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CASE QUESTIONNAIRE — ALLISON HENDERSON C g va FY wot
Your Details jee 2 of a 2, Dott
Surname: HENDERSON Forenames: ALLISON (er. aw)
Your address},
Telephone number 1
Telephone number 2:
Emailaddress:f GRO.
Unique Case Reference No: M010
Professional Advisor: STEVE DARLINGTON
Address: HOWE & CO SOLICITORS, 1010 GREAT WEST ROAD, BRENTFORD, TW8 9BA
Email Address:
Your Branch
Name of Branch: WORSTEAD
FAD Code of Branch: 2261367
Address of Branch: BACK STREET, WORSTEAD
Postcode: NR28 9RN
Your role at the branch (ie. Subpostmaster, Subpostmistress, clerk, etc.): SUBPOSTMISTRESS
When did you begin in this role?
JUNE 1997
Are you still in this role?
= YES
xX NO
If no, when did you leave this role:
FEBRUARY 2010
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CASE QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What is the main issue or main issues you wish us to consider that relate to Horizon or its
associated processes?
a. Wholly inadequate training. (TRAINING)
b. Reconciliation Discrepancies.(DISCREPANCIES)
c. Unhelpful and negative communications in dealings with the Helpline, the auditors and
subsequent investigators. (UNHELPFUL COMMUNICATIONS)
d. Hardware problems. (HARDWARE PROBLEMS)
e. Investigative Processes flawed (INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES)
f. Final amounts claimed by POL are disputed. (DISPUTED SHORTAGES)
g. Costs and Losses suffered by the SPM as a result of POL’s actions. (COSTS AND LOSSES)
2. When did the incidents relating to the main issue or issues occur?
a. TRAINING Horizon was installed in 2001. The SPM was given 1.5 days training.
b. DISCREPANCIES 2006, February 2010.
c, UNHELPFUL COMMUNICATIONS Helpline from 2006 onwards, suspension and prosecution
February 2010
d. HARDWARE PROBLEMS __ From installation in 2001 through to February 2010
e. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES — February 2010
f. DISPUTED SHORTAGES 2006, 2010
g. COSTS AND LOSSES 2010 and ongoing
3. What prior contact have you had with the Post Office in regard to the incidents/issues that you are
now reporting
a. TRAINING When the SPM started in 1997 she received two weeks on-site training after the
branch opened. At that point the accounting systems were wholly manual. When POL migrated
to Horizon online the SPM received only 1.5 days training. Her line manager gave her an
unofficial checklist setting out the monthly reconciliation procedure. The SPM had never used a
computer before and found Horizon very complicated. However, it is patently obvious that 1.5
days training on a totally new system is wholly incapable of imparting a full understanding of
Horizon to anybody, never mind someone with minimal IT knowledge and experience.
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We demand that POL supplies the content of the Horizon training course given to the SPM.
We demand that POL sets out its reasons for delivering a 1.5 day course on Horizon to this
SPM when the norm is two weeks for new SPMs, and even then the course does not cover
every element of the system.
DISCREPANCIES
Prior to 2006 the SPM experienced minimal reconciliation issues and all discrepancies were
eliminated via Error Correction notices.
In 2006 a discrepancy of £2,000 appeared. The SPM could not get through to the Helpline and
she worked until 10pm at night in an attempt to identify the reason for such a large discrepancy.
She rolled over so that she could open the following day. The discrepancy remained at that level
for around two months. The SPM did not receive any Error Notices and became increasingly
concerned. She took out a personal loan of £2k to put into the business in the hope that an Error
Notice would come through at some point and she would be able to repay it.
However, when the £2k loan was put into the til, the next time the SPM performed a balance the
shortfall had doubled to £4k. The SPM was now extremely concerned and had no idea what to
do. In order to continue trading she rolled over the system again hoping that Error Notices
would come through which would rectify the situation.
No Error Notices were received. The differences kept changing and the SPM continued to
rollover in the forlorn hope that Error Notices would come through at some point. (It is common
for Error Notices to come through many months after the initial transactions processing errors
which caused the shortage). This situation continued until auditors arrived in February 2010.
UNHELPFUL COMMUNICATIONS
The SPM often called the Helpline and found it of little use.
HARDWARE PROBLEMS
The SPM complained about the freezing screen to POL and was eventually provided with a new
screen. However, the same problems continued.
The SPM also spoke to the Helpline about frequent reboots and switching the system off
overnight in order that her sleep was not disturbed by the noise it produced.
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e. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
The auditor arrived in February 2010 and performed an audit while the SPM was in the living
room. (The branch was very small and was in fact incorporated into the SPM’s house)
The SPM believed the discrepancy was £9k. The auditor initially said the discrepancy was £18k.
However, he undertook the balance again and the discrepancy fell to £11.9k (!)
We demand that POL sets out its standard ‘auditing’ procedures in detail.
We demand that POL sets out how a professional ‘audit’ can supposedly identify an £18k
discrepancy and then minutes later conclude the discrepancy is 30% less.
The SPM subsequently attended an investigation meeting. The SPM was suspended and a relief
SPM appointed. The SPM was under the impression that the matter would be quickly resolved.
However, after 10 working days of a relief SPM working in her home the SPM sent the relief SPM
away because the SPM felt it was a massive intrusion into her private property.
Several weeks later POL turned up to take away the cash and the stock.
f. DISPUTED SHORTAGES The SPM attended the audit and subsequent investigation meeting
regarding the asserted shortage. At no point did she accept that she had taken any money
whatsoever.
g. COSTSAND LOSSES None
4. How was the issue or issues resolved at the time they occurred?
a. TRAINING Not resolved.
b. DISCREPANCIES The asserted shortage was resolved by the SPM paying £11.9k to POL.
c. UNHELPFUL COMMUNICATIONS Not resolved
d. HARDWARE PROBLEMS
The SPM’s Horizon screen often froze. She often turned off the screen and re-input the same
transactions again. When she complained about this to POL she was given a new screen,
However the same problem persisted.
Sometimes the whole system would go down during processing necessitating a full reboot which
could take up to 20 to 30 minutes. Sometimes the system would not reboot and the SPM had to
call the Helpline. On these occasions the Helpline took actions remotely and this resulted in a
fresh reboot of the system.
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INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
The SPM was interviewed under caution in Norwich on 11" March 2010 around four weeks after she
was suspended. A Federation rep also attended but was not allowed to speak.
Prior to the meeting POL took six-months worth of records from the post office. At the meeting POL
claimed they had returned these to the SPM prior to the meeting and that they had been signed for.
This was determined to be a blatant lie as the SPM received the documents on 23” March, twelve
days after the meeting took place.
During this supposed investigative meeting the SPM was accused of stealing the money in one lump
sum and also that she stole the monies over time. The SPM denied stealing any monies whatsoever.
These accusations appear in the Interview notes and the ‘summary of facts’ produced by POL. These
were unaccompanied by any evidence and as such must be viewed as assertions unsupported by any
evidence whatsoever. No substantive ‘audit’ or ‘investigation’ took place. The interviewer basically
repeatedly asked the SPM where the money had gone with no recourse to any evidence. The
muddled and prejudiced approach of the interviewer is evident in the following appendices. They
highlight the various assertions as to when the money was taken and the fact that the interviewer
was already treating the SPM as a criminal. The full notes of the interview and ‘statement of facts’
have not been included as it is assumed that POL has access to these documents.
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
APPENDIX 3
APPENDIX 4
APPENDIX 5
Shortly after this meeting the SPM resigned on advice from the Federation rep.
DISPUTED SHORTAGES
Resolved by the SPM paying monies to POL. However, the SPM disputes the shortage and
vehemently refutes any accusation that she took any monies out of the branch to which she was not
entitled.
COSTS AND LOSSES
Not resolved
. What is the monetary value of the issue or issues you are now reporting?
a. TRAINING
None
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DISCREPANCIES
The £11.9k shortage asserted by POL.
UNHELPFUL COMMUNICATIONS
None
HARDWARE PROBLEMS
None
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
None
DISPUTED SHORTAGES
The £11.9k asserted by POL
COSTS AND LOSSES
The SPM was so shocked by the whole affair that she has not worked for anyone since and
cannot face running a business. The incident has had a massive detrimental impact on her self-
confidence and has also! i
The SPM paid £11.9k to POL and also incurred £10k of her own legal costs. In addition the SPM
has accrued around £4.5k in bank charges as a result of this situation.
The SPM originally purchased the house including the post office for £97k. Without the post
office it would have been £75k.
The SPM has lost the income stream from the post office. Her property is also worth less than it
would have been if it had retained the post office element.
Her husband was the chairman of the Parish Council in a very small village of approximately 600
adults. There was a great deal of public embarrassment and ‘no smoke without fire’ comments.
Her husband resigned as chairman to protect the integrity of the council due to adverse
comments in the village.
All of these elements must and will be taken into account when computing the total financial
impact of POL’s actions.
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6. Were you the subject of either civil recovery action or criminal prosecution regarding the main
issue or issues you are now reporting?
The SPM was prosecuted for theft at Norwich Magistrates court. The SPM pleaded ‘not guilty’ and
the case was referred to Norwich Crown Court. The SPM had one meeting with her solicitor and
met counsel once, ten minutes before the hearing. She was advised that if she pleaded ‘not guilty’
and was then found guilty she had a 75% likelihood of a custodial sentence. Needless to say the
SPM was greatly shocked by this advice.
She was advised to plead guilty to false accounting in return for dropping the theft charge. She
would also told that she could not mention any problems with Horizon in court.
7. How were the actions against you (if any) resolved?
In the event the judge would not even hear the case until the ‘shortage’ had been paid back by the
SPMI!! An incredible turn of events which demonstrates the sheer prejudice exhibited in this case.
The SPM paid £11.9k to POL. The SPM went back to court in front of the same judge. The SPM
pleaded guilty to false accounting. She was sentenced to 200 hours community service. She was
also ordered to pay £1,500 costs, although POL had tried to claim costs of £3k.
8. What is your explanation for the events forming the main issues or issues you are now reporting?
The SPM worked for many years using the manual system in place pre-Horizon and never
experienced any difficulties. All of the issues started to arise after Horizon Online was installed.
The SPM has difficulty in identifying specific reasons for the discrepancies experienced. However,
several potential factors have been identified as potentially affecting the integrity of the Horizon
system.
The SPM’s bedroom was above the post office area in her house. The Horizon terminal was very
noisy at night. She called the Helpline and was told that it should never be switched off. When she
told them the noise was disturbing her sleep she was simply told to switch it off !
We demand that POL states whether or not turning the Horizon terminal off at night, as the SPM
was advised to do, can affect the integrity of the data on the system
The SPM experienced significant hardware problems (see 2 (d) above) often resulting in
complete reboots of the system and the Helpline taking actions remotely to assist in this
process.
We demand that POL explicitly considers whether or not the frequent screen crashes and reboots
could have impacted the integrity of the system data.
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It is a proven fact that when the swipe-card system was implemented for Giro credits in 2008 the
audit trail previously available for such transactions no longer existed. This fundamental flaw meant
that it was impossible to verify any such transactions from that point onwards because no
documentation whatsoever was retained.
We demand that POL reviews all Giro credits from the date of the imposition of the change to the
system through to termination.
We demand that POL clearly states that it is impossible to verify such transactions.
We demand that POL admits that the removal of the audit trail for Giro credits prevents the
identification and rectification of any input errors.
We demand that POL clearly states that it is unfair to hold SPMs responsible for balances on
Horizon whilst simultaneously preventing SPMs from ensuring their accuracy.
It is a known fact that Fujitsu can, and frequently did, remotely access branch terminals and amend
transactions without the knowledge or authority of the SPMs.
APPENDIX 6
We demand that POL provides details of any and all remote access to this SPM’s terminal
It is a known fact that in certain situations the Horizon system auto-generates transaction reversals
and attaches the user code of persons on the branch who have not actioned them.
APPENDIX 7
We demand that POL provides details of any and all such transactions which occurred in this
branch.
9. Did you request assistance from the Post Office regarding the issue or issues you are now
reporting?
The SPM frequently requested assistance.
10.What assistance, if any, was provided?
None, apart from patchy Helpline responses.
GENERAL POINTS
The SPM took over the branch in 1997 which at that time used pre-Horizon manual system. She experienced
no problems with this system. Her branch migrated to the Horizon Online system and the SPM, having had
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no experience with computers whatsoever, received only 1.5 days training. This was woefully inadequate.
This level of training simply cannot impart a proper understanding of the complex Horizon system to anyone,
still less someone with no prior IT experience.
The SPM received a ten-year long service certificate and a ‘good conduct’ commendation in 2007.
The SPM’s problems commenced in 2006 and continued until February 2010. The SPM worked extremely
hard to try and identify reasons for the shortages but struggled to find any, nor did she receive any
subsequent Error Notices.
The SPM does not know how the shortages occurred but is adamant that she did not take any monies. POL
undertook no audit or investigation. POL simply compared the balances on Horizon with those at the branch
and accused her variously of taking the money in one lump sum and taking it in a piecemeal manner. No
evidence has been provided at any point to substantiate either of these claims.
The SPM experienced significant hardware problems which necessitated frequent reboots of the system.
This could have impacted on the integrity of the data on the system. There is no audit trail for credits to Giro
Bank accounts from mid-2008 onwards. It is known that Fujistu access branch terminals remotely and it is
also known that the Horizon system can auto-generate transaction reversals with no human input
whatsoever. These are all potential sources of system error which undermine the credibility of the balances
on Horizon to such an extent that those balances can only be relied upon if they have been properly audited.
POL’s ‘audits’ are not audits. They simply consist of blind faith in the numbers produced by a flawed and
discredited system. These issues can only be investigated by POL as POL holds all related data. The SPMs
have no information regarding these issues by definition.
This whole issue has had a massive detrimental impact on the SPM’s self-confidence and she has been
unable work since she resigned her position.
The SPM is, from this process, seeking:-
1. Full restitution of all monies paid to POL, plus interest accrued.
2. Compensation for the health issues brought on by the stress she was put under as a result of POL's
actions.
3. Full compensation for the reduced value of her property as a result of POL’s actions.
4, Full apology in writing and in the local and national media.
5. Compensation for having to do 200 hours community service. Apart from the stigma attached, her
husband also had a direct working relationship with the local probation service identifying and
providing work projects in the Parish — a real source of embarrassment.
6. Practical and financial assistance from POL to overturn the unfair criminal conviction and have her
criminal record removed.
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1, , confirm that the contents of this Case Questionnaire are, to the best of my
knowledge and belief true.
Signed .....
Dated
10
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ifX\\sen Wenderse® I confirm that the contents of this Case Questionnaire are, to the best of my
knowledge and belief true.
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ALISON HENDERSON M010
CASE QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDICES
1. POL’s STATEMENT OF SHORTAGE
2. PAGE 13 OF TAPED INTERVIEW
3. PAGE 14 OF TAPED INTERVIEW.
4, PAGE 19 OF TAPED INTERVIEW
5. PAGE 2 OF ‘SUMMARY OF FACTS’ COMPILED BY POL FOR PROSECUTION
6. INTERNAL POL EMAIL ADMITTING REMOTE ACCESS
7. POL REPORT ADMITTING HORIZON FLAWS,
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Meerioix 4: Poul SWHEMENT OF SHO TAGE oer,
IN CONFIDENCE
To: From: cc: in
Mrs Allison Henderson Keith Kinrade Sue Muddeman
Subpostmaster Field Advisor Contracts Advisor
Worstead Outlet Intervention Team
Date: 10 February 2010
Audit of Post Office Branch
Section 1 - Introduction
Worstead
Jason Collins
Fraud Team Leader
Julia Mann
Field Support Team Leader
226136
An audit of the above branch, led by myself, was undertaken on 10 February 2010 . The
purpose of this audit was to verify financial assets due to the Post Office® and confirm
compliance with a range of Business processes, procedures and regulatory requirements.
Section 2 provides a management summary, including the financial audit result.
Section 3 details a breakdown of the result of the financial audit.
Section 2 - Management Summary
The financial audit revealed a current trading position of
£11,957,78
short
a reconciliation of some figures (undertaken after the audit). A breakdown of this figure,
including any pending transaction corrections or losses being settled centrally, can be found
in section 3.
Due to findings revealed at audit and a decision taken by the Contracts Advisor to temporary
suspend you from your role as subpostmaster pending further enquiries, comptiance testing was
not carried out on this visit, therefore there are no appendices attached.
je
subject to
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ee®.
Section 3 - Result of the Financial Audit
Financial assets to the value of £10035.69 — were physically verified compared to
the amount due to Post Office® of £ 21993,47
The difference between these figures is broken down as follows:
£ 1196315 (-) Identified as a difference in cash figures
£ 5.37 (+) Identified as a difference in stock figures
€ 0.00 (-) Identified as a difference in foreign currency figures
£ 0.00 (-) Identified as a difference in cheque (voucher) figures
£ 0.00 (-) Suspense account entries discounted
£ 0.00 (-) Nett discrepancy declared from previous balance period, within
current Trading Period
£ 0.00 (-) Transaction errors revealed to documentation
£ 0,00 (-) Outstanding transaction corrections not processed
£ 11957.78 (-) Total shortage
In addition to the above figure, the following amounts are noted, leaving the total shortage
unchanged:
£ 0.00 {-) Pending transaction correction, advised by Product &
Branch Accounting on the day of the audit
£ 0.00 (-) Outstanding amount, previously settled centrally, as
confirmed with Product & Branch Accounting on the
day of the audit
£ 11957.78 (-) Total shortage
Comments
The shortage of £11,957,78
has been sent to ‘Late Account’ Product & Branch Accounting and is to be settled in accordance
with terms agreed with your Contracts Advisor.
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feliridy, 2! gE NS ye WARD wnhenErud
ROYAL MAIL - CONFIDENTIAL
Record of Taped Interview - Continued ( \a
spots I er cid]
trading statement everything was ok and it all balanced in the end and
everything was ok. 4 weeks later when the auditors came in it was
£42,000 so in that 4 weeks from what you're saying, £12,000
disappeared.
AH Yeah ok
26.04 CK Now obviously I've had a look at yi action logs over the last
couple of months and you don’t have a very large amount as in value
for specific transactions ok so to lose £12,000 in 4 weeks have you got
any idea what’s happened with that?
AH No.
CK Would it be something a transaction that you've done wrong bearing in
Taind that the highest transaction I saw was about £400 in the last
couple of rnonths?
AH Well I don’t know that's why hopefully you're looking through it and
you'll sort it out you'll find it ¢ don’t know.
cK Well what we're looking at going by what you're saying is in 4 weeks
from the January to the February you lost £12,000.
AH Ok:
CK I don’t believe th: where we're looking I believe that this money was
gone long hefore January.
AH Well if that’s the case why was it not picked up before then, I mean if
you know every transaction f'm doing and everything Im doing why was
it not picked up before?
cK No no we're not talking about every, what I'm saying to you is the audit
came to you and you're short right?
AH Right yeah. ‘
CK But you're saying to me no no no hang on a second everything was
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Record of Taped Interview - Continued
rape counter I Person TOE
speaking
right on the 6".
AH As far as I can remember. -
CK Right so we're looking at. well it's a lot, it's £12,000 not a few pounds
it's £12,000 I'm saying to you the system gave you a discrepancy then
you're saying that well sometimes yeah and I find it.
AH What do you want me to say that you know the day before this I decided
to have a nice holiday on 12 grand?
CK : No I'm not saying that the money went in one go what I'm saying to you is
I don’t believe that the money went in the 4 week period that you're
tellin
AH Ok.
CK I think the mon
go in
had-gone either in dribs and drabs or whatever long
before that over a period. I
AH Weil as I
y if that was a case and you can pick this up and every I
transaction I do on that system is picked up then why was, if it started a
tong time ago as you say why was it net picked up before then, why do
you wait until it's 12 grand if you think I'm taking out 5 here or 2 there or I
whatever do you understand what {m saying?
28.39 cK I understand that but! can’t see why you're asking that because you're
saying to me. i
Pw These investigations are done retrospectively, the first point that the Post
Office turned up at your door was when the auditors turned up and the I
auditors went there for whatever reason, it might have been, I mean I
I don't know why the auditors tured up it might have been because they _
saw anomalies in your figures I don't know, I don’t know why the auditors I
ey just turned up as part of their : I
I turned up we didn't ask'them to go ¢
programme but the first time that Post Office ask you to present to them I
It
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Recard of Taped interview - Continued ( { 4
\
oe TEXT cl
responsible for putting the figures in the counting for, the Post Office gave
me all these cash to look after on their behalf I don’t knaw where it is I
don't know what’s happening I don’t want you to think that that's good
enough for when we go away and someone looks at this and decides
what's to happen next that people think well that's alright then.
AH No I know at the end.
PW There is suspicion in relation to his.
AH I know and that’s what I said to you just a little while ago I know at the
end of the day that I signed a contract.
PW
AH To make.
Pw I's legal criminal
AH Yeah alright.
PW I You're in a criminal interview.
AH Yeah if you let me finish I was going to say I signed a contract te say that I
weuld make good any losses I could keep any overs and I know at the end
) of the day I've got to try and get a job to try and pay the money to the
Post Office that they think I took.
cK Right but that.
AH Then when that’s happened and after that I also know that the chances
I are youre going to prosecute me, I know that but irrespective of what I
say here that’s going to happen so it’s.
38.30 {t was put to AH that it was difficult to believe she does not know what
has happened. She was reminded of the caution
39.30 It was put to AH that she had created a false account and that she had
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MRED IKS fee ot" suaapecy 90 COTS
~The Defendant was referred to the branch trading staternent for 6" January 2010,
in particular the cash in hand figure of £16,712.83. The Defendant was asked that I
1
when the trading staternent was completed was that amount of cash in the safe, to i
which she replied, +] should imagine so, if that’s what's there.” (15.34)
The Defendant confirmed that she would have counted the cash. The Defendant
was later asked whether she completed the branch trading statements in the same
way each month and she replied, “Yeah.” (16.52)
@ The Defendant was then shown a schedule of cash in hand figures that the
Investigation Manager had prepared based upon the branch trading staternents he
had obtained. It was pointed out to the Defendant that up until the time of audit
when it was discovered that there was £8,000 in cash in the Post Office, there had
been an average sum of about £20,000 in cash held at the office. ~The Defendant
confirmed that it was a shock to discover the shortage at audit.
It was pointed out to the Defendant that £12,000 therefore must have gone
missing ina four week period.
@ The Defendant later said that she could not recall having a problem in the accounts
but that she quite often did and that her method was to pick through and sort it
out, She said, ‘you know if your stamps and whatever are out then you have to go
through and recount.” (24.35)
The Defendant was later asked what had happened and she replied, 4 don't know
and I can’t say any more, /’m not prepared to say any more, Ive got no other
answers to give you.” (33.31)
The Defendant denied that she had stolen money from the Post Office. The
interview subsequently concluded.
\criminal work folders\ob wilson\264657-hendersonadvance information.doc
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\ wt . . ARAB IX hy ren por Eun
fori ing emote “Acces
Andrew Winn To: on wsnwceiPOSTOFFCEGSPOSTOFFICH er rr ~
23/10/2008 12:46 Subject Re: Rivonhelll) : ot :
Alan SO
_ Réypanggg,to the. Specific questions:- ao :
4: The'aily way POL can Impact branch accounts remotaly Is via the transaction correctlon, process.
q ch in the same way that Infout remittances are guess. thas
yneatiets do.this, the Integtlty-of.the Systm siouild.b6.flawedl.¢Fuliisu peve.the. -abiiily lo lmpactusze
-franch,recorde via the message. fa-bukhave sxtie maly rigorous, progedures Insplacestoiprevent. —- .
(adjus janis:belnig made.without.prior.autborsationi# thin;POL end-Eujiigy
“Fhase conlols form the core of our court defence if we get to that stage. He makes a casual
accusation that fs extremely serious tothe busingss. AS usual he,should elther produce the evidence
for this or withdraw the accusation, . . . . .
Chieques can be carrled across branch trading periods, This ts necessary for branches who have
accepted cheques after the last collection has bean made, If they wore forced to rem out they would
bp ,praducing @ legally binding trading, statemont that slates there are no cheques In the branchwhen
7
wo! GG. thefe ts - and we would thon suspend them!
10 ane knows, ‘The Implication Is
2, What "the abnormal nature of these entries" moans; I assume n
that he acknowledges that when he “mado goad" at branch trading he did hot anckfalsifedihisibfaneh
trading’stalgment: andiraolledtheassforwatds So for example, at partod end his derived Horizon cash
position was £20K but he only physically has £10K.’ He rolls-over by tolling Horizon fie has pulag
+ + extra £10K Into the till -so the derived position Is still £201 carried forward Into the next trading poriod
(evan though there.Is only £10K In the ull). .
His claim Is that if he then ran a’snapshop report Immediately after roll the derived cash pésition would
the £30K - still Only £10K In the til but the carted forward cash position has Increased thus doubling
the cash shortage, ws .
* This would be clearly evidenced by a discrepancy belng shown between tho carried forward and
opening éash positions In subsequent branch trading statements.
.If thet doas not satisfy him he would need to establish that his tral balance actually balances. tt.
does (and it will) he would need to demansirate where the balancing £40k elemant of the loss Is. °
These have to be accepted by the branch in the
‘Those.are all things for him to prove. If he cpn support any of his allegations we will Investigate + and
be extremely worrled whilst dolng so. . .
Hope this helps
. Alon Lusher . ‘To: Androw WinwolPOSTOFFIGE@POSTOFFICE ”
+ 15/10/2008 10:81 . ,
+ et
Subject: Rivenhall
Hi Andrew,
L spoke to you a few days ago about a suspension’at Rivenhall. From our conversation, -belleve ‘that
yourhad @ yood'understanding of the.problem and I would be grateful for fyrthor guidance. Rivenhallls
a one position rural branch ~ thé only abnormal product being an ATM :
Ihave aitached notes of the Interview should you want to refer to them, aljhough they are rather long.
‘There are two Issues which the suspended subpostmaster, Mr Graham Ward, ralsed: ,
1, He claims that on a number of occasions figures have ‘appoared irr. the cheques ling of his account, -
g these fave been Input to ‘hig account electtonically without his knowledge or consent: Hé
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, Zod Paws.
ARID eT PSL ARPT ACMITING oe i Zend ety
THIS DOCUMENT I$ SUBJECT TO LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND MUST NOT SE DISCLOSED TO
ANY PERSON WITHOUT THE EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF POST OFFIGE l.TO GENERAL COUNSEL OR
CARTWRIGHT KING SOLICITORS:
Horizon data
=a nZon data
Lepton SPso 191320
STATUS: DRAFT
Authox: ERR
Version: 1
last edited by: fe era]
Last edit date: 12/06/2013
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Executive summary .
A transaction took place at on the
04/10/2012 at 10:42 for 9 British Telecom bill payment for
£76.09; this was paid for by a Lloyds TSB cash withdrawal for
£80,00 and change give for £3.92, At 10139 on the same day
the British Telecom bill payment wag reversed out to cash
settlement,
The branch was issued with a Transaction correction for
£76.09, which they duly settled; however the Postmaster denied
reversing this transaction and involved a Forensic Accountant
as he believed his reputation was in doubt,
Reviewing the data
On looking at the credence data, tt clearly indicates that the
reversal was conpleted by at 10:37
04/10/2012 and was reversal indicator 1 (existing veversal)
and settled to cash, An existing reversal is where the session
nuinber/Automated Payment number has to be entered to reverse
the item, (Copy in Appendix 1)
The fujitsu logs were requested for this byanch, but whilst
waiting £ ase to arrive communications took Place with
at Fujitsu for more details to gain an
understanding what had occurred at this branch,
Questions asked and extracta from various emaiis in response, '
Question ~ r am requesting fujiteu logs for Ces to
look at a revergal that ey denies transacting, do i
I need to request further details, and also could you explain I I
what happens when the system fails. (I looked at data at i I
his end prior to ne receiving the fujitsu logs, (Copy in
Appendix 1), .
Answer - This shows that Session 537803 was successfully saved I
to the BRDB, but when the user Logged on again H
Recovery reversed the session in session 537805,
It isn’t clear what failed, but if it was a comms error, then
the system would have printed a disconnected session receipt
and the Clerk uld have given the customer £80 and told him
his Bill wag unpaid. The fact that there is no indication of
such a xeceipt in the events table suggests the counter may
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have been rebooted and 80 perhaps may have crashed in which
case the clerk may not have been told exactly what to do,
The reversal was due to xecovery (Counter Mode rd = 118) 80
this wag not an explicit reversal by the clerk, This scenario
is fairly rare so it is certainly quite easy for the clerk to
have made a mistake and either he or the customer could be in
pocket / out of pocket (depending on exactly what happened!) .
The system ig behaving as it shoulda. (email 30/01/2013)
Question - f can Gleaxly see the recovery reversal on the
fujitsr logs xeceived, but would this have been clear had we
not previously discussed this dysue. (Copy of transactions
and events in Appendix 4)
Answer - Note that the standaxd ARQ spreadsheet may not take
it easy to confirm that the Reversal was part of Recovery, but
the underlying logs used to extract them can show it, (Email
30/01/2013)
The files 4 to 25 oat 42.x1s and Events 4 to 25 Oct 12.xls are
part of the standard ARQ xeturned, Rows 141 to 143 Of 4 to 25
Oct 12,xlg clearly show a Reversal, Also Row 70 of Events 4
to 25 Oct 12.x1g shows that seasion 837803 (ie rows 138 to 140
of 4 to. 25 Oct 12,x18) has been recovered and this ovent hag
the same timestamp ag the Reversal Session, Also row 71 of
Events 4 to 25 Oct 412.xlg shows that a xeceipt was generated
from the session §37805 (not explicitly, but it was the only
session at that time), thig xeceipt would have told the user
that a Rollback had taken place (but the logs don't make that
explicit), If that ig sufficient for you purposes, then you do
have all you need in the standard ARQ.
However what I was able to confixm from my look at live data a
couple of weeks ago and is also held in the underlying raw
logs is confirmation that the reversal was generated by the
system (and not manually by the user), What might also be
available in the underlying logs is whether or not the system
was re-booted - suspect it was but have no evidence one way
ox the other (and it isnt in what was extracted this time
either), 4 gan confirm that the uger did Log On again (row 69
of Eventa 4 to 28 Oct 12.xls), (Email 11/02/2013)
Question - X can see where this transaction is and now
undexstand the reason behind it. My main concern ig that we
use the basic ARQ logs for evidence in court and if we don’t
I know you are aware of all the horizon integrity issues and I
want to ensure that the ARQ logs axe used and understood fully
by our operational team who have to work with this data both
in interviews and in court,
Just one question from my part - if the reversal is system
created but shows as an existing reversal, could this not be
reflected with a different code, .i,e, SR (system reversed) to
Clear up any initial challenges, My feelings at tha moment
are not questioning what Horizon does as T fully believe that
it is. working as it should, it is just that I don! t think that
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some of the System based correction ang
transactions are clear to us on either credence or ARQ logs.
T. understand youx concerns, rt would be re,
simple to add an extra column into ¢I
spreadsheet, that would make
atively
he existing ARO report
dt clear whether the Reversal
Basket wag generated by Recovery or not, x think this would
address Your concern, I’m not sure What the formal process ig
for changing the report layout. Penny can you advise as to the
Process: Is this done through a CR? (email 13/02/2013)
Recommendations
itself May be misinterpreted when giving
the same data for Prosecutions.
My recommendation ig that
that ali system created rev:
both fujitsy and credence,
@ change request ia submitted 80
arsals axe clearly identifiable on
Security ~ Fraud Analyst
12" gune 2013
adjustment
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ALISON HENDERSON M010
CASE QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDICES
1.
POL’s STATEMENT OF SHORTAGE
PAGE 13 OF TAPED INTERVIEW
PAGE 14 OF TAPED INTERVIEW
PAGE 19 OF TAPED INTERVIEW
PAGE 2 OF ‘SUMMARY OF FACTS’ COMPILED BY POL FOR PROSECUTION
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Amero x 4s po STREET 6 SHOCTATRE forz.
IN CONFIDENCE I
To: From: ce:
Mrs Allison Henderson Keith Kinrade Sue Muddeman
Subpostmaster Field Advisor Contracts Advisor
Worstead Outlet Intervention Team
Date: 10 February 2010
Audit of Post Office Branch
Section 1 - Introduction
Worstead
Jason Collins
Fraud Team Leader
Julia Mann
Field Support Team Leader
226136
An audit of the above branch, led by myself, was undertaken on 10 February 2010. Th
purpose of this audit was to verify financial assets due to the Post Office® and confirm
compliance with a range of Business processes, procedures and regulatory requirements.
Section 2 provides a management summary, including the financial audit result.
Section 3 details a breakdown of the result of the financial audit.
Section 2 - Management Summary
The financial audit revealed a current trading position of
£11,957,78
short
areconciliation of some figures (undertaken after the audit). A breakdown of this figure,
including any pending transaction corrections or losses being settled centrally, can be found
in section 3.
Due to findings revealed at audit and a decision taken by the Contracts Advisor to temporary
suspend you from your role as subpostmaster pending further enquiries, compliance testing was
not carried out on this visit, therefore there are no appendices attached.
je
subject to
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Doers \
Section 3 ~ Result of the Financial Audit
Financial assets to the value of £10035.69 — were physically verified compared to
the amount due to Post Office® of £ 21993.47
The difference between these figures is broken down as follows:
£ 11963.15 (-) Identified as a difference in cash figures
£ 5.37 (+) Identified as a difference in stock figures
£ 0.00 (-) Identified as a difference in foreign currency figures
£ 0.00 (-) Identified as a difference in cheque (voucher) figures
£ 0.00 (-) Suspense account entries discounted
£ 0.00 (-) Nett discrepancy declared from previous balance period, within
current Trading Period
£ 0.00 (-) Transaction errors revealed to documentation
£ 0.00 (-) Outstanding transaction corrections not processed
£ 11957.78 (-) Total shortage
In addition to the above figure, the following amounts are noted, leaving the total shortage
unchanged:
£ 0.00 {-) Pending transaction correction, advised by Product &
Branch Accounting on the day of the audit
£ 0.00 (-) Outstanding amount, previously settled centrally, as
confirmed with Product & Branch Accounting on the
day of the audit
£ 11957.78 {-) Total shortage
Ke} its
The shortage of £11,957.78
has been sent to ‘Late Account’ Product & Branch Accounting and is to be settled in accordance
with terms agreed with your Contracts Advisor.
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(AGE VS oe WR wrincenr rf
AekosOra 2 =
Ray
ROYAL MAIL - CONFIDENTIAL
Record of Taped Interview - Continued
Frape counter I Person Text
times speaking
trading statement everything was ok and it all balanced in the end and
everything was ok. 4 weeks later when the auditors came in it was
£12,000 so in that 4 weeks from what you're saying, £12,000
disappeared. I
AH Yeah ok. I
26.04 CK Now obviously I've had a look at your transaction logs over the last I
couple of months and you don’t have a very large amount as in value .
for specific transactions ck so to lose £12,000 in 4 eeks have you got
any idea what's happened with that?
AH No.
CK Would it be something a transaction that you've done wrong bearing in
mind that the highest transaction I saw was about £400 in the last i
couple of months?
AH Well I don't know that's why hopefully you're looking through it and
you'll sort it out you'll find i I don’t know. tl
cK Well what we're looking at going by what you're saying is in 4 weeks i
from the January to the February you lost £12,000, i
AH Ok if
cK [don’t believe that is where we're locking I believe that this money was \.
gone tong before January. iv I
AH Well if that's the case why wes it not picked up before then, I mean if : d {i I
you know every transaction f'm doing and everything I'm doing why was
it not picked up before? I I I
CK No no we're not talking about every, what I'm saying to you is the audit I .
came to you and you're short right?
AH Right yeah. °
CK But you're saying to me no no no hang on a second everything was
13
eso15 Version 8 07/09
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AR END“ (ASE Me _ oF -raeeD. ELV ed f
ROYAL MAIL ~ CONFIDENTIAL
Record of Taped Interview - Continued
4
Person TEXT el Hl “
speaking elq>
right on the 6"
AHO As far as I can remember. +
CK Right so we're looking at. well it's a lot, it's £12,000 not a few pounds
it's £12,000 I'm saying to you the system gave you a discrepancy then
you're saying that well sometimes yeah and I find it.
AH What do you want me to say that you know the day before this I decided
to have a nice holiday on 12 grand?
cK : No !'m not saying that the money went in one go what I'm saying to you is i
I don’t believe that the money went in the 4 week period that you're
telling me it did go in.
AH Ok.
CK { think the money had gone either in dribs and drabs or whatever long
before that over a period.
AH Well as I say if that was a case and you can pick this up and every
transaction I do on that system is picked up then why was, if it started a I
long time ago es you say why was it net picked up before then, why do
you wait until it's 12 grand if you think I'm taking out 5 here or 2 there or I
whatever do you understand what I'm saying? .
¢ because you're
understand that but I can't see why you're asking tha
nm
(oa)
w
<0
2
saying to me.
PW These investigations are done retrospectively, the first point that the Post
Office turned up at your door was when the auditors turned up and the '
auditors went there for whatever reason, it might have been, I mean I
don’t know why the auditors turned up it might have been because they
saw anomalies in your figures I don't know, I don’t know why the auditors
programme but the first time that Post Office ask you to present to them
It
s01s Version 8 07/09
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turned up we didn't ask'them to go they just turned up as part of their : I
i
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ARREAD AG (PGE 140 FACED ou Tee OO
ROYAL MAIL - CONFIDENTIAL
Recard of Taped Interview - Continued ( f q a
ape counter I Person TOT ° cle )
times speaking Cc
responsible for putting the figures in the counting for, the Post Office gave
me all these cash to look after on their behalf I don’t know where it is I
don't know what's happening I don’t want you to think that that's good
enough for when we go away and someone looks at this and decides
what's to happen next that people think well that’s alright then.
AH No I know at the end.
PW There is suspicion in relation to his.
3? AH I know and that’s what I said to you just a little while ago i know at the
end of the day that I signed a contract.
PW i's not contractual it's legal
AH To make.
Pw I's legal criminal
AH Yeah alright. I
PW You're in a criminal interview. I
AH Yeah if you iet me finish I was going to say I signed a contract to say that I
would make good any losses I could keep any overs and I know at the end
Q of the day I've got to try and get a job to try and pay the money to the
Post Office that they think I took.
cK Right but that. I
AH Then when that's happened and after that I also know that the chances
are youre going to prosecute me, I know that but irrespective of what I I
say here that's going to happen so it’s. I
38.30 It was put to AH that it was difficult to believe she does not know what I
has happened. She was. reminded of the caution I
39.30 It was put to AH that she had created a false account and that she had
6s015- Version 8 axl I
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PREDIXS 2 fC 2 ok Sdmengecy of cnr
F The Defendant was referred to the branch trading statement for 6" January 2010,
icular the cash in hand figure of £16,712.83. The Defendant was asked that
in parti
when the trading staternent was completed was that amount of cash in the safe, to
which she replied, ‘/ should immagine so, if that’s what's there.” (15.34)
The Defendant confirmed that she would have counted the cash. The Defendant
was later asked whether she completed the branch trading statements in the same
way each month and she replied, “Yeah.” (16.52)
@ The Defendant was then shown a schedule of cash in hand figures that the
Investigation Manager had prepared based upon the branch trading statements he
had obtained. It was pointed out to the Defendant that up until the time. of audit
when it was discovered that there was £8,000 in cash in the Post Office, there had
been an average sum of about £20,000 in cash held at the office. ~The Defendant
confirmed that it was a shock to discover the shortage at audit.
It was pointed out to the Defendant that £12,000 therefore must have gone
missing ina four week period.
@ The Defendant later said that she could not recall having a problem in the accounts
but that she quite often did and that her method was to pick through and sort it
out. She said, “you know if your stamps and whatever are out then you havé to go
through and recount.” (24.3 5)
The Defendant was later asked what had happened and she replied, ‘dont know
and I can't say any more, /'m not prepared to say any more, Ive got no other
answers to give you.” (33.31)
The Defendant denied that she had stolen money from the Post Office. The
interview subsequently concluded.
criminal work folders\rob wilson\264657-hendersonadvance information.doc
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i A\\isen Wenderso™ confirm that the contents of this Case Questionnaire are, to the best of my
knowledge and belief true.
10
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