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Witness Name: Thomas Pegler
Statement No.: WITN08980100
Dated: 12 May 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF THOMAS PEGLER
I, Thomas Pegler, will say as follows:-
Background
1. I was employed by Royal Mail Group / Post Office for 31 years from 1984 until
July 2015. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT
Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 12"
April 2023. I started as a postman in central London but moved across to
counters in 1986, working as a counter clerk in many London Crown Offices
including the House of Commons Post Offices. I was promoted to assistant
then branch manager and ECCO+ implementation manager. ECCO+ was a
predecessor to Horizon solely deployed in Crowns and I supported its roll out
in central London. Still based regionally, I covered a number of area manager
posts then worked in the franchise project team for the region. In 1997 there
were major plans to look at how the business was structured and I was
seconded to the Head Office project team supporting the development of these
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plans. Following this major reorganisation I then worked from Head Office. All
the roles I covered until I left the business in 2015 were focused on the
operation and service and efficiency within the Crown office network. For
information, my parents owned and operated a Sub Post Office branch for over
sixteen years and they did not experience any issues with Horizon.
2. From c.1998 I was Head Office based Crown Service & Efficiency Manager
with a dotted line to regionally based Service & Efficiency teams. These teams
eventually became centrally based under subsequent reorganisations. My job
title changed numerous times until I left in 2015 but essentially my work area
focused solely on the operation of the Crown network, including staff
resourcing; staff redeployment; managing losses & gains; staff duty revision
programmes; liaising with Unions; customer complaint handling; delivering
efficiency programmes etc.: basically anything operational but supporting the
sales teams within the Crown office network.
Organisational Structure
3. I cannot recall precisely the impact of the Network Transformation Programme
on the Service & Efficiency team other than a change in reporting structure and
economies of scale in the number of team members. As with other
reorganisations the main driver will have been cost reduction, but an additional
factor in the Crown network was investment in automation and increasing open
plan working. This would have led to a national revision of staffing patterns in
Crown offices deployed by my team alongside CWU representatives.
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My role in relation to the development of policies applicable to Losses and Gains
in the Crown Network
4. Crown net losses had always been an area of concern over the years with
various iterations of policy and guidelines updated to ensure standard best
practice was deployed. This should lead to losses being kept to manageable
levels. Responsibility for delivering branch P&L, of which counter losses were
a part, sat on individual Branch Managers P&Ls but these also featured on
scorecards further up the “line”, e.g. Area, Regional and the General Manager.
I. The Losses & Gains “policy” had been around in different formats
since well before I joined the business, for example it formed part of
the Personnel Rules and Regulations which were manuals covering
all aspects of working for Post Office. Part of this policy covers an
escalation process which could lead to disciplinary action being taken
on individuals if their loss record was particularly poor. Given my
operational knowledge of Crowns I would have been asked
periodically to help carry out a review of this and rewrite the policy,
for example I can recall reviewing the Losses & Gains Policy for
Crowns in 2008.
ll. This 2008 version of the Losses & Gains policy would have been
introduced in order to incorporate new ways of working, e.g. Multi
User Tills on Horizon including branch trading, changes to thresholds
when losses are reported (the minimum level had been 50p for many
years then £2), bringing a focus back to the retail line on the
management of losses and documenting best security practice. This
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document also attempted to highlight key contacts for Branch
Managers in one place.
Ill. As above, documents that superseded this one would still have
included how to manage poorly performing individuals with regard to
losses but the thresholds would have been different. The previous
documents would have also been written when individual stocks
were the norm and balancing was performed weekly every
Wednesday. Developing this new version was also seen as a good
opportunity to include key Security policy so that Branch Managers
had all the relevant information in one place.
The role of the S&E Team and the policies / practices in place in relation to the
audit process in the Crown network
5. The S&E team were not responsible for and therefore did not carry out financial
audits in the network in order to confirm cash and stock levels. Audits were a
function of the Audit team who sat separately within the organisation within
Districts, then Regions, under Finance, then within the Sales & Service
structure as the business evolved. Branch Managers in Crowns should have
been carrying out a programme of “surprise” checks on stock units, a
programme of misbalance checks when losses or gains were declared, stock
unit rotation as per the Losses & Gains Policy in place at that time. Where main
stocks were held by Branch Managers, Area Managers, subsequently known
as CAMs should validate cash holdings on their visits. Given the amount of
intervention it was seen as a low risk / low priority for the audit team to need to
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6.
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visit the Crown network although my view was that the potential for an audit visit
certainly kept Branch Managers and colleagues focused on the accounting side
of the operation.
I have been asked to consider the following:
I. Losses in the Crown Network (POL00083982) — I remember assisting
my manager pulling some of the data together for this document.
ll. Chapter 8 of the Audit Process Manual, “Annual Certificate of
Compliance” (POL00083967) — my recollection of this is that any audits
planned or executed in the Crown network would be procedural and
based around the Annual Certificate of Compliance, i.e. is the Branch
Manager doing what they say and have signed up to? For example I
recall this covering such aspects as managing visitors to the branch;
maintaining lost property records; maintaining staff training records;
managing attendance policy; managing annual leave (staff holiday
plans); fire and health & safety; loss & gains reporting. When my S&E
team visited branches they would also check service & efficiency
elements of the ACC were being adhered to such as staff planning,
attendance and rostering, and following the losses & gains policy.
lll. Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy Crown Office Network
(POL00084075) — see section 4 above.
IV. Losses & Gains Quick Guide for Crown Managers (POL00084076) —
this was simply a version of the document mentioned above in part Ill
and section 4 for use as an operational document for Branch and Area
Managers.
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V. Briefing Note: Crown Loss Programme Briefing to Roger Gale
(POL00086560) — The general business view taken by — senior
leadership within Head Office at that time was that Policy ownership
does not sit within the retail line and that Post Office branches their staff
and management are deployers of policy held and maintained
elsewhere in the business. I recall that in 2013 there was a change in
that the Security team would take over ownership of the Losses & Gains
policy. This was a note to set out roles and responsibilities in this area
whilst under direction of the Security team.
VI. Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy Crown Office Network
(POL00088124) — this was a refresh of the policy mentioned in part III
and section 4 above, rewritten by a Security team member with mine
and my teams input. This refresh was required as ownership of the
policy was moving from the Network directorate to the Security team.
Crown net losses required improvement and it was an opportunity for
Security to emphasise the need for completing the annual compliance
declarations. This latest version also removed the loss escalation
process but reminded Branch Managers that they would need to
consider the conduct code for poor performers.
Vil. Chapter 6 of the Audit Process Manual “Performing a Branch Audit”
(POL00088109) — as mentioned above in section 5 Crowns could be
audited by the Audit team or Field Support Team as they were later
named. Financial audits of Crowns were few and far between under
normal operation (if any). The only time I can recollect involvement
from the audit team in the Crown network would have been on closure
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of the branch (franchise, merger, relocation, closure or temporary
closure). Myself and my team had no involvement in the audit operation
although it looks like elements of the Managing Crown Office Losses &
Gains Policy has been included in their appendices.
Vill. Audit Charter (POL00083966) — I do not recall seeing this document
before as the Audit function sat in the Finance directorate and as stated
in section 4 of this document “Audit activities are usually performed in
the presence of non Post Office Ltd. Employees (i.e. agents)”.
7. As requested and in respect of Crown offices I have addressed these as follows:
I. As mentioned above in Sections 5 and 6 (parts VII and VIII) I cannot
comment on this, although I assume Audits would be based using a risk
model.
Il. I do not recall audits being carried out in Crowns while I worked at
Head Office. I cannot comment how quickly audits would be completed
after going in a schedule but assume that someone in the audit function
would be able to advise?
Ill. I do not know specifically what the audit team obtained in preparation
to a branch visit but someone from the audit team will be able to advise.
IV. _ I recall in my branch and area manager days before Horizon you could
expect a full financial audit at least once a year. I do not know what the
audit frequency of branches was more recently but the audit team will
be able to provide this information.
V. Auditors who later became Field Support Advisors were responsible for
carrying out Audits
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Vl. [would expect these Audit staff to use / have access to Horizon reports,
reports from P&BA / FSC on the branch, cash declaration records.
VII. If discrepancies were found during an Audit, I would expect the Audit
team to make enquiries with the Area manager, P&BA / FSC, Agency
Network Contracts department.
VIIl. I Though Audits in the Crown network were few and far between, I would
expect Crown staff and Branch Managers to be able to provide any
relevant additional information to the Audit team.
IX. Audit reports would be made available to the retail line management,
i.e. Area, Regional, General and Network directorate managers, the
Security team, Field Support management and financial accounting
teams in P&BA / FSC.
8. As the audit operation and processes were not within my area of responsibility
I cannot answer if there were any variations between Crown and Agency audits,
although for Crowns see my response above at 6 part VII.
9. I cannot remember receiving this email (POLO0085538) but I would have
responded to Paul Gardner. Without a copy of my response I would only be
guessing that a) I would have asked for Crowns to be part of an ongoing audit
programme, and b) ensuring that the Losses & Gains policy was understood by
the Audit team within Network Services. I was not involved in any review of
audit team processes.
The role of the S&E Team and the policies / practices in place in relation to error
notices, transaction corrections, transaction acknowledgements and branch
discrepancies
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10. Myself and the S&E team played no part in the design or operation of the error
1
notice or transaction correction processes as they were not within our area of
responsibility. I understand that ownership of these sat within the Product &
Branch Accounting function within the Finance directorate. Branch Managers
in Crown offices would be responsible for processing or challenging error
notices / transaction corrections. When my team visited Crowns they may have
been called upon to assist Branch Managers in accounting for these but this
would be because of their experience, e.g. all of the S&E team were ex Branch
Managers. Given this my response to 11 will be brief but I will add what I can.
. The responses made in respect of 12 when considering the following
documents:
I. Losses in the Crown Network (POL00083982) — this would just seek to
ensure that the correct process regarding error notices / transaction
corrections were being followed by Branch Managers and _ that
timescales were being adhered to.
ll. Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy Crown Office Network
(POL00084075) — Page 5 in this policy reproduces part of what the
financial audit of a Crown office would cover so is documented as best
practice for Branch Managers.
lll. Summary of Discussion on Compliance, Conformance, Losses and
Debt (POL00105417) - quantifies audit results and branch
interventions, no comment from me.
IV. Review of the Creation and Management of Transaction Corrections in
POLFS to Correct Accounting Errors in Horizon (POL00001642) — just
reiterates the impact on Crowns, note that the Regional Support
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Advisors mentioned ended up reporting to me centrally rather than
regionally as part of a mini Network reorganisation. This was so that
Regional Managers could focus on growing sales in their patch and not
get bogged down with operational issues.
V. Briefing Note: Crown Loss Programme Briefing to Roger Gale
(POLO0086560) — this just outlined that dedicated resource for
transaction correction analysis was being provided to the programme
by the Financial Service Centre (FSC).
VI. Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy Crown Office Network
(POL00088124) — page 14 just reiterates policy on what needs to be
done when carrying out supervisory checks on Stock Units.
Vil. Working Agreement - Finance Service Centre and Network
(POL00088897) — I do not recall seeing this document at the time but
viewing now I note that page 31 mentions that occurrences of large
volume / value transaction corrections will be communicated to the S&E
team. As mentioned in section 11 IV above, these would likely be
through to the RSAs for intervention.
VII. Post & Go — Balancing & Accounting (POL00002259) — Post & Go
machines were deployed within the Crown Network and treated as
Stock Units in their own right and therefore subject to error notices /
transaction corrections. I recall a few hardware issues with these
machines, e.g. incorrect change being given out, more stamps being
dispensed than paid for or notes safe contents not agreeing with end of
day / period reports. This document looked to improve how these Self
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Service Kiosks were managed in order to support their operation by
Branch Managers.
IX. Post Office Ltd - Process Documentation — Branch Correction Process
TCs (POL00003060) — I do not recall ever seeing this document, likely
to be for P&BA consumption?
12.With reference to the bundled documents noted above and my knowledge /
recollection I can provide the following input:
I. Before Branch Trading an error notice was still referred to as an error
notice. It was a notice issued to branches by P&BA as a result of a
discrepancy in accounts, some examples are: Client (e.g. NS&l,
Girobank, etc.) receipts or payments differ from what is received — this
could be transposed / incorrect figures entered, documents missing,
customer challenge received. Crowns used to balance their stock units
weekly on Wednesday evenings then the office would amalgamate and
run the office balance from Thursday sending all supporting
documentation for that week in a pouch to P&BA in Chesterfield.
ll. After Branch Trading was introduced a full branch account statement
was only required 12 times a year, these were Trading Period ends.
Individual stock unit balancing was still taking place weekly in Crowns
so there would be Balance Periods within a Trading Period (usually 4
or 5 BPs ina TP). This had no effect on Transaction Corrections, only
that the frequency of issuing them may be changed in order to be
aligned to the Trading Period end. My only recollection of what a
Transaction Acknowledgement (TA) was is in relation to Post & Go
machines where the third party provider / manufacturer / P&BA poll the
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kit to obtain daily transactional totals. Tas may have been available
across other platforms but this would need to be checked with P&BA /
FSC.
Ill. Error notices and transaction corrections would be issued directly to the
branch where a discrepancy in their accounts had come to light. There
are a multitude of reasons for a mismatch between what the branch had
declared and what P&BA had settled with clients, in some cases this
would rectify a loss or gain the branch was carrying or create a loss or
gain when the correction was brought to account by the branch.
IV. Product & Branch Accounting (P&BA), who I believe later became
Financial Service Centre (FSC), based in Chesterfield issued TCs / Tas
to branches.
\V. Branch Managers in Crowns were responsible for dealing with TCs /
Tas. I believe they could challenge / query these with P&BA, but in the
main they would need to process them through their branch accounts.
VI. See above but I recall that the Regional Support Advisors may have
been an additional support for Branch Managers when it came to
handling transaction corrections.
Vil. For colleagues working on the counter in a branch performing a balance
(physical check of their cash and stock), only one option really existed
and that was to confirm figures and roll over into the next balance period
or trading period. If there was a discrepancy between physical cash
and stock they could recheck themselves, ask a colleague or manager
to recheck — this would of course be time dependent and may find the
error — before confirming and rolling over. The Branch Manager may
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find errors next day, e.g. transfers between Stock Units not balancing,
which rectify the original error. Depending on the value / volume of the
loss or gain would decide what route through the Losses & Gains
procedure the Branch Manager would take.
13.After leaving the Branch network and Region I didn’t really deal with any issues
regarding the suspense account. I can only really recollect that in Crowns there
was “Unclaimed Payments” and “Uncharged Receipts” that were classed as “in
suspense”. For example when I was an Area Manager pre Horizon, as part of
a branch visit I would inspect the accounts and ask to see supporting
documents that formed the totals held “in suspense”. Later in my role in Service
& Efficiency the Regional Support Advisors would be more hands on, in that
they faced up directly with Branch and Area managers so would no doubt get
involved with individuals and branch level detail. I had regular contact and
carried out formal monthly one to ones with all my direct reports, but I don’t
recall any issues arising from the suspense account being withdrawn.
14. In terms of roles regarding the control of losses and gains in the Crown Network
I can provide my feedback as follows:
I. Crown Area Managers (CAM) — responsible for delivering their Area
P&L of which Losses would impact. If Branch Managers held a main
stock then the CAM was responsible for checking the cash and stock
twice a year. These area managers were responsible for seeing that
the Branch Managers were applying any conduct code proceedings on
individuals as a result of volume / value losses & gains applicable at
that time. Note that in a reorganisation this role was renamed Crown
Sales & Customer Service Manager (see part Il below).
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ll. Crown Branch Managers (BM) — were accountable for the running of
their branch, delivering their branch P&L and managing Losses &
Gains. Some branches could be quite small with 6 stock units right up
to very large branches with over 25 stock units. BMs would need to
follow the mandatory policy on managing Losses & Gains including
performing stock unit snap checks; carrying out misbalance checks;
carry out and confirm their branch certificate of compliance; train their
staff and deliver communications on Security and loss management.
lll. See section 11 part I above
IV. Regional Support Advisors (RSA) — I recall there being six RSAs, two
to each Region who primarily supported non sales activity in the
Region. In my last year or so and under a reorganisation the RSAs
reported centrally into me. Under the management of losses and gains
the RSAs would ensure BMs had completed their certificates of
compliance, updating the Regional Manager, following this up with
checks on elements covered in the declaration and losses & gains
process when visiting Crown branches. RSAs would also ensure BMs
were following losses & gains policy including the conduct code side of
things.
V. The Security Team — I remember the Security Team became policy
owners for Losses & Gains in Crowns. Their roles and responsibilities
can be found in Appendix A in POL00088124 (Mandatory Losses &
Gains Policy in the Crown Network — April 2013).
15. Annual Certificate of Compliance — this was an exercise carried out by Branch
Managers annually confirming that their branch was compliant across a number
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16.
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of key areas, if my memory serves correctly this would include Security, Fire
Safety, Training, Sick Absence ... etc.. As and when compliance issues arose
in the Crown network they could be added to the self-assessment performed
by Branch Managers to be monitored by the compliance team. For example
when Royal Mail changed their pricing and size structure, compliance to these
new standards was closely monitored and reported on.
The loss escalation process in the Crown network was designed to raise
awareness, share best practice and monitor losses. It could also lead to the
conduct code being triggered on individuals if loss performance fell outside of
agreed levels. Under the latest policy I recall, if a loss of over £30 was
discovered in a stock unit (SU) the BM or another colleague would check the
SU including associated vouchers. If the loss over £30 still stands then the BM
would need to identify which individuals had worked in that SU during the period
to support trend analysis — there would be a form to complete to send in to the
security team, Regional Support Advisors and Area Managers. If the loss was
over £250 in a shared SU then escalated reporting would be required, also if
any individual could be attributed to “losing” £100 or more then the Branch
Manager would deploy the conduct code accordingly.
The Losses & Gains Action Group was nothing new in the business as there
had been other projects and programmes looking at Business losses during my
career in Post Office. I recall there was a concerted effort within the business
to manage all losses and processes more effectively and a number of work
strands were initiated, e.g. in 2008 and 2013. I was a member of these “action
groups” given my knowledge of the Crown network operation and necessary
working agreements with the unions (Communications Workers Union and
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Communication Managers Association). I would have also been an operational
voice for the branch managers as their time was in short supply given customer,
staff and other business demands, so it would have been important not to
increase their workload unnecessarily as a result of any Losses & Gains
initiatives. The main purpose of such initiatives would have been to reduce the
net Loss figure being posted by the Crown network.
18. The business had come a long way since the “silo” way of working in the 80s /
90s and with regard to addressing shortfalls in Crowns my view was that we, in
the S&E Team, had a healthy and collaborative approach. Myself and team
members would meet individuals within Security and FSC (P&BA) to feed into
or provide guidance on initiatives planned to improve Loss performance in
Crowns.
19.POL00039158, the Branch Support Programme — I do not remember seeing
this document before but may have at the time. It looks as though the group
was predominantly looking at the levels of support it gave our Subpostmasters
following an independent review. The focus would therefore be on the Agency
side of the Network with respect to changes in training and support but that it
would be consistently applied across other branch types, e.g. Crowns. I cannot
recall any meetings I may have had as part of the working group level
representative for Crowns
Potential action against Crown office employees following accounting
discrepancies / shortfalls
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20. If an individual or individuals (working within a shared stock unit) were identified
as being responsible for causing a loss then the Branch Manager would apply
the Losses & Gains Policy appropriate at that time. For example when I was
assisting the central London Area Manager in the 1990s pre Horizon, we would
spend almost one day a week interviewing Crown colleagues who had reached
an upper stage of loss escalation process (3 in 3, 6 in 6, etc.), these were formal
conduct code interviews including Union representation, ultimately these could
lead to individuals being dismissed from the business due to their poor loss
performance. In more recent years it became more difficult to pinpoint
individual poor performance with respect to losses as the Business had adopted
shared tills to promote flexibility within the operation. Branch Managers could
still move staff onto individual tills if poor loss performance was experienced in
a shared stock unit. We had also moved away from the focusing purely on the
punitive side and more about the “Why” it was important, the impact of losses
on the business and why more care was needed to reduce losses, e.g. Branch
Managers discussing performance at their training sessions, Branch Managers
and staff being targeted and rewarded on their branch P&L, comparing the loss
in the branch to the income received from XX number of sales of financial
products. The most recent Losses & Gains Policy I remember took away the
structured tiers, e.g. 3 losses over £x in 3 months equals an informal warning
etc., giving branch managers more empowerment on decisions to apply the
conduct code, which yes, could still result in individuals with poor loss
performance being dismissed.
2
.My understanding was that Subpostmasters had to make good any shortfalls
within their accounts in line with their contract with the Post Office. This would
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mean Subpostmasters putting in their own cash so that the total balance agreed
with the derived figure (e.g. paper based pre Horizon or what was held in
Horizon when their branch was automated). Within the Crown network when I
started you had tolerance built into your balance e.g. if you were +/- 50p out on
balancing you could put in or take out the cash up to that value, this became +/-
£2 then +/-£5 over time. If Crown staff declared losses then the Losses & Gains
Policy would be applied by the Branch Manager.
Knowledge of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system
22. The term bugs, errors and defects was not in my vocabulary at all when working
in the Post Office and has only become known to me through watching the
Horizon Inquiry unfold on YouTube. In formulating my response to the following
question I have considered the documents in the bundle as follows:
POL00100883 — I do not remember the exact scenario but as you can see from
my response I have escalated an issue from Basingstoke Crown office
regarding the performance of one of their Self Service Kiosks (SSK), probably
a Post & Go terminal? I recall there being a few issues relating to the new
hardware being installed in Crowns (Post & Go Machines, Tele Cash
Dispensers), much of this seemed to be teething problems and related to the
hardware. At no time did it cross my mind that Horizon could be to blame for
any of the discrepancies as the business line was that Horizon was robust.
POL00036376 — This appears to be a reproduction of suggested guidelines
issued by me before I left the business in 2015. It describes to fully defund the
kiosk and run all the reports, rolling into a new balance period, accepting the
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discrepancy if there is one then rolling over again. I recall that branches rarely
ran a full cash and stock check of their SSKs so I was asked how they could
effectively re-start as if it were a new machine being commissioned.
23.During my time working for the Post Office and in the Crown network, there
were no concerns raised to me about the robustness of the Horizon system.
Branch Managers and staff were used to using computers in branches as
ECCO+ was in use prior to Horizon. However, in the early days of Horizon I
had heard of issues when Branch Managers had incorrectly posted to
uncharged receipts instead of unclaimed payments or vice versa but this was
“human error” and corrected in the next balance or trading period. I also recall
there was a procedure when “blue screens” happened on Horizon or electricity
failure occurred causing the Horizon kit to go down but this was put down to
teething problems / hardware issues. I recall there were Horizon Software
releases planned and delivered to rectify issues to transactions as they were
required, introduce new transactions or change levels to pricing or volumes etc.
Myself and my team had a close working relationship with the Crown branches
and area management. Along with the standard business processes to report
faults and issues through the Helplines and Area management, myself and my
team were another port of call should Branch Managers want to raise issues
about their Horizon kit and I cannot recall any situations where this was the
case. In my role as a senior manager grade I was also responsible for hearing
appeals against dismissal through the conduct code for staff, in the last year or
so in the business I also heard appeals by Subpostmasters against termination
of their contracts. In these few cases the question over the reliability or
robustness of the Horizon system was not raised by the Subpostmaster.
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Other Matters
24.1 have followed the Subpostmaster Court Cases and Horizon Inquiry
investigating the robustness of Horizon. The Inquiry testimony between
January and March of this year was a revelation and complete shock to me as
it was the first time I had seen / heard hard evidence that there were known
serious issues with Horizon. At no time during my employment with Post Office
was I aware that this was the case.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: 12 May 2023
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Index to First Witness Statement of Thomas Pegler
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No.
URN
Document Description
Control Number
POL00083982
Losses in the Crown Network
(undated)
POL-0081040
POL00083967
Compliance team process - Audit
process Manual - Chapter 8: Annual
certificate of compliance v4 dated
04/02/2008
POL-0081025
POL00084075
Post Office Ltd Mandatory Losses &
Gains Policy in the Crown Office
Network dated 01/09/2008
POL-0081133
POL00084076
Losses & Gains Quick Guide for
Crown Managers Version 1 dated
01/09/2008
POL-0081134
POLO0086560
Briefing Note: Crown Loss
Programme Briefing to Roger Gale
dated 09/01/2013
POL-0083618
POL00088124
Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy -
Crown Office Network v1.0 dated
24/04/2013
POL-0085182
POL00088109
Post Office Audit Process Manual -
Ch 3 - Performing a Branch Audit -
version 6.0 dated 26/05/2016
POL-0085167
POL00083966
Audit Charter: Branch and Cash
Centre Audit Activity (undated)
POL-0081024
POL00085538
Email chain from Paul Gardner to
Anita L Turner, Lin Norbury, John
Breeden Re Network Services Team
- Audit Process review 2011 - Your
help would really be appreciated
dated 10/06/2011
POL-0082596
10.
POL00105417
Note re Post Office Ltd 2008/2009
Objectives and supporting papers re
compliance, conformance, losses and
debt dated 03/03/2008
POL-0104525
11.
POL00001642
Review of the Creation and
Management of Transaction
Corrections in POLFS to Correct
Accounting Errors in Horizon dated
10/02/2010
VIS00002656
12.
POL00088897
Working Agreement - "Final" -
Finance Service Centre and Network
v2.12 dated 20/12/2012
POL-0085955
Page 21 of 22
WITNO08980100
WITN08980100
13.
POL00002259
Post & Go - Balancing & Accounting
Report dated 01/07/2013
VIS00003273
14.
POL00003060
Post Office Limited Process
Documentation - Branch Correction
Process. Version 2.0 (undated)
VIS00004074
15.
POL00039158
Branch Support Programme — TOR
v.3 In confidence Gayle Peacock
dated 07/08/2013
POL-0035640
16.
POL00100883
Email sent from Tina Davis to Gareth
Jenkins and others re : SSK losses -
stock unit proposal for impact
assessment dated 17/06/2014
POL-0100466
17.
POL00036376
Loss in Stock Unit: Branch has a loss
in their Self Service Kiosk dated
26/02/2018
POL-0033311
Page 22 of 22