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Witness Name: Patrick Bourke
Statement No: WITN09830100
Dated: 11 April 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PATRICK BOURKE
I, Patrick Bourke, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1 I am currently employed by Post Office Limited (“POL”) as its Government
Affairs and Policy Director. I have occupied this role since January 2017.
2 This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 16 January 2024
(the “Request”).
3 I have prepared this witness statement independently of POL and with the
assistance of separate legal representation. To assist my recollection and the
preparation of this statement I have reviewed some _ additional
contemporaneous documents, requested and supplied to me by POL, and
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beyond those which were disclosed to me by the Inquiry with the Request. A
full list of the documents exhibited with this statement is included in the
accompanying index, all of which have been previously disclosed to the Inquiry
by POL. Where I have quoted from any of the documents exhibited with this
statement, these are in italics.
4 I have addressed the 93 questions posed to me in the Request in a narrative
form that reads chronologically, insofar as possible. I have broadly structured
the statement to follow the section structure of the Request, but have also
included specific sections to address key issues it raises. My reflections, in
answer to question 92 of the Request, are set out in paragraph 294.
BACKGROUND
5 I have been asked to set out my professional background and qualifications
prior to joining POL. I graduated from the London School of Economics and
Political Science and the University of Strasbourg with a degree in Law and
French Law. I trained as a lawyer at the European Commission, the Post Office,
and DJ Freeman and qualified as a solicitor in 1997. I practised as a solicitor
for 2 years at Berwin Leighton in Brussels, before becoming Head of European
Affairs for Post Office in 1999, again based in Brussels, when I stopped
practising as a lawyer. I joined the then Department of Constitutional Affairs
(now Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”)) in 2002 where, as a junior and subsequently
a senior civil servant, I worked in a variety of roles in international trade policy,
aspects of regulatory reform in the legal services sector, the Freedom of
Information Act 2000, and as the Department's lead on European and
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International policy. I worked at the MOJ for 8 years prior to taking up a post as
Head of European Affairs and EU Representative for the Isle of Man
Government, opening its Brussels office in 2011. I joined POL in 2014.
In September 2014, I joined POL as a programme manager for the Initial
Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme (“The Scheme’). I held this role until
around June 2016. I set out details of this role below at paragraph 23.
I was recruited to POL by a former colleague, Belinda Crowe, with whom I used
to work at the MOJ. In or around spring 2014, she contacted me on LinkedIn
while I was abroad and explained that she was now working at POL. She asked
me to contact her for further information about a role there which she thought
might be of interest to me.
On return, I contacted her and she explained that she was engaged in work for
POL to investigate complaints about a computer system with a view to
establishing what might have gone wrong and to seek a resolution to those
complaints through mediation where appropriate. Belinda Crowe and I had
worked in the same directorate at the MOJ and she was broadly familiar with
my skills and experience. In particular, she was aware that I had led a piece of
work at MOJ to prepare for the commencement (on 1 January 2005) of the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). This involved the close and timely
management of a sensitive case load, significant interest from Ministers and
senior officials across Whitehall, and heightened external scrutiny. Our
discussions continued, we both confirmed our respective interests, and I then
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went through the normal HR vetting and joining process, starting with POL on
a fixed term contract, extendable by mutual agreement.
In around June 2016 my team became part of the Corporate Services Group
and I became the Deputy Corporate Services Director until January 2017. I took
this role as a result of an internal restructuring process following the closure of
the Scheme, and the follow-up work which was by now being conducted as part
of POL’s preparations for litigation. The then General Counsel, Jane MacLeod,
was asked to expand her responsibilities and take on responsibility for
Information Security (including Cyber-Security) & Rights (including compliance
with the Data Protection Act 2018 and FOIA), Audit & Risk, and the Security
team, in addition to the in-house legal function. The new directorate would later
become the Legal, Risk, and Governance team.
As Deputy Corporate Services Director, I helped Jane MacLeod with the
restructure and acted as her deputy for the purposes of management and
helping to integrate the various teams into their new structure. In addition, I was
responsible for managing POL's information security and information rights
teams which included coordinating data subject access and freedom of
information requests (“FOIRs”). I had line management responsibility for
between eight and twelve individuals and I shared a personal assistant with
Jane MacLeod, to whom I reported throughout. Within approximately 6-12
months of the new structure taking shape, steps were taken to break up the
Security team into three smaller teams, with only the Financial Crime team
(looking at money laundering issues) remaining within Jane MacLeod’s wider
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Directorate. While I was not directly involved in this decision, I was aware of
concerns at senior level about the prevailing work culture which characterised
the team.
11 I have been a member of different committees and focus groups during my time
at POL, including being a member of the Postmaster Litigation Steering Group
(‘PLSG’), which I refer to in more detail later in my statement. I was engaged
in Project Sparrow, this being a broad descriptor of POL’s efforts to address the
complaints of postmasters in the Scheme, but the formal governance took place
at the level of the Board of Directors (“the Board”), and as far as I remember, I
only ever attended one meeting at that level.
MY CURRENT ROLE
12 In January 2018, I became the Corporate Affairs Director, joining POL’s
corporate affairs and communications team. The role has been through a
number of changes in scope and job title, reflecting restructuring within the
team, as well as a more widespread and centrally led-exercise to reduce
headcount. I have been in this role, now known as Government Affairs & Policy
Director, for six years and I am responsible for a mix of corporate affairs,
external relations, and general communications work.
13 This involves managing a team responsible for liaising with a number of POL's
stakeholders including various government departments and agencies,
Members of Parliament (“MPs”), trade associations, charitable organisations,
POL's senior leadership team (of which I am also a member), members of the
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Group Executive and POL's Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). Occasionally, I
also work directly with members of the Board. I manage approximately ten
direct reports and I share a personal assistant with 2 others. When I started in
the communications team, my line manager was Mark Davies, the Group
Director of Corporate Affairs and Communications. Following his departure, I
reported directly to the CEO for a period of 5 months, until the appointment of
a new Group Corporate Affairs and Communications Director, Richard Taylor,
in 2020. My current line manager is Karen McEwan, POL's Chief People Officer,
who in turn reports to the CEO, Nick Read.
My role is varied and my job title has not always reflected its content particularly
accurately. POL engages with government (POL’s sole shareholder) at different
levels and through different teams; that has always been the case in my
experience. Between my arrival in late 2014 and early 2019, the scope of the
relationship was relatively narrow reflecting the position that, while owned by
government, POL was commercially and operationally independent of it. At that
time, it was principally conducted through the Corporate Affairs and
Communications team day-to-day, with input from Finance and the Legal teams
as appropriate. At the most senior level, the then CEO and Chief Financial
Officer (“CFO”) (Paula Vennells and Alasdair Cameron respectively) would
liaise with government as necessary through their fellow Board member,
Richard Callard, who was the Shareholder’s representative on the Board.
Since early 2019, however, government ‘oversight’ of the business has become
very much more energetic and substantially broader in scope to the extent that,
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in my personal view, it has become harder to assert that the business is
commercially and operationally independent in any meaningful sense. This is,
at least in part, attributable to government's response in anticipation of the
financial, political, and reputational risks the litigation brought by Alan Bates &
Others under the Group Litigation Order (the “Group Litigation”) would
potentially expose it to (and, of course, did following Fraser J’s judgment in
March 2019). It also reflects the creation of a Post Office Policy Unit in what
was then the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”),
the idea behind which was that POL needed a champion within a mainstream
Whitehall government department to support it from a policy perspective, with
UK Government Investments (“UKGI”) focused on its financial performance as
a government asset.
In reality, despite some limited policy interventions, the new Post Office Policy
Unit has added a further measure of control and constraint on POL’s ability to
manage its business day-to-day. The central, overwhelming, concern of
government in relation to POL since 2019 has been the Group litigation and its
consequences, most notably around the funding and delivery of compensation,
and the Inquiry. More recently, it has also become concerned with aspects of
POL’s senior governance in which it, of course, plays a direct part through its
Board representative. As a result, there has been little substantive
advancement of broader policy questions between POL and its sponsoring
Department, whether through UKGI or the Department proper.
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It has been my experience in the last four and a half years that the CEO, Nick
Read, unlike his predecessor, has preferred to engage directly with BEIS and
UKGI at working, as well as at Ministerial, level in our sponsoring Department
(now the Department for Business and Trade, and UKGI) day-to-day. While he
is supported by me and my team in his formal engagements with Ministers, his
engagement with officials is more frequent and informal in nature and he
typically does not require briefing or the participation of others. As a result, my
role, and my team’s focus, more frequently entails liaising with other parts of
government. For instance, we were recently engaged in coordinating POL’s
input into work being undertaken by HMRC on the practical effects of the
Windsor Framework Agreement with the European Union on postal services
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.
The policy element of the work relates to the development and advocacy of
ideas which benefit (any or all of) the business, postmasters, and its customers.
Examples include our successful efforts to ensure that, as a matter of law, and
despite the closure of thousands of bank branches nationwide, people and
small businesses continue to have convenient, local, access to free to use cash
services. Similarly, we made the case for Her Majesty's Treasury to continue
providing postmasters with financial support to offset against eye-watering
energy bills after the initial six-month period of the scheme.
I am also one of the people who meets with the CEO to discuss a range of wider
issues concerning POL. Here, I act as a sounding board, or, on occasion, I may
provide advice or a solution.
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KNOWLEDGE OF THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM
20 By the time I arrived at POL in September 2014, it was clear that concerns
about the Horizon IT system (“Horizon”) had been expressed to POL for some
time and a fair bit of work had already been done to try to get to the bottom of
the issues and resolve them. At the time, Second Sight had already prepared
its first report and found no systemic problems with the Horizon software;
however, Second Sight reported several themes arising from the postmasters'
complaints relating to Horizon, such as power outages that could potentially
delay a transaction being processed and operational errors arising from the
icons on the branch terminal screen being too close, potentially resulting in
postmasters pressing the wrong keys. Relatively soon after I joined POL, I
began to understand that at the heart of the complaints was the suggestion that
Horizon was producing anomalies; it was not always the case that it was
attributed to a bug; it could also be hardware or external factors such as power
outages.
21 I was not provided with any specific training relating to Horizon. I was employed
to help facilitate a scheme where sub-postmasters’ complaints could be
ventilated, any points of difference with POL could be understood, and a
mediated resolution might be achieved.
22 However, I did take steps to improve my knowledge of Horizon as referred to in
more detail below.
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THE INITIAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW AND MEDIATION SCHEME (“THE SCHEME”)
23 As one of the programme managers brought it to support it, I was responsible
for the day-to-day management and supervision of the Scheme, reporting to
Belinda Crowe. The Scheme was set up in agreement between POL and the
Justice for Sub-postmasters Alliance (“JFSA”), following the publication of
Second Sight’s Interim Report in July 2013. By the time I joined POL in
September 2014, the Scheme was already established and Second Sight were
engaged in this phase of their work. I was not, therefore, involved in designing
the Scheme or in discussions around the scope of Second Sight’s engagement.
24 Upon joining POL, I believe I would have been verbally briefed by Belinda
Crowe about the architecture and processes of the Scheme and on Second
Sight’s role. Tom Wechsler and I were recruited to work on the Scheme by POL
at around the same time and we divided the responsibility for managing it
between us. From memory, the broad division involved Tom Wechsler
managing the Working Group while I was responsible for administering the pre-
Working Group stages of the Scheme, and ensuring the progress of cases
though the system.
25 The Scheme involved a completely fresh and comprehensive reinvestigation of
all the cases admitted to it, resulting in an investigation report for each of the
applicant sub-postmasters. Angela van den Bogerd led a team of people
brought together for the purpose of reinvestigating the facts and circumstances
of each case admitted to the Scheme and for the preparation of investigation
reports. These reports were then submitted to Second Sight to enable them to
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conduct an independent assessment of the facts and circumstances of each
case recorded, at the end of their work, in a Case Review Report (“CRR’). This
CRR would contain a recommendation from Second Sight as to whether, having
reviewed all the evidence, facts, and circumstances, they would recommend
the case as being suitable for mediation. Their CRR, including this
recommendation, was then communicated to the Working Group.
POL also engaged external legal support from Bond Dickinson LLP, as it was
then called, to assist it with the administration of the Scheme and provide advice
in relation to individual cases. Bond Dickinson LLP prepared responses to
Second Sight’s CRRs which included their recommendations as to whether
POL should agree to mediate and, if so, on what basis and issues.
The Working Group's role was to facilitate agreement as to which cases were
suitable for mediation. Their determination of each case was made following
receipt and consideration of the investigation report, prepared by POL, and
Second Sight’s CRR. It was chaired by Sir Anthony Hooper, and also comprised
representatives from Second Sight, members of the JFSA, Alan Bates, Kay
Linnell and POL. Tom Wechsler, Chris Aujard and Belinda Crowe represented
POL. As General Counsel, Chris Aujard was POL’s most senior representative
on the Working Group. In the event of a disagreement amongst the members
of the Working Group over whether or not a case should proceed to mediation,
Sir Anthony Hooper held the casting vote. Sir Anthony Hooper was appointed
to Chair the Working Group on the recommendation of the JFSA.
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I did not have any specific roles or responsibilities in respect of the Working
Group beyond overseeing the preparation of the document packs ahead of
meetings. Tom Wechsler was responsible for engaging with the Working Group
and Sir Anthony Hooper.
Mediations were organised and facilitated by the Centre for Effective Dispute
Resolution (“CEDR’”), who were selected for their independence and reputation
for alternative dispute resolution, and attended by subject specialists from
within POL’s business who had experience of the issues which were the focus
of the mediation in a given case. This would usually be someone with
operational experience of running Post Office branches who understood the
various pitfalls and issues that could arise. Someone from Bond Dickinson LLP
would also usually attend alongside POL. We would receive feedback as to how
the mediation had proceeded. Under the Scheme, POL made provision for
applicant sub-postmasters to have legal representation at the mediation, and
to cover their expenses on the day.
In certain cases, I was involved in determining the levels of payment that we
might make to sub-postmasters during a mediation as part of a resolution to
their complaint. POL’s approach to all mediations, including in relation to the
level of any payments, was at all times guided by legal principles on advice
from Bond Dickinson LLP. Typically, there was a pre-agreed ceiling on any
possible financial payment which might be made in the room. Going beyond
that ceiling would usually need escalation by phone call to me, Tom Wechsler,
or Belinda Crowe. I imagine that had payments exceeded a certain level, a
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further escalation might have been necessary, although I do not now recall
whether this was, in fact, ever triggered.
Neither Tom Wechsler nor I attended mediations, with one exception. I was
interested to see this end of the process better to understand how it worked
and what issues might typically arise in practice. I therefore attended one
involving a postmaster named Mr Bajaj in around February or March 2015.
Throughout my role working on the Scheme, I had relatively little contact with
Second Sight. Most of the contact between POL and Second Sight was
conducted by Tom Wechsler, Belinda Crowe, Chris Aujard, and then Jane
MacLeod once she took over from Chris Aujard as POL General Counsel.
Other than my team being responsible for uploading investigation reports and
Second Sight’s CRRs to a document sharing platform called Huddle. I would
occasionally provide updates and documents to Second Sight when I was
asked.
A number of contentious issues emerged in connection with the Scheme,
including whether the cases of sub-postmasters with criminal convictions could
or should be mediated. POL’s position, based on legal advice from Bond
Dickinson LLP and also, I think, from Cartwright King and Brian Altman KC (see
paragraph 71 below), was that conviction cases could not be mediated which
led to arguments about whether POL was fulfilling the terms on which the
Scheme was established.
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I am also aware that there was disagreement between Second Sight and POL
around the extent to which Second Sight had full access to POL’s prosecution
files. I was not involved in making the decision or determination over any such
access. My understanding is that some information within the prosecution files
was never intended to be shared with Second Sight because the material was
legally privileged. I think that Sir Anthony Hooper may have supported that
stance in the context of a specific case in the Scheme. However, prior to me
joining POL, I understand that some of POL’s prosecution files on specific
cases, and which contained privileged information, were in fact disclosed in full
to Second Sight but in error. As I understand it when POL then refused to
provide the full prosecution files relating to the other cases in the Scheme,
Second Sight formed a view that POL was reneging on the terms of their
engagement, presumably because the access they had been erroneously given
created an expectation. My understanding of this comes from discussions at
the time with Rodric Williams, Belinda Crowe, Mark Underwood and others who
were part of the POL team who were involved with the engagement of Second
Sight and the Scheme.
As stated at paragraph 23 above, I was not involved in discussions or decisions
about the design and framework of the Scheme as it was initially envisaged, as
this pre-dated my employment at POL. However, I assume (but do not know for
certain) that advice as to the non-disclosure of legally privileged material from
POL’s prosecution files to Second Sight in the context of the Scheme would
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have come from Rodric Williams, as in-house counsel for POL, through his
interface with external counsel from Cartwright King and/or Brian Altman KC.
Closure of the Working Group
36 The Scheme came under a significant amount of scrutiny and pressure from
Parliament and the media. Criticism of POL felt like the daily backdrop to our
work. There was a great deal of concern being expressed about perceived
delays in cases progressing through the Scheme. In addition, in many cases
where Second Sight had recommended mediation, POL took the view that the
facts did not support that recommendation and, accordingly, did not agree to
mediate. A collection of MPs, led by Lord James Arbuthnot (“Lord Arbuthnot”),
had been instrumental in supporting JFSA and in the establishment of the
Scheme. They requested a meeting with the CEO, Paula Vennells, in order to
remonstrate about the various complaints of the JFSA about the process. That
meeting duly took place on 17 November 2014 with Paula Vennells, Angela van
den Bogerd, Lord Arbuthnot, Oliver Letwin, and perhaps others, at the House
of Commons. I had been asked, I think by Belinda Crowe, to prepare a briefing
for Paula Vennells for that meeting and I set out details of my role at paragraph
66, where I describe my role in connection with briefing documents.
37 A key request advanced at this meeting by the MPs was for POL to agree to a
general presumption to mediate all cases in the Scheme where this was
recommended by Second Sight. Once the Scheme was in operation, Second
Sight began to recommend that almost all of the cases proceed to mediation.
On the basis of the investigation reports prepared by POL, and our review of
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the CRRs which Second Sight submitted, my team and I had some concerns
about the approach Second Sight were adopting in consistently recommending
cases to be mediated, even in circumstances where their own CRRs appeared
to contradict such a recommendation. For example:
Scheme case Details from Second Sight’s CRR
Case M020 concerned I The draft CRR, dated 5 February 2015, expanded
branch losses _ of I on three specific discrepancies which the Applicant
£19,335.92. believed provided evidence of faults with the
Horizon system. In respect of a purported branch
surplus of £3,500, paragraph 4.4 stated “It is clear
that this discrepancy was caused by a keying error
made by the Applicant, rather than by a ‘fault’ in
Horizon.” \n respect of a shortfall of £200 caused by
an error of phone card stock, the CRR stated at
paragraph 4.8 that “we find that the cause of the
discrepancy in this instance was an operational error
made by the Applicant.” In respect of a purported
discrepancy related to a “Green GIRO” payment of
£1,257.99, paragraph 4.12 provided that “We can
only conclude, on the evidence presented, that there
was no discrepancy related to this amount”. Despite
these findings, the CRR recommended this case for
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mediation to consider “whether Post Office or the
Applicant is responsible in part or in whole for the
losses of £19,335.92.” [POL00035285]
Case M120 concerned
branch losses of
£34,330,41.
The draft CRR, dated 22 November 2014, stated at
paragraph 4.4 that “Having reviewed these
transactions, errors and TCs, we have concluded
that Post Office was not at fault in any of its actions.
The Applicant, on the other hand, made mistakes
and then compounded them with further mistakes,
which had the effect of masking the branch’s true
shortfall that was, by that point, very substantial.”
The CRR went on to recommend this case for
mediation to consider “whether Post Office or the
Applicant is responsible in part or in whole for the
loss of £34,330,41 that remains unrecovered by
Post Office.” [POL00040448]
Case M087 concerned
responsibility for
branch losses of
£43,269.10.
Paragraph 4.18 of the draft CRR, dated 18
November 2014, stated that the branch's shortfalls
“were probably caused by human error, and
exacerbated by her apparent lack of understanding
of Horizon accounting (and end of Trading Period)
procedures.” Paragraph 4.23 stated “It is clear...that
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the Applicant was making errors, and that they were
very difficult to trace, the more so because of the
Applicant's false accounting’. This case was
recommended for mediation to consider “whether
Post Office or the Applicant is responsible in part or
in’ whole for the losses of £47,097.22.”
[POL00040446]
Case M041 concerned I Paragraph 4.20 of the draft CRR, dated 13
responsibility for I November 2014, provided “We concur with Post
losses of £26,256.63. I Office’s assessment that the evidence shows that
the Applicant frequently made mistakes whilst
operating the branch... it is reasonable to assume
that many errors would have gone undetected and
caused branch losses’. The CRR went on, at
paragraph 6.1, to recommend this as “a weak case
for mediation”, despite finding that “the most likely
causes of the shortfalls experienced by the branch
were operational errors made by the Applicant and
her staff’. The issue to be considered at prospective
mediation would be “whether Post Office or the
Applicant is responsible in part or in whole for the
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losses made good by the Applicant of approximately
£77,000.” [POL00035026)
From my reading of the CRRs, such as the examples provided, I came to hold
the view that Second Sight had lost their objectivity. This view was shared by
others at POL and also at Bond Dickinson LLP when they read Second Sight’s
CRRs. At some stage, the JFSA began to refuse to engage in any discussion
as to the merits of cases Second Sight had recommended for mediation
unilaterally declaring that Second Sight’s recommendation alone was or, at
least, should be determinative. In other words, where Second Sight
recommended a mediation, this effectively should be interpreted as an
instruction to POL. On the basis that it considered a significant proportion of
the cases recommended by Second Sight for mediation as being, instead,
unsuitable, POL could not agree to this approach. JFSA refused to engage in
discussions of cases in the Working Group which led to a fatal break down of
the architecture of the Scheme in that it ceased to function as had been
envisaged and, indeed, called its viability into question.
Given the challenges it was facing, a group of those engaged in administering
and participating in the Scheme (consisting of, among others, Tom Wechsler,
Mark Underwood, Mark Davies, Rodric Williams, Belinda Crowe, Chris Aujard,
and then Jane MacLeod — who was General Counsel on a permanent basis)
would have held various discussions about how these might be overcome while
continuing to honour, as closely as possible, the commitments POL made to
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applicants to the Scheme. While I cannot recall specific instances of these
meetings or who participated in any given one, it is my clear recollection that all
of those engaged on the POL side shared that objective. My contribution
towards these discussions about the Scheme came from my direct involvement
with it and the issues encountered. Against the backdrop of daily criticism and
disruption to its operation, I was in favour of finding a way through. I cannot
remember where the idea originated, but I later supported the view that POL
could agree to mediating all of the remaining cases in the Scheme, save for
those in which the applicant had a relevant conviction, because it would
accelerate the process and represent an important concession to the demands
of the JFSA and MPs. Doing so would also have the effect of making the
Working Group redundant and, in circumstances where its work was in any
event hampered, this was an acceptable outcome.
Prior to POL’s eventual decision to move forward on that basis, I was involved
in some work to establish whether any such decision was susceptible to legal
challenge. This arose, I believe, in the context of being told by Chris Aujard that
Paula Vennells was concerned about the possibility of such a decision being
judicially reviewed. In order to understand the parameters of possible courses
of action available to POL, a decision was taken to seek advice from leading
counsel, in this case Tom Weisselberg KC. There were questions over the
extent to which POL was acting in a private or public law capacity with respect
to the Scheme, and therefore whether there were any constraints on POL’s
ability to make changes to the Scheme generally and to close the Working
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Group in particular. The decision to seek this advice and consider the options
for the future of the Scheme appears to have been informed by the meeting
between Paula Vennells and MPs on 17 November 2014, since this is referred
to under the sub-heading “Watershed moment’ in the instructions.
I believe that I drafted the instructions to Tom Weisselberg KC [POL00149601].
In so doing I would have received input from others, including Rodric Williams,
Belinda Crowe, Mark Underwood, Tom Wechsler and POL General Counsel,
Chris Aujard, who would also have approved the final instructions.
I attended the conference with Tom Weisselberg KC at Blackstone Chambers
on 24 November 2014 and circulated an email summary note of his advice to
POL colleagues shortly afterwards [POL00116814]. This email seems to
suggest that it had previously been thought that POL was not able to take the
steps now envisaged. I am aware that in June 2014 POL had obtained legal
advice, known as the “Beachcroft advice”, to which I believe I was referring in
my email of 24 November 2014. This advice was obtained prior to my arrival at
POL, so I was not party to discussions around that advice being obtained. On
27 November 2014, I emailed Rodric Williams attaching a document I had
located and asked him to confirm that the attachment was “the JR advice we
had over the Summer’, which suggests that I was unfamiliar with the document
[POL00149688]. I have recently reviewed documents which show that the
Beachcroft advice was shared with me by Belinda Crowe on 23 October 2014.
Her cover email states that she understood “that Chris [Aujard] spoke to
Stephen Hocking about whether [POL] could simply bring the Scheme in house
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and the answer was that carried too great a risk” [POL00307631]. Belinda
Crowe shared further background documents with me on 23 October 2014
[POL00307633], which included a paper for the Board sub-committee, dated 3
June 2014, which outlined three options for the Scheme going forward, one of
which was “moving the governance and management of the Scheme in-house
(ending Second Sight’s engagement and dissolving the Working Group)”
[POL00027369], and another paper, dated 6 June 2014, recommending this
option to the Board, subject to the risk of judicial review [POL00027153].
Insofar as I read the Beachcroft advice and the Board papers shared by Belinda
at the time, I do not recall the details of their contents. I do not recall being
involved in any discussions relating to the varying or closure of the Scheme
until October 2014, although I now clearly see that this matter had been
considered by the Board in June 2014, prior to me joining POL.
I have been asked to describe the background to an email exchange I had with
Tom Wechsler on 26 November 2014 [POL00149685]. In this exchange we
discussed the possibility of the Scheme being changed in some way, and/or the
Working Group being disbanded. This discussion followed the advice we had
received from Tom Weisselberg KC. In his email of 17:07, Tom Wechsler
appears to be referring to there being, at the time the Scheme was established,
less certainty about whether there were any problems with the Horizon system.
This email seems to reflect a growing sense of confidence within POL, on the
basis of the cases which were progressing through the Scheme and Second
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Sight’s work, that there were, in fact, no problems with Horizon. I cannot recall,
and do not know, what the first two emails in this chain refer to.
On 12 January 2015, I attended a meeting of the Project Sparrow sub-
committee in a supporting capacity. I did not typically attend these meetings, or
any Board-level sub-committee meetings, since I was insufficiently senior. The
minutes for this meeting indicate that I was welcomed as a guest
[POL00006575]. I assume I was required to attend this meeting because of my
involvement in instructing Tom Weisselberg KC in November 2014 and
preparing the briefing materials for the Westminster Hall debate on 17
December 2014. I cannot recall whether I contributed to the discussion.
POL had been invited (in the meeting hosted by Lord Arbuthnot on 17
November 2014) to relax its approach to the Working Group by agreeing to a
general presumption to mediate all cases in which Second Sight’s
recommendation was to do so. However, paragraph (i) of the minutes of this
meeting states that POL should “continue to take a robust approach at the
Working Group, focusing on the agreed Terms of Reference”. I understand this
to mean that POL should continue to determine cases on the basis of the
evidence before it and in accordance with legal principles for compensation,
and in so doing, adhere to the original agreement for operating the Working
Group as intended, which had been agreed at the outset of the Scheme.
The second bullet point under paragraph (i) provides that POL should “consider
the most effective options to draw a line under the Scheme for consideration at
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a future Sparrow Sub-Committee”. This task appears to have been assigned to
Mark Davies.
On 26 January 2015 at 15:35 I shared an options paper with Paula Vennells
[POL00117056] describing ways in which POL might respond to the myriad
challenges facing the Scheme [POL00102065]. This paper set out an
assessment of the risk associated with each option. Paula Vennells responded
at 19:36 later that day with some comments on the paper, which included the
suggestion that the wording “[Second Sight'’s] impartiality is a fiction” was too
strong. This reflected my view at the time that Second Sight had by that stage
lost objectivity, particularly in light of its recommendation that almost all cases
be mediated, even where it's assessment of the facts of sub-postmaster’s case
appeared to reflect a different conclusion as discussed in paragraph 37 above.
My email of 27 January 2015 at 08:37 to Tom Wechsler and Mark Davies in the
same email chain also reflects my view at the time that, while we needed to
keep an open mind to all options, this included the possibility that closing the
Scheme was the least worst option.
I assisted in preparing and/or editing some slides for a meeting between Mark
Davies, Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins on 4 February 2015 [POL00130853].
The slides were designed to inform a decision to be taken by Paula Vennells
and Alice Perkins as to the course of action for the future of the Scheme. These
slides are a representation of where the reflections of the POL team had
reached and reflected their input. In my email to Mark Davies of 08:57
[POL00102109] I asked him for guidance on the extent to which POL was
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required to ask the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) for
approval on our proposed next steps. To the extent that I expressed concern, it
was about ensuring that we were dealing with government stakeholders
appropriately, and the extent to which we should ask them for input on our
forward-looking work. As discussed in paragraph 62 below, the Project Sparrow
sub-committee of the Board decided that POL would agree to the request of the
JFSA and MPs, and POL would mediate all the cases in the Scheme, save
those involving a conviction. One of the natural consequences of that decision
was there was no longer any need for the Working Group in circumstances
where a decision to mediate all cases had been taken.
On 5 February 2015, I emailed Andrew Parsons, of Bond Dickinson LLP, to
request advice on the effect, in both legal and practical terms, of a decision to
terminate Second Sight’s engagement [POL00022352]. This request for advice
would have arisen in the context of wider discussions around the future of the
Working Group. On 6 February 2015 Andrew Parsons provided POL with the
requested advice [POL00021728] [POL00006364]. The decision to terminate
Second Sight’s engagement had not been taken at the time of this request.
Rather, this advice was sought to enable POL to better understand what would
happen should such a decision be taken. Following a Board sub-committee
meeting on 18 February 2015, where the options for taking the Scheme forward
were discussed, a paper was shared with the Board on 2 March 2015 which
sought endorsement for the closure of the Working Group and the current
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engagement with Second Sight to be terminated [POL00223073]
[POL00102254].
50 When POL took the decision to mediate all cases, POL retained Second Sight
in order to deliver on its commitment that every applicant in the Scheme would
have their case comprehensively reinvestigated by POL and an independent
CRR prepared by Second Sight. This would enable them to pursue further
avenues for redress in future should they be dissatisfied by the outcome of the
Scheme.
POL Response to Second Sight’s Part Two Report
51 Second Sight’s Part Two Report was intended to set out a number of thematic
issues which Second Sight identified as arising in two or more cases which they
examined as part of their ongoing work on cases in the Scheme. It was
expressed as intended to be a ‘living document’ which would be updated in the
light of further work. The objective of the Part Two Report was to identify and
explain what thematic issues were revealed by their work to enable applicants
to the Scheme and their advisers to better prepare for any mediation they might
undertake with POL. I recall that there was frustration at POL (and among
applicants to the Scheme, I believe) about the time taken for Second Sight to
finalise this report. POL then also considered that the Part Two Report was
deficient in a number of material respects.
52 On 11 March 2015 Second Sight shared their Part Two Report with Jane
MacLeod, Belinda Crowe and Tom Wechsler. It was then forwarded by Jane
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MacLeod internally to a wider distribution list, which included me. Following
receipt of Second Sight’s Part Two Report, on 12 March 2015, I met with the
communications team, Bond Dickinson LLP, and those working on the Scheme
to discuss how POL might respond. This meeting was arranged by Belinda
Crowe, who at the time appears to have taken the lead in coordinating POL’s
response [POL00040938]. I would have contributed towards this discussion,
although I cannot precisely recall what was discussed
Later that day, I emailed Jane MacLeod to set out the key points arising from
the discussion and agreed next steps [POL00040952]. I copied this email to
Melanie Corfield, Rodric Williams, Belinda Crowe, Tom Wechsler, Mark
Underwood and Andrew Parsons, and believe that the copy list reflects those
who attended the meeting.
Having now reviewed my email to Jane MacLeod of 12 March 2015, it appears
that it was agreed at the meeting that POL would write to Second Sight to
highlight POL’s concerns about their Part Two Report. My email indicates that
POL’s concern was that, “The collective view (Sparrow, Comms and BD) is that
we ought to register with SS the fact that we think the Report goes over ground
we have already addressed with them, strays into areas beyond the Scheme
and SS’s professional expertise, and lack evidence for many of the claims it
makes” [POL00040952]. The genuinely held concerns were that the Part Two
Report often covered case-specific rather than thematic issues, made claims
which were not supported by evidence (or without quoting the source of the
material), commented on matters outside their remit and expertise such as
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criminal law and the interpretation of the postmaster contract, and did not
provide evidence that particular issues had caused losses. The details of these
concerns are set out in POL’s public response to the Part Two Report.
My email to Jane MacLeod attached a first draft of POL’s letter to Second Sight
which I had prepared, and which had “already had the benefit of others’
comments”. I emailed Jane MacLeod again on 16 March at 17:08 and attached
an updated version of the letter to address “the points you raised with me”, and
invited both her input and “substantive comments from others”.
On 17 March at 10:51, I shared an updated draft of the letter to Second Sight
with Jane MacLeod. On 17 March at 12:16 Jane MacLeod responded with a
slightly amended version with some questions embedded in the text
[POL00040953]. The letter reflects POL’s concerns about the content of the
Part Two Report and its utility to applicants in the Scheme. The letter also seeks
to ensure that POL and Second Sight “work on Applicants’ individual cases
collaboratively in an appropriately prioritised manner”, given that the
engagement of Second Sight had by then been rescoped and it was felt that
our priority should be to focus on the remaining cases in the Scheme for the
remainder of their engagement.
I also assisted with preparing POL’s detailed response to the Second Sight Part
Two Report (“POL’s Part Two Response”), which set out POL’s response to
each section of Second Sight’s Part Two Report. I recall that Mark Underwood
and Andrew Parsons initially led on gathering information to inform POL’s
response. On 26 March 2015, I shared a draft of POL’s Part Two Response
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with Andrew Parsons [POL00041013] [POL00041014]. On 27 March 2015 POL
sent a draft version of POL’s Part Two Response to Second Sight, as stated in
Andrew Parsons’ email of 11 April 2015 [POL00041057]. POL’s Part Two
Response was informed by external professional advisers, Bond Dickinson LLP
and Fujitsu as described below
On 9 April 2015, Second Sight issued a finalised version of their Part Two
Report and later that month POL issued its finalised detailed response to the
Part Two Report. Both documents were shared with Applicants to the Scheme
to ensure they had a rounded view of the issues raised in Second Sight’s Part
Two Report.
The process by which expert input was sought for inclusion in POL’s Part Two
Response is illustrated by the email exchange between Mark Underwood and
Fujitsu between 9 and 13 April 2015, where Fujitsu were asked to provide
wording to rebut some assertions included in Second Sight’s Part Two Report,
to inform POL’s response [FUJ00087144]. Fujitsu's input and assistance was
sought again on 8 April 2015 with respect to the response to Second Sight to
address section 14 of their Part Two Report, concerning branch transactions
not entered by a sub-postmaster. Pete Newsome appears to have set out, in
an email to Mark Underwood, the process for injecting a balancing transaction
into branch accounts. The email was sent following a call between Mark
Underwood and Pete Newsome where this matter was discussed. Mark
Underwood then forwarded this email to Andrew Parsons and me. At 16:26,
following his reflection on the email from Pete Newsome, Andrew Parsons
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shared an updated version of the letter to Second Sight. His covering email
(when sharing his updated version) suggested the text about balancing
transactions from an earlier draft was largely retained. Andrew Parsons again
shared a draft marked-up version of the letter with his comments, and a clean
version, at 17:07 [POL00226090].
60 On 11 April 2015, Andrew Parsons emailed Mark Underwood, Melanie Corfield
and I with an updated version of POL’s Part Two Response [POL00041059]. It
appears that POL had asked Bond Dickinson LLP to undertake a complete
review of POL’s draft response to check for accuracy and consistency, and to
highlight any changes that had been made between the initial draft, dated 11
March 2015, and the finalised version, dated 9 April 2015, of Second Sight’s
Part Two Report. Andrew Parsons’ cover email notes that Rodric Williams’
comments on Second Sight’s Part Two Report and had been reflected in POL’s
draft reply to the same. The email otherwise indicates that Andrew Parsons had
advised on points which required further input from POL, with wording to be
considered by Melanie Corfield from a communications perspective, and that
he otherwise provided advice on the proposed drafting of the response
[POL00041057].
My role in briefings — background
61 In my role as a programme manager of the Scheme I was required to prepare
briefing materials for members of the Board, including Paula Vennells and Alice
Perkins, and, on occasion, draft correspondence for Paula Vennells, to inform
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their engagement with MPs about the Scheme. I was also involved in preparing
briefing materials for the relevant Minister (see paragraphs 64 to 94).
The information included in briefing documents was drawn from areas of
expertise across the business, as well as from my knowledge of the Scheme
and that of my POL colleagues, including Belinda Crowe, Tom Wechsler, Mark
Underwood and Mark Davies. Where the information required was beyond the
capacity and capability of my immediate POL colleagues, for example, details
around the safety of convictions and/or technical information concerning
Horizon, I believe I approached the relevant experts from across POL, including
POL’s external advisors, as well as approaching Fujitsu. This can be seen, for
example, with reference to the email chain of 14 December 2014, where advice
and input was sought from Jarnail Singh and Andrew Parsons in respect of a
briefing then being prepared for Jo Swinson [POL00040508] ahead of the
Westminster Hall debate. This is discussed in greater depth in paragraphs 77
to 94 below. My role with respect to preparing briefings was to draw all the
information and details together and present it in a concise and coherent
manner, which would be easily digestible to the recipient. My role working on
the Scheme meant that I had a more overarching vantage point of the matters
to be included in briefing documents than some of the individuals who
contributed specific information towards it. I also drew on my experience of
preparing briefings whilst working in the civil service. I had received feedback
that the way I structured and presented information was found to be easily
navigable and digestible, including by the CEO.
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My role in briefings — specific briefings
63 I have been asked about a number of specific briefings, which I refer to below.
I have relied on the documents provided to me by the Inquiry and by POL to
reconstruct my involvement, as well as that of others, and to help sequence
events.
Briefing note 26 October 2014
64 Ahead of Paula Vennells’ telephone conversation with Lord Arbuthnot on 28
October 2014, I prepared a briefing note for her, dated 26 October 2014
[POL00040288]. I believe this call was arranged to discuss Lord Arbuthnot’s
concerns about the Scheme. Since I was tasked with preparing this briefing
note only around five weeks after I had commenced my employment at POL, I
would have relied heavily on discussions with POL colleagues, in particular
Belinda Crowe and Rodric Williams, as well as Bond Dickinson LLP, and on my
reading of the case documents for cases in the Scheme, to inform the content
of this note. I believe that the content in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the documents
touching on “the integrity of Horizon’ is likely to have been supplied by Belinda
Crowe and/or Rodric Williams as well as Bond Dickinson LLP.
Briefings/letters connected to the 17 November 2014 meeting of Paula Vennells and
MPs
65 On 5 November 2014, Paula Vennells wrote to Lord Arbuthnot to set out POL’s
position on the issues discussed during their phone-call on 28 October 2014,
and prior to the meeting of 17 November 2014 attended by Paula Vennells,
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Lord Arbuthnot, and a delegation of MPs who also had concerns about the
Scheme [POL00116788]. I believe I was asked by Belinda Crowe and/or Paula
Vennells to draft this letter. I initially drafted and shared the letter with Belinda
Crowe and Tom Wechsler for their comment on 30 October 2014 at 13:52
[POL00211585]. Belinda Crowe then circulated the letter for comment amongst
POL colleagues and finalised it. The material for this letter was largely drawn
from the briefing note for the telephone call on 28 October 2014.
I also prepared a briefing note for Paula Vennells to help guide the discussion
in her 17 November 2014 meeting with MPs [POL00116790]. Again, I also
prepared the briefing by drawing on information and content used in the briefing
note for the 28 October 2014 telephone call, and with input from POL
colleagues in the manner described at paragraph 62 above. When I shared the
draft briefing with POL colleagues for their comment on 15 November 2014, I
noted in my covering email that Tom Wechsler had contributed to the draft then
being shared [POL00116787].
The briefing outlines the steps which POL had taken in good faith to try and
resolve the issues with postmasters. This included: establishing the Scheme on
the advice of Lord Arbuthnot and in consultation with the JFSA; appointing their
recommendation for Chairman of the Working Group; reinvestigating the
postmasters’ cases, and, providing funding for applicants to the Scheme to
have professional advisers for both the reinvestigation of their cases and their
representation at mediations. The briefing includes, at Annex E, details of the
costs invested by POL in the Scheme at the relevant time.
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At the time there was a sense of frustration within POL about accusations being
made, in the media and on social media, which did not acknowledge the
genuine efforts being made by POL to resolve the issues raised by sub-
postmasters through the Scheme. The tone of the briefing note for Paula
Vennells’ meeting with MPs on 17 November 2014, and indeed other briefing
materials prepared around that period, at times reflects that sense of frustration.
POL wanted to set out the constructive steps it had taken to try to answer the
concerns of those applying to the Scheme, clearly and on record. There was
also concern that the delegation of MPs might adopt an aggressive posture at
the meeting. The suggestion made in the briefing note that Paula Vennells
should take an “assertive approach” in the meeting on 17 November 2014
reflects that impression. My update to Alice Perkins 26 of November 2014
[POL00149683] reflects that the concern was not misplaced since some of the
attendees did in fact behave inappropriately towards Paula Vennells, albeit I
cannot remember the specific details.
Paragraph 5 of the briefing note, which states that “the Horizon issue is one
which [POL] are absolutely willing to entertain”, reflects that, although at the
time POL had confidence in Horizon, POL was not closed minded and would
listen to allegations and evidence presented to it on the Horizon issue. The
briefing also notes that, “in not one of the 106 cases investigated so far has a
fault with the Horizon system been established. That said, we are being
extremely careful to avoid any sense of complacency and we will apply the
same rigour in investigating the remaining cases as we have to date.”
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As mentioned above in this statement, at the meeting on 17 November 2014,
the group of MPs proposed that going forward there should be a general
presumption that POL would agree to mediate all cases, save in some
undefined exceptional cases, where Second Sight recommended mediation.
On 25 November 2014 Paula Vennells met with Alice Perkins to discuss this
proposal. Upon request from Mark Davies, I assisted in the preparation of some
speaking notes for Paula Vennells ahead this meeting and her meeting with the
Board on 26 November 2014 [POL00308179] [POL00308 180].
Following the meeting with MPs on 17 November 2014, I prepared a note of
advice for Paula Vennells to inform her consideration as to how to respond to
the proposal advanced by MPs that POL mediate all cases in the Scheme
where this was recommended by Second Sight [POL00149669]. I shared this
for comment with Tom Wechsler and Mark Underwood on 26 November 2014
[POL00149668]. The advice, including the recommendation, was the product
of discussions between those involved in the Scheme at POL and at Bond
Dickinson LLP. This would have included Belinda Crowe, Tom Wechsler, Chris
Aujard, Andrew Parsons, as well as Paula Vennells. Our recommendation was
that Paula Vennells should not accede to the request to mediate all cases in the
Scheme, on the basis that this would entail the mediation of “criminal cases”
(cases in which the postmaster or assistant had been prosecuted and convicted
of a criminal offence arising in the context of their work in branch) in relation to
which POL had received legal advice “in the strongest terms” that doing so
would subject POL to “intolerable risk”. POL obtained written advice from Brian
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Altman KC further to a discussion in conference with Rodric Williams and Gavin
Matthews, of Bond Dickinson LLP, on 31 July 2014. His advice, dated 5
September 2014, addressed Sir Anthony Hooper's suggested approach to the
issue of criminal appeal in cases which an applicant in the Scheme had
admitted a criminal offence [POL00006368] and concluded that there was “an
unacceptable risk to POL in providing or being held to a position on criminal
appeal at the early stage of mediation”. Belinda Crowe shared this advice with
me by email on 15 September 2014, the day I joined POL, and shortly after it
had been circulated by Rodric Williams to POL colleagues [POL00209031]. It
would also entail the mediation of cases where POL was not, on any reasonable
view, responsible for the branch losses. This view was based on our reading of
the reports for cases in the Scheme, including CRRs prepared by Second Sight
which, as discussed at paragraph 37 above, often recommended mediation
even where the preceding content of their report did not align with this
recommendation. To agree to mediate all cases would also have had cost
implications for POL, and fundamentally it would have deprived the Working
Group of its central purpose and therefore undermined the Scheme’s
functioning. Sir Jonathan Swift went on to comment:
“...0n a surprising number of occasions Second Sight felt unable to
choose between a bare assertion on the part of the SPMR and the
indications provided in the evidence trail. In none of the cases we
sampled were Second Sight willing to conclude that the shortfall was due
to the Horizon computer system causing those losses, although they did
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speculate that the disproportionate appearance of power failures in the
CQRs was likely to contribute to some extent. In general, Second Sight
accepted that the most likely cause of shortfalls was operator error on
the part of SPMRs and their staff. This accords with the conclusions in
the Part Two Report.” (The Swift Review, 8 February 2016)
[POL00006355}.
On 26 November 2014, I prepared a corresponding update for Alice Perkins
[POL00149683] in advance of a trip she was making to a conference in Turkey,
where she was likely to encounter Lord Arbuthnot. This briefing note was to
inform Alice Perkins of the advice given to Paula Vennells not to accept the
proposal to mediate all cases in the Scheme. This note recycled much of the
content which was used in the advice note to Paula Vennells discussed above
at paragraph 71. The note indicates, under the “Suggested lines” heading, that
there had been some inappropriate and discourteous behaviour towards Paula
Vennells by some of the attendees at the 17 November 2014 meeting. As
described at paragraph 62 above, these notes were prepared in consultation
with POL colleagues.
Following discussion with Alice Perkins on 25 November 2014 and the POL
Board on 26 November 2014, Paula Vennells decided not to accede to the
request from MPs that POL mediate all cases in the Scheme. Belinda Crowe
had pre-emptively drafted a letter from Paula Vennells to Lord Arbuthnot to
convey this message, which she circulated to POL colleagues on 21 November
2014. I circulated an amended version of the draft letter, along with the draft
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advice for Paula Vennells discussed at paragraph 71 above, for comment from
POL colleagues on 26 November 2014 [POL00168751], before sharing a
version which had been reviewed by Tom Weisselberg KC with Gavin Lambert
on 27 November 2014 [POL00124611]. The draft letter to Lord Arbuthnot
explained that Second Sight and the JFSA were the “principal drivers” of the
design of the Scheme, including the establishment of the Working Group and
the recommendation for its independent Chairman. To agree to the presumption
to mediate all cases prior to any consideration of their merits would deprive the
Working Group of its key role in the Scheme. The draft letter also noted that “no
fault with the [Horizon] system has been identified in any of the now 114 cases
that have been comprehensively reinvestigated by Post Office or as part of
Second Sight’s general work”. This statement reflected POL’s understanding of
the cases that had been thoroughly reinvestigated through the Scheme and
Second Sight’s findings recorded in their Interim Report. Sir Jonathan Swift later
commented on the Scheme in the following terms:
“We were impressed at the work carried out by POL. In many cases
Significant amounts of evidence were able to be collated. Having
reviewed the CQRs, it was clear that very many of the SPMRs (for
understandable reasons) were unable to give much by way of specific
instances of concern, or anything other than vague or generic
complaints” (The Swift Review, 8 February 2016) [POL00006355].
74 At the time of preparing this letter, POL had also received advice from Tom
Weisselberg KC (see paragraphs 40 to 42). While speaking to his clerk, I must
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have mentioned this draft letter and, when he offered to share it with Tom
Weisselberg KC for a quick view prior to its finalisation, I agreed. He proposed
a number of amendments in tracked changes, which I then shared with Gavin
Lambert (POL Chief of Staff), Paula Vennells, Chris Aujard (then POL General
Counsel), Avene O'Farrell (Paula Vennells’ personal assistant), and Mark
Davies [POL00124610].
As anticipated, Alice Perkins did encounter Lord Arbuthnot at the conference
they attended in Turkey. On 1 December 2014, she sent an email detailing her
encounter to Paula Vennells, Belinda Crowe, Mark Davies, Chris Aujard and
me [POL00116853]. I assume I was included in this email since I had been
involved in preparing the briefing note for Alice Perkins ahead of her trip to
Turkey.
On 3 December 2014, Belinda Crowe forwarded Alice Perkin’s email to Tom
Wechsler. In a subsequent email exchange between Tom Wechsler and I, Tom
indicated that he was “increasingly of the same view as Patrick”, which was that
“[Lord Arbuthnot] has more personal attachment to this than may immediately
be apparent”. I believe that this refers to my understanding of Lord Arbuthnot’s
personal regret about a military Chinook helicopter crash, which occurred in the
Mull of Kintyre in 1994. At the time, this crash was blamed on pilot error, but
later it was suggested that there had been a cover-up and that it had been
caused by a faulty onboard computer system. I understand that at the time of
the crash Lord Arbuthnot was defence procurement minister, and he later
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apologised for misleading MPs when he was in office after he had dismissed
the doubts they had expressed about the Chinook’s electronics. '
Briefing for Jo Swinson, ahead of the Westminster Hall debate
77 On 11 December 2014, I was asked by Richard Callard, who led the Post Office
Shareholder team at what was then the Shareholder Executive (“ShEx”), to
prepare background information for ShEx to use in a briefing for Jo Swinson,
then the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment Relations and
Postal Affairs, ahead of a Parliamentary debate regarding Horizon on 17
December 2014 (“the Westminster Hall debate”) [UKGI00002627]. The
briefing document took the form of a list of questions and associated information
and answers covering the scope, operation, progress and results of the
Scheme, which POL considered relevant to the Westminster Hall debate. I
shared an early draft of this document with Belinda Crowe, Andrew Parsons,
and Mark Underwood on 12 December 2014 [POL00150097]. My covering
email indicates that it was to be discussed on a call shortly thereafter
[POL00150096].
‘“The Chinnook cover-up continues: When new evidence is presented it is dismissed
as irrelevant”, Guardian, 30 June 2000
(https:/Awww.theguardian.com/comment/story/0,3604,338086,00.html), “New inquiry
into the 1994 Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash announced”, Guardian 8 September 2010
(https:/www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/sep/08/inquiry-mull-kintyre-chinook-crash)
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On 12 December 2014, I also shared the early draft with Richard Callard for
comment [UKGI00002668]. He fed back that, “the tone is right and there is a
good balance of detail vs clarity”.
On 14 December 2014 at 07:27, Belinda Crowe shared a version of the briefing
document which included her comments. In her covering email she stated that,
“My comments [are] on Rod and Andy's”, indicating that the document had
already been circulated amongst POL’s legal advisers who had commented on
the draft [POL00040508]. Belinda Crowe also copied in Chris Aujard and Mark
Davies, “so they can see where we've got to”. Her email also notes that
“Finance will have to sign off the figures”, and she asks Andrew Parsons, “could
you and Jarnail please liaise with [sic] about getting a definitive position on the
prosecution position”. Jarnail Singh was a senior lawyer in POL’s criminal law
team at the time, and was also a recipient of Belinda Crowe’s email. This
exchange illustrates how input was sought from the relevant subject matter
experts across POL’s business, including legal advisers (as I described in
paragraph 62 above).
I responded to Belinda Crowe’s email at 07:34 and stated that the briefing
document was approaching completion, “subject to the point you make about
needing a view on prosecutions and some general tidying up which I am doing
now. I note Rod would like CK to have a look in the morning”. I understand “CK”
to be a reference to Cartwright King, who were POL’s external legal advisers
on criminal law matters at the time.
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At 11:01 Jarnail Singh emailed to provide input on various criminal law points,
to inform the briefings then being preparing for BIS [POL00101857]. Later that
day, at 11:17, Mark Underwood shared an updated version of the briefing
document, titled “Sparrow Question v13.doc”, on the same email chain. It
appears that shortly before this, at 11:13, he had shared the same version of
the briefing document with me and Belinda Crowe on a separate email chain,
and at 11:19, I forwarded this to Richard Callard, with both Belinda Crowe and
Mark Underwood in copy. [UKG1000027 18][UKGI000027 19].
On 14 December 2014, at 16:32 Richard Callard responded to my email of
11:19 to attach a clean and marked up version of the briefing document, called
“Sparrow Q and A 17 December v1.docx” and “Sparrow Q and A 17%
December v1 (tracked).docx” respectively [UKGI00002729] [UKG100002730].
In his covering email Richard Callard indicated that he had made a few changes
and highlighted some outstanding issues in the briefing document, and also
requested comments from POL in respect of a speech which it appears he was
preparing at the time for Jo Swinson to deliver in Parliament [UKGI00002728].
On 14 December 2014 at 20:35, Mark Underwood shared a version of the
briefing document, called “Sparrow Questions V15.docx”, with the large POL
copy list, including Andrew Parsons [POL00040509]. His covering email stated
that the attached document, “includes small edits made by BIS”
[POL00040508].
On 15 December 2014 at 10:03, I emailed Richard Callard, with Belinda Crowe
in copy, and attached a version of the briefing document called, “Sparrow
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Questions V17 FINAL.docx” [UKGI00002743]. In my email I stated that this
briefing document was subject, “to double checking of the criminal law points”,
and advised that “we should have that in the next hour’ [UKGI00002742]. I
believe this relates to the request from Belinda Crowe in her email of 14
December 2014 at 07:27, discussed in paragraph 79 above. Andrew Parsons
and Jarnail Singh would have been responsible for checking any civil and
criminal law points respectively, the latter likely consulting Cartwright King the
external legal counsel advising on criminal matters. The briefing document
covers criminal law issues at various points, for example, the Q&A on, “Why did
POL agree to incorporate convicted cases in to the Scheme” and on, “Why
aren't POL mediating criminal cases”. I believe these (and any other criminal
law questions) may have been the questions on which Belinda Crowe sought
confirmation from Andrew Parsons and Jarnail Singh. I have never practised
criminal law and I would not seek to substitute the understanding of someone
who had relevant expertise with my own.
On 16 December 2014, Belinda Crowe and I met with Richard Callard to
discuss different aspects of preparation for the Westminster Hall debate, and at
12:09 Richard Callard emailed us both with a list of actions and requests for
information further to our meeting [POL00101909]. I responded at 13:13 to
provide the information requested about costs paid by POL within the Scheme
and the number of cases which POL had agreed to mediate. In respect of the
action, “to get in touch with Sir Anthony to request making the letter available
to Parliament (and to share it with JA?)”, I responded, “Belinda is on the case
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— email sent and follow up call soon”. I believe this may refer to a letter from Sir
Anthony Hooper to Jo Swinson, which he wrote either on his own initiative or
upon request from the Minister, in which he provided his views as to how the
Scheme was progressing [POL00102166]. My email also asked that, “should
Jo [Swinson] get sight of James Arbuthnot’s speech in advance, you could
either share this with us or, if that’s not possible, share with us the broad thrust
of it so we might put Jo in the best possible place to answer and [sic] helpfully
and accurately as possible”. My email to Richard Callard also discussed
arrangements for me to meet with him the following day, and I stated, “/ do think
it’s important I am there, if only to gauge atmospherics”. I cannot recall
attending Parliament for the Westminster Hall debate, although from this email
it appears that I may have done so, or at least had the intention of doing so.
On 16 December 2014 at 13:21, Richard Callard requested that we include
quotes from Second Sight’s July 2013 report to support, “where we say there
were no system wide problems with the system”. I responded at 14:43 with the
quote from Second Sight’s Interim Report which provided, “We have so far
found no evidence of a system wide (systemic) problems with the Horizon
software.”
On 16 December 2014 at 16:45, I emailed Mark Davies, Chris Aujard, Rodric
Williams, Tom Wechsler, Melanie Corfield, Jane Hill and Ruth Barker to share
the briefing document, called “UPDATED — Horizon Q&A 16 December
2014.docx” [POL00150316], and Jo Swinson’s speech, called “UPDATED
HORIZON Post Office Speech 16 December 2014.doc” [POL00150315] for the
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Westminster Hall debate. My cover email makes clear that both of these
documents had by then been shared with Jo Swinson and I expressed thanks
to everyone for their “valuable input” [POL00150314]. I did not write Jo
Swinson’s speech. My understanding is that this was written by Richard Callard
or his colleagues at BIS, and they would have drawn from the information that
POL provided to them.
At 19:56 on 16 December 2014, Jo Swinson’s private secretary emailed
Richard Callard further to a meeting between Jo Swinson and Lord Arbuthnot
[POL00101944]. This email set out Lord Arbuthnot’s, “main ‘asks’, and also
confirmed that he, “no longer plans to share his speech with us ahead of time”.
Richard Callard copied Belinda Crowe and I into his response at 20:54, in which
he gave his provisional views and requested our input on how we might
formulate a response to some of Lord Arbuthnot’s asks. It was consistent with
my role at the time for Richard Callard to have copied me into this email, and
for Belinda Crowe to subsequently task me with formulating some responses.
Some of the requests from Lord Arbuthnot felt at the time to be disproportionate,
for example he had asked for an independent review of the Scheme, which was
itself an independent process which had not yet concluded, and my email of
21:08 and Mark Davies’ response at 21:29 reflects this view. For completeness
my email states: “Needless to say some of the ‘asks’ cannot seriously be
entertained, surely?”, and Mark Davies replies, “agreed”.
On 17 December 2014 at 08:36, I emailed Richard Callard to share a document
called, “Legally Privileged and Confidential — further lines for WHD.docx’”, in
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answer to the various requests made the previous day [UKGI00002850]. I
copied a number of internal colleagues into this email “for the sake of
expediency”, these being Mark Davies, Belinda Crowe, Rodric Williams, Jarnail
Singh, Mark Underwood, Chris Aujard, Tom Wechsler and Melanie Corfield, as
well as Andrew Parsons. In my covering email, I stated, “/ would be particularly
grateful for the views of Jarnail on the criminal aspects of this and Andy P to
check I have done the Statute of Limitation bit justice.” At 11:41 Jarnail Singh
responded to share a marked-up version of the “further lines” document for Jo
Swinson [POL00308923] [POL00040517]. This illustrates the approach taken,
as described in paragraph 62, of consistently consulting colleagues with the
relevant legal expertise where their specialist input was sought.
At 08:55 I emailed Richard Callard again, with the same copy list, to suggest
how Jo Swinson might respond to any accusation from Lord Arbuthnot that
there have been, or are likely to be, cases of wrongful conviction or
miscarriages of justice. My suggestion was that the Minister should immediately
respond to say that, “if he is in possession, or aware of the existence of, any
evidence to support those allegations, he should immediately disclose this to
the police.” It was a source of concern for POL that there might be evidence of
wrongful convictions and the issue had been raised at various times in media
reports, I believe. As far as I was aware, despite the allegations being made,
no-one had come forward with any specific information or evidence to enable
POL to follow up. Rodric Williams responded to my email at 09:28 to suggest
that the Minster direct anyone with evidence of wrongful convictions towards
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POL’s legal team or to his office rather than the police. I then forwarded this
suggestion onto Richard Callard, with the caveat that I was, “not sure it matters
too much”
Following the Westminster Hall debate, I was involved with the task of preparing
a document to collate and address all the accusations which had been made
against POL by various parties, including during the Westminster Hall debate
(‘POL’s Response to the Westminster Hall debate”). It appears as though
Tom Wechsler initiated and was initially leading on this piece of work, as he
shared a first draft by email on 8 January 2015 at 15:33 [POL00040790]. In his
covering email, Tom Wechsler stated that this document, “would be for the [sic]
us to offer to the Minister to place in Parliament and for us to use with MPs etc
/ publicly”. I responded to Tom Wechsler at 12:09 and noted points which
required technical advice (for example, branch account discrepancies) as well
as where legal advice was required from Rodric Williams (in respect of the
accusation that POL bring criminal cases even when the CPS had advised
against it and on the statute of limitations). It appears as though this email
followed a conversation I had with Tom Wechsler, and possibly Mark Davies,
as I stated at the outset of my email that “we spoke”.
On 8 January 2015 at 16:43, Angela van den Bogerd responded on the email
chain with answers to some of the technical points I had raised in my email of
12:09. It appears as though I took over with the finessing of POL’s Response
to the Westminster Hall debate, as I circulated a “slightly reworked version” at
19:03 [POL00040790] [POL00040791]. My role was to bring the information
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together, to signpost the document appropriately, and to ensure that it was
presented clearly. As my role evolved at POL, my colleagues would increasingly
involve me in these aspects of preparing external facing documents.
On 13 January 2015, I shared a draft of POL’s Response to the Westminster
Hall debate with Richard Callard [UKGI00002943]. As described at paragraph
62 above, any statements and assurances on matters beyond my knowledge
or expertise or those that worked with me on the Scheme -— including the
integrity of Horizon and the safety of convictions — was derived from the
information and advice provided by expert colleagues and advisors from across
POL. For example, Paragraph 40 of this document stated that, “To date no
evidence has been identified by Post Office as part of its reinvestigation of each
and every case, nor advanced by Second Sight or an individual Applicant, to
suggest that the conviction of any Applicant to the Scheme is unsafe”
[UKGI00002944]. I believe this assurance came from POL’s legal advisers
whose role it was to support all aspects of the Scheme — this includes in-house
lawyers, as well as external firms including Cartwright King and Bond Dickinson
LLP. The Settlement Analysis reports, prepared by Bond Dickinson LLP
following their review of cases specific documentation including the applicants’
Case Questionnaire Response, the Post Office Investigation Report and
Second Sight’s Case Review Report, consistently relayed that there was no
evidence either of flaws with the Horizon system or of convictions being unsafe.
For example:
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Scheme caseIStatements from Bond Dickinson Settlement
number Analysis
M046 There was “No evidence of failure in Horizon or POL
procedures” and the Applicant “Pleaded guilty and
convicted of fraud. No new evidence to call the safety of
the conviction into question” [POL00040331].
M130 “There is evidence that errors were made by staff and
there is no evidence that Horizon was at fault”.
[POL00228329]
M067 There was “No evidence of failure in Horizon” and “All
indications point to the losses being a result of user error,
mismanagement and/or theft. There is no evidence to
suggest that the losses in the branch were caused by
Horizon.” [POL00211412]
M003 There was “No evidence of failure in Horizon or POL
procedures” and “The Applicant was convicted of false
accounting following a guilty plea” [POL00061838].
M109 There was “No evidence to suggest Horizon at fault.
Applicant has accepted that he falsely inflated the cash
on hand figures that meant identification of the cause of
the loss is difficult/impossible” [POL00089549].
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M097 There was “No evidence of failure in Horizon or POL
procedures” [POL00046011].
94 Paragraph 41 of POL’s Response to the Westminster Hall debate noted that,
“Post Office has written to everyone who has suggested that they have or have
seen evidence that a conviction is unsafe and asked them to disclose that
evidence so it can be acted on. To date no-one has provided that evidence.”
The confirmation that no-one had provided any such evidence would have
come from POL’s legal team. I refer to the paragraphs on remote access at
paragraph 133 to 177.
Emails re options paper — 26 January 2015
95 As mentioned at paragraph 47 above, on 26 January 2015, I shared an options
paper with Paula Vennells, for her comment. I believe I would have drafted this
document in consultation with POL colleagues, in the manner described in
paragraph 62 above. As I made clear in the covering email when sharing the
paper with Paula Vennells, it had already been circulated to other POL
colleagues for comment [POL00117056] and I mentioned in my email to Tom
Wechsler and Mark Davies on 27 January 2015 at 8:37am, that “although I
drafted the paper, it is reflective of views as a whole”. As discussed in
paragraphs 47, the email discussion involving Mark Davies and Tom Wechsler
reflects the view then held, and expressed in the options paper, that Second
Sight had, to some degree, lost its independence and was hostile to POL. I
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believe that these concerns existed within POL before my arrival. At 15:12 on
27 January 2015 I shared the options paper with a wider distribution list of POL
colleagues, ahead of a Project Sparrow meeting at 17:00 that day
[POL00158192].
Briefing Paula Vennells/Angela van den Bogerd before Business, Innovations and
Skills Committee on 3 February 2015
96 I helped prepared the briefing for Paula Vennells and Angela van den Bogerd’s
appearance at the Business, Innovations and Skills Select Committee on 3
February 2015. I would have been involved in this exercise because of my role
on the Scheme and, having been a civil servant prior to joining POL, I may have
had some insight into the process of appearing before a Select Committee
which may have been helpful to the structure of the briefing. On 30 January
2015, I emailed Chris Aujard, Mark Davies, Tom Wechsler, Jane Hill, POL’s
parliamentary affairs officer, Melanie Corfield, Rodric Williams, and Belinda
Crowe, and I appear to have shared my thoughts following a run through
meeting the previous day with Paula Vennells and Angela van den Bogerd to
discuss topics and questions which by might be asked by the Select Committee
[POL00151000]. The circulation list for this email is reflective of the POL team
who were in some way engaged in the preparation for the Select Committee,
together with Paula Vennells, Angela van den Bogerd and Bond Dickinson LLP.
97 Again as I have explained, I was largely reliant on the information that was
provided to me by advisers and subject matter experts from across the business
about areas beyond my expertise, such as legal advice about the safety of
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prosecutions and whether there were flaws in the Horizon system. It was in this
context that I felt assured that the statements made in my email of 30 January
2015 about the lack of evidence of an unsafe conviction and the absence of
evidence of a systemic flaw with Horizon in any of the cases were accurate.
None of the CRRs, prepared by Second Sight, the reinvestigation reports,
prepared by Angela van den Bogerd’s team, or the advice on whether cases
should be mediated, produced by Bond Dickinson LLP, that I had seen at the
time suggested there was any evidence of an unsafe conviction in the Scheme.
Similarly, none of these reports provided evidence of a systemic flaw with
Horizon, and Second Sight had stated in their Interim Report that there was no
evidence of a systemic flaw in Horizon.
Assistance with preparation for 4 February 2015 meeting
98 As discussed at paragraph 48, on 4 February 2015, I also helped prepare some
slides for a meeting between Mark Davies, Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins to
inform a decision they were taking regarding the future structure and operation
of the Scheme.
Engagement with MPs
99 On occasion I was also asked to attend meetings with MPs about the Scheme
in my capacity as one of its programme managers. For example, on 8
December 2014 Paula Vennells, Mark Davies and I attended a meeting with
Oliver Letwin. He was one of the MPs in attendance at the meeting with Paula
Vennells and Lord Arbuthnot on 17 November 2014. The purpose of this
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meeting was to inform Mr Letwin about some of the issues we were
encountering with cases in the Scheme. In many cases, some of which we
discussed with Mr Letwin on an anonymised basis, there were clear
explanations for the accountancy discrepancies, and they did not refer to issues
with Horizon. I shared a brief note of this meeting with POL colleagues shortly
afterwards [POL00101711]. This note reflects that we discussed the CRRs
prepared by Second Sight and that these, “were drafted in such a way as for
the reader to come to the obvious and natural conclusion that the SPMR was
at fault” but which then went on to provide that “mediation was nonetheless
recommended”. Examples of this are provided at paragraph 37 above.
100 In my note of the meeting I refer to, “sowing the seeds of doubt...over the
reliability of all [Mr Letwin] is being told” by Second Sight, JFSA, Lord Arbuthnot
and the sub-postmasters. I recognise that this could be misconstrued, but it
simply reflects POL’s desire from the outset of this meeting to ensure that Mr
Letwin was receiving a balanced, rather than partial, view of the situation. POL
wanted to ensure that Mr Letwin understood the situation from POL’s
perspective, on the basis of our exposure to and experience of progressing
cases through the Scheme.
101 POL offered to speak with MPs about the cases of any sub-postmasters within
their constituency, on the basis that their constituent consented for us to do so
given that we would be sharing details of their case and would otherwise be
bound by confidentiality. The purpose of these meetings was to field any
questions MPs had about their constituents’ cases and to otherwise provide
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them with an update as to their progress through the Scheme. It was in this
context that on 21 July 2015 I attended meeting with Matt Warman MP. I
attended this meeting in my capacity as a programme manager of the Scheme
and on the basis that I was well placed to discuss the relevant case.
102 On 15 July 2015 Mark Davies and I attended a meeting with Andrew Bridgen
and Kevan Jones, chaired by Baroness Neville-Rolfe. As Mark Davies recorded
in his note of this meeting, the approach of Messrs Bridgen and Jones at this
meeting was volatile and aggressive, and they refused our repeated offer to go
through their constituents’ individual cases so that they might have the benefit
of the full facts [POLO0318364].
103 On 8 September 2015 Mark Davies, Jane Hill and I attended a meeting with
lain Wright, Chair of the BIS Select Committee. I attended this meeting in my
capacity as a subject matter expert in respect of the Scheme. I do not have a
strong recollection of this meeting, but note that Mark Davies shared a summary
of the key points discussed by email to Jane Hill and I afterwards
[POL00153151], and I also circulated a more detailed note of the meeting on 9
September 2015 [POL00153164] [POL00153165].
104 I believe that POL sought this meeting in order to get a sense of whether there
would be a follow-up Select Committee meeting following the meeting of 3
February 2015, and in light of the Panorama broadcast. Paragraphs 9 and 10
of the note of this meeting indicate that Mr Wright invited our candid views as
to whether a Committee would be useful at that stage, and “we advised him
that an inquiry at this stage would certainly add heat, but shed no further light,
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on this issue. That did not...preclude a useful session at a later stage”
[POL00153165]. This view was on the basis that the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (“CCRC”) was engaged, “to examine the accusations being made
in the criminal sphere and, on the civil side, we had 50 or so mediations to
conduct between now and Christmas.”
105 The summary note from Mark Davies reflects Mr Wright's position in respect of
whether to hold a further Select Committee, in that, “he was undecided on
whether to ask for a further session/inquiry: there were serious allegations
about a very important public business: but equally he was not interested in
simply providing ‘another day in court’ [POL00153151]. This note also
suggested that, when writing to Mr Wright as a follow-up to our meeting on 8
September 2015, “we might even consider suggesting a hearing following
CCRC but make point tha [sic] before then seems premature”. As these notes
from this meeting reflect, POL was not opposed to a Select Committee inquiry
per se, but rather considered that the timing was premature given that the
CCRC process should first run its course, and the mediations, which were then
ongoing, should be held. Paragraph 14 of the note I circulated provides that we
would keep him updated on progress with these processes, “so that he might
make an informed decision about the timing and nature of any inquiry he
determines necessary” [POL00153165].
106 Paragraph 6 of the note I circulated following this meeting provides that we
discussed remote access in detail and, “why what was being alleged did not
(because it simply could not) happen.” This assurance reflected our
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understanding of the position of remote access at that time which I refer to in
detail elsewhere in this statement. The note goes on to provide that we would
write to Mr Wright to set out POL’s rebuttals to the various accusations,
including those featured in Panorama. This letter was sent to Mr Wright on 10
September 2015 [POL00026723].
107 Onor around 11 September 2015, MPs tabled an Early Day Motion (“EDM”) in
the House of Commons about Horizon. I was involved in preparing and
finalising a letter to be sent to the MPs who had sponsored the EDM, with input
from various POL colleagues as described below. It was felt important to write
to the MPs who had sponsored the EDM to ensure they had a more rounded
understanding of the issues (as understood by POL at the time), including
details of the Scheme, and to address the points cited in the EDM.
108 At 10:41 on 11 September 2015, Mark Davies emailed Melanie Corfield, Mark
Underwood, Martine Munby (Head of internal communications), Rodric
Williams and me with some comments and rebuttals in respect of the various
points and allegations made in the EDM [POL00153243]. Having reviewed this
email chain, it appears as though Mark Underwood initially prepared a draft
letter to the EDM sponsors and circulated this at 15:38. Further to comments
by Mark Davies, Mark Underwood amended the letter and then, on 14
September 2015, it appears that I came to be responsible for making any further
amendments to the draft letter. Jane Hill, then POL Head of Public Affairs, was
added to the email chain on 14 September 2015 and provided input on the draft
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letter. My email to Jane Hill of 11:50 reflects that we looked to her for direction
on the plan for how best to communicate the letter to the relevant MPs.
109 On 14 September 2015 at 12:13, I circulated the final draft of the letter to MPs
[POL00153244]. This letter indicated that the EDM had called for a “full
independent judicial inquiry”, and that this had reflected other calls for some
form of public inquiry into POL’s handling of the Horizon issue. The draft letter
to MPs stated POL’s view at the time that, “if would be premature to establish
any other inquiry who mandate includes a review of the criminal cases until
such time as the CCRC has completed its vital work’. This letter also noted that
POL continued to offer meetings to MPs with one or more constituents in the
Scheme in order to discuss their case(s) in full.
110 The letter also relays the findings of Second Sight’s July 2013 report that their
investigation, “found no evidence of system-wide issues with Horizon and its
associated processes.” The letter also stated that, “No evidence has been
presented to suggest that the Horizon system... does not work as it should”.
This reflect POL’s experience (described in paragraph 90 above) that no-one
had come forward with any specific information or evidence to enable POL to
follow up. As was consistent when preparing any external documents or
correspondence, the information in this letter was drawn from appropriate
sources of expertise from across POL.
111. To answer the Inquiry’s question 38, to the best of my knowledge, POL did not
have a strategy for dealing with calls from MPs to set up an independent inquiry.
There was, however, a strong sense, which was shared amongst the POL team,
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that the suggestion of a public inquiry was premature at that stage. This was on
the basis that there were steps being taken and processes then underway to
address these issues which had not yet run their course, such as the referral to
the CCRC and the ongoing mediation of cases which had been through the
Scheme. These points were made in POL’s letter to MPs who had sponsored
the EDM (discussed at paragraph 109), and in our meeting with Mr Wright on 8
September 2015 when discussing a possible further committee (see
paragraphs 103 to 105 above).
112 Later on, when Nick Read, then POL CEO, was told by Alex Chisholm, then
Permanent Secretary at BEIS, that it would be sensible to conduct a non-
statutory inquiry, I felt strongly that the inquiry should be placed on a statutory
footing and explained why to Nick Read who agreed with me. POL continued
to promote the shift of the inquiry onto a statutory footing to Paul Scully after he
was appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at BEIS.
Correspondence on the case of Harjinder Singh Butoy
113 I have been asked about correspondence relating to the case of Harjinder Singh
Butoy. [POL00150875] refers to correspondence sent to Paula Vennells by
Toby Perkins MP (“Mr Perkins”) about his constituent Mr Harjinder Singh Butoy
(‘Mr Butoy”). I can see that Angela van den Bogerd and Belinda Crowe were
asked to take the letter forward by Paula Vennell’s office. Belinda Crowe’s email
of 24 December 2014 at 09:03 confirms that his case was not being considered
under the Scheme and that he had been convicted in 2008. Angela van den
Bogerd’s reply on 24 December 2014 at 09:17 suggests that the Mr Perkins’
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115
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letter expresses concern about an unsafe conviction, in which case POL’s
position should be explained.
Angela van den Bogerd’s email of 15 January 2015 19:55 explains her view
that POL should respond to Mr Perkins explaining that the process to be
followed was through the courts. As explained at paragraph 71, POL had
received advice from Brian Altman KC that conviction cases should not be
mediated in the Scheme. On 16 January 2015, Belinda Crowe emailed me to
ask me to draft a response. I prepared a draft having considered the various
email exchanges and I asked Jarnail Singh to confirm that its content was
correct [POL00150875].
[POL00150876] contains the draft I prepared for Angela van den Bogerd. The
draft includes the statement that: “Post Office has not seen or been provided
with any information to support a suggestion that Mr Butoy’s conviction may, in
any way be unsafe”. I believe this statement was made on the basis of POL’s
review of the prosecution file supplied by Cartwright King and was confirmed to
be correct by Jarnail Singh and was approved by Angela van den Bogerd.
At all times during my employment at POL I have been, and remain, reliant on
the information and expert advice provided to me by my colleagues and/or
external advisers engaged by the business with the requisite locus and
qualifications to provide the information or advice sought. My experience of
professional life has been to trust my colleagues, their advice and judgement,
and to rely on the information that they provide to me.
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117 As far as I recall, nobody from POL’s legal team, including its external advisers,
raised anything that called into question the safety of the convictions of sub-
postmasters and my understanding of the views of Angela van den Bogerd’s
team, Jarnail Singh’s team as well as that of Cartwright King, was that there
was no evidence of an unsafe conviction or evidence of a systematic flaw with
Horizon in any of the cases in the Scheme. To the best of my knowledge, they
had not come across anything that suggested there were any unsafe
convictions more generally and my impression was that they took their
responsibilities seriously. In addition, the default reliance on independent
external legal advisors, with their own obligations and duties to the Court on all
aspects of prosecutions added a further measure of confidence to what was
communicated to me on such issues by colleagues.
Role liaising with ShEx, UKGI and BIS
118 In the context of my role as a programme manager for the Scheme I was also
tasked with providing information about the Scheme to government
stakeholders upon request. I had regular contact with Richard Callard via
weekly and monthly emails. Richard Callard also received separate updates
from POL’s Board and he regularly caught up with Paula Vennells, Chris Aujard,
and, Jane MacLeod.
119 I can see that on 11 December 2014, I was introduced to Richard Callard via
email in the context of a request for briefing materials for Jo Swinson ahead of
the Westminster Hall debate [UKGI00002627]. It appears from this email chain
that Belinda Crowe had initially spoken with Peter Batten on 10 December
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2014, who was the outgoing Assistant Director at ShEx, and then received a
follow-up email from Richard Callard, who was working on the briefing with
Peter Batten. Belinda Crowe then responded to Richard Callard’s email,
copying me in to introduce us, and from this point Richard Callard and I
continued to liaise via email, and, as our email exchange suggests, via
telephone. Prior to commencing my role at POL, I had been a civil servant, so
I had some experience of working with government. It was not unusual for
Belinda Crowe to task me with liaising with Richard Callard, and for me to act
as a point of contact with POL’s government stakeholders in respect of the
Scheme.
120 Richard Callard sat on the POL Board with Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins;
however, I was not involved in conversations at that level. Rather, my role was
at the working level of sharing information and providing updates. Belinda
Crowe, Tom Wechsler, Mark Underwood and I were the key points of contact
with ShEX in respect of the Scheme and we would typically engage with either
Richard Callard or his colleague Laura Thompson.
121 As described in paragraphs 77 to 90, I liaised with Richard Callard in context of
the preparation of Jo Swinson ahead of the Westminster Hall debate and he
was also involved in preparing POL’s Response to the Westminster Hall
debate, which was shared with ShEx in draft form on 13 January 2015
[UKG100002943]. It was usual for POL to liaise with ShEx when updating
Ministers or vice versa.
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122 Having reviewed the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, I can see that,
as a point of contact for ShEx, I was copied into an email from Laura Thompson
on 2 April 2015, following their receipt of a letter from the CCRC regarding a
number of applications from individuals alleging their convictions were unsafe
[POL00151752] and given that this was a legal matter I responded to direct
Laura Thompson to liaise with Rodric Williams.
Liaison with Ministers
123 Following the closure of the Working Group, I continued to have a role liaising
and otherwise assisting in POL’s engagement with government stakeholders,
including at times with the relevant Minister. An example of this is when on 6
July 2015, I shared with POL colleagues a letter which I had drafted to be sent
by Paula Vennells in response to a letter she had received from Baroness
Neville-Rolfe, dated 2 July 2015, in which POL had been invited to attend a
meeting with the Minister and MPs, including Andrew Bridgen, to discuss
matters relating to the Scheme and Horizon [POL00027 164]. It was fairly typical
of my role at the time that I should have been tasked with drafting this letter. My
covering email, when sharing the draft letter with POL colleagues, indicated that
Jane MacLeod had, “seen and is happy with this letter” [POL00152539]. This
email also indicated that the POL team did not think it appropriate for Paula
Vennells to attend the meeting with MPs proposed by Baroness Neville-Rolfe.
As I recall, there had been a suggestion that Paula Vennells had been
duplicitous at the Select Committee on 3 February 2015. In light of this, there
were concerns that any meeting she attended risked not achieving POL’s
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objectives to resolve the issues. Instead, the draft letter proposed that Mark
Davies and I attend the meeting at the Department. Mark Davies and I attended
the meeting with Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Andrew Bridgen and Kevan Jones on
15 July 2015, discussed at paragraph 102 above.
124 As the draft letter makes clear, by this time POL was offering to mediate all
cases in the Scheme, and had also offered every MP with a constituent in the
Scheme the opportunity to discuss their case [POL00152540]. The draft letter
notes that, “in none of the cases [in the Scheme] has our computer system been
shown to have caused the losses complained of and in none of the cases has
any evidence emerged to suggest convictions are unsafe”. This confirmation
was derived from POL’s investigations and legal team. I am aware that advice
had been sought specifically by POL’s legal team from Cartwright King and
Brian Altman KC [POL00006583], which was also commented on by Sir
Jonathan Swift in the Swift Review at paragraph 96. Moreover, Sir Jonathan
Swift also said, “We emphasise that none of the Second Sight reports identify
systemic flaws in the Horizon system likely to have caused the losses incurred
at Scheme branches...POL is entitled to note at this point in time that there is
no evidence that the Horizon system — i.e. — the computer system — is
responsible for the losses which have resulted in convictions” (The Swift
Review, paragraph 95). The draft letter also notes that POL was, “under a duty
to disclose any material which is capable of assisting a defence or undermining
the prosecution, even after the prosecution has concluded” and, “it has
complied with that duty and continues to do so”. The confirmation of POL’s
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compliance with this duty came from the legal team, who had (as mentioned)
written to Scheme applicants asking them to come forward with any evidence.
Panorama
125 In May 2015 POL was contacted by BBC journalists in respect of an episode of
Panorama concerning the Horizon IT system and associated issues with
postmasters. I was not typically involved in liaising with the media or journalists
directly.
126 POL considered it important provide a background briefing to those working on
the Panorama programme on the basis that it provided a rare opportunity to set
out the approach it had taken to investigate and to attempt to resolve the issues
complained of. On 9 June 2015 Mark Davies, Angela van den Bogerd and I met
with two BBC journalists, Matt Bardo and Tim Robinson, to provide this briefing.
I was involved in this briefing because of my role on the Scheme and hence my
ability to provide a summary. As far as I am aware, there was no specific
strategy for engaging with journalists other than to ensure that the reporting on
this issue was fair and fully informed.
127 I began the briefing meeting by providing a background summary of the
establishment of the Scheme and its operation. In the course of this, I stated
that, “in no case that we have come across have we found any evidence
whatever that the Horizon system is responsible for the losses that occurred in
branch”. This statement was a reflection of the cases at the time which had
been reinvestigated in the Scheme.
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128 Angela van den Bogerd and I went on to explain the process by which
discrepancies in branch accounts can be addressed by way of a transaction
correction. When asked whether it was now or had ever been possible for
anybody from POL or Fujitsu to interfere with transactions or transaction data
on a branch terminal without the knowledge of the sub-postmaster, I stated that
“itis 100% true to say that we can’t change, alter or modify existing transaction
data so the integrity is 100% preserved.” I went on to say that there was process
which had only ever been used once to overcome a technical error which could
not be corrected by a transaction correction or a transaction acknowledgment,
called a balancing transaction. This statement reflected my understanding and
knowledge of remote access at the time. The information relayed to the
journalists in respect of remote access and the technical possibilities for
amending branch accounts was provided by Fujitsu, as described in paragraph
62. POL was in contact with Fujitsu to obtain their assistance when preparing
for the briefing meeting [POL00316805]. The Panorama episode aired on 17
August 2015.
129 More generally, I have been involved with communicating with the press, but
this has been more limited. I very rarely communicated with the press directly;
I am sometimes asked to comment on statements prepared by POL’s
communication team and others.
130 Following the broadcast of the BBC Panorama episode I helped draft another
letter to Baroness Neville-Rolfe in early September 2015. I note in my email to
Jane McCleod on 2 September at 22:16, that Baroness Neville-Rolfe was
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concerned about the allegations made by Panorama, and BIS therefore
commissioned a full rebuttal. It had then been reported to me by POL
colleagues and Richard Callard that Baroness Neville-Rolfe was discomforted
by an email she had received from Andrew Bridgen, Kevan Jones and Oliver
Letwin requesting a meeting in respect of the “very serious findings” in the
Panorama episode [POL00153064]. It was these episodes of discomfort and
concern on the part of Baroness Neville-Rolfe, as reported to me by POL
colleagues and BIS officials, that I referred to as “wobbles” in my email. It was
therefore decided by Mark Davies, Mark Underwood, Melanie Corfield, Jane
Hill and Rodric Williams and me that we should write to Baroness Neville-Rolfe
directly to set out the steps that had been taken to address the ongoing
concerns of the sub-postmasters, and to provide further information in respect
of specific cases to balance against some of the allegations made in Panorama.
131 I shared a draft of this letter with POL colleagues on 3 September 2015,
although there seems to be some discrepancy in the chronology of emails on
the email chain which I attribute to the fact that Jane MacLeod was abroad and
travelling, presumably in a different time zone, at the time she received this
email and responded [POL00153064]. In my covering email, when I initially
shared the draft letter to Baroness Neville-Rolfe, I noted that I had, “sought to
address the issue of the ‘public inquiry’ suggestion reasonably head on”. In my
subsequent email to Jane MacLeod, of 2 September 2015 at 22:16, I noted that
“the relative lack of challenge by Government of the call for a ‘public inquiry’
is...currently the most damaging aspect of the project and we feel it necessary
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to begin the process of placing a marker down that this is a place that we, as
an organisation, can't be taken to. The letter makes clear why”.
132 1 do not think that the government's approach to oversight changed following
Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s appointment as the relevant Minister. The Horizon
issue was evolving all the time, and the BBC Panorama broadcast in August
2015 would, in my view, inevitably have led whoever occupied the ministerial
seat at the time to become more concerned and immediately engaged with this
matter.
REMOTE ACCESS
133. My understanding of the extent of remote access, what was and what was not
possible to do through it, and the extent to which any such access would be
visible to a sub-postmaster or anyone else, evolved substantially over time. My
recollection of how this unfolded at different points in time is set out below.
134 I have reviewed [POL00091395] (email from Belinda Crowe, dated 20
November 2014, 14:22), [POL00149277] (email from me, dated 20 November
2014, 9:54 and chain), and [POL00149296] (email from me, dated 21 October
2018, 18:48) and can see that very shortly after I joined POL, the issue of
remote access has arisen in the context of the Scheme. This is, I believe, the
first time I came across the issue of remote access in relation to specific cases,
although I may have been told that this was one of the points of contention as
part of my introduction to the work more generally.
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135 Belinda Crowe’s email [POL00091395] suggests that the recipients of the
email, including me, met earlier in the day and agreed that we needed to set
out the position on remote access in more detail. Belinda Crowe said she would
set up a meeting with Fujitsu and others. Her email also forwards on an email
from James Davidson of Fujitsu (dated 17 April 2014), which includes Fujitsu’s
answers to a series of questions about remote access asked of him by my
colleague Rodric Williams on 14 April 2014 before I joined POL. At the time, I
was unaware of the context of Rodric Williams’ 2014 email.
136 [POL00149277] is an email chain which starts with an email I sent to Melanie
Corfield, Belinda Crowe and Tom Wechsler on 20 October 2014 at 9:52 asking
to be copied into emails concerning remote access. Melanie Corfield was a
member of POL’s communication team.
137. [POL00149296] (email from me, dated 21 October 201, 18:48) sets out my
response to Belinda Crowe’s request for comments on an email she sent to
Angela van den Bogerd and Andrew Parsons (and which I was copied into)
about the text of an email she planned to send to Fujitsu in advance of a
telephone call the following day. Belinda Crowe's email states that she would
like to achieve: “a common understanding of what is possible in relation to
Horizon; whether POL has used the right terminology in the past; what POL
should say in relation to cases in the Scheme; and, ensuring POL has a robust
statement it could stand behind to “close the matter down.” [POL00091397]
indicates that the meeting was cancelled but that James Davidson of Fujitsu
emailed Belinda Crowe on 22 October 2014 at 14:29 which he considered, “sets
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out how Integrity in Horizon is assured and how this forms the basis for
responding to the various challenges made.”
138 In my response to Belinda Crowe, I said that I thought it was important to ask
a question so that there was absolute clarity about governance structure and
the processes through which requests for access must follow, setting out who
at POL authorised the requests to Fujitsu. I also thought that it would be helpful
for there to be a worked example to illustrate this, and to understand whether
there was difference between Horizon online (the second version of Horizon)
and its predecessor. I also thought that it would be sensible to ask for
confirmation that remote access had not taken place in respect of the terminal
at any branches in cases considered by the Scheme.
139 [POL00091397] indicates that on 23 October 2014 Belinda Crowe forwarded
James Davidson's email of 22 October 2014 at 14:29 on to me, Rodric William
and Tom Wechsler, stating that she “did not understand all of this”, and that it
raised further questions.
140 It appears from the documents [POL00149488] that Mark Underwood and I
were tasked with trying to obtain straightforward answers from Fujitsu.
[POL00149488] indicates that Mark Underwood and I met with Fujitsu on 6
November 2014. From the follow up email dated 7 November 2014 at 11:45,
Mark Underwood and I were tasked with drawing up “plain English questions”
on remote access — about what it is and what is not possible to do when not
using a sub postmaster’s user ID.
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141 It is clear from the email exchange between Mark Underwood and I on the
morning of 7 November 2014 that our understanding of remote access following
our meeting with Fujitsu was, to use Mark's words, “that there is no functionality
that allows FJ to edit, remove or manipulate a transaction remotely in any way.
Any change takes the form of an insertion with distinct ID that is easily
identifiable in the audit trail it leaves.”
142 Mark Underwood's email to me on 11 November 2014 13:37 [POL00149488]
suggests that Andrew Parsons (referred to as AP) prepared a paper which
covered the scenarios that enable transactions to be added/injected into a
branch account, leaving Mark and I to focus at a very high level on preparing
questions in writing for Fujitsu on the audit trail linked to additions/injections. I
cannot remember precisely when I read Andrew Parsons’ draft paper, but I
recall that the three scenarios were in branch; transaction acknowledgments
and transaction corrections; and, balancing transactions. Our understanding
was that if a transaction was added to a branch account, it would leave a distinct
identifier, which could be searched for.
143 With reference to suggested questions to Belinda Crowe about the status of
cases in the Scheme, having reviewed documents provided to me by POL, I
can see that Mark Underwood emailed me on 20 November 2014 at 11:56
following a telephone call with James Davidson and reported that “the auditors
have searched the data and no ‘remote access scar’ is present and thus did not
take place” [POL00149598]. On 20 November 2014 at 10:49 Mark Underwood
emailed Tom Wechsler. A further email from Mark Underwood to Tom Wechsler
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(and copied to me) on 20 November 2014 at 10:47 notes that Fujitsu confirmed
during a telephone call that they had downloaded branch data for the 150
Scheme cases and “everything appears golden” [POL00149578].
144 On 20 November 2014 10:47, Mark Underwood emailed Tom Wechsler, with
me in copy, attaching a paper produced by Andrew Parsons’ [POL00212049]
together with a bulleted lists of points for public rebuttals about what could and
could not be done in relation to remote access [POL00212048]. Mark
Underwood's email indicates he planned to send his amendments to Andrew
Parsons’ to consider, following which the paper would have been sent to Fujitsu
to answer the questions posed and confirm the processes described were
correct. Andrew Parsons’ responded on 25 November 2014 at 14:37 and
suggested sending to Fujitsu, “as they will pick up on technical points
[POL00212720].
145 Mark Underwood's email of 26 November 2014 13:29 [POL00149674] indicates
that our questions were sent to them reasonably soon afterwards — Mark
Underwood's email of 26 November 2014 13:23 states that he spoke to James
Davidson that morning about the papers that had been sent over.
146 At the time that I was engaged in trying to obtain answers from Fujitsu to
questions concerning remote access, I did not have any reason to think they
were being unhelpful, and they responded to our requests, albeit there was
evidently some frustration within Fujitsu. [POL00149674] records James
Davidson's frustration with statements made about Horizon by Second Sight,
including consideration of legal action by Fujitsu against Second Sight. This is
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reflected in my email to Tom Wechsler of 19 December 2014 at 07:26, in which
I noted that we “were somewhat disappointed by the efforts of Fujitsu to assist
in plain English answers to the questions we prepared with [Bond Dickinson]’s
help” [POL00062410]. It did not appear to me at the time that this was the
product of evasiveness or reluctance to help. In my email of 19 December 2014,
I stated that the issue of remote access was “one we can definitely close off, I
am sure” [POL00062410]. It appeared to me at the time, perhaps naively, that
it should be possible for Fujitsu to answer the questions we asked of them ina
straightforward way.
147 [POL00062410] records that remote access had been discussed in the
Westminster Hall debate on 17 December 2014 and that Tom Wechsler felt that
POL needed an “agreed line”.
148 I have reviewed POL’s response to the Westminster Hall debate
[POL00040791] and paragraphs 34 — 36 which concern remote access. Tom
Wechsler circulated a first draft on 8 January 2015 and I sent a re-worked draft
on 9 January 2015 [POL00040790]. POL’s response was a collective effort and
I am not sure who had the final sign-off in relation to whether or not balancing
transactions should be referred to.
149 The issue of remote access was revisited again in the course of POL preparing
its response to Second Sight's Part Two Report. From the email chain of 8 April
2015, it appears that Mark Underwood liaised with Pete Newsome of Fujitsu on
acall, and Pete Newsome then followed up to provide a step by step breakdown
of the process by which Fujitsu could inject a “balancing transaction” into a
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branch database [POL00041040]. This was previously understood to be
possible, but Pete Newsome was providing more detail about the necessary
process for this. As the subsequent email chain with Mark Underwood and
Andrew Parsons demonstrates, this information then informed the content of
POL’s response to Second Sight’s Part Two Report, then in preparation.
150 The email from Mark Underwood to James Davidson of Fujitsu on 7 April 2015
reflects that in their Part Two Report, Second Sight had sent two POL / Fujitsu
documents to POL regarding a bug from 2010, known to cause a receipts and
payments mismatch (also known as “the 76 bug”), which had arisen in a pilot,
and indicated that POL / Fujitsu could alter branch data to resolve the bug
[FUJ00081944]. The documents show that Mark Underwood immediately wrote
to James Davidson of Fujitsu to seek an explanation. I asked Mark Underwood,
Andrew Parsons and Pete Newsome of Fujitsu to co-ordinate so that POL could
go back to Second Sight with something meaningful and accurate
[POL00353224]. Mark Underwood then posed a series of further questions to
Fujitsu in light of the information contained in the documents referred to in
Second Sight’s Part Two Report. In the course of an email chain between Mark
Underwood and Pete Newsome of Fujitsu on 8 April 2015 at 15:51
[POL00021667], Pete Newsome indicated that the errors were resolved using
a balancing transaction, a process POL was aware of. He stated, “There is only
one process Fujitsu can use which is the insertion of auditable additional
transactions described in the document so the words below must have been a
loose business description for a meeting with non-technical attendees.”
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[POL00314275]. Andrew Parsons’ took forward the drafting and his draft
response to Second Sight [POL00226072] indicates that POL responded on
that basis, as well as highlighting that the issue had been disclosed to Second
Sight in 2013. I then sent the final version to lan Henderson.
151 These documents show the team trying to better understand what impact this
had on remote access in the context of responding to Second Sight. It is also
clear from the document that the team did not consider it from the point of view
of disclosure in proceedings, which I believe POL would have undertaken
before Mark Underwood or I had joined the business. It is also unlikely to have
occurred to us since Second Sight were drawing our attention to documents
POL had previously sent them and so it did not appear to be new information.
152 To the extent that I understood any alteration of branch data to be possible, my
understanding was that this could only be achieved by injecting a new
transaction into the system, rather than changing data or entries which were
already in the system. I understood that existing data could not be changed,
altered or deleted. Any new entry or transaction which was added to the system
could only be done in limited circumstances, and would leave a non-user
identifier such that it was clear that it did not originate from the user of that
terminal, i.e. it would be identifiable as not having been caused by the sub-
postmaster.
Remote Access — Project Zebra
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153 I believe my first awareness of the Project Zebra occurred when I was helping
to collate material for Sir Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight in the context
of the Swift Review. I have reviewed a number of documents provided to me by
POL and I can see from [POL00237265] that an email from Steve Allchorn
dated 14 December 2015 records that I had a conversation with Jane MacLeod
ahead of a planned meeting with Sir Jonathan Swift. I cannot now recall the
details of my conversation with Jane MacLeod; however, I believe this was the
first time I became aware of the existence of Project Zebra since I was copied
into Steve Allchorn’s email and later exchange with Deloitte’s Mark Westbrook
and Andrew Whitton, which referred to, “Project Zebra Consolidated Report
Draft Subject to Change 21/08/2014 18_06” and “Project Zebra - Board
Briefing 040614 v13 Final Draft.”
154 On reviewing other documents provided to me by POL I can also see that on
23 October 2014 Belinda Crowe shared a Board Paper, dated 6 June 2014,
with me which included a section titled ‘Deloitte Report and Linklaters Advice’,
which appears to discuss the workstream which became Project Zebra
[POL00027153]. This document was shared with me in the context of
consideration of closing the Working Group in the Scheme, as discussed in
paragraph 42 above, to make me aware that this had previously been
considered. I do not recall noticing or engaging with the section in this Board
paper regarding Deloitte’s work.
155 1 do not believe I was supplied with either the Project Zebra Consolidated
Report or the Board Briefing and it appears from [POL00322386] and
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[POL00322475] that Mark Underwood and Rodric Williams arranged for the
Project Zebra documents — referred to as the Deloitte report in the email chain
— to be delivered to Sir Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight in Chambers. I
am aware from my involvement in setting up the Swift Review that Sir Jonathan
Swift met with Deloitte alongside other stakeholders but I was not present at
those meetings.
156 Whilst preparing this witness statement and reviewing documents provided by
POL, I have seen [POL00211254] for the first time, an email from Andrew
Parsons’ to Belinda Crowe and Rodric Williams, which refers to Andrew
Parsons’ note on Horizon access and states: “This describes the position as I
understand it based on the Deloitte report but this needs to go past FJ
/ Deloitte to confirm the position.” I note that Andrew Parsons’ email responds
to an email from Rodric Williams to Belinda Crowe and Andrew Parsons on 21
October 2014 12:48 in which Rodric Williams said, “/f this is the remote access
point — Andy, what progress had been made with Deloitte.” It appears to me
that there was another workstream that I was unaware of and I assume the
reference to the Deloitte report concerns Project Zebra. I do not know why
neither I or Mark Underwood were copied in and can only assume it was
because a decision had been made that it was sensitive and details of it should
not be widely shared.
157 I can also see from my review of documents supplied to me by POL that on 10
November 2014 16:44 Andrew Parsons emailed Belinda Crowe, Andy Holt and
me (with Amy Eames and Rodric Williams in copy) stating that, “I've also had
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some more information from Deloitte that I have included in the note
[POL00149483]. I have not located or accessed Andrew Parsons’ note and I do
not remember its content. I can now only assume that the information from
Deloitte he refers to came from Project Zebra, but I did not know this at the
time.
158 For completeness, while preparing my statement, I also reviewed
[POL00125594] and [POL00129447], an email from Andrew Parsons to Rodric
Williams and Mark Underwood sent on 9 March 2015 at 16:07, to which I was
copied in, and which concerned a paragraph on remote access contained in a
draft Scheme Report. Andrew Parsons’ email forwarded on an email exchange
between Rodric Williams and Martin Smith of Cartwright King dated 9 March
2015 at 12:12. It appears from the chain that Rodric Williams and Andrew
Parsons then discussed the content of Martin Smith’s email before Andrew
Parsons sent across his views to the wider group at 16:07. I do not believe that
I read Martin Smith’s email since Andrew Parsons’ email was addressed to
Rodric Williams and Mark Underwood and they appear to have been taking
forward the drafting of this paragraph. I can see that Martin Smith also raised a
point made to him by Simon Clarke that the draft paragraph did not reflect
aspects of the Deloitte Report which commented on balancing transactions and
the absence of controls that would detect when an authorised user had sent “a
‘fake’ basket into the digital signing process.” Andrew Parsons’ email to the
wider group did not refer to the absence of controls re ‘fake’ baskets, but did
discuss whether the draft paragraph should refer to balancing transactions.
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159 In his 16:07 email Andrew Parsons’ appears to have taken the view that the
paragraph was accurate on the basis of conversations with Fujitsu confirming
that a balancing transaction allowed Fujitsu to inject a new transaction but did
not allow transaction data to be edited or removed. He pointed out that the
paragraph of the Scheme Report was “arguably incomplete” since it only
referred to transaction corrections and transaction acknowledgments as the
method of addressing accounting errors. It appears that the team accepted
Andrew Parsons’ view and chose not to refer to balancing transactions. I do not
believe I was involved in making the decision, but I would have been reassured
by Andrew Parsons’ view that the paragraph was accurate as well as by the
previously reasoned position he refers to that the balancing transaction process
was not mentioned because “it was so rare that it is immaterial.”
160 Having reviewed documents while preparing this statement, I believe that
aspects of Deloitte’s work — in particular, regarding balancing transactions —
were within my knowledge at an earlier stage, but that I did not know they arose
within the context of Project Zebra, which I was unaware of until the early stages
of the Swift Review (paragraph 153 above). For completeness, I can also see
from [POL00117518] that in the context of my collation of information for the
work to be taken forward by the Swift Review, Rodric Williams provided a very
brief outline of the background information concerning the instruction of Deloitte
by the Board.
Remote Access -— Swift Review
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161 My understanding of remote access changed again when Sir Jonathan Swift
delivered the report compiling his findings and conclusions from the Swift
Review, dated 8 February 2016 (the “Swift Review Report”), to POL, which
highlighted that Deloitte’s Board Briefing noted that database access privileges
existed which would enable the deletion of a digitally signed basket, but which
are restricted to authorised administrators at Fujitsu. Those privileges “would
enable a person to create or amend a basket and re-sign it with a fake’ key,
detectable if appropriately checked” [POL00006355 at para 140], and Deloitte
had not seen a way to prevent a person with the appropriate authorisation
carrying out such an exercise in an unauthorised manner.
162 Sir Jonathan Swift also commented that Deloitte noted that administrators had
the ability to delete data from the audit store which could allow, “suitably
authorised staff in Fujitsu to delete a sealed set of baskets and replace them
with properly sealed baskets, although they would have to fake the digital
signatures.”
163 I understood from reading Sir Jonathan’s Swift's report that Fujitsu accepted
that Deloitte’s interpretation was technically correct, but emphasised the wide
range of security measures in the software, hardware and environment which
they said reduced risk of interference. Moreover, Fujitsu stressed — “properly”
in Sir Jonathan Swift's view — that there is no evidence that any such action
occurred and that likelihood of all the security measuring being overcome was
very small.
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164 I tended to agree with Sir Jonathan Swift's view that: “The fact that such activity
is possible does not, of course, indicate that it has actually occurred” and with
his view that whilst it was theoretically possible, there was no evidence it
occurred and it was inherently improbable.
165 Sir Jonathan Swift considered that an alternative would be that Fujitsu would
use the functionality to correct system bugs without drawing them to the
attention of POL or subpostmasters in order to avoid contractual penalties. After
reading the Swift Review Report, I was aware that the public assurances that
POL had given were incomplete and I felt that it was essential that POL should
follow Sir Jonathan’s Swift's recommendations that POL commission work to
confirm the position insofar as possible and seek advice from Brian Altman KC
in relation to disclosure of the Deloitte reports.
166 Sir Jonathan Swift considered that POL’s Westminster Hall Response was
incomplete because it did not refer to balancing transactions or Deloitte’s
observations about the audit store and ‘fake’ baskets. I was unaware of the
latter at the time of my involvement with the preparation of POL’s response. I
was aware of balancing transactions; however my understanding was that POL
had adopted the position that balancing transaction process was so rare as to
be immaterial, and that the main way that accounting errors were carried out
was through the transaction correction and transaction acknowledgment
process. I believe that I was only aware of one case in which a balancing
transaction had been used.
Remote Access — Group Litigation phase
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167 I explain above that my understanding of remote access evolved over the
period of time covered by this witness statement. The early Group Litigation
phase saw a significant evolution in my level of knowledge and understanding.
168 On 13 July 2016, I received an email from Andrew Parsons with a summary of
the Deloitte Preliminary Report [POL00029990]. I recall reading this email and
it being significant as it represented a real-time extension of my understanding
of what was, and was not, possible for Fujitsu employees to do with respect to
branch accounts.
169 The email explained that Deloitte identified that a small number of users, called
super-users, did in fact possess the ability to delete and edit transactions in
branch accounts although it appeared that this would leave an identifiable
digital footprint. This ran counter to my and the wider POL business’
understanding at that time that it was only possible to add or inject a new
transaction into branch accounts. For example, if I put in £100 into the system
instead of £1000, my understanding was that you could not change or fix this
original transaction. Head Office would have to send me a new, separate
transaction (a transaction correction) for £900 which I would accept to correct
the mistake and remedy the difference.
170 This was the view I had also shared during the Panorama interview in June
2015. On the face of it, this email indicated that my knowledge and that of my
colleagues (based on what we had previously been told by James Davison and
others of Fujitsu) was materially inaccurate.
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171 I do not know if others within POL had this knowledge prior to this Deloitte’s
report, but this email was the first time that I believe I was made aware of this
information.
172 The email concludes with two actions which were to be taken forward by Bond
Dickinson LLP.
173. The email chain from 21 July 2016 which consists of communication largely
between legal teams (Rodric Williams and Andrew Parsons) and Mark Davies
[POL00029998], shows that POL was trying to understand the situation as new
information was being fed in to them.
174 When the new information emerged we realised that what we had understood
and had shared publicly with respect to remote access was not 100% accurate.
It was at this point that POL had to, as Andrew Parsons explains
[POL00029998], review everything that had previously been said by POL in
relation to this issue to establish the extent to which it needed changing in the
light of the new information we were actively receiving. As reflected by Andrew
Parsons in one of these emails, it was essential that POL deal with this issue
“candidly”, as Andrew put it, and volunteer a correction regardless of whether
that put POL in a bad light.
175 Although I do not think I had any input in drafting the wording of the corrections
and explanations offered by POL in the light of this new development, my
understanding was that it would need to be done carefully and in consultation
with Fujitsu. I recall that this was a very technical issue and there was a concern
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that while making the language accessible, we still reflected the position
accurately.
176 It was my view then, and continues to be, that POL’s IT capability during this
period was very limited. Our IT expertise was largely, if not entirely, external
until Rob Houghton was brought into the organisation at which point our in-
house IT function began to develop and grow to some degree. Until then, I
believe that there was a significant imbalance in the capability of the POL
customer and the Fujitsu supplier, leading to an over-reliance on the latter by
the former for IT expertise. Anecdotally, at the relevant time, my observation
was that the part of the office designated as the IT function was staffed, in the
main, by Fujitsu contractors. By way of example, I note that James Davidson's
email signature at [POL00091395] identifies him as working for both Fujitsu and
POL.
177 At this stage or subsequent to it, while I was copied into some of the emails
which discussed these important and material issues, I was not involved in
formal discussions, decision-making, and drafting with respect to remote
access issues. This would have been dealt with by internal and external legal
teams and their IT counterparts.
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
178 I was aware that there had been an influx of referrals made to the CCRC in
March 2015, but I had very little involvement in discussions related to this. I was
briefly involved in an email chain with POL colleagues where we tried to
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understand what had prompted these CCRC referrals [POL00063478]. We tried
to identify if there was a particular group, or if the individuals who had referred
their cases shared a common adviser, who we could engage with to try and
understand their concerns and how we might help. I also liaised with ShEx in
respect of this, and confirmed that Rodric Williams was the person best placed
within POL to speak to about this matter [POL00151752]. Since this was a legal
matter, I believe it would have been dealt with by Rodric Williams and POL’s
legal team.
THE SWIFT REVIEW
179 Following the unsatisfactory conclusion of the Scheme and the end of Second
Sight’s work, POL was keen to satisfy itself that the steps it had taken in its
attempts to understand and, where possible, resolve what lay at the heart of
the complaints it had received were objectively appropriate and sufficient. I
cannot recall whether ShEx or POL first had the idea of using the arrival of a
new Chairman at Post Office to commission a piece of work to meet that
objective. The idea was that the incoming Chairman was well placed to be
tasked to undertake this work since he had, by definition, no prior interest in
these matters and no pre-existing relationships with anyone involved and could
therefore approach the exercise objectively and dispassionately. In the event,
Sir Jonathan Swift and his junior, Christopher Knight, were retained to conduct
a review of the matters raised and steps taken to resolve them. The ‘Swift
Review’, as it has became known, was conducted for Tim Parker in a personal
capacity, reporting back to the (then) Minister, Baroness Neville-Rolfe. Sir
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Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight were given unrestricted access to all the
relevant information help by POL, as well as to Second Sight and others, in
undertaking this work. The Swift Review reported its findings, many of which
were complimentary about POL’s actions, but some of which were not. He
made eight recommendations for follow up work, some of which were more
straightforward to discharge than others, but follow up work on each was begun
shortly after his final report was presented to Tim Parker. Quite soon thereafter,
legal proceedings were issued against POL by Alan Bates & Others. In-house
and external lawyers for POL expressed the view that the commencement of
legal proceedings would likely impact how POL would most prudently take
forward the follow up work from the Swift Review which was still outstanding
due to its complexity. Advice was sought from Leading Counsel (Anthony de
Garr Robinson KC) who was of the firm view that the work that remained
outstanding should be still taken forward but as part of POL’s preparations for
defending the litigation. His advice was proactively shared with Sir Jonathan
Swift who indicated that he was content to proceed on that basis.
180 On 8 October 2015, on behalf of incoming Chairman, Tim Parker, POL
instructed leading counsel Sir Jonathan Swift to carry out an independent
review to determine whether any further action needed to be taken by POL to
respond to the concerns about Horizon raised by individuals and MPs, including
whether POL’s reliance on Horizon had resulted in miscarriages of justice
[POL00156617].
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181 My recollection is that POL remained concerned about unresolved disputes
following the closure of the Scheme, and wished to provide reassurance that it
was doing all that it was reasonable to do to seek to resolve those disputes.
Jane MacLeod or possibly me, felt that POL’s incoming Chairman, Tim Parker,
who was without any vested interests, could perform that role supported by
external counsel, who was entirely independent of the team at POL. Tim Parker
had no existing relationships within POL and it was felt that he could be
completely impartial. As indicated above, it was felt important that this work be
undertaken by Tim Parker in his personal capacity, in order to preserve its
independence and integrity, free of the influence of any vested interests at POL,
whether at Board level or otherwise. I can see from documents provided to me
by POL that this appears to have been discussed with Baroness Neville-Rolfe
in a meeting she attended with Jane MacLeod, at which Baroness Neville-Rolfe
advised she would ask Tim Parker to review POL’s position [POL00041135].
182 What became the Swift Review was formally triggered on 10 September 2015
when Baroness Neville-Rolfe, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at
BIS, wrote to Tim Parker asking him to determine whether “any further action is
necessary” by POL [POL00156617].
183 I was part of the POL team responsible for instructing Sir Jonathan Swift and
Christopher Knight. The other members of the team included Jane MacLeod,
in her capacity as General Counsel, alongside Rodric Williams and Mark
Underwood. Rodric Williams, Mark Underwood and I reported to Jane MacLeod
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and we had all been closely involved with the Scheme and the efforts
undertaken by POL to try and resolve the issues with sub-postmasters.
Emails re selecting counsel and the scope of the review
184 I believed that Tim Parker should determine the terms of reference for the
review, and I emphasised this to my colleagues in my email of 24 September
2015 [POL00065606]. I do not recall any dispute about the broad purpose of
the Swift Review within POL, and there was none that I was aware of at the
time.
185 On25 September 2015, Jane MacLeod met with Tim Parker to discuss aspects
of the exercise. Jane MacLeod’s subsequent email to Tim Parker on 1 October
2015 [POL00027126], suggests she was asked to recommend leading
barristers to conduct the review and that Tim Parker also asked her to provide
draft wording to describe its scope.
186 On 30 September 2015, I provided Jane MacLeod with the biographies of three
candidates for consideration for her to share with Tim Parker [POL00153300].
I also shared a draft covering letter for Jane MacLeod to send to Tim Parker,
which included a draft form of words outlining the scope of what became the
Swift Review [POL00153304]. It was drafted with input from Mark Underwood,
and I intended it to be a starting point for Tim Parker to consider and develop
as he felt appropriate, together with leading counsel: it was not intended as a
final draft. This is reflected in my covering email to Jane MacLeod, where I
noted, “the letter sets out a starter for 10 on the question of scope but is explicit
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in that it is offered purely as a straw man to be knocked down/amended by Tim
on Counsel's advice” [POL00153300]. I believe the draft text on the possible
scope of the review reflects discussions with other members of the POL team
as to what might encapsulate the exercise best. For example, at the time,
Rodric Williams had been very busy and, as I noted in my email to Jane
MacLeod [POL00153300], he had not had a chance to consider the draft text
on scope of the review, although it had benefited from some exchanges with
him.
187 On 1 October 2015, Jane MacLeod emailed Tim Parker with a different
selection of leading counsel, using an amended version of my text, and
including an amended version of the draft scope for the Swift Review
[POL00027 126}.
Preparation of instructions to counsel & settling scope
188 I drafted the instructions to Sir Jonathan Swift [POL00156617], which were
reviewed and approved by Jane MacLeod. Ordinarily this task would have fallen
to Rodric Williams, but he did not have capacity, so! assisted instead. I would
have received input from my immediate POL colleagues, including Rodric
Williams, Jane MacLeod, Mark Underwood, and possibly more broadly from
others, including Angela van den Bogerd, where specialist input was required.
I imagine I also sought the input of Andrew Parsons at Bond Dickinson LLP.
189 The draft text about the scope of the Swift Review (paragraph 3 of the
instructions) was again only included as a starting point to enable a wider
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conversation about what the Swift Review was trying to achieve — it was not
intended to be prescriptive. I can see that paragraph 4.1 of the instructions
request counsel’s advice “on the scope of the Review and how this is framed”
[POL00156617]. Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the instructions also asked counsel
to attend a meeting with Jane MacLeod on 8 October 2015, the purpose of
which was, “to settle the Review’s scope and agree a process for conducting,
concluding and reporting on the Review within the desired timeframe’.
190 The meeting on 8 October 2015 with Sir Jonathan Swift was attended by Jane
MacLeod and Rodric Williams and possibly me, although I cannot recall for
certain. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and reflect on the written
instructions and to consider the possible terms of reference for the Swift
Review. On 9 October 2015, following the discussions of the previous day, Sir
Jonathan Swift circulated a seven-point draft outline which he called, “A starting
point for the terms of reference” [POL00102582].
191 On 10 October 2015, Jane MacLeod responded to Sir Jonathan Swift attaching
a draft chronology of the Scheme, to assist with his background understanding
of the issues, and confirming that a meeting has been scheduled for him with
Tim Parker for 20 October 2015 [POL00104218]. The Scheme chronology
document was prepared by Mark Underwood. I am not sure whether this was
prepared specifically for Sir Jonathan Swift.
192 On 12 October 2015 Jane MacLeod emailed Sir Jonathan Swift with a
preliminary response to the first five of the seven points he had listed for
consideration as the terms of reference for the Swift Review [POL00104216].
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The preliminary response under each of these points summarises how POL
had addressed or responded to the issues raised by Sir Jonathan Swift as he
considered the definition of the scope of his work. I do not recall contributing
to the drafting of this email to Sir Jonathan Swift, although it is likely that I would
have been involved in discussions about the issues which are reflected in it.
193 On 14 October 2015, Jane MacLeod emailed Sir Jonathan Swift informing him
that a huge amount of information had been collated [POL00102604]. Jane
MacLeod then shared an updated version of the Scheme chronology document
[POL00130957] and asked Sir Jonathan Swift to indicate which documents and
material he would particularly like sight of at that stage, so that we could
prioritise sharing it with him. As stated above, Mark Underwood prepared the
Scheme chronology and would also have been responsible for collating this
material and, I think, sending it to Sir Jonathan Swift. I was not involved in this
exercise.
194 On 15 October 2015, Jane MacLeod emailed Sir Jonathan Swift again
[POL00162692], attaching a note with preliminary responses to the remaining
points raised by Sir Jonathan Swift in his initial note on the possible terms of
reference for the Swift Review [POL00162693]. I do not recall having any
involvement in collating this response document but, again, I imagine I was
involved in discussions about it content.
195 On 20 October 2015, Jane MacLeod met with Sir Jonathan Swift and Tim
Parker to discuss the Swift Review. I did not attend this meeting. On 21 October
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2015, Jane MacLeod shared a summary note of what had been discussed at
this meeting with Rodric Williams, Mark Underwood and me [POL00102616].
196 Jane MacLeod’s note of the meeting on 20 October 2015 sets out discussions
of the areas of focus for Sir Jonathan Swift's investigation, as well as key people
he would like to speak with, which included Lord Arbuthnot, Alan Bates and
Second Sight. It also set out the key documents and information which Sir
Jonathan Swift required immediately, which included copies of the CCRC
requests, example prosecution reports with their supporting evidence
(preferably those of the three cases referred to in Panorama), and
documentation which describes the investigation process that POL went
through under the Scheme. It is likely that members of my team would have
coordinated the collation of these documents and arranged for them to reach
Sir Jonathan Swift. One of the actions for POL was to set up a meeting with
Christopher Knight, who was appointed as junior counsel on the Swift Review,
to discuss how best to provide access to the required documents.
197 Mark Underwood, Jane MacLeod and I arranged to meet Christopher Knight
on 27 October 2015 at POL’s London headquarters at Finsbury Dials. Ahead of
that meeting, I circulated an agenda which reflected the areas of discussion
from the meeting with Sir Jonathan Swift and Tim Parker of 20 October 2015,
including the four strands of the enquiries which counsel would undertake
[POL00153365]. My covering email to Christopher Knight noted that the agenda
was in draft only, and he should feel free to add to it as he saw fit
[POL00153364].
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198 On 28 October 2015 at 12:29, I emailed Christopher Knight with a summary of
the discussion in our meeting the previous day, and attached a list of agreed
actions [POL00102638] [POL00131182]. This summary note reflects our
discussions with Christopher Knight with respect to how he and Sir Jonathan
Swift might approach each of the four strands of the enquiries to be undertaken,
which had been identified by Sir Jonathan Swift in his meeting with Tim Parker
on 20 October 2015. This note also reflects comments by Jane MacLeod from
the meeting with Christopher Knight on 27 October 2015 about the difficulty of
positively proving that there were no bugs or flaws in the Horizon system that
could have caused discrepancies in the branch accounts. This is what I refer to
in my note of that meeting using the shorthand, “an exercise in proving a
negative”. Jane MacLeod commented that such an exercise would be further
complicated by the age of the Horizon system because it would have been
updated at various points and, therefore, any exercise seeking to prove this
negative position (i.e. that there were no flaws or bugs with the Horizon system
that could have led to discrepancies in branch accounts) would entail scouring
every line of code in the entirety of the system, including prior iterations which
may have since been updated.
199 The email summary of this meeting reflects that I would be the primary point of
contact for Christopher Knight going forward, and that both Mark Underwood
and Steve Allchorn would also be available to provide any information he or Sir
Jonathan Swift might need. I believe that I probably introduced Chris Knight to
Steve Allchorn in the office on the same day as our meeting. I asked him to
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assist with the provision of material to counsel in the Swift Review. Together,
Mark Underwood, Steve Allchorn and I we were responsible for ensuring that
both Sir Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight had everything they needed,
and we responded to various requests they made for information and
documents to enable them to undertake the Swift Review.
200 Following the meeting on 27 October 2015, I had an email exchange with
Christopher Knight in which we discussed the status, and clarified the contents,
of the various materials and information provided to him and Sir Jonathan Swift
[POL00153392]. In this email exchange, we also agreed that it was a priority to
arrange a demonstration of the operation of the Horizon system for him and Sir
Jonathan Swift, in order for them to better understand the context of the review
they were undertaking. I think, but cannot be sure, that this idea first came from
Christopher Knight.
201 = Sir Jonathan Swift interviewed a wide range of stakeholders during the course
of his review, which he lists in the body of the Swift Review Report at paragraph
10.
202 On 30 October 2015, Jane MacLeod provided the first update to Tim Parker on
the progress with the Swift Review [POL00102649]. I had provided Jane
MacLeod with an initial draft of the update to Tim Parker, after first running this
past Mark Underwood for his input [POL00153429] [POL00153430]. I believe
that Jane MacLeod had agreed to provide Tim Parker updates in relation to Sir
Jonathan’s Swift's work on a fortnightly basis so that he could be satisfied that
progress was being made and was made aware of any issues as they arose.
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With reference to the following quote from this document: “At this stage we
propose that Jonathan will provide you with a legally privileged report...It is not
our intention that this report would be made public, and we will therefore need
to consider the best way for your findings to be presented in a way that can be
made public”, my understanding is that POL wanted to ensure that nothing was
considered by Sir Jonathan Swift to be off-limits while nonetheless reserving
POL’s legal position over his findings. While no detailed thought had been given
as to how those findings might ultimately be made public (something POL would
agree with Sir Jonathan Swift at the relevant time), I believe I am right in saying
we probably envisaged a shortish, non-technical, document detailing the scope
of the Swift Review, its principal findings, and next steps (if any). However, as I
say, this was not considered in any detail at all.
203 On 10 November 2015, Sir Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight attended a
demonstration of the Horizon system at Finsbury Dials, POL’s headquarters,
where we had a model Post Office, staffed by colleagues whose names I cannot
recall. After this demonstration, I (along with Mark Underwood, I think) met with
Sir Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight and they provided us with an update
on their progress, including their plans for meetings with key stakeholders, and
made some further requests for information which they considered might be
helpful to them as they carried on their work. This discussion is reflected in my
email to counsel and the POL team on 12 November 2015 [POL00153634].
Christopher Knight responded to this email on the same day to request further
information and to give his view on the sequencing of meetings that he and Sir
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Jonathan Swift wanted to have with various key stakeholders, including Second
Sight, Lord Arbuthnot and Sir Anthony Hooper [POL00153634].
204 Following my email to Counsel of 12 November 2015, Mark Underwood
emailed Steve Allchorn and me with a list of actions, and included a reminder
that we were due to provide Tim Parker with an update on the Swift Review the
following day. At that stage, there was little to report as we were still in the early
stages of work on the Swift Review. I recognised that Tim Parker was extremely
busy, and thought that he might not appreciate a detailed account of the various
procedural steps we were taking at the outset of the Swift Review, such a
liaising with counsel about arranging meetings with stakeholders and providing
them with information requested. At the time I was of the view that Tim Parker
would be more interested in any substantive update on the Swift Review, rather
than in a procedural update of the type which we were then in a position to
provide. In my email of 13 November 2015 at 10:09 I asked Mark Underwood
and Steve Allchorn for their views on whether they considered any report to Tim
Parker would be necessary at that stage, and indicated that I would have
deferred to Jane MacLeod as to whether any update was required
[POL00153638}.
Impact of potential postmaster litigation on the Swift Review
205 On19 November 2015, I was copied into an email from Jane MacLeod to Mark
Davies, which forwarded an email from a journalist requesting comment on an
announcement by the JFSA that they would be commencing litigation against
POL. In her email, Jane MacLeod sought to canvass opinion on the risks and
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potential liability arising from the litigation. On 20 November 2015, Rodric
Williams responded to Jane MacLeod ’s email with, in his words, “a couple of
preliminary thoughts”, and noted that “We should seriously consider
suspending Tim Parker's review...we should be very careful about generating
through the TP review material which is disclosable in the civil action”. I did not
have a view on this suggestion as I was, and am, not a litigator. However, I
could see that the litigation would change the backdrop against which the Swift
Review follow-up work was taking place and that this might well have
implications for whether and how it was to be taken forward. However, this view
was not based on any particular expertise in, or insights about, litigation or its
attendant disclosure obligations about which I know very little.
206 Mark Underwood and I had regular update meetings at a working level with
Christopher Knight to discuss the progress of the Swift Review, and how we
might facilitate their ongoing work through, for example, the provision of
information and/or arranging meetings with key stakeholders. Occasionally
these meetings would also be attended by Sir Jonathan Swift and Jane
MacLeod. One such review meeting took place on 2 December 2015, for which
I circulated the agenda [POL00158278]. Item 4 on the agenda circulated for this
meeting sought counsel's view on what impact, if any, the threatened
postmaster litigation would have on the Swift Review, “as of now” and “if [a]
letter of action [is] received?” [POL00158279]. I cannot recall what counsel
advised about this item at the meeting. However, I suspect that counsel's
advice, as reflected in later correspondence [POL00103324], was that the
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litigation could have an impact because there would almost certainly be an
overlap between the follow up work to the Swift Review and the matters to be
litigated so if and when a letter of claim was received we should seek advice
from whoever was then instructed to advise POL on the litigation. As discussed
in paragraphs 221 to 226 below, a decision was later taken for work arising from
the Swift Review to be addressed through equivalent work taken forward in
response to the Group Litigation.
The final report and recommendations
207 ‘The findings and conclusions from the Swift Review were compiled in the Swift
Review Report [POL00006355]. Sir Jonathan Swift made eight
recommendations for further steps POL could take in respect of its response to
the handling of the sub-postmasters’ complaints about Horizon. POL produced
a summary table of the recommendations from the Swift Review, which
included a proposal for what action should be undertaken to address each
recommendation [POL00103106].
208 Having reviewed Jane MacLeod’s email to Tim Parker of 22 January 2016, I am
reminded that Tim Parker received a first draft of the Swift Review Report in the
week commencing 11 January 2016 when he indicated that he wished to accept
all the recommendations in the report and take them forward where possible
[POL00103110}.
209 Jane MacLeod’s email to Tim Parker noted that on 20 January 2016 a pre-brief
meeting with BIS officials about the progress of the Swift Review had taken
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place. I cannot remember whether or not I attended this meeting. Her email
also noted that, at this pre-brief meeting, BIS officials had been advised that
“the [Swift] review is being conducted for [Tim Parker] personally”. This reflects
my understanding that the Swift Review was undertaken personally for Tim
Parker, as discussed at paragraph 181 above, and therefore did not fall to be
disclosed to the POL Board.
210 On 22 January 2016 Jane MacLeod spoke with Sir Jonathan Swift to discuss
how POL should take forward the recommendations in the Swift Review Report.
They had also discussed whether there were any limitations on the extent to
which Tim Parker could brief the Minister on the Swift Review. This was to
inform Tim Parker's meeting with Baroness Neville-Rolfe on 26 January 2016
(see paragraph 211 below). Jane MacLeod emailed Tim Parker on 22 January
2016 with a summary of the discussion with Sir Jonathan Swift, which reflects
his advice that any update to the Minister should be verbal to avoid the risk of
it otherwise being disclosable under a freedom of information request
[POL00103110]. Jane MacLeod attached an updated version of the table
containing POL’s proposals to address the Swift Review's recommendations,
which had been agreed by Sir Jonathan Swift [POL00103111]. [POL00103110]
indicates that Jane MacLeod forwarded this email and the attachment to Paula
Vennells immediately after it was sent to Tim Parker.
211 +POLalso liaised with ShEx from time to time to provide updates on the progress
with the Swift Review and its anticipated conclusions. For example, following
Tim Parker's meeting with Baroness Neville-Rolfe on 26 January 2016, I then
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spoke with Laura Thompson, who had been present at the meeting. I can see
from [POL00027116] that on 26 January 2016 I emailed the note of my
discussion with Laura Thompson, in which she reported on the meeting
between Tim Parker and Baroness Neville-Rolfe, to my POL colleagues. I was
generally POL’s point of contact at working level with ShEx/BIS in respect of
the Swift Review, as I had been with the Scheme, and my main point of contact
at SheX//BIS was Laura Thompson and sometimes Richard Callard. I do not
believe that I communicated with MPs about the Swift Review.
212 On5 February 2016, Jane MacLeod emailed Tim Parker setting out a summary
of the actions being taken to address each of the recommendations from the
Swift Review Report [POL00153884]. It appears that I, along with Rodric
Williams and Mark Underwood, had shared information with Jane MacLeod
which she had found helpful in composing her email.
213 My recollection is that recommendations one and two were progressed by
Rodric Williams, who instructed Brian Altman KC. To address recommendation
seven, Bond Dickinson were instructed to prepare a report to assess whether
misleading advice was given to sub-postmasters by NBSC call handlers. This
report was subsequently shared with Sir Jonathan Swift on 3 June 2016, who
then confirmed by return email on 21 June 2016 that he was content that
discharged this recommendation [POL00104091].
214 I was involved in preliminary discussions with Deloitte who were instructed to
progress with recommendations three, four, five, and eight. My role in respect
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of this is discussed at paragraphs 228 to 240 below in relation to Project
Bramble.
215 On 19 February 2016, Mark Underwood emailed Sir Jonathan Swift to seek his
views on a draft letter for Tim Parker to send to Baroness Neville-Rolfe to brief
her on the outcome of the Swift Review, which included a high-level summary
of its findings and of further work then being undertaken [POL00103131 &
POL00103132]. I drafted the letter with input and assistance from POL
colleagues (Mark Underwood's covering email makes it clear that the draft had
been a collective effort), which was shared with Sir Jonathan Swift. I am not
sure exactly why it would have fallen to me to draft this letter, although I was
well placed to do so given that I had held a coordination role from the POL side
in respect of the Swift Review throughout this exercise, so was familiar with its
purpose, issues, findings and recommendations.
216 On 24 February 2016 Sir Jonathan Swift responded to Mark Underwood and
shared a marked-up version of the draft letter, with his amendments in tracked
change [POL00131715]. In his covering email, he made clear that his tracked
changes were suggestions, and that POL should “feel free to adopt/or not, as
you consider appropriate” [POL00103134]. It seems reasonable to infer that if
Sir Jonathan Swift had attached great significance to any of his proposed
amendments, he would have made this clear in his covering email.
217 ‘In his marked-up version of the draft letter, Sir Jonathan Swift proposed that
POL remove the following text:
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“However nothing in the materials we reviewed suggested that there is
any evidence that the Horizon system was responsible for those losses
which resulted in convictions. In addition, we have seen evidence that
Post Office’s policy and practice in respect of disclosure of information
were effective in ensuring that those facing prosecutions were not
deprived of information or evidence which would have been helpful to
them in their defence”.
He proposed it should be replaced by the following text:
“The Post Office has previously taken advice from solicitors and Leading
Counsel expert in criminal law on the adequacy of the Post Office’s
policy and practice on disclosure where it acts as prosecutor. Based on
that I am satisfied that proper disclosure was made”.
218 I understand that, by this proposed amendment, Sir Jonathan Swift was stating
more precisely, in terms of his findings, that he was satisfied that POL had taken
expert advice on disclosure, which provided the basis for being satisfied that
proper disclosure was made. Had he seen evidence to suggest that Horizon
was responsible for losses which resulted in convictions, then Sir Jonathan
Swift would not have made this statement.
219 Ihave been asked to explain the reasons for why some of the wording proposed
by Sir Jonathan Swift in his marked-up version of the draft letter to Baroness
Neville-Rolfe was changed in the final version of the letter that was sent on 4
March 2016. I have reviewed documents which show that a version of the letter
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which incorporated the proposed wording of Sir Jonathan Swift was sent to,
and approved by, Tim Parker on 1 March 2016 [POL00103138]
[POL00240197]. It appears that Rodric Williams subsequently amended the
letter before it was sent. A version of the letter with Rodric Williams’
amendments in tracked change, was shared with Jane MacLeod and I on 2
March 2016 [POL00240226] [POL00240227]. The final letter was reviewed and
approved by Jane MacLeod. In any event, the wording included in the letter
which was sent to Baroness Neville-Rolfe is consistent with the findings of the
Swift Review Report, as stated in paragraph 95, which provides that “...POL is
entitled to note at this point in time that there is no evidence that the Horizon
system - i.e. the computer system - is responsible for the losses which have
resulted in convictions’.
220 Following receipt of the letter before claim POL sought advice from leading
counsel on the question of what impact the postmaster litigation would have on
the way in which the Swift Review was to be conducted. On 24 May 2016 Rodric
Williams emailed Sir Jonathan Swift, with Christopher Knight, Jane MacLeod
and me in copy, to provide an update on POL’s progress with the eight
recommendations made in the Swift Review Report [POL00103207]. In this
email, Rodric Williams also sought advice on whether, in light of the sub-
postmaster litigation, it was “reasonable for POL to address any further steps it
might reasonably take in respect of the SPMR cases through the proceedings,
rather than in response to your report and recommendation?”. On 27 May 2016
Jane MacLeod spoke with Sir Jonathan Swift to ask his advice on this point.
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Jane MacLeod emailed Tim Parker later that day to share Sir Jonathan Swift's
advice that Anthony de Garr Robinson KC, the barrister retained to advise POL
on its defence to the sub-postmaster proceedings, “should first be requested to
advise POL whether in light of the litigation, the various work teams [sic] should
be continued, paused or re-defined” [POL00168551].
The impact of the Group Litigation
221 On 28 April 2016, the sub-postmasters’ group litigation Claim was served on
POL.
222 On 27 May 2016 Jane MacLeod sent an email to Tim Parker [POL00168551]
which demonstrates clearly that POL was concerned about how best to take
forward the work streams arising from the Swift Review, whilst being mindful of
the impending litigation. My own view, at the time and now, is that POL was
committed to carrying out the recommendations of the Swift Review.
223 Sir Jonathan Swift had suggested to POL that it seek advice from Anthony de
Garr Robinson KC [POL00168551]. On 9 June 2016 Jane MacLeod attended
a conference with Anthony de Garr Robinson KC to discuss the sub-postmaster
litigation, during which he was asked for advice on whether the work being done
for the purposes of the Swift Review should be continued. On 10 June 2016
Jane MacLeod emailed Tim Parker to convey Anthony de Garr Robinson KC’s
“strong advice...that the work being undertaken under the aegis of your review
should not continue in light of the litigation.” [POLO0168551]. The email
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indicates that he felt the subject matter of the work should be continued and
carried out in preparation for the litigation rather than as a standalone exercise.
224 ~ A\letter from Bond Dickinson LLP to POL, dated 21 June 2016, also confirmed
the “very strong advice” of Anthony de Garr Robinson KC was “that Mr Parker's
review should cease immediately”, together with his advice that “it would still be
prudent for Post Office to implement the 4", 5", 6 and 8 recommendations
of Mr Swift...as appropriately adapted to meet the needs of the litigation”
[POL00022751]. The Bond Dickinson LLP letter also expanded on Anthony de
Garr Robinson KC’s advice, stating that the work on implementing the Swift
Review recommendations “should be instructed and overseen exclusively by
Post Office’s legal team...so as to maximise the prospect of asserting privilege
over this work and protect against the risk that material related to these actions
could be disclosed to the Claimants in the Group Action.”
225 On 21 June 2016 Tim Parker wrote to Baroness Neville-Rolfe to confirm that he
had “instructed that the work undertaken pursuant to my review should now
stop”, on the basis of “very strong advice from Leading Counsel" that this work
“should come to an immediate end, and instead address the issues through the
equivalent work taken forward in the litigation” [POL00022776]. I had no reason
to think that the steps taken on the advice of leading counsel were anything
other than standard behaviour by a corporate entity in the face of litigation.
226 The decision to redirect work on the Swift Review recommendations was sense
checked with Jonathan Swift KC. On 26 July 2016, Rodric Williams emailed Sir
Jonathan Swift and Christopher Knight, attaching Bond Dickinson's letter of 21
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June 2016, to update them that following the advice of Anthony de Garr
Robinson KC, “the Chairman instructed that the work being undertaken in
response to your recommendations should end, and instead be addressed
through equivalent work taken forward in the Group Litigation.” [POL00103324].
In this email, Rodric Williams asked whether this approach raised any issues.
Sir Jonathan Swift responded the same day to confirm that “as we discussed
[on 27 May 2016], counsel instructed on the litigation are much better pleased
to make this type of judgement’.
227 I held the view that POL should proactively disclose the Swift Review Report to
the CCRC, as demonstrated by email to Mark Underwood, Rodric Williams and
Jane MacLeod of 5 April 2016 [POL00153946].
DELOITTE PROJECT BRAMBLE
228 Project Bramble was set up to help satisfy the recommendations of the Swift
Review relating to suspense accounts, transaction logs review, balancing
transactions, and audit store controls (recommendations three, four, five, and
eight) [POL00153883).
229 POL instructed Deloitte to carry out the investigation and I am reminded by
[POL00153883] that on 4 February 2016, I ran a meeting that led to the initiation
of Project Bramble. I do not recall being specifically appointed to initiate the
work; instead, it was a continuation of my work on the Swift Review.
The meeting was attended by me and my POL colleagues, Gary Hooton, Mark
Underwood, as well as Rod Ismay (remotely, I believe). Jon Wear, Andrew
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Whitton and Mark Westbrook attended from Deloitte. It took place before the
finalisation of the Swift Review and I believe this was because we anticipated
that Tim Parker would want POL to get on the front foot and make rapid
progress with the recommendations made by Sir Jonathan Swift, which had
already been provided to us in draft.
230 During the course of the meeting I believe that I would have explained the
context of Project Bramble in light of the Swift Review Report and the Scheme.
The agenda at [POL00153883] indicates that I emphasised that the whole
exercise was legally privileged and related to matters of genuine sensitivity. It
seemed to me that, since Sir Jonathan Swift had prepared and presented his
report to Tim Parker on a privileged basis it followed that any follow-up work
that flowed from it should also be undertaken on a privileged basis. There was
no discussion about needing to protect the work; I believe it was taken as read.
I did not question the fact that it needed to be privileged because there was a
threat of litigation and no reason to think that asserting privilege was any way
remarkable.
231 I cannot recall the specifics but I am confident that we would have received
specific advice about treating the information sensitively; however, if we did I
imagine it would have been given by our in-house legal team as well as Andrew
Parsons. I do not believe that, either before or after the meeting, we thought
about whether or not the output of Project Bramble would be published because
it was intended to be an internal report which would contain information
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connected to the operation of the Horizon system which would also be
commercially sensitive.
232 I was keen to ensure that the recommendations were discharged expeditiously,
and I believe I maintained a general interest in the progress of the report;
however, after initiating Project Bramble, going forward I was not particularly
engaged in the details for the reasons set out below. Instead, my colleague
Mark Underwood assumed the role of internal point-person on the POL side in
its interface with Deloitte.
233 I can see from the documents provided to me by the Inquiry that Deloitte in fact
went on to prepare a number of draft reports, which include:
e Deloitte’s Sparrow Interim Report dated 8 July 2016;
e Bramble Interim Report dated 27 July 2016;
e Bramble Draft Report dated 31 October 2016;
e Bramble Draft Report dated 1 September 2017;
e Bramble Draft Report dated 3 October 2017;
e Bramble Draft Report dated 15 December 2017; And
e Bramble Draft Report dated 19 January 2018
234 I do not know whether a final report was ever prepared.
235 At the time when Deloitte produced the Sparrow Interim Report dated 8 July
2016, I had been appointed as Deputy Corporate Service Director in the
Corporate Services Group and the focus of my work changed, for instance I
was helping Jane MacLeod integrate new teams within a larger function. While
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I was no longer involved in a detailed way, I would have been aware of Project
Bramble in the background, and I would have maintained some level of interest
in it as I mention in paragraph 232 above.
236 By the time the Bramble Draft Report dated 1 September 2017 was produced,
I had moved roles again to become Corporate Affairs Director. At this point,
Project Bramble was no longer taking place within my function and, while I may
have been vaguely aware that it was likely to be ongoing, I had no further
involvement in it. I do not recollect it even coming up in the meetings I was by
then attending.
237 At the time of the Bramble Draft Report dated 19 January 2018 was prepared,
I would have been completely removed from Project Bramble, and I was
unaware that it had gone on for so long.
238 I do not recall reading the reports or, if I did, I did not read them to a sufficient
degree of granularity. The last memory I have of my understanding of the
content of the Project Bramble reports was that the controls in relation to remote
access and the management of the system were tight, if not technically perfect.
I think I was broadly aware of the fact that whatever ‘invisible’ remote access
was found to be technically possible could only be undertaken by Fujitsu staff
with a real determination to overcome a multiplicity of technical hurdles and
significant security controls. In the absence of any obviously compelling and/or
rational motive for going to such lengths, it was not immediately apparent at the
time that remote access by Fujitsu staff could credibly account for losses in
multiple branches.
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239 I did not consider whether any of the issues raised in the reports should be
disclosed to convicted sub-postmasters or the claimants in the Group Litigation
proceedings, not because of any lack of care or integrity on my part, but simply
because the question would never have been put to me as someone who was
unqualified to make any such determination and far removed from the litigation.
240 I did not give the reports or a briefing about the reports to anyone within the
POL senior management, the POL Board, UKGI or BEIS because I only initiated
Project Bramble and was no longer involved with it once I moved roles.
However, I would have reported back to Jane MacLeod, Mark Westbrook (from
Deloitte), Andrew Whitton, Rod Ismay and Andrew Parsons about setting up
Project Bramble.
Freedom of Information
241 On7 October 2014, I emailed Rhiannon Kett of Bond Dickinson LLP about a
FOIR that POL received [POL00101446]. Fujitsu had advised that disclosure
would not prejudice their commercial interest, but I wanted to clarify whether
there were grounds to use sections 43(2) and 31 of the FOIA. I am unable to
recall precisely what the FOIR which prompted this email chain was, but judging
from its content it was for Second Sight’s interim report.
242 On 27 March 2015, POL received a FOIR from Scott Darlington. Mr Darlington
requested a full copy of Second Sight's Part Two report. This report was long in
the making, and there was heightened interest about it because some
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participants in the Scheme wanted to wait until the report was published to
decide how to conduct mediation.
243 On the same day, Andrew Parsons emailed and said that his initial reaction was
that he did not think we should share the report with Mr Darlington
[POL00151730]. He considered Mr Darlington was trying to circumvent the
Scheme'’s processes.
244 I participated in the decision about how to handle Mr Darlington’s FOIR and I
believe that I sought/would have sought advice from internal lawyers about
legitimate grounds under which it might be possible to withhold the report until
such time as it had been through its final round of amendments and been
finalised.
245 Tom Wechsler’s view — explained in response to Andrew Parsons’ email — was
that it appeared Mr Darlington was trying to obtain a draft version of the report
so he could compare it to a potentially amended final report, in order to identify
any differences, and potentially contend that Second Sight has been “gaggea”,
to use Tom Wechsler’s words.
246 I do not recall what happened after this and am unsure if it led to anything, as
the Part Two Report was published shortly after, on 9 April 2015.
247 At the relevant time, I did not lead on FOIR. However, when I worked more
directly with Jane MacLeod as Deputy Corporate Services Director the team
tasked with coordinating responses to FOIRs came under my wing. This
required me to ensure that our processes for responding to FOIRs were working
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effectively in accordance with the requirements of the legislation. I had a lot of
experience working on freedom of information issues when I worked at the
MOJ, which is why Tom Wechsler refers to me as a "genuine expert in Fol".
Tom Wechsler worked at the MOJ at the same time as me and was aware that
I was heavily involved with preparations for the commencement of the FOIA on
1 January 2005.
THE GROUP LITIGATION
Involvement in POL’s conduct of the group litigation and the PLSG
248 In June 2016, following my participation in the Scheme and Swift Review, I was
asked to join the Postmaster Litigation Steering Group (“PLSG’) in my capacity
as a member of the Corporate Services Group.
249 My understanding of the PLSG was that it was intended to act as a working
group to inform the key issues connected to the sub-postmasters’ claim (“the
Claim”) in the early stages of the litigation, in order to assist POL’s legal team
take forward POL’s response to the Claim. This was chiefly a legal exercise led
by POL’s internal legal team with external input from Andrew Parsons of Bond
Dickinson LLP and Anthony de Garr Robinson KC. The group was asked for
their views on a range of issues including, I think, various pre-litigation legal
applications such as orders for costs though I do not remember the detail.
250 The external legal team, together with POL’s legal team, had the greatest
influence on the running of the group and the contributions made to it. The usual
course of PLSG meetings was for Rodric Williams to circulate an agenda setting
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out what the members of the PLSG needed to discuss and where input or
advice was needed. For example, Bond Dickinson LLP would need to
understand all aspects of our operations, from how we recruited, trained and
supported postmasters; details of how some of our products worked; and, how
our contract with suppliers, including Fujitsu, was structured and what provided.
Bond Dickinson LLP was also responsible for drafting a ‘one-pager’, which
consisted of briefing notes to inform the conversations and decisions (see email
from Andrew Parsons on 13 July 2016 [POL00024988)).
251 Each member of the PLSG was a subject matter expert, selected to provide
support and act as a gateway into the function of their POL business area, to
enable the legal team to acquire specific knowledge that might assist in
preparations for litigation [POL00025509]. As I recall, either Rodric Williams
and/or Jane MacLeod determined the architecture of the PSLG. Tom Moran
(General Manager) was appointed to Chair the PLSG because of his general
seniority and understanding of how POL worked in practice; Rob Houghton was
our IT expert; Angela van den Bogerd was looking at the support given to sub-
postmasters and was well acquainted with the issues that the litigation would
touch on; and Tom Wechsler had previously been involved with the Scheme
and was now acting as the Chief of Staff to the CEO, Paula Vennells.
252 Because of the nature of the issues at the centre of the Claim — namely legal,
IT, finance, and accounting issues — I was not a relevant subject expert, and
therefore my involvement with the PLSG was limited. My recollection is that I
did not make any significant or determinative contributions to the conduct of the
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group and litigation strategy, beyond my previous involvement in the Scheme
where I could offer an element of insight.
253 I hada very limited role in making drafting suggestions or otherwise reacting to
PSLG documents. I may have discussed issues outlined in these documents in
the course of colleague-to-colleague conversations.
254 The Terms of Reference of the group [page 2, POL00025509], when seen on
paper look methodical and set; however, in practice and over time, they evolved
and became increasingly run by external counsel.
255 As I lacked the relevant technical knowledge, I became even less involved in
the PLSG’s work over time because it became more about running a litigation
exercise, and so there was very little I could offer or was needed for. My
engagement with and input into the group remained tangential to my day to day
role.
Role and responsibilities in relation to the Group Litigation
256 The Letter of Claim from Freeths dated 28 April 2016 [POL00025510 &
POL00025511] was circulated to members of the PLSG in an email from Rodric
Williams on 6 June 2016 [POL00025507] and it was apparent that all previous
resolution efforts had not succeeded. I do not recall if I read the Letter of Claim
in its totality or not: it was not expected that I would since litigation was not part
of my day-to-day role. However, having seen the document [POL00023488] I
can see that I provided some limited comments on POL’s draft Letter of
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Response to Tom Moran in response to Andrew Parsons’ request to provide
comments by the following PLSG meeting [POL00023490].
257 Around the time when POL’s Letter of Response was being prepared there was
some concern about whether new information relating to remote access had
come to light. Work was undertaken to understand the extent to which this was
consistent with what had previously been said publicly by POL on this issue.
This is reflected in the email exchange between Jane MacLeod and Andrew
Parsons of 29 July 2016 [POL00110482]. Although I was copied into this email
exchange, I do appear to have engaged with it.
258 Allof the significant decisions made with respect to the management of litigation
and the strategy as a whole were accountable to the CEO and the Board. At
the relevant time, Richard Callard of UKGI sat on the POL Board with Paula
Vennells and Tim Parker, along with others. I was not involved in conversations
at that level.
259 My own role was at a working level and included sharing information and
providing updates about the ongoing Group Litigation upon request, although
the non-lawyer contributions required from Corporate Services were extremely
limited. While not formally part of either of our roles, Mark Underwood and I
were also continued to act as points of contact for UKGI in respect of this aspect
of POL’s work and we typically engaged with either Laura Thompson or Richard
Callard. My email to Jane MacLeod on 8 July 2016 [POL00024911], reflects
that I liaised between Laura Thompson and POL, including Jane Hill, Head of
Public Affairs, and Mike Granville, Head of Corporate Affairs.
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Involvement in POL’s general litigation strategy
260 I am asked a series of questions about my involvement in POL’s general
litigation strategy, and I set out my responses immediately below.
261 ‘I had limited if any formal input into the decisions taken with respect to POL’s
litigation strategy, including how it dealt with disclosure or the preparation of
expert evidence within the context of the two trials, or the recusal application
with respect to Justice Fraser.
262 For completeness, I do recall having informal conversations, colleague-to-
colleague, as the decisions unfolded within the context of the two trials;
however, I was not part of the decision-making process. These conversations
consisted of updates and, later on, the sharing of views on what we believed,
at the time, to be the surprising outcome of the Common Issues Trial which had
not been predicted by POL or its legal teams, even as a worst-case scenario.
263 The Board led POL’s legal strategy as well and took all material decisions
including to seek the recusal of Justice Fraser.
264 Decision-making about disclosure and expert evidence fell within the remit of
the external legal team (Bond Dickinson LLP and Anthony De Garr Robinson
KC), Jane MacLeod and Rodric Williams. I don’t recall having any involvement
in these decisions.
265 I do not believe that these responsibilities in decision-making shifted over the
course of the two trials.
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Oversight and Disclosure
266 ~My involvement with the group litigation, including the oversight of the drafting
of POL’s Generic Defence and Counterclaim (the “Defence and
Counterclaim”) remained limited and tangential because the conduct of
litigation did not fall within my remit.
Involvement in the Defence and Counterclaim
267 I was kept in the loop as a representative of the Corporate Services group within
the PLSG, as the Defence and Counterclaim was being drafted, because of the
of my earlier involvement with the Scheme. This mostly occurred through being
copied into email correspondence between our internal and external legal
teams, which included Jane MacLeod, Mark Underwood, Rodric Williams, and
Andrew Parsons.
268 I do not recall if I read all the emails with respect to the Defence and
Counterclaim. As this was a predominantly legal exercise with subject matter
experts brought in as a when needed to plug the gaps in relevant POL company
knowledge, it was not expected that I would review every email and attachment
and provide my views since it was not a central part of my day-to-day role.
269 With respect to the drafting of the Defence and Counterclaim, my recollection
is consistent with what is outlined in Jane MacLeod’s email to Andrew Parsons
on 14 July 2017 [POL00024627]. Having seen the documents provided to me
by POL, I can see that I offered to review the draft Defence [POL00154156] and
provided my comments. My email to Andrew Parsons on 13 July 2017
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[POL00117755] reflects the scope and nature of the input that I would have
offered.
270 I recall that there were PSLG meetings and briefings held with respect to the
Defence and Counterclaim. I do not believe I attended the briefing of the
General Executive by Jane MacLeod and Andrew Parsons, which is mentioned
in an email from Jane MacLeod to Andrew Parsons on 14 July 2017
[POL00024627].
271 + Whilst I had an understanding of some of the issues and pleadings outlined in
the Defence and Counterclaim, and would have informally discussed them in
the course of colleague-to-colleague conversations, I had a negligible role in its
drafting and no role in the decision making as to what points POL raised in the
Defence and Counterclaim.
Involvement in decisions with respect to disclosure within the context of the
trials
272 ~My involvementin any discussions relating to disclosure in relation to the Group
Litigation is set out below and was limited and did not extend to decision-making
because any significant or determinative contributions to discussions and
decisions would have been made by the executive and legal teams and those
with expertise in IT, finance, and accounting.
273 I recall attending meetings in my capacity as a member of the PLSG where the
Group Litigation and POL’s strategy with respect to disclosure was discussed,
however I would not have engaged in these discussions and, since it was not
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my area of expertise I am unlikely to have listened closely to the details of the
discussion.
274 =I recall, for example, attending the meeting on 16 October 2017 where there
was an update on POL’s litigation strategy [POLO0006431] which included
some discussion around disclosure. However, I cannot recall very much of what
was said, only that there was discussion around the high volume of disclosure
that Freeths / the Claimants were requesting and how costly of an exercise it
would have been for POL to comply. I do not believe that I would have been
actively engaged in these discussions.
275 — Inrelation to the specific aspects of disclosure I am asked about, my knowledge
of Fujitsu's Known Error Log (“KEL”) was and remains limited. I had a layman's
understanding of what it was in so far as it had become part of the lexicon
around the time of the Group Litigation and I would hear the term referred to in
conversation around POL. In meetings, people with the relevant expertise
would contribute to the discussion as and when these topics arose, but as my
knowledge in this area was limited, I did not actively engage with or immerse
myself in the detail. As such, I would not have been approached for my views
on the subject. I did provide my comments on a draft public statement which
dealt with issues of disclosure of KEL documents. The original text was drafted
by Melanie Corfield, and after providing input to the best of my ability and
knowledge, I passed it on to Ben Foat and Mark Davies for their final review.
[POL00285929].
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276 I cannot recall when I first heard about the KEL or who had told me about it. It
likely was brought up during the course of a PLSG meeting, but I cannot say
for sure. My understanding was that the KEL was a repository for identifying
every day, non-impactful or significantly disruptive IT bugs, as and when
someone came across an issue. My understanding at the time reflects what
was stated at paragraphs 36 and 37 in the fourth witness statement of Andrew
Parsons [POL00000444], that the KEL was more of a living document that was
continuously updated and changed rather than a storage database, and that
POL would not have had access to the KEL. I also understood that the KEL
would not have held data on branch accounts or actual transaction data, but
what I do not know is whether or not it held information which was relevant to
branch accounts. I would not have had a role in determining its significance
and therefore the decisions and details with respect to its disclosure.
277 ~My understanding of the PEAK database in terms of what it was and its
significance, was less well developed than in relation to the KEL. I do not recall
the PEAK database being discussed in the meetings I attended during that time
and I do not recall having sight of the letter from Bond Dickinson LLP dated 28
November 2018 [POL00003363] until it was shared with my solicitors within the
context of this Inquiry.
Common Issues trial
278 Inthe context of my role as a programme manager of the Scheme, I was tasked
with providing information about the Scheme to government stakeholders upon
request. When the Group Litigation trials commenced, I continued in this role,
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now as the Corporate Affairs Director, to act as a conduit between POL and
government stakeholders on a range of topics including, at times, the litigation.
Meetings, like the one referred to in my email to Jane MacLeod on 21 February
2018 [POL00154252], were held with POL’s legal team to establish a practical
way to keep the government stakeholders informed of the progress of the trials.
The Draft Indicative Agenda attached to my email of 21 February 2018
[POL00154253] would be reflective of the type of information that was shared
during these meetings.
279 Ascan be seen in the email exchange from 28 August 2018 [POL00024179], I
would help Jane MacLeod facilitate the flow of information between POL’s
internal and external legal teams to key government stakeholders. Often this
would happen through briefings of Paula Vennells who would then meet with
ministers and / or the Permanent Secretary at the time, Alex Chisolm.
280 Because of the obvious issues around sharing privileged information, we had
to strike a balance between the desire to be forthcoming to the stakeholders
and adhering to the protocol of sharing confidential and privileged information
in the context of active litigation. There was a lot of back-and-forth internally
and also with the Department to establish the level of detail that could be
shared. I was not involved in the drafting of the Information Sharing Protocol
[UKG100007924].
281 I believe the Group Litigation would have been one of a number of things on
the agenda for discussion during briefings with the Minister and there would
have been a limited amount of time to share updates. Jane MacLeod’s email to
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Alice Cookson on 24 August 2018 [POL00024179] reflects the level of detail
about the Group Litigation which would have been shared.
282 Eventually POL’s in-house legal team and UKGI would have been
corresponding directly with the Department and there would have been no need
for my continued involvement.
283 Apart from these duties, my attendance at PLSG meetings and being copied
into correspondence, I was not involved in any other sub-committee or roles
involving the Group Litigation. I very rarely attended Board meetings, the only
two occasions which appear relevant in this context are the Postmaster
Litigation Subcommittee meeting on 15 May 2018 [POL00006754] which, from
memory, was the first, and more comprehensive outline of how the Group
Litigation was going to be run, and a meeting at which the Swift Review was
considered.
284 I recall hearing about the judgment of Justice Fraser which was critical of POL’s
conduct during the Common Issues trial. I was not involved in any formal
discussions or decision-making with respect to POL’s response to these
criticisms.
285 From conversations with colleagues, I was aware of POL’s decision to seek the
recusal of Justice Fraser. Rodric Williams also updated me, Jane MacLeod,
Angela van den Bogerd, Mark Davies, Mark Underwood, and others about the
recusal application on the day it was being heard [POL00359910]. I broadly
understood the process around it, again through general conversation with
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colleagues. I knew that it was the professional judgement of POL’s external
lawyers that POL should seek recusal as well as an appeal because Justice
Fraser’s judgment was so far outside the ballpark of expected outcomes and
was not expressed in neutral terms. I understood that POL wanted to satisfy
itself before taking such a step and make sure that it was on solid ground by
seeking advice from our external legal team.
286 I had no other involvement with the preparation, strategy, discussions, and
decision-making in the context of the Common Issues trial.
Rapid Response Team
287 The purpose of the Rapid Response Team (“RRT”) was to ensure that the
business side of POL was prepared for the outcomes of the judgement of the
two trials from an operational, commercial, and reputational standpoint, and that
the appropriate steps would be taken after the judgements were handed down.
288 I do not recall very much about the RRT but I believe that I was tasked with
maintaining the government stakeholder interface when and where it might be
necessary.
289 During the Horizon Issues trial, I recall that there was concern within POL that,
amongst all the possible outcomes, Horizon might be found not to be fit for
purpose. The downstream commercial implications of a judgment of this kind
would have been significant — for example, it would have affected customers,
corporate clients, those contracted for business purposes, all for whom we
would be in potential breach of contract. There was therefore a possibility that
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there would be some business interruption after the judgments were handed
down, given that POL had approximately 12 -15 million people coming through
its doors. This was something POL had to take seriously.
Horizon Issues trial
290 During the course of the Horizon Issues trial, I continued to attend PLSG
meetings and was copied into correspondence. However, my involvement was
tangential at best because of my lack of expertise and knowledge concerning
the key issues.
291 I did continue to assist with communicating updates to government and
parliamentary stakeholders as and when needed, however the information that
was shared would have been points that were discussed amongst and agreed
upon by our internal and external legal teams. I recall, for example, drafting a
letter to Members of Parliament updating and reassuring them of POL’s position
and process in the Horizon Issues trial [POL00023629]. This letter was drafted
with the benefit of the advance judgment and with possible “comms points”
provided by Andrew Parsons in his email to me and Mark Underwood on 29
November 2019 [POL00022837].
292 I would have likely read through parts of the expert reports of Jason Coyne and
/ or Robert Worden on the Horizon IT System to gain a general impression of
the contrast between the two, but would not have done so in great detail.
293 I had no other involvement with the preparation, strategy, discussions, and
decision-making in the context of the Horizon Issues trial.
Page 123 of 168
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GENERAL REFLECTIONS
294 I have been asked to reflect on my time at POL and to set out whether, with the
benefit of hindsight, I might have handled certain aspects of my work in relation
to the matters being considered by the Inquiry differently. As I hope to have
made clear in my statement, of the three particular phases of activity I am asked
to consider in particular, I played a significant role in only one: "How POL
handled challenges to the integrity of Horizon by SPMs, Members of
Parliament, journalists and members of the public”. In that regard, I think the
work I was engaged in was conducted in good faith and involved me, and others
at POL, doing a significant number of sensible and reasonable things as we
attempted to understand and to resolve the complaints and disputes brought
forward as part of the Scheme. That in no way diminishes or detracts from the
unequivocal and genuine sense of regret I feel for the distress, loss, and
suffering felt by those affected in general, and by those wrongly prosecuted in
particular. I therefore join myself to the apology POL has quite rightly made for
its failings during this period. It is, naturally, hard to see through this darkest of
chapters in the organisation’s history. Nonetheless, I continue to believe in its
importance in society and I know just how attached people are to their local
community post office, as well as to the postmasters and postmistresses
helping them behind the counters. My hope is that this Inquiry, combined with
the rapid overturning of wrongful convictions and the speedier delivery of
redress to all those affected, will bring us closer to the point at which the Post
Page 124 of 168
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Office can once again be identified as the force for good many of us considered
it to be, rightly I think, for so long.
Page 125 of 168
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Statement of Truth
I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Page 126 of 168
Index to First Witness Statement of Patrick Bourke
WITNO09830100
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No.
URN
Document Description
Control Number
POL00035285
Draft Post Office Mediation
Scheme, Second Sight Case
Review Report for Applicant
Margaret Bateman. (M020)
POL-0032220
POL00040448
Post Office Mediation
Scheme DRAFT Second
Sight - Case Review Report
(Pauline THOMSON)
POL-0036930
POL00040446
Post Office Mediation
Scheme DRAFT Second
Sight - Case Review Report
(Rubbina SHAHEEN)
POL-0036928
POL00035026
Draft - Post Office Mediation
Scheme - Second Sight -
Case Review Report on
Wendy Buffrey, Case
Reference: M041
POL-0031961
POL00149601
Instructions to Leading
Counsel to advise in
POL-BSFF-0008721
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Conference In the matter of
POL complaints and
Mediation Scheme
POL00116814
Email to Chris Aujard, Rodric
Williams, Mark R Davies and
others from Patrick Bourke
Re: Scheme - Con with
Counsel
POL-0114611
POL00149688
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Rodric Williams re: Judicial
Review.
POL-BSFF-0008806
POL00307631
Email from Belinda Crowe to
Patrick Bourke, Tom
Wechsler CC: Belinda
Crowe RE: "What if .." a JR
question
POL-BSFF-0145681
POL00307633
Email from Belinda Crowe to
Patrick Bourke, Tom
Wechsler and Belinda Crowe
RE: JR issues
POL-BSFF-0145683
Page 128 of 168
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10 POL00027369 Post Office Ltd Board Sub I POL-0024010
Committee - Initial
Complaints Review and
Mediation Scheme: The way
forward
11 POL00027153 Post Office Ltd Board - Initial I POL-0023794
Complaints Review and
Mediation Scheme: Sub
Committee
Recommendation, prepared
by Chris Aujard and Mark
Davies
12 POL00149685 Email from Patrick Bourke to I POL-BSFF-0008803
Tom Wechsler RE: He was
sat next to me.
13 I POLO0006575 Sparrow Sub-Committee I POL-0017849
Minutes 12 Jan 2015
14 POL00117056 Email from Patrick Bourke to I POL-0117890
Tom Wechsler and Mark R
Davies with email from Paula
Vennels forwarded. Relates
to response to Second Sight
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Report and possibility of
closing the scheme.
15
POL00102065
January Options v.4
Mediation Scheme and BBC
POL-0101648
16
POL00130853
Post Office - Risks and
Second Sight Report
POL-0120752
17
POL00102109
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Mark R Davies and Belinda
Crowe; re: Next steps
POL-0101692
18
POL00022352
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Andrew’ Parsons, Chris
Aujard and others regarding
Second Sight - Contractual
issues
POL-0018831
19
POL00021728
RE, Second Sight -
contractual issues
POL-0018207
20
POL00006364
Bond Dickinson Note -
Termination of Second Sight
POL-0017632
21
POL00223073
Email from Tom Wechsler To:
Melanie Corfield, Patrick
POL-BSFF-0061136
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Bourke, Chris Aujard and
others re FW: Sparrow paper
for the Board - Action
required
22
POL00102254
Post Office LTD Board
Project Sparrow - Update
and Options Report, 2015
POL-0101837
23
POL00040938
Email chain from Andrew
Parsons to Belinda Crowe,
Amanda A Brown, Rodric
Williams and others re
Second Sight Part two and
the workplan for the meeting
tomorrow with second sight
POL-0037420
24
POL00040952
Email sent from Jane
MacLeod to Patrick Bourke
and others re: Responding to
Second sight part 2
POL-0037434
25
POL00040953
Draft Letter to Second Sight
(lan) from Jane Macleod re:
POL-0037435
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Second Sights _ Briefing
Report - part 2
26
POL00041013
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Andrew Parsons re: Draft
response to second sight
part 2 report of 11 March
2015 - 260315 - clean doc
POL-0037495
27
POL00041014
Reply of Post Office Limited
to Second Sight's Briefing
Report — Part Two (Draft)
POL-0037496
28
POL00041057
Email sent from Andrew
Parsons to Patrick Bourke
and others re: Comparison of
POL reply
POL-0037539
29
FUJ00087144
Email chain from Pete
Newsome to: Mark
Underwoo1, Harvey
Michael, Kevin Lenihan
CC: Patrick Bourke,
Andrew RE: Second Sight's
POINQ0093315F
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final Part Two Report - your
expertise required
30
POL00226090
Letter from Patrick to lan
Henderson RE: Draft
response to SS
POL-BSFF-0064153
31
POL00041059
Draft Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme Reply of
Post Office Limited to
Second Sight's Briefing
Report — Part Two
POL-0037541
32
POL00040508
Email from Mark Underwood
to Patrick Bourke, Belinda
Crowe, Parsons Andrew,
Sparrow Questions
POL-0036990
33
POL00040288
Briefing for Chief Executive
POL-0036770
34
POL00116788
Letter to James Arbuthnot
MP from Paula Vennells RE:
Complaint and Mediation
Scheme.
POL-0117653
35
POL00211585
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Belinda Crowe and Tom
POL-BSFF-0049648
Page 133 of 168
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Wechsler re: Draft Letter
CEO - JA - 291014.docx
36
POL00116790
Steering Brief, Aims and
Approach
POL-0117655
37
POL00116787
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Belinda Crowe, Mark R
Davies and others - Re: CEO
Meeting with MPs - 17/11/14
- draft briefing
POL-0117652
38
POL00149683
Project Sparrow note
POL-BSFF-0008801
39
POL00308179
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Mark R Davie - Re: Paula
Notes
POL-BSFF-0146229
40
POL00308180
Note from Paula Vennells:
Update for Board/Alice
POL-BSFF-0146230
41
POL00149669
Draft Advice reply to James
Arbuthnot written by Patrick
Bourke
POL-BSFF-0008787
42
POL00149668
Email chain from Mark
Underwood to Patrick
POL-BSFF-0008786
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Bourke and Tom Wechsler re
DRAFT ADVICE - PV -
JA.docx.
43
POL00006368
Advice to POL on suggested
approach to criminal case
mediation, by Mr Altman QC
POL-0017636
44
POL00209031
Email from Belinda Crowe
to Patrick Bourke RE:
Escalation points for WG
[BD-4A.F1ID20472253]
POL-BSFF-0047094
45
POL00006355
Review on behalf of the
Chairman of Post Office Ltd
concerning the steps taken
in response to various
complaints made by sub-
postmasters
POL-0017623
46
POL00168751
Email from Mark R Davies to
Patrick Bourke, Chris Aujard,
Melanie Corfield re:
Draft Advice and Letter from
PV to JA
POL-0164048
Page 135 of 168
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47
POL00124611
Letter regarding Draft Letter
from CEO to James
Arbuthnot MP
POL-0130433
48
POL00124610
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Gavin Lambert and Paula
Vennells, cc'd to others,
regarding FW: Draft Letter -
letter not attached
POL-0130432
49
POL00116853
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Tom Wechsler and others -
Re: JA
POL-0117712
50
UKGI00002627
Email from Richard Callard
to Patrick Bourke RE:
Sparrow Questions.
UKGI013441-001
51
POL00150097
Sparrow Questions — for
Parliamentary Debate the
17th December 2014
POL-BSFF-0009215
52
POL00150096
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Belinda Crowe, Andrew
Parsons, Mark Underwood
re Q&A so far.
POL-BSFF-0009214
Page 136 of 168
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53
UKGI00002668
Email from Richard Callard
to Patrick Bourke cc Belinda
Crowe re Draft Q&A
UKGI013482-001
54
POL00101857
Email Chain from Melanie
Corfield to Jarnail Singh,
Patrick Bourke, Belinda
Crowe and Others re
Additional Briefing for BIS -
Subject to LPP.
POL-0101440
55
UKGI00002718
Email thread from Patrick
Bourke to Richard Callard cc
Mark Underwood and
Belinda Crowe RE: FW:
Sparrow Questions
UKGI013532-001
56
UKGI00002719
Sparrow Questions _ for
Parliamentary Debate 17th
December 2014
UKGI013533-001
57
UKGI00002729
Horizon Questions for
Parliamentary Debate 17th
December 2014.
UKGI013543-001
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58
UKGI00002730
Email from Rodric Williams
to Helen Lambert, Jane
MacLeod, cc: Elizabeth
O'Neill and others re:
Litigation and Appointment -
next steps
UKGI013544-001
59
UKGI00002728
Email chain from Richard
Callard to Patrick Bourke cc
Belinda Crowe and Mark
Underwood Re: Sparrow
Q&A
UKGI013542-001
60
POL00040509
Question Sheet on Horizon
for Parliamentary Debate
17th December 2014
POL-0036991
61
UKGI00002743
Information Sharing Protocol
- Group Litigation
UKGI013557-001
62
UKGI00002742
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Richard Callard, CC Belinda
Crowe Re: Q&A
UKGI013556-001
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63
POL00101909
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Richard Callard RE. Sparrow
Actions
POL-0101492
64
POL00102166
Letter from Mr Hooper to Ms
Swinson re Initial Complaint
Review and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0101749
65
POL00150316
Horizon Questions _ for
Parliamentary debate 17
December 2014
POL-BSFF-0009434
66
POL00150315
Westminster Hall debate:
Sub postmaster Mediation
Scheme, James Arbuthnot
MP. Speech
POL-BSFF-0009433
67
POL00150314
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Mark R Davies, Chris Aujard,
Rodric Williams and others
re Westminster Hall Debate -
Docs with Minister - for
information ONLY.
POL-BSFF-0009432
68
POL00101944
Email from Mark R Davies to
Patrick Bourke, cc'd Belinda
Crowe, Chris Aujard and
POL-0101527
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others re: Jo's conversations
with James Arbuthnot-
actions coming out
69
UKGI00002850
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Richard Callard re. FW:
Legally Privileged and
Confidential - further lines for
WHD
UKGI013664-001
70
POL00308923
Email chain from Jarnail
Singh to Patrick Bourke re:
FW: Legally Privileged and
Confidential - further lines for
WHD.docx
POL-BSFF-0146973
71
POL00040517
Report on Further lines for Jo
Swinson MP — Westminster
Hall Debate
POL-0036999
72
POL00040790
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Angela Van -Den-Bogerd,
Belinda Crowe, Tom
Wechsler and others, re the
dossier
POL-0037272
Page 140 of 168
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73
POL00040791
POST OFFICE RESPONSE
TO WESTMINSTER HALL
DEBATE COMPLAINT AND
MEDIATION SCHEME
POL-0037273
74
UKG100002943
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Richard Callard cc: Belinda
Crowe Re: Draft Dossier
Following WHD
UKGI013757-001
75
UKG1I00002944
Post Office Response to
Westminster Hall Debate,
Complaint and Mediation
Scheme
UKGI013758-001
76
POL00040331
Initial Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme
Settlement Analysis
POL-0036813
77
POL00228329
Initial Complaint review and
Mediation Scheme
Settlement analysis for Revti
Raman Bhanote re case
reference M130
POL-BSFF-0066392
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78
POL00211412
Initial Complaint review and
mediation scheme
settlement analysis
POL-BSFF-0049475
79
POL00061838
Initial Complaint Review And
Mediation Scheme
Settlement Analysis - legal
advice
POL-0058317
80
POL00089549
Bond Dickinson Initial
Complaint Review and
Mediation Scheme
Settlement Analysis - Claim
No. M109. Grant Alllen from
Winsford Branch
POL-0086524
81
POL00046011
Initial complaint review and
mediation scheme
settlement analysis - Janet
Skinner
POL-0042490
82
POL00158192
Email chain from Patrick
Bourke to Avene O'Farrell,
Chris Aujard, Tom Wechsler
POL-0146644
Page 142 of 168
WITNO09830100
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and others re: RE: Spm
Sparrow meeting
83
POL00151000
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Chris Aujard, Mark R Davies,
Tom Wechslen and others
re: Select Committee and
Future of Sparrow
POL-BSFF-0010112
84
POL00101711
Email from Patrick Bourne to
Paula Vennells and Mark R
Davies re: Meeting with
Oliver Letwin
POL-0101294
85
POL00318364
Fwd: MP meeting
POL-BSFF-0156414
86
POL00153151
Email chain from Mark
Davies to Patrick Bourke and
Jane Hill re: Meeting - key
points
POL-BSFF-0012263
87
POL00153164
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Mark Davies and Jane Hill
re: Meeting with lan Wright
MP - 8 September 2015
POL-BSFF-0012276
Page 143 of 168
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88
POL00153165
Notes of meeting between
lain Wright MP, Mark Davies,
Jane Hill and Patrick Bourke
POL-BSFF-0012277
89
POL00026723
Letter from Mark Davies to
lan Wright, RE: Post Office
Complaint and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0023364
90
POL00153243
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane Hill, Mark R Davies,
Mark Underwood and others
re EDM
POL-BSFF- 0012355
91
POL00153244
Letter from Mark Davies to
an MP re Post Office
Complaint and Mediation
Scheme
POL-BSFF-0012356
92
POL00150875
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jarnail Singh, Belinda
Crowe, Rodric Williams and
others re PV 1989 - Mr.
Harjinder Singh Butoy - FAD
453340 - Hasland (Horizon)
POL-BSFF-0009987
Page 144 of 168
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93
POL00150876
Letter from AVDB to Mr.
Perkins re Mr. Harjinder
Singh Butoy
POL-BSFF-0009988
94
POL00151752
Email from Laura Thompson
to Patrick Bourke re Letter
from Criminal Cases Review
Commission
POL-BSFF-0010864
95
POL00027164
Letter from Baroness
Neville-Rolfe DBE CMG to
Paula Vennells re: invitation
to meeting
POL-0023805
96
POL00152539
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Tom Wechsler cc Mark R
Davies, Jane MacLeod,
Mark Underwood and others
RE: Sparrow - PV to BNR
POL-BSFF-0011651
97
POL00152540
Draft Letter to BNR from
Paula Vennells RE: Post
Office Complaint and
Mediation Scheme
POL-BSFF-0011652
Page 145 of 168
WITNO09830100
WITN09830100
98
POL00006583
Interim Review of CK
Processes by Brian Altman
ac
POL-0017668
99
POL00316805
Email from Lesley J Sewell
to Mark R_ Davies Re:
Panorama
POL-BSFF-0154855
100
POL00153064
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod, Mark R
Davies, Mark Underwood
and others re BNR letter
draft
POL-BSFF-0012176
101
POL00091395
Email from Belinda Crowe to
Tom Wechsler, Melanie
Corfield, Patrick Bourke and
others, re Strictly Private &
Confidential - Subject to
Privilege Arising from M008
Rivenhall
POL-0090417
102
POL00149277
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Melanie Corfield, Belinda
Crowe and Tom Wechsler re
Remote access - reactive
POL-BSFF-0008397
Page 146 of 168
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statement - in strictest
confidence
103
POL00149296
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Belinda Crowe, Angela Van-
Den-Bogerd, Andrew
Parsons re Horizon access
POL-BSFF- 0008416
104
POL00091397
Email from Belinda Crowe to
Patrick Bourke, Tom
Wechsler, Rodric Williams
and others re Notes for the
1600 meeting
POL-0090419
105
POL00149488
Email chain from Patrick
Bourke to Mark Underwood
re: Horizon questions
POL-BSFF-0008608
106
POL00149598
Email chain including Mark
Underwood (POL); Patrick
Bourke (POL); Tom
Wechsler (POL) & others Re:
Remote Access Question
Raised
POL-BSFF-0008718
Page 147 of 168
WITNO09830100
WITN09830100
107
POL00149578
Email from Mark Underwood
(POL) to Tom Wechsler
(POL); Patrick Bourke (POL)
Re: Remote access and
papers and plans
POL-BSFF-0008698
108
POL00212049
Draft Initial Complaint
Review and Mediation
Scheme, Horizon Data
POL-BSFF-0050112
109
POL00212048
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Belinda Crowe, Patrick
Bourke, Andy Holt and
others Re: Remote access
[BD-4A.FID20472253]
POL-BSFF-0050111
110
POL00212720
Initial complaint review and
mediation scheme horizon
data.
POL-BSFF-0050783
111
POL00149674
Email chain from Patrick
Bourke to Mark Underwood,
Belinda Crowe, Tom
Wechsler and others re FJ
Remote Access
POL-BSFF-0008792
Page 148 of 168
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conversation with James
Davidson
112
POL00062410
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Mark David and others re
Hansard Materials —_ for
Yesterday's Debate
POL-0058889
113
POL00041040
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Patrick Bourke and others
re: Questions for the call
concerning the draft
response to second sights
report
POL-0037522
114
FUJ00081944
Email from Mark Underwood
to Kevin Lenihan and others
re: Second Sight Assertions
About Editing Data.
URGENT.
POINQ0088115F
115
POL00353224
FW: URGENT ACTION:
Second Sight assertions
about editing data. URGENT
POL-BSFF-0178945
Page 149 of 168
WITNO09830100
WITN09830100
116
POL00021667
Email from Mark Underwood
to Pete Newsome and
Michael Harvey RE:
Questions from the Call
POL-0018146
117
POL00314275
Email chain from Pete
Newsome to Mark
Underwood cc Andrew
Parsons, Patrick Bourke,
Harvey Michael RE: Remote
access paper
POL-BSFF-0152325
118
POL00226072
Draft response to SS
POL-BSFF-0064135
119
POL00237265
Email from Mark Westbrook
to Steve Allchorn, Andrew
Whitton CC: Jane MacLeod
and Others RE: Jane &
Patrick Discussion Pre QC
Meeting
POL-BSFF-0075328
120
POL00322386
Email from Rodric Williams
to Christopher Knight CC'ing
Jonathan Swift, Mark
Underwood and others RE:
POL Chairman's Review of
POL-BSFF-0160436
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further information relating to
the Complaint R3eview and
Mediation Scheme
121
POL00322475
Email from Mark
Underwood1 to Rodric
Williams, CC Patrick Bourke
re: Chairman's Review -
Further Information -
SUBJECT TO LEGAL
PRIVILEGE
POL-BSFF-0160525
122
POL00211254
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Rodric Williams, Belinda
Crowe re: Horizon Access
[BD-4A.FID20472253]
POL-BSFF-0049317
123
POL00149483
Email from Mark
Underwood1 to Patrick
Bourke RE: Remote access
[BD-4A.FID20472253]
POL-BSFF-0008603
124
POL00125594
Email from Chris Aujard to
Jane MacLeod, cc to Belinda
Crowe, Rodric Williams and
others Re: Sparrow -
POL-0131264
Page 151 of 168
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WITN09830100
Independent Horizon
Assessment
125
POL00129447
Email chain from Andrew
Parsons to Rodric Williams,
Mark Underwood, cc Belinda
Crow and others - Re:
Mediation Scheme Report
[BD-4A.FID26231777]
POL-0135023
126
POL00117518
Email from Rodric Williams
to Patrick Bourke cc Mark
Underwood re: Actions to
Address Technical
Challenges to Horizon
POL-0115135
127
POL00029990
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Jane MacLeod and Rodric
Williams and Patrick Bourke
Re: Deloitte Preliminary
Report
POL-0026472
128
POL00029998
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Mark R Davies and others
POL-0026480
Page 152 of 168
WITNO09830100
WITN09830100
Re: remote access wording -
subject to litigation privilege
129
POL00063478
Susan Rudkin case study:
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod, Tom
Weschler, Melanie Corfield,
and others Re: CCRC
Letters
POL-0059957
130
POL00156617
Instructions to Jonathan
Swift QC to Advise in
Consultation on 8 October
2015
POL-0145682
131
POL00041135
Letter from General Counsel
POL to Baroness Neville-
Rolfe RE : Post Office
Complaint and Mediation
Scheme
POL-0037617
132
POLO0065606
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Rodric Williams and Jane
MacLeod re Draft Speaking
POL-0062085
Page 153 of 168
WITNO09830100
WITN09830100
Notes for meeting with Tim
Parker - Complaint Review
133
POL00027126
Email from Jane Macleod to
Paula Vennells RE FW
Project sparrow
POL-0023767
134
POL00153300
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod, Rodric
Williams and Mark
Underwood1 Re: Draft to Tim
parker
POL-BSFF-0012412
135
POL00153304
Letter from Jane MacLeod to
Tim Parker re Project
Sparrow - Barrister
recommendations
POL-BSFF-0012416
136
POL00102582
A starting point for the Terms
of Reference
POL-0102165
137
POL00104218
Email chain from Jane
MacLeod to Jonathan Swift
re: FW; Draft terms of
reference
POL-0103801
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138
POL00104216
Email chain Jonathan Swift
to Jane MacLeod re: Draft
terms of reference
POL-0103799
139
POL00102604
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Jonathan Swift, Mark
Underwood and others re:
Post Office: note to
accompany the updated and
attached chronology
POL-0102187
140
POL00130957
Mediation Scheme
Chronology
POL-0120801
141
POL00162692
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Jonathan Swift, cc'ing Rodric
Williams, Patrick Bourke and
another re: Post Office -
response to questions 6 & 7
of ToR
POL-0151082
142
POL00162693
POL answers to JSQC
Questions 6 and 7
POL-0151083
143
POL00102616
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Patrick Bourke, Rodric
POL-0102199
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Williams and Mark
Underwood re: Sparrow -
download from my meeting
with Tim Parker and
Jonathan Swift
144
POL00153365
Draft Agenda for Meeting
with Chris Knight (11KBW)
POL-BSFF-0012477
145
POL00153364
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Christopher Knight, Mark
Underwood and Jane
MacLeod re The Post Office
POL-BSFF-0012476
146
POL00102638
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Melanie Corfield cc: Mark
Underwood re: FW: Post
Office Matter
POL-0102221
147
POL00131182
Action Points from the
Meeting with Chris Knight,
11KBW - 27 October 2015
POL-0121026
148
POL00153392
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Christopher Knight,
Jonathan Swift and cc'd
POL-BSFF-0012504
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Jane MacLeod and others
re: RE: Post Office Matter
149
POL00102649
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Tim Parker re: Post Office -
Investigation update
POL-0102232
150
POL00153429
Email trail from Mark
Underwood to Patrick
Bourke re: What about this ?
POL-BSFF-0012541
151
POL00153430
Email trail from Patrick
Bourke to Jane MacLeod re:
Update to Tim ?
POL-BSFF-0012542
152
POL00153634
Email from Christopher
Knight to Patrick Bourke,
Jonathan Swift, Jane
MacLeod and others re Post
Office Matter
POL-BSFF-0012746
153
POL00153638
Email from Mark Underwood
to Patrick Bourke and Steve
Allchorn re Post Office
Matter
POL-BSFF-0012750
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154
POL00158278
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Christopher Knight,
Jonathan Swift and cc;d
Jane MacLeod and others
re: Post Office - Telephone
Conference
POL-0146569
155
POL00158279
Agenda re: Tim Parker
Review - Telephone
Conference 2 December
2015
POL-0146570
156
POL00103324
Email from Jonathan Swift to
Rodric Williams, re: Post
Office Limited - Update and
Request for Further Advice.
POL-0102907
157
POL00103106
Recommendations and
Proposals
POL-0102689
158
POL00103110
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Paula Vennells, Mark
Underwood, Rodric Williams
and others re: FW:
POL-0102693
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Chairman's review - with
attachment
159
POL00103111
Annex A: POLs proposals for
addressing the Report's
recommendations, as
agreed with Jonathan Swift
Qc
POL-0102694
160
POL00027116
Email from Tom Wechsler to
Paula Vennells re TP/BNR -
Phone call with BIS which
included discussion about
Sparrow
POL-0023757
161
POL00153884
Email chain from Jane
MacLeod to Patrick Bourke,
Rodric Williams, Mark
Underwood1 and others Re:
Sparrow
POL-BSFF-0012994
162
POL00104091
Email from Jonathan Swift to
Mark Underwood,
Christopher Knight, Patrick
Bourke and others re:
Private & Confidential -
POL-0103674
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Subject to Legal Privilege,
Findings in relation to
Recommendation Number 7
163
POL00103131
Email from Mark Underwood
to Jonathan Swift,
Christopher Knight, Jane
MacLeod and others re: A
letter drafted for Tim Parker
to send to the Minister,
briefing her on the outcome
of your enquiry to date
POL-0102714
164
POL00103132
Draft Letter from Mr Tim
Parker to Baroness Neville-
Rolfe re: Project Sparrow
POL-0102715
165
POL00131715
Draft Letter from Tim Parker
to Baroness Neville Rolfe
POL-0121501
166
POL00103134
Email from Jonathan Swift to
Mark Underwood,
Christopher Knight, Jane
MacLeod and others; re: A
letter drafted for Tim Parker
to send to the Minister,
POL-0102717
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briefing her on the outcome
of your enquiry to date
167
POL00103138
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod re Post Office
- Chairman's Enquiry
POL-0102721
168
POL00240197
Draft letter from Chairman to
Minister re Project Sparrow
POL-BSFF-0078260
169
POL00240226
Email chain from Mark
Underwood to Rodric
Williams cc Jane MacLeod
Patrick Bourke RE: Post
Office - Chairman's Enquiry
POL-BSFF-0078289
170
POL00240227
Draft letter re Project
Sparrow
POL-BSFF-0078290
171
POL00103207
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod, RE: FW:
Post Office Ltd- Update and
Request for Further Advice
POL-0102790
172
POL00168551
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Rodric Williams, Patrick
POL-0163848
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Bourke, Mark Underwood
RE: Chairman’s review
173
POL00022751
Letter from Bond Dickinson
LLP to POL RE: advice given
on 9 June 2016 in Bates v
POL litigation
POL-0019230
174
POL00022776
Letter from Tim Parker to
Baroness Neville-Rolfe re
update on handling
postmaster's complaints
POL-0019255
175
POL00153946
Email chain from Patrick
Bourke to Mark Underwood
Rodric Williams Jane
MacLeod RE: Sparrow
Update - CCRC and Brian
Altman QC
POL-BSFF-0013054
176
POL00153883
Project Sparrow -
Chairman's Report
Recommendations
POL-BSFF-0012993
177
POL00101446
Email from Rhiannon Kett to
Patrick Bourke, cc'd Andrew
POL-0101029
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Parsons, Belinda Crowe re:
29517413 1 Legally
privileged, FOIA Request -
BBC leaked report - section
31 [BD.MSG
178
POL00151730
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Belinda Crowe re Freedom
of Information request -
Second Sight report - New
Freedom of _ Information
Request
POL-BSFF-0010842
179
POL00024988
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Rodric Williams, Thomas
P Moran, Andela Van-Den-
Bogerd and others RE:
Postmaster Litigation
Steering Group -
Confidential and Subject to
Legal Privilege
POL-0021467
180
POL00025509
Draft Postmaster Litigation
Steering Group Meeting
POL-0021988
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Terms of Reference and
Membership
181
POL00025510
Bates & Others v POL Claim
Form, Claim no
HQ16X01238
POL-0021989
182
POL00025511
Letter from Freeths to Rodric
Williams (POL Solicitor) re:
Bates & Others v Post Office
Limited Group Action Letter
pursuant to the practice
direction on __ pre-action
conduct
POL-0021990
183
POL00025507
Email from Rodric Williams
to POL employees re
Postmaster Litigation
Steering Group Meeting on 7
June 2016
POL-0021986
184
POL00023488
RE, Draft Letter of Response
- Confidential and Subject to
Legal Priv.MSG
POL-0019967
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185
POL00023490
Email from Thomas Moran to
Andrew Parsons and others
re: Draft Letter of Response
POL-0019969
186
POL00110482
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Rob Houghton. CC'd -
Rodric Williams RE: wording
of Letter of response
POL-0108217
187
POL00024911
Email sent from Jane
MacLeod to Patrick Bourke
and others — cc'd re:
Tim/Minister
POL-0021390
188
POL00024627
Email from Jane MacLeod to
Andrew Parsons re: PLSG
meeting on Wednesday 24
May 2017 @12 in Tonbridge
(1.11)
POL-0021106
189
POL00154156
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Andrew Parsons, Amy Prime
and Rodric Williams RE:
PLSG meeting on
POL-BSFF-0013261
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Wednesday 24 May 2017 @
12 in Tonbridge (1.11)
190
POL00117755
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Andrew Parsons, Amy Prime
and Rodric Williams RE:
PLSG meeting on
Wednesday 24 May 2017 @
12 in Tonbridge (1.11)
POL-0114692
191
POL00006431
Noting paper - Update on
Litigation Strategy
POL-0017736
192
POL00285929
RE: Letter to Freeths and
Court - KEL disclosure
POL-BSFF-0123992
193
POL00000444
4th Witness Statement of
Andrew Paul Parsons
(Womble Bond Dickinson),
Solicitor to POL
VIS00001458
194
POL00003363
Letter from Andrew Parsons
to James Hartley and
Imogen Randall re: Post
Office Group Litigation -
VIS00004377
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Horizon Issues Trial: Expert
Reports
195
POL00154252
Email from Patrick Bourke to
Jane MacLeod, Rodric
Williams and cc'ing Mark
Underwood1 RE: Indicative
agenda for sparrow meeting
POL-BSFF-0013351
196
POL00154253
Sparrow meeting - Draft
Indicative Agenda
POL-BSFF- 0013352
197
POL00024179
Email chain between Andrew
Parsons, Jane MacLeod,
Patrick Bourke and others
Re: Litigation.
POL-0020658
198
UKGI00007924
Information Sharing Protocol
- Group Litigation
UKGI018737-001
199
POL00006754
Meeting Minutes of the
Postmaster Litigation
Subcommittee of POL
POL-0018012
200
POL00359910
Re: Group Litigation Update
- SUBJECT TO LEGAL
POL-BSFF-0185631
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PRIVILEGE - DO NOT
FORWARD
201
POL00023629
GLO Communications
Horizon Issues Trial - Letter
to MPs (Patrick Bourke)
Draft version
POL-0020108
202
POL00022837
Email from Andrew Parsons
to Patrick Bourke, Mark
Underwood, Ben Foat and
others, RE Adverse common
points in the HIT judgement
POL-0019316
Page 168 of 168