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Witness Name: Robert Daily
Statement No.: WITN08940100
Dated: 7 November 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF ROBERT DAILY
I, Robert Daily, will say as follows:
Introduction
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 3 October 2023
(the “Request”). I have received advice and assistance from a lawyer in the
preparation of this statement.
My professional background
2. 1am an employee of Post Office Ltd ("POL") and hold the position of Security
Manager. I joined POL on 17 December 1979. I have listed and summarised
below the roles I have held throughout my career to the present date, and the
approximate dates that I was in these roles, to the best of my recollection:
2.1. Counter clerk (grade Postal Officer), 1979-1984. This role involved
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2.2.
2.3.
24.
2.5.
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serving the general public. I had my own stock unit that I had to balance,
this was completed on a paper balance sheet. At end of a 12-month
probation period, I was sent to work in various branches before taking a
permanent position at George Square Crown Office in Glasgow.
Remittance Unit and TV Licence Records, 1984-1987. Working in the
Remittance Unit, I was placed on what were called "writing duties" and
worked on the "float", meaning that I was sent to various departments to
cover holidays and sick leave. I mainly worked in the Coin Centre in Thistle
Street, Glasgow (part of the Remittance Unit), processing coin from Post
Office branches and making up coin bags to send to Post Office branches.
Being on the float during this time meant that I also worked in TV Licence
Records, attending people's homes to check if they had a TV licence. If
they didn't, they could pay at the door and a receipt would be given, or I
would make a report to my Line Manager.
Remittance Unit, 1987-1989. During this period working in the
Remittance Unit, my role involved processing inward and outward
remittances from branches (this was before systems were computerised)
and processing business banking from external customers.
Cash Management, 1989-1993. In this role I processed the Overnight
Cash Holding figures sent in from Post Office branches and set daily
targets for Post Office branches.
Distribution, 1993-1997. This role involved monitoring the performance
of Remittance Units in the Northern Territory (Glasgow, Aberdeen, Dundee
and Belfast). I visited the units to perform time and motion studies of the
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2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
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work carried out.
Security, 1997 to date. Initially, I worked as a Postal Officer (between
1997-2004), ordering parts for parcel hatches, contacting contractors to
attend branches to repair security equipment, project work (e.g. the screen
2000 upgrade of screens in Post Offices), arranging contractors, and
liaising with Post Offices to arrange suitable dates for this work to be
carried out.
Since 2005 I have worked as a Security and Investigations Manager,
performing various roles. (I had applied unsuccessfully for this post in
about 1999 or 2000, I recall). I describe this role in more detail later in my
statement, but to summarise: in this role I investigate crime or suspected
crime against POL, collate paperwork, identify suspects, arrange and
conduct interviews and submit reports to the Casework team for decisions.
In outline, when a decision is taken not proceed to prosecution, the case
is closed; if a decision is taken to proceed, I submit a report to the Crown
Office & Procurator Fiscal Service ("COPFS"). If the COPFS decides to
proceed with a prosecution, I provide the productions (i.e. exhibits)
supporting the case to COPFS. Latterly (as I explain elsewhere in this
statement) BTO (aka Brechin, Tindall, Oates) Solicitors LLP, were
employed to advise on reports and evidence. I liaised with BTO regarding
the content of my reports to ensure I had covered all enquiries and there
was sufficient evidence to either proceed to prosecution or not.
My "security" role includes attending branches to conduct security reviews,
give advice, and check equipment is being used correctly. I also carry out
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visits and/or phone calls after an incident at a branch (such as a
robbery/burglary).
The Request asks me to give an account of my role as a Security/Investigations
Manager from 2005, including how I became an Investigations Manager, the
experience I had and the training I received, my understanding of what the role
involved, who I reported to, and my opinion on the competence and
professionalism of my colleagues and managers.
I joined the Security & Investigation team as an Investigation Manager in 2005.
In 2011 my role changed to Security & Investigation Manager and my current role
is as a currently Security Manager.
I applied for the job of Investigation Manager in 2004. The role was advertised as
temporary for six months. I was successful in the interview and was appointed.
When the temporary six-month period came to an end, I was informed my position
was being made permanent.
I have been asked to consider my CV, the document at POL00105143. This
contains an account of my skills and experience acquired in the role of
Investigations Manager from January 2005. My recollection is that the Security &
Investigations Team, as it was known then, underwent a reorganisation in 2008,
and I was required to submit my CV.
I have also been asked to consider the document at POL00129121, which
appears to be a statement I made in support if an application for the role of
Investigation Manager. Again, I believe this to be from either 2008 or 2014 when
I had to apply for my role as an Investigation Manager during the organisational
restructures in those years.
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10.
11.
12.
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All the experience and expertise I have has been acquired through working in my
role. I have not pursued any formal qualifications for my role. I have also
undergone training, and set out below an account of the training that I recall being
given.
I say in my CV at POL00105143 that I had the knowledge and skills required for
the position of Investigation Manager, and that I had knowledge of the corporate
investigations policies and standards. I believe that to be an accurate assessment
of my capabilities at that time, and now.
I have been based in Glasgow throughout the time I have had roles in the Security
Team.
I recall that I was temporarily promoted to the role of Investigation Manager in
2000 and I recall attended some training at that time.
I recall that when taking up the role of Investigation Manager, I received 4-5
weeks training in the training unit above the Lavender Hill Post Office/Battersea
Delivery Office in London. The training was given by Royal Mail Group accredited
trainers who had experience of Investigations. The training covered the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE") Codes of Practice, Theft Act, carrying
out searches, suspect offender interviews, cognitive witness interviews, taking
witness statements (including the use of the Solicitor and Friends forms), the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, IIMARC (which refers to "information,
intention, method, administration, risk assessment, communications, human
rights and other legal issues") and NPA notifications ("NPA" refers to "non-Police
Agency", and the notifications refer to notifications we made to the police about
the criminal proceedings we undertook). After a few months in my role as an
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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investigations manager, I went to Rugby to attend further training, including
courtroom training.
I can also recall being given onsite/field training on Scots Law, with the main
difference at the time being that, in Scotland, a suspect was not offered a solicitor
to be present at an interview.
I have also been asked to consider the performance and development review
carried out for the 2013/14 at POL00105145. The document is my performance
review for that year. Each year all managers within POL have to complete a six
month and annual performance and development review ("PDR"). We have to
reflect on what we had done and what we considered we had done well in each
period.
When I took up the role of Investigation Manager, I reported to Judith (Jude)
Trotter, and after she left I reported to Diane Matthews for a temporary period
and then Andrew Daley. Afterwards, my recollection is that I had a series of
managers: Lesley Frankland, followed by Keith Gilchrist, then Kevin Ryan and
Simon Hutchinson (again for a temporary period) and then Helen Dickinson
before she left in around 2019. I am now managed by Simon Talbot.
I have always viewed my colleagues and managers to be competent and
professional.
In outline, I understood the role of Investigation Manager to involve investigating
crime or suspected crime against POL by its staff, agents and their employees.
In my CV at POL00105143 I mentioned the Financial Evaluation form. Following
an interview with a suspect, I was required to complete a Financial Evaluation
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19.
20.
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Sheet. This detailed the suspect's name, the Post Office branch and what they
had said about the loss; the form also recorded my opinion on the loss and any
financial details given by the suspect, including how they intended to repay any
monies. Although I had to complete the form for Scottish cases, it was recognised
that POL Financial Investigators did not have the authority to conduct a Financial
Investigation in Scotland.
In my CV at POL00105143 I also mentioned case submission timescales. All
cases had to be submitted within appropriate timescales. I can’t fully recall the
timescale, but I believe it may have been 12 days from the interview. I also
mentioned in my CV I was in the process of making up a crib sheet as a reminder
for the timescales, but I can’t recall if I completed this.
In my CV at POL00105143 I also mention the Post Office Risk Assessment
("PORA") form. I was also required to complete and submit a PORA prior to
interviews. I would contact the local police to ask if there were any concerns about
the area to be visited including the area the suspected resided. Warning signs, if
known, were to be captured along with a risk evaluation. This was then submitted
to my Line Manager.
In my performance review for 2013/14, at POL00105145, I refer (at pages 3 and
4) to some work I did to secure specialist legal advice for Scottish casework, when
Scottish cases were submitted to POL Legal Services for review. It was
recognised within POL Legal Services and the Security Team that they weren't
knowledgeable about Scots Law. I was concerned that I wasn’t receiving the
same legal support and I recall that I asked if Scottish solicitors could be sought
to assist and advise on whether there was sufficient evidence to submit a file to
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22.
23.
24.
25.
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COPFS. I was advised to identify a suitable firm, and after researching some
candidates I identified BTO LLP Solicitors. I believed they would be best suited
as they employed a number of former Procurators Fiscal and had an office in
Glasgow. I recall that I informed Jarnail Singh in POL Legal Services and I believe
he contacted them and made arrangements for them to advise me on Scottish
cases.
I dealt with Laura Irvine and Lindsay MacNeill at BTO, though mainly Laura. I
recall that I arranged training for them on Horizon (which I think took place at the
St Vincent Street Crown Office). I also made them aware of the Second Sight
report, I either sent a copy or a link to the report. I mentioned on the document at
POL00105145 that I advised BTO and the COPFS on cases at the time and
archived cases in relation to the Second Sight review and cases where Horizon
issues were raised, but I can’t recall which cases.
In 2013 I also arranged for Laura Irvine and Lindsay MacNeill to provide
Courtroom Awareness training for the auditors in Scotland (the document at
POL00139816 is a copy of the presentation they gave). I and my colleague, Mike
Stanway, Investigation Manager, also gave a presentation.
I also mentioned on the document at POL00105145 that I had reviewed the layout
of the report I submitted to the COPFS to bring it into line with the Police. I exhibit
the amended versions of the forms at POL00118102 and POL00118103 to my
statement as WITN08940101.
I believe that from 2006 all reports all non-Police authorities were required to be
submitted to the COPFS electronically. This was to be through the COPFS
Specialist Reporting Agency (SRA) website. I attended training at the Procurator
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Fiscal office in Glasgow. When my colleague Mike Stanway joined the team in
2011, I arranged for him to attend a training session at the same office. Mike was
based in England, but he was partnered with my myself to assist in Scottish
cases.
26. Paragraph 3 of the Request asks me to describe my role in relation to disciplinary
matters, interviewing suspects, disclosure, litigation case strategy and liaising
with other POL departments regarding the progress of cases.
27. Regarding disciplinary matters, the only relevant role that I can recall is that I
would submit a disciplinary report to the relevant Contracts Manager following a
suspect interview, if this was required.
28. Regarding suspect interviews, I both led in interviews and sat in interviews as a
second officer.
29. Regarding disclosure, my role involved disclosing information to solicitors
representing suspects prior to an interview. As part of the prosecution process in
England I would be required to complete the documents of the type at
POL00051526 and POL00051527, and other disclosure forms. These forms are
not required in Scotland.
30. I was not involved in any litigation case strategy.
31. Regarding liaising with other POL departments, in my role I liaised mainly with
Contract Managers, the Former Agent Debt team and Cash Management. I can’t
recall if I liaised with any other departments.
The Security Team’s role in relation to criminal investigations and prosecutions
32. Paragraph 4 of the Request draws my attention to a series of policies and
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33.
34.
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procedures, and paragraph 5 asks me to explain the organisational structure of
the Security Team, my role in the development and/or management of any of
these policies and procedures and to explain the legislation, policies and/or
guidance that covered the conduct of investigations.
There have been a lot of changes in personnel and teams over the period I have
worked in the Security Team, and the account I have given here is to the best of
my knowledge. When I joined there was a Head of Security and Investigations
who oversaw the following:
33.1. The Investigation Team, with a Head of Investigations whose team dealt
solely with investigations.
33.1. The Security Team, who visited branches to advise on the physical
security (e.g. safes, alarms, screens etc.).
33.2. The Physical Security Team who dealt with updating and the purchase of
new equipment (e.g. safes, alarms, screens etc.).
33.3. The Casework Team, dealing with investigation case files.
In 2008, there was a restructure. The post of Senior Security Manager was
introduced, and they reported to the Head of Security. The Senior Security
Manager oversaw the following:
34.1. The Commercial Team, though I can’t recall their responsibilities.
34.2. The Physical Team, whose role was to visit branches to advise on the
physical security in branches.
34.3. The Risk Team, who I believe dealt with Risk Management issues.
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35.
36.
37.
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34.4. The Assets Team, whose role was to update and purchase new security
equipment.
34.5. The Fraud Team, who undertook investigations.
34.6. The Casework Team, who were responsible for the administration of
investigation case files.
In 2011 Investigation Managers also took on the role that had been carried out
by the Physical Team, along with their investigations role.
There was a further restructure in 2014/2015. A number of new teams were
created, and the heads of those teams reported to the Head of Security.
36.1. The Financial Crime Team, whose remit included money laundering
reporting and suspicious activity reports.
36.2. The Crime Risk Team, whose remit included risk management and, Crime
Risk models.
36.3. The Physical Security Team, responsible for physical assets (e.g. safes,
alarms, screens etc.).
36.4. The Security Operations Team, responsible for security and investigations.
36.5. The Post Office Security Team and Intel team, who shared the same
personnel and acted as a point of contact for Law Enforcement, dealing
with robbery and burglary reports and ARQ requests.
In 2019 the team was streamlined. The Head of Security post had two direct
reports, as follows:
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38.
39.
40.
41.
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37.1. The Security Intelligence and Strategy Manager, responsible for the Post
Office Security/Intel team.
37.2. The Security Operations Team Manager, who oversaw the Security
Managers.
Paragraph 6 of the Request asks me to explain my role (if any) in the development
and/or management of any of the policies listed in paragraph 4. To the best of my
recollection, I was not involved in the development and/or management of the of
any of these policies. (I refer later in my statement to the involvement I had in the
development of the Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy for the Crown Office
Network.)
Paragraph 7 of the Request asks me about the legislation, policies and/or
guidance which governed the conduct of investigations by the Security Team
during the period I worked within it and how these changed.
I am aware that there were several policies governing the conduct of
investigations and that these were updated and sent to me over the period I
worked within the Security Team. I would have read these, but I cannot recall the
changes or when the documents were sent to me.
Paragraph 8 of the Request draws my attention to a series of documents and
asks me to describe what, if any, impact there was on the conduct of
investigations as a result of the separation of the Post Office from Royal Mail.
My recollection is that there was no change to the conduct of investigations
following the separation from Royal Mail. If there was a need for a joint
investigation, there was a process to be followed, as set out in the document at
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43.
44.
45.
46.
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POL00123312 (the Memorandum of Understanding between POL and Royal Mail
on Joint Investigation Protocols).
Paragraph 9 of the Request asks me about the process for dealing with
complaints about the conduct of an investigation by the Security Team. I don’t
recall having a complaint made against my conduct during an investigation by the
Security Team. I’m unaware what the process would have been if a complaint
was made.
Paragraph 10 of the Request asks me what (if any) supervision there was over
criminal investigations conducted by the Security Team. Each month I was sent
a "Cases on Hana" file listing all my cases. I had to provide updates on each
case. If no update could be provided, you had to give a reason why.
Paragraph 11 of the Request asks me how Post Office policy and practice
regarding the investigation and prosecution of Crown Office employees differed
from the policy and practice regarding investigation and prosecution of
subpostmasters ("SPMs"), their managers and assistants and if this changed
during my time in the Security Team. I was aware of no such difference.
Paragraph 12 of the Request asks me to consider the document at POL00129339
(a "Project Initiation Document" for a project called "Security Compliance and
Safety" and dated 27 February 2013) and I am asked about the purpose of the
project outlined in the document and my involvement in the project.
I am named as one of the members of the "Working Group" at section 3 of the
document. The purpose of the project, as I recall, was to maintain the integrity of
the Supply Chain sites and the safety of people and assets. My involvement was
to manage the undertaking of the Operation Stripe Testing and Premises Attack
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48.
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Plans tests set out in the project for the Security Team North.
Paragraph 13 asks me to consider the email at document at POL00123863 (an
email to me from Sharron Logan, Security Risk Programme Manager, dated 23
February 2016) and the document at POL00088124 (the "Mandatory Losses &
Gains Policy for the Crown Office Network", version 1.0 dated 24 April 2013), and
asks me to describe the circumstances in which I received this email and the
nature of any involvement I had in reviewing this policy.
I led the Directly Managed Branch ("DMB") programme (formerly the Crown
Office programme) around this time. The DMB programme involved each
Security Manager visiting an agreed number of branches in their area during the
financial year, usually at least one per month. They completed an electronic
toolkit and uploaded it to the programme's Sharepoint site. The toolkit covered
topics on cash management, losses and gains, security procedures and physical
security. Having considered the email at POL00123863, I can recall reviewing the
document at POL00088125 (a draft version of the Mandatory Losses & Gains
Policy) and I recall suggesting amendments to it, mainly:
49.1. The reference to "Multiple Stock Units" at section 3, paragraph 5.b. I made
the suggestion that units should be checked every eight weeks, which is
what ended up being written into the final policy (at section 4, paragraph
7b.).
49.2. The reference to "Snap Checks" at section 4, paragraph 7.a. I also made
the suggestion that these should be carried out every eight weeks, which
is what ended up being written into the final policy (at section 5, paragraph
9.a.)
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50. I did recommend other amendments, but these did not make it into the final
document POL00088124. I have located a version of the document at
POL00088125 which shows the amendments that I suggested (marked in red)
and which I recall returning to Sharron Logan. I exhibit this document to my
statement as WITN08940102.
Audit and investigation
51. Paragraph 14 of the Request draws my attention to the document at
POL00104821 (“Condensed Guide for Audit Attendance”, version 2 dated
October 2008) and asks me to describe the circumstances in which an
investigator would attend an audit of a branch and what an investigator's role
was.
52. I have reviewed the document and believe that it is a document intended for the
use of auditors, not investigators. The circumstances in which I would attend an
audit of a branch as an investigator would be if the Fraud Analysis team identified
an issue at a branch: for example, excess overnight cash holdings or supressed
banking deposits. I might also be instructed to attend if the audit team on site
identified a large discrepancy. My role on arrival was to discuss with the auditors
their findings and gather any paperwork that would assist with a potential
investigation.
53. Paragraph 15 of the Request asks me about who decided, if a shortfall was
identified, whether an investigation into criminal activity should be conducted or
if the case should be pursued as a debt recovery case, and the triggers/criteria
for raising a fraud case.
54. The decision on whether an investigation would be pursued or not was, I believe,
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made by Senior Management or Line Management within the Security Team. I
am not aware of any local contract managers having any input in the decision
making. Over the time I have worked in the Security Team, there were triggers
for raising cases and they changed multiple times over the years. I can’t recall all
the levels at which triggers had been set, but I believe they ranged from £1,000
to £50,000.
The process followed by Security Team investigators when conducting a
criminal investigation following the identification of a shortfall at an audit
55. Paragraph 16 of the Request asks, once a decision had been made to conduct a
criminal investigation, what process the Security Team investigators followed in
conducting their initial investigation.
56. On receipt of the Case Raised form, I would consider the enquiry. If it related to
a Sub Post Office, I would contact POL Human Resources to request the
postmaster’s print-out and P356 assistant list, which included all Horizon User
IDs. If it related to a Crown Office, I would ask for the employee printout. If the
information in the Case Raised form related to an audit shortage, if the
information had not already been provided, I would contact the lead auditor and
request the relevant reports from Horizon, Office Balance, Stock Unit(s)
balance(s) and snapshot(s) for any stock units, Cash Declarations, User IDs and
any relevant forms.
57. Ifasuspect was identified, they would be contacted and invited to interview. They
would be made aware of their right to a solicitor and their right to have a friend to
be present at the interview (we would send the forms POL001(S) "Legal Rights
Scotland" form and POLO03 "Friend" form). Latterly I also told suspects that, if
they were a member of the NFSP, they could contact their local rep for advice.
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58. Once an interview had been conducted, the relevant paperwork was completed
(for example the Suspect Offender report and Financial Investigation form) any
further lines of enquiry made, any statements taken, then a report would be
submitted for a decision to be made to prosecute or not.
59. In answering this question, I have considered the documents at POL00031005,
POL00027863 and POL00030902, being the most recent versions of the
“Conduct of Criminal Investigations Policy” (dated 2013, 2014 and 2018
respectively). I note the flowchart set out in the policies, which would have been
the process to follow for a case in England. For Scottish cases, the process in
the flowchart at page 3 of documents POL00031005 and POL00027863 would
have been followed up to “Criminal Law Team to review the case file. Proceed
with case?". I don’t recall Cartwright King being involved in the process for
Scottish cases; I believe they were returned to me with a decision from POL's
Criminal Law team. If the decision was to proceed to prosecution, I would then
submit the file to the COPFS. If the decision was not to proceed, that case would
be closed. This was the process that was in place before we engaged BTO.
Decisions about prosecution and criminal enforcement proceedings
60. Paragraph 17 of the Request asks, once an initial investigation was carried out,
who decided whether a SPM, their manager(s) and / or assistant(s) or a Post
Office employee should be prosecuted and what considerations determined
whether a prosecution was brought; I am also asked about whether this changed
during my time the Security Team.
61. In England and Wales, I believe POL's Criminal/Legal team would be responsible
for the decision on whether a Post Office employee, SPM, their managers or
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62.
63.
64.
65.
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assistants would be prosecuted by POL. I believe their decision would have been
informed by the evidence detailed in the report.
In Scotland, only COPFS can bring prosecutions. A report would be submitted to
them and, if they were requested, all productions (exhibits) were provided.
Paragraph 18 of the Request asks, if a branch was run by a SPM, whether the
SPM'’s local contract manager had any input into this decision-making process
and if this changed during my time the Security Team. I am not aware of local
Contract Managers having any input to the decision making during my role in the
Security Team.
Paragraph 19 of the Request asks me about the test applied by those making
prosecution and charging decisions and the factors which were considered at the
evidential and the public interest stage. I’m not aware what test was applied in
the decision making or what factors were considered at the evidential and the
public interest stage. I played no role in the decision-making, and would expect
the Criminal Law team to decide in England and the COPFS in Scotland.
Paragraph 20 of the Request asks what legal and other advice was provided to
those making prosecution decisions. I am not aware what advice legal or
otherwise was provided to those making decisions about whether to prosecute
and what charges to bring.
Paragraph 21 of the Request asks in what circumstances steps were to restrain
a suspect's assets by criminal enforcement methods. Following an interview, I
completed a Financial Evaluation Sheet with the financial details provided by the
interviewee. These were submitted with my report. These would be passed to a
Financial Investigator to action if necessary. POL Financial Investigators didn’t
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have the authority to restrain a suspect's assets in Scotland. I believe Police
Scotland have Financial Investigators, but I’m not aware of their powers. When I
submitted a case through the COPFS Specialist Reporting Agency website, I was
asked if compensation was sought. This didn’t guarantee compensation would
be granted; that decision was ultimately for the court.
67. Paragraph 22 of the Request asks who decided whether criminal enforcement
proceedings should be pursued and the factors they considered when making
decisions. I'm not aware if it was the Financial Investigators or senior
management who decided if enforcement proceedings should be pursued or the
factors considered.
Training, instructions and guidance to investigators within the Security Team
68. Paragraph 23 of the request asks what instructions, guidance and / or training
were given to investigators within the Security Team on a range of topics and
how was this provided.
69. Regarding training in interviewing suspects, I recall this was covered in my initial
training when I joined the Security Team in 2005. We were taught interview
techniques and how to ask questions. There were role play exercises, with the
trainers taking on the roles of suspects; we were given a scenario and tasked
with interviewing a suspect.
70. Regarding taking witness statements, I recall that this was also covered in my
initial training. We were given scenarios and had to practice taking statements
from the trainers and fellow attendees.
71. Regarding conducting searches, I recall that as part of my initial training that I
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72.
73.
74.
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have described above, we were taken to a house in the Police College near
London. I assisted in conducting a search, looking for items that had been pre-
placed in the property. We were also trained on how to compete the necessary
forms.
Regarding the investigator's duties in carrying out investigations, I recall during
the initial training that we were taught to ensure all evidence is obtained, lines of
enquiries are completed, mitigating circumstances are considered and
investigated, and interviews are conducted within guidelines. All activities taken
were to be recorded on the Event Log.
Regarding obtaining evidence in the course of an investigation, also during initial
training we were taught that the investigator must obtain all original documents
(for example, in the event of an audit shortage, audit cash sheets, Horizon reports
printed at the time of the audit, Branch Trading Statements and Horizon reports
produced by the branch).
The initial training also taught us about obtaining evidence from third parties who
might hold relevant evidence. For example, banks statements, if it was suspected
a shortfall was due to the monies being deposited into a suspect’s bank account
using Horizon. Also, ARQ requests to Fujitsu in order to obtain Horizon data in
various cases (for example, to investigate deposits into bank accounts in Post
Office Card Account cases involving a vulnerable person duped into making
multiple withdrawals).
Regarding an investigator's disclosure obligations, the initial training taught us
that, in England, it is the duty of the investigator provide a record of all information
obtained and to disclose all relevant information to the prosecution and defence.
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76.
77.
78.
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I learned on taking up my role in Scotland that it is the duty of the investigator to
do the same as in England, with the exception information is provided to the
COPFS. The COPFS considers whether the information meets the disclosure test
before disclosing the information. I attended some training on disclosure provided
by, and have located a copy of the presentation that was given which I exhibit to
my statement as POL00129134.
Regarding drafting investigation reports, the initial training taught us that the
Offender report must contain a "preamble", for example, in the case of an audit
shortage, the details of the audit, the suspect interview (including evidence put to
the suspect), exhibits/productions, details of witness statements, any
denials/admissions made, any follow up enquiries and a summary of the
evidence.
Paragraph 24 of the Request draws my attention to the document at
POL00121680 (an email from Andrew Daley dated 6 September 2010 that was
sent to me and a number of others, together with its attachments at
POL00104837, POL00104848, POL00064059 and POL00124232) and I am
asked where I was based when I received this email, whether this was the first
time I had been sent these materials and if any presentation about them was
given.
The documents relate to some procedures and standards that had been
developed in relation to committal papers. At the time I received the email at
document POL00121680 I was based in Scotland. I can’t recall exactly when I
received the materials, but it is my belief that this would have been the first
occasion on which I saw them. I can’t recall receiving the presentation that is
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79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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referred to in the email.
Paragraph 25 of the Request asks me to consider the document at POL00129144
(an email from Roslyn Simpson dated 5 October 2010 and the attachment at
document POL00129145) and I am asked to explain the circumstances in which
I was due to attend the "Specialist Reporting Agencies — Disclosure Course"
referred to in these documents, whether I attended it and whether I was based in
Scotland at the time.
I believe I was asked to attend the training as I was the investigation manager
covering Scotland (being based in Scotland at that time). I recall that I did attend
on 20 October 2010.
Paragraph 26 of the Request draws my attention to a series of documents relating
to casework management and paragraph 27 asks me a series of questions about
them.
I don’t recall being provided with the 2000 and 2002 versions of the Casework
Management document at POL00104747 and POL00104777 during my time in
the Security Team. I cannot therefore say what I might have understood the
instructions / guidance given in second, third and fourth bullet points on page 2
of the 2000 version and the first, second and third bullet points on page 2 of the
2002 version to mean. Had I considered them at the time, I don’t think I would
have considered them to be relevant to disclosure obligations in relation to
information about Horizon bugs, errors and defects, as I wasn’t aware of any
bugs, errors or defects until I became aware of the Second Sight report.
To the best of my recollection, the compliance checks referred to in David
Posnett's email of 23 May 2011 at POL00118096 had been introduced prior to
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2011 to apply a consistent approach in investigations and the submission of the
"green jackets". ("Green jacket" refers to a folder which, on the outside, displays
the case file number, the type of enquiry and the branch name. It also displays
the date you received the file, who you send it to, the date sent etc. The jacket
contains all the forms relevant to the case, information, reports, with Appendix
folders for witness statements (Appendix A), evidence (Appendix B) and
correspondence (Appendix C).) I can’t recall exactly when they were introduced
or if there were any inconsistencies in investigations or green jacket submissions
prior to the compliance checks being introduced. The checks I believe were
conducted by the Casework Managers.
84. I had no role in relation to the development, management or amendment of the
suite of compliance documents attached to David Posnett's email.
85. I have been asked to set out what I understood by paragraph 2.15 of the
document at POL00118101 ("Guide to the Preparation and Layout of
Investigation Red Label Case Files — Offender reports & Discipline reports”), how
this related to the document at POL00118102 (Offender Report template), and
its relevance to the Post Office’s disclosure obligations (and in particular as they
related to information about Horizon bugs, errors and defects).
86. I don’t exactly recall the document at POL00118101, but I do recall that there
were requirements which governed the preparation and layout of case files. My
understanding of paragraph 2.15 of the document at POL00118101 is that any
failures in "security, supervision, procedures and product integrity" identified that
led to a crime being committed were to be included in the Offender report.
87. I have considered the document at POL00118104 (titled “Identification Codes”
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and attached to David Posnett’s email of 23 May 2011). I don't recall ever having
seen this document. I do not know who drafted the document. I find the
descriptions attached to the codes to be disgusting and racist. As to why Security
Team investigators were instructed to assign identification codes to suspected
offenders, my understanding is that identification codes were already in place
when I started as an investigation manager. I took them as being a standard entry
of the Offender and Discipline reports. I have some recollection that I had a file,
possibly an Excel file, which described IC codes 1 to 4, but I cannot now locate
this. I do know that it didn’t resemble the document at POL00118104. In my
experience, the only codes I recall every having to use regularly were IC1 and
IC4.
Analysing Horizon data, requesting ARQ data from Fujitsu and relationship with
Fujitsu
88. Paragraph 28 of the Request asks what analysis (if any) was done by Security
Team investigators of Horizon data when a SPM / SPM’s manager(s) or
assistant(s) / Crown Office employee(s) attributed a shortfall to problems with
Horizon. If a shortfall was claimed to be attributed to Horizon, I cannot recall if
data and a statement was requested from Fujitsu or only a statement. I didn’t
carry out analysis on the Horizon system, this was conducted by Fujitsu.
89. Paragraph 29 of the Request asks ARQ data requested from Fujitsu as a matter
of course when a shortfall had been identified and the relevant SPM / SPM’s
manager(s) or assistant(s) / Crown Office employee(s) attributed the shortfall to
problems with Horizon. ARQ data was not requested from Fujitsu as a matter of
course. It would only have been requested if it was relevant to an enquiry.
90. Paragraph 30 of the Request asks whether ARQ data, when it was obtained from
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91.
92.
93.
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Fujitsu, was provided to the SPM in question as a matter of course. I don’t recall
the data ever being provided to the SPM.
Paragraph 31 of the Request asks me to consider the documents at
FUJ00225725 (email correspondence between July and September 2010
relating to a request I made for ARQ data for Bridgeton Post Office) and
FUJ00226055 (emails between Cartwright King solicitors and Gareth Jenkins of
Fujitsu, 28 November 2012) and I am asked to describe the circumstances in
which I would have contact with Fujitsu when I worked within the Security Team
and the relevant contacts at Fujitsu.
Initial contact with Fujitsu was made through our Security Team. On reviewing
the document at FUJ00225725 I can see that my initial request was made to
"Post Office Security". I was not in direct contact with either Penny Thomas or
Gareth Jenkins. I would only contact Fujitsu if it was specifically required for case.
The documents at FUJ00156984, FUJ00156985, FUJ00156994, FUJ00156998
and FUJ00157004 show some emails that I exchanged with Andy Dunks, who
worked in Security Operations within Fujitsu, during 2017-2018. I contacted Andy
Dunks directly as I had been copied in on correspondence with him and therefore
had his contact details.
Paragraph 32 of the Request asks what role I understood Gareth Jenkins to have
relation to the criminal prosecutions he was involved in. I recall Gareth Jenkins’
name, and note that he was sent an email in November 2012 (document
FUJ00226055) which refers to him providing a report in a case in 2012 in which
I was to be a witness. Other than that I don’t recall any involvement he had in
relation to criminal prosecutions.
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94. Paragraph 33 of the Request asks me to what extent did I considered Gareth
Jenkins to be acting as an expert witness, my understanding of the rules
governing independent expert evidence and who provided advice or assistance
to me in this in this regard. Other than what I described in paragraph 93 above, I
don't recall Gareth Jenkins’ involvement in relation to criminal prosecutions. Other
than those cases where Fujitsu staff were asked to provide witness statements,
I don’t recall having to request an expert witness in any of my cases.
Relationship with others
95. Paragraph 34 of the Request asks me to describe my involvement with Cartwright
King Solicitors, including the level of interaction that I typically had in a case (and
the roles I had) and my contacts. Personally, I had very little interaction with
Cartwright King Solicitors, as my involvement was mainly with Scottish cases. I
do remember a meeting with Cartwright King Solicitors regarding the case
mentioned in the document at FUJ00226055. As I recall, the case related to a
shortage at Winlaton Post Office, in north-east England, and I was the lead
investigator. I recall that the meeting was with Rachel Panter and another person
who may have been Martin Smith. I can’t recall the details of the meeting or what
was discussed.
Involvement in the Criminal Case Studies
Prosecution of Peter Holmes
96. Paragraph 35 of the Request asks me to provide a full account of my involvement
in and my recollection of the criminal prosecution of Peter Holmes and I am asked
to consider the documents referred to in Paragraph 36.
97. Paragraph 37 of the Request asks me how and when I first become involved in
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98.
99.
100.
101.
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this case. I can’t recall exactly how I first became involved, but I expect I would
have been contacted by my Line Manager at the time and informed that I would
be leading the case, with Chris Knight as the second officer.
Paragraph 38 of the Request asks me if I was aware of any allegations made by
Peter Holmes relating to the reliability of the Horizon IT system and, if so, what I
thought the significance of this was. Mr Holmes indicated during interview that
the loss may be down to the Horizon system. At the time, I don't believe I would
have been aware of the significance of this, as I don’t recall being aware of any
issues with Horizon at the time. Mr Holmes said he couldn't explain the losses,
and didn’t believe anyone else in the office had stolen any money.
Paragraph 39 of the Request asks me about my role in relation to the audit of
Jesmond Branch undertaken on 18 September 2008. I was not involved in the
decision to conduct an audit at Jesmond Post Office and I don’t recall why the
audit was undertaken. I believe I was emailed the audit report on 18 September
2008; I believe this to be the case because I would have had to have had the
report before I travelled down to Newcastle on 19 September. It would have been
provided by Mike Webb, Lead Auditor, or the Casework team.
Paragraph 40 of the Request asks me to explain how the search at Jesmond Post
Office was conducted and my role, if any, in that search. I can’t now recall
conducting a search at Jesmond Post Office.
Paragraph 41 of the Request asks me about the decision to search Mr Holmes’
home on 19 September 2008 and the conduct of the search. The decision to carry
out a search followed POL policy: we were instructed to conduct searches to
preserve any evidence. I can’t recall how we conducted the search, but looking
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at the document at POL00060805, I can see that I was accompanied by Chris
Knight and Mark Haddrell. We would have searched one room at a time, with Mr
Holmes being present. Looking at page 7 of the document at POL00060805, I
can see that I recorded the first item, found by myself. After this, I can see that all
other items found were recorded against Chris Knight and Mark Haddrell, which
suggests they continued the search.
102. Paragraph 42 of the Request asks me whose decision was it to interview Mr
Holmes. Again, decision the decision to interview Mr Holmes followed policy. As
an investigator, I was expected to interview a suspect as part of an enquiry.
103. Paragraph 43 of the Request asks what my view was of Mr Holmes’ assertion in
his interview (at page 8 of the document at POL00050208) that the only way he
could explain the losses were “it’s the Horizon that’s let us down”. My view was
that Mr Holmes’ assertion needed following up. I can see that there was a request
made for the ARQ data (as I discuss elsewhere in my statement) but I can't recall
if a request for a witness statement from Fujitsu was made. I can’t remember now
what my view would have been about Mr Holmes’ assertion about Horizon.
104. Paragraph 44 of the Request asks me to consider my investigation reports at
documents POL00050334 and POLO0050832. In particular, my report at
POL00050334 refers to a request being made to ascertain whether Horizon
equipment at the Jesmond Branch was faulty. I note that at POL00050832, at
page 7, my report says that checks had revealed no problems with Horizon. I
cannot recall what checks were carried out in relation to Horizon at the branch,
who carried out the checks or what the results where. I’ve considered all the
documents and can’t find anything in relation to the request or the results of the
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checks.
105. Paragraph 45 of the Request asks me to consider the document at POL00050255
(the Suspect Offender Reporting form) which advises that Mr Holmes was
suspended on the authority of Brian Trotter, and asks what input, if any, I had in
the decision. I had no input into the decision to suspend Mr Holmes.
106. Paragraph 46 of the Request has asked me to consider the witness statements
of Thelma Crerand (Assistant Manager, Jesmond Post Office) (POL00047293),
Vicky Mitchell (Post Office Assistance, Jesmond Post Office) (POL00047294),
Doreen Corcoran (Counter Clerk, Jesmond Post Office) (POLO0051515) and
Jenera Begum (Counter Clerk, Jesmond Post Office) (POL00043887) and about
my role in relation to obtaining these statements. I can’t recall who decided that
each of the individuals should provide a witness statement or at what stage in the
investigation was it decided that they should provide witness statements.
107. My role in taking witness statements involved asking each of the witnesses
questions, and I captured their answers/comments on the statement. I don't recall
giving the witnesses any information prior to them giving their statements, in this
case or indeed in any other case. I asked all the witnesses if they were aware of
any problems with Horizon and all said they weren't aware of any problems.
108. Paragraph 47 of the Request asks me to consider the financial evaluation sheet
completed for Mr Holmes at document POL00043951, the enquiries made to
Barclays bank at document POL00050821, the results of those enquiries at
document POL00060806 and the witness statement of Sunil Khanna in relation
to the salary paid to Mr Holmes, at document UKG100014640, and asks me about
the investigation into Mr Holmes' finances.
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109. I can’t recall what the investigation into Mr Holmes’ personal finances revealed. I
recall that I did obtain the statement from Sunil Khanna in relation to Mr Holmes’s
wages. I can’t recall the investigation or who I would have reported the results of
those investigations to. I’m not aware if the outcome of those investigations
factored into the decision whether there was sufficient evidence to charge Mr
Holmes.
110. Paragraph 48 of the Request refers me to the documents at POL00043951 (the
Financial Evaluation Sheet completed in this case) and POL00051984 (witness
statement of Laura Currie of the Alliance and Leicester dated 26 August 2009)
and asked me about the investigations into the finances of Mr Holmes’ wife’s
business. The only bank statement that I can recall obtaining related to Mr and
Mrs Holmes' joint account, I don't recall obtain statements relating to her business
account.
111. Paragraph 49 of the Request asks me to explain any further sources of
information I considered during the investigation. I can’t recall if any other sources
of information were considered during the investigation.
112. Paragraph 50 of the Request asks if any Horizon data (and in particular ARQ
logs) requested from Fujitsu in this case. I note that on page 2 of my investigation
report dated 6 October 2008 (POL00050334) I said that "Horizon data has been
requested". I do not believe I would have said this if it hadn’t been requested.
Similarly, page 6 of my investigation report dated 30 January 2009
(POL00050832) refers to Horizon data having been "received and analysed".
Again, I do not believe I would have said this if this hadn't been done. I note the
Court of Appeal's judgment in Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office Limited
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(POL00113278) which advised (at paragraph 229) that ARQ data was obtained
but that it was not clear if it was disclosed.
113. Paragraph 51 of the Request asks if I obtained legal advice at any stage of the
investigation. Having considered various documents referred to in the Request, I
can see that I corresponded with Juliet McFarlane, Principal Lawyer in the POL
Criminal Law Division, at various stages of the case. This would have been to
inform her of progress, seek advice on the next steps and discuss the expert
accountant's report.
114. Paragraph 52 of the Request asks what role, if any, I played in the decision to
prosecute Mr Holmes and refers to the documents at POL00050865 (memo from
Terry Crowther, Fraud Team, dated 4 February 2009) and POL00050912 (memo
from Juliet McFarlane, dated 16 February 2009).
115. I have also reviewed the reports I made at documents POL00050334 and
POL00050832. In both reports I said that I saw no reason why POL should not
proceed with prosecution. This was my view based on the evidence gathered.
The decision was not ultimately mine to take. The file would be submitted to the
DAM (I think this stood for "Decision Authority Manager") to decide whether POL
should proceed to prosecute or not. The file was then sent to Legal Services for
a legal/final decision.
116. Paragraph 53 of the Request refers me to the documents at POL00066227 (Juliet
McFarlane's attendance note of her call with me on 10 November 2009) and
POL00043846 (the Schedule of Charges) and asks what role, if any, I played in
deciding on and/or drafting the charge faced by Mr Holmes. I would have played
no part in drafting the charge faced by Mr Holmes at document at POL00043846.
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I don’t recall the actual conversation I had with Juliet McFarlane and recorded in
the document at POLO00066227 and whether it came before or after the drafted
charge.
117. Paragraph 54 of the Request asks me who was the disclosure officer in this case
and paragraph 55 asks me to explain my role in relation to disclosure. As the lead
investigator I would have been the disclosure officer. My role would have been to
ensure all appropriate material used and unused was disclosed to the prosecution
and defence.
118. Paragraph 56 of the Request asks me what role I played in preparing for the
prosecution and refers to the documents at POL00050940 and POL00050978
(letters I sent to Gosforth Magistrates Court in February and March 2009),
POL00051080 (a memo I sent to Juliet McFarlane on 9 March 2009),
POL00051205 (a memo Juliet McFarlane sent to the Fraud Team, and copied to
me, on 18 March 2009) and POL00066225 (Juliet McFarlane's attendance note
of her call with me on 13 August 2009).
119. My letters to the Magistrates Court were in connection with arranging a court date.
I obtained a summons and sent it to Mr Holmes. I then informed Juliet McFarlane
that the summons had been served by Royal Mail Special Delivery. Juliet
McFarlane then informed me of the prosecuting agent on behalf of POL.
Document POL00066225 states I held a discussion with Legal Services
regarding Mr Khanna’s statement and the documents mentioned in his statement.
I can’t recall the details of the conversation. I would also have prepared the
committal bundle, but as I was not so experienced in dealing with cases in the
English courts, I recall that I was provided with assistance to do this.
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120. Paragraph 57 of the Request asks me to consider the documents at
POL00052028 and POL00052037 (emails referencing a request I made for the
Event Logs for Jesmond Post Office in July 2009) and asks me to describe the
disclosure requests made by the defence and how these were responded to. The
request I made was, I believe, for the alarm logs for Jesmond Post Office. These
would have been disclosed to the defence.
121. Paragraph 58 of the Request asks what, if any, further enquiries I conducted after
receiving the defence expert report and about my response to the report. I recall
receiving the expert accountant’s report (at document POL00052103). I cannot
recall conducting further enquiries or what my response to the report, but having
considered document UKGI00014638 (an email I sent to Juliet McFarlane on 19
August 2009), I can see I that I was of the opinion that, without seeing the
business’ daily takings for the period in question, I couldn’t agree with the expert
accountant’s conclusions.
122. Paragraph 59 of the Request asks me to consider Mr Holmes’ defence statement,
dated 30 July 2009 (at document POL00052178 and POL00052193) and asks
me about my observations of the statement and my role in addressing the matters
raised in it. In particular, it asks me how I responded to Mr Holmes' statement that
“I do not believe that Royal Mail has conducted a thorough investigation and did
not consider any alternative in relation to the allegation”.
123. I do not recall receiving the defence statement but accept I would have received
it, as I am copied into the memo dated 5 August 2009 at POL00052193. I don't
recall what view, if any, I had about the contents of the defence statement.
124. Paragraph 60 of the Request asks me to consider the defence representations,
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dated 24 August 2009 (at POLO0052389) which were copied to me on 4
September 2009 (under cover of the document at POL00052391) and asks me
about my views on the representations and on the defence accountant’s findings.
I don’t recall receiving the defence representations. I note at document
POL00053521 that the daily takings records were obtained, but I don’t recall
viewing these.
125. Paragraph 61 of the Request refers to the document at POL00060822 (Juliet
McFarlane's memo of 25 September 2009 recording that the Crown rejected the
basis of plea of false accounting but not theft) and asks what role I had in deciding
to reject the basis of plea. I don’t recall having any input into the decision to reject
the basis of plea, or being aware of the rationale on which the decision was
based.
126. Paragraph 62 of the Request asks me to consider the further defence
representations dated 16 November 2009, at document POL00053521 and
copied to me on 24 November 2009 (under cover of the document at
POL00053598) and asks me about my response to these representations,
whether a conference with counsel was arranged and my role in that conference.
I can’t recall responding to the representations or if a conference with counsel
was arranged.
127. Paragraph 63 of the Request refers to the document at POL00053795
referencing that Mr Holmes pleaded guilty to a revised indictment on 22
December 2009, and asks what my views were about this at the time. I don’t
recall having any views on this at the time.
128. Paragraph 64 of the Request refers to the document at POL00054149 (a memo
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dated 17 February 2010 recording the sentence imposed on Mr Holmes) and
asks me what my response was. I don’t believe I made a response at the time.
129. Paragraph 65 of the Request refers to the documents at POL00054544 and
POL00054543 (containing emails exchanged in March 2010 regarding
enforcement proceedings) and POL00054790 (the Case Closure Reporting form
I sent on 23 May 2010) and asks me what criminal enforcement proceedings
were taken against Mr Holmes and about my involvement in these proceedings.
I believe consideration was given to recovering the money from Mr Holmes,
initially, but page 3 of the document at POL00054543 shows that POL resolved
to seek recovery from the SPM. My only involvement was to forward a debarment
notice regarding Mr Holmes, as I mention on the Case Closure Reporting form at
POL00054790.
130. Paragraph 66 of the Request asks me to describe any further involvement I had
in this case. Other than what I have described elsewhere in this statement, I don’t
recall any further involvement in the case.
131. Paragraph 67 asks me what my reflections are now on the way the investigation
and prosecution of Mr Holmes was conducted by the Post Office and the outcome
of the case, and my attention is drawn to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Josephine Hamilton & Others v Post Office Limited at document POL00113278.
132. I have considered the Court of Appeal judgment, and in particular paragraphs
226 to 230 relating to Mr Holmes. I noted the finding at paragraph 229 that ARQ
data was obtained but that it was not clear if it was disclosed. I acknowledge that
ARQ data was obtained, but cannot recall whether or not it was disclosed. If it
was not disclosed, I cannot now offer a reason why that was.
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Prosecutions in the Devolved Nations
133. Paragraph 68 of the Request draws my attention to a series of documents and
paragraph 69 asks me to describe how I became involved in the investigation and
prosecution of cases in the devolved nations, particularly Scotland. I was
recruited to the Security Team to work in Scotland as I based in Glasgow.
134. Paragraph 70 of the Request asked about my experience of the Scottish legal
system before I became involved in this work. I had no experience of the Scottish
Legal system prior to my role as a Security Manager.
135. Paragraph 71 of the Request asks me to describe the process by which cases
were investigated and prosecuted in Scotland, how the process in Scotland
differed from England and Wales and any ways in which the process in Scotland
changed during the time I was involved.
136. The conduct of investigations in Scotland was similar to England and Wales, the
key difference was in the prosecution of cases. As I have described elsewhere in
this statement, the prosecuting authority in Scotland is the COPFS. All cases,
whether they be Police or non-Police cases, have to be submitted to the COPFS,
who then decide whether to proceed to prosecution or not. In around 2006, it
became a requirement that non-Police authorities had to report cases through
the COPFS Specialist Reporting Agency website. On inputting a case, you had
to input a charge to proceed to submission.
137. The process also differed in that in Scotland corroboration of evidence is required;
you need to have two separate sources of evidence. For example, if a person
transacts a deposit into their bank account using Horizon without putting the
money in the drawer, the two sources of evidence could be drawn from the
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Horizon data, bank statements, CCTV, or witness evidence.
138. Another difference was that prior to 2010, a suspect didn’t have a right to a
solicitor. This changed in 2010 with the Supreme Court decision in Cadder v HM
Advocate. From 2010, anyone being interviewed under caution had to be offered
a solicitor to be present. The email exchanges documented at POL00121659 are
referring to the procedural changes which would be required following this
decision.
139. Another difference is that, in England, we are only required to summarise the tape
transcripts from an interview, while in Scotland we are required to type out the full
tape transcripts from an interview.
140. Paragraph 72 of the Request asks me to provide details of the individuals I
worked with on cases in Scotland. Those that I can recall were Raymond Grant
and Shirley Stockdale, who were based in Scotland along with Judith Trotter,
Tony Robertson, Diane Matthews, Steve Bradshaw, Mike Stanway, Andrew
Wise, Kevin Ryan and Suzanne Winter.
141. Paragraph 73 of the Request asks me to describe any difficulties I encountered
while working on cases in Scotland. I can’t recall any particular difficulties.
142. Paragraph 74 of the Request refers me to the email chain dated 12 August 2013
at document POL00139853 and asks me to explain the circumstances in which I
was approached by the Crown for comment on prosecution cases; about any
discussions I had with John Scott, Jarnail Singh or any other individual in the Post
Office about this request; and who made the decision that I would not provide a
statement and the reasons for this decision.
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143. I can’t recall the circumstances in which I was approached by the Crown or any
discussions with John Scott or Jarnail Singh. It may be that the only contact I had
with John Scott or Jarnail Singh was by email, but I can't now be certain about
that. It seems to me likely that the decision that I would not provide a statement
would have been one for John Scott and/or Jarnail Singh, and I suspect the
reason for the decision was possibly that I was not qualified (legally or otherwise)
to provide such a statement, but I can't be certain about this.
General
144. Paragraph 75 of the Request refers me to the documents at POL00124103 and
POL00124105 (email correspondence in December 2017 referring to the
outcome of a meeting about prosecution) and asked me to describe the
circumstances in which I received the email and my understanding of the
approach of the Post Office to “testing a case in the criminal court prior to the civil
hearing”. I can’t recall the exact circumstances in which I received the email, I
expect it was sent in order to update the Security Team on the business’ position
on prosecutions. I vaguely recall discussions on a test case but not the reasons
behind it.
145. Paragraph 76 of the Request asked me to what extent (if any) I considered a
challenge to the integrity of Horizon in one case to be relevant to other ongoing
or future cases. I didn’t consider any challenge to any one case being relevant to
other ongoing cases or future cases. I recall that when I attended team meetings,
the updates we were given were that a Subject Matter Expert would be coming
“on board” and that the Horizon system was robust with no integrity issues.
146. There are no other matters that I consider are of relevance to the Inquiry's terms
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of reference that I would like to draw to the attention of the Chair.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
07 Nov 2023
Dated:
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Index to First Witness Statement of Robert Daily
URN
Document Description
Control Numbers
POL00105143
Curriculum Vitae — Robert Daily,
undated
POL-0080769
POL00129121
"Robert Daily - Investigation
manager -— Northern Team
(Glasgow)", undated
POL-0135052
POL00105145
2013/14 Year End Performance
and Development Review
POL-0080770
POL00139816
Auditor Training delivered by BTO
LLP Solicitors, 9 December 2013
POL-0140992
POL00118102
POL Template Offender Report
VIS00012692
POL00118103
POL Template Offender Report
POL-0134173
WITN08940101
POL Template Offender Report by
Robert Daily
WITN08940101
POL00051526
R v Peter Holmes, Schedule of
Sensitive Material completed 19
May 2009
POL-0048005
POL00051527
R v Peter Holmes, Schedule of
Non-Sensitive Unused Material
completed 19 May 2009
POL-0048006
10.
POL00123312
Memorandum of Understanding
between POL and Royal Mail on
Joint Investigation Protocols,
undated
POL-0129511
11.
POL00129339
Project Initiation Document for
"Security Compliance and Safety"
project, dated 27 February 2013
POL-0135224
12.
POL00123863
Email from Sharron’ Logan,
Security Risk Programme
Manager, 23 February 2016
POL-0130046
13.
POL00088124
"Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy
for the Crown Office Network",
version 1.0 dated 24 April 2013
POL-0085182
14.
POL00088125
Draft version of "Mandatory
Losses & Gains Policy for the
Crown Office Network"
POL-0085183
15.
WITN08940102
POL Mandatory Losses & Gains
Policy - Crown Office Network -
with Robert Daily amendments.
WITN08940102
16.
POL00104821
“Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance”, version 2 dated
October 2008
POL-0080453
17.
POL00031005
“Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy”, version 0.2
dated 29 August 2013
POL-0027487
18.
POL00027863
“Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy”, version 0.3
POL-0024504
Page 40 of 44
WITNO08940100
WITN08940100
revised 10 February 2014
19.
POL00030902
“Conduct of Criminal
Investigations Policy”, version 2.1
dated 4 September 2018
POL-0027384
20.
POL00129134
Presentation by Scottish
Prosecution College: "Disclosure",
Kirsty McGowan, Policy Division,
Crown Office, undated
POL-0135064
21.
POL00121680
Email from Andrew Daley, 6
September 2010
POL-0127942
22.
POL00104837
Attachment to email from Andrew
Daley dated 6 September 2010
POL-0080469
23.
POL00104848
Attachment to email from Andrew
Daley dated 6 September 2010
POL-0080480
24.
POL00064059
Attachment to email from Andrew
Daley dated 6 September 2010
POL-0060538
25.
POL00124232
Attachment to email from Andrew
Daley dated 6 September 2010
POL-0127633
26.
POL00129144
Email from Roslyn Simpson, 5
October 2010
POL-0134939
27.
POL00129145
"Specialist Reporting Agencies —
Disclosure Module Joining
Instructions", 20 October 2010
POL-0134940
28.
POL00104747
"Investigation Policy - Casework
Management", version 1.0, March
2000
POL-0080387
29.
POL00104777
"Investigation Policy - Casework
Management", version 4.0,
October 2002
POL-0080417
30.
POL00118096
Email from David Posnett dated
23 May 2011
VIS00012685
31.
POL00118101
"Guide to the Preparation and
Layout of Investigation Red Label
Case Files — Offender reports &
Discipline reports”, undated
VIS00012690
32.
POL00118102
Offender Report template,
undated
VIS00012691
33.
POL00118104
“Identification Codes”, undated
VIS00012693
34.
FUJ00225725
Email correspondence July and
September 2010 re ARQ data for
Bridgeton Post Office
POINQ023184F
35.
FUJ00226055
Emails between Cartwright King
solicitors and Gareth Jenkins, 28
November 2012
POINQ0232172F
36.
FUJ00156984
Email correspondence March-
May 2017 "RE: ARQ request
Craigton — POLTD/1617/0023"
POINQ0163179F
37.
FUJ00156985
Email correspondence May 2017
"RE: Witness statement"
POINQ0163180F
Page 41 of 44
WITNO08940100
WITN08940100
38.
FUJ00156994
Email correspondence March-
May 2018 "FW: ARQ request
Craigton — POLTD/1617/0023"
POINQ163189F
39.
FUJ00156998
Email correspondence March-
May 2018 "FW: ARQ request
Craigton — POLTD/1617/0023 —-
Project Bramble - Legally
Privileged and Confidential"
POINQ163193F
40.
FUJ00157004
Email correspondence March-
June 2018 "RE: ARQ request
Craigton — POLTD/1617/0023"
POINQ163199F
41.
POLO0060805
Audit report, 18 September 2008
POL-0057284
42.
POL00050208
Record of Tape Recorded
Interview, 19 September 2008
POL-0046734
43.
POL00050334
Investigation report, 6 October
2008
POL-0046813
44.
POL00050832
Investigation report, 30 January
2009
POL-0047311
45.
POL00050255
Suspect Offender Reporting form,
22 September 2008
POL-0046813
46.
POL00047293
Witness statement of Thelma
Crerand, 11 May 2009
POL-0043773
47.
POL00047294
Witness statement of Vicky
Mitchell, 11 May 2009
POL-0046687
48.
POL00051515
Witness statement of Doreen
Corcoran, 11 May 2009
POL-0047994
49.
POL00043887
Witness statement of Jenera
Begum, 22 July 2009
POL-0040366
50.
POL00043951
Financial Evaluation —_ Sheet,
undated
POL-0043772
51.
POL00050821
Letter from Robert Daily to
Barclays Bank, 30 January 2009
POL-0047300
52.
POL00060806
Barclays Bank statements, July
2007-August 2008
POL-0057285
53.
UKGI00014640
Witness statement of Sunil
Khanna, 22 July 2009
UKGI025433-001
54.
POL00051984
Witness statement of Laura
Currie, 26 August 2009
POL-0048463
55.
POL00113278
Court of Appeal judgment in
Josephine Hamilton & Others v
Post Office Limited [2021] EWCA
Crim 577
POL-0110657
56.
POL00050865
Memo from Terry Crowther, Fraud
Team, 4 February 2009
POL-0047344
57.
POL00050912
Memo from Juliet McFarlane,
Principal Lawyer, 16 February
2009
POL-0047391
58.
POL00066227
Attendance note made by Juliet
McFarlane, 10 November 2009
POL-0062706
Page 42 of 44
WITNO08940100
WITN08940100
59.
POL00043846
Schedule of Charges, undated
POL-0040325
60.
POL00050940
Letter from Robert Daily to
Gosforth Magistrates’ Court, 17
February 2009
POL-0047419
61.
POL00050978
Letter from Robert Daily to
Gosforth Magistrates' Court, 9
March 2009
POL-0047457
62.
POL00051080
Memo from Robert Daily to Juliet
McFarlane, 9 March 2009
POL-0047559
63.
POL00051205
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Fraud Team, 18 March 2009
POL-0047684
64.
POL00066225
Attendance note made by Juliet
McFarlane, 13 August 2009
POL-0062704
65.
POL00052028
Emails 7 July 2009 "Jesmond
SPSO Contract No: 704055"
POL-0048507
66.
POL00052037
Emails 9 July 2009 "Fw: Jesmond
SPSO ROMEC CONTRACT
704005"
POL-0048516
67.
POL00052103
Expert Accountant's Report, Peter
Smith, 28 July 2009
POL-0048582
68.
UKGI00014638
Email Robert Daily to Juliet
McFarlane, 19 August 2009
UKGI025431-001
69.
POL00052178
Defence Statement, 16 July 2009
POL-0048657
70.
POL00052193
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Post Office Security, 5 August
2009
POL-0048672
71.
POL00052389
Letter McKeag & Co Solicitors, 24
August 2009
POL-0048868
72.
POL00052391
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Post Office Security, 4 September
2009
POL-0048870
73.
POL00060822
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Post Office Security, 25
September 2009
POL-0057301
74.
POL00053521
Letter McKeag & Co Solicitors, 16
November 2009
POL-0050000
75.
POL00053598
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Post Office Security, 24
November 2009
POL-0050077
76.
POL00053795
Memo from Juliet McFarlane to
Post Office Security, 21 January
2010
POL-0050274
77.
POL00054149
Memo from S Andrews to Post
Office Security, 17 February 2010
POL-0050628
78.
POL00054544
Emails 30 March 2010 "Re: Fw:
REGINA v PETER ANTHONY
HOLMES CASE NO:
POLTD/0809/0128 14'" May 2010
for Confiscation proceedings.”
POL-0051023
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WITNO08940100
WITN08940100
79.
POL00054543
Emails 30 March 2010 "Re: Fw:
REGINA v PETER ANTHONY
HOLMES CASE NO:
POLTD/0809/0128 14" May 2010
for Confiscation proceedings."
POL-0051022
80.
POL00054790
Case Closure Reporting form, 23
May 2010
POL-0051269
81.
POL00121659
Emails 22/23 June 2010 "Fw:
Legal Rights Scotland"
POL-0127921
82.
POL00139853
Emails 12 August 2013 "RE: PF"
POL-0141029
83.
POL00124103
Email Mark Raymond 20
December 2017 "Prosecution
meeting outcome"
POL-0130245
84.
POL00124105
Emails 20/21 December 2017
"RE: Prosecution meeting
outcome"
POL-0130247
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