WITN04600301 - Email from Jan Holmes to Mik Peach re: Cleveleys - Horizon Equipment

Evidence on official site

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From: Holmes Jan R[/O=ICL/OU=UKSOUTH FEL01/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=HOLMESJ]
Sent: Wed 20/08/2003 4:09:33 PM (UTC)

To: Peach Mik; __-....GRO

Subject: RE: Cleverleys - Horizon Equipment

Mik,

Thanks. I agree with all comments.

Jan
coe Original Message-----
From: Peach Mik
Sent: 20 August 2003 17:08
To: Holmes Jan R
Subject: RE: Cleverleys - Horizon Equipment
Jan,

suggested amendments in red

Regards
Mik
Jim,

For clarification I am not part of Fujitsu's legal department. My role in Post Office Account is restricted to assisting Post Office with
litigation support as and when it is required.

Thanks for the papers. I've done some preliminary work and, perhaps inevitably, the picture is not as clear as we might wish

Let me start with the easy stuff :

1. We will have no record of any transaction data from Cleverleys dated before November 2000 in the central audit archive since this
is automatically deleted 18 months from the date that it is written. So, if 30th November 2000 was the last active day for the Counter
that data would have been deleted on or about 30th May 2002.

2. Similarly, there will be nor Help Desk logs since these are also deleted after 18 months.

Now the hard stuff

1. Transactions exist on the Counter for no more than 34 (not 90 as quoted) days after which they are automatically deleted by a
Riposte routine (Riposte is the messaging software that passes information around the whole system and generates the transaction
information). In the case of this particular system transactions MAY still exist, provided that the counter has not been powered up at
any time since the last "active day".

2. If a Counter has been switched off for more than 35 consecutive days and then switched on Riposte will not start-up. This is a
security device to deter a Counter being stolen and subsequently being attached back onto the network in order to conduct
transactions illegally.

3. If Riposte were made to work after 35 days it would immediately check for transactions >34 (not 90 as quoted) days old and delete
them immediately.

4. Under any circumstances we could not allow a 3rd party direct access to a Counter since the filestore is encrypted and for them to
be able to do anything would require our releasing the crypto key. This we would not do.

I don't know if you phrased the above for some legal reason, I would have said "Under no circumstances would we allow a 3rd party
direct access to a counter. The filestore is encrypted and for a 3rd party to make sense of the data we would have to release to them
details of the encryption key. This we would not do."

How we can help :

1. If this is to be pursued then the work would have to be undertaken by our technical specialists in Bracknell, possibly with the 3rd
party in attendance as an observer. Do you need to add that the 3rd party should be security cleared before being allowed access ?

2. We could make no guarantees about recovering any data since there are a number of activities that, quite frankly, we have had no
cause to attempt before and therefore could not be certain of the outcome.
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3. There would be a charge associated with this work.