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Witness Name: Catherine Elizabeth Macdonald
Statement No.: WITN09100100
Dated: 11 May 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF CATHERINE ELIZABETH MACDONALD
I, Catherine Elizabeth Macdonald, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry
with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 12" April 2023.
2. I have been retired from the Post Office since October 2016 and this
statement is written in my own words from memory and with the help of the
documents provided by the Inquiry.
BACKGROUND
3. I joined the Post Office in April 1983 as a Data Processing Officer progressing
to a Senior Data Processing Officer in 1986. This involved the keying of data
from the weekly cash account and supporting documents and transfer of data
to magnetic tape and mainframe. In 1996 I became an Input Postal Officer in
the Data Preparation Team which was responsible for the receipt and
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preparation for keying of the weekly cash account and supporting documents,
becoming team leader of this area in 1998 until 2001. I was the Document
Filing and Retrieval team leader before moving in 2002 to a project
environment which included the Payments Processing Outsource Project - the
transfer of cheque processing to an external company EDS (Electronic data
systems I believe) where I remained until October 2005.
. [held the position of Branch Control Manager from October 2005 until March
2012. This was initially a team of 5 Postal Officers and me. The role was to
manage and produce probity reports for several POLFS (Post Office Limited
Financial System) General Ledger (GL) Accounts and Write Off Accounts
including various Suspense Accounts, Discrepancies and Crown Office
accounts, and to provide monthly reports which included Crown Office Loss,
Gains and Crown Transaction Correction Accounts, Local Suspense reports
(also known as Rolling loss reporting), Missing Green Giro enquiry processing
and PIVOT (Correcting transaction volumes). Around 2006/7 following some
large losses involving ‘Cheques at Site’ found at audits I was asked to develop
a process for monitoring values held in this GL Account and to report
branches consistently holding high or increasing values for a special audit.
Shortly afterwards I was asked to do the same for ‘Declared Cash Holdings’
and worked with the Leeds Cash team to identify branches holding excess
cash and for them to arrange its return to the relevant Cash Centre. I worked
with colleagues from around the business — Network Support, Crown Office
CAMS, Security, Cash teams and Audit /Training teams. This led to identifying
new areas of the accounts to monitor including reversals, cash in pouches,
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spoilt/rejected labels and Lottery scratch card holdings. I was also asked to
develop a ‘branch view’ which would enable a user to see e.g. debt,
transaction corrections, cash holdings — declared and generated, and
cheques in one place. This was developed in Excel using the expertise I had
available on the team and became known as a ‘rota check.’ From
approximately 2009 -2011 ‘Multiple partner accounting’ and ‘Multiple partner
debt recovery responsibility was passed to me along with the branch control
duties. Subsequently the number of team members increased to 12. The team
went through a few name changes including Branch Control and
Conformance, however I cannot remember the dates of these changes and
for ease I have consistently referred to the team as ‘Branch Control’
throughout this witness statement.
5. I left Product and Branch Accounting (“P&BA”) in March 2012 to join the
Network Transformation Team and had no further involvement with Branch
Trading, Horizon or the analysis of POLFS and Credence. I have no formal
professional qualifications but have attended numerous Post Office training
courses including Horizon classroom training to enable me to work on the
Crown office counter as strike cover. I left the business in October 2016.
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF SUBPOSTMASTERS FOR SHORTFALLS
6. I have been referred to a number of policy documents relating to the
contractual liability of subpostmasters for shortfalls (POL00083939,
POL00088904, POL00086845, POL00088867, POL00030562,
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POL00113670, POL00086868, POL00090357 and POL00088312) and I have
been asked about my knowledge of these policies.
7. In respect of my understanding when I worked in P&BA of the contractual
position as to the responsibility of the SPMs for shortfalls or ‘losses’ identified,
it was that the SPM was ultimately liable for any transactional accounting
losses and might have been found culpable for any robbery losses. The SPM
was required to sign the weekly cash account and later the monthly Branch
Trading Statement to confirm that it was an accurate picture of their balance
at the said date.
8. I have been referred to Crown Office Network policies POL00084075 and
POL00088124. In respect of how the Post Office policy on the responsibility of
Post Office employees in Crown Offices for shortfalls and losses differs from
the policy of SPMs, Crown office staff were to be subject to various step checks
to identify potential losses, and loss reporting, and escalation processes were
to be in place. My understanding was that the SPM was responsible for the
processes and procedures they put in place in their respective branch.
P&BA AND CROWN OFFICE BRANCHES
9. Asa First line manager my role was primarily to implement policies agreed by
senior managers. On occasions I was asked for input when new polices were
being developed. I remember attending a meeting/ workshop with senior
managers but not the date. The purpose of this meeting was to identify ways
that we could work with Crown Offices to try to reduce their losses. It was
agreed that I would be a P&BA contact for Crown Area Managers and their
Branch Managers, should they be waiting for specific transaction corrections
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(‘TCs’). A report which was produced monthly for Crown Finance Analysts
was to be shared with the Crown Area Managers detailing the top 20 highest
value losses and gains written off to profit and loss along with a new report
detailing the top 10 highest value loss and gain TCs. The change this policy
brought was improved and closer working relationships and losses were
reduced.
P&BA TEAM AND ERROR NOTICES, TRANSACTION CORRECTIONS,
TRANSACTION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, BRANCH DISCREPANCIES AND
RECOVERY OF DEBT
10.1 have been referred to a number of policy documents relating to error notices,
11.
transaction corrections, transaction acknowledgements and branch
discrepancies (POL00083939, POL00088904, NFSP00000169,
NFSP00000043, POL00085794, POL00030562, POL00083951,
POL00083952, POL00003060, POL00084012, POL00083982,
POL00084075, POL00084076, POL00105417, POL00039089,
POL00001474, POL00113432, POL00086560, POL00088124,
POL00088897, POL00002259, POL00086868, POL00090357,
POL00088312, POL00003060, and POL00039065) and I have been asked
about my knowledge of these policies.
In respect of Error Notices I was not involved with the creation or issue of
these as I had never worked on an Error Resolution team. My only
involvement from 1983 to 2002 was the preparation (batching into 50s),
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keying and transmitting and filing the documents. I knew that they were issued
to correct misbalances on the cash account lines in CBDB — Counters
Business Data Base. I knew that they were brought to account on the cash
account but had no knowledge of any dispute processes.
12.In respect of TCs, my team rarely had cause to issue these so, my knowledge
is limited. My understanding is that they were issued where there was a
mismatch between Horizon data and e.g. Client, Cash, and Stock Centre data
in the ‘Open Item’ managed GL Accounts. These TCs were issued by Postal
Officers on the relevant Error Resolution team. The exceptions I am aware of
were PIVOT volumes where the correct volume was agreed with the SPM and
a TC issued, and in the case of robberies whereby a few days after the
robbery my team member would contact the branch to advise that a TC would
be issued to remove the amount from their ‘Robbery Suspense account’ and
put into a ‘Pending Culpability account.’ It was always concerning if a branch
was receiving a high volume of TCs and any high value TCs over £25k. This
was an indicator of non-conformance, an SPM who may be struggling and
need support in a particular area, or possible suspicious activity. Processes
were put in place around 2009 within P&BA so that the Branch Control Team
could establish if there were any other concerns at the branch, e.g. training
issues, high or increasing debt, and then take any necessary steps, e.g.
training requests or special audits, notifying Contract Advisors, Multiple
Partners, or Crown Office Area Managers. A ‘Large Value Transaction
Correction’ process was put in place in 2009.
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13. The options available to Crown Offices when accepting a TC or completing
Branch Trading were ‘Make Good Cash’ or ‘Write Off to P&L (profit & loss).
The options available to SPMs when accepting a TC or completing Branch
Trading were ‘Make Good Cash,’ ‘Make Good Cheque’ or ‘Settle Centrally’ if
the value was £150 or more. If less than £150 the options were ‘Make Good
Cash’ or ‘Make Good Cheque.’
14.If Crown Office staff found a loss or shortage when balancing their branch
from 2009 they would follow the Crown Office Mandatory Losses and Gains
procedure. If SPMs found a loss or shortage when balancing they would
investigate and action as they had been trained to do.
15.In respect of Transaction Acknowledgements I was not involved with this
process. I was aware of these being issued on the Lottery Team but am
unsure of the date these were introduced or the impact of these on branches
balancing.
16.In respect of Branch Discrepancies I can confirm that prior to Oct 2005 on the
weekly cash account there was a box on the document that had to contain an
entry. If it didn’t, the cash account was returned to the SPM for completion. If
the value of the discrepancy was above a certain amount, (I cannot remember
what it was) then the indicator code on the cash account was changed. The
indicator code was captured as part of the keying procedure, but the value of
the discrepancy was not. From October 2005 I was the owner of the General
Ledger Account Branch Discrepancies. This was an ‘Open Item’ managed
account, which means that any items visible represent uncleared
transactions/postings. In other words, an opposite entry is required to clear
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the open item. Debit and Credit (loss and gain) entries appeared in this
account when the branch had committed/confirmed a discrepancy on Horizon.
Some branches did this daily, some weekly and some branches didn’t create
any entries. As part of the Branch Trading process once the branch
discrepancy had been accepted and transferred to Local Suspense a
compensating entry would appear in the Branch Discrepancy Account GL and
the open items would clear. The entry would then appear in the Local
Suspense Account also, an ‘Open Item’ account. The opposite entry would
appear once the SPM had completed the Branch Trading process.
17.In respect of Debt Recovery my experience and knowledge are limited to the
processes in place for Multiple Partners. These branches had the option to
‘Assign to Nominee’ when accepting TCs and at Branch Trading which gave
visibility of all losses and gains in the respective branch customer account. If a
Partner wished to dispute a TC or Branch Trading discrepancy this was
blocked pending resolution.
18.1 have been referred to the Witness Statement of Susan Harding
(WITN03980100). In respect of the Local Suspense being removed as part of
the IMPACT Programme, my understanding is that prior to October 2005 there
were Suspense Accounts available on the weekly Cash Account where both
Crowns and other branches could record values (losses and gains) when they
were authorised by the NBSC Helpline. My understanding is that these values
would have caused high value discrepancies and the amount could be held in
these suspense accounts pending resolution
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19.1 have been referred to the guidance document “Debt Recovery Processes
under Branch Trading (POL00085794). In respect of the only option open to
an SPM who received a TC from October 2005 being to contact NBSC
Helpline if they did not understand it or wished to challenge it, I cannot confirm
as I cannot remember if this was their only option. Prior to October 2005 I
believe the issuing persons contact details were on the paper Error Notice.
20.In respect of a SPM not able to provide information at the time of the call to
the helpline to show that a TC was issued incorrectly, I can confirm that my
understanding was that if the value was more than £150, they should ‘Accept
and Settle Centrally’. If the amount of the TC was less than £150 the options
would be to Make Good Cash or Cheque.
2
=
.In respect that from October 2005 a SPM identifying a discrepancy which they
considered to have been caused by a system error, the options available to a
SPM would be to call NBSC helpline and seek agreement from P&BA to
‘settle centrally’ whilst the matter was investigated if the value of the
discrepancy was £150 or more. If the discrepancy was a loss or gain of less
than £150 the options available would be to Make Good Cash or Make Good
Cheque whilst the matter was investigated.
22.In respect of the TC/Debt recovery review document dated 14 November
2008 provided by the Inquiry (POL00001404), I did not know whether ‘settle
centrally’ signifies acceptance of debt liability, as this was not something I was
involved with. This is the first time I have seen this document.
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23.In respect of anything to distinguish a ‘blocked debt’ from an ‘undisputed settle
centrally debt’ I remember seeing the word ‘blocked’ in the narrative section of
a TC or Branch discrepancy on the Customer Line on occasions.
24.\In respect of whether I considered it satisfactory that SPMs were required to
settle centrally even when they disputed a TC/TA/Discrepancy I can confirm
that I accepted that this process had been agreed by the impacted teams/
parties. Given the knowledge I had at the time I had no reason to doubt the
integrity of Horizon. My understanding was that to ‘Settle Centrally ‘meant that
the amount was transferred to the SPM Customer Account pending
investigation and was a mechanism which allowed the branch to rollover into
the next Branch Trading Period.
25.In respect of whether the process for challenging TC’s/TA’s/Discrepancies
meant that a loss was assumed to have been caused by an error or
wrongdoing on the part of the SPM, my view would be that errors could have
been made by e.g. Cash and Stock Centres or Clients as well as SPMs.
26.In respect of the role played by the P&BA team when a SPM challenged a
TC/TA/ Discrepancy, the document (POL00088897) provided to me by the
Inquiry was updated and produced after I left the team so I cannot comment.
27.\In respect of the loss escalation process when a shortfall/ discrepancy was
identified in a Crown Office my recollection is as follows. The Crown Office
manager would follow their guidelines and procedures in identifying the cause
of the shortfall/loss. Once they had identified that a TC was required to
resolve this they would email the Branch Control team inbox with details
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including the dates of the error, stock unit if possible, the product involved and
value. A Branch Control team member would immediately approach the
relevant P&BA team by email, or if high value (over £25k) in person, to
request an investigation. A response would be provided to the Crown Office
and appropriate Crown Area Manager (“CAM”) as soon as possible with the
outcome.
28.In respect of the relationship between the S&E Team , the P&BA Team and
Security team when addressing shortfalls in a Crown Office branch, I cannot
recall what the S&E team refers to. The relationship between P&BA and
Security was such that if there were any concerns, I could have contacted the
Security team and the Crown Office CAMS to discuss any action necessary.
The Crown Office Loss and Gain report was provided to the Security team.
Should I have felt that training issues needed to be addressed I would have
addressed these with the respective CAM.
RECOVERY OF CURRENT AND FORMER AGENTS DEBT
29.1 have been asked to consider documents regarding the Recovery of Current
and Former Agents Debt (POL00083939, POL00088656, POL00084977,
POL00086338, POL00088897, POL00085769, POL00002086, POL00087471,
POL00113670, POLO00086868, POL00090357, and POL00088312) Several of
the documents provided by the Inquiry were written after I had left P&BA. These
are the Fraud & Conformance Team Handover document revised July 2012
(POL00002086), Former Agents Debt Management (POL00087471) and
Operators’ in Service Debt (POL00113670 , POL00086868, POL00090357 and
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POL00088312). I was not involved with the recovery of Current or Former
Agents Debt. There were Current Agents and Former Agents Debt teams within
P&BA. I do not know if anyone within P&BA was involved in the recovery of
debt from current or former Crown Office employees.
30. The Branch Control team would raise concerns with other teams around POL
including the Current Agent Debt team via the Local Suspense Report which
detailed the top 20 losses and gains at Branch Trading. This report was
compiled weekly. Checks would be made on ‘Remedy’ to see if the NBSC.
helpline had been contacted and if there was information regarding the
discrepancy. A check would be made to see how the discrepancy had been
settled - ‘Made Good’ or ‘Settled Centrally,’ and was this a compensating
discrepancy. This information was included on the report along with details of
any TCs which may have accounted for the discrepancy. Where no
information was available to us the branch would be called and we would
have a discussion regarding the cause of the discrepancy if the SPM was
available. Asummary of the discussion would be included on the report. The
Local Suspense report was also shared with the Contract Advisor team and
Security team. The Branch Control team would also share concerns on an ad
hoc basis with the Retail Cash team in Leeds and vice versa. Requests for
training were requested where it was clear that a SPM was struggling in a
particular area. This could be as a result of a discussion with them or the
volume and value of a particular TC. Special audits were also requested on
occasions, at the request of a Contract Advisor or significant concerns in the
Cash ledgers, Cheques at Site ledgers or increasing debt. The Branch Control
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team also worked closely with the Branch Support team to address non-
conformance.
RELIEF FROM ACCOUNTING LOSSES / WRITE-OFF PROCESS
31.1 have been asked to consider documents relating to Relief from accounting
losses / Write-off process (POL00088904, POL00086845, POL00088867,
POL00030562, POL00030562, POL00087409, POL00113670,
POL00086868, POL00090357 and POL00088312). In respect of relief that
could be granted from accounting losses or debt, I was aware that a SPM
could obtain that if they were ‘new SPMS’. When analysing a branch as part
of the Branch Control processes the length of the time the SPM had been in
post was checked and the Contract Advisor informed if a new SPM was found
to be incurring a high level of TCs or high or increasing debt.
CIVIL CLAIMS AND OTHER DEBT RECOVERY PROCEEDINGS
32.1 have been referred to POLO0085008 and asked to describe my involvement
in any analysis or review of the debt recovery process. In respect of Civil
claims and debt recovery proceedings I did not work in this area and cannot
answer the questions listed.
33.In respect of my recollection of the criminal and civil cases listed I was not
involved in any prosecutions or civil actions. The names listed do not mean
anything to me. There are three names where the Inquiry has provided
documents and I will comment on these in turn.
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34. Hughie Thomas (POL00069056_001 to POL00069056_0023). From the
documents provided by the Inquiry I can see that this SPM was suspended in
October 2005 shortly after the Branch Control Team was formed. I do not
recollect any involvement in any investigation into this branch at the time of
his suspension.
35.Seema Misra (POL 00049519). The document provided by the Inquiry shows
an email that I have been copied into by a Security team investigator detailing
a recovery amount. This was normal practice. The branch name is familiar to
me and may have been included in a Local Suspense report but I cannot
remember any details.
36.Rachel Williams (POL00091599). The document provided by the Inquiry
shows an audit report and states that the auditor spoke to me prior to his visit
to the branch. This was standard practice. The auditor would call the Branch
Control team prior to an audit to find out whether any TCs had been issued
and needed to be accepted, and whether there was any outstanding debt at
the branch. I am not familiar with the SPM or Branch Name.
KNOWLEDGE OF BUGS, ERRORS OR DEFECTS IN THE HORIZON SYSTEM
37.In respect of POL00006837, I have read through the document and the name
of the SPM does not mean anything to me. I would assume that the auditor
has stated that he is going to call me to check to see if I have any concerns
regarding debt or transaction corrections.
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38.
38.
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In respect of concerns I may have had regarding the robustness of the
Horizon IT system whilst I was employed by the Post Office, I can confirm that
I had no knowledge or any concerns regarding the integrity of Horizon data. 1
had no knowledge that the deficiencies in the Horizon system could cause
discrepancies or shortfalls in branch accounts. My understanding was that
Horizon worked correctly and reliably.
' have no other matters that ! wish to bring to the attention of the Chair.
Statement of truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated:
Le wan aca.
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Index to First Witness Statement of Catherine Elizabeth Macdonald
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No. I URN Document Description Control Number
1 I POL00083939 Post Office Ltd Guidance on Losses at I POL-0080997
SPSO's: Guidelines on Responsibilities
and Recovery Arrangements
2 I POL00088904 Post Office Ltd Policy on Losses and POL-0085962
Gains within the POCL Agency Network
3 I POLO0086845 Post Office Ltd Security Policy: POL-0083903
Accounting Losses Policy for Agency
Branches
4 I POL00088867 Post Office Ltd: Liability for Losses POL-0085925
Policy for agency branches v2.0
January 2004
5 I POL00030562 PO Overarching Losses Policy POL-0027044
6 I POL00113670 Operators’ In Service Debt POL-0112554
7 I POLO0086868 POLICY DOCUMENT- Operators’ In POL-0083926
Service Debt v1.1
8 I POL00090357 Policy document - postmasters' lifecycle I POL-0087326
issue, policy issue 8, version 2.0
9 I POL00088312 POLICY DOCUMENT- Postmasters’ In I POL-0085370
Service Debt v0.3
10 I POL00084075 Post Office Ltd Mandatory Losses & POL-0081133
Gains Policy in the Crown Office
Network
11 I POL00088124 Mandatory Losses & Gains Policy - POL-0085182
Crown Office Network v1.0
12 I NFSP00000169 Letter circulated to the National VIS00007617
Executive Council enclosing
correspondence regarding debt
recovery process dated 17 December
2004
13 I NFSP00000043 Negotiating Committee for Horizon debt I VISO0007491
recovery
14 I POL00085794 Debt Recovery Process under Branch POL-0082852
Trading
15 I POL00083951 Process for Awaiting TC (Transaction POL-0081009
Correction) - Multiples - v1
16 I POL00083952 Process for awaiting TC (Transaction POL-0081010
Correction) - singletons - v1
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17 I POL00003060 Post Office Limited Process VIS00004074
Documentation - Branch Correction
Process. Version 2.0. Doc is not dated.
18 I POL00084012 Transaction Correction / Debt Recovery I POL-0081070
Process (undated) Date estimated from
content
19 I POL00083982 Losses in the Crown Network (undated) I POL-0081040
Date estimated from content
20 I POL00084076 Losses & Gains Quick Guide for Crown I POL-0081134
Managers Version 1
21 I POLO0105417 Note re Post Office Ltd 2008/2009 POL-0104525
Objectives and supporting papers re
compliance, conformance, losses and
debt
22 I POL00039089 Operating Level Agreement on Product I POL-0035571
and Branch Network Accounting,
Network and Service Delivery v1.0
23 I POL00001474 Product and Branch Accounting - Large I VISO0002488
Value Transaction Correction Process
24 I POL00113432 Rota Check Procedure POL-0112538
25 I POLO0086560 Briefing Note: Crown Loss Programme I POL-0083618
Briefing to Roger Gale
26 I POL00088897 Working Agreement - "Final" - Finance POL-0085955
Service Centre and Network v2.12
27 I POL00002259 Post & Go - Balancing & Accounting VIS00003273
Report
28 I POL00039065 Email from Andrew Winn to Cathy X POL-0035547
Macdonald cc Eleanor Kimberley re FW:
Rolling Loss Report
29 I WITN03980100 WITN03980100 - Susan Harding WITN03980100
30 I POL00001404 TC/Debt Recovery review - Key VIS00002418
Feedback Issues
31 I POLO0088656 Debt & Losses Reduction: FSC Process I POL-0085714
Flows (Undated, date estimated)
32 I POL00084977 Post Office, Former SPM End to End POL-0082035
Debt Review v.0.5
33 I POL00086338 POL Former Agents Debt: Alison POL-0083396
Bolsover (undated, date inferred from
chart)
34 I POL00085769 Business Loss Programme Board POL-0082827
ONCH - Cash Loss deficiencies
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35 I POLO0002086 Fraud & Conformance Team Handover I VISO0003100
Report
36 I POL00087471 POL Process Former Agent Debt POL-0084529
created by Michelle Stevens
37 I POL00087409 Product and Branch Accounting - Write I POL-0084467
off process - Revised July 2009
38 I POLO00085008 Back Office Efficiency Programme Debt I POL-0082066
Review, Work Management Tools
Terms of Reference
39 I POLO0069056_001 Hughie Noel Thomas - file note POL-0065535_001
40
POL00069056_002
Letter from Angela Van Den Bogerd to
HN Thomas Re Post Office complaint
review and mediation Scheme
POL-0065535_002
41
POL00069056_003
Former Subpostmasters Accounts
Authority for Write Off re: Hughie Noel
Thomas (Gaerwen branch) - no further
action in pursuit of debt.
POL-0065535_003
42
POL00069056_004
Hughie Noel Thomas case study: Letter
from D E L Storey to Post Office
Limited, Clive Burton re: Hughie Noel
Thomas
POL-0065535_004
43
POL00069056_005
Letter from Clive Burton to Miss D
Lydiate RE: Hughie Noel Thomas
Retired, of 15 Rhos Elen, Gaerwen
Ynys Mon, LL60 6HH Insolvency of the
former Postmaster @ Gaerwen Branch
Llangefri County Court No.1 of 2008
POL-0065535_005
44
POL00069056_006
Bankruptcy Report for Thomas Hughie
Noel (2008)
POL-0065535_006
a5
POL00069056_007
Email trail from Ged Harbinson to Clive
Burton - attached Letter from Insolvency
Service to POL re bankcruptcy order
Hughie N Thomas 06/02/2008
POL-0065535_007
46
POL00069056_008
Hughie Thomas case study- Email from
Dave Posnett to Clive Burton, Paul
Dann and others re: Investigation Team
Recovery- Office Name- Branch Code
POL-0065535_008
a7
POL00069056_009
Email - from Mick F Matthews to Ged
Harbinson re. Hughie Noel Thomas -
Suspended Postmaster Gaerwen Post
Office - Branch Code: 160/604.
POL-0065535_009
48
POLO0069056_010
Email from C Burton to M Matthews re:
Hughie Noel Thomas - Suspend
Postmaster Gaerwen Post Office
POL-0065535_010
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49
POL00069056_011
Letter from Alan Brown to Mrs Denise
Fletcher, Re: Cheque enclose.
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POL-0065535_011
50
POLO0069056_012
Email to Clive Burton from Diane
Matthews RE Hughie Thomas -
Suspended Postmaster Gaerwen Post
Office (160/604)
POL-0065535_012
51
POL00069056_013
Letter from Clive Burton to Hughie
Thomas RE: Former Supostmasters
Account- Gaerwen Post Office
POL-0065535_013
52
POLO0069056_014
Letter from Clive Burton to Hughie Noel
Thomas re: Former Subpostmasters
Account Gaerwen Post Office
POL-0065535_014
53
POLO0069056_015
Hughie Thomas Case Study - Email
chain from People Contact Services to
Clive Burton re: Hughie Noel Thomas -
Former Subpostmaster Gaerw
POL-0065535_015
54
POL00069056_016
Former Subpostmasters Statement of
Exception Office Name: Gaerwen Cash
entry
POL-0065535_016
55
POL00069056_017
Final Cash Account of Postmaster of
Gaerwen Branch - Branch Accounts
POL-0065535_017
56
POLO0069056_018
Email from Emlyn Hughes to SG TS
Agent Recruitment Support re: Gaerwen
160604 Mr H N Thomas
POL-0065535_018
57
POLO0069056_019
Transfer Report Cessation from Mr Noel
Thomas to James Evans
POL-0065535_019
58
POL00069056_020
Transfer report - Cessation from Hughie
Noel Thomas
POL-0065535_020
59
POL00069056_021
Letter from Warehouse Errors
Investigation Team to Gaerwen SPSO
(Hughie Thomas) enclosing Stock
Discrepancy Returns Form
POL-0065535_021
60
POL00069056_022
Handwritten note FAO Clive Burton re
Gaerwen PO
POL-0065535_022
61
POL00069056_023
P596 Advice of cheques or returned
items, to the manager of Gaerwen PO.
POL-0065535_023
62
POL00049519
Email from Dave Posnett to Clive
Burton, Paul Dann, Marie Crocket and
others re Investigation Team Recovery -
West Byfleet SPSO 126023.
POL-0045998
63
POL00091599
An Audit report of the Allerton Post
Office branch.
POL-0091176
64
POL00006837
Note of audit by POL employee at the
end of TP 1
POL-0000029
Page 19 of 19