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Witness Name: Judy Balderson
Statement No.: WITN09210100
Dated: 3 October 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF JUDY BALDERSON
I, Judy Balderson, will say as follows:
Introduction
1. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 23.8.23 (the
“Request”). I have received advice and assistance from a lawyer (Tom Crisp, an
Associate solicitor of DAC Beachcroft LLP) in the preparation of this statement.
My professional background
2. The Request asks me to provide an outline of my professional background, my
career and qualifications, and I am asked in particular about my roles as a
Network Field Support Advisor and Field Team Leader. I am a former employee
of Post Office Counters Ltd ("POCL") (subsequently Post Office Ltd ("POL")) and
held various positions during my employment, which I detail below.
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I joined POCL in October 1980 (to the best of my recollection, I think the exact
date was the 13" October). I left POL on 30.9.16.
Since leaving POL, I have not completed any paid work (by choice), but do
occupy my time with some voluntary work in schools.
After completing a seven-week residential classroom training course, my first role
was as a counter clerk, serving the public at both Crown Office branches in
Hereford.
About four years later I moved into the accounts branch, performing a variety of
functions, such as preparing stock remittances for branches in Herefordshire.
Later I moved onto the cash account duty, which involved producing a cash
account each week and submitting this to the financial service centre in
Chesterfield.
I do not recall the exact date but about five years later (possibly in about 1990) I
became an auditor. This work involved verifying assets and checking for
procedural compliance in Post Office branches, Crown Office branches and "Rem
Units" (as the accounts branches had become known by then).
The process of asset verification involved physically counting all cash and stock
(for example, postage stamps, saving stamps and motor vehicle discs) presented
by the postmaster, branch manager or officer in charge. Checks of compliance
procedures were completed in various ways, for example by observation/
witnessing the initial entry procedure for a branch or cash centre; by examination
(physically checking that a branch held the correct version of, say, the Anti-Money
Laundering Reporting Form) and by questioning (posing questions such as "How
frequently do you change the safe key with the spare safe key to prevent excess
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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wear?”).
During this period my duties remained basically the same, but I had a variety of
job titles, including "Auditor" and "Inspector"; I think the role went by the title of
“Checker” at one point, but I cannot be certain about that. Eventually the role was
given the title of "Field Support Advisor".
All these roles were of the same grade/pay scale and, as I say, my duties did not
change radically until I became a Field Support Advisor. At this point, the training
of postmasters was added to the role.
I was already part of the Audit team when the role of "Field Support Advisor" was
created, and I automatically moved into this role.
The duties of the Field Support Advisor included training new and existing
postmasters when major changes in procedure occurred, verifying Post Office
assets, and measuring compliance with Post Office procedures during branch
audits.
I cannot recall the exact date, but in around 2012 I became a Field Team Leader.
In this role I managed a team of Field Support Advisors. I applied to become a
Field Team Leader, was interviewed, and ultimately appointed.
My duties as a Field Team Leader were many and varied. My main role was to
manage a team of Field Support Advisors and ensuring they had the capability
and resources to fulfil their role. I also authorised travel claims and monitored
the hours of my team. I conducted quality assurance reviews, which involved
observing a team member conducting an audit in a branch and then providing
feedback on their performance. I conducted annual appraisals for my team
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15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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members and in addition held regular 1-2-1 meetings with them. I led Crown
Branch audits. I would also assist and occasionally lead audits in all branch types
when there was a need. I was responsible for maintaining elements of the Audit
Process Manual.
Then, about a year later (1 cannot recall the exact dates but I think it was around
2013) I became part of the team working on reviewing concerns raised by
postmasters with the Horizon system. Initially I completed this work alongside my
Field Team Leader role, but for about nine months I was withdrawn from my Field
Team Leader role and worked as part of the Horizon team full time, before
returning to my Field Team Leader role in 2015.
I obtained no qualifications during my time at POCL/POL. I have 'O' and 'A' Level
qualifications.
I received in-house training to carry out the audit roles I have described above.
Initially I attended audits with more experienced colleagues, and I also recall
attending training workshops. I also recall that there were a number of manuals
and publications which we referred to in carrying out our roles, and team meetings
also provided an opportunity for development.
I had numerous line managers during the period I was a Field Support Advisor.
The names I can recall include Sarah Cotterell, Simon Drinkwater, Karen Derbe,
Alvin West and Paul Holland. There is I am sure at least one other, but I cannot
now recall their name. It's possible some of these people were my line manager
before I became a Field Support Advisor, and possibly when I was a Field Team
Leader.
During my career at POCL/POL, I did not witness anything that would lead me to
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have concerns about the competence and professionalism of my colleagues or
managers.
20. The Request asks me what (if any) role I had in disciplinary matters, interviewing
suspects, disclosure in legal proceedings, litigation case strategy and liaising with
other POL departments in respect of the progress of cases. As a Field Team
Leader, I was responsible for dealing with disciplinary matters within my team.
As a Field Support Advisor, I had no role in disciplinary matters.
21. In none of the roles I have described did I have any part to play in conducting
interviews with anyone accused of criminal offences; disclosure in criminal or civil
proceedings; or developing litigation case strategy. I was not involved in liaising
with other Post Office departments in respect of the progress of cases.
22. The Request asks me to estimate the total number of audits I was involved with
and the number of branches I audited during my time working in the Audit team.
During my time in the Audit team, I audited all branch types including cash/stock
centres. I would estimate I completed hundreds of audits, possibly thousands.
The audit process and the policies/practices in place
23. The Request asks me to give an account of my role in the audit process and the
policies and procedures which governed it. During my time with the Audit team,
my role was to verify Post Office assets in branches and Cash/Stock centres. I
also reported on compliance with Post Office procedures. I described above (at
paragraph 8) what asset verification and compliance checks entailed. When
audits were completed, reports would be sent to various individuals, depending
on the type of branch (as far as I can recall, for example, a report of a Crown
Office (and I think a WH Smiths branch) was sent to the Area Manager for the
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branch. All audit reports I completed were, as far as I can recall, sent to my line
manager. If the audit resulted in a suspension, then reports were sent to the
Contracts Advisor and the Investigation Manager. There could have been others
to whom reports were sent, but I cannot now recall.
24. Policies and practices were updated on a very regular basis, for example through
weekly publications such as Counter News. Counter News was sent weekly to
branches to update them on any changes — for example, dates for the return of
stock such as philatelic items and National Lottery scratch cards. There was also
the Audit Process Manual, which contained, amongst other things, details of any
changes in the audit process and the version of the documents we needed to use
when completing an audit. This was updated as required and updates were
issued (as far as I can recall) at period ends (the point at which branches were
required to produce a branch trading statement). Given the time that has since
passed, I cannot specify any specific dates of changes, but I recall that it was an
ongoing process. When I was a Field Support Advisor, if I identified a practice
which I felt required a policy update, I would feed this information back to the
relevant manager.
25. During my time as a Field Team Leader, I had responsibility for
overseeing/updating some policies. I talk about the role I had in the development
of policies and practices elsewhere in my statement.
Recruitment and training of auditors
26. Paragraph 6 draws my attention to a series of documents (the document called
“Assurance Review — Recruitment (Vetting & Training)" dated October 2009 at
POL00032698; the document called “Network auditing approach, methods and
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assurance” dated 2013 at POL00086765; and the undated documents called
“Training & Audit Advisor” and "Audit Advisor’ (at POLO0088453 and
POL00088557). I am asked to give an account of process by which auditors were
recruited and the training provided.
27. Apart from my own experience of being appointed as an Auditor, as described
above, I only had knowledge of the recruitment process once I became a Field
Team Leader. During the time I was a Field Team Leader, as far as I can recall
all new members of the team were recruited internally, following an application
and interview process. New staff members were mainly recruited from Crown
Office branches or cash centres, but some came from other places, such as
Royal Mail or the Chesterfield Financial Service Centre.
28. As far asIcan recall, there were no minimum criteria that auditors had to achieve
for their roles. Induction training was provided for new team members. Training
was provided until staff felt confident to conduct/lead audits alone. Telephone
contact with a Field Team Leader or colleagues was always available.
29. Refresher training for staff was provided on ongoing basis, via workshops, Work
Time Listen and Learn (WTLL) sessions, internal bulletins and manual updates.
30. Speaking from my own experience as an auditor, I felt confident to conduct
branch audits during my time on the audit team. I cannot speak for the experience
of others, but I do recall that if staff in my team felt insecure about a certain aspect
(an operational matter such as providing the check and send service for passport
applications was a common example, I recall) I would arrange additional training
for them in that aspect.
The planning and scheduling of audits
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31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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Paragraph 11 draws my attention to the document at POL00084650 (Chapter 1
of the Audit Process Manual (Version 8.0, Jan 2010)) and I am asked to give an
account of how audits were scheduled and planned; how promptly they were
carried out once they were scheduled; the frequency of audits; any enquiries or
investigations carried out before a branch visit; and any variations between
Crown Office and other branches as to the scheduling of audits.
I can recall that there were a range of circumstances which informed when
branch audits were scheduled. There were routine scheduled audits and targeted
audits (carried out, for example, if the data suggested a branch had higher than
expected cash holdings or was not returning cash when requested to do so).
Transfer and closure audits were also completed.
Audits were also conducted following a robbery/burglary or following a major
incident, such as a fire or flood. Audits could be, and were, requested by the
Investigation team. Occasionally audits were scheduled following a customer
complaint (for example, because a branch did not have cash to pay a pension).
My recollection is that, if an audit was scheduled, it was carried out, but the
timetable for completing an audit would regularly change for a variety of reasons
(for example, because of staff sickness, or because a burglary or robbery audit
would be prioritised). It is therefore impossible to put a timescale on the exact
time between an audit being scheduled and the audit taking place.
What enquiries or investigations were conducted before a branch visit would
depend on the reason for the branch visit. The process changed during my time
as an Auditor and it is difficult after such a long period to be time to be specific as
to when these changes took place. I can remember, for example, that we were
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36.
37.
38.
39.
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routinely supplied with data (such as remittances sent to and received from the
branch) but later in my career this information was telephoned to the lead auditor
on site during the audit. Cash management data was available for targeted audits.
In addition, the size of the branch and branch type was considered to establish
what audit resource was needed to conduct the audit. At some point we were
supplied with data about transaction corrections issued. This often assisted in
identifying a possible compliance issue when additional training may be required
(for example, several transaction corrections being made for lottery transactions),
but I do not remember having this information for the whole time I was an auditor.
ATM input data was provided if relevant, and also a list of assistants registered
to work in the branch.
Initially when I became an Auditor we would receive a monthly list of postmasters
who had an authorised holiday scheduled. There was probably other information
available to me but after so long it is hard to remember.
When I first started as an auditor, branches were audited at least once within a
60 month period. Later on, branch audits became more targeted, using the
management data described above, although audits of branches selected at
random were also completed. Transfer and closure audits, burglary/robbery
audits and audits requested by the Investigations team took place as the need
arose.
Branches were also audited when a new postmaster was appointed. My
recollection is that audits took place at three months and 12 months after transfer,
but I cannot be certain about this, and think that the three month audit was
changed to a cash-only check at some point, or could have been ceased
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altogether.
40. I do not know how or why Crown Office branches were scheduled for audit, so
have no knowledge of any variation in the scheduling of Crown Office and other
branches.
The auditing process
41. Paragraph 17 draws my attention to a series of documents containing policies
and guidance on the audit process and I am asked to give an account of the
auditing process, touching on the information that would be considered when
completing an audit; the investigations undertaken into any discrepancies which
were discovered; the practice of requiring postmasters to make good any
discrepancies; the conduct of audits if the Horizon system was unavailable; and
any variations between Crown Office and other branches as to audit process.
42. The sources of information I would consider when completing an audit would vary
depending on the reason for of audit, as I have described above. For example,
you would consider the core and outreach element of the Audit Process Manual
if you were scheduled to attend a core and outreach branch. We would consider
any details available from the last audit completed at the branch. For any special
audits (usually requested by the investigation branch) we would consider cash
holdings, or whatever the stated reason for the audit.
43. If a postmaster had two or more branches and all their branches were being
audited at the same time (which was usual), we would liaise with the lead auditor
of the other branch(es), and share information. The purpose of sharing
information would be to coordinate arrangements for the audit, and, if a decision
was taken to suspend one branch, we would need to ensure the other branch or
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44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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branches were not opened also. At post-transfer audits (the first audit a new
postmaster would undergo) we would look at any training records available.
If a discrepancy or shortfall was discovered, initially the manager or postmaster
would be asked if there was any additional cash or stock that had not been
presented to the audit team. After checking the cash and stock counted,
sometimes the manager or postmaster would disclose information that an error
notice (which later became known as a transaction correction) was expected for
a very recent branch error and this would account for the discrepancy found at
the audit. Then a telephone call would be made to the Finance Service Centre in
Chesterfield to establish if a transaction correction was due.
Sometimes a telephone call was made to the cash or stock team if it was
considered that cash or stock had been incorrectly booked in or remitted out.
(Subsequently, cash auto settlement reduced the need to call Chesterfield).
Camelot was sometimes contacted if lottery scratch card discrepancies were
found.
At branch closures/transfers, postmasters were asked to make good any shortfall
or give any surplus up to a specified amount; this was so the branch accounts
balanced for the new postmaster. If the postmaster declined to make good the
shortfall or the surplus was more than the specified amount, it was settled
centrally.
I was aware of a practice of postmasters being requested to make good
discrepancies on the day of audit. I have no recollection of when and how I
became aware of this practice but it was longstanding. At branch closures and
transfers, the branch accounts had to show a clear balance and if outgoing
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49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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postmasters declined to make up any shortfall the amount would be settled
centrally. If a postmaster made a payment to me to settle a branch shortage, I
issued a receipt to the postmaster for the amount received.
For smaller shortfalls, at audits other than at transfers and closures, managers
and postmasters were advised that the shortfall should be made good on
completion of the next branch trading statement. Prior to the introduction of
branch trading statements, I think it was common practice to ask postmasters to
make good an audit shortfall on the day of the audit unless an error
notice/transaction correction was expected. I cannot recall how I became aware
of this practice.
I believe the instructions to auditors on taking payments from postmasters was
contained in the Audit Process Manual, within the closure and transfer sections.
If a discrepancy or shortfall was discovered, postmasters were able to obtain
transaction logs of data held on the system and look for unusual transactions. If
a postmaster asked me during an audit for copies of documents (for example,
suspense account, transaction logs or branch trading statements) then I would
provide copies of these. I recall one instance when a when a postmaster who had
been suspended requested copies of the branch trading statements.
My recollection of how I would conduct audits and the communication of
information is that, initially, the audit team were introduced to the postmaster or
officer in charge and the purpose of the visit was explained. This was particularly
important for the postmaster's first audit, when he/she may not have been aware
of the process.
During the audit updates were given. For example, in a branch with individual
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54.
55.
56.
57.
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stock units, the result of each stock unit checked would be communicated as it
was completed. The postmaster was at liberty at any point during the audit to ask
questions about the process.
In respect of audits being conducted in circumstances when it was not possible
to access the Horizon IT system, it was possible to undertake a verification of
assets even if it was not possible to produce the reports needed for the audit. For
example, a fire or flood might have damaged any Horizon kit beyond repair. On
these occasions, the assets (cash and stock) could be physically counted, but a
balance could not be completed.
The only variance in the audit process in respect of Crown Office branches and
other branches that I can think of is that the amount of a reportable discrepancy
was larger for a Crown Office branch. I cannot remember the actual amounts and
do not know why a different amount was reportable in a Crown Office as opposed
to other branches.
Paragraph 27 draws my attention to the documents at FUJ00001894 and
POL00002841 and I am asked to give an account of Fujitsu's role in the audit
process; whether auditors had access to information which postmasters didn't;
and my understanding of the Audit Global User Account and any audit measures
in place in respect of this.
The only Fujitsu involvement in the audit process that I can recall was if a one-
shot password was required. Auditors required access to Horizon to obtain
reports required for an audit. If the postmaster, or a member of staff with
manager-level access to the system, was on duty they could add you to Horizon
as a User. But if no one was on duty with manager-level access, we could ask for
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58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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a "one-shot password" which gave us access to Horizon; we could then create
ourselves as a User and obtain the necessary reports. At the end of the audit
(unless a suspension occurred) we would delete ourselves from Horizon.
My recollection is that the format of the information available to an auditor may
have been different to that available to a postmaster, but I cannot think of any
information I had access to that a postmaster did not.
My recollection is that I had two global user account to access Horizon. One was
for use in Counter Training Offices to reset the terminals at the end of a classroom
course. I also had an audit global user account which allowed me access to the
Horizon system in branches. This was used, for example, when remitting cash
and stock from the branch during a closure audit. This ensured any entries made
on Horizon were attributed to the auditor. It also provided access to an icon on
the Horizon system to transfer any final account discrepancies outside of a
trading period to Chesterfield.
If auditors forgot their global user password or timed out on the system, my
recollection is that they contacted either the scheduling team or the Field Support
Change Advisor, so I presume they controlled the issuing of global user
passwords.
Paragraphs 32 and 33 draw my attention to some documents and I am asked
whether I created or contributed to policies, practices and procedures that were
in place.
Aside from being responsible for maintaining elements of the Audit Process
Manual when I was a Field Team Leader (which I described at paragraph 14) I
do recall having some input into the development of policies and practices. For
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example, the document at POL00087764 (an email exchange between me and
Warren Hattrell, Field Team Leader South, and Sandra McBride, Network
Support Change Advisor, in November 2015) refers to a change to the EASE
database which I suggested when the Financial Service Centre in Chesterfield
began to accept debit card payments from postmasters.
63. The document at POL00086389 ("the Audit Process Update — Period 10") refers
to work I undertook to simplify the transfer pack paperwork so that, rather than
having lots of separate documents to print out, the required number of copies of
each document could be combined into a single file so auditors could print off a
pack and know they had all the paperwork they needed to complete the transfer
audit.
64. The document at POL00087614 ("Terms of Reference Audits", dated April 2015)
refers to a work aid I suggested that Field Team Leaders use when completing
an observation of Field Support Advisors completing an Audit. The aim of this
work aid (as described in the document) was to deliver consistent quality audits
by providing a "check list", but it was not mandatory.
Prosecution of Joan Francis Bailey
65. Paragraph 35 draws my attention to a series of documents relating to the audit I
undertook at the Howey Post Office branch in 2011, Mrs Bailey's subsequent
interview, and the inspection report in respect of her, and I am asked to give an
account of my involvement in the audit of the Howey branch, touching on matters
relating to the scheduling and conduct of the audit; the shortfall discovered; my
awareness of other audits conducted prior to 2011; whether ARQ logs were
obtained; the decision to suspend Mr Bailey; and my involvement in Mrs Bailey's
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case prior to the decision to charge her.
Audit of Howey Branch
66. I am reminded by the documents that I was the Auditor who completed the audit
at Howey branch on 5.1.11. I cannot now recall why the audit was scheduled.
67. I cannot now recall the exact process used in this particular audit, and can only
go by what is contained in my audit report at POL00055918. As I stated in my
report, I introduced myself to Mr Bailey on arrival and then proceeded to verify
Post Office assets held at the branch (which is consistent with my recollection of
how I approached every audit I carried out).
68. I am reminded by the document at POL00062294 that on 17.1.11 I returned to
Howey branch to conduct an audit of the satellite branch. I cannot recall anything
about the visit, and can only go by what the memo advises.
69. On the two occasions I attended the Howey branch as described above, I
attended alone.
70. Ihave no recollection of any discussions with Mr or Mrs Bailey during the audit,
the documents I considered and what my initial enquiries revealed, and can only
go by the details contained in my audit reports.
71. I am asked whether the size of the shortfall I discovered was unusual, in my
experience. During my time as part of the audit team, I have attended audits with
varying amounts of discrepancies. My role was to report the discrepancy I found
at Howey branch during the audit conducted. My recollection is that shortfalls
over £1,000 had to be reported. I don't recall giving any consideration as to
whether the amount was unusual or not.
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72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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I cannot recall if I made any further investigations to ascertain the cause of the
shortfall. I can only go by the details contained in my audit reports.
I have no recollection of requesting ARQ logs from Fujitsu for Howey branch. I do
not know if anyone else did. I cannot recall being aware that ARQ logs existed at
the time I carried out this audit; I believe that I became aware of ARQ logs during
the period when I worked in the Horizon team in about 2013 to 2015.
I have no recollection of any discussions with Stephen Bradshaw or any other
investigators in the case before, during or after the audit. I can only go by the
details contained in my audit reports.
Although I cannot now recall completing any documentation after the audits I
carried out at Howey branch, as the documents I have been referred to show, I
did prepare audit reports. As I set out in my report, the discrepancy was reported
to the Contracts Advisor and Fraud Team Manager.
As detailed in my report, the decision to suspend Mr Bailey was made by the
Contracts Advisor.
I have no memory of any audits completed at Howey branch prior to 5.1.11,
although I accept I may have performed an audit there before then (given that I
had been carrying out audits for many years prior to 2011).
As far as I can recall, I had no further involvement in Mrs Bailey’s case prior to
the decision being made to charge her.
I have considered Mrs Bailey's “human impact" witness statement at
WITNO3160100, noting in particular paragraphs 61 and 89. As I say above, I
cannot recall anything about the audit visit and therefore cannot offer any
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reflections about the audit and investigation carried out. Mrs Bailey has said in
her statement that I disregarded a package of unremitted stamps. I cannot recall
what I found with regards to obsolete stock in Howey branch, but my recollection
of the process is that any obsolete stock on hand would have been disregarded,
as per the guidelines in the Audit Process Manual. It was not uncommon for
audits to find obsolete stock in branches. Looking back at my report, I believe I
counted all the cash and stock provided by Mr and Mrs Bailey, and in my report I
refer to a number of occasions on which I drew their attention to the audit shortfall.
My report also says that Mr and Mrs Bailey declined to count the cash or stock
themselves despite my inviting them to do so three times.
80. Mrs Bailey's statement implies that the audit didn’t consider Horizon transactions
and says that she and her husband were unable to check the Horizon system
themselves, as the system would not allow them to look at past transactions. In
my recollection of how the system worked, I believe Mr or Mrs Bailey could have
accessed transaction logs to look for any irregular transactions when they
became aware of any discrepancy.
Criminal proceedings
81. lam asked to describe what involvement I had in the criminal proceedings against
Mrs Bailey and to offer a view on how POL conducted its prosecution.
82. Ihave no memory of being asked for or preparing a witness statement in the case
against Mrs Bailey. However, I recall that during my time as an auditor I did make
a number of witness statements, whether or not one related to Mrs Bailey I cannot
recall.
83. As I have no memory of any involvement in the prosecution of Mrs Bailey, I am
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unable to provide a view as to how the case was conducted by POL.
84. I have no memory of being informed of the outcome of the case against Mrs
Bailey.
General
85. I am asked to provide an account of the incident documented in POL00090679,
a letter from Mrs Thomas of Tylerstown Post Office dated 12.2.17 in which she
describes her concerns about losses recorded in the Horizon system. I don’t now
recall having spoken to Mrs Thomas about a Moneygram systems error. It seems
possible that I may have visited the Tylerstown branch, which is how Mrs Thomas
may have got my contact details. I don’t recall having said anything about carrying
out further investigations. I think it is unlikely I would have said that I would
arrange to credit the office, as I don't recall that that was within my power. It
seems more likely that I would have offered to request a transactional correction.
86. Itis possible that the letter is describing an event that took place shortly before I
left POL in 2016. My belief is that I would have undertaken any actions I promised
to Mrs Thomas.
87. At Paragraph 58, the Request asks me if I was aware of concerns related to the
robustness of the Horizon system during my time working for POL. Personally, I
do not recall ever seeing or hearing anything which caused me concern as to the
robustness of the Horizon system, whether as an auditor or while working in
branches. I did acquire direct experience of using Horizon myself after it was first
introduced when, working around my other commitments, I worked in a Crown
Office branch to improve my knowledge of the system. I would also provide
support to Crown Office branches at Christmas and I sometimes worked on the
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88.
89.
90.
91.
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counter then. When I was a Field Support Advisor I also delivered on-site training
to new postmasters, and so acquired experience of the system that way.
I was aware of the concerns raised by postmasters when I was working in the
Horizon team between 2013 and 2015, but I don't remember having any cause
for concern that there were bugs, errors or defects with Horizon.
I do recall that I and some other colleagues received an email after the broadcast
of the Panorama programme in 2015 which revealed the existence of concerns
about the Horizon system. I have looked back to check when the programme was
broadcast and believe it was in August 2015. At this time I had left the Horizon
team and had gone back to being a Field Team Leader. I think the email was
from Julia Marwood, who was an Area Manager at the time, but I cannot be
absolutely certain of this. The email, to the best of my recollection, said that POL
was refuting the allegations made in the programme, and that POL had no reason
to believe that the Horizon system was not robust.
At Paragraph 59, the Request asks me whether I considered a challenge to the
integrity of the Horizon system in one case to be relevant to other cases. I am
aware since I have left POL that further evidence has come to light that has
questioned the robustness of the Horizon IT system; it seems to me logical these
issues could have arisen at any branch, but I am not party to all the information
to enable me to come to a more informed view.
At Paragraph 60, the Request also asks me to what extent I considered POL
sufficiently investigated bugs, errors and defects in Horizon. During the period in
which I worked in the Horizon team, the impression I had was that POL was
making efforts to support postmasters raising concerns with the Horizon system
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and I had no reason to doubt that they were insufficient. In my experience, we
spent a long time trying to resolve individual issues raised by postmasters.
Clearly, since I have left POL, further evidence has come to light, which has
caused me to question that opinion. As I am not party to that information in full, I
do not consider it appropriate for me to comment further.
92. At Paragraph 61, the Request asks me to what extent I consider that Fujitsu
passed sufficient information to POL about bugs, errors and defects in Horizon.
It was only on reading the list of issues for this inquiry that I became aware that
Fujitsu held a list or lists of bugs/errors and defects in Horizon. I have no
knowledge if, and/or when the list or lists was passed to POL, so am unable to
comment further.
93. At Paragraph 62, the Request also asks me to what extent I had sufficient
information about bugs, errors and defects in Horizon. As I have said elsewhere,
I had no idea during my period of employment with POL that a list or lists of
bugs/errors and defects with the Horizon system existed. I have tried my very
best to recall the information that has been requested of me, but after such a long
period of time, I have found it impossible to be specific about dates/timelines and
information related to the audits at Howey Post Office in January 2011.
Other Matters
94. Ihave no further matters I wish to bring to the attention of the Chair of the Inquiry.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
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03 Oct 2023
Dated:
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Index to First Witness Statement of Judy Balderson WITN09210100
No. I URN Document Description Control No.
1. POL00032698 I"Assurance Review - Recruitment I POL-0029633
(Vetting & Training)" (October 2009)
2. POL00086765 I “Network auditing approach, methods I POL-0083823
and assurance” (2013)
3. POL00088453 _I “Training & Audit Advisor” (undated) POL-0085511
4. POL00088557 __I "Audit Advisor” (undated) POL-0085615
5. POL00084650 I Chapter 1 of the Audit Process Manual,
(version 8.0, Jan 2010) POL-0081708
6. FUJ00001894 I “Audit Trail Functional Specification” I POINQO008065F
(version 8.0, 18 October 2004)
7. POL00002841 I Global User Account (September 2016) I VISO0003855
8. POL00087764 I Email exchange between with Warren I POL-0084822
Hattrell, Field Team Leader South, and
Sandra McBride, Network Support
Change Advisor (November 2015)
9. POL00086389__I "Audit Process Update — Period 10" POL-0083447
10. I POL00087614 I"Terms of Reference Audits" (April I POL-0084672
2015)
11. I POL00055918 I Howey branch audit report (5 January I POL-0052397
2011)
12. I POL00062294 I Memo to Colin Burston (17 January I POL-0058773
2011)
13. I WITNO3160100 I "Human impact" witness statement of I WITN03160100
Joan Bailey (11 February 2022)
14. I POLO0090679 I Letter from Mrs Thomas, Tylerstown I POL-0090200
Post Office (12 February 2017)
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