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Witness Name: Sir Michael
Hodgkinson
Statement No.: WITN10660100
Dated: 27 February 2024
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF SIR MICHAEL
HODGKINSON
I, Sir Michael Hodgkinson, will say as follows...
INTRODUCTION
1. I held the position of senior non-executive director of Royal Mail Holdings Plc (“RMH”)
from 1 January 2003 until 31 August 2007. Between May 2003 and March 2007, I
was the chairman of Post Office Ltd (“POL”).
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry with
the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 14 December 2022 (the
“Request’).
3. The matters set out in the Request date back a number of years (up to 21 years
ago) and my recollection of that period is affected as a result. I am now 79 years
old and I have not had any involvement with the RMH or POL since I left in
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2007, almost 17 years ago.
4. My lack of recollection has unfortunately not been assisted by the limited
disclosure of relevant documents and information. I have made a number of
requests for further disclosure from those representing POL, to assist me in
addressing the matters set out in the Request, but I have been informed that,
due to the passage of time, limited information is now available.
5. I have been assisted in preparing this witness statement by Kingsley Napley
LLP.
BACKGROUND
6. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career:
6.1. In 1965, I graduated from Nottingham University with a degree in Industrial
Economics and joined the Ford Motor Company as a financial analyst. I
qualified as a Cost and Management Accountant whilst at Ford. In 1969, I
joined the British Leyland Group as a financial analyst and progressed
through the company, being appointed in 1978 to be Managing Director of a
newly formed company: Land Rover Ltd. In this role, I was responsible for
the Land Rover and Range Rover product lines.
6.2. In 1983, I joined the Grand Metropolitan Group, initially responsible for a
major section of the Brewing Division, and eventually becoming Chief
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Executive Officer of the European Food Division.
6.3. In 1992, I joined BAA Plc, as Group Airports Director, where I was
responsible for the day to day operation of the airports. I became Chief
Executive Officer in 1999, before retiring in June 2003.
7. In the autumn of 2002, I was asked if I would be interested in joining RMH as a
senior non-executive director, because it was starting a major transformation in
preparation for privatisation. In addition, I was asked if I would take on the role of
chairman of POL. It was anticipated that when RMH was privatised, POL would
remain a government owned business, and would eventually require its own
corporate governance processes. I believe that my history of working closely
with government in the airport sector, and working alongside strong trade unions
in the car industry, was probably why I was approached. However, I made it
clear that I was unable to take on the role as chairman of POL until June 2003,
due to my existing commitments. I set out more detail about my roles with POL
and RMH later in this statement.
8. I was informed that my role on the RMH board and my role as chairman of POL
(combined) would require two days per week of my time, which was possible
alongside my other commitments. In the event that RMH was privatised, it was
envisaged that I would spend all of that time working for POL.
9. I have been asked to set out what other jobs, roles or directorships I held at this
time. These were as follows: -
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9.1. Non-Executive Director at FKI plc (until July 2008).
9.2. Board member of Transport for London and Chairman of the Finance
Committee (2001 — 2012).
9.3. Non-Executive Director of First Choice Holidays, which subsequently
became TUI Travel (January 2004, becoming Chairman in March 2004, and
then Deputy Chairman of TUI Travel in 2007 until 2018).
9.4. Non-Executive Director of Dublin Airport (2004 — 2010).
9.5. The POL nominated director on the board of the Bank of Ireland (May 2004
until July 2006). This role was a direct result of my position as a director on
the board of POL.
10.1 stepped down as chairman of POL in March 2007. It was clear that the
privatisation of RMH would not be taking place in the foreseeable future, and
that POL would therefore remain in the Holdings Group (ie. Royal Mail Holdings
Plc; POL; Royal Mail Group Ltd; Parcel Force Worldwide; and General Logistic
Systems B.V.) and so did not need an independent chairman. It was also at a
time when we had achieved the immediate tasks which were required of the
POL board, for example: network rationalisation, introduction of financial
services, and agreement of a strategy for government funding. With recruitment
of a new CEO, we also had a stable board. There was also a lot of discussion
about the increase in the parcel business at that time and the benefit which POL
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could offer to Royal Mail Group Ltd as a result. It was therefore believed that
greater coordination between the companies would be beneficial.
11.1 had intended to resign from the board of RMH in May 2007, but this was
delayed until August 2007, due to a delay in obtaining the necessary legal
consent from the Secretary of State.
12.1 have been asked to provide an overview of my professional career since
leaving POL and RMH: I continued my work with First Choice, which
subsequently became TUI Travel. I stayed with TUI Travel until 2018. I
continued with Transport for London until 2012, becoming their representative
on the Crossrail Board in 2008. Between 2009 and 2018, I was an advisor to
the West Midlands Council on their share of Birmingham Airport. Between 2014
and 2019, I was Chairman of Keolis UK Ltd. Since 2014, I have been working for
Canadian Government central pension fund PSP, as their advisor to their airport
infrastructure fund. I am also one of their board directors for Budapest airport.
ROLE AT RMH AND POL
13.When I joined, RMH was a public limited company, wholly owned by the
Government. It had four main subdivisions:
13.1.POL;
13.2, Royal Mail Group Ltd;
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13.3. Parcel Force Worldwide; and
13.4. General Logistic Systems B.V (GLS).
14.1 had no involvement with Royal Mail Group Ltd, Parcel Force Worldwide or the
General Logistic Systems B.V, other than as a non-executive director of RMH.
15.1 have been asked to summarise my views on the responsibilities of a board of
directors in the operation of a company solely owned by government. In my
view, the responsibilities of a board are to oversee the management of the
company, to develop and approve a corporate strategy that reflects the goals
agreed with the Government shareholder, to ensure that the board consists of
the right quality of directors to deliver that strategy, and to make sure that the
financial statements are accurate and represent a true and fair view of the
company’s activities. This is similar to the responsibilities of any board.
16. The main difference for a board of a company solely owned by the Government
is that there is a political dimension to the company's work. For example, Post
Offices have an important role to play in society and government has a
responsibility to ensure that people are connected to the postal system, even if
they live in rural areas of the United Kingdom. The rural Post Offices would
often be unprofitable, but the Government would provide the additional funding
to ensure that the Post Offices remained in place and could continue to operate.
From recollection, POL liaised with the Government about the number of Post
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Offices; this was a discussion about the relationship between society's access
and the costs associated with keeping the branches open, as this required
government funding.
17.To the best of my recollection, in the period between June 2003 and January
2004, I was spending approximately three days a week working for RMH and
POL. This subsequently reduced to two days. I was initially spending time
getting to know the people and the business. This period gave me a good
understanding of how best I could use my time and add value going forward.
RMH Board
18.1 joined the board as a senior non-executive director. There were a number of
non-executive directors who were recruited to join the RMH board at the same
time as me. I understood that this recruitment drive was with privatisation in
mind, which was anticipated to happen in the next few years. If this happened, I
was going to move away from RMH and retain my role as chairman of POL.
19.When I joined, RMH had an established and conventional company board —
there was a chairman, a senior non-executive director, non-executive directors,
and representatives from the sub divisions. The structure was mature but many
of the board members were new.
20.1 would regularly attend board meetings, which I believe were every month. A
board pack would be provided in advance containing various papers and other
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information. I cannot recall how this information was received. In addition, I
cannot recall who set the agenda or the names of those who regularly attended.
In my view it operated as a normal board would.
2
=
-Whilst I cannot recall all of the details of the board meetings I attended, I do
recall the themes. I recall that the there was a focus on staff engagement, and
the connected idea of share options for the staff. We were also focused on the
need for investment, in order to fund the upgrading of processes throughout the
business. The problem of the pension fund deficit was a regular item for
discussion. We also focused on improving the communication with the staff.
22. The board had sub-committees (such as audit, compliance and risk), which had
delegated responsibility and reported to it. I cannot recall any details about their
membership and I do not have.a copy of the terms of reference.
23.1 believe I was chair of the corporate and social responsibility governance
committee and on the board of the remuneration sub-committee. I was also the
chair of the health and safety subcommittee, although I do not recall whether this
was formally linked to the board. As above, I cannot recall any details about
these committees.
24.1n addition to attending board meetings, I recall that I visited several of the sites,
spoke to the staff, and also did a post round.
25.1 have been asked to summarise the level of IT experience of those attending
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the RMH board. I do not know the answer to this question.
POL Board
26. When I joined POL, it was facing a serious decline in its traditional businesses
and had just embarked on its own transformation. The transformation included
reducing the number of Post Office branches, introducing new financial service
products, and developing a viable future strategy that would be accepted by the
Government. As stated above, RMH was considering privatisation at some
stage, which would eventually require POL to establish its own corporate
governance committees and procedures. The aforementioned was a significant
amount of change for the organisation.
27.My role as chairman was to make sure that everyone was working together, and
to help support the executive team (the CEO, the COO, the Sales and Marketing
Director, the Finance Director, and the IT Director) to run their business. During
my tenure, the executive team of POL was a very accomplished and capable
team, who had a lot of experience in their respective roles. I would like to think
my leadership style was collaborative and open.
28.When I joined, there were several short-term aims:
28.1. To make sure that the network rationalisation and rural strategy was agreed
with government and in place;
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28.2. To introduce the new financial services, which were crucial to the future of
the company’s finances;
28.3. To improve cost efficiency; and
28.4. To ensure that we had the right quality of people on the board going
forwards.
29. The longer-term goals were to ensure POL was ready to introduce a classic
corporate governance structure and to create a conventional board for when
RMH was privatised. We also needed to develop a strategy which the
Government would be able to fund going forwards.
30. Due to the passage of time, I do not specifically recall how regularly our board
meetings were held. Whilst I do not recall any details of what was discussed, I
do recall that I would ‘meet with the CEO in advance of a board meeting and
decide the agenda. Various attendees would prepare written reports in advance
for the meeting. The meetings were attended by the executive team, non-
executive directors, the company secretary and others who had an issue to
speak to in that particular meeting. If a member of the executive team could not
attend, they would generally delegate any report for the board to another person
if possible. There would be various action points agreed during the meetings. I
ideally liked to focus a third of our meetings on future strategy.
31.When I started as chairman, POL’s corporate governance relied on the
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governance structure of RMH. From recollection, it was not a very developed
board, mostly consisting of the executive team with no independent non-
executive directors (until the arrival of Brian Goggin in September 2004, and
Alan Cook in February 2005). POL did not have any of its own. subcommittees
which reported to the board until I introduced the risk and compliance committee,
so it would instead rely on the subcommittees of the RMH. This is not unusual
for a subsidiary company, and I thought the corporate structure was adequate to
fulfil its responsibilities.
32.1 introduced a risk and compliance committee because the board was conscious
that it would need to have greater corporate governance measures in place with
the progression into the financial market, specifically because of the risk of mis-
selling financial products. I do not now have the terms of reference for this sub-
committee but, from the documents provided with the Request, I can see that the
aim of this group was to have oversight over audit, legal, anti-money laundering,
and crime and fraud matters [see POL Board Minutes dated 15 December 2004
- POL00021486]. The documents provided also show that the group was set up
during the latter half of 2004 and that the meetings were held quarterly. The
Finance Director was a permanent member but I do not recall the full
membership details. Due to the passage of time, I have no substantive
recollection of the details discussed in these meetings. I have recently been
provided with copies of six risk and compliance committee minutes [5 January
2005 - POL00021416; 6 April 2005 - POL00021417; 29 September 2005 -
POL00021418; 8 November 2005 - POL00021419; 22 March 2006 -
POL00021420; 6 September 2006 - POL00021421] and, whilst they are not a
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complete set, they show that there were team updates about matters such as,
branch audits and inspections, AML and regulatory compliance, the Financial
Services Authority (as it then was), internal crime and IMPACT (which I deal with
below). With privatisation of RMH, further committees would eventually be
required.
33. From approximately 2006 onwards, I believe I was also chair of the sales and
marketing committee. This committee was created with the aim of improving
sales after the introduction of the financial services products. I am not sure if the
committee was formally linked to the board.
34.Whilst my memory is limited, I do recall that a significant amount of the board's
time was taken up dealing with the following —
34.1. The solvency of POL.
34.2. The move towards financial services.
34.2.1. As POL was making a loss, the move towards financial services
was a very important part of the strategy, as it was hoped that this would
significantly improve the financial position of the company.
34.2.2.. As part of the move into financial services, the board was
required to evaluate various bids from different financial services partners.
After consideration, we awarded the bid to the Bank of Ireland. This
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required a member of the POL board joining the Bank of Ireland board,
and vice versa. I was asked, by the Bank of Ireland, to take on this role on
behalf of POL.
34.2.3. We particularly focused on travel products, such as foreign
exchange and travel insurance, because of my background and
knowledge of this industry.
34.2.4. We identified the need for an additional non-executive director to
join the board, who had financial services expertise. Alan Cook was
subsequently identified for this role, which we deal with further below.
34.3. The Rural Strategy - as discussed above, decisions about the accessibility
and availability of the Post Office network.
34.4. Rationalisation of the Post Office network, which was a combination of
reducing costs and increasing the footfall for the remaining outlets.
34.5. General cost reduction, and plans to minimise the losses of the ‘Crown’
post offices.
34.6. Horizon, which I discuss later in my statement.
34.7. The replacement of the old-fashioned Post Office books, with a card
account.
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34.7.1. This required a lot of work and was successfully implemented,
only for the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) to say that they
would stop using the Post Office card account and introduce their own
card. Eventually, a few years later, the DWP did start using a combined
card account with the Post Office.
34.8. The replacement of the CEO.
34.8.1. In approximately summer 2004, David Mills, the CEO of POL,
said he would probably retire by the end of December 2005. Finding a
suitable replacement CEO is a very important job for the chairman, and it
was a challenging task at that time. In my view, we needed someone with
substantial financial services experience and a close relationship with the
Government. The pool of candidates was further reduced by the fact that
it was a role in the public sector.
34.8.2. Alan Cook was highlighted to us as a potential suitable
candidate as a short term non-executive director, and a possible
replacement as CEO because of his close relationship with the
Government in his job as CEO of National Savings & Investments and
because of his extensive financial services experience. Alan Cook joined
as a non-executive director of POL in February 2005, and later agreed to
consider the position of CEO after getting to know the people and the
organisation in general. Fortunately, Alan Cook decided quite quickly that
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he would like to be considered as the next CEO, so we started the very
lengthy process to get him approved by Department of Trade and
Industry. I do not recall why this process took so long, but he started as
CEO in March 2006.
35. The recruitment of Alan Cook, and the other tasks outlined above, were
significant undertakings for the board at that time.
36.1 have been asked about the level of technical IT expertise of those attending the
board. I cannot answer this question other than to say that an IT Director was a
member of the board.
Oversight by the Boards
37.1 have been asked to address various questions about the areas the boards of
POL and RMH had oversight over and the extent of that oversight, if any.
38.In respect of POL, my recollection is as follows:
38.1. the legal department: I do not believe the board had direct oversight or
involvement with the legal department and I do not recall the structure of
the legal team. This was the ultimate responsibility of the CEO and COO.
The level of involvement of a board with a legal department varies from
company to company. I do not recall that we received a list of individual
ongoing cases; however, I would expect the board to be made aware of
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non-routine civil litigation or criminal prosecutions brought by POL (i.e.
cases which had the potential of impacting the company financially or
reputationally).
38.2. investigation and prosecutions of SPMs for theft, fraud and false accounting
for alleged shortfalls in branch accounts: the risk and compliance committee
would have had some general oversight of investigations and prosecutions
of SPMs generally but I really cannot recall the details. I was certainly not
aware that there was any systemic issue with Horizon.
38.3. pursuit of SPMs for the recovery of alleged shortfalls in branch accounts,
including through civil proceedings: again the risk and compliance
committee might have had some general oversight over the civil recovery of
money from SPMs generally but I really cannot recall the details. Again, I
was certainly not aware that there was any systemic issue with Horizon.
38.4. company compliance with the Race Relations Act 1978: From my
recollection the board did have oversight of the company-wide policy of
non-discrimination. I can see references to diversity training in the
documents provided with the Request. My assumption is that the training
also addressed racial discrimination, and that the training was provided to
ensure that the company and its employees were compliant with the
company wide policy and legislation. We also received updates from
human resources about the same. I cannot recall any breaches being
raised with the board.
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38.5. /T department: the board had some oversight, as the executive team
included an IT director. The IT director was responsible for updating the
board in relation to IT projects and other IT related matters.
38.6. security and/or the investigation department: the risk and compliance
committee might have had some oversight but I cannot recall the details. I
can recall occasionally being asked to approve the funding of additional
security for post offices who were at risk of burglary.
38.7. the accounting system used to collate individual transactions, cash and
stock declarations etc, used for preparing management and statutory
accounts: the board had some oversight, as the executive team included a
finance director. The finance director was responsible for updating the
board in relation to these matters. They were also assisted by the auditors,
who reviewed the accounts half yearly. 1 would have expected any
discrepancy to be reported to the board. I do not recall this happening.
38.8. problem management team: I have no recollection of this team.
39. In respect of RMH, my recollection is that the oversight was very similar to POL,
but with established sub-committees reporting to the board.
40. The CEO and I reported from the POL board to the RMH board. I believe we
provided a written report. We did not report to Royal Mail Group Ltd.
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41.In terms of reporting to the Department of Trade and Industry, I do not recall who
would attend these meetings on behalf of POL. I believe they took place
quarterly but do not recall attending myself.
42.I have been asked to summarise my understanding of how the Government
maintained oversight of POL and RMH during my time as director. From
recollection, the shareholder executive had regular meetings with RMH and also,
on occasion, joined the RMH board meetings. I do not believe I was part of the
regular quarterly meetings with the shareholder executive, so cannot comment
further on them.
43. In relation to POL, there were also quarterly meetings with the Department of
Trade and Industry. I do not recall attending these, but I may have attended the
odd one. POL would also have had regular meetings with the Government about
on-going issues, such as the rural strategy. I also do not recall attending these
meetings.
44. At the time, I felt that the oversight was adequate.
HORIZON
45. The responsibility for monitoring the Horizon IT System (“Horizon”) lay with POL.
46. The responsibility for criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings arising from
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alleged shortfalls in branch accounts based on Horizon data, also lay with POL.
47.When I joined as chairman, I do not recall any specific briefing or training about
Horizon or about the contract between POL and Fujitsu. I have been shown the
Second Supplemental Agreement [POL00090428] and the Third Supplemental
Agreement [FUJ00118186]. I have no recollection of seeing these documents
before, and do not recall the clauses about which I have been asked. I note that
they were created several years before I joined.
48.1 have been asked if I was aware of any bugs, errors or defects or concerns with
the integrity of Horizon or complaints about the same. I was not.
49. Although I cannot recall whether there were specific reporting lines, my assumption
is that the IT Director reported to the CEO about matters relating to Horizon. As
both were POL board members, I was reliant on them raising any concems they
had with Horizon.
50.1 do not recall any issues about the integrity of Horizon being raised.
51.When I first became the chairman of POL, I did request to further my
understanding of the Horizon system. I have been asked about the purpose of my
request. I believe that my first POL board meeting was 19 June 2003 - or this
certainly would have been one of the first meetings. As can be seen in POL board
minutes dated 19 June 2004 [POL00021482], I wanted to learn more about
Horizon (see POLB03/37). I was interested in the capabilities of Horizon because
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of the POL board's strategic plans for growth into the financial services market. In
particular, we were focusing on offering banking products, insurance and travel
products, and foreign exchange. These products were significantly higher value
items than the products the Post Office had historically sold. I recall asking
questions of the board as to whether Horizon was suitable for this. During my
induction, I was told categorically by everyone I met (e.g. the executive team, the
crown offices, and Post Offices I visited in East London) that Horizon was a
significant improvement on what had existed before. However, we were entering
into a completely different world with different products and I wanted to understand
whether the system had been designed with these products in mind, whether it was
reliable, and whether it was capable of handling transaction of much higher value. I
also wanted to be confident that Horizon was resilient enough to adapt to new
products.
52.1 recall that a meeting was arranged a few weeks after the board meeting to
address my queries. I really cannot recall who attended the meeting, but I think it
was the senior IT management and members of Fujitsu. I expect Alan Barrie (the
IT director) set the meeting up, but I do not have any notes or records relating to it.
Although I do not recall the specific questions I asked, my memory is that we
discussed the issues addressed above. I do recall that I was left with the
impression that POL not only had a good working IT system at the time, but a
system that could be developed for the future.
53. Throughout the POL board meetings during my tenure, there were regular
references to Horizon. My recollection is that these were all forward-looking
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discussions, i.e. how the system could help to further POL’s expansion into new
markets, the introduction of the IMPACT accounting system, and the extension of
the current contract with Fujitsu in 2010. There were significant savings to be
made by extending the Horizon contract. It is important to stress however that the
extension of the contract with Fujitsu was only being discussed on the basis that it
was working properly, which was my belief at that time.
54. As set out above, I do not recall hearing about any bugs, errors, defects or
concerns with the integrity of Horizon. From recollection, the first time I heard any
comment about possible problems with Horizon was in early August 2007, when I
called into the office to say farewell to my colleagues. One of the senior area
managers (the name of which I do not recall) had recently received an audit report
about a large deficit in one of the Post Offices in her area. She told me that her
team had not been able, to date, to understand what the problem was, and she
said she was wondering whether there could be a problem with Horizon. She said
her team were investigating all possible ways that the Horizon system might have
caused the issue, but the investigation appeared to be at a very early stage. I
trusted that this was in hand.
HORIZON: CIVIL PROCEEDINGS AND PROSECUTIONS
55.1 do not recall discussion about the prosecution or civil proceedings brought against
SPMs arising from alleged shortfalls in branch accounts based on Horizon data or
generally and I was not aware that there was any systemic issue with Horizon.
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56.1 have been asked about where the responsibility lay in the Holdings Group for
criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings of SPMs for shortfalls in branch
accounts. I cannot recall who would have been responsible within POL, but my
assumption is that this would have been dealt with by the POL legal department,
who would have reported any issues to the CEO or COO.
57. I do not recall discussion about the risks and compliance issues arising from
the prosecution of SPMS for theft and false accounting, or the pursuit of civil
litigation against SPMs to recover alleged short falls in branch accounts. As far
as I was aware, there was a fully functioning legal team responsible for these
actions.
58.1 do not have any recollection of the policies, guidelines or practices followed
when pursuing a civil action against an SPM.
59. Similarly, I cannot recall any detail about the audits of SPMs’ branch accounts, or
the practices and policies adopted in respect of suspending or terminating SPMs’
contracts.
60.1 also cannot recall the policies, guidelines or practices when investigating alleged
offences and bringing criminal prosecutions.
61.1 do not recall the POL board discussing the bringing of specific prosecutions or
civil proceedings against SPMs, and litigation was not a standard agenda item
during our board meetings. This similarly applies to the RMH board. I note that
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there is discussion about the principle of the approach to litigation in the POL
board minutes dated 13 October 2004 [POL00021485] and that David Miller was
actioned to verify the current procedures and report back to the POL board. I do
not recall whether this happened. I recall discussion about how we dealt with
franchise breaches by SPMs, i.e. selling a different lottery ticket, but I do not
recall individual cases being discussed.
62.1 can recall that SPMs were occasionally prosecuted for fraud, which I think I
learned during my induction process. I do not have any recollection of these
cases being discussed during POL board meetings.
Civil proceedings against Ms Wolstenholme (Cleveleys)
63. The Request provided me with three documents which relate to the civil
proceedings against Ms Wolstenholme, namely: an email chain with the subject
‘Legal case — Cleveleys PO 153 405 Mrs J Wolstenholm’ [POL00142503}, an
advice on evidence and quantum by Mr Brochwicz-Lewinski [POL00142504], and
the IT spend from 2003 [POL00120833]. I do not recall seeing these documents
before now.
64.1 do not recall this matter being discussed at a board meeting.
THE IMPACT PROGRAM
65.1 have been asked about the nature and extent of my involvement in the design
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and implementation of the IMPACT program; I was not involved with the design
and implementation.
66.As can be seen in the POL board minutes dated 1:September 2004
[POL00032050}, the IMPACT business case was presented by Peter Corbett.
IMPACT stands for “Improved Accounting” and the intention was for the Horizon
system to be extended to accounting, with a hope that this would improve
productivity. It was presented as a very straightforward, low risk program.
67. IMPACT was presented to the POL board, as we needed to approve the spend. I
note that the board authorised the spend subject to an ongoing system of risk
assessment [POL00032050]. I do not recall to what this amounted.
68. As can be seen in subsequent POL board minutes (e.g. POL board minutes
dated 23 February 2005 [POL00021487] and POL board minutes dated 17
August 2005 [POL00032147)), there were updates about IMPACT at relevant
intervals. I note that POL00021487 mentions that the “Testing phase [is]
underway’. Although I cannot recall the content of this meeting, this implies to
me that people were taking the introduction of this system carefully and properly.
69. Although I was not present during the POL board meeting on 17 August 2005
[POL00032147}, POLB05/79(c) details the sums of money that could be saved
as a result of this program.
70.1 have been asked about the extent to which POL and RMH discussed the fact
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that the IMPACT program would prevent SPMs from placing disputed
discrepancies in a local suspense account. I do not recall this being discussed.
GENERAL
71.1 have been asked whether I felt I had sufficient time to dedicate to my roles at POL
and RMH. I felt like I had sufficient time to dedicate to this role. For the first six
months as chairman, I worked more than anticipated, as I needed to understand
the role and the organisation.
72.As I did not know anything about the issues with Horizon at the time, I do not think
there is more I could have done at the time either. Since concems started to
circulate about Horizon in the public domain, I have wondered what our board
might have missed during my tenure.
73. By the time I was in post, my understanding was that Horizon was up and running
successfully, and embedded in the organisation. It is therefore hard to say what I
would have done differently with hindsight, as my understanding of the situation
now is in stark contrast with my understanding at the time.
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Statement of Truth
Dated: a7° are Qday.
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Index to First Witness Statement of Sir Michael Hodgkinson
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No. I URN Document Description Control Number
1 POL00021486 I POL board minutes dated 15 I POLO0000019
December 2004
2 POL00021416 I Risk and Compliance POL-0018046
Committee minutes dated 5
January 2005
3 POL00021417 I Risk and Compliance POL-0018047
Committee minutes dated 6
April 2005
4 POL00021418 Risk and Compliance POL-0018048
Committee minutes dated 29
September 2005
5 POL00021419 I Risk and Compliance POL-0018049
Committee minutes dated 8
: November 2005
6 POL00021420 I Risk and Compliance POL-0018050
Committee minutes dated 22
March 2006
7 POL00021421 Risk and Compliance POL-0018051
Committee minutes dated 6
September 2006
8 POL00090428 I Second Supplemental POL-0087397
Agreement
9 FUJ00118186 Third Supplemental POINQ0124350F
Agreement
10 POL00021482 I POL board minutes dated 19 I POL0000015
dune 2003
11- I POL00021485 I POL board minutes dated 13 I POL0000018
October 2004
12 POL00142503 I Email chain with subject POL-BSFF-0001779
‘Legal case - Cleveleys PO
153 405 Mrs J Wolstenholm'
13 POL00142504 =I Advice on evidence and POL-BSFF-0001780
quantum by Mr Brochwicz-
Lewinski
14 POL00120833__I The IT spend from 2003 POL-0126849
15 POL00032050 POL board minutes dated 1 POL-0028985
September 2004
16 POL00021487 POL board minutes dated 23 I POL0000020
February 2005
17 POL00032147 POL board minutes dated 17 I POL-0029082
August 2005
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