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Witness Name: Philip Gerrish
Statement No.: WITN08370100
Dated: 7/¢ [2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PHILIP GERRISH
INTRODUCTION
I, PHILIP GERRISH will say as follows:
1. This written witness statement has been drafted in response to the Rule 9
request dated April 14° 2023 and supplementary questions sent to me on
May 16" 2023 regarding involvement in action taken against Sub-
Postmasters by Post Office Ltd, as part of Phase 4 of the Post Office Horizon
IT Inquiry (“the Inquiry”).
Relevant background
2. I originally joined the Post Office as a counter clerk in the City of London in
1980. In 1988 I joined the Post Office Investigation Department (POID) as an
Assistant Investigation Officer. I was promoted to Investigation Officer in 1989.
l investigated suspected or detected crime across the whole business
including, predominantly, the mail, parcels and counters networks. In 1996
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following the Review of Corporate Centre (ROCC) I transferred across to Post
Office Counters (POCL) as an Investigation Manager in the South East
Region. In circa late 1998, to the best of my recollection, I was temporarily
promoted to Regional Security and Investigation Manager (RSIM) in the
POCL South East Region and subsequently seconded to the Shaping for
Competitive Success project (SCS) in the following year. In October 1999 I
was appointed Territory Security Manager (TSM) for the Post Office Network
(PON) East Territory. Again, to the best of my recollection, sometime in 2002
following an internal re-organisation, I was appointed National Internal Crime
and Investigation Manager for PON. I left Post Office Limited (POL) in 2004
when I was appointed Head of Investigation for Royal Mail and Group. This
role did not include any responsibilities or accountabilities involving Post
Office Ltd or Parcelforce Worldwide (PFW) which both had their own Heads of
Security and embedded Security and Investigation teams. I subsequently
became Director of Investigations Royal Mail and Group. I retired in 2015.
. Between 1996 and 1998 I was one of three Investigation Managers within the
POCL South East Region investigating suspected or detected crime against
the Post Office. I covered Kent and East Sussex. As the temporary RSIM for
POCL South East in addition to the Investigation function I was also
responsible for 3 CM2 IDs, 3 Security Managers and the physical and
procedural security inspections and investment for all outlets (branch and sub
offices) within the Region. Between 1999 and 2002, as the TSM for the East
Territory, I lead the team that investigated crime against PON/POL in that area
and managed physical and procedural security standards inspections and
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investment across that Territory. Between 2002 and leaving POL in 2004 as
National Internal Crime and Investigation Manager I led the team responsible
for investigating internal crime across the whole Post Office Network including
Scotland and Northern Ireland. POL did not bring prosecutions in Scotland or
Northern Ireland. In Scotland cases were submitted to the Procurator Fiscal
(PF) and in Northern Ireland the Public Prosecution Service Northern Ireland
(PPSNI) following its inception and before that the Police. I have been asked
to consider which was the most effective system. I cannot comment. I only
had personal experience of the English system.
The policies/practices in place relating to criminal investigation and
prosecution
4. Between 1989 and 1993 (as an Investigation Officer) and 1996 and 1998 (as
an Investigation Manager) POCL I worked in defined geographical areas;
formerly in East London and Essex and latterly in Kent and East Sussex,
investigating suspected or detected crime committed against the Post Office.
This included investigating Sub Postmasters (SPMR) and Sub Postmaster’s
assistants. To the best of my memory, policies and practices did not change
in any significant material way during that period excepting the introduction of
taped recorded interviews and the increased use of computers to manage
casework processes. Policies, procedures and practices were outlined in the
POID manual subsequently translated into Group Policy, Procedures and
Standards and in accordance with appropriate legislation including the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) Codes of Practice and the Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act (1996) when the Act came into force.
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The rationale behind the practice of bringing private prosecutions
5. Historically there has been a two century long plus precedent of Post
Office/Royal Mail investigating its own crime and decades of bringing private
prosecutions. The POID and its subsequent iterations such as Post Office
Security and Investigation Services (POSIS) was a Home Office recognised
law enforcement agency operating under all relevant criminal legislation. The
Police had neither the resource, the knowledge nor the desire to investigate
Post Office/Royal Mail internal crime. The obligation to carry out these
activities in-house would have emanated from the considerations of public
money, public property, public trust, the breach of that trust and deterrent. I
cannot comment on POL’s rationale post separation or after 2004. On
occasions POL/RM may have requested Police assistance in an investigation.
This may have been because there were additional external suspects linked
or potential physical risk. This would not preclude POL/RM still leading the
prosecution.
Policies governing the conduct of criminal investigations by the Security team and
the organisational structure
6. I have been asked to explain my role in the development, authorisation,
management and/or assurance of several policies (listed by reference to
documents that have been provided to me by the Inquiry) relating to the
conduct of criminal investigations by the Security team. I have examined the
documents provided to me. My responses are as follows.
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a. POL00104771 (2002) - I have no particular recollection of the
document but it's reasonable to assume that I would have been part of
its assurance at that time.
b. POL00030578, POL00104812 (2007) and POL0031008 (2010) - I
would have been part of the assurance group for such a Group policy
from my perspective in my role as Head of Investigation for Royal Mail.
c. POL00104806 (2007), POL0031004 (2008), POLO031003 (2009) and
POL00030786 (2011) - I can’t recall these documents specifically but it
would be normal for me to have had awareness of such documents
and if they were being reviewed, as Head of Investigation for Royal
Mail.
d. POL00026573 (2010), POL00104857(2010) - These documents were
for RM Group Security team only.
e. I have no knowledge of any of the remaining documents which all
appear to be POL specific and all created after I had left POL in 2004.
7. When I arrived at POCL in 1996 I reported to a RSIM who in turn reported to
the Head of Human Resources and subsequently the Head of Finance in one
of 7 POCL Regions. To the best of my recollection the team consisted of 3
Investigations Managers, 3 Counters Managers 2 ID, 3 Security Managers
and some administration support staff. A Post Office Security Executive sat in
the POCL corporate centre setting physical and procedural Security policy. In
4999 following the Shaping for Competitive Success project PON restructured
and merged 7 regions into 3 territories with the Security and Investigation
functions in those territories reporting to a Head of Security. In the East
where I became TSM I inherited a similar but larger structure. I believe the
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West and North Territories were similarly structured. In 2002 following an
internal re-organisation PON/POL moved to 3 teams with national specific
responsibilities: - An Internal Crime and Investigation Team, a Physical and
Procedural Security team and a third team that consisted predominantly of
admin support and Burglary and Robbery liaison. I left for RM in 2004.
8. During my period in POCL/PON/POL the individual Investigator was
responsible for the progression and conduct of an investigation held by them
with input and advice as required from line managers and casework
managers.
9. I have been asked about the role of the Financial Investigation Unit, and in
what circumstances they would become involved in an investigation. I am
unable to answer this question as the Financial Investigation Unit was
introduced sometime after I had left POL in 2004
10. During my time in POL no other teams within POL were involved in criminal
investigations and prosecutions.
11.During my time in POL, the legislation, policies, guidance and principles
governing the conduct of investigations were predominantly the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act (1984) Codes of Practice, the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act (1996) and the POID manual subsequently translated into
Group Policy, Procedures and Standards. Policies, procedures and standards
were generally reviewed every three years and/or at any restructuring or if
relevant legislation changed.
12. During my time in POL there was a Group Serious Complaints policy as
guidance for dealing with complaints about members of the team in relation to
their conduct in an investigation.
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13. I have been asked about the nature of any supervision over criminal
investigations by Security Managers. At no stage during my period at
POCL/PON/POL from 1996 until I left in 2004 can I recall criminal
investigations being carried out by people known as Security Managers. I
believe it was a generic job title introduced in POL in later years. During my
time criminal investigations were carried out by Investigation Managers and
Security Managers conducted physical and procedural security reviews and
inspections. Any reference to Security Managers carrying out criminal
investigations will I believe relate to a time after I had left. I do not recall any
Security Managers supervising or overseeing investigations carried out by
Investigation Managers.
14.During my time up until 2004 the Post Office’s approach to suspected fraud
was in accordance with the RM Group policy. Where it was identified, it was
to investigate and apprehend and prosecute where appropriate those
responsible.
15.During my time until 2004 there was no difference in the approach to
investigate a Crown Office employee or a SPMR or a SPMR’s assistant.
16.Post SCS, as a separate Business Unit, POL had increasingly sought to
develop its own identity as a Business. From around 2008 POL was
increasingly operating very separately and independently as a Business as it
moved inevitably to separate. Although the Group Security Director may havi
still had some reserved powers POL Security operated without any Group
oversight and it had developed its own policies, procedures and standards,
together with the training of its employees. Whilst my name is included in at
the top of some kind of process map as the Head of Investigation of RM, I ha
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no knowledge or involvement in either POL00104900 or POL0104889. I do
not specifically recall document POL00105098 but I do recall having
involvement in developing a memorandum of understanding where RM and
POL were attempting to agree primacy in cross business crime investigations.
E.g. Where an RM postman steals cash from behind the PO counter or a PO
counter clerk steals mail from behind the counter.
How and when the Security team became involved in an investigation
17.From my knowledge prior to 2004, audits would be conducted either as part of
the Audit team’s own risk programme, if an office was closing or transferring
or if it was requested as part of an Investigation inquiry.
18.1 have been asked to consider POL00084813 and explain in what
circumstances an investigator would attend an audit of a branch and what
their role was. I have no knowledge of this document as it relates to a date
after I had left POL in 2004. During my time investigators played no role in the
audit itself. If the investigator had requested the audit prior to an intended
interview then I would have expected the investigator to attend the office
before the audit had been completed. An exception would be if there was a
possibility that evidence could be destroyed. If an unexpected deficit had been
discovered by the audit team, then I would have expected the investigator to
attend as soon as he/she could depending on other commitments/priorities.
19.1 am unaware of any specific instructions for auditors but during my time prior
to my departure from POL I would have certainly expected the Investigation
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team to have been contacted if an investigator had requested the audit and/or
depending on the size of any discrepancy.
20.1 have been asked to consider POL00104929 and POL00105226 and answer
a number of questions in relation to decision-making following a shortfall
being identified during a branch audit. I have no knowledge of these
documents as they relate to a date after I had left POL in 2004. During my
time in POCL/PON/POL the decision to pursue an investigation into potential
criminality was made by the Investigation team and based upon the evidence
available at the time. The Security team were not involved in debt recovery at
all. To the best of my knowledge this was conducted within the Finance part of
the business. The local contract managers were not involved in the decision
or otherwise to conduct a criminal investigation. I do not know if they were
associated with in any decisions involving debt recovery. I cannot recall
specific triggers for raising cases during my time in POCL/PON/POL. Cases
for inquiry could be raised from many sources: client complaints, customer
complaints, staff information, random checks, audit activity. The volume and
frequency of discrepancies were obviously factors together with the amounts
involved. Cases were categorised as theft, false accounting etc. depending on
the offences committed. Fraud Act offences came in after my time in POL.
Involvement of the Security team in the suspension process
21.1 have been asked to consider POL00104809 (2005). I have no knowledge of
or involvement in the document but it includes references to agents and is
likely a legacy document. I have also been asked to consider POL00105231
(2012). This is a Royal Mail only document and does not relate to POL.
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22.1 have been asked about the Security team’s role in suspension decisions
when a shortfall was identified. During my time in POCL/PON/POL between
1996 and 2004 an investigator would discuss the shortfall and the
appropriateness of a suspension with the relevant Retail Network or Retail
Line Manager. The Retail Line/Network Manager made the final decision to
suspend.
23.During my time at POL up to 2004 there was no difference to the decision
process for suspension involving a Crown employee or a SPMR or agent.
The individuals who made the suspension decision in the business may have
been in different operational lines of the business structure depending on the
office being a Branch Office or a Sub office.
The process followed by Security team investigators when conducting a criminal
investigation following the identification of shortfall at an audit
24.During my time at POL between 1996 and 2004 Investigation Managers were
expected to follow the evidence and conduct their investigations in
accordance with all relevant legislation and the RM Group policy, procedures
and standards.
25.1 have been asked to review a 14-page document, POL 00105223, that I have
not seen before, was evidently written at least 9 years after I had left POL and
to explain how it differs with processes that would have been in place during
my time in POL. I don’t have a specific document to compare it with but it
appears to be a review of POL’s casework process at the time. Broadly
speaking it appears to follow a logical casework process that I'd have
expected to see in my time: - covering the setting up of a file, source of
information, other information or documents required, file construction,
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reporting, association of necessary evidence (inc. tape transcripts,
statements), obtaining process. The decision to set up a case appears to be
at the discretion of a Team Manager rather than a casework manager. There
are a number of forms that I do not recognise including FES and ECF. There
are also a number of actions or information reference points in a number of
areas that I am unaware of and/or that were not around during my time.
These are Equifax, Stakeholder notification, statements from Fujitsu, call logs,
full rota checks, PORA, Grapevine, Financial investigators, Credence. It also
appears that external lawyers, Cartwright King, are advising on criminal
cases.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
26.1 have been asked to explain my role in the development, authorisation,
management and/or assurance of any of the polices set out in several
documents that I have been provided with by the Inquiry. I have examined the
documents signposted in this question. My responses are as follows:
a. POLO00030659 (1997) — I have no knowledge or recollection of this
document.
b. POL00030800 (2011), POL00031011 (2009)- 1 would expect to have
been familiar with the 2 documents as Head of Investigation in RM but
was not involved in their creation or management as they were owned
by Legal Services.
c. POL00031008 (2010) - It would be normal for me to have had sight
and knowledge of such a document if it was being reviewed, as Head
of Investigation for Royal Mail.
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d. POL00030598 (2011)-This document relates to Royal Mail only and not
POL.
e. I have no knowledge of any of the remaining documents which all
appear to be POL specific and all created after I had left POL in 2004
and one after I had retired.
27.1 have been asked to describe the Post Office prosecution policy. During my
time in POL up to my leaving in 2004 there was a Group Prosecution Policy.
To the best of my recollection POL did not have a separate policy at this time.
If there was any recorded distinct POL policy document it wouldn’t have
differed in essence from the Group policy.
28. Solicitor’s Office Criminal Law (later Legal Services) advised on whether the
case was suitable for prosecution and advised appropriate charges. During
my time in POL the decision to prosecute was then made by the nominated
business prosecution authority.
29.During my time in POL up to my departure in 2004 the local contract
managers (Retail Network or Retail Line Managers) played no part in the
decision or not to prosecute.
30. During my time in POL up to my departure in 2004 the advice to prosecute
was made by Solicitor’s Office Criminal Law in accordance with the Code for
Crown Prosecutors.
31. The nominated business prosecution authority had the benefit of the Criminal
Law advice on each individual case. They had also undertaken a short
training course delivered by the Solicitors Office on the legal requirements,
the prosecution process and their role within it as the business authority to
prosecute.
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32.Legal advice was provided by internal solicitors in Criminal Law but if a case
went to Crown Court, then external Counsel would also further advise.
33.During my time in POL up to 2004 no different approach to investigating was
applied to a case involving an audit shortage than any other case of an
investigation.
34.1 have been asked in what circumstances were steps to restrain a suspect's
assets by criminal enforcement methods such as confiscation proceedings
considered. During my time at POL steps to restrain a suspect's assets did
not take place and such action was not possible.
35.1 have been asked who decided whether criminal enforcement proceedings
should be pursued and what factors they considered when making such
decisions. I cannot answer this question as no criminal enforcement
proceedings took place during my time in POCL/PON/POL. Financial
Investigators were introduced sometime after I had left in 2004.
Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security team
36.1 have been asked to consider POL00104805. If I recall correctly this
document was a distance learning module developed in Royal Mail to
supplement classroom training.
37.During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 training took the nature of a
POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in the POID manual
and subsequently in Group Policy, procedures and standards that developed
as we moved to ways of working involving computer systems. During my time
up until around 2004 all POCL/PON/POL interviews were generally led by an
Investigation Officer/Manager at PEB (CM1) Level.
38.1 cannot answer beyond 2004 as detailed above.
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39.1 have been provided with several documents by the Inquiry and asked if any
of those documents were provided to investigators within the Security team.
a. POL00105225 - I have no knowledge of this document which is a POL
document apparently from 9 years after I left POL.
b. All of the other documents listed and detailed were developed by Royal
Mail, intended for a Royal Mail audience, and to the best of my
recollection circulated to Royal Mail Investigators only and placed upon
the RM Security intranet site. By this time POL Security was operating
totally independently and had developed its own guidelines, processes
and procedures. I cannot recall if POL had access to our intranet site. I
do not know what documents POL provided to the POL Security team.
40. During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 taking witness statements
formed part of the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in
the POID manual and subsequently the Group policy, procedures and
standards and in the P.A.C.E. Act Codes of Practice.
41.1 have been asked if POL00104827 and/or POL00104826 were provided to
investigators within the Security team. Both of the documents listed and
detailed were developed by Royal Mail, intended for a Royal Mail audience, to
the best of my recollection circulated to Royal Mail Investigators only and
placed upon the RM Security intranet site. I cannot recall if POL had access
to the RM Security intranet site. I do not know what documents POL provided
to the POL Security team.
42. During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 conducting searches formed
part of the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in the
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POID manual and subsequently the Group policy, procedures and standards
and in the P.A.C.E. Act Codes of Practice.
43. I have been asked if POL00104828 and/or POL00104849 were provided to
investigators within the Security team. Both of the documents listed and
detailed were developed by Royal Mail, intended for a Royal Mail audience, to
the best of my recollection circulated to Royal Mail Investigators only and
placed upon the RM Security intranet site. I cannot recall if POL had access
to the RM Security intranet site. I do not know what documents POL provided
to the POL Security team.
44. During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004, conducting an investigation
formed part of the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in
the POID manual and subsequently the Group policy, procedures and
standards.
45. During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 obtaining evidence formed
part of the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in the
POID manual and subsequently the Group policy, procedures and standards.
46.1 have been asked about what instructions, guidance and training were given
to investigators about obtaining evidence held by Fujitsu in the course of an
investigation. I cannot recall any guidance around Fujitsu during my time at
POCL/PON/POL and I obviously can't comment after I left.
47.During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 disclosure obligations formed
part of the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in the
POID manual and subsequently the Group Policy, procedures and standards
with additional specific training post introduction of CPIA.
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48.1 have been asked if any of POL00104891, POL00104848 or POL00104893
were provided to investigators within the Security team. All of the documents
listed and detailed were developed by Royal Mail and intended for a Royal
Mail audience and to the best of my recollection circulated to Royal Mail
Investigators only. They would also have been placed on the RM Security
intranet site. By this time POL Security was operating totally independently
and had developed their own guidelines, processes and procedures. I do not
know what documents POL provided to the POL Security team.
49. During my time in POL between 1996 and 2004 report writing formed part of
the POSIS residential induction training course, was detailed in the POID
manual and subsequently the Group Policy, procedures and standards.
50.1 have been asked if either of POL00104881(2011) or POL00104879 (2011)
were provided to the POL Security team. These documents are RM
documents only and intended for a Royal Mail audience and circulated to
Royal Mail Investigators only. I do not know what documents POL provided to
the POL Security team.
Analysing Horizon data and requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu
51.1 have been asked to consider POL00105223 and POL00105213 and to
address, prior to the introduction of the tool “Credence” in 2009, what analysis
was done by Security team investigators of Horizon data when a SPM/ SPMs’
assistant/ Crown Office Employee attributed a shortfall to problems with
Horizon. I am unable to answer this question as I have no knowledge of the
documents or the tools identified as they relate to dates after I had left POL in
2004. During my time in POCL/PON/POL I cannot recall any cases where
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SPMRs/SPMRs assistants or Crown Office employees attributed a shortfall to
problems with Horizon.
52.1 have been asked to explain the process for requesting Horizon data from
Fujitsu. During the period from Horizon’s introduction until I left in 2004, I
cannot recall any specific process for obtaining data but I do recall that
requests for data printouts were only allowed to be very limited due to contract
restrictions, making them difficult to obtain if required and therefore fairly rare.
53.1 have been asked to consider POL00105222 and answer if there was a
formalised process for requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu prior to publication of
this document (September 2013). I am unable to answer this question as I
have no knowledge of this document or any process relating as it refers to a
date after I had left POL in 2004
54.1 have been asked about ARQ logs and their use. I do not know what ARQ
logs are or for what they were/are used.
55.1 have been asked whose decision it was whether ARQ data was requested
from Fujitsu in a given case. I cannot answer this question for the reason
explained above
56.1 have been asked where a shortfall had been identified and the SPM/
assistant’ Crown Office employee was attributing it to problems with Horizon
but did not have corroborating evidence of material problems with Horizon, if
ARQ data was requested from Fujitsu as a matter of course. I cannot answer
this question for the reason explained above.
57.1 have been asked if ARQ data was provided to a SPM as a matter of course
when it was obtained from Fujitsu. I cannot answer this question for the
reason explained above.
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Cases against SPMs
58.1 have been asked about my recollections of the criminal cases in respect of
24 named individuals. I have no recollection of any of these cases or names
supplied. I have been asked to examine documents relating to 2 cases. Both
would appear to have taken place after I had left POL and my name
appearing in a box on a casework tick-list would seem to be a templated
document that had not been amended after my departure.
59.1 have been asked if there are any prosecutions which I had a role as
investigator which I consider are relevant to the matters being investigated by
the public inquiry. None at all.
60.1 have been asked, looking back, if I have any concerns about any criminal
cases in which I was involved. To the best of my recollection, I did not
personally conduct any investigations into counters crime after 1998 and
therefore I don’t believe any of my cases would have involved Horizon. I have
absolutely no concerns about any of the criminal cases that I conducted.
The Security team’s role in relation to debt recovery
61.1 had no role in or knowledge of debt recovery during my time in POL.
Knowledge of bugs, errors, and defects in the Horizon system
62.1 had no personal concems nor awareness of any concerns around the
robustness of the Horizon system or problems with it. And therefore, I have
none to report. I have been asked to consider POLO0086845 and
POL00088867 and to address whether the suggestion that system faults with
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Horizon were “very rare” correspond with my understanding of the position in
2003. Yes, it would correspond to my opinion, as I was unaware of any faults.
Other matters
63.1 have nothing to add.
I believe this statement to be true.
Dated:......... ZL eftrs 20 28
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Index to First Witness Statement of Philip Gerrish
No. I URN Document Description Control Number
i POL00104771 Post Office Ltd - Security I POL-0080411
Policy [Theft and Fraud
by Sub Office Assistants]
POL00030578 S02 Royal Mail Group POL-0027060
Criminal Investigation and
Prosecution Policy
December 2007
POL00104812 “Royal Mail Group Ltd POL-0080444
Criminal Investigation and
Prosecution Policy”
POL00031008 RMG Ltd Criminal POL-0027490
investigation and
Prosecution Policy v1.1
November 2010
POL00104806 Royal Mail Group Security I POL-0080438
~ Procedures and
Standards: Standards of
behaviour and complaints
procedure No.10-X v2
POL00031004 RMG Policy — Crime and I POL-0027486
Investigation (S2) ~
version 3.0
POL00031003 Royal Mail Group Crime I POL-0027485
and Investigation Policy
v1.1 October 2009
POL00030786 Royal Mail Group Policy — I POL-0027268
Crime and Investigation
(S2) v3 effective from
April 2011, owner Tony
March, Group Security
Director
POL00026573 RMG 20rocedures & POL-0023214
Standards — Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 &
Financial Investigations
doc 9.1V1
10 I POLO0104900 Undated ‘Separation POL-0080532
Project — Criminal
Investigations Policy for
Post Office Ltd’
11 I POL00104889 Undated flow diagram of I POL-0080521
‘Research, interpretation,
preparation, development
and publication of
investigation procedures
12 I POLO0105098 A memorandum of POL.-0080728
understanding on joint
In
lwo
SI
jon
In
IN
oo
ko
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investigation protocols
post independence
involving royal mail and
post office lid security
POL00084813
Condensed Guide For
Audit Attendance
POL-0081871
ls
POL00104929
“Post Office Limited:
Internal Protocol for
Criminal Investigation and
Enforcement (with
flowchart)”
POL-0080561
POL00105226
Undated Appendix 1 —
POL Criminal
Investigations and
Enforcement Procedure
(flowchart)
POL-0080851
POL00104809
Royal Mail Group Security
— Procedures and
Standards: Suspension
from duty No.6-X v1
POL-0080441
POL00105231
Royal Mail Internal
Information Criminal
Investigation Team:
Suspension from Duty v1
POL-0080856
POL00105223
Security Operations
Casework Review
POL-0080848
io
POL00030659
Post Office Internal
Prosecution Policy
(Dishonesty), Andrew
Wilson December 1997
POL-0027141
Is
POL00030800
RMG Policy — Prosecution
(S3) Version 3.0
POL-0027282
[4
POL00031011
RMG Prosecution Policy
(undated) V2.1
POL-0027493
IS
POL00030598
Royal Mail Prosecution
Decision Procedure
POL-0027080
POL00104805
Royal Mail Group:
Evidence and Witness
Statements “E" Learning
POL-0080437
POL00105225
Post Office: A guide to
interviewing
POL-0080850
POL00104827
Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Witness Statements P&S
Doc 5.4 v2
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Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Appendix 2 to P&S 5.4 —
POL-0080458
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Managing the witness and
structure & contents of
witness statements v1
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Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Searching No. 7-X v5
POL-0080460
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Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Searching doc 7.5 v6
POL-0080481
POL00104857
Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Initiating Investigations
doc 2.1
POL-0080489
POL00031008
RMG Ltd Criminal
Investigation and
Prosecution Policy v1.1
November 2010
POL-0027490
POL00104881
Royal Mail Internal
Information Criminal
Investigation Team: Guide
to the preparation of
suspect offender reports,
England, Wales and
Northern Ireland" v1
POL-0080513
POL00105223
Security Operations
Casework Review
POL-0080848
uo
(a)
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Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Appendix 1 to P&S 5.4 —
Rules & Continuity of
Evidence v1
POL-0080523
ig
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Royal Mail Group Security
Procedures & Standards:
Appendix 1 to P&S 9.5
Disclosure of Unused
Material & The Criminal
Procedure &
Investigations Act 1996.
Version 1.
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Appendix 7 to 7.4 —
Dealing with Defence
Solicitors & Complaints by
Suspects v1
POL-0080525
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Appendix 1 to 8.2 Suspect
Offender Reports,
Preamble Guide England,
Wales and Northern
lreland v1
POL-0080511
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Fraud Risk Security Pro-
forma — Guide to
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Obtaining Reports from
Horizon - undated
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“Post Office: Security
Investigations Data
Handling Process (Fujitsu
Horizon Data Request)"
v1
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POL00052874
Casework management
initial tick list of Tahir
Mahmoud
POL-0049353
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Casework Management
Initial Ticklist- Oyeteju
Adedayo
POL-0049382
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Post Office Ltd Security
Policy: Accounting Losses
Policy for Agency
Branches
POL-0083903
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Post Office Ltd: Liability
for Losses Policy for
agency branches v2.0
January 2004
POL-0085925
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