenders. I did not ask them to do this nor have I ever
used the words “cuff him’, it’s like something out of a Police TV programme, It’s
not real life. I never use the word “cuff”. I was also informed by Mr Thomas, prior
to the Police arriving, that he is friends with the Police and they frequent his office
regularly for tea and biscuits as they are only a few doors away. I knew the Police
would not consider Mr Thomas a threat or that he would be non-compliant with
their requests and I never even considered there would be a need to restrain him.
Page 26 of 40
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These comments are completely untrue. I have done numerous investigations
which involved the Police regarding employees or Subpostmasters and handcuffs
have never been used. At this stage, I also knew that other members of Mr
Thomas's family, including his daughter, had active user accounts on the system
and therefore, it was believed the loss may have been due to the loss in 2004 not
having been made good and the problem continuing. Therefore at this stage, I did
not consider Mr Thomas to be a thief.
8
.On Page 144 Mr Thomas states the Police answered:
“No I am not going to cuff him” and “Noel will find his own way to
Holyhead Police Station for an interview”.
The police did not make the first part of the statement as the request was never
made. With regards to the second part of the statement, the Police Officers and
Mr Thomas were conversing in Welsh which neither myself or Mr Bradshaw speak
or understand. We were not informed that Mr Thomas had not been arrested at
this point, and were asked to make our way to Holyhead Police station believing
they would transport Mr Thomas there. It was only when we were at the custody
suite that we were informed Mr Thomas was attending on a voluntary basis.
82.Mr Thomas has described me as aggressive. I do not consider my behaviour to be
aggressive at all. I remember being quite overwhelmed with Mr Thomas attitude
towards me as he was very loud and angry but could understand that as it was a
really stressful situation for him.
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83.On page 144 Mr Thomas stated I was aggressive with the custody sergeant in
charge and wanting him put in a cell, against stating:
“first of all, she wanted me cuffed and thankfully again, I knew one of
the Policemen and he said no”
This did not happen. This was one of my first occasions when I had to attend a
Police Station to interview a suspect and the explanation of the background and
necessity for the situation we were in was undertaken by Stephen Bradshaw who
liaised with the Custody Sergeant. I was observing at this point and I had a
pleasant normal interaction with them. I have attended Police stations on
numerous times since, possibly over 50, and when I go into a Custody suite, I do
as I am told by the Custody Sergeant and their staff, the same as the suspect.
The Custody Sergeant will then agree a course of action and I abide by this in all
cases. In my experience it is absolutely normal for suspects to be placed into a
cell whilst awaiting a solicitor or to be interviewed. This is decided by them and I
certainly played no part in Mr Thomas being placed into a cell.
84.Mr Thomas stated the interview lasted 6 hours. This is not my recollection at all,
nothing like. From checking the documents “Summary of Tape Recorded
Interview” (POL00044864) it is noted the interview lasted 46 minutes and 1 set of
tapes. Mr Thomas may have been in the Police Station for this length of time, I am
not sure. Mr Thomas arrived around 18:00 hours and at 19:52 the interview
started and at 20:36 the interview ended. I remember waiting for Mr Thomas's
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Legal Representative to arrive, then we gave disclosure. Following this Mr
Thomas had a consultation with his solicitor. I remember clearly, myself and
Stephen Bradshaw were asked to approach the desk and speak with the Custody
Sergeant who informed us a request was made by Mr Thomas's solicitor for the
interview to be undertaken in the Welsh language. We were happy to comply but
an interpreter would be required. The Custody Sergeant then asked if Mr Thomas
had been conversing in English during the day to which we both replied yes. We
were recalled back approx. 15 minutes later to inform us they had declined the
solicitors request as he agreed Mr Thomas understanding of English was good
and therefore the interview would proceed in English.
85.Mr Thomas stated “/ wanted him”. I am taking that as meaning I wanted him to
admit or wanted him be guilty at all costs. I can state that this was never the case.
As with all interviews, I have to ask difficult and challenging questions and I want
the suspect to be able to give their account and if there are mitigating
circumstances then I will investigate them. From reading the “Summary of Tape
Recorded Interview” (POL00044864), I do not think my questioning reflects me
“wanting him”. I never received any challenge from Mr Thomas's solicitor, Mr
Williams, and on the final page Mr Williams is asked “Are you happy the interview
has been conducted in accordance with PACE” to which he relies “Yes I’m sure”.
Also, as is reflected in the same document, Stephen Bradshaw led the majority of
the questioning as at this time I was fairly inexperienced.
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86.1 have been asked to describe the nature of the Police involvement in this
investigation. Gaerwen Police station was located around 50 to 100 yards away
from Mr Thomas's Post Office. We had a conversation with Mr Thomas about that
and he stated he knew the Police Officers and they would often call in for tea and
biscuits.
87.The situation within the Post Office was quite tense. Both myself and Stephen
Bradshaw were asking questions to both the auditors and Mr Thomas who
appeared angry, understandably. The request was made to interview Mr Thomas
and he suggested he was accompanied by Mr Evans as discussed above. I went
outside and called my Line Manager Mr Dawkins to update him on the situation
and take guidance as to the next steps. I was told to contact the Police as they
were yards away and seek assistance from them. I do not know Mr Dawkins’s
rationale for this as he made the decision but I do know some of it was due to the
risks to Post Office staff and not wanting the situation there to escalate into
something worse as had happened previously.
88.When the Police arrived it was very clear they knew Mr Thomas and his family
personally. They were talking in Welsh and laughing, I do not know what was said.
I cannot remember if myself or Stephen Bradshaw spoke to the Police and
explained what we were looking to do which was interview Mr Thomas. The Police
agreed to assist and we believed Mr Thomas was being arrested and a
subsequent search of his home would be undertaken. The police had a further
conversation with Mr Thomas, in Welsh and I believed it was being explained to
him what we had just discussed. It was a couple of hours later, upon arrival into
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Holyhead Custody Suite that I was informed Mr Thomas had not been arrested as
he had been allowed to voluntarily attend. We were also informed no search had
been undertaken.
89.1 have been asked to consider FUJ00155181, FUJ00152563, POL00068342 and
POL00063813 regarding any contact I had with Fujitsu. I emailed Graham Ward
from the Casework Team requesting some assistance from Fujitsu to try and
substantiate, or not, Mr Thomas's claims about the Horizon issues. I received data
from them, I think as part of an ARQ request. I have not had sight of the exhibits
list to refresh my memory but presume the transactions re withdrawal data for
incorrect PIN etc came from them.
90.From my recollection, I did not have any direct communication with Penny
Thomas or Gareth Edwards apart from to manage them as witnesses in the case
for example dates to avoid, dates required in court etc.
9
. The email POL00068342 refers to me meeting Brian Pinder, Head of Fujitsu on
Monday 19" December 2005 to oversee the removal of the Horizon equipment. I
did meet somebody from Fujitsu when the equipment was removed by cannot
recall his name, I presume it was Mr Pinder. The reason for this is Mr Thomas
stated the equipment was faulty and I insisted on it being checked. I was not
comfortable with an Interim Subpostmaster opening the Post Office with the same
equipment as they may experience the same issues Mr Thomas had reported and
experience losses and I thought that would not be right.
Page 31 of 40
92.
93.
94.
95.
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I have been asked to provide details of my understanding of the allegations made
by Mr Thomas relating to the Horizon system and what the significance of this
was. From my recollections, Mr Thomas stated his electricity is affected when
wagons or HGV's pass his office causing online card withdrawal transactions to
not be registered.
I have been asked if the call logs from Mr Thomas to the Horizon Service desk or
NBSC for the relevant period were ever requested by anyone involved in the
prosecution of Mr Allen. Firstly, I do not know who Mr Allen is on any investigation
associated with during my tenure with POL. Secondly, the call logs were
requested for Mr Thomas and Gaewen Post Office and are associated as part of
FUJ00155181. From my best recollection, the call logs for 2005 were requested
and received on 14" October 2005, the day after the audit and subsequent
interview with Mr Thomas. It was noted that the only call pertaining to issues with
the Horizon system was made after the arrival of the auditors on 13" October
2005. The caller who was identified as the PM “Some On-Line banking PIN
withdrawals are zero value on the On-Line banking report by Pin and the PM
wants someone to explain this to him”.
Regarding the removal of equipment from Gaerwen Post Office, please see point
no: 91
I have been asked about my involvement in the decision to charge Mr Thomas. I
did not play any part in this decision or any subsequent arrangements made
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between both sets of Legal teams. I was there to undertake the administrative
parts for example witness management.
96.All evidence and supporting paperwork and documentation would have been
forwarded to the Prosecution Office and advising lawyer for their advice. The
subsequent evidence bundle would be compiled by them. I do not recall providing
any further evidence. As stated in point 74, I did compile an Investigation Report —
Legal which would have been much more in depth and contained evidence
gathering which was done after the audit and interview. I have not been provided
with this document to review.
97.1 have been asked to consider documents FUJ00152587, FUJ00152635 and
FUJ00152641. I recall meeting somebody at the Post Office to remove the
equipment and presume from the documents this was Brian Pinder. I think Gareth
Jenkins was a Fujitsu expert on Horizon and Penny Thomas was the contact for
obtaining Horizon data. I have never met Gareth Thomas or Penny Thomas and
my interaction with them was regarding their witness availability. All other
requests were made via the Casework Management Team who would be the
interface into all requests made to Fujitsu.
98.With regards to the request for a statement from Gareth Jenkins, I would have
asked the Casework Team for a statement regarding the Fujitsu involvement and
it would be the Casework Management Team who would go via their agreed
Page 33 of 40
99.
100.
101.
102.
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channels and obtain this, with Gareth Jenkins offered by Fujitsu as their subject
matter expert. I was not involved in this process apart from ask for a statement.
I was not the disclosure officer in this case. This was undertaken by the
Prosecution Support Office.
I did not review the prosecution decision or review the indictment. I was sent the
advice which is from the Legal experts, which I am not.
I have been asked about a conversation I had with Mr Pinder as on FUJ00152635
relating to a conditional plea by Mr Thomas that “Horizon in no way played a part
in this loss”. I do not recollect this conversation, however, from the documents I
can recall it was proving difficult to arrange for Mr Jenkins to commit to a date to
attend the upcoming trial and I was in constant communication with him via email.
With Mr Jenkins being based down South and Caernarfon Crown Court being a
considerable logistical commute for him, I was relaying the advice received from
Juliet McFarlane, advising POL Lawyer and ratified on document POL00048201.
Mr Pinder would let his Fujitsu team member know accordingly.
I had no discussion with Mr Thomas regarding the basis of plea being “Horizon in
no way played a part in this loss”. This was undertaken at a much higher level
than myself between the prosecution and Defence parties. I was informed of the
outcome.
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103.1 have been asked about my comment on FUJ00152650 “Mr Thomas was not
expecting a custodial sentence and although not a particularly long sentence, it
does send out the right message”. The first part of the sentence was made due to
a conversation in court where the prosecuting barrister said both parties expected
a suspended sentence. We were all shocked when the judge gave his sentencing
submissions especially given the character references provided and read out in
court. With regards to the last part of the sentence, this was a quote from the POL
communications department which I cut and pasted.
104.1 played no part in any subsequent proceedings against Mr Thomas or had any
further involvement in the case.
General
105.1 have been asked on my reflections on the way the investigation and
prosecution of Alison Hall was conducted. I have no recollection of being
involved in any case against this person so cannot comment.
106.1 have also been asked my views on POL00113278 para’s 149 to 155 and I have
no comment to make that I have not already delivered in this statement.
107.When I left POL in 2008, the issue of the Horizon system having bugs and its
integrity were just starting to be raised. I did not become involved in this whilst in
Page 35 of 40
108.
109.
110.
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POL and where raised as mitigation in my investigation, I followed the process
and raised the issues. The evidence has shown in some instances, there are
clearly issues and if these have been covered up then everybody associated
with this period has been working against a backdrop of false information. The
high level decision makers need to answer for their actions.
I cannot comment regarding information passed to POL from Fujitsu as I was not
involved in this process.
Clearly, as an investigator gathering evidence to show how/why losses occurred,
if I did not have the right data or knew there were bugs or defects then I am not
reporting the true state of affairs. I feel this is especially relevant to the case
against Miss Janet Skinner although she did not suggest Horizon as an issue,
the system defects should have been highlighted as part of Fujitsu/POL
safeguards for losses that are growing at a pace like they were at Bransholme
Post Office.
I have no further comments to make or matters to bring to the attention of the
chair of the inquiry.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated ..1°' November 2023
Page 36 of 40
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URN
Document Description
Control Number
POL00104968
POL - Enforcement and
Prosecution Policy
POL-0080600
POL00104747
Casework Management Policy
(Version 1.0, March 2000)
POL-0080387
POL00104777
Casework Management Policy
(Version 4.0, October 2022)
POL-0080417
POL00104754
Rules and Standards Policy
(Version 2.0, October 2000)
POL-0080394
POL00030687
Investigation Procedures Policy
(Version 2.0, January 2001)
POL-0027169
POL00104762
Disclosure of Unused Material,
Criminal Procedures and
Investigations Act 1996 Codes of
Practice Policy (Version 1.0, May
2001)
POL-0080402
POL00030578
Royal mail Group Ltd Criminal
Investigation and Prosecution
Policy (1 December 2007)
POL-0027060
POL00104806
Royal Mail Group Security —
Procedures and Standards —
Standards of Behaviour and
Complaints Procedure (Version 2,
October 2007)
POL-0080438
POL00123309
Email from Dave Posnett to
Aftab Ali, Andrew Daley, Andrew
S McCabe and others Re:
Investigation Communication 6-
2014 Joint Investigation
Protocols RMGS and PO Ltd
Security
POL-0129508
10.
POL00123310
Royal Mail Group Security
Investigation Communication-
Joint Investigation Protocols
RMGS And PO Ltd Security
POL-0129509
11.
POL00038728
RMG 2.2 Joint Investigation
Protocols - RMGS and PO Ltd
Security v1 Final
POL-0028039
12.
POL00123312
A Memorandum Of
Understanding On Joint
Investigation Protocols Post
Independence Involving Royal
Mail And Post Office Ltd
Security
POL-0129511
Page 37 of 40
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WITN08330100
13.
POL00104821
Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance” (Version 2, October
2008)
POL-0080453
14.
POL00118096
Email from Andrew Wise to
Michael Stanway forwarding an
email re Casework Compliance
VIS00012685
15.
POL00118109
Appendix 2 - File construction
and Appendixes A, B and C:
"Compliance Guide: Preparation
and Layout of Investigation Red
Label Case Files" Undated -
date taken from parent email
VIS00012698
16.
POL00118101
Appendix 3 - Offender reports
and Discipline reports:
"Compliance Guide to the
Preparation and Layout of
Investigation Red Label Case
Files" - undated (date taken
from parent email)
VIS00012690
17.
POL00118102
Appendix 4 - Offender reports
layout: "POL template Offender
Report (Legal Investigation
VIS00012691
18.
POL00118104
Appendix 6 - Identification
codes
VIS00012693
19.
POL00047368
Post Office List of Exhibits in
The Queen v Janet Skinner
POL-0043847
20.
POL00044632
Interview Transcript - Janet
Louise Skinner
POL-0041111
21.
POL00048259
Schedule of non-sensitive
unused materials by Diane
Matthews. R v Janet Skinner.
POL-0044738
22.
POL00044633
Summary of tape recorded
interview - Janet Louise Skinner
POL-0041112
23.
POL00044656
Summary of tape recorded
interview - Janet Louise Skinner
POL-0041135
24.
POL00048161
Memo re Post Office Limited v
Janet Louise Skinner, by Juliet
McFarlane.
POL-0044640
25.
POL00048168
Janet Skinner Case Study:
Internal memo from Terry
Crowther (Investigation
Casework Team Support) to
Diane Matthews
POL-0044647
26.
POL00048407
Letter from Myer Wolff to Royal
Mail Legal Services, RE:
Outcome of Plea hearing (R v.
Skinner)
POL-0044886
27.
POL00048013
Antecedents re Janet Louise
Skinner (North Bransholme Post
Office branch).
POL-0044492
Page 38 of 40
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WITN08330100
28.
INQ00001035
Transcript (25/02/2022): Post
Office Horizon IT Inquiry -
Stephanie Reilly [WITN0318],
Tracy Felstead [WITN0319],
Seema Misra [WITNO065] and
Janet Louise Skinner
[WITNO126].
INQ00001035
29.
POL00113278
Approved Judgment between
Josephine Hamilton & Others
and Post Office Limited
POL-0110657
30.
POL00044861
Investigation Discipline Report
by Diane Matthews - Hughie
Noel Thomas
POL-0041340
31.
POL00047748
Post Office Limited Internal
Investigation Team - Terms of
Reference: Criminal
Investigation - Gaerwen Post
Office
POL-0044227
32.
1NQ00001044
Transcript (14/02/2022): Post
Office Horizon IT Inquiry - Baljit
Sethi [WITN0200], Jo Hamilton
[WITN0040] and Hughie Noel
Thomas [WITN0162]
INQ00001044
33.
POL00044864
Summary of tape- recorded
interview of Hughie Thomas -
conducted by Diane Matthews
and Stephen Bradshaw.
POL-0041343
34.
FUJ00155181
Criminal case study of Hughie
Thomas: Audit Record Query
0506/401 Re: Gaerwen PO
requesting an analysis of all
helpdesk calls from 14/09/05-
13/10/05 and Relevant
Documents
POINQ0161376F
35.
FUJ00152563
Email to Penny Thomas re:
Gaerwen FAD Code 160604 -
Branch Audit and Transaction
Issues
POINQ0158758F
36.
POL00068342
Electronic Memo from Sue
Hodgins to Emlyn Hughes, Area
Intervention Office 10 and Alan
Knowles re: Gaerwen in
confidence
POL-0064821
37.
POL00063813
Memo from J A McFarlane to
Investigation team Post Office
Limited Re Royal Mail Group plc
v_ Hughie Noel Thomas
POL-0060292
38.
FUJ00152587
Email from Graham C Ward to
Brian Pinder re: Gaerwen
Statement
POINQ0158828F
Page 39 of 40
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WITN08330100
39.
FUJ00152635
Email from Brian Pinder to
Gareth Jenkins, Penny Thomas
and Andy Dunks re Gaerwen
(Hughie Thomas case study)
POINQ0158830F
40.
FUJ00152641
Noel Thomas Case Study: Email
chain from Diane Matthews to
Thomas Penny. Re: Gaerwen
POINQ0158836F
41.
POL00048201
Memo from Phil Taylor to
Investigation Team Post Office
Limited cc Diane Matthews re:
Regina v Hughie Noel Thomas
Adjourned Sentence
POL-0044680
42.
FUJ00152650
Hughie Thomas case study:
Email from Diane Matthews to
Alison Edwards, Mal Rannard,
Jay O'Laogun and others Re:
Hughie Thomas Gaerwen Post
Office
POINQ0158845F
43.
POL00113278
Approved Judgment between
Josephine Hamilton & Others
and Post Office Limited
POL-0110657
Page 40 of 40