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Message
From: Sarah Haywood [
Sent: 29/08/2014 14:29:46
To: Parsons, Andrew [/O=BON jup/cn=Recipients,
cc: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd f I; Phil Bowdery
Subject: RE: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Attachments: _DOC_29236793(1)_ATM Related Questions from Second Sight on 29th July 2014 (3) (Autosaved).docx
Dear all,
Apologies I didn’t have the comments in balloons to comment on. Please see the attached latest version contining
comments SH7R6 & SH10R9.
Transaction Reversal fraud differs to Cash Trapping fraud.
Transaction Reversal
An error condition is created at the ATM which makes it appear that cash will not be dispensed. This forces a re-
credit of the amount withdrawn back to the account when in fact the criminal gets the cash (through the insertion
of device, e.g. a Claw, manipulation of the ATM dispense mechanism by hand, or more rarely through corruption of
the transaction messages).
Cash Trapping
The criminal attaches a device to the ATM so that when the ATM tries to dispense cash the cash is trapped and the
customer cannot retrieve it. The criminal then returns to the ATM and retrieves the trapped cash
Sarah Haywood I ATM & Travel Services Manager, Finance Service Centre
No.1 Future Walk, Chesterfield, S49 1PF
postoffice.co.uk
@postofficenews
©BOO®
From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 29 August 2014 14:58
To: Sarah Haywood
Subject: RE: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Hi Sarah,
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Section below:
Q. We know that the Wincor ATMs were targeted post 2009 with partial retract; transaction reversal[AP61] ; and
malware attacks [P2] so we need to know whether any SMPRs were held accountable for mysterious shortfalls that
were later found to have been (or that might have been) brought about by such attacks. The Industry tells us that,
whereas Diebold and NCR are open and tend to disclose (to Industry fraud/security specialists) the attacks that
have been successful against their ATMs, Wincor is far less open and far more secretive about them and
unprepared to share knowledge/intelligence.
Answer: No type of ATM fraud that Post Office or Bol are aware of will create a shortage when the ATM is balanced.
As explained in Post Office's note on retract fraud, this type of fraud does not cause a loss to the branch where the correct
Post Office procedure is followed.
In the case of cash trapping, there is no loss to the branch as . as cash has been dispensed correctly from ATM (and will
be recorded as being dispensed by the ATM on the Bank Totals receipt) but intercepted by fraudster. It will be the
customer that did not receive their cash. Although Post Office will assist customers and BOI to investigate any cases of
cash trapping, it will not cause a loss in the branch accounts as the accounts will record cash being dispensed and the cash
will have been taken (albeit by the fraudster rather than the customer). ). Providing the branch could provide evidence that
the ATM was balanced correctly any disputed amounts would have been refunded to the branch[AP63] . Post Office Ltd
subsequently wrote off these amounts.
Thanks,
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
IV 9HQ
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From: Sarah Haywood
Sent: 29 August 2014 13:20
To:! }
Cc: Phil Bowdery; Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Subject: FW: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Andrew,
Please see the attached response relating to the investigation of cash losses.
Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.
POL-0018388
Kind regards
Sarah Haywood I ATM & Travel Services Manager, Finance Service Centre
No.1 Future Walk, Chesterfield, S49 1PF
Postline:
postoffice.co.uk
@postofficenews
©BOC®
From: Mark A Wood
Sent: 28 August 2014 12:02
To: Sarah Haywood
Subject: FW: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Mark Wood I Method of Payment Manager, Finance Service Centre
1* Floor, 1 Future Walk, West Bars, Chesterfield, S49 1PF
Post Office stories
@postofficenews
©GBOOLO ®
From: Phil Bowdery
Sent: 21 August 2014 11:17
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Cc: Parsons, Andrew I Mark A Wood
Subject: RE: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Andy
Please see attached document with updates as far as possible at this stage.
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I have copied this to Mark Wood who will pick up as soon as possible on the accounting queries that I have noted as
Sarah’s involvement being required. Please note that it may be necessary to await Sarah’s return on 28", which Mark
will follow up on her return.
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Regards
Phil
From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 17 August 2014 20:31
To: Phil Bowdery
Cc: Parsons, Andrew ¢
Subject: FW: Confidei
j
ht Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Hi Phil,
Andy Parsons our external lawyer working on the Mediation Scheme has some further questions/comments on the content
of the attached document - would you please action these. I’m on leave until 26" August so if you have any queries please
revert to Andy. Once you have the answers would you forward to Andy and cc to me.
Thanks,
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
©®BOOC®
@postofficenes
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From: Parsons, Andrew [mailto
Sent: 14 August 2014 11:28
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Subject: RE: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two [BD-4A.FID20472253]
Angela
See my comments and amendments attached.
There are a few areas where we could do with providing more detail. In relation to malware attacks and investigating
cash losses, we Say little more than "yes we investigate". This assurance has not worked with SS previously and I think
we need to provide them with more detail to make our position more robust.
A
Andrew Parsons
Senior Associate
for and on behalf of Bond Dickinson LLP
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Follow Bond Dickinson:
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www.bondd
son.com
From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd [mail
Sent: 14 August 2014 09:45
To: Parsons, Andrew
Subject: Fw: Confidential & Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Andy,
Would you have a look at the attached please and reconfigure as you see fit. Any queries please give me a call.
Thanks
Angela
From: Phil Bowdery
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2014 03:44 PM
To: Angela Van-Den- -Bogerd
Cc: Parsons, Andrew ! ~ ~ "GRO ~
Subject: RE: Confi dential ‘& Legally Privileged. Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Angela
Apologies for the delay in getting this back to you. I had to run the queries by the bank and just got responses.
I’ve made changes as marked up so that these should be clear. Also attached an example of recent National Crime
Agency warning regarding malware that was shared by Bol with POL.
Regards
Phil
From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 04 August 2014 19:46
To: Phil Bowdery
Cc: Parsons, Andrew (
Subject: Confidential & Legally Bivigged Second Sight Briefi ing Report - Part Two
Phil,
Thanks for your response. I have formatted the Q&As onto a word document — would you please check for accuracy and
also answer my further questions.
Treally appreciate your help with this.
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Thanks,
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
Post Office stories
@postofficenews
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unauthorised review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient please contact me by reply
email and destroy all copies of the original message.
From: Phil Bowdery
Sent: 30 July 2014 12:04
To: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Subject: RE: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Angela
From the e-mail and our chat I’ve pulled together the following that shows the specific points that have been looked into
(annotated A to E in the text below) and the respective answers that are provided below. I’ve pulled these together from
discussion with Sarah Haywood and the information just provided by Bol this morning.
I hope this is some assistance for your meeting.
Phil
What happens if it [ATM] is turned off and on again during the day or weekend and what happens if there's a power
cut or telecoms interrupt? If there is a loss of power then the ATM will go out of service but the data of transactions and
information on the daily ATM total receipts will not be lost as this will be stored in the electronic journal on the ATM.
Almost answers the point Angela. The data may well will be in a stored state when the power goes off (depends whether
it is held in volatile memory or constantly updated to a stored location on the ATM's main hard drive).
You will say yes, of course... but, in
that context, we need to look at those gobbledegook output figures that have been supplied on case M040.(PB note: this
is a case where a daily cash dispense figure was not shown on a bank totals receipt and has been investigated but no
final conclusion could be reached as happened several years ago)
One of the Main Clearing Bank's ATM experts has offered to run a test of this very point for us to see whether data
corruption occurs. Tomorrow we will also need to talk
about the vulnerability of the ATMs to hacking and malware and dD.
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reported. Normal banking practice is to carry out a thorough investigation whenever a material shortage is
reported. Tests should include comparison of the PC's hard drive content with a reference drive, etc.
The Industry tells us that, whereas Diebold and NCR
are open and tend to disclose (to Industry fraud/security specialists) the attacks that have been successful against their
ATMs, Wincor is far less open and far more secretive about them and unprepared to share knowledge/intelligence.
Answers to A to E.
Answer A: The response from Bol is yes. In relation to the issues raised at the Brampton ATM (509340) on the journal
extract for 26/04/2011 the fact that the counters reset when SOP was performed would seem to indicate that the issue
related to a cassette issue and was resolved by the device “intelligence” during SOP. [P Bowdery comment: the bank has
assumed that the same case is being referred to in this response].
Answer B: Bol and Wincor perform tests at UAT level when any change is developed or deployed which would test for
this functionality; it is not common practice to test for this functionality in a business as usual context. Also to be noted
that any rebuild/maintenance to ATM in the field that affected software would also go through user acceptance testing
before being brought back into service.
Answer C: The ATMs do not operate on NT but were moved to XP several years ago. There are currently changes to ATM
operating systems across the industry as XP is being replaced. Bol has confirmed “ We have been actively working with
our IT team and our 3rd party ATM provider Wincor Nixdorf on planning for this change. This programme is in planning
for 2015 delivery as central and local device changes required. _In the interim, whilst our fleet is on the WIN XP
operating system, BOI do not rely on Windows XP security. We use industry leading software on all fleets to mitigate
against the security risks associated with WIN XP. BOI is addressing the operating system migration as a medium term
issue for scheme compliance. There is no imminent danger as Microsoft will still support XP up until April 2014 and even
after this the XP OS will still operate but Microsoft will not offer any patches to system bugs etc. of which there is a very
small risk. There is no security threat to our ATMs as our fleet is protected by Wincor’s PSA/Protect-1 OS which is
independent from MS XP.”
Answer D: Any unresolved cash discrepancies can be escalated via an agreed operating model for further investigation
by Bol, POL, or Wincor as appropriate. This includes Wincor investigating the journal roll for the ATM and the weekly
balancing data provided by the Post Office Agent. This factors will be considered in line with the Operational Level
Agreement in place between POL and Bol on ATM balancing/accounting.
ANSWER E: No type of ATM fraud that we are aware of will create a shortage when the ATM is balanced. It will either
cause a branch to have less surplus that expected (e.g. less cash in ATM than expected due to a partial retract fraud) or
in the case of cash trapping no surplus at all (i.e. as cash has been dispensed correctly from ATM but intercepted by
fraudster and customer did not receive their cash). Providing the branch could provide evidence that the ATM was
balanced correctly any disputed amounts would have been refunded to the branch. Post Office Ltd subsequently wrote
off these amounts.
Phil Bowdery I ATM Product Manager
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
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From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
Sent: 29 July 2014 13:13
To: Phil Bowdery
Subject: FW: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Hi Phil,
Ineed an urgent answer to the question SS pose below as I’m meeting with them tomorrow and as you can see they keep
pushing back on some of the explanations I am giving.
Please give me a call if you need to discuss or come and see me on the 5" floor as I’m in Old st today.
Thanks,
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
¢
©®OOG®
@postofficenews
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unauthorised review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient please contact me by reply
email and destroy all copies of the original message.
From: Ron Warmington [mailto:f” GRO.
Sent: 29 July 2014 12:57
To:
d; Belinda Crowe; ‘Chris Holyoak’
‘Parsons, Andrew’; David Oliveri
Almost answers the point Angela. The data may well will be in a stored state when
the power goes off (depends whether it is held in volatile memory or constantly
updated to a stored location on the ATM's main hard drive). The question then is
does the ATM always pick up from where it left off and incrementally add new
dispensed figures (dispensed before 16:30 hrs but AFTER the power or
telecomms interrupt) to those stored figures? You will say yes, of course... but, in
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that context, we need to look at those gobbledegook output figures that have
been supplied on case M040.
One of the Main Clearing Bank's ATM experts has offered to runa test of this
very point for us to see whether data corruption occurs. Have POL/BoI/Wincor
ever run tests on this functionality? Tomorrow we will also need to talk about the
vulnerability of the ATMs to hacking and malware (are BoT still running on a
Windows NT platform?) and the sort of routine investigations that are carried
out (by POL/BoI/Wincor) when ATM cash shortages are reported. Normal
banking practice is to carry out a thorough investigation whenever a material
shortage is reported. Tests should include comparison of the PC's hard drive
content with a reference drive, etc.
We know that the Wincor ATMs were targetted post 2009 with partial retract;
transaction reversal; and malware attacks so we need to know whether any SMPRs
were held accountable for mysterious shortfalls that were later found to have
been (or that might have been) brought about by such attacks. The Industry tells
us that, whereas Diebold and NCR are open and tend to disclose (to Industry
fraud/security specialists) the attacks that have been successful against their
ATMs, Wincor is far less open and far more secretive about them and unprepared
to share knowledge/intelligence.
Regards, Ron.
Belinda Crowe; ‘Chris Holyoak'
Parsons, Andrew'; David Oliveri}
E: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Ihave revisited Doc 18 of M127 (attached for ease) and can see that we did not answer the second part of question
2 “Can amounts of dispensed recorded etc be affected by a power cut”
This was an oversight on the case handler’s part — please accept my apology for this. However I have previously answered
this question — albeit it was phrased differently — in my response to you on 13" March (e-mail attached for ease) but
extract copied below:
What happens if it [ATM] is turned off and on again during the day or weekend and what happens if there's a
power cut or telecoms interrupt? If there is a loss of power then the ATM will go out of service but the data of
transactions and information on the daily ATM total receipts will not be lost as this will be stored in the electronic journal
on the ATM.
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Hope this clarifies the point but if there is anything further please let me know.
Thanks,
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
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From: Ron Warmington [mailt
Sent: 22 July 2014 16:02
ngela Van-Den-Bogerd; Belinda Crowe; ‘Chris Holyoak'
‘Parsons, Andrew’; David Oliver:;
Briefing Report - Part Two
Yes, that's the doc. Although it isn't a complete email... it looks like just an
extract of some or all of the text of an email. It has Judy Balderson's questions
in black and John Hughes’ answers in red. There is no Question 1. Question 2
asks, in essence, two sub-questions, the second ("Can amounts of dispensed
recorded etc be affected by a power cut") being the most important (though it
should have asked about power or telecommunications interrupts not just power
cuts). In any event, that question was not answered at all.
Docs 18, 19 and 20 are all linked.
Best regards, Ron.
From: Angela Van-Den-Bogerd [mailt
Sent: July 22, 2014 3:33 PM
la Crowe; ‘Chris Holyoak' _.
arsons, Andrew’; David Olivetis«i
Subject: RE: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
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Ron,
T’ve just accessed Doc 18 of M127 POIR and I’m not sure I see the link. Doc 18 is an e-mail from John Hughes UK ATM
Service Co-ordinator BOI on 10" Feb 2014 answering a number of questions posed by the case handler. Is this the
document you mean?
In the interest of answering as quickly as possible the ATM related questions you believe we haven’t answered would you
mind responding to me, detailing the questions you want answered. I’ll then respond with the answers.
Thanks in anticipation.
Angela
Angela Van Den Bogerd I Head of Partnerships
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
Post Office stories
@postofficenews
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unauthorised review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient please contact me by reply
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From: Ron Warmington [mailto:
Sent: 22 July 2014 14:36
lyoak'
‘Parsons, Andrew’; David Olive
Briefing Report - Part Two.
Angela Van-Den-Bogerd
On ATMs Belinda I raised, in the July 10th WG face-to-face, Doc 18 in M127
where the essential question (whether those ATM output reports can be
corrupted) was not answered at all by POL's ATM Security expert. This was a key
question back then and it remains a key question still.
Thanks, Ron.
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1752 PM”
To: Chris Holyoak
Parsons, Andrew (1
; David Oliver: Angela Van-Den-
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Bogerd; Belinda Crowe
Subject: RE: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Thanks Chris
I have just completed the minutes of last week’s call (I was out of the office at the end of last week). I note the date in
the minutes shows 27 July for the Part 2 report. I suggest I leave it to you to update the Working Group of the delivery
date.
In relation to the 3 outstanding questions:
Answers to 1 and 3 are being finalised and should be with you tomorrow.
In relation to 2. Angela and Andy are not aware of any outstanding questions relating to ATMs. I have copied them in
and perhaps you can let them have the question so that they can respond.
As to your final point, I think we will have to take great care on version control and it may be worth you setting out for
the Working Group how that will work in practice. I assume that the Working Group will want to be sighted on any
changes, and for clarity as far as I am concerned with my secretariat hat on, I will need to be clear, if the document is
being regularly updated, which version is being sent to the applicants when we issue the draft CRR. If I have
misunderstood what you are saying, please let me know.
Best wishes
Belinda
Belinda Crowe
148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
_
From: Chris Holyoak [mailto:
Sent: 22 July 2014 13:23
To: Belinda C ; David Oliver
Subject: Second Sight Briefing Report - Part Two
Belinda,
In advance of Thursday's call and given the email traffic about Part Two of Second Sight's Briefing Report, I thought that
it might be useful to confirm our understanding and anticipated delivery timetable of a draft report.
Despite a number of email exchanges with Post Office we are awaiting detailed responses to the following questions
that will impact on final delivery:
1. 'One-sided' transactions (Could they have led to customers getting something for nothing at the
Subpostmaster's expense?)
ATMs (Can the 16:30-16:30 output reports be corrupted by power or telecommunications failures?)
3. Suspense Accounts (Has Post Office or any of its 'clients' written back amounts from suspense accounts into
profit?)
N
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Notwithstanding the above, we anticipate releasing a preliminary Draft Report to the Working Group, including an
updated ATM section, by Friday 1 August.
We have always advised that Part Two of our Briefing Report would be a living document and in many respects will not
be considered complete until we have finalised the analysis of substantially all cases in the Scheme, but at present we
are confident that most of the significant issues and our comments will be included in this draft.
Please feel free to include this message in the agenda for Thursday's call if helpful.
Regards
Chris Holyoak
Senior Consultant
Second Sight Support Services Ltd
Website: htt ://www.2ndsight.eu
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