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Witness Name: Hugh Meyrick
Flemington
Statement No.: WITNO8620100
Dated: 19 March 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF HUGH MEYRICK
FLEMINGTON
1, Hugh Meyrick Flemington, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
(the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 request dated 30
January 2024 (the “Request”).
2. At the outset, I want to express my heartfelt sympathy for sub-postmasters
and sub-postmistresses (“SPMs”) and the families affected by the
important issues being considered by the Inquiry.
3. I have attempted to the best of my ability to recall events and provide
comprehensive assistance to the Inquiry. It is important to say that the
majority of events which are described in this witness statement occurred
approximately 10 to 15 years ago. I left my employment with the Post
Office Limited (“POL”) on 20 March 2014, and do not have access to
POL’s records of emails and documents which existed at the relevant time
to assist my recollection. My recollection has been helped to an extent by
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carefully considering the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, but it
is still difficult to recall accurately the detail and surrounding
circumstances of all events.
4. I have referred to the roles of individuals throughout this statement to
assist the Inquiry, although this is to the best of my recollection, and I do
not have a record of the various roles.
5. I have been assisted by BCL Solicitors LLP in the preparation of my
witness statement.
BACKGROUND
6. I trained as a solicitor in Exeter and qualified as a company and commercial
lawyer in 1996. With one-year's post qualification experience, I accepted
a role in a City law firm working primarily on the IT & IP aspects of mergers
and acquisitions, and remained at this firm for 4 years (1997 — 2001).
7. I then joined another City law firm in the IT & IP department and worked
there from 2001 to 2004, before taking up an in-house role at a private
healthcare specialist between 2004 and 2009, working on a variety of
commercial contracts.
8. On 15 June 2009, I joined Royal Mail Group (“RMG”).
9. Prior to joining RMG, I had very limited civil litigation experience (I had
undertaken a six-month seat while completing my training contract more
than a decade previously) and no criminal law experience.
POL LEGAL
10. By way of an overview of my roles over time, I initially worked in RMG’s
Group Tech & IP team (based at RMG’s Blackfriars offices). I increasingly
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did work for the separate POL legal team (“POL Legal”) (based at POL’s
Old Street offices), such that by Easter 2010 I was working exclusively in
POL Legal. I became Head of Legal in POL Legal in August 2011. After
the separation of RMG and POL on 1 April 2012 I remained Head of Legal
at POL Legal, a position I held until I left POL on 20 March 2014. I provide
further detail regarding these roles below.
linitially worked in RMG’s Group Tech & IP team, under a lawyer seconded
from a City law firm to RMG, who reported to Doug Evans, General
Counsel of RMG. In this role, I worked on a variety of commercial contracts
and IP matters, alongside external law firms. RMG ran an external model,
whereby each matter would have an internal and external lawyer working
on it.
Until September 2010, I worked 5 days a week and thereafter I moved to
4 days a week (always Monday — Thursday).
Prior to the separation of RMG and POL, the RMG legal team consisted of
a number of different teams, including POL Legal, the Competition Law
Team, the Group Tech & IP Team, the HR and Employment Team, the
Civil Litigation Team and the Criminal Law Team. The RMG legal team
was based in Blackfriars, save that the Criminal Law Team was based in
an office in Victoria, and POL Legal was based in Old Street. I understood
that each of the RMG sub-teams (each of which had their own Head of
Legal) reported up to RMG’s General Counsel, Doug Evans, and later
when he left in December 2010, a secondee General Counsel from a City
law firm.
Prior to separation, POL Legal was entirely non-contentious and POL’s
litigation needs were met by the RMG Civil Litigation Team and the RMG
Criminal Law Team. In 2010 or 2011, I became aware that prosecutions
were undertaken by RMG’s Criminal Law Team, but I had no specific
knowledge of the detail.
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When I joined RMG, POL Legal was made up of 4 lawyers, comprised of
a Head of Legal (Kiron Farooki), together with: (i) a networks lawyer,
responsible for dealing with SPM contracts; (ii) a property lawyer; and (iii)
a commercial lawyer who covered areas such as telecoms and IT.
Susan Crichton joined POL Legal as Legal & Compliance Director in
around January 2010. Whilst Kiron Farooki was Head of Legal at POL at
that time, Susan Crichton came in above her. Kiron Farooki, along with all
other lawyers in the team, worked to Susan Crichton. I recall that Susan
Crichton had a reporting line to the RMG General Counsel pre-separation,
and then to Paula Vennells (CEO of POL from 2012 onwards) post-
separation.
During the early part of 2010, I became increasingly dedicated to POL
Legal work at the invitation of Susan Crichton, which resulted in me
gradually transitioning over to work exclusively for the POL Legal team
around Easter 2010. Notwithstanding that I was working in the POL Legal
team, my contract of employment remained with RMG until separation.
On going to work at POL Legal from Easter 2010, Susan Crichton steadily
involved me in a broad range of matters, which included a significant
degree of work in the run-up to separation, together with supporting bids
for government work, procurement services (ranging from issues such as
stationery to cash vans), ROMEC (property maintenance), payment card
industry accreditation, and other matters such as mutualisation and state
aid.
Kiran Farooki left as Head of Legal at POL in Spring 2011. Susan Crichton
continued in her role as Legal and Compliance Director and, in August
2011, I was offered and became Head of Legal at POL. When I became
Head of Legal, the other lawyers in POL Legal reported to me. All of the
team were non-contentious lawyers at this time. This was the first time I
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had undertaken such a role, and I was very much dependent on Susan
Crichton’s guidance on the scope, nature and detail of the role.
My day-to-day work as Head of Legal included:
vi.
vii.
viii.
working with the lawyers to find new ways of collaborating with the rest
of the business;
supporting members of the POL legal team on a daily basis, in
particular being a sounding-board or a point of escalation on non-
contentious matters;
managing individuals i.e. performance reviews and regular one to one
meetings;
managing ‘business-as-usual’ spend of a budget set by a separate
finance team (but not project budgets);
dealing with law firm panel matters;
assisting on, as and when necessary, public procurement and supply
chain issues together with matters such as POL bidding for
government work, state aid, network transformation, Crown
transformation or mutualisation planning, all of which were large scale
and/or time consuming;
dealing with requests from colleagues in other parts of the business;
recruiting and staffing within HR-set headcount limits; and
dealing with miscellaneous matters such as the summer student
placement scheme.
It is important for context to emphasise that as Head of Legal,
approximately 95% of the work that I did was not related to the Horizon
issues described below. My involvement with Horizon was initially sporadic
and peripheral (for example, relating to a specific issue such as resourcing
for the Civil Litigation Team regarding John Longman in September 2011
(see paragraph 63 below)), until the very end of June 2013 when, before
going on sabbatical from 12 July to around 3 Septembers 2013, I became
involved in the response to the emerging issues regarding Horizon.
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22. I! did not acquire any criminal litigation experience or additional civil
litigation experience (beyond my 6-month civil litigation seat whilst training)
during my time at RMG or POL prior to separation. When contentious
issues arose whilst I was Head of Legal of POL Legal prior to separation,
those issues would simply have been dealt with by the relevant member of
the RMG legal team.
23. In the run up to separation on 1 April 2012, I undertook a large amount of
work preparing for the separation of POL from RMG, including, in
particular, participating in negotiations opposite RMG, together with the
recruitment of new staff in anticipation of separation.
24. It was known that after separation POL Legal would split from the other
RMG legal teams, and Susan Crichton would officially become General
Counsel for POL, having essentially been the de-facto General Counsel
since she had started.
25. On 1 April 2012, separation of POL from RMG took place. Although my
employer changed, my title remained the same. I was not in the office for
the first few weeks post-separation, because very sadly my father passed
away unexpectedly on 2 April 2012 and so I was not fully engaged back at
POL until the end of April 2012.
26. Post-separation, POL Legal was required to cover a wide range of areas
including financial services, telecoms, public procurement, state aid and
competition, commercial contracts, IP, data, and property, along with civil
and criminal litigation.
27. Post-separation, I continued to be based in the Old Street office with POL
Legal. The office was open plan. I worked 4 days a week, on Monday to
Thursday. I continued to work under Susan Crichton’s guidance and
reported to her. Susan Crichton worked 5 days a week. As a general
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working style, it was common for me to escalate issues to, and discuss
them with, Susan Crichton for her to make a decision on, and to keep her
generally aware of issues. I continued to be involved in recruitment and
arranging for law firm secondees to help bolster the team. By the end of
2012, we had grown the team to about a dozen lawyers from its original
POL Legal base of around 4.
In the run up to separation, I had asked Susan Crichton if we should get on
and recruit a new criminal lawyer to join the POL Legal team. I was told by
her that it had been agreed at a high level that POL Legal would inherit a
member of the RMG Criminal Law Team. Rob Wilson, the Head of the
RMG Criminal Law Team, identified Jarnail Singh as one of the senior
lawyers in the RMG team pre-separation, who had been in the team for a
number of years, and post separation he transferred to POL Legal to
become the sole criminal lawyer.
The HR headcount template allowed for one in-house criminal lawyer in
POL Legal, but our budget permitted support from external lawyers. To
this end, I understood that Cartwright King had been recommended to
Susan Crichton by Rob Wilson as external lawyers who had previously
worked with the RMG Criminal Law Team. I do not recall when Cartwright
King first became involved in assisting with prosecutions and I was not
involved in instructing Cartwright King (they were in place by the time I had
returned following my father’s funeral and so I was unaware of the precise
remit of their retainer and the detail of the initial discussions with them).
Susan Crichton dealt with the initial conversations with Jarnail Singh when
he joined POL Legal, and I think I first met Jarnail Singh in around late April
or early May 2012. I did not have any real involvement with Cartwright
King until the months following separation and I have set out my
recollection of the scope of this below.
When informed that a criminal lawyer was transferring over, I recall having
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a discussion with Susan Crichton about who Jarnail Singh would sit under,
given that I had no experience of criminal litigation. She indicated that the
POL lawyers all had to sit under me as Head of Legal, as that was how the
HR structure dictated it.
I also remember querying with Susan Crichton who would supervise Jarnail
Singh as the whole area of criminal law was foreign to me and something
of which I had had no experience. She explained that she would run with
the prosecutions, in conjunction with Jarnail Singh, using Cartwright King
(and other external counsel) as external advisors as appropriate. She had
been involved where necessary on issues relating to prosecutions pre-
separation and so this was a continuation of the status quo. Jarnail Singh
therefore reported to me for normal management issues, such as approval
of annual leave and salary reviews etc., but in terms of criminal
prosecutions was supervised by Susan Crichton.
While I did not supervise Jarnail Singh on the prosecutions, he sometimes
involved me on emails, rather than Susan Crichton. Although I asked him
to be mindful of this, I would try to progress matters where possible on the
occasions when this happened. Equally, at some points in time, for
example when Susan Crichton was on annual leave, and particularly when
POL Legal began to respond to the emerging issues regarding Horizon at
the end of June 2013, I would try to progress matters where possible in her
absence.
One-on-one meetings that I had with Jarnail Singh related to the discussion
of any personnel-related issues, for example, he was not used to typing his
own documents and this was a significant point of change for him. I did
not discuss the detail of the criminal proceedings with him. As a result, I
did not have day-to-day knowledge of individual prosecutions. In
particular, I was not aware of the specifics of particular prosecutions, and I
would not authorise decisions to charge. Until I was involved in the
preparation of the relevant policy in March 2013, I also did not have any
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knowledge of the process through which POL decided if a prosecution
should be commenced. Even then, my involvement was at the policy level
rather than in the practical application of the policy.
Immediately post-separation, POL Legal had a litigation secondee from
Bond Pearce to assist with civil litigation matters. Bond Pearce became
Bond Dickinson from 1 May 2013. The name is used interchangeably
within this witness statement. In September 2012, Rodric Williams began
at POL Legal to advise on civil litigation matters. The Bond Pearce
secondee had produced monthly litigation reports, and these became
rebadged as the Significant Litigation Reports once Rodric Williams arrived
(see paragraph 42 below).
I have been asked to comment on my understanding of LPP when I joined
RMG and POL. I understood LPP to apply to confidential communications
between myself and POL employees and agents, either in the context of
providing legal advice or where litigation was happening or contemplated.
I had a good working relationship with Susan Crichton. She was calm and
approachable and always available to escalate matters to for guidance,
approval or a decision.
I have been asked to comment on the adequacy and competency of the
RMG and POL legal departments. During my time at RMG and POL, I
understood the legal departments to be adequate and competent and have
set out some further reflections on these issues in the ‘General’ section
below. I recall on one occasion (which I assume was shortly after
separation), in the context of Jarnail Singh having delivered training to the
investigators in the POL Security Team with help from Cartwright King,
Cartwright King provided positive feedback regarding Jamail Singh’s
competency. Jarnail Singh was a pleasant person who got on with the rest
of the team.
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39. Chris Aujard joined POL Legal as interim General Counsel on or around
the week commencing 14 October 2013, as a successor to Susan Crichton.
He was briefed by Susan Crichton shortly afterwards and took over
management of the criminal proceedings from her. He made it clear to me
from the outset that he was taking over all Horizon matters.
POL BOARD & EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
40. I only occasionally attended POL’s monthly board meetings. Sometimes,
but by no means always, to deputise for Susan Crichton at her request or
following an invitation to speak regarding a specific topic (and always in
each case following a full briefing from her).
41. I have been provided with a copy of the POL board minutes from a meeting
held on 21 November 2012 (POL00027553). I was invited to attend this
meeting to speak regarding Project Rainbow, and the minutes show that I
only attended for this item (112/117) (page 1 of POL00027553). I believe
this was a data protection issue and not relevant to Horizon. The minutes
also show that Fay Healey, Chief HR Officer, was deputising for Susan
Crichton (page 1 of POL00027553). Indeed, it was never automatic that I
would deputise for Susan Crichton. The ‘Items for Noting’ section shows
that Alwen Lyons (Company Secretary) gave the board a brief update on
Second Sight’s progress with their Horizon work (page 6 of POL0027553).
42. I have considered an email chain from 11 and 12 September 2012, relating
to monthly litigation reports for the board (POL00181607). Helen Perkins,
Assistant Company Secretary at POL, emailed Rodric Williams and Jarnail
Singh to request that they “update the report on litigation for [her] ...for the
board pack’ (page 3 of POL00181607). This was a request to prepare
Significant Litigation Reports for the board to update them in respect of civil
and criminal proceedings. These were prepared by the relevant people
from the criminal and civil litigation teams, as the subject matter experts.
Helen subsequently commented on Jarnail Singh’s report in an email to
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Alwen Lyons and me, dated 12 September 2012. I replied stating that I
could “see the spelling, formatting etc. [issues]” (page 1 of POL00181607).
l asked to see the finished version so that I could give Jamail Singh advice
regarding the form of the reports (rather than the substance or the content).
This is an example of the type of management I was involved in regarding
Jarnail Singh. In this instance, I would have gone through the feedback
from the business with him. This type of issue would not have caused me
wider concern about Jarnail Singh; I anticipated that he had just not been
involved in the preparation of this type of report before.
I have also been provided with a copy of the agenda from an Executive
Committee meeting on 16 September 2013 (POL00295988). This was
soon after I returned from a sabbatical. I was deputising for Susan Crichton
at this meeting and I would have received a full briefing from her prior to
the meeting. I am not listed as a specific sponsor or presenter and Angela
Van Den Bogerd presented the Horizon update.
KNOWLEDGE OF HORIZON
44.
45.
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47.
During 2009, I became aware of the Horizon IT system by virtue of my
involvement in relevant contractual work, in conjunction with external law
firms.
I recall receiving a high-level briefing on the Horizon contract in my first
month at RMG.
It was intended that all POL employees would have training on Horizon so
that they could assist with strike cover i.e. if branch staff took strike action
then they could operate the Horizon system. However, I never received
this training because of availability clashes. As a result, I never
experienced the Horizon system and had no awareness of how it operated.
I cannot recall receiving any briefing or training on the migration to Horizon
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Online.
When I joined RMG, I cannot recall being informed of any Horizon issues
including bugs, errors or defects; a lack of integrity; or complaints or
concerns.
I have set out throughout my witness statement when my knowledge of
bugs, errors and defects materially changed.
I did not know what ARQ data was when I joined RMG or while at POL.
I cannot recall being aware of the ability of Fujitsu employees to alter
transaction data or data in branch accounts without the knowledge or
consent of SPMs (i.e. remote access) whilst I was employed by RMG
and/or POL.
I have considered a copy of a Computer Weekly article dated 11 May 2009
(POL00041564). This article was published before I joined RMG. I do not
remember reading it at the time of publication or at all. I can remember
hearing reference to it, but I am not able to say when that occurred. I do
not remember the detail of discussions I had (if any) with individuals within
RMG and POL about the article (including, in particular, anyone in the Civil
Litigation Team or Criminal Law Team, who were dealing with the relevant
cases).
I have been asked to consider a report prepared by Rod Ismay, Head of
Product & Branch Accounting, dated 2 August 2010 (POL00026572), and
an Ernst & Young report, dated 27 March 2011 (POL00030217).
I do not recall seeing the Rod Ismay report on 2nd August 2010 or
subsequently. I note that I am not listed as being a recipient of the report
either in the “To” or “Cc” fields.
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In relation to the 2011 E&Y report (POL00030217), I cannot recall having
read this document. The letter was addressed to Sarah Hall at POL.
TRIAL OF SEEMA MISRA
56.
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60.
I have been asked to consider an email chain with David Jones and others
on 3 February 2010 (FUJ00152903), and an email chain with Jarnail Singh
and others dated 21 October 2010 (POL00055590).
The 3 February 2010 email chain shows that David Jones, a lawyer at
Fujitsu, asked me if I could find out who was dealing with a particular matter
at POL. As I was not previously aware of this matter, I made some
enquiries. It appears that Mark Dinsdale, Security Team Manager,
confirmed that it was Jarnail Singh. I also do not recall that I had come
across Jarnail Singh before this point in time, and I do not recall speaking
to him about this matter (1 was merely passing on his email details).
I have been provided with a copy of an expert witness statement of Gareth
Jenkins of Fujitsu, dated 8 October 2010 (POL00129960). This witness
statement appears to have been prepared in relation to the Seema Misra
case. I do not recall seeing this witness statement at the time and there
would have been no reason for me to have done so.
I do not remember receiving any further communications in relation to the
Seema Misra case in the period between the above email chain on 3
February 2010 and 21 October 2010, when Jarnail Singh confirmed the
outcome of the trial to various parties (POL00055590).
I do not have any recollection of any so-called “attack” on Horizon before
this email chain. My understanding of the email would have likely been
that there were not any problems with Horizon and the “unprecedented”
attack had been defended.
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SHOOSMITHS LITIGATION
61. I have been asked to consider a number of documents relating to claims
intimated by Shoosmiths / Access Legal from 2011, when the RMG Civil
Litigation Team was handling these matters.
62. I cannot recall seeing the letter of claim, dated 23 August 2011, regarding
Mr Julian Wilson (POL00046944). It was addressed to POL, but would
likely have been directed to RMG’s Civil Litigation Team, as there was no
litigation expertise in POL Legal at this time.
63. I have considered an email chain from 1 September 2011 to 15 September
2011 (POL00056928). It appears that on 1 September 2011, Emily
Springford, Principal Lawyer — Dispute Resolution, who was in RMG’s Civil
Litigation Team, was attempting to locate an agency file. She requested
assistance from John Longman, Security Manager, who raised issues
relating to his capacity to assist. She escalated her request for assistance
to Rebekah Mantle, Head of the RMG Civil Litigation Team, and Rebekah
Mantle contacted Sabrina Jethwa and Susan Crichton. Being relatively
new and junior, Sabrina Jethwa in turn referred the issue to me and I
emailed John Scott (who headed the POL Security Team, which amongst
other things conducted investigations into Horizon issues) on 8 September,
asking if John Longman could be made available. My limited involvement
was in relation to this one resourcing point, rather than the substantive work
required.
64. By this time in late 2011, I must have been aware that there had been some
complaints about Horizon in the past, and that complaints were being made
again, as I comment, “We are starting to have these cases come in again
on Horizon” (page 2 of POL00056928). I cannot recall where this
knowledge originated from or when.
65. I believe that the comment regarding saving fees (“Apparently having Jon
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Longman help us is saving us hundreds of thousands in external fees")
was a message from the RMG Civil Litigation Team. It is likely that I would
have asked that team for more information on the background to their
request, to understand why it was needed or how important it was. I cannot
recall previously being aware of Mr Longman or his work.
On 15 September 2011, I emailed John Scott again, stating that I “am being
chased by my lit[igation] colleagues...successfully defending these claims
is key to POL’ (page 1 of POL00056928). I believe that the phrase "key to
POL" was used because I understood from the RMG Civil Litigation Team
that it was an important issue which needed to be dealt with. The
understanding at RMG / POL at that time was that the system was robust
so it was logical and important that these claims be defended.
Susan Crichton was copied into my email to keep her informed and
because she was senior to me and would help ensure that John Longman
was made available to the RMG Civil Litigation Team.
I have considered an email from Emily Springford (of the RMG Civil
Litigation Team, who were dealing with these matters at this time and until
separation) to various recipients, dated 20 October 2011, regarding POL
receiving four letters of claim from SPMs which included allegations
regarding the Horizon system (POL00176465). The email primarily relates
to the need to ensure document preservation. Although I was sent this
email, I have no specific recollection of it.
I have considered a note of a conference with Richard Morgan QC of
Maitland Chambers, dated 26 October 2011, prepared by Bond Pearce
(POL00107695). Bond Pearce would have been instructed by the RMG
Civil Litigation Team.
The attendees from RMG were from the Civil Litigation Team, along with
Sabrina Jethwa from POL Legal (who was a non-contentious lawyer
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assisting with SPM contracts at this point). I was not an attendee at this
conference. I do not recall receiving any briefing on the occurrence or
outcome of this conference. I do not know to what extent the RMG Civil
Litigation Team followed Mr Morgan QC’s advice. I was focused primarily
on separation negotiations at this time (as well as business-as-usual work)
and I would not have had involvement in civil litigation matters in any event.
I have also been provided with a copy of a document with the title, “Briefing
note on the current status of claims involving Horizon”, said to be prepared
by ‘Legal Services’, dated 12 March 2012 (POL00058211). It is likely that
this was a briefing note prepared by RMG’s Civil Litigation Team
immediately prior to separation to assist with the transfer of the civil
litigation files to POL. I cannot recall, but it is likely that I saw this document
because of the impending separation. The report describes five civil
claims. The briefing note stated that: (i) the Horizon system was “robust’;
(ii) the system had been “rigorously tested”; (iii) it had been in use for 10
years with 20,000 SPMs having used it “fo successfully perform millions of
financial reconciliations’, and (iv) the National Federation of SPMs had
“also expressed its full confidence in the accuracy and robustness of
Horizon”. The briefing note referred to a claim being struck out and the
relevant SPM being refused leave to appeal.
There was a further conference with Richard Morgan QC of Maitland
Chambers on 12 June 2012. I have considered the note of the conference
prepared by Bond Pearce (POL00006484). This conference occurred two
months post-separation and I can see that I attended the conference with
Susan Crichton. As POL Legal was being supported by a Bond Dickinson
secondee post-separation in relation to civil litigation (Rodric Williams had
yet to arrive at POL Legal), Susan Crichton and I attended.
I do not remember this conference. I recall that Bond Pearce had
recommended a Chancery QC, which may have been Richard Morgan QC.
The note of the conference records that “an impasse has been reached in
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relation to the Horizon litigation which POL is seeking to address. The
question is what is the best way of breaking that impasse” (page 1 of
POL00006484). Mr Morgan QC raised a number of salient issues to
consider, including concerns regarding the potential for the “floodgates” to
be opened to civil claims, and was happy to explain these issues to the
board directly. I understood that the system was robust and therefore the
likelihood of the floodgates opening was minimal.
74. The note of the conference goes on to state that the “proposal to instruct
an Independent expert to prepare a report on the Horizon system is the
highest risk response to the issue” (page 1 of POL00006484). I do not recall
the genesis of the proposal to instruct an independent expert, other than
by this time I was generally aware that concerns had been raised by MPs
on behalf of their constituents, and consideration was being given to how
POL should respond. I do not remember meeting with MPs and believe
that this would have occurred at Susan Crichton’s level, or above. Mr
Morgan QC stated that a “less risky approach is to agree to take the
relevant MP’s privately through particular cases in which they are
interested’. POL would have wanted to take advice on the available
options before a decision was made at board level (and this was an
example of that); POL could have been criticised either way, including, for
example, a suggestion that there had been a knee-jerk reaction to political
pressure. Ultimately, POL was not swayed by the risks, including the point
raised by Mr Morgan QC regarding “open[ing] the floodgates to damages
claims”, (page 1 of POL00006484) and subsequently instructed Second
Sight as an independent expert in early summer 2012.
INSTRUCTION OF SECOND SIGHT AND ONGOING LITIGATION
75. I understood that the purpose of the Second Sight review of the Horizon
system was a thorough independent review to identify any issues with
Horizon which might highlight problems with a prosecution or civil claim.
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I welcomed the Horizon review as it appeared a sensible step for POL to
take following the concerns which had been raised. I thought that if there
were any issues, Second Sight would highlight them, and the concerns
would be resolved.
I recall that Susan Crichton recommended Second Sight, because prior to
joining POL she had worked with a colleague at General Electric who
subsequently joined, or helped set up, Second Sight. I was not involved in
the identification of Second Sight, or (as far as I can recall) its engagement,
scope or remit.
I have been provided with copies of three overlapping email chains from 9
to 11 July 2012 (POL00180855, POL00180846 and POL00141398). The
emails relate to a criminal prosecution of a SPM, Ms Wylie. The chain
begins with a lawyer from Cartwright King, Rachael Panter, emailing Andy
Cash of Cartwright King, regarding a letter received from the defence
solicitors asking for Cartwright King's position in relation to the ongoing
Horizon investigation, which I took to be a reference to the involvement of
Second Sight.
Andy Cash forwarded the email to Jarnail Singh, who would have been
dealing with the prosecution at POL, seeking details of how to respond.
Jarnail Singh forwarded the chain to Susan Crichton and me on 9 July
2012. Jarnail Singh’s email stated that he had “raised this with you and
briefly discussed this with Hugh last week with our possible approach or
view’ (page 2 of POL00180855). I have no recollection of this discussion.
On 9 July 2012, Susan Crichton emailed me to let me know that “[Jarnail
Singh] says that he is coming up with a plan...suspect may be quicker as
you suggested to go to Counsel for views, suspect we could use the junior
at the [Bond Pearce] meeting to do a quick written opinion” (page 1 of
POL00180846). I replied stating, “[I] think I'll look up criminal sets as I
wasn’t bowled over by the [Bond Pearce] ones” (page 1 of POL00180846).
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81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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Jarnail Singh subsequently emailed Susan Crichton and me, providing
further views on the position and stating that he needed “more information
and advice to address these concerns’ (page 2 of POL00180855). I replied
on 10 July stating, “are you able to advise Susan and I on this or do you
want to go to Counsel” (page 1 of POL00180855). We were attempting to
ensure that there was appropriate external resource in place to support
Jarnail Singh. Jarnail Singh replied, stating that with “steer and stance, I
can then advice [sic] [Cartwright King] and have input from them” (page 3
of POL00141398). A meeting was arranged with Susan Crichton, Alwen
Lyons, Jarnail Singh and me (page 2 of POL00141398).
On 11 July 2012, Jarnail Singh emailed Susan Crichton, Alwen Lyons and
me, setting out a number of questions regarding the remit and scope of
Second Sight (page 1 of POL00141398).
On 11 July 2012, timed at 12:22, Andy Cash of Cartwright King emailed
Jarnail Singh (POL00143379), attaching a copy of an advice note by Harry
Bowyer of Cartwright King, dated 11 July 2012 (POL00026567).
Mr Bowyer described there being “apocryphal evidence on the internet and
elsewhere that the [Horizon] system was leading to injustice” (page 1 of
POL00026567). He referred to the instruction of Second Sight and stated
that “an expert should be identified and instructed to prepare a generic
statement which confirms the integrity of the system and why the attacks
so far have been unfounded” (page 3 of POL00026567). Mr Bowyer also
stated that he presumed that “our thinking [in instructing Second Sight] was
that as we have nothing to hide we have no objection to our practices being
scrutinised in which case we should say so” (page 3 of POL00026567).
Jarnail Singh provided the advice note of Cartwright King’s Mr Bowyer to
Susan Crichton and me on 16 July 2012 at 11:24 (page 1 of
POL00143379).
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86.
87.
88.
89.
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Mr Bowyer described the consequences of the integrity of the system being
compromised as “catastrophic” (page 2 of POL00026567). The
implications of a problem with Horizon were obvious, but at the time POL’s
thinking was that the Horizon system was robust. Despite the ‘floodgate’
risk that had been flagged during the conference with Richard Morgan QC
on 12 June 2012, POL had resolved to instruct Second Sight. If there was
substance to the concerns, convictions would be questioned, and unjust
ones overturned. However, I understood from a conversation with Jarnail
Singh, at some point in time shortly after separation, that Gareth Jenkins
was the Fujitsu Horizon guru involved in the cases. Jarnail Singh also said
that in 99.9% of cases there was other evidence of theft, and so it was not
apparent that many cases solely relied on Horizon data (see paragraph
93).
There is a related email chain (POL00141400), dated 16 July 2012,
regarding applications for stays of prosecutions whilst Second Sight was
undertaking its work. I cannot recall how these discussions concluded.
I emailed Jarnail Singh on 16 July 2012, timed at 11:33, having considered
Cartwright King’s advice. I noted that I assumed that Jarnail Singh would
be the single point of contact that case officers could approach, as
proposed by Cartwright King i.e. a disclosure officer (page 1 of
POL00143379). Jarnail Singh replied referring to a need to “provide extra
evidence as defence would put us to proof as to the systems integrity’
(page 1 of POL00143379) and stating that the “only way to fully comply
with prosecution disclosure obligations would be to instruct an expert at
Fujitsu” (page 1 of POL00143379).
At 13:00 on 16 July 2012, Jarnail Singh emailed Susan Crichton and me,
asking if we were “happy with our stance” (page 2 of POL00141400). It
appears that Susan Crichton, Jarnail Singh, Alwen Lyons and I already had
a meeting planned at 3:30pm on 16 July 2012, as I replied, copying Susan
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90.
91.
92.
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Crichton and Alwen Lyons, stating “one for our 3.30 meeting I think’ (page
41 of POL00141400). I asked Jarnail Singh to confirm that “your
recommendation hasn’t changed and is still to keep fighting any such [stay]
application?”. I set out a list of the issues arising from Cartwright King’s
advice, including a reference to “a plan/bible of what information we are
going to provide...if we have to fight applications to stay’ (page 1 of
POL00141400). I was attempting to distil Cartwright King’s advice into
action points to ensure that Jarnail Singh was appropriately considering the
issues raised when recommending a way forward regarding stay
applications. Jarnail Singh replied at 14:26, confirming that by now he had
briefly spoken with Susan Crichton.
I cannot recall how any discussion concluded, however I believe that
ultimately the involvement of Helen Rose (Fraud Analyst) as a disclosure
officer flowed from the discussions at this time. On 25 July 2012, Joanne
Hancock, Senior Security Programme Manager, emailed Jarnail Singh,
confirming that “Helen Rose from the POL Security Team has been
nominated” (POL00141406).
I have been provided with an email chain dated August 2012
(POL00141416), in which Helen Rose emailed Jarnail Singh regarding her
role as disclosure officer. The date of the email does not appear in the
copy provided to me. Jarnail Singh subsequently asked Cartwright King to
look at the information which Helen had collated and advise “in readiness
to instruct an expert as part of providing an advance pack disclosure” (page
1 of POL00141416). Cartwright King replied that the information provided
“appears to be what we want’ i.e. flowing from the 11 July 2012 advice
note. Harry Bowyer provided a list of 4 matters that an expert report would
need to address (page 1 of POL00141416). It does not appear that I
received this email and I was already away on annual leave from the
evening of Thursday 2 August 2012.
Helen Rose and Jarnail Singh continued discussions regarding Helen's
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work in August 2012 (POL00020489). On 11 September 2012, Jarnail
Singh sent Helen's final report on her analysis of Horizon cases to Andy
Cash and Andrew Bolc at Cartwright King, and requested their comments
before “forwarding the data for an expert report’ (page 2 of POL00020489).
Andy Cash replied and confirmed that in Harry Bowyer’s view, if the report
was comprehensive, it was what was needed. He stated “we now need
the experts report on it as soon as practcable [sic]...” (page 1 of
POL00020489). Jarnail Singh queried whether to use Gareth Jenkins of
Fujitsu as previously or “somebody entirely independent’ (page 1 of
POL00020489). Harry Bowyer replied confirming that having an entirely
independent expert would be preferable but practically difficult in the
timescales, and referred back to his July advice regarding the contents of
the report (page 1 of POL00020489). I was not copied into this email, but
it seems to me, looking at this email chain now, that Jamail Singh was
continuing to follow Cartwright King’s advice.
GARETH JENKINS
93. On 21 October 2010, Jarnail Singh mentioned in his email (which, as in
paragraph 59 above, I was copied into) regarding the Seema Misra trial
“the considerable expertise of Gareth Jenkins...” (page 1 of
POL00055590). At some point in time, shortly after separation, Jarnail
Singh explained to me that Gareth Jenkins was the Fujitsu Horizon ‘guru’,
and he had been used to provide evidence in prosecutions of SPMs.
94. On 13 September 2012, Jarnail Singh emailed Penny Thomas at Fujitsu,
seeking the expert that had been suggested previously by Cartwright King
(POL00181611). It now appears that Jarnail Singh copied and pasted into
his email the 4 items which Cartwright King had advised the expert should
address per Harry Bowyer’s email, dated August 2012 (see
POL00141416). I forwarded Jarnail Singh’s email to Lesley Sewell, Chief
Information Officer (because it was a Fujitsu matter), and Susan Crichton
because she would need to be aware of this.
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95.
96.
97.
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On 1 October 2012, Jarnail Singh emailed Gareth Jenkins at Fujitsu
(POL00096985). It again appears that he copied and pasted the 4 items
which Cartwright King had advised the expert should address per Harry
Bowyer’s email, dated August 2012 (see POL00141416). It appears that
Penny Thomas at Fujitsu had directed Jarnail Singh to Gareth Jenkins. I
was copied into this email and understood that Jarnail Singh was following
Cartwright King’s advice.
Gareth Jenkins emailed Jarnail Singh on 1 October 2012, attaching two
reports regarding Horizon and Horizon Online Integrity. He said that he
would “try to produce a further short report addressing your specific points
below’. On 2 October 2012, Gareth Jenkins emailed Jarnail Singh
(POL00096985) attaching the further report (POL00129957,
POL00129958 & POL00129959). He also attached his witness statement
from the Misra case. I do not remember looking at these documents at the
time. I was aware that the criminal litigation experts, Cartwright King, had
recommended this report and POL had obtained the report as a result. I
would have expected Jarnail Singh to liaise with Cartwright King to confirm
if anything further was required or for Cartwright King to raise any issues
with the report.
I became more aware of Gareth Jenkins as a result of the above
developments in 2012, but I never worked directly with him.
FUTURE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (2012)
98.
On 12 December 2012, I emailed Susan Crichton and Alwen Lyons
(POL00122000) a working draft of a board paper regarding the future of
criminal prosecutions (POL00122001). The recommendation section was
blank and the sponsor of the paper was Susan Crichton (page 7 of
POL00122001). My email contained a reference to the paper having “been
through” John (John Scott, Head of Security) and the law firm DAC
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Beachcroft. I cannot now recall wny DAC Beachcroft was involved, but
POL may have wanted an entirely new firm to consider the issue and other
implications of the policy.
99. It appears that I was asked to help prepare a draft of the paper with the
input of others. I may not have sent it to Jarnail Singh because the proposal
could have led to his redundancy and so there would have been some
sensitivity. I recall that John Scott's view was that the police and CPS
would not prosecute these cases for POL, but I cannot recall any
discussion about the pros and cons of the CPS taking over the prosecution
function.
100. The purpose of the draft board paper was stated as being to “outline the
benefits and disadvantages of the current [prosecution] approach” and
“provide a number of alternative approaches for consideration” (page 1 of
POL00122001). The paper annexed the current prosecution policy
statement, effective from 1 April 2012, owned by Jarnail Singh, with the
review of the policy due by 1 April 2013 (page 8 of POL00122001). I
believe that this policy was largely based on RMG’s existing pre-separation
policy. The prompt for the board paper therefore may have been the
prosecution policy's impending April 2013 review date; such review date
would most likely have been diarised by Alwen Lyons, the company
secretary.
101. On5 March 2013, prior to the April 2013 review date of POL’s prosecution
policy, I emailed John Scott, Susan Crichton, Jarnail Singh and Alwen
Lyons (POL00122166), attaching a copy of a “redraft....following our last
meeting” (page 1 of POL00122166) of a new draft criminal enforcement
and prosecution policy. This occurred having taken on board comments
from John Scott’s team (POL Security Team); the policy was redrafted
based on views collated from the various subject matter experts
(POL00030621). I asked if there were any more comments or if everyone
now agreed with the draft. I cannot recall how this stage concluded.
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THE HELEN ROSE REPORT
102.
103.
104.
105.
I have been provided with a copy of Helen Rose’s draft report, ‘Horizon
Data Lepton SPSO 191320’, dated 12 June 2013 (FUJ00086811).
I cannot recall how this report came to be created or who it was
commissioned by, and I do not recall reading this document, but I can see
that I am copied into a subsequent email chain on 10 and 11 July 2013
along with Susan Crichton and Jarnail Singh (POL00323842).
This report raised concerns that POL “cannot clearly see what has
happened on the data available to us and this in itself may be
misinterpreted when giving evidence and using the same data for
prosecutions” (page 3 of FUJ00086811). She also referred to an exchange
with Gareth Jenkins in which she stated, “/ know that you are aware of all
of the Horizon integrity issues...” (page 3 of FUJ00086811).
There is an overlap between Helen Rose’s report and the identification of
the two bugs which Gareth Jenkins disclosed to Second Sight. POL’s
response to these issues is considered below.
SECOND SIGHT INTERIM REPORT
106.
107.
I cannot recall any involvement in POL’s decision making regarding how to
respond to Lord Arbuthnot MP, Alan Bates and The Justice for
Subpostmasters Alliance (JFSA), including any negotiations concerning
the inclusion of JFSA cases in the Second Sight review.
I cannot recall any involvement in POL’s response to Second Sight's
requests for information and / or the investigation of spot reviews leading
to their interim report.
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108. Susan Crichton was the contact at POL Legal who was updated formally
on the progress of Second Sight’s work. I recall her telling me at some
point that Second Sight had not identified any issues yet but I cannot recall
when this was.
109. On 27 June 2013 at 19:51, Rodric Williams emailed various recipients
including Lesley Sewell (CIO), Alwen Lyons, Rod Ismay, and Jarnail Singh
(page 1 of POL00029622). POL, with assistance from Bond Dickinson,
was preparing letters to 14 affected branches to disclose the existence of
a Horizon bug. Rodric Williams stated that there was a need for POL Legal
to “do a final cross check of the intended recipients to make sure they are
not the subject of prosecutions/investigations’ (page 2 of POL00029622).
It is clear from Rodric Williams's email on 3 July 2013 (see POL00145142
at paragraph 129 below), that POL was obtaining legal advice from
Cartwright King regarding the mechanics of disclosure in criminal cases to
ensure that its obligations were properly satisfied (POL00145145).
110. As far as I can recall, I became aware of two bugs with the Horizon
system, which were subsequently mentioned in the Second Sight interim
report, on or about Friday 28 June 2013. One of the bugs affected 14
branches (the ‘local suspense’ bug) and the other affected 64 branches
(the ‘receipts and payments mismatch’ bug).
111. On 28 June 2013, at 10:15, Lesley Sewell received information from Gareth
Jenkins of Fujitsu (his witness statement from the Seema Misra case)
(POL00098812). Lesley forwarded this on to Alwen Lyons, Martin
Edwards (Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive) and Mark Davies (Head of
Communications) at 11:30 (page 1 of POL00098812). Mark Davies
wanted to establish whether the 14 and 64 bugs had been referenced in
Court (page 1 of POL00098812). Alwen sent the email chain to me at
17:29 on the same day, asking if we could check if the 14 branch and 64
branch bugs had been referred to in Court or if it would be quicker to
contact Gareth Jenkins (page 1 of POL00098812).
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112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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Gareth Jenkins’ email on 28 June 2013 at 10:41 stated that the 14 branch
bug had been first raised in February 2013, with the final set of information
sent to POL on 15 March 2013 (page 4 of POL00029648).
Subsequent emails with Gareth Jenkins between 28 June 2013 and 1 July
2013 (POL00031351) clarified that a bug which affected the Falkirk branch
had been raised in the Castleton and Misra cases, but Gareth Jenkins was
not aware “of any other specific bug being discussed in Court (either
related to Horizon or HNG-X)’ (page 3 of POL00031351).
On 28 June 2013 at 14:01, Rodric Williams emailed various recipients
(POL00029622) attaching a paper which summarised the 14 and 64
branch issues (POL00029623). I am copied into this email.
On Friday 28 June 2013, at 17:08, I emailed Alwen Lyons, Mark Davies,
Rodric Williams, Jarnail Singh, and Lesley Sewell (POL00060572). I
referred to a case commencing on Monday 1 July 2013 in Birmingham (this
was the Balvinder Samra case, although I appear to have been unfamiliar
with this name at the time). I must have spoken to Jarnail Singh before
drafting this email as I would have been unfamiliar with the criminal case
and procedural issues such as adjournments. I explained that Jarnail
Singh was to “get [Cartwright King] up to speed...to enable [Cartwright
King] to say something to judge re bugs [Post Office] have found and
disclosed...and fact that an Second Sight interim report may be coming out
before MP summer recess (16 July) to offer judge the chance to adjourn
the case” (page 2 of POL00060572). The email records my thinking that it
was prudent to be “open and transparent’ (page 2 of POL00060572).
The remainder of the email lists practical suggestions relating to preparing
a communications statement and beginning fact finding to be able to take
appropriate action. Specifically, I raised communications in relation to the
SPMs / ex-SPMs of the 14 branch bug, the need for Rodric Williams and
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Simon Baker (Head of PR) to confirm that there are no other bugs and
“[Rodric Williams] / [Jarnail Singh] to confirm that no prosecutions relate to
these bugs etc.”. I was relying on Rodric Williams and Jarnail Singh to
respectively consider the important civil and criminal implications outside
of my knowledge and expertise, with assistance from Bond Dickinson and
Cartwright King as appropriate. Jarnail Singh was getting Cartwright King
up to speed to provide POL with specialist criminal advice regarding the
developments.
117. I refer to “put{ting] it in context — size of incorrect balances vis a vis all the
transactions we process a day etc”. Although these limited bugs had been
identified (as subsequently confirmed by the Second Sight report), POL’s
impression was still that the Horizon system was robust.
118. On Sunday 30 June 2013, at 18:00, Jarnail Singh replied to my 28 June
2013 email above (POL00060572). He added the name of the defendant
(Balvinder Samra) to the subject of my email. Jarnail Singh referred to
discussions which had taken place with prosecution counsel, Cartwright
King and Gareth Jenkins. Gareth Jenkins had confirmed that he had raised
two Horizon bugs (I understand this to be the 14 and 64 branch issues)
with Second Sight. The judge was to be updated the next day. Jarnail
Singh noted POL’s duty to be “open and honest’ (page 1 of
POL00060572).
119. On 1 July 2013, I understand that I received an invitation to what was
described as an “emergency” Second Sight meeting (POL00296868). This
meeting took place against the background of the discussions above
regarding the 14 and 64 branch issues. The meeting was scheduled from
12:00 until 13:30. I do not recall this meeting, but I sent an email at 13:16
on the same day containing high level draft points for the board
(POL00060587). I appear to have been contributing remotely by preparing
a first draft of high-level notes which was sent following the meeting
finishing early, in anticipation of my being out of the office in the afternoon.
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120.
121.
122.
123.
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I flag up that the note has gaps in it, and it is amended by Mark Davies at
1:41 (page 1 of POL00060587). After that, I ask for someone else to
continue to progress the note. I would also have updated Susan Crichton
of any developments ahead of her 3pm meeting with Second Sight (page
2 of POL00115919).
The version following Mark Davies’ amendments (it is unclear which
amendments were made by who in the version that I have seen) contained
a reference to early indications being that Second Sight’s interim report
may say that there are no “systemic issues”. The email referred to the 14
and 64 branch bugs and potential issues regarding training. I would not
have regarded these issues, in the context of 6 million transactions being
processed a day across 11,800 branches, as being a systemic issue.
There was also consideration given to instructing a consultancy firm such
as Ernst & Young to review and improve POL’s processes.
My understanding at the time was that Second Sight had been thoroughly
investigating the Horizon system for a year and had not identified any
systemic issues i.e. issues in terms of the overall robustness of the system
in its interim report. I understood that the Horizon expert at Fujitsu, Gareth
Jenkins, did not consider that there were any systemic issues either. I had
also been previously assured by Jarnail Singh that the criminal cases were
sound, and that in 99.9% of cases there was other evidence of wrongdoing
(also see paragraph 124 below).
There was a high level of interest from politicians and the press at this time
and therefore heightened sensitivity regarding the release of Second
Sight’s interim report.
Following the meeting on 1 July 2013, Rodric Williams circulated an
updated draft briefing note for Paula Vennells regarding the implications of
Second Sight’s interim report (POL00115918) on 2 July 2013 to Leslie
Sewell, Susan Crichton, Mark Davies, Alwen Lyons, Martin Edwards,
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Simon Baker, Jarnail Singh and me.
124. Paragraph 35 states that: “since separation, we have never had a
successful prosecution which has relied solely on Horizon evidence to
convict. We have always had other evidence which contributed to the
prosecution, e.g. the behaviour of SPM, failure to mention Horizon
problems until trial, other staff using Horizon without incident’ (page 6 of
POL00115919). This accords with the information which Jarnail Singh
provided to me shortly after separation (see paragraphs 86 and 121
above).
125. On 2 July 2013, Rodric Williams emailed Andrew Winn (POL IT), Andy
Parsons (Bond Dickinson) and Rod Ismay, in the context of an email chain
regarding the letters to the 14 branches affected by the ‘local suspense
issue’ bug (POL00145142). He stated that he needed to “check the
position on the Merthyr [Dyfan] one because of a criminal prosecution”.
126. On 3 July 2013, Lesley Sewell requested more information on the local
suspense issue, which was provided by Gareth Jenkins (POL00029648).
The information was then shared with Rod Ismay, who looped in Rodric
Williams (POL00029648). Rodric Williams provided more information on
the timeline, per a call with Andy Winn.
127. On3 July 2013, Martin Edwards emailed Alice Perkins and Paula Vennells
a briefing note for a meeting with Lord Arbuthnot MP on the same day
(POL00098898). It appears that the briefing note is likely to have extracted
the comment on prosecutions not solely relying on Horizon evidence from
paragraph 35 of the earlier briefing note dated 2 July 2013
(POL00115919). I do not recall being involved in the preparation of this
document, and I note I am not expressly thanked in Martin’s email (others
were).
128. I have been asked to what extent I agreed with the following quote (from
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129.
130.
131.
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POL00098898): “No reason to believe [the identification of two
“exceptions”] means there [were] other undiscovered issues’. There was
nothing to indicate that any other undiscovered issues existed, and if there
were I would have expected them to be identified by Second Sight activity
going forward.
On 3 July 2013, Rodric Williams emailed Martin Smith and Simon Clarke
of Cartwright King, requesting their advice regarding disclosure to defence
counsel of the 14 branch issue, following a conference earlier that day
(pages 1 and 2 of POL00145142). Rodric Williams also clarified the
timeline of the 14 branch issue and asked if that affected Cartwright King’s
advice. I can see that I chased responses to Rodric Williams’s questions
as Susan Crichton and I were due to brief POL’s CEO (page 1 of
POL00145142). It is apparent that consideration of the impact on Gareth
Jenkins as an expert witness had begun by this stage (page 1 of
POL00145142). The involvement of Cartwright King was a continuation of
the process which had begun in late June 2013, following POL Legal
becoming aware of the two bugs.
I do not recall if I attended the Cartwright King conference on 3 July 2013.
On 4 July 2013, I forwarded Rodric Williams's email dated 3 July 2013 to
Martin Smith and Simon Clarke, both of Cartwright King, and copied Susan
Crichton (POL00098984). I forwarded the ‘local suspense issue’
information on to Martin Smith and Simon Clarke because I was aware that
Jarnail Singh was getting them up to speed with developments and I was
trying to help pull everyone and all the information together so that
Cartwright King had all the information they required to provide their advice
and that POL Legal were progressing everything appropriately. I was
taking what I regarded as a practical approach to help the business work
through the issues and obtain the right advice. Ultimately, what followed
was advice being received from Cartwright King, including Simon Clarke’s
advice note dated 15 July 2013.
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132. On 4 July 2013, I emailed Martin Smith and Simon Clarke of Cartwright
King, copied to Jarnail Singh, Susan Crichton, Rodric Williams and Andy
Cash, a “first rough draft from Second Sight with one half of the Interim
Report’. I asked for “material and significant concerns’ i.e. concerns at a
high level (POL00145201). I was continuing to assist to bring the civil and
criminal lawyers together and ensure that the necessary external advice to
consider the implications of Second Sight’s interim report was obtained.
Cartwright King replied stating that it would be “far better to advise once
we have seen the entire report’ (page 1 of POL00145201). They stated
that their “advice overall with regard to disclosure has not changed” and
decisions regarding disclosure would need to be made on a “case-by-case
basis” (page 1 of POL00145201).
133. On 4 July 2013, Susan Crichton contacted Simon Baker to check the
timeline of events regarding the ‘local suspense issue’ (POL00029648).
134. I have been provided with a copy of an email chain which includes an email
from Paula Vennells dated 6 July 2013 (POL00191252). In the email she
asks Susan Crichton, “would we ever ask the lawyers to consider reviewing
past prosecutions...” (page 3 of POL00191252). I was forwarded the chain
by Susan Crichton on Sunday 7 July 2013 in which she was being asked
for comments by Paula Vennells. I replied to Susan Crichton as soon as
possible that morning, setting out my high-level thoughts to assist her
response. In my response, I collated information we had obtained from
Cartwright King. It is clear that at this point in time we were aware that
Cartwright King was engaged and advising on the implications of the
Second Sight Interim review, including whether or not it had implications
for past convictions. I also discussed options regarding the Second Sight
review, favouring retaining an independent reviewer (page 1 of
POL00191252).
135. On7 July 2013, Paula Vennells emailed Mark Davies, Martin Edwards and
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136.
137.
138.
139.
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Susan Crichton a draft statement regarding Horizon (POL00115982). The
Second Sight interim report was being published the following day. I
emailed Mark and Susan Crichton my comments on the draft, copied to
Rodric Williams. I thought that the draft reference to “historic issues” was
unhelpful as it may suggest that POL was worried about the safety of past
convictions (page 2 of POL00115982). I wrote that this “may even give
some people false hope” (which was not something I wanted to do) (page
2 of POL00115982). It appeared preferable for the wording to avoid
incorrectly suggesting that this was a systemic issue; there was no
suggestion of such an issue in Second Sight’s report. I again indicated my
view that the independence of Second Sight was important.
Second Sight’s interim report was dated 8 July 2013 (POL00099063). As
anticipated from the correspondence preceding the report, the preliminary
conclusion was that Second Sight had “so far found no evidence of system
wide (systemic) problems with the Horizon software’ (page 8 of
POL00099063). The interim report noted the existence of the 14 branch
and 64 branch bugs.
As can be seen from the correspondence prior to the Second Sight interim
report being published, POL was considering the implications of the report
and how to respond in advance. In particular, what came out of the interim
report was consideration of the implications for civil and criminal cases and
wider non-legal elements such as engagement with Lord Arbuthnot MP.
On 8 July 2013, Rodric Williams emailed Paula Vennells and Susan
Crichton comments on the Second Sight interim report (POL00099107). I
was copied into this email, but I do not recall that I had any involvement in
commenting on the text of the Second Sight interim report.
On 9 July 2013, Lesley Sewell emailed Susan Crichton, setting out a list of
how POL could manage activity going forward (POL00191593). I was
copied into this email. I replied to Susan Crichton, suggesting a list of legal
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issues for practical planning purposes. The content is too detailed for me
to have prepared it solely based on my own knowledge. The focus is a
response to the Second Sight report publication, split into criminal, civil,
budget and strategy issues. Cartwright King must have advised regarding
Gareth Jenkins’ future involvement by this point in time, as point 6 in my
response noted the need to instruct a new expert from Fujitsu and then
move to a non-Fujitsu expert as fast as possible (page 1 of POL00191593).
140. I also noted in the email that the criminal case review, which was
“underway by external lawyers [Cartwright King]” will focus on post-
separation cases initially (page 1 of POL00191593). I expect that as these
prosecutions were run by POL (rather than RMG), it would have been
easier to collate the relevant paperwork. I state that the “recommendation
is that all cases since 1 Jan 2010 be reviewed (to tie in to the migration
from old to new Horizon)” (page 1 of POL00191593). This was a
recommendation by Cartwright King (page 2 of POL00191681).
141. On 10 July 2013, I emailed Susan Crichton (POL00191680) my comments
on her draft board paper (POL00191681), but it is unclear from the face of
the document, and I cannot recall, what they were.
142. I have been asked to comment on an email chain dated 10 and 11 July
2013 (POL00323842), in which Rodric Williams seeks advice from
Cartwright King regarding whether or not Helen Rose’s report, which was
said by Rodric Williams to be marked “confidential and legally privileged”,
was in fact legally privileged (page 4 of POL00323842). Issues of
disclosure in the context of a criminal case, and whether a document was
subject to LPP which may have affected whether it needed to be disclosed,
were not issues which I had any experience of and were issues which we
expected the internal and external litigation lawyers to deal with.
143. As can be seen from the emails dated 28 June onwards, leading up to
Cartwright King’s advice dated 15 July 2013, POL was seeking and
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implementing external legal advice to respond to Second Sight’s interim
report.
SABBATICAL
144,
145.
I was away on a mostly unpaid sabbatical from 12 July to around 3
September 2013. During this period, I only intermittently checked my
emails (as I had been told by Susan Crichton that I should have a proper
break and avoid looking at them) and attachments were almost impossible
to review on my mobile device.
During this time, I believe that Piero D’Agostino (Lawyer, Financial
Services) deputised for me (as he had previously done on other occasions,
for example in a week in October 2012). However, it is unlikely that Piero
D'Agostino would have been involved in Horizon-related matters, as they
were already being dealt with by Susan Crichton, Rodric Williams and
Jarnail Singh.
REVIEW OF PAST CRIMINAL CASES
146.
147.
148.
I was not responsible for overseeing the Cartwright King review of past
criminal cases — that responsibility lay with Susan Crichton and
subsequently Chris Aujard. I note too that I was on sabbatical for the initial
period of this issue.
On Saturday 13 July 2013, Rodric Williams emailed Susan Crichton and
others, with an overview of who was doing what following the Second Sight
interim report (POL00297710).
I was away and therefore not involved in these action points, but there is a
reference which again indicates that Cartwright King had already provided
advice regarding Gareth Jenkins by that point in time: “[Cartwright King]
has raised [an] issue concerning Horizon evidence presented by Fujitsu
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during criminal trials’. The email confirmed that Simon Clarke of Cartwright
King’s related advice note would be delivered by 15 July 2013. The email
also confirmed that I emailed contact details for a potential new Horizon
expert at Fujitsu to Cartwright King on 10 July 2013.
149. On 15 July 2013, Simon Clarke of Cartwright King issued his advice note
regarding the use of Horizon system expert evidence in past and current
criminal proceedings (POL00006357). I was away on sabbatical at this
point and do not remember receiving the advice note. Before the concerns
leading up to this advice note, the POL view was that Gareth Jenkins was
the leading Horizon expert who was relied on by POL in its prosecutions.
Following advice from Cartwright King (between around 3 and 15 July
2013), that impression changed, and POL became aware that there
needed to be a replacement expert. POL would ultimately have been
guided by Cartwright King who had formed the view that Gareth Jenkins’
“credibility as an expert witness [was] fatally undermined; he should not be
asked to provide expert evidence in any current or future prosecution”
(page 13 of POL00006357). Cartwright King’s advice, followed by POL,
was that a review should be undertaken (it was already underway)
regarding making related disclosures to SPMs (page 14 of POL00006357).
150. On 17 July 2013, Martin Smith of Cartwright King emailed me, Susan
Crichton, Rodric Williams and Jarnail Singh an advice note regarding
Hitesh Hirani’s case (POL00168975). This appears to have been one of
the case-by-case reviews being undertaken by Cartwright King regarding
disclosure. This was an email which, although also sent to Susan Crichton,
and copied to Rodric Williams and Jarnail Singh, began “Hugh” and so, as
it was always almost impossible to review attachments on my mobile
device, I asked for clarification of what the attachment was to ensure that I
did not need to do anything further.
151. I have been provided with a copy of an advice note prepared by Simon
Clarke of Cartwright King, dated 2 August 2013, regarding the duty to
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152.
153.
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record and retain material (POL00006799). Whilst I cannot recall seeing
it, I was on sabbatical at this time and expect that this advice note would
have been dealt with by Susan Crichton or Jarnail Singh.
I have been provided with a copy of an advice note prepared by Cartwright
King, ‘Observations and analysis of the Cartwright King prosecution review
process’, dated 5 December 2013 (POL00198595). I cannot remember
seeing this review note previously, although it was emailed to Chris Aujard
and me on 6 December 2013 (POL00198594). I believe that Chris Aujard
would have dealt with this advice note as he took over all Horizon matters
after joining POL Legal (see paragraph 39 above). The advice note states
that over 300 cases had been reviewed in depth and demonstrated that
POL followed the advice to complete the review and disclosure exercise
(page 13 of POL00198595). I cannot recall having had any involvement in
or knowledge of the disclosure issues discussed at paragraphs 24 — 27
(pages 8 and 9 of POL00198595), other than when I saw the emails
discussing the Cartwright King prosecution review on 20 February 2014
and promptly alerted Chris Aujard (POL00201067).
I have been provided with a copy of Cartwright King’s advice regarding R
v Hosi, dated 1 May 2014 (POL00133638). As I explain below, I had left
POL by this point in time.
BRIAN ALTMAN QC
154.
155.
At some stage, a decision was made to obtain additional independent
advice from external leading counsel regarding POL’s future strategy,
including the Cartwright King case review.
On 22 July 2013, Gavin Matthews of Bond Dickinson emailed Susan
Crichton, Jarnail Singh, Rodric Williams, Simon Richardson and me,
copied to Andy Parsons of Bond Dickinson, regarding a list of general
issues to discuss with Brian Altman QC (as he then was) (POL00297884).
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156. On 22 July 2013, I replied to Gavin Matthews’ email, copying Susan
Crichton, providing a list which I had previously drafted to try to assist. I
was aware that Brian Altman QC was being instructed but I was not
othemise involved in his instruction. It is unlikely that I joined the telephone
call with Brian Altman QC on Wednesday 24 July 2013, referred to in Gavin
Matthews’ email and I have no recollection of doing so.
157. I have been provided with a copy of Brian Altman QC’s observations on
the terms of reference for his appointment, dated 2 August 2013
(POL00021981) as well as an undated terms of reference prepared by
Bond Dickinson (POL00021982). I was on sabbatical when the terms of
reference were prepared and discussed.
158. Brian Altman QC notes on page 3, footnote 4, that POL needs to determine
whether he is advising on the “efficacy” of prosecutions or the “safety” of
convictions (page 3 of POL00021981). I was not involved in the decision-
making process around this question. It is also apparent that Bond
Dickinson subsequently advised POL on 9 August 2013 that Brian Altman
QC’s remit should not extend to the safety of convictions (POL00021980).
159. I have been provided with a copy of Brian Altman QC’s ‘Interim Review of
Cartwright King’s Current [Case Review] Process’, dated 2 August 2013
(POL00006583). I was on sabbatical when this advice note was prepared
and received. In preparing this statement, I can see that at paragraph 15,
Brian Altman QC stated that “...the approach of [Cartwright King] and
counsel appears to be fundamentally sound...”, but queried a cut-off date
of three years for the review (page 6 of POL00006583).
160. I have been provided with a note prepared by Bond Dickinson of a
conference with Brian Altman QC on 9 September 2013 (POL00006485)
and a further note of the same conference by an unknown author
(POL00139866). The conference was attended by Susan Crichton, Jarnail
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Singh and Rodric Williams, as well as attendees from Cartwright King and
Bond Dickinson. I did not attend the conference. I received a copy of Bond
Dickinson’s note of the conference by email a few weeks later on 25
September 2013 (POL00168919). I recall that shortly after I returned from
sabbatical Susan Crichton told me that she was leaving POL, and in that
context stated that Rodric Williams would progress the Brian Altman QC
workstream.
161. I have been provided with an advice note prepared by Brian Altman QC.
(‘General Review’), dated 15 October 2013 (POL00006581). I do not recall
reviewing this advice and believe that Chris Aujard would have dealt with
it (with help from Rodric Williams if needed). The advice follows the 9
September conference, which I did not attend.
162. I can see that the advice note confirmed Brian Altman QC’s advice that 1
January 2010 was a “logical, proportionate and practicable” cut-off date for
Cartwright King’s case review (page 5 of POL00006581). I do not recall
having any involvement in the setting of the cut-off date for the Cartwright
King case review. As above, I considered that the review was taking place
and being progressed appropriately by others, following advice from
Cartwright King and Brian Altman QC. In paragraph 72 of Brian Altman
QC’s advice note, he referred to a telephone conference which he attended
on 4 October 2013 with representatives of POL (I was not present), Bond
Dickinson and Cartwright King. I am now aware that he stated that “it was
agreed by all that the 1st January 2010 start date for the [Cartwright King]
review was logical and proportionate, and there should be no change to it’
(page 27 of POL00006581). Paragraph 3, point 2, of Brian Altman QC’s
subsequent advice note dated 21 October 2013, confirms that Rodric
Williams and Jarnail Singh of POL, Martin Smith and Simon Clarke of
Cartwright King and Gavin Matthews of Bond Dickinson attended this
meeting (page 2 of POL00038592).
163. At paragraph 130, Brian Altman QC advised that the Falkirk issue was “an
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isolated instance” with no relevance to Cartwright King’s review (page 42
of POL00006581). As above, I do not recall reading this advice and it was
being dealt with by others.
164. At paragraph 148, Brian Altman QC advised that Gareth Jenkins was
“...tainted and his future role as an expert is untenable” (page 47 of
POL00006581).
165. I can see that at paragraph 162, Brian Altman QC stated that, “[Cartwright
King] has also tended to advise on its likely stance to any application for
permission to appeal, or to any substantive appeal, should permission to
appeal be granted. That amounts to consideration of the safety of the
conviction” (page 51 of POL00006581). Please also see the email from
Bond Dickinson dated 9 August (POL00021980) regarding Brian Altman
QC’'s earlier comments relating to the distinction between reviewing
efficacy and safety.
166. At paragraph 167, Brian Altman QC discussed dangers with permitting
convicted individuals to participate in a mediation process (page 52 of
POL00006581). As above, I do not recall reading this at the time, and it
was being progressed by others.
167. I have been provided with an advice note prepared by Brian Altman QC,
‘Review of POL prosecution role’, dated 21 October 2013 (POL00038592).
It is not clear that this document ever came to me (I was away this week).
As above (see paragraph 39), it would have been part of the range of items
that Chris Aujard said that he was taking on.
168. I can see that at paragraphs 40 — 66, Brian Altman QC discusses various
POL policies (pages 17 to 25 of POL00038592). I believe that the April
2012 to April 2013 POL prosecution policy document (as above, this is the
document referred to at paragraph 100 (page 8 of POL00122001)
prepared by Jarnail Singh) was likely prepared to be in place at separation
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— this would explain why it is derived from the RMG policy. As also
mentioned above at paragraph 101, by March 2013 the policy was being
revised (see POL00122166 on 5 March 2013). It appears that the 14 and
64 branch issues then arose and by August 2013 Cartwright King had
started advising on amending the policy. Brian Altman QC then became
involved and advised on these matters in October 2013.
169. I have been asked regarding my understanding of Brian Altman QC’s
comment that “The Horizon data integrity issue was an exceptional
instance of [POL] prosecutorial failure of serial non-disclosure in breach of
[POL’s] disclosure obligations” and conclusion that there was no need for
POL to divest its role as a prosecutor (page 4, paragraph 4 iii), of
POL00038592). As above, I do not recall seeing this advice note at the
time, but it appears that this paragraph needs to be read in conjunction with
paragraphs 96 and 97, where Brian Altman QC explains that the “recent
events have to be seen in their proper context’ and that the “serial non-
disclosure of relevant material occurred in circumstances in which POL and
its advisors were wholly unaware that there might be disclosable material
or information...” (page 34 of POL00038592). Brian Altman QC also
concluded that he had seen “no evidence to suggest that [POL] exercises
its investigation and prosecution function in anything other than a well-
organised, structured and efficient manner, through an expert and
dedicated team of in-house investigators and lawyers, supported by
[Cartwright King] and [Cartwright King’s] in-house counsel, as well as
external counsel and agents where required”.
170. I have been asked my views on the conclusion that there was no need for
POL to divest its role as a prosecutor. As far as I can recall, I was generally
aware that POL was considering its position and taking advice from its
external advisors on this point.
171. I have also been provided with a copy of an updated version of Brian
Altman QC’s ‘Review of POL prosecution role’ advice note, dated 19
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December 2013 (POL00112937). I do not recall seeing this or being asked
to review this by Chris Aujard.
CCRC
172. I had no experience or understanding of the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (“CCRC”) prior to joining RMG / POL. I have been provided
with a number of documents relating to the CCRC:
i. the CCRC’s letter dated 12 July 2013, which was received by POL on
15 July 2013 (POL00039994).
ii. an undated one-page advice note on the CCRC and a suggested
response to the CCRC (POL00039993).
iii. the ‘draft paragraphs for insertion into CCRC reply’ document
(POL00039995).
iv. Susan Crichton’s email dated 16 July 2013 to Andy Parsons at Bond
Dickinson, regarding the letter dated 15 July 2013 from the CCRC
(POL00039996).
v. Susan Crichton’s holding response to the CCRC, dated 24 July 2013
(page 5 of POL00040813).
vi. POL’s draft response to the CCRC dated 26 July 2013, referring to the
instruction of Brian Altman QC and the Cartwright King case review
(page 4 of POL00040813).
vii. the CCRC’s letter to Susan Crichton, dated 30 July 2013 (page 3 of
POL00040813).
173. As above, I was on sabbatical from 12 July 2013 until around 3 September
2013. Although I was aware that the CCRC had made contact
(POL00297884), I do not recall seeing any of these documents at the time
and I cannot recall having any role in preparing the response.
174. Ihave also been provided with a copy of Chris Aujard’s letter to the CCRC,
dated 5 June 2014 (POL00124350). As below, I had left POL by this point
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in time.
REPLACEMENT EXPERT WITNESS
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
Following the receipt of advice from Cartwright King, including Simon
Clarke’s advice note dated 15 July 2013, POL gave consideration to
instructing an alternative expert witness for criminal and civil cases. I can
see from his advice notes that this issue was also discussed with Brian
Altman QC (page 2 of POL00006485 and page 47 of POL00006581).
I was not involved in the decision to appoint a new expert, although I
occasionally assisted in the search.
I have been asked if I briefed members of the board on the issues raised
in relation to Gareth Jenkins. I cannot recall ever having briefed the board
on this issue.
On 1 October 2013, Jarnail Singh emailed me a CV from Professors
Kramer and Dulay of Imperial College London (POL00146545). He
subsequently sent the CV to Alwen Lyons, asking who would be able to
sign off their instruction. Alwen suggested that Lesley Sewell and I could
sign the instruction off. She said that I could “say whether their background
will be creditable in court’. This issue was outside of my experience, and
I replied stating, “! wouldn't know but I can ask [Cartwright King] or the new
GC [Chris Aujard] what they think’. Rodric Williams subsequently
confirmed that a next step had already been agreed.
Whilst I was away (from Thursday 17 October 2013 to Monday 28 October
2013), on 22 October 2013, Jarnail Singh emailed Alwen Lyons
(POL00146675) attaching a draft paper for approval of the new Horizon
expert (POL00146676). I do not recall having any involvement with the
preparation of this paper, this appears to be an early draft of the paper
discussed below at paragraph 181.
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180. I have been provided with an email chain from 27 October 2013 to 11
November 2013 (POL00300593). During this chain, it is clear that Rodric
Williams is progressing the process of appointing a new expert and Jarnail
Singh is ascertaining details regarding costs, with ultimate sign off resting
with Chris Aujard.
181. On 19 January 2014, Jarnail Singh emailed Larissa Wilson and others
(POL00147247), attaching an updated Executive Committee paper by
Chris Aujard, dated 17 January 2014 (POL00147248) seeking budgetary
approval for a new Horizon expert. I do not have any recollection of
assisting with this Executive Committee paper. By this point in time, I note
that Brian Altman QC had agreed with the advice of Cartwright King to
appoint a new expert.
THE MEDIATION SCHEME
182. I do not recall being involved in the creation or running of the mediation
scheme.
183. I have been provided with a copy of an email chain primarily between
Jarnail Singh and Bond Dickinson, regarding the overlap between the
mediation scheme and criminal prosecutions, dated 21 to 26 January 2014
(POL00325795). There is reference to a meeting on 28 January 2014. I
cannot recall whether or not I attended this meeting.
REVISION OF PROSECUTION POLICIES AND FUTURE PROSECUTIONS
(2013/2014)
184. On 16 October 2013, following advice from Cartwright King and Brian
Altman QC regarding the existing prosecution policy (see page 34 of
POL00006581 — Brian Altman QC commented on revisions being made by
Cartwright King to POL’s prosecution policy), Jarnail Singh emailed me
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185.
186.
187.
188.
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(POL00300567) regarding the decision maker described in the draft
revised prosecution policy. I left for annual leave the following day, and
Jarnail Singh then chased a response when I returned on Monday 28
October 2013. I asked Jarnail Singh what Brian Altman QC had
recommended and Jarnail Singh confirmed Cartwright King’s advice (page
1 of POL00300567). I recall that at this point, all such issues were being
directed to Chris Aujard.
A draft prosecution policy appears to have been prepared by Simon Clarke
of Cartwright King in November 2013 (POL00123144), but I do not recall
seeing it.
On 21 January 2014, Rodric Williams emailed Chris Aujard
(POL00123142) in relation to Project Sparrow. I cannot recall the
background or scope of Project Sparrow. The email attached a draft board
paper (POL00123143) on future prosecutions and its appendices
(POL00123144). I understand that the board paper was prepared by Chris
Aujard for the directors of POL. It appears that I had some involvement,
although various issues would have been outside of my knowledge and I
do not recall my precise contribution. I cannot remember any discussions
with Chris Aujard about the draft board paper.
I have been asked why Brian Altman QC’s comments regarding disclosure
failings were not incorporated into the paper. As above, I was not involved
in progressing Brian Altman QC’s advice and do not recall my precise
contribution to the note.
The working draft paper set out various options for dealing with future
criminal conduct and pros and cons of the options were described in
Appendix F (page 20 of POL00123144). I do not recall who drafted
Appendix F.
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RESIGNATION
189. By the end of 2012, the POL Legal team had grown to around a dozen
lawyers and I was seeking to split my role up into two or three parallel
teams, which I discussed on and off with Susan Crichton during 2013. I
was expecting to resolve this when I returned from sabbatical, but between
Susan Crichton’s leaving and Chris Aujard’s arrival this was never
progressed in the run up to Christmas 2013. Consequently, I decided to
hand in my notice at the start of January 2014.
190. After leaving POL on 20 March 2014, I joined TSB in May 2014 as Head of
Legal of a Commercial team. I left that role in July 2018. I then decided to
work short fixed term contacts, working as a lawyer at the London Legacy
Development Corporation (March 2019 until October 2019), Burberry
(November 2019 until December 2020) and BSI (April 2022 until October
2022).
GENERAL
191. I have been asked to reflect on my time at POL and consider if there is
anything which could have been handled differently with the benefit of
hindsight.
192. I have been specifically asked about how POL handled challenges to the
integrity of the Horizon IT system, the approach to prosecutions and the
disclosure of information to SPMs convicted on the basis of Horizon data.
193. In relation to challenges to the Horizon IT System and the approach to
prosecutions, pre-separation, RMG’s Civil Litigation Team and Criminal
Law Team were responsible for progressing criminal and civil cases.
194. Post-separation, we were dependent on the advice of the internal lawyer
subject matter experts, external lawyers and external counsel in relation to
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195.
Dated:
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these issues and the disclosure of information to SPMs. My primary
involvement as Head of Legal was principally in relation to the response to
the emerging issue of the 14 branch and 64 branch bugs becoming
apparent to POL Legal in June 2013, which had resulted from the
instruction of Second Sight in 2012, that instruction being despite risks
being raised regarding ‘floodgates’ by POL’s external advisors prior to their
instruction. I always understood that POL was acting appropriately and in
good faith as it responded, in line with the advice that had been obtained.
Given all of the above, and with hindsight, it would have been desirable at
times to have had more resources in the POL Legal team, for example a
second criminal lawyer (but there were issues with HR headcount
limitations) and/or more than one external law firm advising. Doing so
would have provided a wider variety of views.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
[1% Hard Ur4
Page 47 of 56
Index to First Witness Statement of Hugh Flemington
No.
URN
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Document Description
Control Number
POL00027553
Post Office Minutes: Board
Meeting held on 21st November
2012
POL-0024194
POL00181607
Email chain from Hugh
Flemington to Rodric Williams re
Board report on significant
litigation
POL-BSFF-0019670
POL00295988
POL Executive Committee
Agenda
POL-BSFF-0134038
POL00041564
Bankruptcy, prosecution and
disrupted livelihoods -
Postmasters tell their story;
reported by Rebecca Thomson -
Article
POL-0038046
POL00026572
Horizon — Response to
Challenges Regarding Systems
Integrity
POL-0023213
POL00030217
Ernst & Young Management letter
to POL for year ended 27 March
2011
POL-0026699
FUJ00152903
Email from Hugh Flemington to
David M Jones, Thomas Penny
and Guy Wilkerson re WEST
BYFLEET ISSUES
POINQ0159098F
POL00055590
Email from Marilyn Benjamin on
behalf of Jarnail A Singh to Mandy
Talbot, Hugh Flemington,
Jacqueline Whitham, Re: Regina
v Seema Misra-Guildford Crown
Court-Trial-Attack on Horizon
POL-0052069
POL00129960
Witness Statement of Gareth
Jenkins
POL-0120220
10
POL00046944
Letter from Shoosmiths to The
Post Office re: Julian Wilson
POL-0043423
1
POL00056928
Julian Wilson case study: Email
from Hugh Flemington to Dave
Pardoe, John M Scott and others
Re: Horizon resourcing
POL-0053407
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No.
URN
Document Description
Control Number
12
POL00176465
Email from Emily B Springford to
Angela Van-Den-Bogerd, Lesley J
Sewell, Mike Granville and others
re: JFSA claims - disclosure and
evidence gathering
POL-0171736
13
POL00107695
NOTE OF CONFERENCE WITH
RICHARD MORGAN
QC MAITLAND CHAMBERS IN
THE MATTER OF POTENTIAL
CLAIMS BY SCOTT
DARLINGTON & OTHERS
AGAINST POST OFFICE
LIMITED
POL-0105986
14
POL00058211
Briefing note re: The current
status of claims involving horizon
POL-0054690
15
POL00006484
Summary of Conference with
Counsel at Maitland Chambers
about Horizon
POL-0017789
16
POL00180855
Email chain from Hugh
Flemington to Susan Crichton.
Re: Def sols raising Horizon
investigation.
POL-BSFF-0018918
17
POL00180846
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Susan Crichton RE: Wylie - Def
sols raising Horizon Investigation
POL-BSFF-0018909
18
POL00141398
Email chain from Jarnail A Singh
to Jorja Preston re Re: Wylie -
Def sols raising Horizon
investigation.
POL-0142783
19
POL00143379
email chain from jarnail singh to
hugh flemington and susan
crichton re Case no. 21392
Prosecution v K Wylie
POL-BSFF-0002544
20
POL00026567
Advice on Evidence by H.M.M
Bowyer
POL-0023046
21
POL00141400
Email chain from Jarnail A Singh
to Hugh Flemington, cc'd Susan
Chrichton re CASE NO 21392 -
Prosecution v K Wylie.
POL-0142785
22
POL00141406
Email from Helen Rose to Jarnail
A Singh re Disclosure Officer for
Horizon
POL-0142791
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No.
URN
Document Description
Control Number
23
POL00141416
Email from Jarnail A Singh to
Andy Cash re Horizon integrity
project
POL-0142801
24
POL00020489
Email chain between Harry
Bowyer, Jarnail Singh, Andy Cash
and Helen Rose re Helen Rose
disclosures report (defence expert
reports & disclosure requests)
POL-0013681
25
POL00181611
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Lesley Sewell, Susan Crichton re
expert report
POL-BSFF-0019674
26
POLO0096985
Email chain from Gareth Jenkins
to Jarnail Singh, CC'ing Penny
Thomas, Hugh Flemington and
others re: Horizon Fujitsu Report
Very Urgent.
POL-0096568
27
POL00129957
Horizon Integrity Report prepared
by Gareth Jenkins of Fujitsu for
Post Office Ltd
POL-0120217
28
POL00129958
Diagram of Audit System
POL-0120218
29
POL00129959
Diagram of Audit System
POL-0120219
30
POL00122000
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Susan Crichton and Alwen Lyons
re: Legally privileged and
confidential - do not forward -
POL - Prosecution Board Paper
121212
POL-0128248
31
POLO00122001
POL Draft Prosecution Policy
Paper
POL-0128249
32
POL00122166
Email from Hugh Flemington to
John M Scott, Jarnail A Singh,
Susan Crichton and Alwen Lyons
re: New Draft Criminal
Enforcement & Prosecution Policy
EPP
POL-0128409
33
POL00030621
POL Criminal Enforcement and
Prosecution Policy (unsigned)
POL-0027103
34
FUJ00086811
Horizon data, Lepton SPSO
191320, Draft Report by Helen
Rose
POINQ0092982F
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POL00029622
Email from Rod Ismay to Rodric
Williams, Andrew Winn, Simon
Baker and Lesley Sewell and
others, re: Anomaly in 14
Branches - Strictly Private &
Confidential - Subject to Privilege
- Do Not Forward
POL-0026104
36
POL00145142
email regarding letters to
branches and B14 timing
POL-BSFF-0004269
37
POL00145145
Email between Cartwright King
and Post Office regarding the
discrepancies found in the 14
branches.
POL-BSFF-0004272
38
POLO00098812
Email from Alwen Lyons to Mark
R Davies, Lesley J Sewell et al.
Re: My Witness Statement for the
MISRA case
POL-0098395
39
POL00031351
Email from Davidson James to
Lesley J Swell, Jenkins Gareth
Gl, Alwen Lyons, Re: Discuss of
defect in horizon in court.
POL-0028253
40
POL00029623
Undated report re: Branch
Accounting Incidents.
POL-0026105
“1
POL00060572
Khayyam Ishaq case study: Email
from Jarnail A Singh to Hugh
Flemington, Alwen Lyons, Mark M
Davies and others re A couple of
thoughts Balvinder Samra Hurst
Lane west Bromwich Birmingham
Trial Monday 1st June 2013
POL-0057051
42
POL00296868
Email Invite from Amanda A
Brown to Mark R Davis, Lesley J
Sewell, Rodric Williams and
others for emergency Second
Sight meeting on Monday ‘1st July
2013
POL-BSFF-0134918
43
POLO0060587
Seema Misra Case Study: Email
from Hugh Flemington to Mark R
Davies, Alwen Lyons, Martin
Edwards and Others RE: High
Level points for the Board on the
SS matter
POL-0057066
44
POL00115918
Email from Rodric Williams to
Mark Davies RE: Updated Draft
Briefing Note.
POL-0116920
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POL00029648
Email from Susan Crichton to
Simon Baker and others, re: 'FW
Timeline for Local Suspense
Problem’
POL-0026130
46
POL00098898
Email from Martin Edwards to
Alice Perkins, Paula Vennells,
cc'd Susan Crichton and others;
re: JA meeting brief
POL-0098481
47
POL00115919
Post Office Limited - Internal
Briefing Note to Paula Vennells:
Second Sight review into Horizon
-Implications of Interim Report -
DRAFT
POL-0116921
48
POL00098984
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Martin Smith, Simon Clarke, cc'd
Rodric Williams and others re:
Fw: Timline for Local Suspense
Problem
POL-0098567
49
POL00145201
Email chain including Rodric
Williams (POL); Hugh Flemington
(RMG); Susan Crichton (POL) &
Others Re: Advanced Draft of
Report about Disclosure
POL-BSFF-0004328
50
POLO0191252
Email from Hugh Flemington To:
Susan Crichton RE: Proposed
way forward
POL-BSFF-0029315
51
POL00115982
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Mark R Davies Susan Crichton
and Rodric Williams re: Fw: Fwd:
File - draft horizon statement
2.docx
POL-0116984
52
POL00099063
Signed Interim Report into alleged
problems with the Horizon system
POL-0098646
53
POL00099107
Email from Martin Edwards to
Williams Gibson re: SS Interim
Report
POL-0098690
54
POL00191593
Email from Hugh Flemington To:
Susan Crichton re FW: Tactical
Activities
POL-BSFF-0029656
55
POL00191680
Email from Hugh Flemington To:
Susan Crichton re Legally
privileged and confidential
POL-BSFF-0029743
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POL00191681
POST OFFICE LTD BOARD
Update following the publication
of the Interim Report on Horizon
POL-BSFF-0029744
57
POL00323842
Email from Rodric Williams to
Martin Smith, Simon Clarke and
others re the report of helen rose
POL-0172300
58
POL00297710
Email from Rodric Williams to
Susan Crichton, Hugh Flemington
CC'd to Jarnail A Singh and
others RE;Horizon / Second Sight
- Status, Contacts etc as at
12.07.13
POL-BSFF-0135760
59
POL00006357
Advice on the use of expert
evidence relating to the integrity
of the Fujitsu Services Ltd
Horizon System
POL-0017625
60
POL00168975
Email from Hugh Flemington to
Martin Smith re Harry Bowyer's
Advice in relation to Hitesh Hirani
POL-BSFF-0132566
61
POL00006799
Advice on Disclosure and the
Duty to Record and Retain
Material
POL-0017591
62
POL00198595
Observations and Analysis of the
Cartwright King Prosecution
review process re. POL and
Royal Mail Group Ltd.
POL-BSFF-0036658
63
POL00198594
Email from Jarnail Singh to Chris
Aujard Hugh Flemington RE:
Observations and Analysis of File
Review
POL-BSFF-0036657
64
POL00201067
Email chain from Hugh
Flemington to Chris Aujard RE:
M030's Legal Investigation Report
POL-BSFF-0039130
65
POL00133638
POST OFFICE LTD — CASE
REVIEW R. v. JERRY KWAME
HOS! Snaresbrook Crown Court
POL-0138091
66
POL00297884
Email from Gavin Matthews to
High Flemington, Susan Crichton,
Rodric Williams and others RE;
Issues for Brian Altman QC to
deal with
POL-BSFF-0135934
67
POL00021981
Terms of Reference for the
Appointment of Brian Altman QC,
Observations
POL-0018460
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POL00021982
Draft Terms of Reference for the
Appointment of Brian Altman QC
POL-0018461
69
POL00021980
Email from Gavin Matthews to
Susan Crichton, Rodric Williams,
Hugh Flemington and others re:
Brian Altman QC - terms of
Reference
POL-0018459
70
POL00006583
Interim Review of CK Processes
by Brian Altman QC
POL-0017668
71
POL00006485
Note of Conference with Brian
Altman QC
POL-0017790
72
POL00139866
Notes of Meeting with BAQC.
9/9/13
POL-0141042
73
POL00168919
Email from Matthews Gavin to
Susan Crichton, Jarnail A Singh,
Hugh Flemington and others re:
Private & Legally Privileged -
Horizon [BD-4A.FID20472253]
POL-BSFF-0132510
74
POL00006581
Review of PO prosecutions by
Brian Altman QC
POL-0017666
75
POL00038592
Draft Review of Post Office Ltd
Prosecution Role by Brian Altman
Qc
POL-0027903
76
POL00112937
Post Office Ltd Review of Post
Office Ltd Prosecution Role -
Brian Altman QC
POL-0110333
77
POL00039994
Letter from Sally Berlin to Paula
Vennells, RE: Horizon Computer
System
POL-0036476
78
POL00039993
CCRC reviewing criteria
POL-0036475
79
POL00039995
Draft Paragraphs for Insertion into
Reply to CCRC
POL-0036477
80
POL00039996
Email from Susan Crichton to
Andrew Parsons and Simon
Richardson and others, RE: For
discussion
POL-0036478
81
POL00040813
Letters from Chris Aujard to Mrs S
Berlin RE: Horizon Computer
System
POL-0037295
82
POL00124350
Letter from Chris Aujard to Mrs S
Berlin re: Horizon Computer
System
POL-0127416
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POL00146545
Email from Alwen Lyons to Rodric
Williams, Jarnail A Singh, Hugh
Flemington and others re Experts
Horizon issues
POL-BSFF-0005672
84
POL00146675
Email from Jarnail A Singh To:
Alwen Lyons CC: Rodric Williams,
Hugh Flemington re request
approval for Appointment of
Horizon experts
POL-BSFF-0005802
85
POL00146676
Letter on expert witnesses for civil
recovery and criminal prosecution
proceedings.
POL-BSFF-0005803
86
POL00300593
Email from Jarnail A Singh To
Rodric Williams and Hugh
Flemington Re: Meeting with
Fujitsu re:New Expert
POL-BSFF-0138643
87
POL00147247
Email from Jarnail Singh to
Larissa Wilson cc Chris Aujard,
Hugh Flemington re Budget -
appointment of Independent
Horizon expertft for approval for
EXco Monday
POL-BSFF-0006370
88
POL00147248
POL Executive Committee -
Expert witness proposal
POL-BSFF-0006371
89
POL00325795
Email from Jarnail Singh to
Andrew PParsons CC'd Rodric
Williams, Hugh Flemington, Chris
Aujard and others RE;Early
intervention [BD-
4A.F1ID20472253] Meeting room
107 Tuesday 28/01/2014 10-12
am
POL-0172589
90
POL00300567
Email from Jarnail A Singh to
Hugh Flemington and Rodric
Williams Re: Decision Taker in
POL prosecution
POL-BSFF-0138617
91
POL00123144
Draft Board Paper on Future
Prosecutions including Known
Transactional Issues and Draft
POL Prosecution Policy being
developed by Cartwright King &
Brian Altman
POL-0127570
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POL00123142
Email from Rodric Willams to
Chris Aujard cc Hugh Flemington
bcc Renata Prywerek RE: Private
& Confidential - Subject to Legal
Privilege Sparrow - Future
Prosecutions
POL-0127568
93
POL00123143
Letter from Chris Aujard to the
Directors of POL cc. Belinda
Crowe re Project Sparrow - Paper
on Prosecutions going forward.
POL-0127569
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