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Witness Name: David John Courtley
Statement No.: WITN03530100
Dated: 16 May 2023
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID JOHN COURTLEY
I, MR DAVID JOHN COURTLEY, will say as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. I was previously employed by the ICL group and Fujitsu Services Limited (“Fujitsu”)
as Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) from July 2001 to April 2004, and as Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) from April 2004 to December 2008. I currently manage an
independent IT consulting business. I am not involved in the Horizon project at present
and have had no involvement in it since I left Fujitsu in 2008.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the
“Inquiry”) with the questions put to me in a Rule 9 Request dated 24 February 2023
(the “Request’). It is based on my direct knowledge of relevant matters. I was
assisted in preparing this statement by Morrison Foerster, who represent Fujitsu in the
Inquiry.
3. The topics in the Request relate to matters that took place at least 15 years ago. I
have tried to remember relevant events and information so as to assist the Inquiry as
far as possible but have not always been able to do so.
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BACKGROUND
4. My professional background prior to joining Fujitsu was mostly in various managerial
roles in the IT services industry.
5. I graduated from the University of London in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science in
Mathematics. I began my career at SD-Scicon, undertaking mathematical analysis
and programming in areas such as operational research. I subsequently moved into
various managerial roles at SD-Scicon. SD-Scicon was later acquired by Electronic
Data Systems (EDS), a global outsourcing company. I went on to various senior
management roles there, including as Head of their Defence Division and their Public
Sector Division. Immediately prior to joining Fujitsu, I was CEO of a Human Resources
outsourcing joint venture between BT and Accenture, called E-PeopleServe.
MY ROLES AT FUJITSU
6. As noted above, I joined Fujitsu in 2001 as COO, and became CEO in 2004. I had
substantially similar responsibilities in these two roles, but the main change when I
became CEO was that the heads of certain key functions, (e.g. Finance, Human
Resources, Commercial, Legal) reported to me, when they had not in my previous
role as COO.
7. In both roles, I had responsibility for Fujitsu's activities in the UK, Continental Europe,
Scandinavia and Africa. This primarily entailed ensuring Fujitsu delivered for its
customers across those markets, was profitable doing so, and had good strategy to
sustain and develop business with both existing and new customers. I was particularly
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involved in developing the company’s approach to Sales and Marketing and identifying
new ways for the company to win outsourcing and other business with UK government
organisations, UK private sector customers, customers in Europe and Scandinavia,
and some global organisations. I was also involved in restructuring parts of the
business, conducting certain acquisitions across the markets Fujitsu operated in to
increase the company’s capability, and was involved in managing performance and
delivery issues on a number of large accounts. Fujitsu also had difficulties and
challenges in parts of Continental Europe, including France (which was loss-making),
and I regularly visited these local operations outside the UK to discuss the business
and plans with the relevant country managers. I also worked on managing and
improving Fujitsu’s relationship with its shareholder, which improved over time. I
believe that, during my time as COO and CEO, there were over 20,000 employees or
contractors in the business. Some of these issues that fell within my responsibilities
are referred to in document Fujitsu Services Holding Plc Minutes of Meetings of the
Fujitsu Services Management Committee of the Board of Directors dated 20 August
2002 (FUJ00003534) and other board documents.
. While I was COO and CEO, Fujitsu’s business in the UK was divided into multiple
divisions, each led by a divisional director. These directors reported to me regarding
the work ongoing in each division. When I joined Fujitsu, the Post Office Account
(which included the team delivering the Horizon project) sat within the Large Projects
Division. By 2004, the divisions were restructured, so as to make each division more
responsible for its own sales and financial performance. Following that restructure, the
Post Office Account came under the UK Commercial Business Division, which was
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subsequently renamed the Private Sector Division. I have been assisted in recollecting
these details by reviewing various Fujitsu organisation charts from the relevant times
(specifically: FUJ00151237, FUJ00115869, FUJ00115875 , FUJ00115890 ).
9. The Post Office Account was led by an account manager, who reported to the director
of the relevant division. The relevant division director would then be responsible to me
regarding the activities of the Post Office Account (as well as all other accounts falling
within his or her division). For completeness, I note that for a brief period of several
months in 2001/2002, while the director position for the Large Projects Division was
vacant, there would have been a direct reporting line from the accounts in that division
to me as COO.
10.As is apparent from the various board documents the Inquiry has drawn to my
attention, during my tenure, the Post Office Account was one of several significant
accounts for Fujitsu. Given the wide-ranging nature of Fujitsu’s business and my
responsibilities across it, I was not routinely involved in the day-to-day aspects of the
Post Office Account.
11.1 primarily received information about the Post Office Account from (i) monthly
meetings with the director of the relevant division (which were also attended by the
division leadership team) and (ii) account reviews, which were held periodically for all
major accounts and were attended by Fujitsu’s Chief Financial Officer, the division
director, the account manager and the account leadership team.
a. Monthly Division Meetings. The scope of what was reported during monthly
division meetings was generally quite wide. They would cover key issues
for the division such as the financial results and financial forecasts, staffing
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levels, the division’s sales pipeline, as well as the relationship with key
customers. Technical issues arising on individual accounts would not
generally be discussed unless there had been a major technical incident or
problem that had placed a customer relationship at serious risk.
b. Account Reviews. Account reviews were an opportunity for me, and others
in the senior leadership team, to interact directly with the account
management team for major accounts. I do not recall how frequently they
occurred, and they may not have been at precise regular intervals. I recall
that we would usually discuss the account's progress to key milestones, it’s
financials, the relationship with the customer, as well as any major incidents
that may have occurred. These meetings were intended to be a proactive
exercise to focus on major accounts. My expectation was that these
meetings provided comprehensive updates on an account's progress,
covering commercial issues as well any major development issues and
risks. An example of the issues covered during such a meeting with the Post
Office Account can be seen at document Fujitsu Account Plan, Account
Review, Post Office and Royal Mail Group dated 31 January 2007
(FUJ001 16308).
12.1 also would have received ad hoc updates or briefings about the Post Office
Account, particularly if there had been a major incident. However, my recollection
is that my primary regular sources of information about the account were the
forums mentioned above.
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PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON PROJECT PRIOR TO AUGUST 2001
13.The Inquiry has referred me to a document, which is an ISC Paper for the Large
Projects Division from around September 2001 (FUJ00115991). It has asked what the
“major problems” with the Pathway project referred to in that document were and why
they were seen as “behind” Fujitsu at the time.
14. My understanding on reviewing the document is that the phrase “major problems” was
used to refer to (i) the tensions experienced between Fujitsu and Post Office Limited
(‘Post Office”) while the Horizon project still incorporated a “benefit card” element and
(ii) the difficulties encountered during the initial rollout of Horizon in 2000, including
delays and defects with the system. I was aware that there were difficulties in the initial
years of the Horizon project as many of the senior team I worked with were in the
business at that time. However, as I was not working for Fujitsu then, I am not able to
describe those difficulties any more specifically. Naturally, as the Department of Social
Services had left the Horizon project in mid-1999 and rollout had largely been
completed by the time I was COO, those issues would have been behind Fujitsu by
September 2001 when document FUJ00115991 was prepared (while the document is
not dated, see email from Tony Oppenheim to myself dated 2 September 2001
(FUJ001 15990) which records when the document was sent to me).
HORIZON SERVICE DISRUPTION IN Q1/Q2 2004
15.The Inquiry has drawn my attention to a number of service outages in Q1/Q2 2004
that impacted some Post Office branches’ ability to trade. Based on document Update
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Report for Event 574 dated 6 July 2004 (FUJ00116220) and Post Office Account, CS
Staff Briefing dated 6 May 2004 (FUJ00116221), related outages also appear to have
begun in 2003. I have no clear recollection of these outages. I note that FUJ00116220
states that the Post Office Account presented a corrective action plan to me and others
from the Post Office in October 2003, though I do not specifically recall it.
16. Based on the documents I have reviewed; I believe these outages were mostly due to
network or infrastructure performance issues and failures. For example,
FUJ00116221 notes there were “VPN issues” and FUJ00116220 primarily refers to
network issues in giving an account of the outages.
17.1 believe the outages may have been due to issues at some of the network suppliers
the Post Office Account was using at the time, and this is supported by the references
to Energis in FUJ00116220, who were a network supplier Fujitsu used on Horizon at
the time. However, given this incident was nearly 20 years ago, that is only a vague
recollection, and deficiencies in Fujitsu's operations and processes could also have
contributed to the outages.
18.1 note that on page 18 of FUJ00116221 and at pages 1 and 2 of FUJ00116220, there
are a number of criticisms of Fujitsu listed. While I do not remember this outage in
detail, the criticisms listed there accord with my recollection about the Post Office’s
view of Fujitsu at that time, and the criticisms were not considered unfounded by
Fujitsu at the time. In particular, I recall that, at the time, Post Office regarded us as a
reactive supplier rather than a proactive one — meaning that Fujitsu tended to react to
problems as they arose rather than planning for them in advance and suggesting
contingencies.
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19.As a result of certain of these outages, a red alert was raised in March 2004. The red
alert process in Fujitsu was designed to ensure that a severe performance issue was
recognised and taken seriously at all levels in the company and that the best technical
and other resources were mobilised as a priority to ensure the problem was addressed
as soon as possible. For example, FUJ00116221 refers to individuals from Fujitsu in
Japan joining the red alert team. A red alert could be declared by either Fujitsu itself
or a customer. It appears from document Minutes of a meeting of the Fujitsu Services
Management Committee of the Board of Directors of the Companies dated 9 June
2004 (FUJ00003575) that, in this case, Fujitsu declared the red alert in recognition of
the seriousness of the outages.
20.FUJ00116221 notes that I received daily updates about this issue during the red alert,
and a range of measures were put in place to resolve the issues. While I expect I did
receive such updates, I do not recall them or the specific measures listed in the
document that were taken to resolve the red alert. While I may have been briefed on
the measures taken, it is unlikely I would have been personally involved in defining
them.
21.My role was to support the Post Office Account in resolving the red alert, including by
ensuring appropriate resources were allocated and deployed from across the
business, monitoring the account's progress towards resolution, and ensuring work
on solutions for the red alert were appropriately prioritised by others in the business
or by external suppliers. This role particularly involved helping to unblock difficulties
the account was facing in resolving the red alert, where those were escalated to me.
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HNG-X CONTRACT
The formulation of Fujitsu’s bid
22. During my tenure at Fujitsu, the company employed a bid review process that provided
governance for any ongoing bids throughout the entire life cycle of a bid (i.e. from the
decision whether to bid at all, to an eventual contract award). This was known as the
Customer Solution Life Cycle (“CSLC”). Fujitsu’s Business Assurance unit monitored
compliance with the CSLC.
23.1 generally attended key meetings which occurred under the CSLC process. This
included a “sign on” meeting, which reviewed potential bid proposals to determine if
the company would bid, and a “sign off’ meeting where completed bids were reviewed
and approved. I would not have been involved in the day-to-day running of bid teams.
My primary interest was to review bids so as to ensure that (i) the relevant proposal
was within Fujitsu’s capability and resources to deliver, (ii) estimates (e.g. as to time
and costs) had been appropriately reviewed and tested within the organisation, and
(iii) that the pricing was appropriate.
24.Having reviewed an email from Business Assurance to Justine Colley, Paul Lush &
Others (FUJ00116138), I recall that Steve Muchow had primary responsibility for the
HNG-X bid. I would have met him and others on the bid team at the meetings
described above, though I cannot now recall those meetings in detail.
25. My primary role in connection with the bid for the HNG-X project was to engage with
senior stakeholders at the Post Office to (i) assure them of Fujitsu’s commitment to
Horizon, and (ii) discuss how we could improve the relationship between Fujitsu and
the Post Office, specifically how Fujitsu could become more of a business partner to
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Post Office (rather than just an engineering supplier) and how Fujitsu could be more
proactive, rather than reactive.
26.Having reviewed document ICL Horizon Contract Renewal Bid Directive dated 21
February 2002 (FUJ00116126), I recall that I met Alan Barrie, who had a senior
commercial role at the Post Office, in February 2002 to discuss the bid. I attached
copy email, FUJ00151236 confirming the meeting. This meeting was primarily for me
to assure Alan that the Post Office would remain a priority for Fujitsu, that Fujitsu
would continue to “put its best foot forward”, and to discuss the relationship he wanted
to have as stated above. I do not recall us discussing any technical details about the
HNG-X project. I may have attended other meetings with Post Office employees, but
I do not recall those.
27.I have been asked specifically about the role of financial and costs considerations in
Fujitsu’s strategy to obtain an extension of the Horizon contract in 2005.
28.In relation to Fujitsu’s financial considerations, the objective was to aim for a
reasonable level of profit on all accounts, and for new business it was competing for.
While I was at Fujitsu, we generally aimed for a defined “hurdle rate” of profit. The
“hurdle rate” did not represent a hard and fast rule, but rather was a norm, based on
our understanding of market norms, to guide bid teams. The Post Office Account was
one of a number of large accounts while I was at Fujitsu. Its financial performance was
important to the company, alongside the performance of all accounts.
29. Having reviewed FUJ00116138 and FUJ00116126, I was reminded that reducing IT
costs was a significant factor to the Post Office in the bid for the contract extension.
Slide 4 of FUJ00116138 states that Post Office’s IT costs were running at 16% of their
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revenue. In that context, it appears to me that reducing IT costs would have been an
entirely natural and normal goal for the Post Office to have been looking at. My
recollection is that, even though costs were important, they did not dominate over
other priorities on service or design.
30.1 have been asked what other proposals or ideas Fujitsu considered as part of its pitch
to Post Office. While I was not directly involved in discussions about potential new
products, I believe Fujitsu may have discussed and considered various financial
services products that, at the time, we believed Post Office might be interested in
considering offering. However, I am unsure if this occurred during the bid or after the
contract for HNG-X was agreed.
The negotiations for the contractual extension in 2005
31.1 have been referred by the Inquiry to document Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2005 (FUJ00003673) and specifically
asked what “cost savings” are referred to on page 3 of that document. I do not recall
what particular cost savings were identified.
32.1 have also been referred by the Inquiry to document Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts Reported dated August 2005 (FUJ00003676) and Fujitsu
Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated November 2005
(FUJ00003587). I have been specifically asked about the effect of Post Office’s
proposed ownership direction on the proposal for HNG-X. While I recall this proposed
change of ownership direction within the Royal Mail Group, I do not recall the specific
impact it had on HNG-X. FUJ00003676 indicates that Fujitsu was considering an
alternative proposal given Post Office’s investment constraints. The same document
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explains that this involved “leverag[ing] the counter assets and only tak[ing] on tech.
refresh when absolutely necessary”. I surmise from reviewing the document that this
was a proposal to continue using existing hardware at the post office branch counter
for longer, and to update any new hardware less regularly. I do not recall if this
proposal was eventually accepted, or the impact it may have had on HNG-X.
Conclusion of the HNG-X Contract
33.Having reviewed the documents put to me by the Inquiry, I can see that the contract
to secure the extension of Fujitsu’s role on Horizon and the development of HNG-X
was signed around August 2006.
34. In document Major Account Review, Actions dated 7 March 2006 (FUJ00116310),
there is a reference to Post Office wanting to wait until 3 months after the contract
had been signed for external publicity of the agreement. That would have been their
prerogative as the customer. A “no publication” requirement was not an uncommon
request or requirement from customers. Many customers simply do not allow their
suppliers to publicise new contracts. This document notes that Post Office’s
“reasons are valid”, though I do not recall the specific reasons Post Office gave at
the time.
35. I understand from document Fujitsu Services Holding PLC, Letter of Comfort for Post
Office Ltd (FUJ00003648) and Fujitsu Services Limited Written Resolutions of the
Directors (FUJ00003649) that around the time the HNG-X contract was concluded,
Fujitsu Services Holdings PLC (Fujitsu’s parent company) issued a letter of comfort
(the “Comfort Letter”) to extend the provisions of an existing Deed of Guarantee
dated 31 December 2002 (the “Existing Guarantee”) to the new HNG-X contract. The
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Existing Guarantee document Varied and Restated Codified Agreement between Post
Office and Fujitsu (FUJ00000074) appears to guarantee Fujitsu’s performance under
the Horizon contract that was in place at that time. I do not recall the specific
commercial reasons why the Existing Guarantee was given to begin with. However,
the purpose of the Comfort Letter was to ensure that the Existing Guarantee would
remain in place to support the new contract arrangements. Failing to extend the
guarantee would have sent the wrong message to Post Office that the wider Fujitsu
group was no longer backing the Horizon project.
CHALLENGES WITH THE DELIVERY OF HNG-X
36. My recollection is that the main issue during the development of HNG-X was that
development took longer to complete than estimated and hence there were delays
compared to the original timetable. There may also have been some changes to the
requirements, which would have affected the timescales. While such delays were not
desirable, I also believe the delays were handled in an acceptable manner with Post
Office, as I do not recall them leading to a serious deterioration in our relationship with
Post Office at the time.
37.Having reviewed email from Alert Management Centre dated 20 March 2007 attaching
weekly report (FUJ00151238) and its attachment All Open Problems (FUJ00151239),
I note that the HNG-X project was on amber alert during 2007. While I recall receiving
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regular emails of this nature (which summarised open alerts around the company), I
do not recall this specific amber alert or any details about it.
38.The Inquiry has drawn my attention to document Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts dated November 2007 (FUJ00003702) which refers to
challenges on the HNG-X project in terms of “timeline and cost”. I do not recall what
these challenges were specifically, except for the issues around delays to the project
which I have mentioned above.
39.The same document also refers to “perception issues with the client”. Having read the
document, my recollection is that these particular perception issues did not relate to
the Horizon project. Rather, they related to a separate, relatively small stand-alone
project we undertook for the Royal Mail Group to install video screens at Royal Mail
sites to facilitate management communications. This project was run by the Post
Office Account. It did not go particularly well. I recall there were reliability issues with
some of the equipment.
40.1 have also considered document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major
Accounts dated February 2008 (FUJ00003708), which refers to (i) Post Office
introducing a number of changes which were putting timelines and target completion
dates at risk and (ii) service issues that occurred with the existing Horizon system in
December 2007. Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2008 (FUJ00003707), I am reminded
that Post Office did eventually accept that their new requests would have timing and
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cost implications. However, I do not remember the specific changes they proposed or
the service issues in December 2007.
41.The Inquiry has asked whether, in my view, HNG-X was fit for purpose when it was
signed off and rolled out. I understand that the HNG-X rollout took place in 2010, after
I had left Fujitsu. As such, I am not in a position to comment on that question.
42. Overall, reflecting on my involvement in the HNG-X project, my view is that the time
estimates we gave to deliver HNG-X should have been longer given the overrun that
occurred, so perhaps these should have been reviewed again at an early stage which
possibly may have identified the potential overrun risks. The delays were
disappointing as they had financial implications for both Post Office and Fujitsu, and
they also meant that Fujitsu had failed to meet Post Office’s expectations.
OPERATION OF HORIZON
43.1 have been asked what difficulties I recall occurred during the operation of Horizon
up to 2007. I recall there generally were issues with outages occurring too frequently.
Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Projects
Report dated February 2005 (FUJ00117424), I recall there were a number of Horizon
outages due to hardware failures on EMC disc arrays. This was a problem that
occurred on the Post Office Account and also on other accounts. According to
FUJ00117424, these issues in live service meant a red alert was raised on the Post
Office Account by around February 2005.
44.I have been asked whether I would have done anything differently in relation to
Horizon. It is difficult to say, given the length of time the programme went on for and
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the relatively limited nature of my involvement in the day-to-day operations of the
programme. I did believe at the time that the project was undertaken diligently and
professionally by a capable and knowledgeable team. Given the significance of the
project, it was always a priority for me to ensure that the Post Office Account was led
by a capable and experienced manager who was well-respected by Post Office and
within Fujitsu.
45.However, despite the acceptance and testing regimes that occurred for the Horizon
system, it seems clear, based on what I know now, that there were still serious errors
in the software and more could have been done to identify these and their impacts.
We could, for example, have undertaken additional technical and architectural reviews
of the system and its operation, either using our own technical resources from outside
the project, or by suggesting an independent third party review.
46.1 have been asked about the mechanisms available for Fujitsu to receive feedback on
how well Horizon was functioning. In my experience, as COO and CEO, I would
primarily receive feedback about Horizon (and the wider relationship with Post Office)
through management meetings and account reviews, occasional meetings with senior
Post Office employees, the red alert process, or reports on the Post Office’s customer
satisfaction (which I cover in greater detail below). I expect the Post Office Account,
through their day-to-day interactions, would have had a number of other methods of
getting feedback on how Horizon was functioning, including, for example, the
Helpdesk or any tools they had to monitor live service. However, I do not have any
specific knowledge of these.
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47. I have been asked by the Inquiry to provide a view on the point in time that Horizon
became “robust”. I do not recall the term “robust” being ordinarily used in the context
of evaluating the Horizon project, or any IT project, while I was at Fujitsu. I do not
believe it bears any special meaning in the IT context. The term “robust” is undefined
in the Request, and in the context of a large-scale IT project, it could have different
meanings.
48.In my opinion, whether a system is “robust” primarily depends on the customer's
expectation of the IT system. In my view, as long as there were outages, Horizon
could not be said to be a fully or entirely “robust” system, as it would periodically not
have been available. Based on my recollections and my review of documents while
preparing this statement, throughout the time I was at Fujitsu, the system had
fragilities due to its scale and the limitations of the network technology and
infrastructure at the time. The extent of any outage (in terms of duration and number
of branches affected), would affect how serious the issue was, but any unplanned
disruption was problematic.
49.1 cannot say exactly when Horizon became a robust system, but I have sought to
explain what I consider to be a robust system.
Secondments
50. My recollection is that secondments to customers were not common at Fujitsu. If they
were done, they would usually be to fill a technical skills gap at the customer, in
circumstances where the relevant individuals had to be within the customer's
organisation (rather than external contractors).
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51.The Inquiry has drawn my attention to document Fujitsu Services Management
Committee Major Accounts dated August 2006 (FUJ00003688), which mentions 15
Fujitsu employees who were seconded to Post Office. I do not recall the details around
this particular secondment, including whether it was a formal secondment where the
individuals seconded were legally employed by Post Office. I believe this secondment
may have been a long running one that started before I joined Fujitsu, but I do not
recall with certainty.
52.1 believe there were a few secondments of Fujitsu employees to the Post Office while
I was at Fujitsu, but I do not recall the exact number. I am not aware of the detailed
terms of these secondments. I expect this would have mainly fallen under the purview
of the Post Office Account.
Customer Satisfaction
53. Customer Satisfaction was measured periodically using a well-defined process known
as the Customer Satisfaction Interview Programme (“CSIP”). The relevant interviews
were undertaken independently of the account team by an external provider. This
process involved a number of customer representatives being asked to respond to a
detailed survey, providing narrative responses and numerical scores on Fujitsu’s
performance. I recall routinely receiving CSIP reports from major accounts, including
the Post Office Account. An example of a CSIP report that I received on the Horizon
project is document Fujitsu Services Customer Satisfaction Interview Programme
2007 (FUJ00151241).
54.In relation to the Horizon project, the customer who would have been involved in the
CSIP would have been Post Office and the respondents selected for interview would
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have been senior individuals at Post Office who worked directly with Fujitsu on
Horizon. The CSIP would not have interviewed end-users of the Horizon system.
55. Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts
dated August 2007 (FUJ00003705), I note that the customer satisfaction score was at
a high of 9 in August 2007. I do not recall why the customer satisfaction score was
particularly high at that time.
56. However, I would note that I, and others in the senior executive team, would not be
misled by high scores in CSIP interviews. We recognised that scores did not always
tell the full story regarding customer satisfaction. We would need to consider the
respondent's statements in the report, the actual performance of the account, and any
other feedback provided by the customer.
REFLECTIONS
57.1 have been asked by the Inquiry who I think is responsible for the Post Office scandal.
I can only approach that question from a position of limited information and knowledge.
While I am aware many sub-postmasters were wrongfully prosecuted and convicted
in reliance on data from the Horizon system, the information I have on the scandal is
limited and informed mostly by recent press reports. As such, I do not believe I am in
a position to properly form an informed view on who bears responsibility for the
scandal.
58. Notwithstanding my observations in the paragraph above, and so as to assist the
Inquiry as far as possible, I will attempt to respond to the question that has been put
to me as best as I can. It appears to me that, based on the limited information I am
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aware of currently, there must have been failings (i) at the Post Office, which actually
prosecuted sub-postmasters wrongly, and (ii) at Fujitsu, which designed the system
that supplied the data used in court cases. I am aware, from the public reports about
the overturning of various sub-postmasters’ convictions, that the data that was used
to support prosecutions and other cases against sub-postmasters was flawed. While
no major IT system can be entirely free of bugs or errors, the data used to prosecute
or bring cases against sub-postmasters should have been comprehensively checked
for reliability and accuracy. It appears now that may not have been properly done by
the individuals who were involved with and had responsibility for cases against sub-
postmasters at the time.
59.1 am really very sorry personally about what has happened to so many people, and
for the part I and the company I worked for in a senior role had in this.
Statement of Truth
16th May 2023
Dated:
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INDEX TO THE FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID COURTLEY
Exhibit URN Document Description Control No.
No.
1. FUJ00003534 Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu Services POINQ0009705F
Management Committee
of the Boards of Directors of Fujitsu Services
Holdings PLC, Fujitsu Services Limited and Fujitsu
Services (Investments) Limited (the “Companies”)
dated 20 August 2002
2. FUJ00151237 Fujitsu Operational Structure chart (undated) POINQ0158086F
3. FUJ00115869 Fujitsu UK Organisation Structure Chart dated April I POINQ0122040F
2004
4. FUJ00115875 Fujitsu Services Organisation Structure Chart POINQ0122046F
dated 2005
5. FUJ00115890 Fujitsu Services Organisation Chart POINQ0122061F
6. FUJ00116308 Account Review of Post Office & Royal Mail Group I POINQ0122479F
dated 31 January 2007
7. FUJ00115991 Large Projects Division — ISC paper POINQ0122162F
8. FUJ00115990 Email chain between David Courtley and Tony POINQ0122161F
Oppenheim with subject “Reviews of the ICL Large
Projects (PFls)” dated 2 September 2001
9. FUJ00116220 Report titled “Update Report for Event 574” dated 6 I POINQ0122391F
July 2004
10. FUJ00116221 Presentation titled “Post Office Account, CS Staff POINQ0122392F
Briefing” by Martin Riddell dated 6 May 2004
11. FUJ00003575 Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu Services POINQ0009746F
Management Committee
of the Boards of Directors of the Companies dated
9 June 2004
12. FUJ00116138 Email chain involving FSL Business Assurance and I POINQ0122309F
others with subject “Post Office Group BNB
Review’ dated 11 April 2002
13. FUJ00116126 Horizon Contract Renewal dated 21 February 2002 I POINQ0122297F
14. FUJ00151236 Email note from the secretary of Alan Barrie, with POINQ0158085F
subject “Dinner with Alan Barrie and lan Miller
(Parity) re future relationship between PO and ICL”
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15. FUJ00003673 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009844F
Accounts Report dated May 2005
16. FUJ00003676 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009847F
Accounts Report dated August 2005
17. FUJ00003587 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009758F
Accounts Report dated November 2005
18. FUJ00116310 Fujitsu Major Account Review dated 7 March 2006 _I POINQ0122481F
19. FUJ00003648 Fujitsu Services Holdings PLC Letter of Comfort for I POINQ0009819F
Post Office Limited dated August 2006
20. FUJ00003649 Written Resolutions of the directors of Fujitsu POINQ0009820F
Services Limited dated August 2006
21. FUJ00000074 An agreement (guarantee) between Post Office POINQ0006245F
Limited and Fujitsu Services (Pathway)Limited
dated 28 July 1999
22. FUJ00151238 Email from Alert Management Centre to Allen Guy I POINQ0158087F
and others with subject “Alert Management
Summary - 20th March 2007” dated 20 March 2007
23. FUJ00151239 ‘I Attachment to POINQ0158087F (above) titled “All I POINQ0158088F
Open Problems” (undated)
24. FUJ00003702 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009873F
Accounts Report dated November 2007
25. FUJ00003708 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009879F
Accounts Report dated February 2008
26. FUJ00003707 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009878F
Accounts Report dated May 2008
27. FUJ00117424 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0123595F
Projects Report dated February 2005
28. FUJ00003688 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQO009859F
Accounts Report dated August 2006
29. FUJ00151241 Fujitsu Services Customer Satisfaction Interview POINQ0158090F
Programme dated 14 November 2007
30. FUJ00003705 Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major POINQ0009876F
Accounts Report dated August 2007
Page 22 of 22