WITNO09250100
WITNO9250100
Witness Name: Paul Graham Bosson
Statement No.: WITN09250100
Dated: 13 June 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PAUL GRAHAM BOSSON
I, Paul Graham Bosson, will say as follow:-
Introduction
1. Iam a former employee of Post Office Limited and held the position of Network
Audit Manager.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 15" May 2023
(the “Request”).
Background
3. I joined the Post Office straight from school in 1977 where I worked for 2 years
at the Crown Office in Reading.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
._ In the following 4 years or so, I worked in the Accounts Department, which dealt
with the supply of cash and stock to Post Office Branches and also the retum
of items such as mutilated stamps; foreign coin; excess cash and claims for
various allowances such as telephone calls and monthly charges.
. I also worked for short spells in the Planning Department which dealt with
monitoring of Post Office buildings and various projects such as build work;
repairs; painting etc.
. Following this, I moved to completing the Reading Head Office Cash Account
each week, which also included summarising and submitting the Head Office
Expenditure Schedule.
. Around the early 1980's I joined the Audit Team in Reading which at that tine
covered Post Office Branches in the Reading Postcode area.
. Following aPost Office reorganisation, I was promoted to an AuditManager the
date of which I think was towards the end of the 80's. The role involved
managing anddevelopinga team of around 8 auditors and scheduling audits of
Post Office Branches, including Crown Offices each week in accordance with
the annual audit plan. I remained in this role for around 20 years, during which
time it was renamed to Network Audit Manager following another
reorganisation.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
9. I eventually moved to a new role which I think was around 2005 dealing with
Governance and Compliance auditing, which involved carrying out reviews on
a range of procedures throughout the business.
10.1 eventually left the Business in 2011 after 33 years service.
The Audit Process & Policies/Practices in Place
41.My role as Network Audit Manager primarily involved managing a team of
around ten auditors ensuring they had the appropriate skills for their role. This
would be achieved through ongoing on thejob training and monthly one to ones
to address any skill gaps.
12.As I recall, each month I would receive a list of Post Office Branches to be
audited which had been identified as scheduled or risk audits. These branches
would be scheduled for audit within the month received and would be
undertaken by varying numbers of auditors, dependant on the size of the
Branch. A Lead Auditor would be assigned to each audit who would be
responsible for the planning and leading of the audit. Branches were generally
closed whilstcash and stock items were reconciled to declared figures. In some
cases, where satisfied that sufficient cash and stock had been counted and
reconciled, the office was allowed to open to reduce the impact on customer
service. The remaining value items to be counted and reconciled would be
isolated and given access to the Branch on completion of this.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
13. The audit of the cash and stock used to be completed manually and recorded
on an Audit Form, P32 which detailed all cash stock and vouchers checked to
produce a Balance Due which should reconcile to the Branch figure. Any
difference would represent the Branch surplus or shortage which Sub-
postmasters would be requested to withdraw or make good which would be
undertaken at the time of the audit. In cases where the discrepancy is proven
to relate to a transactional error where a corrective error notice is due, the
amountmay be heldin uncharged receipts or unclaimed payments pending the
receipt of this. In some circumstances where the amount of shortfall was such
that the Sub-postmaster was not in a financial position to make good the
amount, authority was sought from the Retail Network Manager to hold the
amountin unclaimed payments pending a formal repayment agreement being
made.
14.An electronic version of the AuditP32 was created and superseded the manual
version, but! am unsure when this was introduced.
15.In terms of the policies in place during my time as Network Audit Manager, I am
unable to recall what would have been in place and when/if they were subject
to change during that period.
Recruitment & Training of Auditors
16. I have been asked to consider the following documents, Assurance Review —
Recruitment (Vetting & Training) version 1.0 dated 27 October 2009
[POL00032698], Network auditing approach, methods and assurance dated
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
2013 [POL00086765], Training & Audit Advisor [POL00088453] and Loss
Prevention - Audit Advisor [POL00088557).
17. Auditor vacancies were advertised and recruited intemally. My recollection is
that there were no restrictions regarding what teams/department they worked
in, but generally it was beneficial to have an operational background such as
working in a Crown Office or Cash Centre. Candidates would be subject to an
interview process to determine their capabilities and suitability for the role, with
the best candidate being offered the post.
418. The successful candidate would be provided with induction training and on the
job training with auditors within the team until both they and the Network Audit
Manager were confident that their knowledge and skills were at a level where
they could undertake audits on their own. This would always be at very small
Branches. Generally, most audits required a staffing level of atleast two or more
people, so support was always available to new recruits. Regular monthly one
to ones and Performance Reviews addressed any concerns or issues had by
the new recruit or Network Audit Manager, with additional training on any
specific areas of weakness identified. Again, this would be addressed by on the
job training.
19.In my view even given the lack of an actual Audit training course, I had
confidence that Auditors had sufficienttraining and expertise to effectively carry
out audits at Post Office Branches. All Auditors received monthly one to ones
which reviewed performance and any knowledge gaps identified by the
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
individual or Network Audit Manager. This would be subsequently addressed
with appropriate additional training as required.
The Planning & Scheduling of Audits
20.1 have been asked to consider document, Chapter 1 of the Audit Process
Manual — Audit Plan & Scheduling version 8.0 dated 2010 [POL00084650}.
21.Post Office Branches were audited based on risk. My recollection is that various
risk models were used to establish branches thatposed the greatest risk. Audits
could also be requested if concerns/issues are identified by various
departments such as Security or the Finance department in Chesterfield. A
monthly program of audits was produced, and audits were scheduled each
month from this, with the higher risk branches prioritised first. Branches
potentially could be subject to several audits each year depending on previous
audit findings or ongoing risk. From recollection, low risk branches could go up
to 3 years withoutan audit. A percentage of randomly selected branches were
also included for audit each year.
22.A Branch profile used to be held detailing hours of opening; numberof individual
tills where appropriate; whether it conducted National Lottery/ Bureau de
Change/ Car Tax; ATM machine; Stamp Vending machine or other
products/services unique to certain branches which would be used in
determining the staffing level for the audit. This was originally in a paper format,
butan electronic version was later introduced but! cannotrecall when thiswas.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
23.In cases where Branches were scheduled following a request from the Security
Team, discussions between the Lead Auditor and the Security Lead team
member attending would be had to determine what the issue/concer was, and
the approach required by the Security Team leader. Generally, these types of
audits would mean the branch would remain closed until all issues had been
resolved by the Security Team.
24.1 believe that Crown Offices were scheduled for audit every 2 years or sooner
if risks/issues were identified, as I would assume they wentthrough the same
tisk assessment as other Post Office Branches.
The Auditing Process
25. I have been asked to consider various documents in relation to the auditing
process [POL00083966, POL00084801, POL00087627, POL00088252,
POL00084003, POL00084813, POL00085652, POL00086765, POL00086839
and POL000877 16].
26.When completing an audit, a number of printouts were obtained from the
Horizon system. This would be achieved by requesting the Sub-postmaster or
Branch Manager with manager's access, to produce the required reports.
Alternatively, as I recall, the Sub-postmaster or member of staff with managers
access could be asked to create a User ID for the lead auditor to allow them
access to the Horizon system to produce the required reports. In the absence
of anyone being available with managers access to the Horizon system, a One-
Shot password would need to be obtained via the Horizon Helpdesk to enable
the Lead Auditor access to the Horizon system. As I recall this was the
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
procedure for all audits. The following reports were obtained from the Horizon
system —
e Previous Branch Trading Statement (Reprint.
e Office Snapshot
e Overnight Cash Holding Declaration
e Suspense Account
e Remittances In and Remittances Out
e Reversals
* Transaction Corrections Processed
e Transaction Corrections Outstanding
e User Summary
e Transaction Log over £5k
27.1n the eventof an unexplained discrepancy being discovered on the auditwhich
the Sub-postmaster could not explain, and could not be attributed to any
obvious error in the transactions or cash and stock declaration completed by
the branch in the week the audit was conducted, or there was evidence of
fraudulent activity discovered, this would be escalated to the Security Team,
Network Retail Manager, and the appropriate line manager of the Lead Auditor
for advice and any ongoing actions.
28.Errors made in transactions reported from the branch would, once reconciled
by receiving departments resultin error notices being issued to correct the error
and enable the branch to offsetlosses or surpluses caused in their accounts as
a result.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
29. As previously mentioned in my statement, Sub-postmasters would be asked to
make good Sosses or withdraw surpluses discovered on the audit. In cases
where the discrepancy is proven to relate to a transactional error where a
corrective error notice is due, the amount may be held in uncharged receipts or
unclaimed payments pending the receipt of this. In some circumstances where
the amountof shortfall was such that the Sub-postmaster was notin a financial
position to make good the amount, authority was sought from the Retail Line
Manager to hold the amount in unclaimed payments pending a formal
repayment agreement being made. This was a longstanding requirementas far
as I recall and was in place when I first joined the Audit Team in 1977.
30.1 do notrecall any incidents or need for an Auditor to take any form of payments
from a Sub-postmaster as any losses would be processed through the Branch
account.
3
.I cannotsay for certain, but if a discrepancy was found on the audit, I can see
no reason why a Sub-postmaster could not provide their own information or
investigate it further through direct contact with the relevant
department/agencies to determine if any transactional errors had been made to
account for the discrepancy at the Branch. Errors made in transactions
submitted to the various departments would be identified in due course and
correction (error) notices issued to the Branch.
32. If a Sub-postmaster was suspended as a result of a discrepancy found on an
audit, given he would nothave access to the relevant documents/information it
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
is unlikely that they would be able to pursue any enquiries of their own. My
assumption would be that enquiries would be made by the Security team as
part of their investigation.
33.At the start of the audit, Sub-postmasters would be appraised of what would be
happening during the auditand what documentation would be required from the
Horizon system. They would be asked to identify where all cash stock and
vouchers were held, and to provide them to the Auditor. They would be advised
that where possible the Branch would be reopened as soon as possible to
minimise disruption to customers. If this was found to be not possible for
example because cash declared by the Sub-postmaster did not accurately
match that produced to the Auditors, this would be communicated to the Sub-
postmaster. If a compliance auditis also being undertaken, the Sub-postmaster
would be advised that questions would need to be asked to them and staff
members. Throughout the audit the Sub-postmaster would be updated on
progress. On completion of the audit, the result of the financial audit would be
advised to the Sub-postmaster and a close of meeting held to discuss findings
and recommendations following the compliance audit.
34.Sub-postmasters were freely able to discuss with the Lead Auditor any
concerns they may have regarding the audit or perhaps issues with staff
members that gave them cause for concern. Where possible, issues would be
resolved at the time or where necessary, referred to the appropriate Retail Line
Manager or Security team for advice or assistance. I do not recall any instances
of having to do this in my time working in Audits.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
35.In the eventof a Horizon system failure at a branch my understanding would
be that a complete audit would not be possible due to the lack of available
reports from the Horizon system. In the event of damage to the Horizon system
through incidents such as fire where the building is deemed unsafe, assets
would be removed to a secure location in sealed pouches and bags by Cash in
Transit and held at a secure location. Where possible any documentation
should be retrieved from the branch to assist in the completion of a P32 Audit
of Accounts. haveno recollection of incidences of thisin my time as an auditor.
36. The approach to Crown Office audits is different to other branches given thatit
is managed by Post Office managers who have responsibilities to undertake
random spot checks of counter stocks held by Post Office staff members.
Checks on audit would include any stocks held by the Branch Manager
including where applicable Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs), Stamp
machines. Additionally, any dormant unused stocks anda minimum of 50% of
live counterstocks must be checked. Any stocks with a high cash on hand figure
recorded should also be checked. Where time allows additional checks of live
counter stocks can be made.
37.From recollection each Auditor had their own unique password to have limited
access to the Horizon system when auditing a branch. In order to access the
reports etc that they required; the Sub-postmaster would be required to add
them to the Branch Users on Horizon where they would then log on using their
password. On completion of the audit the auditor would need to log out of the
Horizon system and be removed by the Sub-postmaster from the user list.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
38.In the event that a Sub-postmaster or a person with manager access was not
presentat the Branch to add the auditorto the Horizon system a phone request
is made on the day to the Horizon Helpdesk to obtain a one shot password
which provides the Auditor with additional access to the Horizon system which
has the same as access rights of the Sub-postmaster or person with manager
access. This level of access wouldalso be requiredin the eventthat the Branch
was closed or transferred.
39.Checks were carried out on the Office Horizon system as part of the audit
process to determine if the Office Horizon User List was upto date and reflected
the current staff at the branch, and if they held the correct user level. Sub-
postmasters would be asked to ensure staff had correct user levels and to
remove any staff no longer employed at the Branch.
40.1 have been asked to consider documents, Audit Trail Functional Specification,
version 8.0 dated 18 October 2004 [FUJ00001894] and Global User Account
dated September 2016 [POL00002841].
41.As I recall, although I cannotbe certain, Fujitsu hada limited role in the auditing
of branches. The only involvement believe was providing a one shot password
on request to enable an Auditor access to the Horizon system to obtain various
reports.
42.From memory I am not aware that Auditors had access to information thatwas
not accessible to Sub-postmasters.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
43.1 have been asked to explain my understanding of an Audit Global User
Account. I cannot remember and am not familiar with the Audit Global User
Account during my time as Network Audit Manager.
Prosecution of Mr David Yates
44.1 have been asked to set out my recollection of this case and to assist me to
consider the following documents, my witness statement in the proceedings
against Mr Yates [POL00066598], taped record of Mr Yates interview on 7
March 2003 [POL00047494] and the Post Office Ltd Offender Report of Mr
Yates [POL00061010].
45.On the 6" March 2003, I received a telephone call from Mr Michael Dadra who
was the Operations Manager within the Security & Audit Team. The call related
to a previous audit that had been conducted at Walton on Thames Post Office
on the 15"" November 2002. As I recall, I believe I would have been the Lead
Auditor on this particular audit. Mr Dadra informed me that following post audit
checks on remittances dispatched from Walton on Thames (which had been
included in the audit), itwas discovered that they had notbeen received by the
Post Office Cash Centre and had also not been recorded in the subsequent
cash account submitted by Walton on Thames Post Office. This amounted to a
discrepancy of £330,000.00.
46.To clarify, Post Office branches, where required, receive cash from the Post
Office Cash Centre and will receive sums of cash through various transactions
throughout the day. In some circumstance, branches could receive large
deposits of cash from local businesses. They will also throughoutthe day make
cash payments to customers andclients, again through various transactions. In
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
some instances branches, where cash deposits far out way the cash payments,
will end up with excess cash, which would need to be remitted back to the Post
Office Cash Centre. In some branches this could be quite significant amounts.
Audit of Walton on Thames Branch
47.1 have been asked to consider document, Memo from R Parker to David Yates
re audit of Walton on Thames branch dated 21 June 2002 [POL00047328] and
letter to David Yates from R Parker re finding of audit dated 26 November 2002
{POL00047481] and to set out my involvement or awareness of the audits
completed at the Walton on Thames Branch prior to 7 March 2003.
48. In view of the findings following the audit conducted at Walton on Thames on
the 15'" November 2002, an audit was arranged for Friday 7"* March 2003. The
audit was led by myself, and I was assisted by Sue Le May, an Auditor in the
Audit Network Team. Sue Le May would have assisted me in the counting of
cash and stock held at Walton on Thames.
49.When we arrived at the branch at approximately 08.55am, Mr Yates was not
present but one of his staff members was in situ preparing the branch in
readiness for opening at 09.00am. I informed the staff member of our intention
to audit the branch, and that the branch would remain closed until a result had
been reached. Shortly after, at around 09.05am, Mr Yates arrived whereupon I
apprised him of the process of the day as previously discussed with his staff
member. I asked Mr Yates to printan Office Snapshot from the Horizon system
which on examination indicated an overall cash holding of £410,354.67. ! further
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
requested from Mr Yates, the previous days Over Night Cash Holding
declaration (ONCH). On examination of this, it showed a total ONCH holding of
£43,566.00 which was significantly differentto the figure indicated on the Office
snapshot.I asked Mr Yates why there was such a large variance between the
two, and he informed me that he had sent a remittance the previous day but
had not yet processed it through the Horizon system. I asked Mr Yates to
provide me with the Cash in Transit collection book, which bears the signature
of the Cash in Transit collecting officer, evidencing that they had been received
for dispatch to The Cash Centre. On examination of the CIT collection book
there was no evidence ofa collection on the 6" March 2003, the last entry being
the 5 March 2003.
50.1 further asked Mr Yates to provide me with the remittance under copies
P5257MA, which would detail what cash in denomination, had been remitted to
the Post Office Cash Centre but he claimed that he couldnotfindthem. He then
wenton to admit thatno remittance had been despatched the previous day and
subsequently we would find an audit discrepancy of £350,000.00.
51. Following these admissions by Mr Yates, I phoned the Operations Manager, Mr
Michael Dadra and informed him of the position. He in turn then contacted Paul
Dawkins, the Internal Crime Manager for that area, who arranged for Mr Dave
Posnett and Mr Rob Fitzgerald to attend the branch and conductan interview
with Mr Yates.
52.At this point! documented details confirming the events thus far. This was then
signed by myself and Mr Yates and given to Mr Posnett on his arrival.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
53.In the meantime, the audit of the branch continued in order to determine the
true extentof the loss. This was achieved by a physical check of all cash, stock
and vouchers on hand and compared to the office snapshotas provided by Mr
Yates at the commencement of the audit, in order to verify they were present.
54. The audit revealed a total Branch shortage of £359,325.35 which was notified
to Mr Posnett, and is broken down as follows —
Cash shortage - £356,541.35
National Lottery Tickets Disallowed (out of date)
- £483.00
Littlewoods Tickets Disallowed (out of date) - £650.00
National Lottery Tickets Shortage - £208.00
Net Shortages in Stock - £1987.84
Charge Error Notice Accounted for on audit - £112.00
Claim Error Notice Accounted for on audit +£512.28
Previous weeks Declared Surplus not withdrawn
+£144.20
55.The size of this audit shortage was by far the largest I encountered during my
audit career. At the time I wouldnot have been aware of the circumstances that
caused it, as this was for the Security Team to determine in interview, and to
pursue any further enquiries.
56.1 cannot recall what ARQ logs are and who would have been responsible for
obtaining them from Fujitsu or indeed if they were obtained.
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
57.Although I cannotrecall, it is very likely that! would have spoken to Mr Posnett
regarding the previous audits performed at Walton on Thames and that it was
highly likely that Mr Yates produced bogus CIT receipts and P5257MA
documents to conceala discrepancy. It is unclearas to why this was not picked
up following post audit checks of outward remittances.
58.Retail Network Managers are responsible for the decision to suspend Sub-
postmasters, so in thisinstance Elaine Wrightwould have suspended Mr Yates.
59. Following this decision, we were advised by Elaine Wright to secure all cash,
stock and value items in the Branch safes pending arrangements being made
for the branch to be transferred to a temporary Sub-postmaster.
60.1 have been asked to consider document, Memo from Paul Bosson to David
Posnett dated 4 September 2004 [POL00066457]. Following the audit on 7
March 2003, I completed an audit report to Dave Posnett and copied in Elaine
Wright, Retail Line Manager, detailing my findings on the audit of Walton On
Thames. A further copy would have been submitted to my line manager Mr
Martin Ferlinc for information. This is normal policy in the event of an audit
involving the Intemal Crime Team.
61.1 am not aware at what point Mr Yates was charged. As I recall the only
involvement following the audit at Walton On Thames was to provide a witness
statement on the 7" July 2003.
Criminal Proceedings
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
62.Prior to this case I do not recall if I was involvedin any proceedings against
Sub-postmasters, their managers or assistants, or Post Office employees
relating to shortfalls shown on the Horizon IT system.
63.1 cannotrecall who would have asked me to provide a witness statement, butit
would most likely have been someone from the Intemal Crime Team. My
assumption is it would have been Mr Posnett, but this may not necessarily have
been the case. I cannotrecall who if anyone! had contact with when drafting
my statement or any discussions that may or may not have taken place.
64.1 do not recall if any discussions were had with Counsel or POL Legal
representatives regarding my role as witness. As faras I am concerned my role
in this case was to describe the events leading up to, and during the audit
performed at Walton On Thames, which subsequently led to the audit
discrepancy discovered.
65. From what! recall, the prosecution seemed to follow the usual process andwas
conducted in the same way as any other.
66.1 am sure I would have been informed of the outcome of the case against Mr
Yates. I am not surprised at his guilty plea given the admissions he made in his
statement that he had used POL funds to pay for staff wages and bills. As
tegards to his sentence, which I believe was a 3 year prison sentence, I was
not really surprised given the amount of discrepancy involved in this case.
67.1 have been asked to considerthe Judgmentof the Court of Appeal in Josephine
Hamilton & Others v Post Office Limited [2021] EWCA Crim 577
[POL00113278] and my reflections on the investigation that was done in Mr
WITNO9250100
WITNO9250100
Yates case. Reflecting on the case against Mr Yates, it seems that despite his
admissions that he used POL cash for personal use, there seems to be a
significant unknown sum of money that related to unexplained losses reported
‘on the Horizon system over a number of years which does not appear to have
been investigated further to determine how or why they occurred.
Knowledge of bugs errors and defects in the Horizon system
68.During my time working in POL, I did not have any reasons for concem
regarding the robustness of the Horizon system, as I accepted that given it had
been thoroughly tested prior to roll out, that it was reliable and fit for purpose. I
am not aware of any instances where concerns were raised to me by anyone
including members of my audit team regarding the integrity of the Horizon
system. In the event that concerns had been raised by POL regarding the
Horizon system they should have been communicated to the audit teams
across the country as well as Retail Line Managers and the Internal Crime
Team.
69. Auditors in my team would not have been instructed to ignore Horizon issues if
they were raised as possible reasons for shortfalls. In the event of any such
concems being raised on an audit, the auditee should have in my view, been
advised to speak to their Retail Line Manager who is responsible for the
managing of the Branch.
Other Matters
WITNO09250100
WITNO9250100
70. I have completed this statement as honestly and as accurate as possible. As
you can appreciate this refers to a case over 20 years ago and remembering
events and policies during that time is quite challenging for someone like myself
who has a poor long term memory. Many of the documents provided to me are
dated after I moved from my role of Network Audit Manager and after I left the
Post Office.
Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Signed: I GRO I
Dated: 13th June 2023
Index to First Witness Statement of Paul Graham Bosson
WITNO09250100
WITNO9250100
No,
URN
Document Description
Control Number
1
POL00032698
Assurance Review - Recruitment
(Vetting & Training)” (version 1.0,
27 October 2009)
POL-0029633
POL00086765
Network auditing approach,
methods and assurance (2013)
POL-0083823
POL00088453
Training & Audit Advisor
POL-0085511
POL00088557
Loss Prevention - Audit Advisor
POL-0085615
POL00084650
Chapter 1 of the Audit Process
Manual - Audit Plan &
Scheduling Version 8.0 2010
POL-0081708
POL00083966
Audit Charter - Branch and
Cash Centre Audit Activity
POL-0081024
POL00084801
Audit Process Manual —
Chapter 3 Performing a Branch
Audit — version 5.1
POL-0081859
POL00087627
Audit Process Manual — Chapter
3b — Follow up Audit Processes
version 3.0, May 2015
POL-0084685
POL00088252
Audit Process Manual Volume 4 —
Chapter 7 — Performing a Cash
Centre Audit (version 5.0)
POL-0085310
10
POL00084003
Audit Process Manual - Post
Incident Auditing without Horizon,
Chapter 14 of the Audit Process
(version 1.0, 1 November 2006)
POL-0081061
11
POL00084813
Condensed Guide for Audit
Attendance” (version 2,
October 2008
POL-0080453
12
POL00085652
Requirement of Network Field
Support Advisors at audit,
following discovery of
discrepancy” (version 1.0,
October 2011)
POL-0082710
13
POL00086765
Network auditing approach,
methods and assurance” (2013
POL-0083823
14
POL00086839
Training Guide: Compliance
Audit Tool” (December 2013)
POL-0083897
15
POL00087716
Training-Aide for Branch Asset
Checking” (version 1.7,
November 2014
POL-0084774
16
FUJ00001894
Audit Trail Functional
Specification (version 8.0, 18
October 2004)
POINQO008065F
17
POL00002841
Global User Account (September
2016)
VIS00003855
WITNO09250100
WITNO9250100
18
POL00066598
Witness statement of Paul
Bosson dated 7 July 2003
POL-0063077
19
POL00047494
David Yates — Record of Taped
Interview dated 7 March 2003
POL-0043973
20
POL00061010
Post Office Ltd - Offenders
Report on David Yates
POL-0057489
21
POL00047328
Memo from R. Parker, Security
& Audit to Mr David Yates,
Agent re: Audit of Walton on
Thames Branch Code 090023
dated 21 June 2002
POL-0043807
22
POL00047481
Letter to David Yates re audit
findings dated 26 November
2002
POL-0043960
23
POL00066457
Memo from Paul Bosson to
David Posnett re Audit of
Walton On Thames dated 4
September 2014
POL-0062936
24
POL00113278
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
in Josephine Hamilton & Others v
Post Office Limited [2021] EWCA
Crim 577
POL-0110657